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
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A

# HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY

THE RIGHT REV. CONNOP THIRLWALL,

LORD BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II



NEW-YORK:

PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS,  
No. 82 CLIFF-STREET.

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1845.





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# HISTORY OF GREECE.

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

### FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS TO THE END OF THE WAR BETWEEN SPARTA AND OLYNTHUS.

THE position in which Sparta was standing at the end of the Peloponnesian war was so strong and commanding, that only a little moderation and prudence on her part seemed to be wanting to secure her dominion over Greece, and the general tranquillity, for a long course of years. Yet not many, as we have seen, had passed before she found herself engaged in a new struggle, which at one time threatened her safety, and, even when most prosperously conducted, added little to her glory, and did not compensate by any solid advantage for the sacrifices which it required. It is not easy to determine how far this result must be ascribed to errors of policy committed by the Spartan government, or to causes which it could not control, or to the nature of the Constitution, which every year changed the officers of state who had the principal share in the administration of affairs. But after making full abatement for unavoidable adverse circumstances, it can hardly be questioned that the Spartans were too much elated by success, that they overlooked the bounds of a reasonable ambition, and neglected the steps and the instruments by which they had risen to their lofty station. Their treatment of Athens was clearly injudicious. The obligation conferred by their resistance to the wishes of their allies, who proposed the harshest exercise of the rights of war against their fallen enemy, was cancelled by the sanction afterward given to the atrocities of the Thirty; and all the benefit that might have been derived from the support of that odious government was thrown away by the lenity which permitted its overthrow; yet in such a manner as neither to excite any feelings of gratitude, nor even in any degree to weaken the impression of their previous hostility, which was shortly after renewed and confirmed by the ungenerous exaction of the loan by which they had endeavoured to avert the revolution. This unwise fluctuation was, indeed, the effect of a struggle between parties at home; but it seems to have been assumed by all parties that it was impossible Athens should ever again become formidable, and that she might safely be either trampled on or restored to independence.

The war undertaken on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks seems to have been in itself a politic as well as an honourable measure. But the Spartan government appears not to have formed a clear view of its own designs, or to have been blinded by inordinate ambition to the danger as well as the difficulty of its enterprises. The war, so long as it was confined to the object of protecting the Asiatic colonies, might have been both safe and useful to Sparta; but even for this purpose it was necessary that she should not at

the same time have been embarrassed by a contest in Greece; and when the views of her commander were enlarged to the conquest of Asia, it became time to consider whether, even if the resources of Sparta were adequate to this end, it could be accomplished without the ruin of her institutions. There was evidently some miscalculation at the outset of the expedition of Agesilaus, since it was found necessary to recall him in the midst of his triumphs; even if Sparta did not involve herself in the unseasonable quarrel with her old allies, which broke out in the Corinthian war, through her own imprudence. How far this was the case, depends on a question which we cannot now determine. It is not clear whether the animosity of Thebes was wholly provoked by the conduct of the Spartan government, or may rather be attributed to political changes, which arose at Thebes immediately on the close of the Peloponnesian war from other entirely unknown causes. But at least we can hardly acquit Sparta of an excessive confidence in her own strength, when we see her needlessly braving the united hostility of the principal powers to which she owed her success in her recent conflict with an enemy, who, though humbled and weakened, was neither conciliated nor subdued.

The peace of Antalcidas, though it did not restore to Sparta all that she had lost in the preceding interval subsequent to the Peloponnesian war, placed her in a situation in some respects more advantageous than that which she stood in at the beginning of this period. Athens, indeed, was no longer a subject existing only by sufferance of her sovereign, but was once more an independent and powerful state. She was, however, confined almost entirely to her natural resources, and forbidden to aspire to imperial rank. Thebes was irrecoverably lost as an ally. The injuries she had suffered were so deep that it was scarcely possible the breach between her and Sparta could ever be amicably healed, or that a party favourable to the Spartan interests could ever prevail there so long as the state retained its independence. But the injury had disarmed the animosity which it provoked. Thebes was no longer anything more than the first of the Boeotian cities, and was surrounded by implacable and vigilant enemies, all connected by the firmest ties of interest with Sparta. Peloponnesus, now that Corinth was restored to the aristocratical party, was more than ever at the beck of her ancient mistress, who thus saw herself without a rival in Greece; and so long as her views were confined to this range, the Persian alliance, though less honourable, was likely to be more useful to her than that of the Asiatic Greeks. Xenophon, indeed, would appear grossly to have deceived himself, or to have endeavoured to mislead his readers, if he meant to assert that Sparta had acquired any additional glory by the peace of

Antalcidas;\* but if his expression, as it seems it may do, only imports that her state was rendered much more flourishing by this transaction, his remark was undoubtedly true.

Nevertheless, her new position, as we have already observed, was an artificial and precarious one. What had been done was to dissolve the power of Greece nearly into its first elements. These elements might be again combined together, and directed against Sparta. The single legitimate object of her policy was to keep them disunited, and as far as possible subservient to her. But both vigilance and moderation were necessary for this end. Her power would be the more stable the less it was felt. Every case in which it was wantonly and oppressively exercised, tended to spread general alarm, and to rouse a spirit of resistance, which could not long want means and opportunities. But the Spartan government was again blinded by ambition and resentment, and was tempted by the prospect of immediate advantage to sacrifice all that it had gained by the peace of Antalcidas.

A cautious policy would have dictated the expediency of at least covering all acts of aggression with some pretext derived from the character which Sparta assumed of conservator of the peace. But her very first measure was one for which she did not plead any pretence but her own interests or vindictive feelings, and which must have given the greater umbrage, as it was avowedly the beginning of a series of retaliations, by which she proposed to chastise those of her allies who had offended her during the war. The first victim selected as an example of this system was Mantinea, which was obnoxious on account of her democratical constitution and her attachment to Argos, and had not disguised the reluctance with which she had hitherto served the Spartan cause. It may be remembered that, after the destruction of the mora, Agesilaus made a forced march past the walls of Mantinea, to spare his troops the mortification of witnessing the joy which he expected to see expressed there at the recent disaster. But it seems that the only overt act of hostility which could be alleged against the Mantineans was, that they had supplied Argos with corn during the war. The other grounds of complaint were still slighter, and more difficult of proof; that they had sometimes evaded their share of service in the Spartan army, under false pretexts, and had discharged its duties with manifest ill-will. These, however, were considered at Sparta as reasons sufficient to justify the demand that the Mantineans should throw down their walls; and when they refused to give this pledge of obedience, preparations were immediately made for invading their territory.

This invasion, however contrary to the spirit of the peace of Antalcidas, does not appear to have violated the Greek international law; for a truce which had been concluded for thirty years between the two states after the battle of 418, had, at least according to the Spartan calculation, expired. Yet it seems as if Agesilaus did not approve of the expedition; for he obtained leave to decline the command on a

plea which can scarcely have been more than a pretext. The Mantineans had rendered important services to Sparta in the last Messenian war, which had been conducted by his father, Archidamus; and he affected to consider this as an obligation conferred on his family. It might have been thought that if such an excuse was admitted, the threatened hostilities ought to have been withheld on the same ground. Agesipolis, however, took the command, though his father Pausanias was connected by ties of personal friendship with the chiefs of the democratical party at Mantinea, against whom the blow was especially aimed; for the destruction of the walls would have placed them at the mercy of Sparta, and consequently of their political adversaries. We learn through Diodorus, that they applied to Athens for succour, but without effect. This is less surprising than that Sparta should have sought and obtained aid from Thebes. This fact, indeed, is not mentioned either by Xenophon or Diodorus; but it is recorded by Plutarch,\* with details which seem to leave no room for doubt, for he relates that an engagement took place between the invaders and the Mantineans, in which the two great Thebans, whose names will soon become familiar to us, fighting side by side, narrowly escaped death. When we remember the disposition which prevailed at Thebes towards Sparta at the time of the treaty, we can hardly understand a proceeding which seems to imply a renewal of the ancient alliance; and we are left to a doubtful conjecture, whether at this time the fear which the Thebans entertained of the Spartan power was stronger than their resentment, or the party friendly to Sparta had recovered a temporary ascendancy. The battle, however, is also mentioned by Pausanias;† but Xenophon only relates that Agesipolis, finding that he could not shake the enemy's resolution by the ravages which he committed in their territory, proceeded to invest the city with a trench and a wall. The Mantineans prepared to sustain a siege; and as the last year's harvest had been unusually abundant, and the place was plentifully victualled, Agesipolis, dreading the cost and tediousness of a long blockade, resorted to a fresh expedient. The Ophis, a small stream, but at times swollen to a considerable size, flowed through the town, and Agesipolis, taking advantage of an extraordinary flood,‡ raised an embankment, by which he forced it back, and laid the low grounds at the foot of the adjacent walls under water. Their basements, as well as those of the houses, were built, as was usual throughout Greece, of unbaked bricks, and they soon began to crack and totter. It was, according to Pausanias, by a like device that Cimon made himself master of Eion on the Strymon. The besieged, however, still held out for a time, and propped up their sinking walls with wooden buttresses, and only sent an offer of submission when they found that the water was gaining upon them, so that longer delay would expose them to the horrors of a storm. But they were now informed that the conquerors would no longer be content with the razing of the walls; they required that Mantinea should cease to exist as a city, and that its population should be dispersed among

\* *Hell.* v., 1, 36, ο Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πολλὸ ἐπικυδοτερον ἐχόντων ἐκ τῆς ἐν Ἀργαλείῳ εἰρήνης καλουμένης.

\* *Pelop.* 4.

† *viii.*, 6, 7.

‡ *Diodor.* xv., 12.



the four villages out of which it had been collected in the capital.\* It was too late to dispute about any terms short of death or slavery; and the besieged capitulated. The popular leaders expected no mercy; but Pausanias exerted his influence with his son in their behalf, and they were permitted to go into exile. There were about sixty who took the benefit of this indulgence, and as they left the city along a road lined with the hostile troops, Agesipolis had some difficulty in sheltering them from the rage of their political enemies. The conditions were then executed. The aristocratical Mantineans, Xenophon observes, regretted the destruction of their houses, which put them to the expense of building new ones. But they were consoled for this loss by the power which they thus acquired in the villages near which their estates lay; and they cheerfully contributed their contingents to the Spartan levies. The Spartans affected to treat each village as a separate state, and on these occasions sent a different officer (a *xenagus*) to each to collect its forces.

The only remark which this transaction draws from Xenophon is, that the event might serve as a warning not to build a town so that a river should run through it. We do not know why he did not add the alternative, or to build the walls with more solid masonry. But it seems more important to observe that this attack on Mantinea was an act of mere open violence, and that, as Xenophon does not throw out any hint that it was sanctioned by the terms of the peace of Antalcidas, we have no reason to suppose that the Spartans themselves pretended to put such a construction on it.† Such a pretence would, indeed, have been too glaringly inconsistent with their declared motives; and it would have been difficult to show why, on the same principle, Tegea likewise was not dissolved into the nine hamlets of which it was originally composed. On the other hand, it seems that, by a liberal interpretation of the treaty, Platæa was held entitled to resume its place among the Boeotian cities. The remains of the ancient people returned from Athens and Scione to the glorious land of their forefathers, and rebuilt their walls. Whether Sparta permitted them to retain their connexion with Athens may perhaps be doubted.‡

The temper manifested by the Spartan government in these proceedings held out encouragement to every party throughout Greece which was discontented with the state of things at home, and desired a change consistent with the interests of Sparta, to address itself to her for assistance. The first application was made by the exiles of Phlius, who now hoped to be restored to their native city. They seem to have belonged to the same party which we mentioned as in banishment from Phlius, when we last

had occasion to notice the affairs of that little state;\* for that was a party deemed to be so much attached to Sparta, that its adversaries had ground to fear that she might exert her power in their behalf. But it also appears to have been subsequently re-enforced by other exiled adherents of the same cause; for they claimed Spartan aid on the ground that, since their banishment, Phlius had ceased to contribute its contingents to the armies of the confederacy, and had refused to receive the Spartans within its walls. The ephors were well disposed to comply with their wishes; but, though they no longer thought fit to exercise the forbearance which they had shown when the party now in power intrusted them with the citadel, they assumed an appearance of mildness and moderation which they had neglected in the recent case of Mantinea. Instead of an imperious demand, they sent a bland message, importing that the exiles were friends of Sparta, and had been guilty of no offence, and requested their recall as a favour. But after the example of Mantinea, the government of Phlius could not mistake the force of this gentle language; and it saw that its chance of successful resistance to the will of Sparta was the slighter, as the exiles had still left many kinsmen and friends behind them. It therefore thought it safest to yield with a good grace, and repealed the decree of banishment. By the same decree, however, their property had been confiscated, and it had been subsequently purchased by private persons. It now became necessary, for the sake of tranquillity, to restore it to its late owners; and the method adopted for the satisfaction of all the parties concerned was to refund the price to the purchasers from the treasury.† All disputes which might arise out of the conflict of old and new claims were to be referred to an impartial tribunal.

Though Xenophon gives no other instance of a similar interference, there may have been some foundation for the statement of Diodorus, who represents the peace of Antalcidas as the occasion of a general reaction in the states which had previously acknowledged the Spartan supremacy, attended with the banishment of many friends of Sparta who were afterward forcibly restored by her interposition.‡ But early in 382, the attention of the Spartan government was drawn towards a more important object by an embassy from the Chalcidian cities, Acanthus and Apollonia. Their envoys came to solicit protection against the power of Olynthus, which was threatening their independence. The Chalcidian cities, which seem from the first to have been linked closely together by their common origin and interests, had, as we have seen, been brought into a still closer union by their struggle with Athens. The issue of the Peloponnesian war released them from all control and apprehension with regard to their old mistress and enemy, and left them at full liberty to regulate their own concerns. But the struggle had begun with a great step towards the aggrandizement of Olynthus, which henceforth assumed the first place among them,

\* Vol. i., p. 162. So in 1162 the population of Milan was distributed by Frederic I. among four villages, which were to be upward of eight miles apart from one another. Diodorus (xv., 5) says that the Mantineans were made to migrate *εἰς τὰς ὀψυχὰς πόλιν κόμας*. But one of these was the site of Mantinea.

† We should, indeed, not have thought of it, if Wachsmuth (1, 2, p. 240) had not described Sparta as enforcing the terms of the treaty against Mantinea.

‡ To Wachsmuth, however (1, 2, p. 371), it appears unquestionable that they continued in a relation of isopoly to Athens.

\* Vol. i., p. 570.

† It does not appear that the arrangement was prescribed, as Manso represents (Sparta, iii., 1, p. 111), by Sparta. § xv., 5.

and in the year following the peace of Nicias, farther strengthened herself by the acquisition of Mecyberna,\* a port town only between two and three miles off. It was natural that with these advantages she should aspire to the rank of an imperial state, and it appears that, not long, at least, after the end of the war, she had succeeded in forming a confederacy among the kindred cities, of which she was acknowledged as the head. The terms which she granted to them would have been liberal if they had been cities of a different origin from her own. They were admitted to that kind of political connexion which the Greeks described by the word *sympolity*.† Their citizens enjoyed all the civil rights of citizens of the sovereign city. They were capable of acquiring property in land in the Olynthian territory, and of allying themselves with Olynthian families; but they were excluded from all the political privileges which were exercised in the Olynthian assembly, and were compelled to submit to the laws, and, it seems, also to adopt the Constitution of the ruling state. It was to be expected that several of the Chalcidian towns should prefer political independence to any advantages that might result to them from such a union with Olynthus, even if the state of parties created no grounds of discontent. If, as has been conjectured,‡ Apollonia was anciently considered as the capital of Chalcidice, her reluctance to submit to the sovereignty of Olynthus may be the more easily understood. She and Acanthus had resisted the demand, which the Olynthians had endeavoured to enforce by a threat of war, that they should join their forces to the army of the confederacy: and it was to avert the execution of this threat that the embassy was sent.

The power of Olynthus had recently received an enormous accession through a series of events, which, however, have been related but obscurely, and not without an appearance of contradiction. Amyntas, the prince to whom the Macedonian sceptre had now descended, had been defeated in battle by the Illyrians, and found himself for a time unable to maintain possession of his dominions. According to Diodorus, in his despair he made over a large part of them to Olynthus, which continued for some time to collect the revenues of the ceded territory, and when the king, having, by an unexpected turn of fortune, expelled his barbarian enemies, demanded it back, refused to restore it. Amyntas, notwithstanding his successes against the Illyrians, found himself unable to cope with the power of the Olynthian confederacy, and applied for succour to Sparta. Indeed, the language of Diodorus would lead us to conclude that his ambassadors accompanied those of the Chalcidian cities; but it is difficult to reconcile this supposition with the speech which Xenophon puts into the mouth of the Acanthian minister. This speech also gives a very different account of the transactions which had taken place between Amyntas and the Olynthians. It passes over the danger with which the king had been threatened by the Illyrians in total silence, and charges Olynthus with

an attempt—for which no motive or occasion is assigned—to engage the Macedonian towns in a revolt against their sovereign. This attempt, it is said, was begun upon some of the smaller towns which lay nearest to the Chalcidian border, and had been gradually pushed farther, until the king was expelled from his capital, Pella. The truth probably lies somewhere between these seemingly conflicting statements. Perhaps Amyntas, when his affairs seemed desperate, committed a part of his kingdom to the Olynthians, who may have taken advantage of their temporary possession to excite a desire for republican government at Pella and in other cities; and, when Amyntas claimed his deposits, may have supported them in open rebellion.

The Chalcidian envoys, after having stated these facts in an assembly which was attended by deputies from the principal states of the Peloponnesian confederacy, proceeded to rouse the jealousy of Sparta by a more exact description of the resources, prospects, and plans of her new rival. The force which Olynthus was already able to bring into the field was considerable, not less than 8000 heavy infantry,\* and a far greater number of targeteers, together with a body of not much less than 1000 horse. Potidæa had already acceded to the confederacy, and the towns of the adjacent peninsula might be expected soon to follow her example; for, notwithstanding their extreme aversion to the dominion of Olynthus, they stood in such awe of her power that they had not ventured to take any part in the embassy which was sent to plead the common cause. Several of the neighbouring tribes of independent Thracians had begun to pay court to her rising greatness, and their submission would be the more important, as the extension of her conquests in this quarter might lead to the acquisition of the gold district of Mount Pangæum. With a well-filled treasury, an overflowing population, and abundance of ship-timber, there was nothing to prevent Olynthus from becoming formidable by sea as well as by land. Her ambition kept pace with the growth of her power, and she was preparing to strengthen herself by an alliance with Thebes and Athens, which had already sent ambassadors to open a negotiation with her. But, though no time was to be lost, it was not too late for Sparta to interfere. If, indeed, the confederacy were suffered to last much longer, it would become so firmly cemented by mutual interest and habit, through intermarriages and the intermixture of landed property, that it might be very difficult to dissolve it. But, at present, many of its members were impatient of the relation into which they had been forced to enter with Olynthus, and would hasten to break it off as soon as they were assured of Spartan protection.

The Spartan government affected to leave the decision of the question to its allies; but its inclination to comply with the request of the Chalcidians was generally known, and many of the deputies were eager to pay court to it by

\* Thucydides, i., 39.

† Hell., v., 2, 12, ἐφ' ἧς τοῖς ἀντοῖς χρηθῶσι νόμοις καὶ συμπολιτεύειν.

‡ By Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, iii., p. 487.

\* The emendation δὲκατὰ χίλιον for δὲκατοσίον in Xen., Hell., v., 2, 14, seems absolutely necessary, as the former number exceeds the amount of the force mentioned by Demosthenes. De F. L., p. 425—in a passage where his argument leads him to rate the power of Olynthus at this period as low as possible—very much less than the latter number falls short of it.

anticipating its wishes. It was agreed to send an army of 10,000 men against Olynthus; and the influence of Sparta was no less manifest in the arrangements which were adopted for carrying this resolution into effect than in the proposition itself. The confederates were to be at liberty to commute the services of their contingents for money, at the rate of three Æginetan obols—five Attic—for the foot soldier, and four times as much for the trooper; and every city which withheld its contingent was to be liable to forfeit a stater a day for each man. The Chalcidian envoys, however, observed that the levying of this army would demand a considerable time, while their friends were in want of immediate succour; and that it would be better not to wait until the whole should be collected, but to send a smaller force—whatever troops were then ready to march—without delay, under a Spartan officer, whose presence would animate the wavering to resistance, and would shake the devotion of those who had already submitted to Olynthus. Accordingly, about 2000 Lacedæmonian troops were ordered to march forthwith under the command of Eudamidas, a Spartan of some influence; for at his departure he engaged the ephors to commit the division which was next to follow from Laconia to the charge of his brother Phæbidas. He himself proceeded, without lingering on the road, to the Chalcidian peninsula, where he was received at Potidæa, which he made his headquarters; and, notwithstanding the smallness of his force, he not only carried on hostilities against Olynthus, but was able to spare some of his men to garrison the other towns.

Not long after Phæbidas set out on his expedition; but he did not pursue his march without interruption. He stopped at Thebes, and encamped near the walls. His pretext for this delay was, perhaps, to obtain a re-enforcement from the city. But as it had so lately sent envoys to treat with the Olynthians, he can hardly have expected to succeed in this object, and we are therefore led to suspect a different motive. Diodorus\* may only have expressed a suspicion, which was naturally suggested by the ensuing events, when he described Phæbidas as acting upon secret instructions of the Spartan government. Xenophon speaks as if he had never heard of such a rumour; but as he assigns no reason for the stay in the neighbourhood of Thebes, even his account strengthens the probability that Phæbidas had been invited to this step by one of the Theban parties, though he may not have had a distinct view of its consequences. The old oligarchical faction, which was interested in maintaining the alliance with Sparta, as it had never been forcibly dislodged, had not been wholly deprived of its influence by the revolution which took place shortly after the close of the Peloponnesian war. It was still strong enough to procure the appointment of Leontiades, one of its adherents, to the high office of a polemarch, which seems to have possessed much larger powers than were exercised by the Athenian *strategus*. On the other hand, the adverse party swayed the popular assembly; and Ismenias, one of its leaders, was the colleague, or one of the col-

leagues—for the number is not certain—of Leontiades. The negotiation with Olynthus had no doubt been the work of this party, and it now carried a decree forbidding all Thebans to join the expedition of Phæbidas. Leontiades had from the first paid assiduous court to the Spartan general, whom his rival, Ismenias, totally neglected, and by degrees established himself in his confidence sufficiently to venture on a proposal full of risk to both. He offered to put him in possession of the citadel. This would convert Thebes from a jealous rival into a useful dependant of Sparta; its forces would immediately be at the disposal of Phæbidas for the main object of his expedition; and in the mean while he would have achieved a conquest far more important than that of Olynthus itself. Xenophon remarks—apparently to guard against the doubts which his readers might conceive as to the fidelity of his own narrative—that Phæbidas was a man who loved a brilliant exploit better than his life, but that he was not of a very calculating or cautious temper. He seems, indeed, to have embraced the offer without hesitation, and it was concerted between them that he should set forward as if on his march, for which he had already made preparations, but that, at the proper juncture, Leontiades should overtake him, and conduct him and his troops into the citadel. The day selected was the great festival of Demeter, the Thesmophoria, when the Theban women celebrated the mystic rites of the goddess in the Cadmea, as the citadel was called from its supposed founder, and the council, which commonly sat there, met near the market-place. In the stillness of a sultry noon, when the crowd, seeking shade and repose, had left the streets almost empty, Leontiades rode out after Phæbidas, who, immediately changing his line of march, followed his guide to the citadel, and took possession of it without opposition.

Leaving him there, Leontiades proceeded to the council, where Ismenias was transacting business; he bade the councillors not to be alarmed because the citadel was in the hands of the Lacedæmonians, who were not come with hostile intentions towards any of the peaceable citizens. But as the law empowered a polemarch to arrest any one who was chargeable with a capital offence, he should immediately exercise his authority, and commit Ismenias to prison, as guilty of stirring up war; then, without farther parley, he ordered some of his officers, whom he had either brought with him, or had stationed near at hand for the purpose, with some armed men, to seize the prisoner and convey him to the Cadmea. Diodorus speaks of an unsuccessful attempt made by the party of Ismenias to dislodge the enemy; but, according to Xenophon, they were struck with consternation by the surprise of the citadel, and, as soon as the arrest of Ismenias became known, about 400 of them quitted the city and took refuge in Athens. Ismenias was removed from his office, and Archias appointed in his room; and Leontiades then repaired to Sparta to obtain the sanction of the Spartan government for these proceedings.

They were, so far as the Spartan general was a party to them, a grosser breach of faith, and a more palpable violation of the treaty of

Antalcidas than had yet been witnessed. Accordingly, the intelligence was received at Sparta with an appearance of as much concern and indignation as Charles V. expressed at the violence offered by his generals to the pope. But when the conduct of Phœbidas came to be discussed, Agesilaus did not scruple to defend it with a freedom worthy of the boldest of the sophists. According to Xenophon, he distinctly laid down the principle that the case was to be tried by no other rule than that of expediency; if what had been done was against the interest of Sparta, Phœbidas deserved to be punished; if it was for the good of the state, he was not bound to wait for orders. The simple question was, whether they were gainers or losers by the transaction. Plutarch, with reason, considers this language as inconsistent with the professions of a high regard for justice which Agesilaus often had in his mouth; but it does not seem to afford any ground for suspecting that he was privy to the plot before its execution. As to the practical conclusion, all doubts—if any had been ever felt—were removed by the arguments of Leontiades. He reminded the Spartans of the hostility which Thebes had displayed towards them on every occasion since the close of the Peloponnesian war, and of the jealousy with which they had viewed her ascendancy in Bœotia. She had now ceased to be formidable to them, and, if they would but protect their friends, a scytlé would at all times be sufficient to procure whatever they wished from her. It was the bargain which they had made at Athens with the Thirty; and experience had not taught them that the gain was less clear than the dishonour. After their treatment of Mantinea, indeed, they might think that it would be folly to forego any advantage for the sake of their reputation. Their decision afforded a new and more signal confirmation of the assertion made by the Athenians in the conference at Melos: that "of all states, Sparta had most glaringly shown by her conduct, that in her political transactions she measured honour by inclination, and justice by expediency." But what gave a peculiarly Spartan character to this proceeding was, that while they determined to keep the fruits of iniquity, they assumed the office of avengers of wrong. They sentenced Phœbidas to a fine of 10,000 drachmas, and deposed him from his command; but instead of evacuating the Cadmeæ, they strengthened the garrison, and appointed Lysanoridas, with two colleagues, in the room of Phœbidas, and sent a commission composed of three Spartan judges, and of one from each of the confederate states, to sit in judgment upon Ismenias. The charges brought against him were, that he had accepted Persian gold, had devoted himself to the interests of the barbarian, and, together with Androclidas, had been a principal mover of the late war. With what success he defended himself against these allegations, does not appear. Xenophon thinks it enough to say, that he was unable to convince his judges that he was not a man of great and dangerous ambition; in other words, a formidable enemy to Sparta: he was therefore condemned and put to death. Archias and Leontiades, and their faction, remained masters of Thebes under Spartan patronage.

By this event, the Spartan government was both encouraged and enabled to prosecute the war against Olynthus with increased activity. A requisition was sent to all the cities of the Peloponnesian confederacy to furnish their contingents to the force which had been voted by the congress at Sparta, which, with the troops still due from Laconia, or as many as could be spared there, were placed under the command of Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaus, whose rank and personal reputation disposed the allies to engage with greater readiness in an expedition, which, considered with regard to their own interests, most of them must have viewed either with indifference or aversion. The new government of Thebes, in particular, displayed its gratitude to Sparta and its respect for Agesilaus by the zeal with which it contributed both infantry and cavalry for the purpose of subjecting another independent city to the dominion of Sparta. Teleutias, urging these levies with all his influence in the places which he passed through, while he maintained the best discipline among his troops, advanced with no great speed. But he sent notice of his approach to Amyntas, calling upon him to raise as many mercenaries as he could, and to engage the neighbouring princes by subsidies either to espouse his cause, or at least to remain neutral. He also sent to Derdas, prince of Elymia, representing the danger with which his principality was threatened by the ambition of Olynthus, and exhorting him to aid in repressing it. These applications were successful, and before he arrived at the theatre of war, he was joined both by a body of Macedonian troops, and by Derdas himself, at the head of about 400 Elymian cavalry. Thus re-enforced, he found himself strong enough to advance immediately against Olynthus. On his march from Potidæa through the Olynthian territory, he obtained from such ravages as might impede his retreat, but he met with no enemy till he had come up close to the walls, where the Olynthian army was drawn up to receive him. The cavalry charged his right wing, where the main body of his own was posted, with such vigour, that even the infantry began to give way; and a general rout would, perhaps, have ensued, if Derdas—whom Teleutias, to show his respect for so useful an ally, and his admiration of the fine condition of his men, had stationed in the left, which he himself commanded in person—had not made a movement towards the gates, which induced the Olynthians, through fear of being cut off from the town, to make a hasty retreat. In this they were very roughly handled by the Elymians, and their whole army sought shelter behind their walls. Teleutias reared a trophy, and on his return to Potidæa, ravaged the enemy's territory. This seems to have been the principal advantage he obtained in this campaign. At the end of the summer he dismissed his Macedonian and Elymian auxiliaries, and the Olynthians then began in their turn to make inroads on the allies of Sparta.

Early in the spring of 381, Teleutias was again joined by Derdas, who happened to have arrived at Apollonia only a few hours before a body of 600 Olynthian cavalry, in one of their marauding excursions, not aware of his presence, came up close to the gates. His appear-

ance, when he sallied forth with his horse, put them to flight, and he chased them back to Olynthus with a loss of eighty men. The Olynthians were now again nearly confined to their walls, and were able to cultivate but a small part of their territory; and somewhat later in the season Teleutias himself took the field, to renew and complete the devastations of the year before. As, however, he approached the town, the Olynthian cavalry came out to meet him, and even ventured to cross a river which separated them from the enemy. Indignant at their presumption, he hastily ordered Tlemonidas, the commander of his targeteers, to charge them at full speed. The Olynthians, seeing these troops advancing towards them, quietly retreated to the other side of the water, which the targeteers immediately forded; but before they had recovered from the disorder of the passage they were attacked and routed by the cavalry, and Tlemonidas himself was slain. At this sight Teleutias entirely lost his temper, and ordered a general charge of horse and foot, but in the heat of the pursuit he inadvertently approached so near the walls as to be within the range of the enemy's missiles from the battlements.\* This compelled him to fall back in some disorder, and the Olynthians took advantage of the favourable moment to sally out with their whole force and charge the phalanx. Teleutias himself fell; and after his death his army was entirely broken up, and fled, pursued with great slaughter, to the nearest friendly cities.

This disaster did not divert Sparta from her object; it only roused her to fresh exertions. It was now thought necessary to send one of the kings to conduct the war. It was, perhaps, known that the presence of Agesilaus would be required nearer home; and his colleague Agesipolis was appointed to take the command at Olynthus, with a council of thirty Spartans to supply the defects of his experience. He levied a considerable army of volunteers—at least of troops so called—from Laconia, and from several of the allied states, as well as supplies of money; on his march through Thessaly he attracted a body of cavalry into his service; and when he arrived in Macedonia, he was supported by Amyntas and Derdas with even greater zeal than they had hitherto shown. It seems, however, that he did not begin operations against Olynthus before the spring of the following year, 380, when he marched against the city without encountering any serious resistance, wasted its territory, and took Torone by storm. But in the midst of his successes he was seized with a fever, which, in the course of seven days, put an end to his life, at Aphytis, in the peninsula of Pallene, whither he had been conveyed at his own desire, to enjoy the deep shade, and the clear, cool waters, which he had observed near a temple of Dionysus. His body, immersed in honey, was carried home for a royal burial. Xenophon makes a remark on this occasion which is meant to excite our admiration for the magnanimity of Agesilaus, but which is, perhaps, more striking as an illustration of

the state of feeling which commonly prevailed between the two royal families at Sparta. Agesilaus, he says, instead of betraying any joy—as might have been expected—at the death of his rival,\* shed tears over the young man, whom he had always found an agreeable and respectful companion.

While Agesipolis was absent on his last campaign, Agesilaus had been employed in reducing another of Sparta's refractory allies to complete subjection. The exiles who had been restored to Phlius complained that their claims were not referred to an impartial tribunal; for none such, as they contended, was to be found in the city; and the adverse party would not submit to foreign arbitration. It rejected their demands with the greater confidence, as, having assisted Agesipolis with a liberal subsidy, for which it had received his thanks before his departure, it no longer felt any apprehension of Spartan interference. The exiles, however, applied to Sparta for redress, whether before Agesipolis set out on his expedition is not clear; but it seems to have been after his departure that the government of Phlius ventured to condemn their opponents, who had gone without a public commission to plead their cause at Sparta, to a penalty. This imprudent display of animosity furnished those who were soliciting the interposition of Sparta with fresh motives and stronger arguments, which were seconded by the influence of Agesilaus, who had some personal and hereditary connexions among the exiles. The ephors were induced to decree an expedition against Phlius, and Agesilaus himself took the command. On his march he was met by several deprecatory embassies from the party in power, with offers of money to purchase his forbearance. But he now remembered his ancient regard for justice, which he had forgotten in the case of Phœbidas, and declared, with great solemnity, that the object of his expedition was not to wrong any one, but to succour the oppressed. The envoys at length professed their readiness to make any sacrifice he required to avert the invasion. But he answered that promises from men who had already broken their compact with their fellow-citizens would not satisfy him; he must have some more solid security; and that which he insisted on was nothing less than the occupation of the citadel. As they refused to give him this proof of confidence, he proceeded to besiege their town. There were, however, several Spartans in the camp, who, not being biased by similar feelings in favour of the exiles, loudly expressed their disapprobation of an enterprise undertaken against such a place as Phlius, which was able to arm 5000 men, for the sake of a few individuals. To silence these murmurs, Agesilaus directed his Phliasian friends to give the most liberal reception to all their fellow-citizens who might be drawn by ties of blood or friendship to come out and join them;

\* Xenophon (Hell., v., 3, 5) observes, that this was a very common oversight; though he thinks proper to moralize on the indiscretion of Teleutias. It is surprising that Schneider should have been uncertain about the meaning of the sentence πολλοί—δυσχερής, where the tense so clearly marks a general reflection.

\* οὐκ, ὅς τις ἀνὴρ, ὅστις δὲ δυνάσται. Hell., v., 3, 90. Schneider, in his notes on v., 3, 16, 95, thinks that this refers to a quarrel which had arisen between the two kings on the subject of Phlius. But Xenophon affords no ground for this conjecture; and the rivalry between the two royal houses is sufficiently notorious. What Diodorus says, xv., 19, of the difference between the characters and views of the two kings, does not refer particularly to Phlius, and probably has no other foundation than the part taken by Agesipolis in the affair of Phœbidas.

to form them into companies, and provide them with arms and the means of military training; and, if their own funds were not sufficient, not to hesitate to borrow money for that purpose. In this manner a corps of refugees was raised, exceeding 1000 men: so well equipped and disciplined, that the remonstrants themselves admitted they could not desire more serviceable comrades.

Still, by dint of extraordinary abstinence, patience, and courage, the besieged held out for a year and eight months. They husbanded their stock of provisions with such parsimony as to make it last twice the time for which it had been calculated. Delphio, one of the leading men, with a band of 300 devoted followers, maintained order within, annoyed the enemy with frequent sallies, and repressed the disposition to surrender, which began to manifest itself as food grew scarce and hope faint. At length, however, early in 379, finding their provisions entirely spent, they were obliged to capitulate, and, probably expecting to obtain milder terms from the ephors than from Agesilaus, the personal friend of the refugees, they requested leave to send envoys with offers of unconditional submission to Sparta. Agesilaus, piqued at the slight thus put upon his own authority, granted a safe conduct to their ambassadors, but at the same time exerted all his influence to be appointed arbiter of the terms of peace, and in the mean while redoubled his precautions to prevent the escape of the besieged. Nevertheless, Delphio, and a slave who had often shown his dexterity in carrying away arms from the enemy's camp, contrived one night to elude the vigilance of the sentinels, and escaped. The rest received orders from Sparta to submit to such conditions as Agesilaus should dictate. His edict was, that 100 commissioners should be chosen, one half from the refugees, the other from the besieged,\* with power to put to death or banish as many of their fellow-citizens as they would, and then to frame a new Constitution; and, before he marched away, he lodged a garrison in the citadel, with pay for six months, to remain until this business should be accomplished. It is to be hoped that as much regard to equity was shown in the selection of the commissioners as in the nominal proportion assigned between the opposite parties. Xenophon does not mention the immediate result; but the permanent effect was to render Phlius a devoted vassal of Sparta.

In the course of the same year the Olynthian war was brought to a close by Polybiades, who had been appointed to the supreme command after the death of Agesipolis, and pressed the Olynthians by sea and land, until they were reduced by famine to sue for peace. It was granted on no harder condition than that they should become members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, on the same footing of subjection to Sparta with the rest. The importance of this event could not be duly estimated at the time. It was, probably, considered at Sparta

as a glorious triumph; and those who viewed it with different feelings were equally unable to perceive how pregnant it was with calamities both to her and to Greece.

#### CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE END OF THE WAR WITH OLYNTHUS TO THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA.

Thus, by a vigorous and dexterous use of the advantages which she gained from the peace of Antalcidas, Sparta had advanced some steps nearer than she had ever been before to a complete subjugation of Greece. If her old rival had now recovered her independence, Thebes was reduced to a state of subjection like that in which Athens had been held by the Thirty. Within the Peninsula the hostility of Argos was counterpoised by the attachment of the newly-restored Corinthian oligarchy; and the fate of Mantinea and of Phlius struck the smaller states with awe. The acquisition of Olynthus raised her reputation no less than it immediately strengthened her power. To one who considers the dangers—at this time completely veiled from human foresight—which really impended over the liberty of Greece, the establishment of the Spartan dominion may seem to have been, as at least the lighter evil, a desirable event. Such it would certainly have been if it could have been effected so as not to excite irritation and alarm; but the causes which made the Spartan ascendancy generally odious rendered it also insecure. Pleas might be found for the proceedings against Phlius, and Mantinea, and Olynthus; but the seizure of the Cadmea was so glaring an act of injustice, that even at Sparta, according to Xenophon, no attempt was made to defend it, except on the score of expediency. It was, probably, some consolation to Spartan pride to ascribe the reverses by which it was soon after deeply humbled to the anger of the gods; and Xenophon directs the attention of his readers to the manner in which Sparta fell from her most palmy state to one of degradation unexampled in her history, as a signal proof of a superintending Providence. Thebes, which had suffered the wrong, was chosen as the instrument of divine wrath for punishing the guilty.

But though we would not neglect the moral and religious side of the subject, there are some others which it will be fit to notice, and which Xenophon appears studiously to have kept out of sight. Thebes at this time possessed two great men, not, perhaps, the first or the last whom she produced, but the only ones whom the course of events permitted to take a prominent part in the affairs of Greece. These two men were not more conspicuous for their personal qualities than for the mutual attachment by which they were united, notwithstanding a dissimilarity amounting almost to a contrast in their characters and circumstances. Pelopidas was of noble birth, inherited an ample fortune, and enlarged his connexions by an honourable marriage. He was wholly possessed with an ardent desire of action and glory, conscious of abilities equal to the loftiness of his aims, and valued the advantages of his rank and wealth

\* *τῶν αἰσίων*. Plass (iii., p. 588) interprets this expression to mean *Spartans*, apparently without either grammatical or historical grounds. By a still stranger oversight, he calls Delphio a *native of Delphi*, though he is described by Xenophon not only as *Δελφίων τις*, but simply as *Δελφίω*.

only as they might be subservient to a generous ambition, in which his own elevation was not distinguished from his country's greatness. His friend Epaminondas was of a nature formed rather for contemplation than for action, and highly cultivated by philosophical studies; but it was also one which found a sufficient impulse to the most strenuous exertions in the light which his philosophy threw on his duties as a man and a citizen. He was, it seems, of a good family, but was bred and lived in poverty—not merely relative to his birth and station, but real and absolute as that of Socrates; but, as it did not exclude him from the best society, nor from any opportunity of serving the state, he appears to have reckoned it as one of the favours of fortune which kept him free from useless encumbrances. His mind had been chiefly formed by his intercourse with Lysis, one of those Italian Greeks who preserved and unfolded the doctrines of Pythagoras, and who were induced by some causes, which are now only matter for conjecture, to fix their residence at Thebes.\*

The arrival of these learned emigrants would have been an event of no slight importance if it had produced no other effect than that of moulding the character of Epaminondas. But it seems probable that it was attended with consequences much more extensive, and that it contributed not a little to that great turn in the affairs of Greece which we are now about to relate. We collect from Plutarch's work on the Genius of Socrates that these Pythagoreans diffused a general taste for philosophical pursuits among the Theban youth. One tendency of these new intellectual habits may have been to soften the Theban prejudices against Athens, now the central seat of literature and philosophy, and thus to prepare for the hospitable reception of the Athenian exiles, which, in its turn, may be supposed to have given a fresh impulse to liberal studies at Thebes; and this was an excitement which must have rendered those who shared it the more impatient of Spartan domination, and the more indignant at the treachery by which Thebes had been subjected to it. The violence of Sparta probably united many Thebans in the cause of liberty whose political sentiments might otherwise have kept them wide apart. There is no reason for thinking that the exiles who took refuge at Athens after the seizure of the Cadmea were, in general, partisans of democracy. Among them were several men of the highest rank, including almost all who had filled the high office of *hipparchus*, or master of the horse, which, at Thebes, seems to have been invested by the old aristocratical institutions with somewhat of a religious, as well as a military and civil character. But whatever may have been their previous opinions, they were now naturally led to consider the independence of Thebes as intimately connected with the establishment of popular government.

Pelopidas and Epaminondas were attracted towards each other by the secret sympathy of kindred natures; that it was no accidental

cause which cemented their friendship was proved by the invariable constancy with which it maintained itself through the course of a highly agitated public life, in which less congenial spirits would have found abundant motives for jealousy and discord. They had served together in the Theban division which had been sent to support the Spartan invasion of Mantinea,\* and had fought side by side in the engagement which has been already mentioned as having taken place before the siege of that city. Their line had partially given way, and they were almost surrounded by the enemy. Pelopidas fell, pierced with wounds, and Epaminondas, though he believed him to be dead, continued to shield his body until he himself, having received several wounds, was nearly overpowered by superior numbers, when Agesipolis came up to his relief. But this occurrence might rather be considered as an indication of the friendship established between them than as its foundation, or as the occasion from which it derived much additional warmth. Epaminondas is said to have been the only one among the friends of Pelopidas whom he could not prevail on to accept pecuniary assistance from him. Pelopidas, on the other hand, emulated his friend's poverty in the simplicity of his own habits, though he took no interest in his philosophical pursuits, but, after the old Theban fashion, gave his leisure to field sports and athletic exercises.

On the seizure of the citadel, Pelopidas joined the fugitives, and accompanied them to Athens. Epaminondas remained at Thebes, probably not because his feelings were undecided, nor because he thought himself secured from jealousy by his poverty or his philosophy, but because he conceived that to be his proper post where he had the best prospect of preventing violence and bloodshed. He and his family kept up a secret correspondence with the refugees, who were burning with impatience to return and take vengeance on the traitors, and were stimulated with fresh eagerness by all the accounts which they received of their proceedings. Leontiades and Archias were men of very different characters; but their opposite qualities seem to have concurred to aggravate the burden and the shame of the tyranny—Xenophon himself uses the word—which they exercised with the aid of the foreign garrison. Leontiades was an active and vigilant party leader, who devoted his whole attention to public affairs, and found constant occupation in providing for the security of his government. For the designs of the exiles were suspected, and it was known that they had left many friends behind them who would be ready to aid them; and it was his chief care to repress such attempts from without by caution and severity at home. Archias was a man of voluptuous habits, who desired power as an instrument of sensual indulgence. He quailed, indeed, before his more vigorous and austere colleague, but still was able to gratify his passions with the dishonour of the most reputable families. It was probably such provocations, rather than any encouragement which they received from

\* Boeckh (*Philolaus*, p. 10) thinks they may have been descendants of the exiled Corinthian Bacchiadae, and have been induced to settle at Thebes, as the city which had given shelter to Philolaus, of whom the reader will find some account, vol. i., p. 166.

\* Not, as Plam (ii., p. 600) misinterprets Pausanias, ix., 1, 1, to the aid of Mantinea, which would contradict instead of confirming Plutarch's account.

the state of affairs, that, towards the end of the year 379, ripened the wishes of the Theban exiles into a plan for the recovery of their city. The events of the year, indeed, were such as might otherwise have deterred them; but they seem to have relied on the general eagerness of the population of Thebes to shake off the degrading yoke, and perhaps had received promises of support from their well-wishers in Athens. It is possible that their movements may have been accelerated by the efforts which their adversaries made to counteract them. Leontiades had sent private emissaries to Athens for the purpose of taking off the foremost of the refugees by assassination. But the meditated blow only reached Androclidas, and served to put the rest on their guard. The Spartan government then endeavoured, by an imperious mandate in the name of the confederacy, to induce the Athenians to dismiss their Theban guests. But Athens now required the hospitality shown to Thrasybulus with similar firmness in resistance to this demand.

Pelopidas was, it seems,\* the first to form the resolution of exposing his life in a bold attempt for the common cause. But he easily found associates, among whom were several men of the first Theban families, eager to share the danger with him. They communicated their design to their friends at Thebes; and Epaminondas was urged to lend his aid to it. But he was restrained by scruples—not, perhaps, simply of natural humanity, or even of philosophy, but rather arising out of his Pythagorean religion—from engaging actively in an enterprise which could only be executed by means of a tumult, in which it was likely that some innocent Theban blood would be shed. He would not, it seems, have hesitated to punish the traitorous tyrants without any legal forms; and he could have depended on the calmness and moderation of Pelopidas; but among the partners of his project were some men of more fiery temper or less scrupulous character, who, it was to be feared, might seize the occasion to revenge themselves on their personal enemies.† He therefore thought it most becoming to await the issue, and not to come forward until he saw a clear opportunity of promoting the public good without becoming a party to any private wrong. He even dissuaded his friends from the enterprise: whether he proposed any other mode of accomplishing its object does not appear; but we are informed that he endeavoured to excite the self-confidence of the Theban youth, and encouraged them to try their strength with the Lacedæmonians of the garrison in gymnastic exercises, in which they had commonly the advantage, as a prelude to more serious conflicts. His brother Cephisias, however, was not checked by the like scruples, but entered with ardour into the undertaking. But the most important confederate of the party at Thebes was Phyllidas,

who, according to Xenophon, having been sent on some business to Athens, instigated the exiles to the attempt, and yet had so completely concealed his sentiments from the government at home that he filled the post of secretary to the polemarchs, and insinuated himself into the especial favour of Archias by a show of willingness to pander to his lust.

A day was at length fixed for the attempt, and it was concerted that the main body of the exiles, headed by Pherenicus, should post themselves in the Thriasian plain—or, perhaps, should slowly advance from Eleusis towards the border—while a small party—twelve, according to Plutarch, but according to Xenophon no more than seven—among whom Pelopidas, Mellon, Damoclididas, and Theopompus were the most conspicuous for their rank, if not for their zeal, should make their way into Thebes, and join their associates there. Two of the Athenian generals, presuming, it seems, on the approbation of the people, and apprehending that to procure a formal decree for the purpose would defeat the plan by publishing it to the enemy, undertook, on their own authority, to march with an Athenian force to the frontier, and there to remain in readiness to succour their friends, as occasion might require. Pelopidas and his companions assumed the garb of hunters, and when they reached Mount Cithæron, despatched a messenger to Thebes to announce their approach, and to make arrangements for their reception.\* Charon, one of their most resolute partisans, offered his house as a hiding-place for them, and a rendezvous for all the conspirators, and their messenger returned to give them the necessary directions. In the mean while Phyllidas, in expectation of the event, had appointed the same evening for a banquet, which he was to give to Archias and Philippos, one of his colleagues, under the pretext either of a public festival,† or of celebrating the termination of their year of office, which was now near at hand. And he had promised Archias that he would endeavour, towards the close of the entertainment, to procure the presence of some Theban matrons. But as Leontiades would not have approved of such proceedings, Archias had desired that he should not be invited to their orgies.

The success of the enterprise depended very much on the promptitude with which it might be carried into execution. The rumours which had reached Thebes of a plot against the government had alarmed the Spartan harmosts; and their anxiety seems to have been increased by some accounts which they received of sinister omens and prodigies that had been lately observed. Lysanoridas had even been induced to set out for Haliartus on the very day appointed for the arrival of the exiles, to perform some propitiatory rites enjoined by a Theban soothsayer who was in the plot. The forces of Thebes were ordered to be kept in readiness for marching whenever the Spartan com-

\* According to Plutarch (Pel., 8), whose authority in this matter we prefer to Xenophon's, who not only represents Mellon as the author and leader of the enterprise, but omits the name of Pelopidas altogether in his account of it: a silence which speaks too much against himself, though it certainly refutes Diodorus, who (xv., 81) says of Pelopidas that all writers agreed in ascribing the chief merit in the recovery of the Cadmeæ to him.

† Plutarch, De Gen. Soc., 3.

\* Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat., 2.

† Schneider raises a question whether the Aphrodisia mentioned by Xenophon (v., 4, 4) is not to be taken figuratively. It seems very doubtful whether such a metaphor could have been used by Xenophon, and whether, if the banquet had only been given to celebrate the termination of the year of office, it would not have been postponed until the year had expired.



manders should send for them. But as the hour of action drew near, Hipposthenidas, one of the patriotic party at Thebes, began to be disheartened, and was struck with the seeming absurdity of the scheme, of dislodging the foreign garrison by the massacre of a few citizens. Without consulting any of his associates, he determined to put a stop to their enterprise, and despatched a man named Chlidon, who had been employed in Mellon's service, to prevent him and his comrades from pursuing their way. But the messenger himself was detained at Thebes by an accidental hinderance; and the little band of exiles, who, as soon as they had crossed Cithæron, took different roads, and thus more easily escaped notice, through the inclemency of the weather entered the city unobserved, and met safely in Charon's house, where they were joined by their partisans, until the whole number amounted to forty-eight.\*

They had not been long assembled before they were threatened with a new danger. A message came from Archias to summon Charon into his presence. It seemed probable that the plot had been discovered; and the recent pusillanimity of Hipposthenidas directed general suspicion against him as the informer. Charon obeyed the summons, with little hope that he should see his friends again, among whom he left his young son as a hostage for his own fidelity. He, however, returned, and informed them that Archias and Philippus, whom he found already much excited with wine, had heard that some of the exiles were concealed in the city, but the report was so vague that they had sent for Charon without any suspicion, merely to make inquiries on the subject. The confederates were soon after unconsciously exposed to still greater peril. Charon had not long quitted the presence of the polemarchæ, when a letter was brought to Archias from an Athenian of the same name, who was at this time hierophant, communicating to him almost all the details of the plot. Happily, the polemarch was now so heated and stupefied by the debauch, that when the bearer of the letter told him it related to important business, he laid it aside unopened, exclaiming, Let business wait until to-morrow; and expressed his impatience for the appearance of the female visitors whom Phylidas had led him to look for.

This was the moment chosen for the attack. Mellon and a few of his companions were at the door, disguised either as women or as revellers; and Phylidas, on pretence of respect for the delicacy of the matrons, had induced Archias to dismiss all the attendants. The conspirators were then admitted, and, after a short struggle, despatched Archias, Philippus, and the other guests. In the mean while Pelopidas, with Damocleidas and Cephisodorus, repaired to the house of Leontiades, which was already closed for the night. He himself was still reclining after a temperate meal, while his wife

was spinning by his side. With some difficulty they gained admission. He was roused by the noise in time to seize a weapon, with which he made a vigorous resistance, and slew Cephisodorus, but at length fell by the hand of Pelopidas. Having then closed the doors of the house, and threatened death to the inmates if they should open them, the survivors proceeded to that of Hypates, another leading member of the government, who lived close by. He made his escape, but was overtaken and despatched. Before the death of Archias and his colleagues was made public, Phylidas went to the prison, where a number of his friends were confined for political offences, and, having obtained entrance on pretence of an order from the polemarchæ, overpowered the jailers, and set the prisoners at liberty. They found arms in the public porticoes and the armorers' shops, and rushing through the streets, proclaimed the fall of the tyrants, and invited all Thebans to rise in the cause of freedom.\*

During the night the citizens, who did not know what to believe, remained quiet; but Hermippidas and Arceus, the colleagues of Lysanoridas, who were left in command of the citadel, hearing the uproar, sent for succours to Thespiæ and Plataea; and the insurgents despatched couriers to their friends in Attica. In the morning, as soon as the events of the night were fully ascertained, the people were called together, and Pelopidas and the other champions of freedom, among whom Epaminondas now took his place, entered the assembly in solemn procession, accompanied by the priests, who bore the sacred symbols of suppliants, and conjured the spectators to fight for their hearths and altars. The exiles were hailed with shouts of applause as the deliverers of their country; and Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon were placed at the head of the government with the title of Bæotarchs, which seems to have been meant to indicate that Thebes was about to resume her ancient station among the Bæotian cities. The whole military force of Thebes declared itself on the side of independence; and when it was known that a body of troops was on its way from Plataea to re-enforce the garrison, the Theban cavalry sallied forth to meet them, and dispersed them with some slaughter. In the course of this and the following day, the two Athenian generals, who were waiting with their forces on the frontier, marched into Thebes, and began to co-operate with their allies in the siege of the citadel. Xenophon says that the garrison was very weak, though other accounts make it amount to 1500, and even to 5000 men.† But the troops which composed it were probably, in general, but ill affected to the service: the assailants offered large rewards to the first who should scale the walls; and the Spartan commanders found themselves compelled to propose terms of capitulation, which were glad-

\* Yet Xenophon (v., 4, 3) describes the conspirators as passing a night and a day in their dangerous concealment before they struck the blow. If so, they were probably waiting for the entertainment to be given by Phylidas, which, according to Plutarch, as we have seen, took place on the day of their arrival. It is remarkable that Schneider, with the evidence of this discrepancy between the two writers before him, should observe "*De tempore consentit Plutarchus.*"

\* According to Plutarch, the attack on Archias, which was headed by Mellon, was simultaneous with that which was undertaken against Leontiades and Hypates by Pelopidas. And this looks the more probable account. But Xenophon, who seems anxious to prevent the reader from suspecting that Pelopidas had any share in the exploit, represents Phylidas—of course after the death of Archias—as leading the way first to the houses of Leontiades and Hypates, and then to the prison.

† Plut., De G. S., 33. But in Pel., 12, he says it amounted to 1500, exclusive of the Thebans who joined it.

ly granted by the besiegers. The garrison was allowed to march out with their arms; but several of the Thebans who had taken refuge among them were arrested and put to death by their exasperated countrymen, who, according to Xenophon, even wreaked their fury on the families of their victims. The Athenians, however, were humane enough to interpose, and succeeded in sheltering some from the vengeance of their enemies.

The news of the Theban insurrection was received at Sparta with the vexation which men commonly experience when they are deprived of the fruits of their injustice. It vented itself first on the harmosts who had surrendered the Cadmea.\* Hermippidas and Arceus were put to death before they returned home, and it seems with scarcely any form of trial, at Corinth; and Lysanoridas, likewise, as Plutarch leads us to suppose, in his absence, was condemned to a penalty so heavy as to be equivalent to a sentence of banishment.† The partisans of the tyranny, who were now in their turn driven into exile, roused the hostility of the Spartan government against the city which had so audaciously asserted its independence, and an army was ordered to march against Thebes. It was expected that Agesilaus would have taken the command, but he declined it on the plea that his age entitled him to exemption from foreign service. His real motive, Xenophon informs us, was, that he shrank from the reproach which he apprehended of involving his country in war for the support of an odious cause. His excuse was admitted, and his colleague, Cleombrotus, the brother of Agesipolis, was forced to conduct the expedition. He seems to have engaged in it with feelings not unlike those which his father had shown towards the Athenians in similar circumstances.‡ The road into Boeotia through Eleutheræ was guarded by Chabrias, the Athenian general, at the head of a body of targeteers. Cleombrotus therefore crossed the mountains by the pass above Platææ, which he found occupied by a small Theban force, consisting, according to Xenophon, of the liberated prisoners; but they were cut down almost to a man by his light troops. He remained encamped in the Theban territory about sixteen days, but so studiously abstained from committing any damage, that

his men were at a loss to understand whether they had been at war or at peace with the Thebans. On his return, he left Spodrias as harmost at Thespiæ, with a third part of the allied forces, and all the money he had brought from home, and directed him with it to enlist mercenaries in his service. He himself descended to the seacoast on the Gulf of Creusa, and, as he pursued his march along the mountain road towards the Isthmus, was assailed by a storm of wind so violent as to carry away a considerable quantity of arms and baggage with the beasts of burden into the sea. It was considered, Xenophon says, by some, as an omen of the impending political tempest.

The expedition of Cleombrotus, fruitless as it was with regard to the Thebans, seems to have made an impression at Athens which could not have been expected, and which it is difficult to explain. That the wishes of the people at large were strongly in favour of the independence of Thebes cannot be questioned, and, indeed, had been distinctly declared when Chabrias was sent to guard the pass of Eleutheræ. Nevertheless, after the return of Cleombrotus, the two generals who had aided in the recovery of the Cadmea were brought to trial; one of them was put to death, the other, who did not abide the trial, was outlawed. It seems absolutely necessary to suppose that they had acted without the sanction of the people, and Xenophon describes their offence to have been, that they were privy to the attempt of the Theban exiles. Yet an orator of the next generation asserts, that a decree was passed on the motion of Cephalus, a leading statesman of this period, for sending succours to dislodge the Lacedæmonian garrison.\* If this was the case, we must conclude that the charge on which they were condemned was, that, by the encouragement which they gave to the exiles, they had drawn Athens into hostilities against Sparta. According to Xenophon, the expedition of Cleombrotus led the Athenians for the first time to reflect on the danger to which they had exposed themselves by their breach of the peace, now that Corinth no longer served as a barrier to protect them from invasion, and in the height of their alarm they condemned the two unfortunate generals. Yet the character of the Athenians renders it hard to believe that they were impelled on this occasion by mere timidity. There was, as may be collected from Plutarch,† a party at Athens—the relics of the oligarchy—with the popular orator Callistratus at its head, favourable to the oppressors of Thebes, and desirous of upholding the ascendancy of Sparta. It had been unable to resist the first impulse of the public feeling in behalf of Theban liberty. But when the sympathy which had been roused by the danger of the cause had been somewhat weakened by its success, it seems as if its adversaries found means to produce a temporary reaction, in which the two generals were sacrificed to the hope of reconciliation with Sparta.

This turn in the public mind at Athens gave great alarm to the new government of Thebes.‡

\* Dinarchus c. Dem., p. 95.

† De Gen. Soc., c. 31. Pelopidas and his companions pretended to be the bearers of a letter from Callistratus to Leontides.

‡ According to Plutarch, Pel., 14, it would seem that

\* Xenophon (H., v., 4, 10, 13) speaks of only one harmost. Plutarch's statement, which was probably drawn from Theban historians (see Schneider on Xen., H., v., 4, 3) as to the three whom he names, is better entitled to credit. If it were not that two were put to death, as equally sharing the whole responsibility, we might have supposed that they were appointed according to the practice which has been already noticed (see vol. i., p. 443, note 7) to take the command in succession. This would reconcile Xenophon with Plutarch; and perhaps the condemnation of both officers is sufficiently explained by the extraordinary irritation produced at Sparta by the recent loss.

† Plut., Pel., 13. Here, again, one might be tempted to apply the fragment of Theopompus, which suggested the conjecture proposed in vol. i., p. 558, col. 1, note \*, for the slight variation in the name of Lysanoridas, or Lysandridas, raises no difficulty; but the execution of the women seems to imply that they were the chief offenders.

‡ Xenophon (H., v., 4, 14) very clearly describes the beginning of the expedition of Cleombrotus as subsequent to the recovery of the Cadmea, and to the arrival of the Thebans, who made their escape after that event, at Sparta. On such a point he is certainly the best authority. Plutarch, however, represents Cleombrotus as marching to the relief of the citadel, and as having reached Megara before he heard of its surrender from the garrison, which met him there.

Pelopidas and his friends had reckoned on the support of the Athenians, and feared that, if abandoned to their own resources, they must be crushed by the irresistible force of the Peloponnesian confederacy. In this emergency they may have been driven to a stratagem which was perhaps suggested to them by the well-known venality of the Spartan character. Sphodrias, the harmost at Thespiæ, had passed through an honourable career of soldiery, but he was believed to be incapable of resisting a bribe, and the event seemed to prove that he had been corrupted by Theban emissaries.\* He was induced to march from Thespiæ as if with the intention of surprising Piræus, in which the gates were not yet finished. If, indeed, he was, as Plutarch represents him, a man of high ambition and weak judgment, it would be conceivable that he was seized with a desire of emulating the exploit of Phæbidas, and as he might think more safely, since the Athenians had been the aggressors. His measures, however, were in this case so ill concerted, that by daybreak he had advanced no farther than the Thriasian plain, where his men are said to have been struck with superstitious terror by a blaze which seemed to issue from the temple of Eleusis. It was now manifestly useless to proceed; but, instead of retreating as rapidly and quietly as possible, he indulged his troops with havoc and plunder. In the mean while news had been brought to Athens that a great army was marching against it; and the whole city was up in arms. It happened that three envoys had arrived not long before from Sparta; and they were immediately arrested as privy to the designs of their generals. They, however, not only asserted their own innocence, which they contended was sufficiently proved by their presence at a juncture when, if they had been aware of the movements of Sphodrias, they would certainly have withdrawn from the city, but assured the Athenians that they would soon receive satisfaction from the Lacedæmonian government, which, they doubted not, would capitally punish the general who had taken such a step without its orders. They were believed, and suffered to depart.

Sphodrias, indeed, was recalled, but, not venturing to return home, was tried in his absence. His doom was generally considered certain, being not only merited by his rashness, but demanded by policy to soothe the Athenians; and Etymocles, one of the envoys who had held out the expectation of his punishment at Athens, was among his judges. He seemed to have the less chance of escape, as he belonged to the party which was opposed to Agesilaus, and had, perhaps, on this account been selected by Cleombrotus for the command at Thespiæ. But the character of Agesilaus was distinguished from the ordinary Spartan mould by an amiable softness, which he did not scruple to indulge at the public expense; and he was on this occasion assailed on his weak side. His son Archidamus was on a footing of affectionate intimacy with Cleonymus, the son of Sphodrias,

and the tears of his young friend induced him to intercede with his father in behalf of the culprit. Agesilaus, though convinced that Sphodrias had not merely been guilty of imprudence, but had sold the interests of the state, could not resist his son's entreaties, and exerted all his influence to save Sphodrias, alleging that it would be hard and unwise to put to death a man whose previous conduct had been irreproachable for a single offence. His interest prevailed, and Sphodrias was acquitted.

The report of the sanction thus given to his conduct excited great indignation at Athens, where the secret springs of the transaction were probably long unknown; and the friends of Thebes eagerly availed themselves of it to urge the people into a close alliance with her. Active preparations were now made for withstanding the common enemy. The fortifications of Piræus were completed; a new fleet of a hundred galleys was put on the stocks;\* and, as if the shock had roused her from her lethargy, Athens began to remember her ancient maritime dominion, and to stretch her hands out to recover it. She at this time possessed several eminent generals and statesmen: the ingenious and enterprising Iphicrates; Chabrias, a kindred spirit, though somewhat more tardy in maturing his plans, displaying an energy bordering upon rashness in their execution; his young friend Phocion, already capable of supplying the defects of the elder general by his promptness of decision and steady coolness of temper.† Conon was now gone. He had, it seems, escaped, or had been released from his Persian prison, and ended his days in Cyprus.‡ The gratitude of the Athenians honoured him with a brazen statue, the first that had been erected to a citizen since the time of Harmodius and Aristogiton, as well as his friend Evagoras, both in an august position, expressive of their signal services to the state, near that of Zeus the Deliverer.§ He had left a son, Timotheus, who inherited his talents and virtues, and was peculiarly qualified by his upright and amiable character, even more than by his abilities, for completing his father's work, by the restoration of the Athenian empire, with such limitations as the altered condition of Greece now prescribed. We do not exactly know on what footing the cities recovered for Athens by Conon and Thrasybulus were placed. It seems, however, most probable—especially as Conon is so constantly spoken of as the liberator of the Greeks||—that they retained their independence, and only paid really voluntary contributions for their own protection as occasion required.¶ After the peace of Antalcidas their connexion with Athens was dissolved, and Sparta appears to have taken possession of most of them again. Several of them were now weary of the imperious and oppressive rule exercised by her harmosts, and believed that Athens, schooled by her reverses, might be more safely trusted with power than her rival. Chios

Gorgidas had been created *hectarch* in the room of Charon or of Melon.

\* Such appears to have been Xenophon's opinion. Plutarch, in his *Agesilaus*, 24, ascribes the conduct of Sphodrias entirely to ambition or vanity; but in *Fel.* 14, adopts the report that he was bribed by Pelopidas.

\* Polybius, ii., 62.

† Plutarch, Phoc., 6.

‡ Lyrius, *De bonis Aristoph.*, p. 155.

§ Demosth., *Lept.*, p. 478. Isocr., *Evag.*, p. 200, c.

|| Demosth., *Lept.*, p. 477. Dinarchus c. Demosth., p. 91.

¶ Boeckh (iii., c. 71) seems to be of a different opinion. But at least it may be inferred from the facility with which the confederacy was afterward revived, that none of the old abuses had crept in before the peace of Antalcidas.

and Byzantium first revolted from Sparta, and sought Athenian protection. They were followed by Rhodes and Mitylene, and these formed the nucleus of a new confederacy, which gradually embraced a great number of insular and maritime states. Athens was to preside; no longer, however, as a sovereign, but in the spirit with which Aristides regulated the Constitution of the original league. All the members were to be equally independent; they were to send representatives to a congress\* which was to be held at Athens, and in which the smallest state had a vote, and the greatest, Athens herself included, was to have no more. This assembly was no doubt empowered to fix the amount of the contributions,† which took the place of the old arbitrary tribute. Athens, however, was to receive and dispose of them. According to Diodorus,‡ one of her first measures was to give her new allies an earnest of the equity and moderation which were henceforth to govern her conduct towards them, by a decree which directed the restitution of all the lands that had been parcelled out among her citizens in the *cleruchial* colonies, and forbade all Athenians to acquire or cultivate land out of Attica. We should, however, have wished for some higher authority than Diodorus to satisfy us, both that this decree was not simply prospective, and how far, both as to time and place, its retrospective range extended. That Athens had formed any new cleruchial establishments since the Peloponnesian war, as Diodorus seems to state,§ and now gave them up, appears hardly credible. One peculiarity in the Constitution of the new confederacy was, that it was not confined to the maritime states, but included Thebes among its members. The addition of so powerful an ally tended to counterpoise the preponderance of Athens, and thus to secure the independence of the rest. But it altered the character of the confederacy, as it implied the maintenance of a land force, to which the contributions of the maritime states were to be applied, as those of Thebes to the common navy. The decree by which Diodorus says the Athenians resolved to raise an army of 20,000 heavy infantry and 500 cavalry, and to equip a fleet of 200 sail, was most probably an act of the congress, and described the amount of the united forces which it voted for carrying on the war.

For this information we are indebted almost wholly to Diodorus; Xenophon passes over this important event in profound silence. Yet, though Diodorus has evidently fallen into one of his usual errors when he refers the origin of the confederacy to the interval between the recovery of the Cadmea and the attempt of Sphodrias, we shall probably not be far mistaken if we suppose that it was formed very soon after the latter event. The danger with which Sparta saw herself threatened by the defection of her maritime allies, induced her, it is said, both to treat the rest more mildly, and to adopt a new system for the regulation of their contingents. The whole confederacy was divided

into ten classes: Sparta herself forming the first, the Arcadian states the second and third, Elis the fourth, the Achæans the fifth, Corinth and Megara the sixth, Sicyon, Phlius, and the towns of the Argolic Acté the seventh, the Acarnanians the eighth, the Phocians and Locrians the ninth; Olynthus and the other cities on the coast of Thrace made up the tenth. As to the other details of the new arrangement Diodorus is silent, except that one heavy-armed soldier was deemed equivalent to two light-armed, and one trooper to four heavy-armed; which seems to imply that each state was permitted to determine the quality of its contingent.

After the acquittal of Sphodrias, the Spartan government prepared for a fresh expedition against Thebes. The forbearance of Cleombrotus had been viewed with great disapprobation at Sparta, and Agesilaus was now invited to take the command. He no longer thought it indecorous to accept a commission which gave him an opportunity, probably by no means unwelcome, of gratifying his old resentment. His first care was to secure the passes of Cithæron, and for this purpose he took advantage of a war which was at this time carried on between the Arcadian towns of Cleitor and Orchomenus,\* in which the former employed a body of mercenaries. He bargained with Cleitor for the use of this little army, and as soon as he had crossed the border, having furnished his commander—the *condottiere*, as the Italians would call him—with a month's pay, sent him forward to occupy Cithæron with his troops. To protect Cleitor in their absence, he enjoined the Orchomenians to suspend hostilities as long as the expedition should last, and issued a general proclamation that, if any city should attack another while the army of the confederacy was in the field, it should be the first against which his arms should be turned. Having crossed Cithæron without interruption, he advanced through Thespie to the Theban frontier. He found the approaches to the plain of Thebes on this side closed against him by a trench and palisade, which were guarded by the Theban cavalry. But the enemy soon lost their advantage from the want of persevering vigilance, and Agesilaus, having passed through their undefended lines, spread havoc over the fertile plain, which was just white for the harvest. Xenophon would lead us to suppose that he met with no farther opposition, but withdrew, as soon as he had completed his ravages, for want of any other object. Other credible accounts, however, inform us that his movements were watched by Chabrias at the head of an Athenian army, which was sent to the aid of the Thebans, who were commanded by the Bœotarch Gorgidas, a worthy colleague of Pelopidas, and that at one time a battle was expected. The Athenian and Theban troops were advantageously posted on the range of hills two miles south of the city, yet Agesilaus thought himself strong enough to attack them. He first sent his targeteers against them, and, when these were repulsed, advanced to the charge with his phalanx.

\* *συλλήψεις*. A name invented by Callistratus. Theopompus in Hierocritio, *Συλλήψεις*. † xv., 20.

‡ xv., 23. We do not think it at all clear that Diodorus here means to speak of new colonies, though Boeckh (iii., 18) understands him so.

\* It seems that it may not be unnecessary to assure the reader that Cleitor or Clitor was not a town in Bœotia, and that there was an Arcadian town named Orchomenus; since a person ignorant of these facts thought himself qualified to write a history of Greece, and made this war *verba* Bœotie the subject of profound political remarks.

Chabrias ordered his men to keep their ground, pointing their spears against the enemy,\* and resting their shields upon one knee; Gorgidas followed his example. The attitude was new, and indicated a spirit which might make the victory doubtful, and Agesilaus thought it prudent to sound a retreat. The manœuvre acquired so much celebrity that a statue was afterward erected to Chabrias at Athens in the attitude which he had devised; and it seems to have hastened the enemy's retreat from the Theban territory. Agesilaus, passing through Thespiæ on his return, helped the inhabitants to repair their fortifications, and then, having left his client Phœbidas there as harmost, pursued his march home.

Phœbidas, in the course of the year, annoyed the Thebans so much by frequent inroads, that at length they collected all their forces, and, under the command of Gorgidas, invaded the territory of Thespiæ. But they were checked in their meditated ravages by the activity of the Spartan general, who hovered about them, to cut off all stragglers from the phalanx with his light troops. They found their position irksome, and even dangerous, and began to retreat, closely followed by Phœbidas, who hoped to put them to the rout. But a wood which lay on their road forced them to turn upon their pursuer, and their cavalry made a charge, in which Phœbidas fell; and his troops, disheartened by their loss, fled in disorder to Thespiæ.† This success encouraged the Thebans to renew their invasion of the Thespian territory, and to make attempts upon some of the other Bœotian cities. Xenophon observes that in all these cities an oligarchical government had been established, like that from which Thebes had just been delivered, and that large migrations had taken place from among the commonalty to Thebes; so that the friends of Sparta were in need of succour. A new general was sent with a mora—which was transported across the Corinthian Gulf—to Thespiæ, to bridle the Thebans a little in the absence of an invading army.

Early in the following spring (377) Agesilaus again took the field. The commander of the garrison at Thespiæ had, by his orders, secured the pass of Cithæron, and he descended to Plateæ. It was expected that he would this time take a different road from that by which he had entered the plain of Thebes the year before, and an intrenchment had been thrown up across the vale of the Asopus at Scolus to arrest his march. But he deceived the enemy into a belief that he meant again to pass through Thespiæ; and they abandoned their position at Scolus to take up one near the western border. He then made a rapid march down the vale of the Asopus, and having passed Scolus unopposed, first ravaged the eastern side of the Theban territory as far as the confines of Tana-

gra, which was in the hands of a friendly party, and then marched along the plain westward, leaving the city on his left, until he reached the place—a pass named Graossethos—where the Thebans were either waiting his approach from Thespiæ or prepared to oppose his retreat; they were, however, so strongly posted, that he did not think it prudent to attempt to dislodge them by force, but, changing his front, moved towards the city. Alarmed for its safety—for it had been left very weakly guarded—they hastily quitted their position, and marched towards Thebes. On their way they fell in with the enemy; but, after a little skirmishing, Agesilaus retreated, and encamped for the night at the position which they had left. The next day they were encouraged by this slight advantage to pursue him, but their light troops were driven off with considerable loss by the Olynthian cavalry, which was now serving in his army according to the terms of the treaty. He stayed a short time at Thespiæ to compose the feuds which were still raging there. The oligarchy, notwithstanding the Lacedæmonian garrison and the migrations of the commonalty, still thought itself endangered by the presence of the disaffected, and wished to rid itself of them by a massacre. Agesilaus diverted his partisans from this design, and induced them and their adversaries to give one another the security of oaths of mutual amnesty. Having thus established an appearance of tranquillity, he crossed over to Megara; here he met with an accident—the bursting of a bloodvessel, as Xenophon describes it—which was the beginning of a long illness.

His two expeditions had destroyed two successive harvests, and scarcity began to be felt at Thebes. To relieve it, agents were sent with two galleys to purchase corn at Pegasæ; but Alcetas, who commanded a Lacedæmonian garrison at Oreus, on the opposite coast of Eubœa, having intelligence of their movements, sent out three galleys, which intercepted them on their return, and captured their vessels with about 300 men. The prisoners were lodged in the citadel of Oreus; but they were so negligently guarded, that, during the absence of Alcetas, who was in the habit of paying too frequent visits to the lower town, they contrived to make themselves masters of the fortress; and the Lacedæmonian force was so small, or had rendered itself so odious, that the townsmen seized this opportunity to renounce their connexion with Sparta. Thus not only were the ships and cargo recovered, but a secure channel was opened for fresh supplies.

But the damage which the Theban agriculture suffered from these inroads of Agesilaus was, perhaps, more than compensated by the military experience which the Thebans gained from them. They had not, indeed, been able to protect their territory, nor had they ventured to meet the enemy on even ground, or fought a regular battle; but they had not been confined to their walls; they had engaged in partial conflicts with a Lacedæmonian army; they had seen it retreat before them, and had found a pretext for erecting a trophy. And all this when opposed to the ablest commander that Sparta had ever possessed at the head of the forces of her newly-augmented confederacy. They were

\* The *δέσπαρα δρόμῳ πορευομένους* of Polyænus, ii., 1, 2, and *projecta hastia* of Nepos, Chabr., 1, must interpret or correct the phrase of Diodorus, xv., 32, *ἐν δρόμῳ τῶν δέσπαρων πύκτων*.

† Notwithstanding the many discrepancies between Xenophon's narrative, H., v., 4, 44, and that of Polyænus, ii., 3, 2, it seems probable that they refer to the same occurrence; nor is it impossible that Xenophon, when he represented the valour of the Thebans as the effect of necessity, may have trusted too much to the Lacedæmonian part of the affair.

thus learning to shake off the terror which the Spartan name inspired; and it was not without reason that Agesilaus was reproached with the lessons which he had given them.\* The great men who now conducted their affairs perceived the importance of these trials of strength for rousing the spirit of their fellow-citizens, and made it their object to provide as many as they could with safety. Among the expedients to which they resorted for cherishing the martial ardour thus excited, one, which is attributed sometimes to Gorgidas, sometimes to Epaminondas, and which we might almost suppose to have been suggested by Pythagorean recollections, was the institution of a kind of military brotherhood, consisting of 300 men, selected not merely with regard to their personal qualities, but to their mutual intimacies. They were maintained in the Cadmea at the public expense, to be in constant training and readiness for action, and either from this or from some other unknown cause, acquired the name of the Sacred Band.

The next spring (376) found Agesilaus still confined to his chamber, and Cleombrotus was ordered to take his place at the head of the army, which was again to invade the Theban territory. But he neglected the precautions with which his colleague had secured the passes of Cithæron, and found them occupied by Theban and Athenian troops. He sent his targeteers to dislodge the enemy, but they were repulsed, routed, and some forty of them slain. He chose to treat the obstacle as insurmountable, and led his army home. His conduct again excited loud murmurs at Sparta, not only among his fellow-citizens, but among the allies, who, in a congress which was held there after his return, complained that more energetic measures were not adopted for bringing the war to a close. No use, it was observed, was made of their naval superiority, which would enable them either to starve Athens into submission, or to transport an army at any time to one of the Bœotian or Phocian ports, so as to attack Thebes at the proper season. This suggestion was adopted; a fleet of sixty galleys was fitted out, and placed under the command of Pollis, who was instructed to cruise among the Cyclades, and intercept the corn ships bound for Piræus. Athens, entirely dependant on foreign supplies, began to suffer from the blockade. But she was now able to meet the enemy at sea. A fleet, according to Diodorus, of more than eighty galleys, was quickly manned, and the command was assigned to Chabrias. For the purpose, it would seem, of forcing the enemy to a battle, he undertook the siege of Naxos. Pollis, coming up to relieve it, did not decline an engagement, which, after a hard struggle, in which Phocion greatly distinguished himself, was decided in favour of the Athenians. The enemy's loss, on the most moderate calculation, seems to have exceeded thirty galleys, and, if we may believe Diodorus, would have been far greater if the recollection of Arginusæ had not restrained Chabrias from pursuit, and induced him to devote his whole attention to his own people, who were to be saved from the wrecks of eighteen ships. The victory, though, with respect to the numbers en-

gaged, much less brilliant than many of an earlier period, was peculiarly seasonable and important, not only because it delivered Athens from the danger of famine, but because it encouraged the people in their hopes of regaining the dominion of the sea; for it was the first that had been won by an Athenian fleet—at Cnidus Conon commanded a foreign navy—since the end of the Peloponnesian war.

Early in the following year (375) Sparta renewed her preparations for the invasion of Bœotia. But before they were completed, the event of the battle of Naxos suggested to the Thebans that Athens might render them much more efficacious service than they had received from her troops, if she would revive the practice of former times, and would send a fleet round Peloponnesus, which, threatening the enemy at home, would divert him from the meditated expedition. The proposal was very readily adopted; and Timotheus was ordered to sail westward with sixty galleys. It does not appear that he had any more specific instructions, or that he attempted to do any mischief on the coasts of Laconia. He first bent his course to Coreyra, and, according to Xenophon's language, immediately made himself master of the island, but used his success with great moderation, did not treat it as a conquered country, banished none of the citizens, and made no change in the laws. All this, perhaps, means nothing more than that at his first appearance the Corcyraens willingly renewed their ancient connexion with Athens, and that Timotheus did not abuse their confidence. He was no less successful in Cephallenia and Acarnania, and even drew Alcetas, king of the Molossians, whose authority seems to have extended over a great part of the Epirot tribes, into the Athenian alliance. He was not, however, suffered to make this progress without interruption. A fleet was sent out from Peloponnesus to oppose him, under the command of the Lacedæmonian admiral Nicolochus. He found Timotheus in the Bay of Alyzia on the Acarnanian coast, and, though he had no more than fifty-five galleys, and expected six from Ambracia, he did not hesitate to offer battle. He was, however, defeated; but it would seem with little loss; for having soon after received the re-enforcement from Ambracia, he again sailed up to Alyzia, where Timotheus was refitting, and his challenge not being accepted, raised a trophy in his turn. But he was not able long to present so bold a front; for Timotheus, having repaired his vessels, and obtained some addition to his force from Coreyra, put to sea with seventy sail; an armament which the enemy could not repel, but which the Athenian general, who, according to his friend and eulogist Isocrates, had brought with him only thirteen talents from home, found it very difficult to maintain; and the intelligence of his successes was accompanied with an application for fresh and larger supplies from the treasury.

His expedition, however, had answered the purpose for which the Thebans had suggested it. It gave such occupation to Sparta as prevented her this year from renewing the invasion of Bœotia, and thus enabled them to direct their forces against the Bœotian towns, which, under the sanction of the peace of Antalcidas

\* Plut. Ages., 26.

and the patronage of Sparta, had asserted their independence. These towns recoiled more than ever from the dominion of Thebes, because, while the Theban government had been assuming a more popular character, their institutions had become, under Spartan influence, more purely oligarchical than before. There were three among them which were viewed at Thebes with peculiar animosity, which they returned with a deadly hatred, excited by the contests and mutual injuries of many generations. These were Platea, Thespiæ, and Orchomenus; and they continued to hold out after most of the others had been compelled to renew their ancient connexion with Thebes. Orchomenus, as the most important, had received a Lacedæmonian garrison of two moras. In the year 375 Pelopidas, who was annually re-elected to the office of Bœotarch, hearing that the garrison was absent on an expedition into Locris, conceived hopes of surprising the city. Expecting, probably, that success would depend more on the rapidity of his movements than on the force employed, he took with him only the Sacred Band—which had hitherto never been brought into action, either by itself or as a separate body, but had been distributed over the foremost ranks of the Theban armies—and a small troop of horse. But on his arrival he found that a sufficient force had been sent to supply the place of the absent garrison at Orchomenus, and that it would be prudent to retreat. He took the road which skirted the northeast corner of the Copaic Lake, and was marching along the foot of the hills on the eastern side, about three miles in a direct line from Orchomenus, near Tegyra, when he was suddenly encountered by the two moras, commanded by the polemarchs Gorgoleon and Theopompus, which were returning from Locris. The numbers of the enemy, according to the ordinary composition of the mora, must have been three or four times larger than his own; and the first impression produced on his followers was dismay. He himself did not despair; and when one came running up to him with the exclamation, "We have fallen into the midst of the enemy," coolly answered, "Why not they into the midst of us?" He seems to have relied on the effect of one desperate effort to break through the enemy's line; and having first sent his cavalry forward to the charge, brought up his little band, formed, according to the old Theban practice, in a great depth. It is doubtful what the issue would have been, if the two Spartan generals had not fallen in the first onset. This event decided the fortune of the day. Their troops, indeed, at first preserved sufficient presence of mind to open their ranks, so as to afford a passage for the Thebans, who, they supposed, could not aim at anything more than making their way through. But Pelopidas, instead of using the opportunity of escape, successively attacked each division of the enemy, until he had completely routed their whole army. He did not, however, think it prudent to follow up his success, fearing that he might be overtaken by fresh troops from Orchomenus.

The importance of this victory is not to be measured by the numbers engaged. Xenophon, indeed, passes over it in total silence; but this may be considered as a tacit testimony to the merits of Pelopidas. The battle of Tegyra con-

tributed more than any previous event to raise the Thebans in their own estimation, and to abate their fear of Spartan valour and discipline. It encouraged them to bolder enterprises, and made them more careless of the support and good-will of their neighbours, and less attentive to the appearance of mildness and moderation in their treatment of their enemies. In the spring of 374 they undertook an expedition against Phocis; from what motive—whether merely to hurt an ally of Sparta, or to revenge themselves for assistance which the Phocians had given to the Bœotian towns—we are not informed. The Phocians applied for succour to Sparta, and Cleombrotus was sent with an army, which he transported into their country across the Corinthian Gulf. Upon this the Thebans retreated, and remained upon the defensive within their own frontier. It was at this juncture that a warning voice reached Sparta, revealing a danger which threatened her and the rest of Greece, and which, it seems, neither she nor any other state had hitherto despaired.

The glimpses which we have caught from time to time in the course of this history of the internal state of Thessaly, have shown us that country, though acknowledging a kind of political unity, as seldom, if ever, and at the most very imperfectly united under one government. A few great families, whose possessions lay chiefly about the cities of Larissa, Crannon, and Pharsalus, were sometimes able to extend their influence over several other towns. Now and then one of their chiefs was raised to the dignity of *tagus*; at other times their authority, even in the cities where they resided, was shaken by civil feuds. At the period which we have now reached the principal seats of power were no longer the same: most of the Thessalian towns acknowledged the ascendancy of Pharsalus or of Phæræ. At the close of the Peloponnesian war, Phæræ was under the dominion of Lycophrôn. His elevation was, perhaps, connected with those struggles against the old aristocracy, in which, not many years before, Critias had taken a part. He felt himself strong enough to aim at extending his power over the whole of Thessaly; and among the events of the year in which Athens surrendered, Xenophon records a victory which he gained over the Thessalians who opposed him, among whom those of Larissa were foremost, but does not mention any results that ensued from it. Some ten years later, at the breaking out of the Corinthian war, we find him still engaged in a contest with Larissa, which was then subject to Medius, probably the head of the Aleuads. Lycophrôn was supported by Sparta, and Medius applied for succours to the confederacy which had just been formed against her. The Theban Ismenias was sent to his aid with a body of 2000 men, Bœotians and Argives, and enabled him to make himself master of Pharsalus, which was occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison. Medius is said to have sold all the inhabitants as slaves. It seems as if the success of Agesilaus, after his return from Asia, gave a different turn to the affairs of Thessaly. Pharsalus, having apparently recovered the greater part of her population, not only regained her independence, but rose to a new eminence, and became a rival to Phæræ.

The city, however, was no longer in the hands of the Scopadæ; it was divided between contending factions, which, for the sake of quiet and security, had resorted to an expedient less common in the history of the later Greek republics than it had been in earlier times. They placed themselves in the power of an individual on whom all could rely. It was one of their fellow-citizens named Polydamas, whose reputation and virtues attracted and earned this honourable confidence. He was intrusted with the citadel, and with the whole administration of the public revenue. He discharged his trust with the strictest integrity and disinterestedness, rendering an account every year, and sometimes supplying the deficiency of the revenue by advances from his private fortune.

At Phæræ, the supreme power had now passed into the hands of Jason, probably Lycophron's son, as he is said to have inherited his father's hospitable relation to Sparta, which continued after his own political connexion with her had ceased. He likewise succeeded to Lycophron's ambitious views, but enlarged them into bolder schemes of aggrandizement, and, with superior genius and energy, possessed far ampler means of fulfilling them.

He kept a standing army of 6000 mercenaries in his pay, all picked men, trained under his own eye with unintermitting care, and attached to his service both by a judicious liberality, and by the respect and confidence which his character inspired. He had compelled most of the Thessalian cities of the first rank to enter into alliance with him, or, in other words, to become his subjects, notwithstanding the opposition of Pharsalus; and his sway was acknowledged by several of the neighbouring tribes. Even Alcetas, the king of Epirus, was leagued with him on the footing rather of a vassal than an equal. This success encouraged him to carry his views much farther; and to whatever quarter he looked, he saw no barrier to his ambition which he did not feel himself able to surmount. The first step which he had to take was to acquire the title of tagus, and to unite all Thessaly under his legitimate authority. The force which Thessaly alone was at this time able to furnish was estimated at 10,000 heavy infantry, and 6000 cavalry. He might then calculate on the submission of all the bordering tribes, which would yield both an abundant supply of light troops, and regular tribute. The state of Macedonia was such as seemed to give him a warrant for looking upon its resources as his own. In those, together with the Penest population of Thessaly, he perceived the elements of a naval power, which would make him master of the Grecian seas. He would then, perhaps, be strong enough to cope with the united powers of Greece, and the dissensions of the Greek states would render his triumph certain. He had already formed an alliance with Thebes, chiefly, perhaps, because Pharsalus was already connected with Sparta, through Polydamus, whose family had long been attached to the Spartan interest by the bonds of hospitality. But policy would probably have inclined him to prefer the weaker side, as that which was likely to prove most subservient to his projects. On a like principle, he declined the alliance to which Athens would gladly have admitted him; for he

considered her as a rival, whose friendship would only obstruct the accomplishment of his designs for the foundation of a maritime empire. As soon as the affairs of Greece should be settled to his wish, a boundless prospect of greatness lay open before him. The retreat of the Ten Thousand, and the Asiatic campaigns of Agesilaus, had taught him how easily he might effect the overthrow of the Persian monarchy, and make himself master of the East. In himself he seems to have combined most of the qualities and habits requisite for such undertakings as those which were continually present to his thoughts: a frame capable of enduring every hardship; indefatigable activity and constant presence of mind; a thorough knowledge of human nature, and perfect self-control.

One part of his vast plans now seemed ripe for execution. Pharsalus and the towns which were still dependant on it were the only obstacle to the union of Thessaly under his rule. He was strong enough to have overcome their resistance by force; but knowing the character of Polydamus, he believed that his object might be attained by milder methods, which his own character, no less than policy, led him to prefer. He therefore concluded a truce for the purpose of a personal conference with Polydamus, and when they met, frankly unfolded his schemes, pointed out the means which he possessed of carrying them into effect, and, on the ground of an irresistible necessity, urged Polydamus to use his influence at Pharsalus to put an end to an unavailing opposition, and as the reward of his co-operation, promised him a place only second to his own in the new order of things. Polydamus met this proposal with equal openness, and informed Jason that the main difficulty which prevented him from immediately acceding to it was his reluctance to abandon his old allies, the Spartans, against whom he had no ground of complaint. Jason applauded his loyalty, and gave him leave to go to Sparta, and lay the whole state of the case before the government there, and then ask if they were prepared to protect Pharsalus from Jason's attacks. Polydamus accordingly proceeded to Sparta, where the subject was discussed in a style equally foreign to that of modern diplomacy. He disclosed the danger which threatened, not only Pharsalus, but the liberties of Greece; described Jason's character, plans, and resources; and informed his allies that, unless they could send a force sufficient to encourage the Thessalians to assert their independence, it would be more advisable that they should remain quiet. Nothing less, he intimated, than a Spartan army, with a king at its head, would answer the purpose. The government took three days to deliberate; and having considered the number of their troops already engaged in foreign service, and those which were required for the defence of Laconia, now that the Athenians had begun to threaten their coasts, they came to the conclusion that they were not in a condition to afford protection to their Thessalian allies, and therefore advised Polydamus to make the best terms he could for himself and for Pharsalus. He thanked them for their candour, and took their advice. On his return to Thessaly, he begged Jason to permit him to keep the citadel of Pharsalus for those who had committed it to



his custody; but promised that he would exert his influence with his fellow-citizens to induce them to enter into alliance with him, and that he would assist him to obtain the dignity of tagus. Jason was generous enough to appreciate this noble uprightness, and the compact was soon concluded between them. The result appeared in a general pacification, which immediately followed; and not long after, Jason was elected tagus, or assumed the title with universal consent. His first care was to regulate the military force of the country. He determined the contingents of infantry and cavalry to be furnished by each of the Thessalian towns, and by his foreign allies; and he seems to have raised them to an amount never before equalled: for the army which he was now able to bring into the field consisted of not less than 28,000 heavy-armed, and more than 8000 cavalry. As to light troops, Xenophon observes that there were enough to be a match for the whole world, as there was no reckoning the towns which supplied them. For the maintenance of this great establishment he revived the tribute which had been imposed on the subject tribes of Thessalians by Scopas, one of his ancient predecessors.

While this formidable power was taking its stand at so short a distance from the theatre of war, where the states of Southern Greece were wasting their strength in fruitless contest, one of the belligerents began to be desirous of peace, not from any sense of the common danger, but from weariness, disappointment, and jealousy. Athens found that the cost of the struggle in which she had engaged in behalf of Thebes fell chiefly upon herself: her coasts and shipping were infested by privateers from Ægina; her citizens harassed by repeated calls for military service, and the wealthier burdened by the war-taxes; while the Thebans refused to contribute to the support of the navy by which their territory had been saved from invasion. It does not appear whether she remonstrated with her allies, but she sent envoys to Sparta, and concluded a separate peace.

It was, however, destined to be of very brief duration. Two of the envoys, according to instructions which they had brought with them, sailed from Laconia as soon as the treaty was signed, to carry the intelligence to Timotheus, with orders to return home. On his passage along the coast of Zacynthus, he stopped to land a party of exiles, who, having been expelled by their adversaries from the island, had sought his protection. They undoubtedly belonged to the democratical side, though Diodorus, with more than ordinary self-contradiction, states the reverse.\* Timotheus enabled them to occupy a stronghold near the city, and furnished them with means of annoying their adversaries. The oligarchical Zacynthians made complaints at Sparta, and Spartan envoys were sent to Athens to remonstrate against the proceedings of Timotheus. But they obtained no satisfaction there: the sacrifice of the exiles was

thought too dear a price for peace; and at Sparta the refusal was held a sufficient ground for renewing the war, and a decree was made for raising a fleet of sixty galleys from the principal maritime states of the confederacy. A squadron of twenty-five was sent, it appears, in the autumn of the same year (374), under the command of Aristocrates, to the relief of Zacynthus. But early in the next spring the remainder, or, according to Diodorus, an additional armament of sixty-five galleys, with 1500 mercenaries, sailed under Mnasiippus to the same quarter, but with a different destination. The main object of this expedition was to recover Corcyra, in compliance with the solicitations of a body of refugees, who had been encouraged by the hope of Spartan protection to rise against the popular government. If we may believe Diodorus, this armament was preceded by a squadron of twenty-two galleys under the command of Alcidas, which was avowedly bound for Sicily, but was directed to surprise the city of Corcyra. Xenophon only says that, before the sailing of Mnasiippus, envoys were sent from Sparta to Syracuse to obtain aid from Dionysius for the recovery of Corcyra, as an object not less interesting to him than to Sparta.

On his landing in Corcyra, Mnasiippus found no enemy to face him in the field. He ravaged the country, where he collected a rich booty, and then occupied an eminence about half a mile from the city, which he thus cut off from all communication with the rest of the island, while his fleet blockaded the port. The Corcyreans were soon reduced to great distress, and sent envoys to Athens to implore succour; and notwithstanding the depressed state of their finances, the Athenians prepared vigorously to contest the possession of this important island. A fleet of sixty sail was decreed, and Timotheus was appointed to the command. But as this fleet could not be immediately manned, Stesicles was sent before with about 600 targeteers to Epirus, and King Alcetas was requested to afford him the means of transporting them across the channel to Corcyra; and under favour of night they effected their entrance into the town.\* But at first they only aggravated the sufferings of the besieged, by diminishing their scanty stock of provisions. Many were driven by hunger to make their escape from the city into the enemy's camp, and at length these desertions became so frequent, that Mnasiippus made a proclamation that all fugitives should be sold as slaves. But as starving men were not to be repelled even by this threat, he or-

\* Diodorus (xv., 46,) relates that a person, whom he calls Ctesicles, had been previously sent to Zacynthus to take the command of the exiles. As to the identity of his Ctesicles with Xenophon's Ctesicles, there will now be no doubt, though Wesseling seems to have thought that they were different persons; not, as Schneider represents, that Ctesicles returned from Zacynthus to Athens before he was sent to Corcyra. The way in which Schneider and Maso would reconcile Diodorus with Xenophon, by supposing that Stesicles proceeded from Zacynthus, in vessels furnished by Alcetas, to Corcyra, seems inconsistent, as Wesseling appears to have perceived, with the language of Xenophon, who evidently means to represent Stesicles as sent towards Corcyra directly from Athens. Where Xenophon and Diodorus differ on a point of this kind, we cannot hesitate to prefer the contemporary writer. Otherwise nothing could be more natural than that some succours should have been sent to the Zacynthians, who were the occasion of the war.

\* But in such a writer as Diodorus this affords no ground for suspecting any corruption in the text. We take this opportunity of observing that Diodorus has evidently confounded the short peace which was broken through this step of Timotheus, with that which was concluded next before the battle of Leuctra, and has prematurely introduced the embassy of Callistratus and Epaminondas

dered them to be driven back with scourges. A part, probably the bulk, of these unhappy persons were slaves; and these were not admitted within the walls: many were starved to death. Mnasippus now began to look upon the city as his own; and the near prospect of success unfolded a tendency in his character to that greediness and arrogance which seem to have been the most common failings of Spartan officers. Though he was in no want of money, having received pecuniary contributions from several towns in lieu of their contingents, he began to reduce the number of his mercenary troops, and to withhold the pay of those which he retained, apparently, as Xenophon intimates, with a fraudulent purpose. The men were consequently dissatisfied; and by way of compensation, he seems to have connived at some relaxation of discipline. The posts were less vigilantly guarded, and parties were more and more frequently seen scattered over the country in quest of plunder. The besieged watched their opportunity, and on one of these occasions made a sally, and took and killed several of these stragglers. Mnasippus hastened to repel this attack with a few troops whom he had about him, and ordered his officers to lead out the mercenaries. Some of them now ventured to observe that they could not depend on the obedience of men who had been disappointed of their pay; but Mnasippus silenced them with blows. They collected their troops, but all moved reluctantly to action. The enemy, however, gave way at their approach, and Mnasippus pursued them as far as the sepulchral monuments, which, as at Pompeii, lined the road near the gates. Here they made a stand, and, mounting on the tombs, assailed their pursuers with missiles, while reinforcements, issuing from the adjacent gates, fell on the flanks of the besieging army, and at length put the two wings to flight. Mnasippus, who was in the centre, and fully occupied with the enemy in front, found himself gradually abandoned, until there remained only a handful of men about him to bear the shock of all the forces opposed to him. As soon as he fell, the rout became universal; and the Corcyreans might have made themselves masters of his camp, if they had not been deterred by the multitude of the camp-followers, whom they mistook for effective troops. This victory had the effect of raising the siege. Intelligence came soon after, that an Athenian armament was close at hand, and it was believed that the Corcyreans were on the point of manning their ships to join it. Hypermenes, who was second in command to Mnasippus, embarked his men with such haste, that not only a great part of the valuable booty which they had collected, but some of the sick, were left behind in the camp. The fleet then made for Leucas.

The Athenian armament, which was at this time off the coast of Messenia, had been delayed by financial embarrassments, which led to a change in the command. The decree which had directed Timotheus to sail to the relief of Corcyra with sixty galleys had not supplied him with the means of equipping them; and he found it necessary, for this purpose, to resort to the allies of Athens. He sailed from Piræus in the spring to collect men and money from the islands and coasts of the Ægean. This cruise

occupied a long time. He seems to have obtained a re-enforcement from Bœotia,\* and to have visited the coasts of Thrace and Macedonia; and it was, perhaps, on this occasion that he contracted a friendship with King Amyntas, from whom he did not scruple to receive a present of timber for a house which he was building at Athens. But as to the main object of his voyage, he appears to have effected but little; possibly because the mildness of his character would not allow him to extort what he could not obtain by gentle means. In the mean while the people at home, not fully aware of his difficulties, grew impatient; and he had rivals who were ready to put the worst construction on his proceedings; Iphicrates and Callistratus combined their influence against him. A considerable part of the season was spent, while the danger of the Corcyreans grew every day more urgent, and the people were informed that he had advanced no farther southward than the island of Calauria, and that the fleet was in a state of mutiny for want of pay.† He was now formally accused by Iphicrates and Callistratus, and was recalled to answer their charges. But before the trial he was removed from the command of the fleet, which was conferred upon Iphicrates, with whom, at his own request, were associated Callistratus, though they had not previously been on good terms,‡ and Chabrias. Several points in this transaction are very obscure. The trial of Timotheus was deferred till late in the autumn, when his two principal accusers appear to have been absent. It was signalized by one remarkable incident, which illustrates the character of the man and of the times. The Epirot king Alcetas, and Jason of Phœre, having heard of the peril of Timotheus, made a journey to Athens for the purpose of interceding in his behalf. They lodged in his house; but he was at this time so poor—having, it seems, spent almost all his patrimony in the public service—that he was obliged to borrow a small sum of money, as well as vessels and furniture, for the reception of these distinguished guests. Their intercession was of more avail to him than his own or his father's services would have been; perhaps even than his innocence, however clearly it might have been proved. There was, however, another motive, equally foreign to the merits of the case, which may have had some weight in his favour. The King of Persia offered him employment in Egypt, which was at this time in a state of revolt; and the prospect of the advantage which Athens might derive from his interest at the Persian court might be urged as an argument for his pardon or acquittal.

Iphicrates, having been appointed to the command, showed himself either more active or less scrupulous in the fitting out of the fleet, or his connexion with Callistratus enabled him to obtain more from the people. Every galley that could be found, and even the Paralus and Salaminia, were placed at his disposal, under a promise that he would soon send back many

\* [Demosthenes] in *Timoth.* p. 1188.

† Demosthenes, *u. s.*

‡ *ὅτι μὴλα τῶν ἑσθίων ἔδρα, Xen., H., vi., 2, 29.* Voemel, in his *Notes in Libani Vitem Demosthenis*, p. 9, has strangely mistaken Xenophon's meaning, as if it was that Callistratus was not well fitted for the post.

others in their room; and thus he was enabled to man above seventy vessels. He had reason to expect that he should have to meet the enemy as soon as he reached Corcyra; but his crews were in great want of training, and, on the other hand, the emergency admitted of no delay. He, however, contrived to effect his object, without devoting any time exclusively to it, by converting the voyage itself into one continued lesson in the principal operations of naval warfare; so that, before he reached his destination, his men had become masters of all the evolutions on which, in an ancient sea-fight, the victory mainly depended, and, at the same time, had acquired habits of strict military discipline. While still on the coast of Peloponnesus, he had heard a report of the death of Mnasippus, and of the events connected with it; but it was not until he arrived at Cephallenia that he fully ascertained the truth. There he rested a while, and brought over the whole island to the Athenian alliance, and then proceeded to Corcyra. He had not long arrived there before he received intelligence of the approach of a squadron of ten galleys, which had been sent by Dionysius to the aid of his allies. He immediately stationed his scouts on the heights, so as to be apprized, by preconceived signals, of the enemy's first appearance and subsequent movements, and ordered twenty of his captains to be in constant readiness to put to sea at a moment's warning. The Syracusans, unconscious of their danger, had landed on another part of the coast. One of their commanders, a Rhodian, had urged his colleagues not to protract their stay there, and set the example of embarking. He alone, though he fell in with the enemy, made his escape. The other nine galleys were taken by the Athenians, with all their crews, and the admiral Anippus. Iphicrates returned in triumph to the town, and, being in great need of money, agreed with his prisoners to accept a certain ransom, for which the Corcyreans gave him security. From Anippus he hoped to extort a larger sum by the threat of selling him as a slave; but the Syracusan, overwhelmed by his misfortunes, put an end to his own life. Leaving the greater part of his crews in Corcyra, where they found employment in the labours of husbandry, he crossed over, with his military forces, to Acarnania, which was divided between the Athenian and the Lacedæmonian interest. After having carried on the war there with various success, he returned to Corcyra, and sailed, with his whole fleet, which now amounted to about ninety galleys, to Cephallenia, where he stayed some time, raising contributions and meditating to invade Laconia and other parts of the enemy's coast, if circumstances should require it.

But in the spring of 371 a prospect of peace began to open. Callistratus, who was much less in his element in the camp than in the popular assembly, had returned to Athens with the consent of Iphicrates—probably in 372—having undertaken either to procure a supply of money or to bring about a peace. He himself, as we have already seen, had been, from the first, averse to the alliance with Thebes. Iphicrates, and, probably, Chabrias also, wished the war in Greece at an end, because the state of the Persian empire held out opportunities for a

much more brilliant and profitable service in the East. And, if we may believe Diodorus,\* the Persian king was desirous of terminating a contest which rendered it more difficult to obtain Greek auxiliaries for his wars with his revolted subjects, and sent envoys to Greece to declare his wishes. Xenophon makes no mention of this embassy, and, indeed, indirectly contradicts the statement,† but only points out some of the causes which again inclined the Athenians towards peace. They had more reason than ever to be dissatisfied with the conduct of the Thebans. While they had been exerting their almost exhausted strength against the common enemy, Thebes had been aggrandizing herself, or gratifying her resentment, by attacks upon the old allies of Athens, carried to the utmost extent of vindictive rancour. The Phocians, indeed, had been protected by the arms of Sparta; but, in the latter part of 373, while Iphicrates was absent on his expedition to the west, Platæa and Thespiæ had been erased from the list of the Bœotian cities. The Platæans, according to Diodorus, had signified an intention of placing themselves under the protection of Athens, and had even sent, or were on the point of sending, for an Athenian garrison; and it is possible that the movements of the Thebans may have been quickened by the fear of seeing their prey rescued from their grasp. A Theban army marched suddenly against Platæa, surprised a large part of the population outside the walls, and took many prisoners; and the town, unprepared for a siege, and, perhaps, seeing no certainty of succour in any quarter, soon capitulated on condition that all the inhabitants should be allowed to depart with their moveable goods. They took refuge in Athens, and were admitted to their ancient privileges;‡ but their city, except the sacred buildings, was again levelled with the ground. Isocrates on this occasion undertook to plead their cause in a rhetorical pamphlet, to which he gave the form of a speech, in which the supposed orator urges the Athenians to interfere and restore the outcasts to their town and territory. In this declamation the injury which they had suffered is described as a perfidious violation of a state of peace, though it is admitted that they had declined to enter into that dependant connexion with Thebes to which most of the Bœotian towns had submitted. According to this statement, the Thespians appear to have sustained still greater wrong, for they, it is said, had acknowledged the authority of Thebes, though only through compulsion. But their subjection did not save them from a fate like that of Platæa. They were forced to evacuate their city, which was also razed to the ground; but the main part of the inhabitants appear to have occupied a stronghold named Cersesus, situated on a rocky spur of Mount Helicon, where they maintained themselves, for some years longer.§ In the mean while, their com-

\* xv., 50. The motive of Artaxerxes is explained on the occasion of another embassy, which (c. 38) he represents as the origin of the preceding treaty, which was broken by Timotheus. There seems to be strong ground for suspecting that both these Persian embassies are purely fictitious, and that they were suggested by those of Antalcidas and of Philiscus.

† By the allusion to the expected coming of Antalcidas. H., vi., 3, 12.

‡ *Isocratides*. Diodorus, xv., 46.

§ Pausan., ix., 14, 2, 4.

plaints and supplications helped to rouse the indignation of the Athenians against Thebes. The people decreed that an embassy should be sent to negotiate a peace with Sparta; but, to avoid the appearance of breaking with their present allies, invited the Thebans to become parties to the treaty. Callias, the torchbearer, on account of the relation between his family and Sparta, was placed at the head of the embassy: he was accompanied by six colleagues, and by Callistratus, who appears to have attended without the title of an ambassador. His presence seems to have been very much needed; for, of three speeches reported by Xenophon as delivered on this occasion by the Athenian envoys, his is the only one which was not grossly irrelevant and unseasonable. Callias was chiefly anxious to impress his hearers with a due sense of his own dignity, and, glancing slightly at the events of the day, grounded his argument in favour of peace on the legends of Triptolemus and Hercules. He was followed by Autocles in a speech not equally absurd, but much more misplaced, being full of invectives against the hypocrisy or inconsistency of the Spartans, who, professing to be the champions of liberty and independence, exerted a despotic authority over their allies, oppressed the weaker cities with tyrannical governments of their own appointment, and in the seizure of the Cadmea had directly violated the treaty which they pretended to enforce: charges, no doubt, very well founded, but which, so urged at such a time, could only serve to defeat the purpose of the speaker's mission; and they manifestly produced general surprise and embarrassment, and gave great offence to the Spartan part of the audience. Callistratus, however, judiciously remedied the effects of his colleague's indiscretion, acknowledging that there had been faults on both sides which called for mutual forbearance, and endeavouring to show that the interests of both states, properly understood, would be best promoted by an amicable agreement between them on the footing which the peace of Antalcidas professed to establish. We learn, from an allusion in this speech, that Antalcidas was at this time absent on a mission to the Persian court; and the orator thinks it necessary to notice an insinuation which, it appears, had been thrown out by some who were averse to peace, that Athens had been impelled to these overtures by the apprehension that Antalcidas might return with a supply of Persian gold for the prosecution of the war.

The terms of the treaty were then discussed and adjusted. It was agreed that the Spartans should withdraw their harmosts from the towns which they now occupied; that the armies should be disbanded on both sides, and the fleets laid up; and that every state in Greece should be left to the enjoyment of independence. A clause was added which provided that, if the treaty should be infringed to the injury of any of the contracting parties, any of the rest should be at liberty, though not bound, to aid in obtaining redress by arms. This article, of so sinister an aspect, seems to have been inserted chiefly with a view to Thebes, and to indicate a suspicion which was soon confirmed. The Athenian embassy had been accompanied or follow-

ed by envoys from Thebes, with Epaminondas, who was distinguished among his countrymen by his eloquence no less than by his other attainments, at their head. The treaty was ratified by the Spartan government in the name of the whole Peloponnesian confederacy; Athens and her allies were introduced as distinct parties; and so, according to Xenophon, the name of Thebes was at first inserted without any farther explanation. But the next day the Theban envoys demanded that it should be erased, and the name Boeotians substituted in its stead. This brought the question to a point.\* A debate ensued, in which Agesilaus and Epaminondas, whose speech on this occasion seems to have gained great celebrity, took the principal parts. Agesilaus put an end to it by asking whether the Thebans would permit the Boeotian towns to ratify for themselves. Not, replied Epaminondas, until we see the provincial towns of Laconia annexing their oaths to the treaty. Agesilaus then declared that he would allow the name of Thebes to stand there on no other condition, and bade them take their choice. They persisted in their resolution, and the negotiation ended with the exclusion of Thebes, which was thus left alone, exposed to the hostility of all parties. This result gave great pleasure at Athens, where, according to Xenophon, hopes were entertained that the penalty which Thebes had incurred during the Persian war† might still be exacted.

The Athenians forthwith executed their part of the treaty; withdrew their garrisons, and recalled Iphicrates, ordering him to restore all that he had taken since the ratification. The Spartans also withdrew their harmosts and garrisons; but a question then arose, whether Cleombrotus, who, it would seem, had continued with his army in Phocis from 374, should be recalled. Opinions were divided on the subject in the Spartan assembly. A person named Prothous seems to have been the organ of a moderate party, which was desirous that the conditions of the treaty should be faithfully executed, and perhaps was secretly inclined to favour Thebes. He proposed that Cleombrotus should evacuate Phocis, but that a fund should be raised by the voluntary contributions of the allies, to be deposited in the temple at Delphi, and that if the Thebans persisted in their refusal to acknowledge the independence of the Boeotian towns, an army should be collected against them from all the states of the confederacy which might be persuaded to concur in the enterprise. But the influence of Agesilaus prevailed in the assembly, and this motion was rejected with contempt; and Cleombrotus, who had sent home for instructions, was directed immediately to invade Boeotia, if Thebes did not withdraw her pretensions. Diodorus says that envoys were despatched to receive her final answer, and that on this occasion the Thebans were called upon

\* Nepos, Ep., iv., 4. Maxime ejus eloquentia eluxit Spartas, legati ante pugnam Leuctricam. I have not hesitated to refer the altercation between Agesilaus and Epaminondas, related by Pausanias, ix., 13, 2, to this occasion, though the author himself assigns it to the epoch of the peace of Antalcidas, since he supposes it subsequent to the battle of Mantinea, in which Epaminondas was wounded. Diodorus also speaks of the eloquence displayed by Epaminondas on this occasion (xv., 38)—as appears from the mention of Callistratus—though he also assigns a wrong date.

† See vol. i., p. 293.

not only to resign their claims of sovereignty in Bœotia, but to restore the Plateans and Thebans to their homes. As their determination remained unchanged, Cleombrotus began his march towards the Bœotian frontier. He found the pass near Coronea guarded by a division of the Theban forces under Epaminondas, and therefore made a circuitous march, first crossing the mountains so as to come down upon Creusis, where he made himself master both of the town and of twelve Theban galleys which were lying in the port, and then took the road which leads up to the plain of Leuctra, where he encamped. The Thebans, as soon as they heard of his movements, reunited their forces, and occupied a rising ground at no great distance over against him. Epaminondas commanded as Bœotarch, with six colleagues of the same title; Pelopidas did not fill that office this year, but was appointed to the command of the Sacred Band. The Lacedæmonian army is said to have consisted of 10,000 heavy infantry, with 1000 horse, and the usual complement of light troops: the Thebans are said to have been not more than 6000 strong; but, perhaps, in this estimate their cavalry was not included.

Notwithstanding his superiority in numbers, Cleombrotus, it seems, would fain have declined an engagement; and he had enemies about him who were on the watch to see whether he would give this decisive proof of the friendly feelings which he had long been suspected of entertaining towards the Thebans. His friends reminded him of the unfavourable impression which had been made at Sparta by his conduct on former occasions, when he abstained from ravaging the Theban territory, and afterward suffered himself to be deterred by a trifling obstacle from invading it; and they warned him that if he now spared the enemy, he had nothing to expect but ignominy and exile. By these suggestions he was goaded into the resolution of offering battle, though it does not appear from Xenophon's description that there was in this step any of that temerity which Cicero imputes to it. On the contrary, it was a question warmly agitated on the Theban side, whether they could prudently run the risk of an action. Xenophon avoids mentioning the name of Epaminondas—which was no doubt grating to a Spartan ear—and represents the decision to which the Theban commanders came, as the desperate choice of men who, having tasted the bitterness of exile, preferred the prospect of death in battle to that which Dante feelingly describes, of again eating a stranger's bread, and pacing up and down a stranger's stairs.\* They foresaw, he says, that if they shrank from fighting, the Bœotian towns would declare against them; Thebes would be besieged, and, when provisions failed, would be surrendered in spite of them by their own partisans. We learn, however, from other authority which we have no reason to question, that three out of the seven Bœotarchs thought it safer to abide the event of a siege, and proposed to remove their wives and children into Attica, and that it was chiefly the influence of Epaminondas, combined with that of Pelopidas, though he had no vote in the

council of war, that decided for immediate action.\* Whether it was the courage of despair, or a clear-sighted confidence in their own resources, by which they were animated, may, perhaps, be more safely collected from the sequel.

It was not only the superior numbers of the enemy that inspired apprehension. Notwithstanding the success which the Thebans had obtained in some little engagements, as in that of Tegyra, they had not shaken off their old awe of the Spartan valour and discipline; and the chiefs thought it necessary to resort to some extraordinary expedients for raising the spirits of their troops. Epaminondas, it is said, was so scrupulous a lover of truth, that he never permitted himself to utter a falsehood even in jest. It may not follow that in the defence of his country he would have refused to concur in a pious fraud; but at least no such scruples were felt by his friends and colleagues. The momentous crisis prepared the minds of men to expect and receive omens and prodigies; and care was taken that they should not be disappointed. A report was spread through the camp, that the arms which were hung up in the temple of Hercules at Thebes had suddenly disappeared, carried away by invisible hands; by those of the ancient heroes, it might be inferred, who were coming to aid their people in the approaching struggle. A still more distinct intimation of victory was obtained from the oracular cave of Trophonius, at Lebadea, which was consulted, it is said, by order of Epaminondas.† The superstitious hopes of the multitude appear to have been strongly excited by a local legend, which was revived, now, perhaps, for the first time to become the basis of a favourable prophecy. The plains of Leuctra had, it was believed, been the scene of an act of violence, offered by some Lacedæmonians‡ to daughters of the land, who had killed themselves, and were buried there; and their father, Scedasus, having in vain sought satisfaction for the injury, had likewise destroyed himself, uttering imprecations against Sparta with his last breath. A Spartan exile in the Theban camp, named Leandrias, seems to have assisted Pelopidas in adapting this story to the occasion.§ He attested that his countrymen had long been warned by oracles that their commonwealth was to suffer a great visitation of Divine vengeance at Leuctra; but as there were other places of that name, the prediction had been neglected as unintelligible. To render its meaning clearer, Scedasus himself was said to have appeared to Pelopidas in the night, and to have demanded a sacrifice for the tomb of his daughters—a human one, according to Plutarch's account, which has very much the appearance of a later fiction devised

\* Pausanias, ix., 13, 6. Plutarch, Pel., 20.

† According to Diodorus, xv., 53, the answer was, that the Thebans must vow to institute games in celebration of their approaching victory. According to Pausanias, iv., 33, 5, they were enjoined to set up a trophy with the shield of Aristomenes. This is probably the version which was fabricated after the design of restoring Messene had been conceived.

‡ For whom the significant names Parathemidas and Phrurachidas were probably invented, in allusion to the treacherous occupation of the Cadmeæ.

§ Diodor., xv., 54. The name Leandrias bears a suspicious resemblance to that of the exiled harmost Lysanoridas or Lysandridas.

\* Tu proverai sì come sa di sale Lo pane altrui, e com' è duro calle Lo scendere e 'l salir per l' altrui scale. Parad., c. 17.

after the victory. Propitiatory rites, however, were performed by the Thebans at the fated monument.

Epaminondas himself is said to have expressed his contempt for omens which forbade a citizen to defend his country, in the language of the Trojan hero.\* If he did not disdain the aid of superstition, he seems, at least, to have employed some nobler expedients for rousing the energies of his countrymen. As there were in the army troops from various parts of Bœotia—among them, according to Pausanias,† a body of Thespians—who, he had reason to suspect, might be disaffected to the cause, he proclaimed that all who would were at liberty to quit the camp. All the Thespians, and some others, are said to have availed themselves of this permission. The Thebans he endeavoured to inflame with indignation against their enemy, to whom—not perhaps without some exaggeration, yet neither, probably, as Xenophon himself seems to indicate,‡ without reason—he imputed the design of razing Thebes to the ground, destroying the males, and enslaving the women and children.§ That a design was entertained of subjecting Thebes to the same kind of political dissolution which Mantinea had experienced is attested by a contemporary,|| as well as by Plutarch and Diodorus; and it is possible that the Spartans may have accompanied their last demands with threats which justified the language of Epaminondas.¶

Xenophon's account of the battle seems to contain little more than the pretences by which the Spartans, to console themselves for their defeat, endeavoured to detract as much as possible from the skill and valour of their enemies. He thinks it worth notice, that as Cleombrotus held the last council of war, which was called just before the battle, towards noon, he and his officers were believed to have been somewhat heated with wine; and that the market-people, and other followers of the camp, having been prevented from withdrawing by the enemy's cavalry and light troops, caused the numbers of the Thebans to appear more formidable than they really were. But he attributes the event of the battle chiefly to the superiority of the Theban cavalry over that of the Spartans, which was at this time in a very low condition, being filled with the substitutes of the wealthier citizens, whom they provided with horses and arms, but who were never trained for the service; whereas the Theban cavalry had constant exercise in their expeditions against Orchomenus and Thespiz. Hence, in the skirmish before the battle, the Lacedæmonian cavalry—which, however, probably formed but a small part of that which belonged to the Peloponnesian army—was quickly routed, and in its retreat created some confusion in the phalanx, which, nearly at the same time, was charged by the Theban infantry. Other writers expressly ascribe the issue of the action to the

tactics of Epaminondas,\* whom Xenophon does not mention, though he notices the great disparity between the depth of the Theban phalanx and that of the enemy. The Thebans were formed not less than fifty deep; more than four times the depth of the Lacedæmonian line, in which the *enomoty*, of thirty-six men, stood in three files. It was the object of Epaminondas to bring his mass to bear upon the enemy's right wing, where the Spartans were posted; and he seems to have succeeded in detaching it from the main body, so that it had to sustain the whole brunt of the first onset. Pelopidas, with his Sacred Band, contributed greatly to the success of this operation. The Spartans did not long keep their ground: Xenophon seems anxious to prove that they were not immediately routed. Cleombrotus himself fell early, but was carried off the field alive, though he survived but a short time. Among the Spartan officers who fought by his side, none distinguished themselves more than Spodrias and his son Cleonymus, who were both left among the slain. The part of the Peloponnesian army which had not been engaged, seeing the Spartans give way, fell back with them upon their camp, which was on a rising ground, and protected by a trench. Here they formed again, and the victors made no attempt to force their intrenchments.

So ended the battle of Leuctra—one of the most decisive in the history of Greece. Yet, according to Xenophon, the loss of the Lacedæmonians did not exceed 1400; and Diodorus, who states it at 4000, has probably followed an account which greatly exaggerates it, even if it was meant to include the loss of the allies, which appears to have been very trifling. But of this number 400 were Spartans; more than half of all who were present in the army,† who were only 700; and no inconsiderable portion of the whole Spartan population. The Thebans, according to Diodorus, lost only 300; according to another author, only forty-seven.‡ But these numbers are of no importance; they had gained a clear victory in a fair battle, over a regular Lacedæmonian army, much more numerous than their own, with a king at its head: it mattered little with how many lives they had purchased such a triumph. The Spartans could hardly be brought to submit to their defeat, and were desirous of returning to the field to recover their slain, and prevent the enemy from raising a trophy. But their commanders perceived that, even if they had strength sufficient left for such an attempt, the temper indicated by their allies, who were all manifestly unwilling to renew the engagement, the issue of which some scarcely affected to regret, would render it very dangerous. A council of war was held, in which it was unanimously agreed to acknowledge the loss of the battle by the usual application for leave to bury the slain. Epaminondas, it is said, to prevent the Spartans from concealing the extent of their misfortune, required that their allies should collect their dead first: it

\* Diodor., xv., 52. Compare Plutarch, Dem., 20, Reg. et Imp., Ap. 8. † ix., 12, 8. ‡ See above, p. 30.

§ Frontinus, Strat., i., 11, 6.

|| Isocrates, Philip., p. 91.

¶ *Δακεδαιμονίων στρατηγό-  
ντων ἐπὶ Θηβαίων, καὶ βουλησάντων λυγρῶσαι τὴν θάουριαν  
καὶ ἀδικεῖν τὸς ῥέτας.* Compare Plutarch, 303, b.

¶ Plutarch, Pol., 20, distinctly asserts that the danger which hung over Thebes was *ἀντίκρυς ἀσκήλη καὶ καταγ-  
γῆλα δίκαισμος*.

\* Diodor., xv., 55. *λοιπὸν τινὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥάξης χρησάμε-  
νος.* Plut., Pol., 32.

† This must be Xenophon's meaning in Ages., ii., 94. He could not mean that the whole number of the Spartans who survived the battle, both at home and abroad, was less than 400.

‡ Paus., ix., 12, 12.

was then seen that almost all the slain were their own.\*

The messenger who carried these tidings to Sparta found the city engaged in the celebration of one of its great festivals, the *Gymnopaedia*. The people were in the theatre, and a chorus exhibiting. The ephors did not interrupt the performance, or abridge the amusements of the day, and when they communicated the names of the slain to their friends, enjoined the women to refrain from the customary wailings. The spirit of the old institutions manifested itself on this occasion in all its energy, perhaps not without some mixture of politic ostentation. The only signs of grief and dejection which any of the strangers who had been attracted to Sparta by the festival could have witnessed were shown by the few relatives of the survivors who appeared in public the next day; the friends of the fallen thronged the streets with the countenances and mutual congratulations of men who had received joyful tidings.

But the emergency called for something more than a cheerful face. The defeated army, which was still in the presence of the victorious enemy, could not be considered safe; and the whole remaining force of the city that was capable of foreign service was ordered to march to its relief. Two moras had been kept at home, together with the veterans who wanted less than five years of the term of the military age. These were now called out, and even the citizens who had before been exempted from military duty by civil offices, were directed to join them. Agesilaus was still unable to take the field, and his son, Archidamus, was charged with the command of the expedition. The oligarchical governments of the peninsula, feeling themselves involved in the danger which threatened the head of the confederacy, exerted themselves to raise re-enforcements for him. Tegea, Mantinea, Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius, and the Achæans—probably only some of their cities—are mentioned by Xenophon as the most zealous in the cause.

While Archidamus was busied with his preparations, the Thebans were no less eager to profit by their victory. Immediately after the battle they had sent a herald, crowned as a messenger of good news, to announce it at Athens, and to call upon the people to avail themselves of the opportunity which now offered itself of taking vengeance for all the injuries they had ever suffered from Sparta. But to the feelings which now prevailed at Athens the contents of this message were so unwelcome, that the invitation sounded like mockery. The council, which received it, did not disguise its displeasure, and dismissed the herald not only without any answer to his application, but without the usual honours of hospitality. The Thebans, at the same time, solicited succours from their ally the tagus of Thessaly; and Jason very promptly complied with their request, though with views widely different from those which suggested it. He gave orders for manning a squadron, as if it was his design to proceed to Bœotia by sea; but having by this feint thrown the Phocians off their guard, he made a forced march through their country with a small body of troops—according to Diodorus, 1500 infantry

and 500 horse—which they could easily have stopped, and arrived without interruption at Leuctra. Here he was urged by the Thebans to join them in an attack, to be made from opposite sides, on the enemy's position. But he represented to them the danger of driving such an enemy to despair, and so risking the fruits of their glorious victory, and offered his mediation. With the Spartan commanders he had probably less difficulty, when he sought to convince them of the advantages which they would reap from a convention which would enable them to withdraw their disheartened and disaffected troops in safety. The friendly footing on which his father had stood towards Sparta, and the character of proxenus by which he himself was still connected with her, notwithstanding his alliance with Thebes, gave a colour of disinterested good-will to his advice. His object, as Xenophon observes, was to maintain a balance between the two states, so as to keep them both dependant on himself. At the request of the Spartans, he concluded an armistice for them; and their generals were so anxious to take advantage of it, and so fearful lest it should be broken by the enemy, that, having given orders which expressed their intention of crossing Cithæron, they set out the same evening in the direction of Creusis, and pursuing their march all night in great disorder and alarm along the rugged coast road, reached the Megarian town of Ægosthena, where they met with Archidamus and a part of his forces. He waited there for the rest—perhaps to give a better air to his retreat—and as soon as they arrived marched back to Corinth, and disbanded his whole army.\*

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

### FROM THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA TO THE FOUNDED OF MESSENE.

THE ill-humour with which the news of the battle of Leuctra was received at Athens, seems to have arisen merely out of the old jealousy and animosity with which the Athenians had been used to regard their northern neighbours, and which revived as soon as the affairs of

\* Diodorus gives a very different account of several transactions connected with the battle of Leuctra from that which has been given on Xenophon's authority in the text. He represents the arrival of Jason as preceding the battle, and as followed by a truce, concluded through Jason's mediation, between Cleombrotus and the Thebans, which bound the Spartan king to withdraw his forces from Bœotia. But on his retreat he met with Archidamus, who had been sent with a strong re-enforcement to support him; and the two commanders, regardless of the recent compact, returned to Leuctra and fought the fatal battle. It is remarkable enough that Wesseling, who is usually disposed to place too much confidence in his author, in this instance very judiciously questions his accuracy; while Schneider, without a shadow of an argument, and in defiance of every principle of sound criticism, assumes that it is Xenophon who has grossly distorted facts, which, at the time when his history was written, were notorious to all his readers. Wesseling saw that Xenophon's narrative, in its leading outlines, bears the clearest stamp of truth; he might have added, that Diodorus has here only committed one of his ordinary blunders. It was probably the misplacing of Jason's arrival that drew him into all the other mistakes. Niebuhr, in his Lectures, observed, "According to Diodorus, the Spartans, in the loss of the battle, suffered the punishment of perjury. Either Archidamus joined his colleague before the battle, or Cleombrotus was calumniated after his death. I believe that Diodorus here adopted a story invented by the Spartans."

\* Paus., u. 2.

Thebes became prosperous; for in the event itself, considered with respect to their own interests, they could have seen nothing to deplore: and they proceeded without delay to take advantage of the shock which it had given to the influence of Sparta. It seems to have been the prevailing opinion throughout Greece, and not least at Sparta itself, that the Spartan power had suffered a fatal blow; and Xenophon intimates that the Athenians were surprised to find that any of the Peloponnesian states still adhered to the ancient chief of their confederacy. They believed that the time had now come when Athens might step into the place of Sparta as guardian of the peace of Antalcidas, and might transfer all the advantages which her rival had reaped from that title to herself. They therefore assembled a congress in their own city, to which they invited deputies not only from their old allies, but from all the states of Greece which were willing to adopt the peace of Antalcidas as the basis of their mutual relations. It seems to have been attended by many, if not by most members of the Peloponnesian confederacy; and the resolution to which it came in the oath by which each state was to ratify the compact was thus expressed: "I will abide by the treaty sent down by the king, and by the decrees of the Athenians and their allies, and, if an attack be made on any of the states which take this oath, I will succour it with all my might." So that Athens found herself able to obtain better security for the execution of the treaty than had been given in the last congress held for the like purpose at Sparta, where none of the parties had been bound to enforce its observance by arms; and yet the engagement for mutual defence now involved those who entered into it in danger of a contest both with Sparta and Thebes. Elis would gladly have united herself to an association which would separate, and might protect her from Sparta; but she would not resign her claims to the sovereignty of the Triphylian towns. The congress, on the other hand, determined that every town, small or great, should be alike independent, and commissioners were sent round to exact an oath to this effect from the magistrates of each state. It was taken, Xenophon says, by all but the Eleans.

We should have been glad to know which of the Peloponnesian states acceded to this confederacy; but all the information that Xenophon gives as to this point only enables us to conclude that the Mantineans at least were of the number. One of the first effects of the battle of Leuctra seems to have been a revolution which overthrew the Mantinean aristocracy; and the declaration of the congress at Athens—though it expressed the very same principle on which the Spartans had professed to act when they scattered the Mantineans over their four villages—was now interpreted by the democratical party as a license to restore their political unity and to rebuild their city, and the work was immediately begun. The Spartan government felt that the restoration of Mantinea would prove to all Greece that it was no longer formidable even to its nearest neighbours; but, in its anxiety to escape this humiliation, it resorted to a step which still more

clearly betrayed its weakness, and showed how much it was dispirited by its recent reverse. Agesilaus, who had now recovered from his illness, was sent to use all his hereditary influence at Mantinea to stop the work; and he was instructed to undertake that, if it was only deferred for the present, he would procure the consent of the Spartan government, and even some help towards defraying the expense of the building. He was not allowed to lay this proposal before the popular assembly, but was informed that the decree of the people rendered it necessary to proceed without delay. Though he felt this repulse as a personal affront, and though it set the power of the state at defiance, it was not thought expedient at Sparta to have recourse to arms, and the treaty last concluded with Athens served as a plea for acquiescence; for it was now admitted that the independence of Mantinea had been violated when it was dismembered for the sake of the aristocratical party. Some of the other Arcadian towns sent workmen to assist the Mantineans, and Elis contributed three talents to the cost of the fortification. The new city was so constructed as to be secure from such attacks as had proved fatal to that which it replaced.\*

Peloponnesus had, for some years, been violently agitated by political convulsions, and had been the scene of incessant struggles between the two leading parties, the friends of aristocratical and of democratical institutions. It seems that the principles on which the peace of Antalcidas was professedly founded had encouraged the partisans of democracy to hope that they might establish their ascendancy, wherever they were the strongest, without any obstruction from Sparta. Her conduct towards Phlius and Mantinea must have checked these hopes; yet they seem to have revived when the new confederacy between Thebes and Athens, after the recovery of the Cadmea and the revolt of several maritime states, compelled Sparta to observe more moderation towards her remaining allies. In many places the aristocratical party was overpowered, and suffered severe retaliation for the oppression it had exercised during the period of its domination; but these triumphs were only the beginning of a series of fierce and bloody contests. The exiles were continually on the watch for an opportunity of regaining what they had lost, and the attempt, whether it succeeded or failed, commonly ended in a massacre. The oligarchical exiles of Phigalea, having seized a fortress near the town, surprised it during a festival, while the multitude was assembled in the theatre, and made a great slaughter among the defenceless crowd, though they were at last forced to retreat, and take refuge in Sparta. The Corinthian exiles, who had found shelter at Argos, were baffled in a similar enterprise, and killed one another to avoid falling into the hands of

\* "They were careful not only to exclude the river from their city, but also to make the substruction of their walls of such a height as could not possibly be submerged by means of such streams as those which water the Mantinea." (Leake, *Mores*, iii., p. 73.) But when elsewhere (ii., p. 41) he says that "we find the Mantineses choosing a level situation for their new city in preference to its old position upon a hill," this seems only to mean that the insulated rocky height of Gurtzuli (see i., p. 103) had been included within the ancient fortifications; but even of this we find no proof.



the opposite party, which immediately instituted a rigorous inquiry at Corinth, and condemned numbers to death or exile on the charge of abetting the conspiracy. Like scenes took place at Megara and Sicyon. Phlius, more especially, was continually harassed by civil feuds. The democratical exiles took possession of a stronghold in its neighbourhood, and collected a body of mercenaries, with whose aid they defeated their enemies in battle, and killed 300; but afterward, having been betrayed by their auxiliaries, they were overpowered, 600 were slain, and the rest were forced to take refuge in Argos. Argos itself was not an indifferent spectator of these events. Though democracy had long been firmly established there, the jealousy of the people was roused against the class, which might well be suspected of wishes hostile to the existing government, but, perhaps, had given no other occasion for a charge of treasonable designs. It may easily be supposed that the confluence of democratical exiles from other cities tended to keep up a state of constant unnatural excitement at Argos; and there were demagogues who took advantage of it to instigate the multitude against the wealthier citizens, who, if we may believe Diodorus, were at last driven into a conspiracy for self-defence; but it seems extremely doubtful whether any sufficient proof of the fact was ever obtained. Those on whom suspicion first fell were put to the torture; others killed themselves to avoid it: at length one of the accused, either to obtain relief from torment, or with a motive like that which prompted the confession of Andocides, offered to make a discovery, and informed against thirty of the most eminent citizens, who, it seems, almost without the form of a trial, were put to death and their property confiscated. But this disclosure, as it appeared to confirm the original charge, served rather to inflame than to allay the popular suspicions, which were continually cherished by the arts of the demagogues. Arrests were multiplied, until the number of the prisoners amounted to 1200; and the populace, impatient of legal delays, arming itself with clubs, rose upon them, and massacred them all. This bloody execution became memorable under the name of the *scytalism*.\* The demagogues who had excited the phrensy now endeavoured to restrain it from farther excesses; but the attempt only turned it against themselves, and most of them shared the fate of their victims. Their blood seemed to propitiate the infernal powers: the flame, no longer supplied with fuel, expired, and tranquillity was restored. It must be considered as an indication of a remarkable superiority in the Athenian character and institutions over those of Argos, that, under similar circumstances, in the affair of the *Hermes* busts, when religious and political fanaticism combined their influence to madden the people, no such spectacles were witnessed at Athens.†

The spirit of hostility to Sparta, which had been let loose in Arcadia by the battle of Leuctra, manifested itself, not long after, in a much more important event than the restoration of Mantinea. The chiefs of the parties opposed to the Spartan interest in the principal Arcadian towns concerted a plan for securing the independence of Arcadia, and for raising it to a higher rank than it had hitherto held in the political system of Greece. With a territory more extensive than any other region of Peloponnesus, peopled by a hardy race, proud of its ancient origin and immemorial possession of the land, and of its peculiar religious traditions, Arcadia—the Greek Switzerland—had never possessed any weight in the affairs of the nation: the land only served as a thoroughfare for hostile armies, and sent forth its sons to recruit the forces of foreign powers—Greek or barbarian—and to shed their blood in quarrels in which they had no concern. A wish for a better state of things may have occurred to Arcadian patriots at an earlier period; or it may have been first suggested by the destruction of Mantinea, but it was the battle of Leuctra that opened a prospect of carrying it into effect. A Mantinean named Lycomedes, a man of large fortune and of the highest birth in his native city, seems to have been either the author or the most active mover of the project which was now formed, and which was at least partly executed in the course of the same year (371). The object was to unite the Arcadian people in one body, yet so as not to destroy the independence of the particular states; and with this view it was proposed to found a metropolis, to institute a national council which should be invested with supreme authority in foreign affairs, particularly with regard to peace and war, and to establish a military force for the protection of the public safety.

The plan in itself was one which might have presented itself to a friend of aristocracy who took an interest in the honour and prosperity of Arcadia, as readily as to a man of opposite political sentiments. But the aristocratical interest in the Arcadian towns depended upon Spartan protection; and for Sparta no event was more to be dreaded than one which made Arcadia united, powerful, and independent. The erection of such a state on her northern frontier manifestly tended to exclude her from all political intercourse with the rest of Greece; and it had therefore been a main object of her policy to keep the Arcadian cantons as much as possible separate from each other. And though there is no reason to doubt that Lycomedes, and those who shared his views, were chiefly desirous of rescuing their country from a degrading subjection to her imperious neighbour, and of elevating her to an honourable station among the Greek commonwealths, they undoubtedly did not overlook the accession of strength which would result from this event to their party in its contest with its domestic adversaries. Their plan could not fail to be agreeable to the Thebans, just in proportion as it was alarming to Sparta; and it was very early communicated to Epaminondas. If, indeed, we could rely on some expressions of a late Greek author, according to their literal interpretation, we should suppose that the plan was first conceived by

\* *σκυταλισμός*—from the weapon (*σκυτάλη*) which seems to have been principally used.

† Niebuhr observes that no massacre took place at Athens, and considers this as an effect of the mild, humane character of the people, and of the theatrical amusements by which it was softened and refined. "The people of Argos had but a shadow of Athenian life, and so sank into a savageness into which Athens never fell."

him;\* but it seems rather more probable that he only fostered it with his encouragement and advice, and lent his aid to the execution. Xenophon touches upon this subject with evident reluctance; he mentions the civil discord to which the project of the union gave rise in Arcadia, but scarcely hints at the issue of the struggle; and we are thus forced to depend upon such information as is to be gleaned from later writers, and, after all, are left in ignorance of several interesting particulars. It appears, however, that within a few months after the battle of Leuctra, a meeting of Arcadians from all the principal towns was held to deliberate on the measure; and, under its decree, a body of colonists, collected from various quarters, proceeded to found a new city, which was to be the seat of the general government, and was called Megalepolis, or Megalopolis (the Great City).†

The site chosen was on the banks of the Helisson, a small stream tributary to the Alpheus, in the upper part of the plain—the only one of considerable extent on the western side of Arcadia—through which the river flows before it reaches the gorge at Carytena: at a short distance from one of the passes leading into the vale of the Eurotas, but still nearer to the borders of the Messenia. The site was perfectly level, resembling those of Tegea and Mantinea, and strikingly contrasted to those of the old Arcadian cities. We do not know that Epaminondas was consulted with regard to the situation; but even if he was, it is not certain that his choice was determined by the advantages which the ground offered for defence, as, indeed, none such have yet been discovered in it. It seems more probable that the work was begun in a sanguine and confident spirit, which paid less regard to strength than to convenience of position, and believed that safety would be sufficiently provided for by an ordinary fortification. The city was designed on a very large scale, and the magnitude of the public buildings corresponded to its extent; the theatre was the most spacious in Greece. The territory annexed to it seems to have been chiefly composed of the districts belonging to the Mælian and Parrhasian villages, perhaps nearly the same as during the Peloponnesian war acknowledged the sovereignty of Mantinea, until they were restored to independence by the interference of Sparta; but the population was to be drawn, not from these only, but from a great number of the most ancient Arcadian towns. Pausanias gives a list of forty which were required to contribute to it. The greater part of them appear to have been entirely deserted by their inhabitants; others retained a remnant of their population, but in the condition of villages subject to Megalopolis. It is not quite clear whether the migration was voluntarily undertaken by any, or they all only submitted to a decree of the majority; but there seem to have been few who did not at least submit willingly, and whose attachment to their native seats was not for the time overcome by their enmity to Sparta, or by their patriotic zeal, or by the prospect of the advantages con-

nected with the franchise of a great city.\* Four towns only—Lycoa, Tricoloni, Lycooura, and Trapezus—either retracted their consent, or refused to sacrifice their inclinations to the public will. They were among the most ancient in the land; and it is only remarkable that the same repugnance was not more generally felt. Lycoa and Tricoloni, however, were compelled to yield, and their inhabitants were transferred to Megalopolis. Trapezus made an obstinate resistance; and its citizens who survived the struggle preferred quitting their native land to changing their abode in it, and having found means for embarking for the Euxine, were hospitably received as kinsmen in the city of the same name. Lycooura—which boasted of being the most ancient city under the sun—was spared out of respect to the sanctity of one of its temples. The districts which were thus drained of their population never recovered it, and were left in a great measure uncultivated.

The most interesting subject connected with this event, the constitution under which Arcadia was to be united, is unfortunately involved in the greatest obscurity. Megalopolis was the place appointed for the deliberation of the supreme council of the Arcadian body. But of this council we only know that it was commonly described by the name of the Ten Thousand: an appellation which raises a number of perplexing questions. For that it was a representative assembly, and was not intended to consist only of Megalopolitans, is clear, both from the terms in which it is spoken of, and from the nature of the case: this would have been a privilege which the other cities would never have conceded to a colony formed out of the most insignificant townships. On the other hand, that so numerous a body should have been collected either at stated times, or as often as occasion required, from the other parts of Arcadia, is scarcely less hard to understand. Equally strange does it appear, that no mention should be found of any more select council, which, according to the uniform practice of the Greek democratical states, should have prepared the business to be transacted by the assembly of the Ten Thousand. These difficulties remain just the same, whether the name was used in a vague sense for a great multitude, or was adopted upon an estimate, or—want to be more or less exact, of the numbers which might be brought together for the purpose of consultation. But though no express mention is to be found of a smaller council, there is what may be considered as a trace of one, sufficiently clear, perhaps, where the existence of the thing might fairly be presumed from analogy without any other evidence. Among the buildings of Megalopolis, Pausanias enumerates the council-house of the Ten Thousand, which was called from its founder the Thersilion. But the remains which appear by their position to answer most nearly to the description of the Greek antiquarian, indicate, as we learn from

\* Paus., viii., 27, 2; ix., 14, 4.

† Niebuhr says, "Megalopolis, afterward Megalopolis." Pausanias, ix., 14, 4, *Μεγάλη καὶ ἔκστας ἑνὶ καλίστρᾳ πόλις*; but he calls the citizens *Μεγαλοπολίται*.

\* So Pausanias, viii., 27, 3, 5, speaks of the general *πρόβουλα* διὰ τὸ ἔχθος τῶν Ἀρκάδιων, and the *συνούδιον* with which they obeyed the decree. And he seems as well entitled to credit as Diodorus, who (xv., 94) gives a different view, which, however, is adopted by Niebuhr (Lect.): "The population of forty townships were forced to settle in Megalopolis."

a modern traveller,\* that the edifice to which they belonged was not designed for the meeting of 10,000 persons; nor is it probable, as the same author remarks, that any was appropriated to that purpose, except either the theatre, or one resembling the Athenian *Phryx*. We are therefore inclined to conclude that the *Thersilion* was intended to receive a smaller number of deputies, who were properly the council of the great assembly. And if this was the case, it becomes less important to inquire how the assembly was composed. On the other hand, it is possible that in the enthusiasm with which the undertaking was begun, more was expected than was afterward performed. Ten thousand may have been the amount of the army which it was proposed to keep on foot, and which was also to constitute the assembly for deciding on peace or war, and other questions of public interest.† But the practice may have differed widely from this theory of the Constitution, though the name was retained. Our information is no less defective as to the executive power. Diodorus calls *Lycomedes* the general of the Arcadians; but whether this was the title of the chief magistrate of the Arcadian body, is a question which we cannot resolve. It is certain, however, that there were other magistrates,‡ who no doubt presided in the great council, and, perhaps, composed the smaller one. The force raised for the public service at the outset seems not to have exceeded 5000 men; they were distinguished by a peculiar name, as the *Eparites*—a word probably of appropriate meaning in the Arcadian dialect, but which we do not find explained.§ Their ordinary station was most likely fixed at *Megalopolis*; and if the conjecture just proposed as to the character of the assembly of the Ten Thousand is well founded, it would seem to follow that they must have had votes in it.

Ten commissioners were appointed to superintend the first settlement of the colony, and were honoured with the title of founders. Two of them, *Lycomedes* and *Opoieas*, were *Mantineans*; two, *Timon* and *Proxenus*, were leaders of the democratical party at *Tegea*. Of the rest, two came from *Clitor*, two from *Mænalus*, and as many from the *Parrhasian* cantons.¶ As there was reason to apprehend that *Sparta* might attempt to interrupt the work in its beginning, *Epaminondas* sent *Pammenes*, one of his ablest officers, with 1000 choice troops, to guard and assist the colonists; and hence he also might be looked upon as one of the founders; but it does not appear that he had the foremost, much less, as was sometimes contended, an exclusive claim to that title.¶ It

was not, however, at *Megalopolis* that any opposition was offered to the undertaking; but in other places violent contests arose between the advocates and the adversaries of the new measure. At *Orchomenus* it seems to have been viewed with general aversion, not merely because of the aristocratical ascendancy in the government, but also on account of the neighbourly hatred felt towards *Mantineæ*; and the animosity of the *Orchomenians* was, perhaps, inflamed by the loss of three of their subject towns, *Thisioa*, *Methydrium*, and *Teuthis*, which were annexed to the territory of the new capital. They openly renounced all connexion with the Arcadian body, and received a garrison composed, according to *Diodorus*, of 1000 *Lacedæmonians*, and of 600 *Bæotian* and *Argive* refugees, who had been collected at *Corinth* under the command of one *Polytropus*, who would therefore seem to have been a *Spartan*; but *Xenophon* merely describes them as mercenaries. It was, however, at *Tegea*, the chief seat of *Spartan* and aristocratical influence in *Arcadia*, that the hardest struggle took place. Though *Proxenus* and *Timon* had been deputed as founders of *Megalopolis*, *Stasippus* and his partisans did not cease to exert their utmost efforts to counteract the plan of the union, and to keep *Tegea* in its ancient state of subservience to *Sparta*, or, as *Xenophon* expresses it, probably in their language, in the enjoyment of its hereditary institutions. *Proxenus* and another democratical leader, named *Callibius*, conscious, though they were outvoted in the oligarchical councils, that the majority of the citizens was on their side, appealed to arms. *Stasippus*, however, was able to meet them with an equal force, and an engagement ensued outside the walls, in which *Proxenus* was slain and his followers put to flight; but *Stasippus*, who was by nature averse to bloodshed, would not suffer them to be pursued. *Callibius*, having collected his scattered troops, returned towards the city, and posting them close to the walls, opened a negotiation with his adversaries. This, however, was only a stratagem to gain time; for he was every hour expecting a re-enforcement which he had sent for from *Mantineæ*. As soon as it appeared, some of his men scaled the walls and threw open the gates. *Stasippus* and some of his party immediately quitted the city by another road, and, before they were overtaken, reached a temple of *Artemis*, where they barred themselves in. But their enemies respected the sanctity of the place no more than Greeks usually did on such occasions; and having induced them to surrender, by assailing them with missiles from the roof, conveyed them, bound, on a wagon to *Tegea*, where, after a mock trial, in which the *Mantineans* assisted as judges, they put them all to death. Their surviving partisans, to the number of 800, fled to *Sparta*.

The safety of *Sparta* seemed to require that she should not passively submit to the blow thus struck at the last remains of her influence in *Arcadia*; and among the *Tegean* refugees were several private friends of *Agessilaus*, and

\* *Leake*, *Mores*, ii., p. 39.

† *Wachsmuth*, i., 2, p. 293, takes a similar view of the subject, only he considers 10,000 as a rough estimate of the whole military force of *Arcadia*; but this, according to *Mr. Clinton's* calculations (*F. H.*, ii., p. 419), would be too far below the truth. *Niebuhr* observes, "*Megalopolis* was to be the centre of *Arcadia*, and in *Arcadia* 10,000 were to form a rural commonalty (*eine Gemeinde von Landleuten*), but were not all to reside in *Megalopolis*." He afterward calls them *das Collegium der 10,000*.

‡ *Ἀρχοὶ*; *Xen.*, H., vii., 4, 33.

§ Unless it was equivalent to *Ἐκκλησία*, which *Diodorus* substitutes for it, xv., 62.

¶ *Paus.*, viii., 27, 1. The remark of *Pausanias*, viii., 27, 1, seems to have been pressed too far by some modern writers. So *Colonel Leake* speaks of *Epaminondas* as choosing the site of the

new capital of *Arcadia*: an assertion for which we want better authority. What *Pausanias* says, ix., 14, 4, as to the foundation of *Megalopolis*, is not more accurate than the accompanying statement about the rebuilding of *Mantineæ*.

probably of other leading Spartans, who solicited redress and revenge against the Mantineaans, and their political adversaries. The interference of Mantinea in the civil feuds of Tegea was construed as a violation of the principle which had been recognised in all the treaties concluded since the peace of Antalcidas, and therefore afforded a fair colour for taking up arms; and war was accordingly declared against Mantinea on this ground.\* But the strongest motive by which the Spartan government was urged to this step, appears to have been the necessity which it felt for some effort which should restore confidence and cheerfulness at home; for, notwithstanding the heroic countenance with which the news of the battle of Leuctra had been received, it had made an impression of deep despondency, from which the city had not yet recovered. After the return of the defeated army, a grave question had arisen as to the manner in which it should be treated. According to the precedents of earlier times, the Spartan who saved his life by flight was subject to the loss of all his civil privileges, and to marks of ignominy; and we have seen that it was thought necessary to inflict a temporary degradation on the prisoners who had surrendered—with the permission of their superiors—at Sphacteria.† There were some who held that the dishonour which the Spartan arms had incurred at Leuctra could only be effaced by a rigorous enforcement of the ancient martial law. But Agesilaus, and probably most other members of the government, saw that such severity would be now very ill-timed; and, according to Plutarch, he was empowered to frame some new regulations on this head; but, instead of any formal innovation, simply proposed that the law should be suffered to sleep for this once, without prejudice to its application on future occasions.‡ It was, however, on this account the more desirable to divert the thoughts of the people from the recent disaster by a fresh expedition; and Agesilaus was now sufficiently recovered from his illness to take the command.

Xenophon says that he marched with one mora, probably meaning only the Spartan division of his forces. He was joined by troops from Heræa and Lepreum, and sent for Polytropus and his mercenaries from Orchomenus. In the mean while the Arcadians had collected their forces at Asea, near the frontier of Laconia, all but the Mantineaans, who did not think it safe to leave their city exposed to the attack of Polytropus, and, therefore, first marched against Orchomenus; and, though they were compelled to retire from the town, in their retreat they made a successful stand against Polytropus, who was pursuing with his light troops, killed him, and made some slaughter among his men. Agesilaus was at this time waiting for him in the small

Arcadian town of Eutæa, which he found quite defenceless; for all the men of military age were absent in the camp at Asea, and the walls were in a ruinous condition. Yet with politic generosity—for Sparta needed friends more than spoil—he not only spared persons and property, but even employed his men in repairing the walls. When he heard of the death of Polytropus, he continued his march towards Mantinea, leaving the Arcadians in his rear. They soon followed in the same track; and he might have attacked them before they joined the Mantineaans: some of his council urged him to do so; but he thought himself too near the hostile city, or perhaps, as Plutarch says, wished, if possible, to avoid a battle, and therefore suffered them to form the junction unmolested. He himself was soon after re-enforced by the light troops from Orchomenus, and by a squadron of cavalry from Phlius; and the enemy was strengthened by a body of Argives. Neither side, however, was willing to fight: Agesilaus, because his first care was to husband the strength of Sparta; the Arcadians, because they expected soon to be joined by a Theban army; for they were informed by the Eleans that Thebes had borrowed ten talents from Elis for the purpose of the meditated expedition. Perhaps the same intelligence increased the anxiety of Agesilaus to return home. But that his retreat might not appear to be the effect of fear, he remained three days before Mantinea, and ravaged the plain;\* and then marched back with the utmost speed. Still the honour of Sparta had been vindicated, and the fallen spirits of his countrymen were cheered by the result of the expedition.

The Thebans were, in fact, advancing with a powerful army, and not long after joined the Arcadians—who employed the interval after the retreat of Agesilaus in an inroad into the Heræan territory—at Mantinea. The victory of Leuctra had so completely changed their position, that they had now the forces of almost all northern Greece, except Attica, at their command. Even Phocis, though as hostile as ever, was compelled to aid them against her late allies. All the Eubœan towns, the Locrians, both of the east and west, the Acarnanians, the Trachinian Heraclea, and the Malians,† contributed to swell their army; and Thessaly furnished cavalry and targeteers. The whole force now assembled at Mantinea amounted, according to Diodorus, to 50,000; according to Plutarch, to 70,000 men, of whom 40,000 were heavy-armed.‡ The professed object of the expedition was to protect Mantinea, and, as it now was no longer in danger, and the season—it was mid winter—was unfavourable to military operations, several of the Theban commanders proposed to return. Xenophon, indeed, who still mentions none of their great names, represents them as at first unanimous on this head, and as only detained by the persuasion of their Peloponnesian allies, who urged them to invade Laconia. But we can more easily believe Plutarch's statement: that Epaminondas and Pelopidas, who were both in command as Bœo-

\* Xenophon's language, H., vi., 5, 30, *συνθηρίων ἀναι—κατὰ τοὺς ἔθνη*, seems more applicable to the oath prescribed by the congress at Athens than to that of the treaty previous to the battle of Leuctra, which did not impose any obligation. Yet it is hardly credible that Sparta sent deputies to the congress. † Vol. i., p. 390.

‡ So Plutarch, Ages., 30. Valerius Maximus, vii., 2, E., 12, refers the suspension of the laws to a different occasion, which will shortly be mentioned; and we are strongly inclined to suspect that the expression of Agesilaus reported by Plutarch belongs to that occasion, not to this, where it is certainly much less appropriate.

\* Plutarch, Ages., 30, adds that he took a small town belonging to the Mantineaans. One might suspect that he had only read about Eutæa.

† Or, according to Xen., Ages., ii., 24, Eubœians.

‡ Ages., 31.

tarchs, were no less desirous not to let slip such an opportunity of crushing or humbling Sparta, and, indeed, it can hardly be doubted that they had already conceived the design of a great work which they executed before they withdrew from Peloponnesus. But it seems that they had some difficulty in obtaining the consent of their colleagues, who were disposed to exaggerate the obstacles of the Laconian frontier, and the resistance which they had to expect when they should have crossed it. They expected to find all the passes, which were naturally difficult, strongly guarded, and could not at once reconcile themselves to the thought of seeking an enemy, who till lately had been deemed almost invincible, in his own country, where he would be animated by the strongest motives to extraordinary exertions. Their apprehensions were only overcome when they received invitations and assurances of support from Laconia itself, and were encouraged by some of the provincials, who came for that purpose to the camp, to expect that the appearance of their army would produce a general revolt of the subject population, which, it was said, had already refused to obey the orders of the government when it was summoned to the defence of Sparta. They were also informed that one of the principal passes, which led through Caryæ and Sellasia into the vale of the Eurotas, was quite unguarded; and some of the inhabitants of Caryæ offered themselves as guides, and were ready to pledge their lives for the truth of their assertions. The invasion was then unanimously resolved upon.

To distract the enemy's attention, and to accelerate their own movements, the invaders divided their forces so as to penetrate into Laconia simultaneously by different routes. Xenophon speaks only of two divisions, that of the Thebans, who were to take the road which led through Caryæ into the valley of the Cénus, and that of the Arcadians, who were to cross the border more to the west, and to traverse the district called Sciritis. But from Diodorus we learn that there were two other divisions, consisting one of the Argives, the other of the Eleans; and though he has not very distinctly described their lines of march, it seems clear that they formed the two wings of the invading army, the Argives making a circuit which brought them through the Thyreatis over Mount Parnon, the Eleans one by which they were led into the upper vale of the Eurotas. Sellasia was the place of rendezvous appointed for all the four divisions. The Thebans and the Eleans appear to have met with no resistance. The Argives found the passes guarded by a body of troops, consisting partly of Boeotian refugees, commanded by a Spartan named Alexander, who, however, was overpowered, and fell with 200 of his men. The pass of the Sciritis might also have been occupied, and, from its natural strength, it was believed that the Arcadians would never have been able to force it; but Ischolaus, a Spartan, who was posted near it at the village of Ium, with a garrison of neodamode troops, and about 400 of the exiled Tegeans, instead of securing the pass, determined to make his stand in the village, where he was surrounded by the enemy and slain, with almost every one of his men. The four

divisions then effected their junction without farther opposition, and after having plundered and burned Sellasia, descended to the banks of the Eurotas, and encamped in a sanctuary of Apollo at the entrance of the plain of Sparta. The next day they pursued their march along the left bank of the river, which was swollen by the winter rains, until they reached the bridge which crossed it directly over against the city. A body of heavy-armed, which appeared on the other side, deterred them from attempting the passage, and they proceeded, still keeping the left bank, to plunder and destroy the dwellings which were thickly scattered in the neighbourhood of the capital, and which, from Xenophon's description, who says they were full of good things, seem to have been chiefly villas of the more opulent Spartans, and were probably better stored and furnished than their houses in the town. It was the first time that fires kindled by a hostile army had ever been seen from Sparta since it had been in the possession of the Dorian race; and the grief and consternation excited by the spectacle in the women and the elder part of the men, were proportioned not merely to its strangeness, but to the pride and confidence with which the traditions of so many centuries had taught them to regard their soil as inviolate, and their city, though unwall'd, as impregnable.

The danger which threatened the state was indeed sufficient to have shaken any ordinary courage. A handful of Spartans was the only force that could be securely relied on for the defence of an open city, spread over a great extent of ground, against the mighty host which was now separated from it only by the river. The subject population, free and servile, was in part at least either in declared revolt, refusing to obey the requisitions of the government, or notoriously disaffected. And the recollection of Cinadon's plot might suggest suspicions—as the event proved, not unfounded—of disloyalty even among the members of the ruling class. But, however faithful they might be to one another, the terror of some, and the rashness of others, might in a moment defeat every precaution, and involve the whole in ruin. In this emergency all eyes were turned upon Agesilaus. As he was fully aware of the danger, so he clearly perceived the course which could alone afford a prospect of deliverance. To remain strictly on the defensive, and, in case of an attack, to take advantage of the inequalities of the ground, and of the position of the streets and buildings in the outskirts of the town, and in the mean while to maintain tranquillity and obedience within, was all that was left to be done, and this, with the means at his disposal, demanded all his abilities. The Spartans, when distributed over the wide range which they had to defend, made so poor a show that the government thought it necessary to resort to an expedient which had been adopted before on less urgent occasions; to arm as many of the Helots as could be induced to enlist by a promise of emancipation; and notwithstanding the atrocious purpose which had been cloaked by a similar proposal in former times, more than 6000 volunteers now presented themselves. Their services were accepted with trembling, and em-

ployed with continued distrust, until the arrival of some foreign auxiliaries gave a little more security to the government. Not many days after, a small force—probably less than 6000 strong—collected from Corinth, Sicyon, Pellene, Epidaurus, Træzen, Hermione, and Halia, having been transported in succession over the Argolic Gulf to Brasæ on the coast of Laconia, crossed the mountains, and, though the enemy was encamped only two or three miles off, made its way into the city.

In the mean while the invading army, having ravaged the eastern side of the plain till it came over against Amyclæ, then crossed the river and turned its front towards Sparta. As the greatest breadth of the plain lies between the river and the foot of Taygetus, still more spoil was found here than on the other side, and this with the greater part of the allies was the single object of attention. The Theban generals alone appear to have been able to prevent their troops from ranging at large in quest of plunder, and to have taken precautions against a surprise from the city. What Epaminondas most desired was to draw the enemy into an engagement, and he is said to have tried the effect of a taunting challenge on Agesilaus, whose temper was not always proof against provocation. But on this occasion he controlled his own feelings, and calmed the general excitement by his authority and example. When this attempt failed, and the sight of the devastation committed for three or four days by the invaders did not rouse the Spartans from their defensive attitude, the cavalry was ordered to advance towards the city, perhaps in the hope that a skirmish might ensue, and become the occasion of a general action; if, indeed, we may not conjecture a deeper design, and suppose that this movement was concerted with a disaffected party within, which at least seems to have seized this opportunity of declaring itself, in a manner which at any other juncture, or without some understanding with the enemy, would appear to have been strangely imprudent. The Spartans had a small body of cavalry, very inferior not only in numbers, but in condition, to that of the allies; it was, however, drawn up on the level south of the city. Its appearance served rather to heighten than to check the confidence of the assailants. But an adjacent building, which was consecrated by tradition as the house of the tutelary Twins, concealed about 300 of the young Spartan infantry, who, when the enemy drew near, started from their ambush to support the charge which was made at the same time by their own cavalry. This unexpected attack threw the advancing squadrons into confusion, and though they were pursued but to a short distance, they did not stop till they reached the Theban phalanx, and even a part of the infantry were so much alarmed by their fight as to begin a hasty retreat. It was perhaps on this occasion, while the allies were advancing, that a band of about 200 men, who had for the most part been long suspected by the government, occupied the Issorium, one of the heights on the skirt of the town towards the river. As they had received no orders, it was evident that they were acting with treasonable designs, and some proposed that they should be forthwith dislodged by force. Agesilaus, however, thought

it more prudent, as the extent of the conspiracy was not known, to try a milder course, and going up to the place with a single attendant, affected to believe that they had mistaken his orders, and directed them to station themselves in different quarters. They obeyed, thinking that they had escaped detection; but fifteen of them were arrested by the orders of Agesilaus, and put to death without form of trial in the night. The suppression of this attempt may have led to the discovery of another more dangerous conspiracy, in which a number of Spartans were implicated. They were arrested in a house where they held clandestine meetings. The clearer their guilt, the more dangerous it probably appeared to bring them to trial; yet there was no power in the state which could legally put a Spartan to death without one. Even the authority of the ephors had never yet been carried so far. They determined, however, after a consultation with Agesilaus, to dispense with legal forms,\* and the prisoners were delivered to a secret execution. The desertions which took place among the Helots and the Laconian troops were carefully concealed from public knowledge; but this may not indicate their frequency, so much as the vigilance of Agesilaus.

The reports brought to the camp of the allies as to the state of things in Sparta did not encourage Epaminondas to repeat the attempt in which the cavalry had been repulsed, or to prolong his stay in the neighbourhood of the capital. He directed his march southward, and ravaged the whole vale of the Eurotas as far as the coast. Some unvalled towns were committed to the flames, and an assault was made for three successive days on Gythium, the naval arsenal of Sparta, but without success. If it was the design of Epaminondas to take advantage of the discontent which was supposed to prevail in the subject population towards the government, to effect a permanent revolution, the devastation committed by his allies, which he was probably unable to restrain, must have tended to counteract it. He was joined, Xenophon says, by some of the provincials; but the majority must have looked upon the invaders as enemies. Their stay was protracted for some weeks. At length the Peloponnesian troops began to withdraw with their booty, leaving the country almost exhausted. The growing scarcity of provisions and diminution of numbers, combined with the hardships of the season, would have admonished Epaminondas to retire, even if, as Xenophon would lead his readers to suppose, his only business, after recrossing the border, had been to march homeward. But the historian, professing to mention all the motives which induced the Thebans to quit Laconia, has carefully suppressed the main object which Epaminondas had in view, and which he accomplished during his stay in the peninsula. He meditated a blow much more destructive to the power and prosperity of Spar-

\* This is the occasion to which, as has been mentioned in a preceding note, we believe the proposal of Agesilaus (Plut., Ages., 30) that the laws should be allowed to sleep for one day, but should remain in force ever after, ought to be referred. On the occasion to which Plutarch assigns it, it is difficult to understand what particular day could be meant, or how Agesilaus should have been led to use such a phrase.

ta than the invasion of her territory. His design was to deprive her of Messenia, to collect the Messenians in the land of their forefathers, and to found a new city, where they might maintain their independence. He had already sent to the various regions in which the remains of the heroic people were scattered, to invite them to return to their ancient home. After the close of the Peloponnesian war, those who had found refuge in Naupactus were expelled by their triumphant enemy. A part betook themselves to their kinsmen in Rhegium and Messana; but the greater number crossed over to Africa, in compliance with a timely invitation which they received from the inhabitants of Hesperia, one of the Cyrenaic cities, who, pressed by the assaults of their barbarian neighbours, sent to Greece to collect new settlers. Pausanias intimates that some had already arrived in Peloponnesus, and were consulted by Epaminondas on the site of the city which he was about to build for them.\* It is, however, hardly credible that he was himself undecided on that point, or that he ever turned his thoughts with this view to Andania or Ecehalia. Ithome was recommended at once by the most animating recollections, and by the advantages of its strong and central position; and the western slope of the ridge on which the ancient stronghold stood was selected for the new city, Messene. The foundations were laid with the utmost solemnity; and, if we may trust Pausanias, Epaminondas, on this occasion, did not disdain to practise a pious fraud, for the purpose of showing that the undertaking was sanctioned by the will of the gods. We read of visions in which the priestly hero Caucon appeared, first to him, and then to Epiteles, the commander of the Argive forces, and which led to the discovery of a metal roll, on which were inscribed the liturgical forms which Caucon was said to have brought from Eleusis into Messenia. It was believed to have been buried at Mount Ithome by Aristomenes, when he found that the end of his struggle was approaching, in conformity to an ancient prophecy, as a pledge vouchsafed by the gods, on condition that it should be kept secret until the destined hour arrived for the restoration of his country. The name of Aristomenes was invoked with peculiar veneration, not only by the Messenians, but by the Greeks of every race who took part in the founding of the city; and the victory of Leuctra was, now perhaps for the first time, ascribed to his supernatural interposition. But, though Epaminondas did not neglect the aid to be derived from pious and patriotic enthusiasm, he at least paid equal attention to all the material means of securing the duration of his work. The most judicious use was made of the natural advantages of the site; the most approved architects of the day were employed upon the plan, and the most skillful workmen in the execution; and the fortifications of Messene, which, some centuries later, excited the admiration of Pausanias, are still found to justify his praise by the solid and beautiful masonry of the remains which are yet standing.

The population of the new capital undoubtedly did not consist wholly of the Messenians who were recalled from foreign lands by the in-

itation of Epaminondas; though we do not perceive so great a difficulty as some authors have found in adopting the statement of Pausanias, which leads us to suppose that they had already returned to Peloponnesus when the first stone of Messene was laid. This, indeed, would be scarcely possible, if the design of building the city had first occurred to the Theban general after he entered Peloponnesus; but it seems probable that he had been long meditating it, and perhaps he had formed it soon after the battle of Leuctra. That event, which was generally considered as a death-blow to the Spartan power, may have excited hopes in the Messenian Helots of recovering their independence, and their wishes may have been secretly communicated to the Theban government. The proceedings of the Arcadians would confirm them in their projects, and the foundation of Megalopolis might easily suggest the thought of a new Messenian capital to Epaminondas. We do not, indeed, venture, with a modern historian,\* to interpret a vague, and certainly hyperbolical, expression of Xenophon's, into an intimation that a general insurrection had taken place in Messenia soon after the battle of Leuctra; but it seems highly probable that the Messenian Helots broke out into open revolt as soon as they heard of the arrival of the Theban army in the peninsula, and that their envoys were among the most urgent in exciting Epaminondas to invade Laconia. They no doubt contributed the largest share to the population of Messene: whether they were admitted to a perfect equality with the Naupactian exiles, who, as they were singularly tenacious of their Dorian dialect and customs, probably included many Dorian families, is a different question. It seems at least clear, from the accounts of Diodorus and Pausanias, that they were considered as the core of the colony, though the Spartans always affected to treat the whole as a mere mass of revolted Helots.† Indeed, it is difficult to understand the remark of Polybius‡—that the democratical equality which was established at a later period at Messene gave great offence to the old citizens—except on the supposition that its institutions were from the beginning aristocratical. And—notwithstanding the prevalence of democratical principles in the states of the Theban confederacy—the distinction which must have been felt between men who had been lately serfs and men who had been always free, might have been universally admitted as a sufficient ground of a political inequality between the two classes. The Messenian Gorgus, whom Polybius describes as distinguished among his fellow-citizens by his birth and his wealth, as well as by the prizes

\* Meno, iii., 2, p. 80. It is, it must be observed, in a passage where Xenophon is merely alluding to the events which had taken place in Laconia, and that for the purpose of eulogizing the Philianians, that he uses the expression ἀποστάντων πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων. In his own direct narrative of the same occurrences he had already informed us that the Helots were so far from having all revolted, that they were invited by the government to enrol themselves in the regular infantry, and accepted its offers with great willingness.

† Isocr., Archid.

‡ vii., 10. Ὅσους δημοκρατίας κατὰ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους, καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀξιόλων ἀνδρῶν πεφυλασμένους, τῶν δὲ κατὰ κεκληρονομήσαντας τὰς τοῦτον οὐσίας ἐπικρατούντων τῆς πολιτείας ὁσυχέρως ἐπέφρονε τὴν τοῦτον ἰσχυροτέραν εἰ μὴ οὖν τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτῶν.

which he gained in the national games,\* reminds us by his name of the son of Aristomenes, who led the colony to Rhegium; and it may safely be presumed that families which traced their descent to the companions of that hero and of his sons, were viewed in a very different light from those which had submitted to the conqueror, and had been degraded by ages of servitude.†

If there was a privileged class of this kind, it probably enjoyed peculiar advantages in the distribution of the territory. But, however this may have been, all the lands which had hitherto been in the hands of the Spartans now undoubtedly became the property of their cultivators and the other new settlers. This portion probably included the most valuable part of the inland districts. Those which belonged to the subject-freemen, which lay chiefly near the coast, continued, perhaps, to be held on the same terms as under the preceding government. But the whole country was not immediately recovered from the dominion of Sparta. Some of the towns were guarded by Lacedæmonian garrisons. Such, at least, was the case with Asine; though Pausanias says that the Dryopes were permitted to retain it because they had refused to aid the Spartans in the second Messenian war;‡ and therefore we cannot rely with perfect confidence on a statement—otherwise probable enough—of the same author: that the Nauplians, who prudently propitiated the new lords of the soil with presents and professions of loyalty, were left in possession of Methone.

When the fortifications of Messene had been carried so far that the presence of the army was no longer needed, Epaminondas, leaving a garrison there, began his march homeward. The building of Messene is so coupled with that of Megalopolis in the accounts of Diodorus and Pausanias, that we may, perhaps, infer that he did not pass through Arcadia without contributing some important assistance to the latter work, which was still in progress. An enemy, however, still awaited him at the Isthmus. In their distress, the Spartans had applied for succour to Athens; and their ambassadors were accompanied by envoys from the Peloponnesian states which still adhered to them, among whom those of Corinth and Phlius appear to have supported their request with the greatest earnestness. They appealed to the generosity, to the jealousy, to the fears, and the hopes of the Athenians. Some discussion arose in the assembly as to the right or obligation of interference. The conduct of the Mantineans in the civil war of Tegea was regarded in various lights: by some as an unjustifiable aggression, by others as a rightful defence of the aggrieved democratical party; and, according to these different views, the Spartan invasion of Mantinea, which had provoked the retaliation of the Arcadians, was either condemned as an encroachment on the rights of an independent state, or vindicated as an act permitted, and even required, by the principle laid down in the last congress, and

which, therefore, entitled Sparta to the aid of the Athenians. The Corinthian envoy observed, that whatever difference of opinion there might be on this question, the Thebans had, at least, been guilty of an unprovoked aggression towards his own city, having, in their passage through its territory, committed various acts of wanton hostility. But there was already a general disposition among the people, if not in favour of Sparta, yet strongly adverse to Thebes. The assembly, after having heard the ambassadors, would not listen to any arguments on the other side, but decreed that the whole force of the commonwealth should march to the relief of Sparta, and appointed Iphicrates to the command. An army was immediately raised; and the troops are described by Xenophon as so zealous in the cause, that they murmured because Iphicrates halted for a few days at Corinth. But when they resumed their march, expecting, the historian says, to be led to some glorious action, no such result ensued. It seems that Iphicrates had no wish to seek the enemy, and perhaps, having heard that Sparta was freed from immediate danger, he contented himself with attacking some places in Arcadia, either for the sake of plunder or in the hope that this diversion might hasten the enemy's retreat from Laconia. But it does not appear that his operations produced any effect on those of the Theban army.\* When Epaminondas began to move towards the Isthmus, he posted himself there to guard the passes at the southern extremity; but, through some oversight, which Xenophon notices with evident surprise, as an extraordinary failure of his military skill, he left the most convenient of them—that on the side of Cenchreæ—open; and the Thebans penetrated, without any opposition, to the Isthmus. A body of cavalry, which was sent to observe their movements, and which, Xenophon says, was larger than that purpose required, though insufficient for any other, approached so near as to be drawn into a skirmish, and lost some men in its retreat. With this little advantage over one of the greatest captains of the age, who commanded the forces of the only power which could now be considered as a rival to Thebes, Epaminondas concluded this memorable campaign.†

The services which he had rendered to his country were, in general, duly appreciated by his fellow-citizens; but they excited, and did not disarm the envy of some inferior minds; and the expedition itself, successful as it had been, afforded them a pretext for assailing him. The yearly term for which he held his office of *Boetarch* had expired, it seems, soon after he entered Peloponnesus, and he and his colleagues

\* Yet it is rather for want of better authority to confirm it than on account of its intrinsic improbability, that we hesitate to admit the assertion of Nepos, *Iphicr.*, ii., 5, that the expedition of Iphicrates caused the Thebans to withdraw from before Sparta. Diodorus (xv., 65) says that the Athenians were too late (*ὑπερσπείροντες τῷ καιρῷ*), meaning apparently too late to save Laconia from devastation. Xenophon has left the movements of Iphicrates in great obscurity, through his desire to keep clear of all allusions to the foundation of Messene.

† Pausanias, however, adds (ix., 14, 7), that he appeared before Athens, and that Iphicrates restrained the Athenians from marching out to give him battle. Possibly the only mistake in this statement is, that it represents the presence of Iphicrates, instead of his absence, as the cause which prevented the Athenians from fighting. According to Xenophon, he must have been in the rear of Epaminondas.

\* Polyb., vii., 10, 2. Probably the son of Eclectus, whose statue at Olympia is mentioned by Pausanias, vi., 14, 11.

† Niebuhr, however, expressed, we believe, the common opinion when he observed of Messene, "Sparta had now a purely democratical people by her side."

‡ *ib.*, xv., 8. Compare *ib.*, 13, 8.



had retained their command, without any express sanction, three or four months longer. On this ground he and Pelopidas were separately charged with a capital offence. It was merely an experiment to try the strength of their popularity; for their conduct, though perhaps it infringed the letter of the law, was manifestly in accordance with the will of the people. It is, indeed, somewhat surprising that their adversaries should have ventured on such an attempt, and still more that the issue, as we learn from Plutarch, was considered doubtful, because Pelopidas was first brought to trial. Epaminondas, it is said, declared himself willing to die, provided the names of Leuctra, Sparta, and Messene, and the deeds by which his own was connected with them, might be inscribed upon his tomb. Both, however, were acquitted in the most honourable manner;\* and Pelopidas, less magnanimous or more irritable than his philosophical friend, who would have forgiven the harmless display of malice, afterward employed the forms of law to crush their principal accusers.†

## CHAPTER XL.

FROM THE FOUNDING OF MESSENE TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEÆ.

The storm had passed over Sparta, and, chiefly, perhaps, through the prudence and energy displayed at this critical juncture by Agesilaus, had left her standing erect; but it had shaken her power to the centre, had stripped her of the fairest half of her territories, and converted it into a stronghold for a foe from whom she had to expect implacable and active hostility, and who possessed the means of offering her continual annoyance. The prospect of the internal disorders likely to be produced by the blow which deprived so many of her citizens of the whole or the greater part of their property, was sufficient to excite alarm for the safety of her institutions; and she still saw herself exposed to the recurrence of the same danger which had lately threatened her very existence. The whole line of her frontier was encompassed by

\* In the case of Epaminondas, it is said (Paus., ix., 14, 7) that the judges would not go through the form of voting before they dismissed the charge. Compare Plutarch, Reg. et Imp., Apoph., 22.

† Manco (Sparta, iii., 2, p. 219) objects to Dodwell's arrangement of the events following the battle of Leuctra down to the return of the Thebans from Peloponnesus, and assigns the spring of the archon Lysistratus (368) for the close of the campaign in which Messene was built. His chief argument seems to be, that otherwise there will be no events to fill the year between April, 369, and April, 368. He also lays some stress on the authority of Diodorus, who places the invasion of Laconia under Lysistratus. But he neither rejects the testimony of Pausanias, who distinctly refers the founding of Megalopolis to the archonship of Phæradides, and that of Messene to the year of Dycinætes, or attempts to explain it away in a manner which seems very unsatisfactory; intimating, if we understand him right, that Pausanias is in each case speaking, not of the act, but of the design; for with regard to Messene, at least, nothing can be plainer than that, according to the belief of Pausanias, not a stone was laid before the arrival of Epaminondas. It would have been better, if necessary, openly to discard the testimony of Pausanias altogether. But it is neither necessary for any purpose, nor convenient. If, according to Dodwell's arrangement, there is a scarcity of events in the year of Lysistratus, Manco seems not to have observed that, according to his own, the latter half of that year is much too crowded; for he supposes the second invasion of Peloponnesus to take place in the course of the same spring in which the first expedition ended.

enemies, who might again invite and support an invader; and within the peninsula her allies were few and feeble. Beyond the Isthmus there was no power to which she could look for efficacious assistance but her ancient rival; and one of the first measures of the government, when Laconia was relieved from the enemy's presence, was to send an embassy to Athens, for the purpose of cementing the alliance between the two states, and of concerting plans for mutual defence. The Athenian council, in compliance with the views of the Peloponnesian ministers—for envoys came from Phlius and other allied states—proposed a decree to the assembly, by which it was to be declared that the naval armaments of the confederacy were to be under the control of Athens, the land forces to be commanded by Sparta. This arrangement, which was warmly recommended by the Phliasian envoy, seemed at first to meet with general approbation. But Cephisodotus, an Athenian orator, appears to have thought the opportunity favourable for the display of superior sagacity, and, having pointed out to his fellow-citizens that they were placing themselves under a disadvantage—inasmuch as while they would have to serve under Spartan generals, none but Helots, or subjects of Sparta, would man the Laconian contingents in the allied fleets—he succeeded in rousing their jealousy. The proposed decree was amended, and the command by sea and land was assigned to each state alternately for five days. The Peloponnesian envoys, who came invested with full powers, and were conscious that they appeared in a character which was, in fact, that of suppliants, were forced to acquiesce in this absurd distribution of authority, which manifestly tended to defeat the purposes for which the alliance was formed.

In the spring of 368 Epaminondas again marched at the head of a Theban army to invade Peloponnesus. The forces of Athens, under Chabrias, had already joined those of Sparta and her other allies at the Isthmus, and, according to Diodorus, numbered 20,000 men, while the Thebans scarcely exceeded the third of that amount. Yet the allies thought it necessary to throw up an intrenchment across the Isthmus, between Cenchreæ and Lechæum, and when the Thebans encamped in the plain, remained on the defensive, and declined their offer of battle. Xenophon, who says nothing of the intrenchment, but only observes that the Lacedæmonians occupied the weakest position, on the western side, represents Epaminondas as first gaining a partial advantage over them by surprise, and then as having been permitted to descend unmolested on the plain of Sicyon, through the remissness of the Spartan commander, who might easily have defended the pass. Diodorus merely relates that he forced the enemy's lines. Having thus effected a junction with his Peloponnesian allies, he first led them against Sicyon and Pellene, and, it appears, compelled both cities to renounce their alliance with Sparta,\* and then, to gratify Argos, proceeded to ravage the territory of Epidaurus. On his return to the Isthmus, he made an attempt upon Corinth, which was victorious—

\* Xenophon (vii., 1, 18) only speaks of an attack: *προσέβηεν*. Diodorus (xv., 69) says *καταλύσαντες* *προσέβηεν*.

ly repulsed by Chabrias, and soon after a Syracusan squadron of twenty galleys sailed into Lechæum, with a body of barbarian mercenaries, Celts and Iberians, and a troop of about fifty horse, sent by Dionysius to the aid of his allies. This cavalry distinguished itself above that of Athens and Corinth in the skirmishes which took place while the enemy remained at the Isthmus; but in the course of a few days the Thebans returned home, and their allies disbanded their troops. Whether their departure was hastened by the arrival of the Syracusan re-enforcement—which, after having gained some trifling advantage over the Sicyonians, itself returned to Sicily in the autumn—does not appear. It may have been the effect of jealousy, which was beginning to arise between Thebes and the chief of her Peloponnesian confederates. For the Arcadians, since they had been united in one body, manifested a new spirit of national pride and independence, which was sedulously cherished by Lycomedes, who bade them consider that their support was no less necessary to Thebes than it had been to Sparta, and urged them no longer to content themselves with a subordinate station. They eagerly listened to his persuasions, and though no breach immediately ensued, it soon became evident that they no longer looked upon Thebes as their champion and guardian, but rather wished to show that they did not need her aid. They made a successful expedition to the relief of Argos against Chabrias and the Corinthians, and another for the purpose of reducing Asine in Messenia, which was still held by a Lacedæmonian garrison. They seem, indeed, here to have failed in their main object, but they ravaged the suburbs, gained a victory over the garrison, and slew the Spartan commander. They were still more fortunate in an irruption which they made into Laconia, where they stormed Pellana in the upper vale of the Eurotas, put the Lacedæmonian garrison, amounting to about 300, to the sword, and carried away the inhabitants into slavery. No hardships or difficulties could damp their ardour; and they were so elated with the consciousness of their strength, that they began to neglect not only the Thebans, but their other allies; and, instead of restoring the Triphylian towns to Elis, claimed them as their own, on the ground that the Triphylians regarded themselves as Arcadians. Thus the same object of contention which had caused the quarrel between Elis and Sparta, now began to estrange Elis from her new allies.

Towards the end of the year an attempt was made to bring about a general pacification; but the proposal came not from any of the belligerents, but from a quarter where it might have been supposed that the discord of the Greeks would have been viewed with no feeling but pleasure. A Greek of Abydos, named Philiscus, was employed for this purpose by Ariobarzanes, the Persian satrap of the Hellespont, in the name, it would seem, of Artaxerxes, though without any commission from the court of Susa.\* Ariobarzanes had his private motives for wishing to serve Sparta, and his agent came amply furnished with money, as well as clothed with

the authority which the Persian king had of late years assumed in the affairs of Greece. He convened a congress at Delphi, which was attended by deputies from the states of both the confederacies. Whether Delphi was chosen for the place of meeting merely to give greater solemnity to the occasion, or in the hope that some use might be made of the oracle, is uncertain. But Xenophon observes, in a tone of pious reprobation, that, instead of referring the business for which they were assembled to the decision of the god, they deliberated on it themselves. Their consultations proved fruitless; and perhaps even the authority of the oracle, if it had been appealed to, would have been unable to compose the conflict of their adverse interests and clashing pretensions. The Thebans either absolutely refused to renounce their claims of sovereignty over the Bœotian cities, or would only consent to do so on condition that Sparta should acknowledge the independence of Messenia. This demand the Spartans rejected; and Philiscus, affecting to consider the Thebans as the enemies of peace, dropped the character of a mediator, and began to levy troops for the service of Sparta. The Athenians paid extraordinary court to Ariobarzanes. They conferred the honour of their franchise on him and on three of his sons, as well as on Philiscus, who seems to have been a worthless military adventurer, who abused the satrap's favour to exercise a cruel and insolent tyranny over many of the Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, and was at length killed by two conspirators at Lampsacus.\*

Thebes had never been less inclined to make concessions degrading to her dignity; for she had lately been extending her influence in a new quarter, to which it will now be proper to call the reader's attention. After the battle of Leuctra, a series of revolutions had taken place in Thessaly, which made an opening for Theban intervention, and gave it great weight in the affairs of that country; and the personal reputation of the great men who now presided over the Theban councils procured respect for the name of their city still farther to the north of Greece. Jason's career had been abruptly terminated in the year after the battle of Leuctra, at a time when, having firmly established his authority in Thessaly, he was beginning to unfold his ulterior designs. He had given a strong indication of them on his march homeward from Leuctra, when he razed the walls of the Trachinian Heraclea, that it might not afford an enemy the means of blocking up the pass of Thermopylæ. In the following spring he made preparations for an expedition towards the south, which excited general attention by the novelty of its avowed object, and gave occasion to a variety of conjectures as to its real end. He called upon his subjects to furnish a sacrifice for the approaching Pythian festival; and it was computed that, although no district was heavily burdened, their contributions would amount to 1000 oxen, and 10,000 head of smaller victims. He at the same time ordered a levy of troops throughout Thessaly, and declared his intention of marching to Delphi, and presiding over the Pythian games. The Delphians were so much alarmed at this intima-

\* Xenophon (vii., 1, 27) only names Ariobarzanes. Diodorus (xv., 70) does not mention him, but says that Philiscus was sent by Artaxerxes.

\* Demosthenes c. Aristocr., § 166, Bekk.

tion, that they consulted the oracle as to the course which they should pursue if Jason should meddle with the sacred treasures; and they were said to have received the same answer as had been given on several similar occasions—that the god would take care of his own. But when the time drew near, having one day reviewed his cavalry, and then taken his seat in public to give audience to all who had business to transact with him, he was murdered by seven young men, who pretended to appeal to him for the settlement of some private differences. Five of the conspirators made their escape on horses which were waiting for them; and the honours which they received in most of the Greek cities through which they passed, proved the alarm which had been excited by Jason's ambition.

His dynasty, however, survived him; and two of his brother's, Polydorus and Polyphron—one of whom was suspected of having had a hand in the murder—for a short time shared his authority between them. But on a journey which they took together to Larissa, Polydorus died suddenly in the night, assassinated, as was believed, by Polyphron, who remained sole tagus, and by his administration converted the office into a tyranny. He put to death the estimable Polydamas, and eight other principal citizens of Pharsalus, and drove many into exile from Larissa. But, after a reign of a year, he was murdered in his turn by his nephew Alexander, who, professing to revenge the death of Polydorus, succeeded to the government, but soon became infamous for his outrageous cruelty. He is described as a monster who delighted in torture and bloodshed, and who was restrained by no ties, divine or human. Like the fabulous Cæneus, he paid divine honours to the spear with which he killed Polyphron. The towns of Melibœa and Scotussa had incurred his resentment, but deemed themselves secure under the faith of treaties and professions of amity. Alexander surrounded the popular assembly in each town at the same time with his troops, and massacred all the citizens who were present. Such atrocities inspired all classes of his subjects with terror, but more especially the ancient families, which might be considered as objects of his jealousy. The Aleuadæ of Larissa, unable to resist him, began to look out for foreign protection; and their local position, as well as their political relations, inclined them first to seek it in Macedonia. We abstain for the present from entering into any account of the circumstances of that country, farther than is necessary for the understanding of this narrative. The order of events is not perfectly clear; but it seems that Alexander, who was now on the throne of Macedon, was invited by the Thessalians, and that he both complied with their request, and succeeded even beyond their wishes; for he not only relieved them for a time from their fears of the tyrant, who was ignominiously repulsed from Larissa, but took possession first of that town, then of the citadel, and afterward of Crannon, which he occupied with his garrisons. But his power was not yet securely established at home, and the danger which threatened him there seems to have compelled him to withdraw his troops from Thessaly, or, at least, to have prevented him from

affording any farther succour to his Thessalian friends. Finding themselves exposed to the vengeance of the tyrant of Phæræ, they applied for aid to Thebes, and while Epaminondas was engaged in the expedition to Peloponnesus, which was last related, Pelopidas was sent into Thessaly.

He was admitted into Larissa, and either the force or the reputation which he brought with him so awed Alexander, that he sought a personal interview with him, and seemed at first willing to submit to his mediation. But the discoveries with regard to his character and conduct to which this meeting gave rise appear to have exasperated Pelopidas, whose temper was warm, and induced him to vent his indignation in very severe language, which made the tyrant tremble for his safety. He broke off the negotiation by a clandestine retreat, leaving Pelopidas supreme arbiter of the affairs of Thessaly, which he settled on an apparently firm footing. This, however, was not the only honour he earned for himself and for his country in the course of this expedition. He was invited into Macedonia by the rivals who were there contending for the crown, and having restored tranquillity, took thirty noble Macedonian boys as hostages for its maintenance, and carried them away to Thebes. Among them, according to a statement of Diodorus and Plutarch, which we shall hereafter have occasion to examine, was a brother of the king's, who was destined some years later to mount the throne of Macedon, and to make a new epoch in the history of Greece.

But the order which he had left established in Thessaly was not of long duration. Soon after his return, fresh complaints reached Thebes of the conduct of Alexander, and in the course of the same summer, Pelopidas again set out to take cognizance of them, accompanied by Ismenias, a friend of congenial character. They went in the quality of ambassadors, without any military preparations, relying on the influence which Pelopidas had already peacefully exerted, or on the forces which they might be able to raise in Thessaly; but having unexpectedly fallen in with the tyrant, they imprudently put their persons in his power,\* and he did not scruple to throw them into prison. He was, however, well aware of the danger to which he exposed himself by this step from the resentment of Thebes, and to avert it, sent an embassy, with proposals of alliance, to Athens. The detention of Pelopidas could not there be viewed otherwise than as a happy event; it was an important object of Athenian policy to obstruct the progress which Thebes had been making towards the dominion of Thessaly; Alexander might prove a useful ally, and he seems to have courted the favour of the people

\* The imprudence of Pelopidas is censured by Polybius, viii., 1 (iii., p. 2, Tauchn.), in a passage which, though it applies simply to the consequences of this one act of indiscretion, has been perverted, by a writer whose bold strokes of this kind we have had frequent occasion to notice, into an observation, "that the mismanagement of Pelopidas in Thessaly produced serious ill consequences to Thebes, and especially great loss of reputation." The true reading is *διὰ τὴν*—he injured his own reputation. But the "positive imprudence" to which Polybius imputes his misfortune is precisely that which is described by Plutarch and Diodorus, namely, as Polybius goes on to say, *εὐθὺς καὶ δεξιὸς περιστάσεως οὐκ ἔμελλεν ἐκφέρειν*.

by liberal subsidies. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that his personal character should have been overlooked, his proposals accepted, and his munificence requited with a statue erected to his honour,\* as well as with a decree, which directed Autocles to sail with thirty galleys, and 1000 men, for his defence, when Thebes sent an army to avenge the insult she had received, and to recover her hero.† The command of an expedition for such a purpose could have been intrusted to no one so fitly as to Epaminondas, but his conduct in his last campaign in Peloponnesus had given a handle for calumny. According to Diodorus,‡ his enemies spread an opinion that he might have pushed the advantage which he gained in the passage through the Isthmus much farther, and excited a suspicion that he had purposely spared the Spartans; though we have seen that, if we may believe Xenophon, his own situation might have become embarrassing if the road had not been left open through the negligence of the Lacedæmonian commander. The people, however, were induced to remove him from the office of Bæotarch, and he accompanied the expedition for his friend's deliverance as a private soldier. Alexander seems to have made preparations for a vigorous resistance; and his superiority in cavalry enabled him to reduce the enemy to such a scarcity of provisions, that the Theban generals found themselves compelled to retreat before they could strike a blow. But to retreat under such circumstances was an operation full of difficulty and danger. Alexander, re-enforced by the Athenian troops, and by many Thessalians who went over to the prosperous side, hung upon their rear, obstructed their march, and made great slaughter among them with the missiles of his light troops. Their condition had become desperate, when Epaminondas was called upon by the soldiers to take the command. His tactics, aided by the charm and the terror of his name, saved the whole army from destruction.

On his return, Cleomenes and Hypatus, the generals to whose imprudence the danger was attributed, were punished with a fine, and Epaminondas was reinstated in his office, and in the esteem and confidence of his fellow-citizens. The enterprise was renewed under his command; whether in the same year or early in 367, is not clear. The result places the ascendancy of his genius or of his reputation in a very strong light. The army with which he was sent into Thessaly was probably not more formidable than the last. Yet now, according to Plutarch, the tyrant offered no resistance; and Epaminondas was only withheld from crushing him by fear that, if he should be driven to despair, he might take his revenge upon his Theban prisoners. They had been treated of late with greater rigour, probably after the attempt for their deliverance had been baffled, though it is difficult to believe that the citizens of Phææ were at first permitted to visit Pelopidas, and to listen to his invectives against their tyrant. But it may not be too romantic an incident for this period of ancient history, that Alexander's wife, Thebe, a daughter of Jason, obtained a secret interview with him, and

was roused by his exhortations to fiercer resentment, and to purposes of vengeance against her brutal and profligate husband. It was, therefore, the object of Epaminondas to terrify the tyrant, but not so as to goad him to a desperate resolution; and Alexander was so much alarmed by his preliminary operations, that to conjure the impending storm he consented to release his prisoners, though in return he obtained nothing more than a thirty days' suspension of hostilities.

It seems to have been while Epaminondas was absent on this expedition that a measure which he had once successfully deprecated, was carried into effect by a party at home, which was either incapable of his enlarged views and humane feelings, or recklessly lent itself to a popular prejudice. Already, in the year after the battle of Leuctra, a proposal had been made in the Theban assembly to destroy Orchomenus, once the sovereign, long the rival of Thebes, and still an object of jealousy both on account of its rank among the Bæotian towns, and as the chief seat of aristocratical influence in Bæotia. But the people had been shamed out of this barbarous design by the remonstrances of Epaminondas, who endeavoured to animate them with sentiments more worthy of the high station to which their recent victory entitled them to aspire.\* The project, however, was not abandoned by its authors, as the passions which suggested it could only be laid in a brief calm by the voice of reason and humanity. But now, either an accidental combination of circumstances favoured its execution, or an atrocious plan was concerted to ensure its success, and to take advantage of the absence of the man who alone, perhaps, would have been able to frustrate it. A plot was disclosed to the Theban government which had been formed, it was said, by a party of Theban exiles, to overturn the democratical Constitution, and in which the nobles, or members of the equestrian order of Orchomenus, were to be the principal agents. The conspirators intended to take the opportunity of a review which was to be held at Thebes, and was to be attended by 300 of the Orchomenian cavalry, to effect an aristocratical revolution. It is possible that the whole story may have been a fiction; and it seems at least to have been greedily received by the magistrates and the people. The Orchomenians were arrested and brought before the assembly, which seems to have sat in judgment on the charge, and probably, without very mature deliberation, decided against the accused: they were all condemned to death, and the whole city was involved in their doom. A Theban army was immediately sent against it, which razed it to the ground, put the men to the sword, and carried the women and children away into slavery.† Epaminondas, on his return, did not suppress his grief at the event, and is said to have declared that, if he had been present, he would have prevented it.‡ The precipitation with which the people indulged their evil passions in his absence may be considered as the most honourable homage ever paid by a Greek state to the virtue of a citizen.

In the spring of 367, another body of auxil-

\* Plutarch, *Pelop.*, §1. † Diodorus, *xv.*, 71. ‡ *xv.*, 72.

\* Diodorus, *xv.*, 57.

† Pausanias, *lx.*, 15, 2.

‡ Diodorus, *xv.*, 79.

aries arrived from Syracuse in the Corinthian Gulf, and a question arose as to the manner in which they should be employed. The Athenians proposed that they should be sent into Thessaly, where Alexander was, perhaps, at this time threatened by the Theban arms; but Sparta had need of them for a purpose much more urgent, and a majority among the deputies of the allied states decided in favour of her claim. They were, accordingly, ordered to sail round to the coast of Laconia, and to join an army which was placed under the command of Archidamus. His first object was the reduction of Caryæ, which seems to have held out, perhaps under the protection of a foreign garrison, ever since the invasion. It was now stormed, and every man taken in it put to the sword; he then crossed the border, and proceeded to ravage the territory of Megalopolis; but on the approach of an Argive-Arcadian army retreated westward, and encamped near the Arcadian town of Midea. Here Cissidas, the commander of the Syracusan auxiliaries, informed him that the time to which Dionysius had limited his stay—probably according to his contract with the barbarian mercenaries—had expired, and immediately set out to return to Sparta; but he found the pass through which his road lay occupied by a body of Messenians, and was obliged to send for aid to Archidamus. Having reunited their forces, they marched in another direction on the Laconian frontier, but were again intercepted by the Argive-Arcadian army. A battle became inevitable; and Archidamus, having drawn up his troops on a small plain, which lay between him and the enemy, exhorted his countrymen to vindicate the ancient honour of Sparta, and to exert themselves that day, so as to be able once more to meet the gaze of their women and children, and old men, and that of foreigners, which had once been turned towards them in admiration, without a blush. The effect of this address was heightened by some favourable omens, and the spirit which it breathed animated his hearers with an impetuous courage, which in better times would not have been deemed sober enough for Spartan warriors. The enemy scarcely waited to receive their furious onset; and the cavalry and Celtic mercenaries made great havoc among the fugitives. Of the Lacedæmonians, according to the report which Archidamus sent home, not a man was killed. This may have been a piece of exaggeration, such as was common enough in Spartan despatches; but we could more easily believe the fact, than that Archidamus meant only that no Spartan life was lost.\* The loss on the other side appears to have been great, though it can scarcely have amounted, as Diodorus relates, to 10,000 men. The news of the victory, which would once have made but little impression at Sparta, drew tears of joy from Agesilaus, the senators, and the ephors. But the disaster of the Arcadians caused scarcely less pleasure at Thebes and Elis, where the spirit which they had lately shown was treated as arrogance, and their success was viewed with jealousy.

The obstacles it opposed to the supremacy which Thebes aimed at establishing in Peloponnesus, but still more, perhaps, the proceed-

ings of Philiscus, had led the Theban government to look to another quarter for more effectual means of securing its preponderance; and intelligence of a negotiation which Sparta was carrying on at the Persian court seemed to require that some steps should be taken to counteract it. There could be no doubt as to the person who was best qualified for such a mission; and Pelopidas was no sooner restored to liberty than he set out on a journey to Susa, accompanied by Ismenias. The fame of the battle of Leuctra and of the invasion of Laconia had preceded them, and their progress through the Persian provinces was a kind of triumph. At Susa the courtiers gazed with admiration on the representatives of the state which had humbled the haughty mistress of Greece, whose victorious arms not many years before made their monarch tremble for his throne. Envoys from Sparta and Athens, from Arcadia, Elis, and Argos, met them at the king's gate; but Artaxerxes distinguished the Thebans with peculiar honours. He had previously shown, by his treatment of Antalcidas, that his favours were dispensed to foreigners in proportion to the political influence of the states to which they belonged. Antalcidas, whom on his first embassy he had flattered with marks of most signal condescension, when he appeared at the Persian court after the battle of Leuctra, met with such a supercilious reception, that he is said on his return to Sparta to have been driven to suicide by the taunts of his enemies.\* Euthycles, who now filled his place, was indeed able to claim a little more respect on the ground of the recent victory of Archidamus; but even this served to raise the credit of Thebes; for it had been gained over the Arcadians and Argives, and seemed to prove that they could not conquer without her help. They could, therefore, procure very little attention, and Timagoras, one of the Athenian envoys, appears to have discovered that the surest way to conciliate the king's good graces was to side with the Thebans. The royal bounty was largely showered upon him, and the example of former ambassadors, perhaps, encouraged him to hope that he might enjoy it with impunity. But the people, exasperated by the failure of his mission, which he probably could not have brought to a more advantageous issue, wreaked their disappointment on him, and put him to death, on the impeachment of his colleague Leon, for an offence which they might otherwise have been easily induced to overlook. Pelopidas obtained everything that he asked. One of his objects was to procure the king's sanction for the independence of Messenia; another to disarm the naval power of Athens; and this seems to have been part of a plan which was earnestly entertained by Epaminondas, of transferring to Thebes the

\* Plut., Artax., 22. But this part of the story is very doubtful. Antalcidas appears, from the anecdote in Plut., Ages., 32, to have been one of the ephors at the time of the invasion in 369, and we have no hint of any Spartan embassy to Susa between this year and 367, when Euthycles was the chief envoy. Antalcidas, however, appears to have been ambassador at the Persian court in the year before the battle of Leuctra (Xen., H., vi., 3, 12); and though he was then expected soon to return, his stay in Persia may have been prolonged until the news of the battle arrived there, and he may then have experienced the change of treatment described by Plutarch, who, however (Art., 32), distinctly asserts, what is equally probable, that he was sent to apply for Persian succours immediately after the battle.

\* Maseo's conjecture, Sparta, iii., 1, p. 179.

maritime dominion which Athens had begun to recover. An article was inserted in the royal rescript, by which the Athenians were enjoined to lay up their fleet; and when Leon protested against this partiality, all the satisfaction he received was the addition of a clause by which they were permitted to appeal to the king, if they thought themselves aggrieved by the injunction. It may probably be attributed to the address of Pelopidas that the Arcadians, whose political importance, if it had been rightly estimated, would have entitled them to more respectful consideration, were treated as of inferior moment to the Eleans; a slight which so deeply offended their envoy Antiochus that he refused to accept the king's presents, and on his return to Greece exposed the pompous weakness of the Persian court to the derision of his countrymen. Pelopidas likewise declined all the magnificent presents offered to him by Artaxerxes, retaining only some simple tokens of regard; but in addition to the more solid advantages conveyed by the rescript, the Thebans were honoured with the title of the king's ancient allies.

It was not, however, in Persia, but in Greece, that the real success of the embassy was to be proved; and the result disappointed the expectations which were raised by its reception at the court of Susa. Thebes hoped to have placed herself in the station which Sparta had occupied by means of the peace of Antalcidas; but she found the Greeks no longer willing to submit to Persian dictation. The reports brought back by the envoys of the state of the empire, had, perhaps, divulged the secret, that the threats of the great king were little more than an empty sound. A congress was held at Thebes, in which a Persian commissioner, having, with the usual solemnity, produced the royal seal, read the document to which it was affixed; and the Theban government then called upon the deputies of the other states, as they valued the king's favour, to bind themselves by an oath to comply with its contents. All, however, rejected this demand, and observed that they were sent not to swear, but to listen to the king's message. Lycomedes, who was one of the Arcadian deputies, took a higher tone, and denied the right of Thebes to summon the congress, which he contended ought to have been held in that part of Greece which was the theatre of war. This objection provoked an angry reply, which induced Lycomedes and his colleagues to withdraw abruptly from the congress. The Thebans then sent ambassadors to each state separately with the same demand, hoping that as none could be sure of support from the rest, none would venture to incur their enmity, as well as that of Persia, by the refusal. But Corinth, to which the first application was made, having rejected the oath, emboldened the other states to follow her example, and the whole project, concocted with such elaborate preparations, fell at once to the ground.

The disposition manifested by the Arcadians rendered it important for Thebes to strengthen her footing in Achaia; and in the spring of 366 Epaminondas undertook a third expedition into Peloponnesus for that purpose. The Isthmus was still guarded by Lacedæmonian and Athenian troops; but at his request Pisias, the Ar-

give general, by a night march made himself master of the pass near Cenchree, and thus enabled the Theban army to enter Achaia. Oligarchy had gained the ascendancy in the Achæan cities under Spartan patronage, and had not been disturbed by the last Theban invasion, but they remained for the most part neutral in the contest between Thebes and Sparta. The leading men now threw themselves on the forbearance of Epaminondas, and, by assurances of fidelity to Thebes, induced him to exert his influence in their behalf to prevent a revolution which would have driven them into exile. Having taken security for their obedience, and finding, it seems, no other occasion that required his presence in the peninsula, he marched home. But the democratical Achæans, and the Arcadians, complained that he had left Achaia in the state most favourable to the renewal of Lacedæmonian ascendancy; and the Thebans, copying the example of Sparta, sent harlots to the Achæan cities, who instigated the commonalty to expel the oligarchs, and establish democratical institutions. This change, however, was soon followed by a counter-revolution; for the exiles, having collected their forces, found themselves strong enough to recover possession of their cities, and now openly renewed their alliance with Sparta, and gave great annoyance to their Arcadian neighbours.

At Sicyon affairs took a different turn. There Euphron, an able and enterprising man, had enjoyed the confidence of the Spartan government, as the leader of the oligarchical party, while the city adhered to Sparta. We do not know what part he took in the change of policy by which in 368 Sicyon went over to the Theban alliance. Its constitution seems not to have undergone any formal alteration in consequence of that event; but it may have somewhat affected Euphron's influence, and he may thus have been led to desire a revolution which would place him again, though in a different attitude, at the head of the state. When Epaminondas withdrew from Achaia, as we have just seen, leaving the oligarchical governments standing, the dissatisfaction expressed by the Arcadians and Argives at this toleration appears to have suggested to him the means of gratifying his ambition. He proposed to renounce his connexion with his old friends, and himself to introduce democracy at Sicyon; the only effectual security, as he pretended, against the restoration of the Spartan dominion, which he had long endured with impatience, and would fain avert by any sacrifice. The Arcadians and Argives gladly lent their aid, and the revolution was quietly and easily effected. Euphron assembled the people, invited them to the enjoyment of liberty and equality, and bade them begin the exercise of their rights with the election of a college of generals. Five were chosen, and he was one of the number. The first advantage which he took of his office was to appoint his own son to the command of the foreign mercenaries employed by the state, and to gain as many of them as he could to his interest by a lavish expenditure of the public money. The confidence of the people which he enjoyed as the restorer of freedom, enabled him to resort even to the treasure of the temples for that purpose; and the charge of *Laconism*, which

was brought against many of the wealthy citizens, yielded an ample supply of confiscations. It only remained for him to get rid of his colleagues, and when some of them had been removed by the dagger, and the rest driven into exile, Euphron, being left sole general, became in name as well as in deed the tyrant of Sicyon.

His government appears to have been mild and popular, though the want of money urged him to persecute the rich. But though he had strengthened the democracy by the admission of many new citizens, among whom were several emancipated slaves, he felt that his power rested on the support of his allies, who had helped him to lay its foundation, and he endeavoured to propitiate their favour by the readiness with which he joined their expeditions, and by presents distributed among their leading men. So, perhaps, he conciliated the Theban harmost, whom he was obliged to receive into the citadel. But his position amid so many conflicting interests was too difficult to be long maintained. We are unable, from the string of obscure allusions which Xenophon has here substituted for a narrative, to gather the motives which induced Æneias, the general of the Arcadians, to overthrow his authority, and to restore oligarchy at Sicyon. But the Theban harmost seems to have concurred in this measure, since he continued to hold the citadel after the Arcadians had retired. Euphron made his escape to the port, and, sending for Pasimelus, the Spartan officer who was commanding at Corinth, delivered it up to him, and renewed his connexion with Sparta, not without attempting to vindicate his past conduct by pretences which did not deceive those who listened to them. This, however, was not his last political apostasy. The discord which continued to prevail in Sicyon between his partisans and the party which Æneias had restored enabled him, with the aid of a body of Athenian auxiliaries, to regain possession of the town; but, as the citadel was still occupied by a Theban garrison, he ventured on the bold step of going in person to Thebes, with all the money he could collect, in the hope, by his gold and intrigues, to procure a decree for expelling his adversaries and re-establishing his authority. His proceedings, however, were watched by his enemies, some of whom followed him to Thebes; and, when they perceived that he had so far ingratiated himself with the leading men as to have a fair prospect of success, they relieved themselves from their fears by despatching him openly in the Cadmea, not far from the place where the council was assembled. The perpetrators of this outrage were arrested, and were brought before the council for punishment by the magistrates, who, perhaps, sincerely regretted his death. But one of the culprits, having avowed his share in the deed, so forcibly exposed the character and conduct of Euphron—an outlawed tyrant and traitor, who had aggravated his guilt by the arts of corruption with which he endeavoured to screen it from vengeance—that his judges pronounced the murder a legitimate act. The majority of Euphron's fellow-citizens viewed it in a different light: they still revered him as their benefactor, and, having transported his body to Sicyon, interred

it, with the honours due to a heroic founder, in the market-place.\*

While Sicyon and Pellene were compelled, by terror of the Theban arms, to forsake their old ally, Phlius, where the dominant party had more reason to dread a revolution, remained firmly attached to Sparta. It was, on this account, exposed to the unrelenting hostility of its more powerful neighbours, suffered great hardships, and was often placed in extreme peril. Xenophon—who extols, not only the courage, but the constancy of the Phliasians, in which we see little beyond the instinct of self-preservation—dwells, at greater length than we can spare for such a subject, on the adventures in which, either alone or with the aid of a small body of Athenian troops, they repulsed the attacks of their enemies, who were instigated and seconded by their exiled fellow-citizens. After several attempts on the town and the territory had been baffled, they were threatened with still greater and more frequent annoyance by the erection of two fortresses on their frontier, one called Tricaranum, which was built by the Argives; the other, called Thyamia, which was begun by the Sicyonians, but had not been finished in the year 366, when the Phliasians, supported by the Athenian general, Chares, who had been sent to the relief of Phlius, wrested it from them, and then carried on the fortifications as a bulwark for themselves against Sicyon. While Chares was lending his aid to this work, he was suddenly called away to the defence of Attica itself. The frontier town of Oropus, which, on account of its position with regard to Eubœa, was of great importance to the Athenians, had, some years before, been restored to them through a domestic revolution which drove a number of its citizens into exile. The refugees found shelter at Eretria, which was at this time under the rule of Themison; and with his help they crossed the channel, and recovered possession of their city.† The whole

\* There is some obscurity about the chronology of Euphron's reign; but, on the whole, it seems safer to adopt Xenophon's statements than to suppose, with Dodwell, that he was grossly mistaken in his account of a person who evidently attracted no small share of his attention. If Euphron's tyranny began immediately after the second Theban invasion of Peloponnesus (368), Xenophon, who distinctly places its beginning after the third invasion (366), must have fallen into an error very unusual with him, not only as to the date, but as to the facts. The authority of Diodorus (xv., 70) as to the beginning of Euphron's tyranny can have no weight in itself when opposed to Xenophon's. Manso (iii., 2, p. 241), following Dodwell, supposes that the campaign against Phlius, described by Xenophon (vii., 2, 11), in which Euphron accompanied the Theban commander of Sicyon, took place in the year preceding the third expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus, and hence infers that the Thebans had left a garrison in Sicyon in 368. But the *αἰὲς πόρι* in this section may be equivalent to *τῷ βραχέει χρόνῳ*; and Xenophon's account of the manner in which Euphron acquired the tyranny is utterly inconsistent with the supposition that there was at that time a Theban garrison at Sicyon. Nor is it easy to believe that he would have related the interference of Æneias at vii., 2, 1, if it occurred in the year before the third Theban invasion. Dodwell indeed asserts, *Imo ejectione optimates Euphronis quidem consilio, opera tamen Thebanorum, postquam Boeotarchia exutus esset Epaminondas, agnoscit ipse Xenophon*. But I am unable to discover in Xenophon anything to that effect.

† In the account here given of these transactions we have adopted the view taken by Winiewski, *Comment. in Dem., De Cor.*, p. 23. Its accuracy depends on the interpretation of Xenophon's words, vii., 4, 1, *Ἰσχυρῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ Φυγίου κατὰ κράτος*. But it seems impossible to suppose that Xenophon can have meant any other exiles than a party in Oropus itself. Yet even Schlosser has assumed

disposable force of Athens immediately marched against them; Chares was hastily recalled; and it is probable that the Spartan officer who commanded at Corinth was requested to co-operate with him. But it happened that, just at this juncture, the Lacedæmonian garrison was dislodged from the port of Sicyon by the Sicyonians and Arcadians; and perhaps this occurrence prevented him from marching, or sending a re-enforcement to assist in the reduction of Oropus. The immediate result of the Athenian expedition seems strange, and it is not clearly explained by any of the ancient writers who mention or allude to it. The Oropians, alarmed at the enemy's strength, and, perhaps, not prepared for a siege, appear to have proposed to commit their town to the keeping of the Thebans, as neutrals in this quarrel, until their claims should have been peacefully adjusted. The Athenians were induced, chiefly, it seems, by the advice of Chabrias and Callistratus, to consent to this compromise, which, as the Thebans afterward refused to give up the place, contributed to widen the breach between the two states, and proved fatal to one of its authors; but, at the time, the displeasure of the Athenians vented itself in reproaches upon their allies, who had failed them in their hour of need. This state of their feelings soon became known in Arcadia, and encouraged Lycomedes, who viewed Athens rather as the enemy of Thebes than as the ally of Sparta, to hope that she might be gained over to the Arcadian interest. He himself undertook the negotiation, and concluded a separate alliance, which the Athenian assembly, notwithstanding some scruples which made it hesitate for a while, at last decided was no breach of its engagements with Sparta: she, it was argued, must be concerned no less than Athens to keep Arcadia independent of Thebes. This was the last service which Lycomedes rendered to Arcadia. Almost every Greek who took an active part in public affairs might, in any part of Greece, fall in with some deadly enemies. Lycomedes, returning from Athens by sea, was landed, at his own desire, on a point of the Peloponnesian coast, where a party of Arcadian exiles happened to be collected, and fell beneath their daggers.

Though Athens professed to have taken this step without any views hostile to her former allies, but rather to promote one of the objects of their alliance, it was manifest that it could not but change her relations towards those among them in whom the fear of Thebes was not so strong as their enmity to the Arcadians. Such, it seems, was known to be the case with Corinth; and hence a motion was soon after made in the Athenian assembly by one Demotion, that the generals be directed to take care that Corinth was not lost to the people of Athens. This proposition, which, under any other government, would have been kept strictly secret, created an alarm which rendered it abortive. The Corinthians no sooner heard of it, than they dismissed all the Athenian troops who were stationed in various posts within

their territory, after having paid all arrears due to them; and when Chares soon after appeared before Cenchreæ with a squadron, and offered his services to protect the city from some attack with which he pretended to have heard it was threatened, he was courteously thanked, but was not permitted to enter the harbour.

To supply the place of the Athenians, and to guard against the effects of their resentment, the Corinthians collected a body of mercenaries; but as this was a burden which they could not long endure, they at the same time began to turn their thoughts towards peace, and, having ascertained that the Theban government was not averse to it, they requested that as many of their present allies as might be willing to concur with them might be admitted to a share in the treaty. Having obtained leave to sound their allies, they first applied to Sparta. The language of their envoys, as its substance is reported by Xenophon, breathes a feeling of tenderness for the pride and the misfortunes of their ancient ally, which reminds us of the friendships of the heroic age. The Spartans themselves are called upon to say whether they see any prospect of safety for Corinth if the war should be much longer protracted. The Corinthians would most gladly see Sparta sharing the blessings of peace with them; but if this may not be, then they beg leave to save themselves from ruin, that at some future time they may again be able to serve her. The Spartans responded to this delicate loyalty with a generous frankness. They admitted the urgency of the case, advised the Corinthians to make peace, and permitted their other allies who were weary of the war to join them; but for themselves, they declared that, whatever might befall them, they would never resign their claim to Messenia, and, so long as this was made the condition of peace, would continue the war as they could.

An oration is preserved among the works of Isocrates, which appears to have been written for this occasion, either to be delivered by the prince Archidamus, who is the supposed speaker, or as a manifesto to vindicate the tenacity with which Sparta clung to her alleged right, now apparently the only obstacle to a general peace.\* In this work her title to Messenia is grounded not merely on length of possession, but on a donation, by which the sons of Cresphontes, after the murder of their father, are said to have transferred their rights to the Spartan Heracleids, and which was confirmed by the Delphic oracle. The new Messenians are represented as a mere herd of revolted slaves. The oration, as appears from these arguments, was designed chiefly for Spartan hearers or readers; and a great part of it is occupied with motives for a persevering resistance to the demands of their enemies, drawn

that they were Athenians (i., 3, p. 52). Can he have been misled by a writer who had seized this fictitious handle for a fresh declamation on the tyranny of the Athenian democracy which had driven these unfortunate men into exile?

\* Niebuhr refers the oration to a later date—after the battle of Mantinea—and observes of it, "It is a specimen of the folly which looks upon an obstinate refusal to acknowledge existing circumstances as something magnanimous (der Verkehrtheit, die ein starres Verläugnen der Wirklichkeit als etwas Grosses ansieht). It is a silly notion that Isocrates wrote this speech for Archidamus, to convince the Spartans in the *ὑπόνοια*. It is a mere declamation." We must, however, remember the speech which Cleon made for Lysander, and that Xenophon (H., vii., 4, 9) gives us reason to believe that the spirit prevailing at Sparta was just that which breathes through the Archidamus.



as well from the justice of their cause, as from the examples furnished by the history of their own times, of signal reverses and unexpected deliverances. But a project which follows, and is proposed in a tone of earnestness as deep as Isocrates was ever able to convey by the silver chime of his melodious eloquence, seems rather to have been calculated for other ears. It sounds like an indirect threat, to warn their enemies not to drive them to despair. Sooner than submit to the dismemberment of their territory, Archidamus would persuade his countrymen to remove their wives, and children, and aged parents, to some place of shelter, which they might easily find in the Dorian colonies, and then to abandon Sparta, where they had always lived as in a camp, and return to the life which their forefathers led when they issued from Doris to invade Peloponnesus. As an invading army, without a home, fortifying themselves in an enemy's territory, and spreading devastation around them, they would, wherever they appeared, be irresistible and intolerable; and those who now dictated such insulting terms would be glad to restore Messenia as the price of peace. It is singular enough that, at the end of so many centuries, Sparta should again be found borrowing the voice of an Attic schoolmaster, to rouse the courage of her sons in a new Messenian war; and the change which she had undergone in the interval may, perhaps, be not improperly measured by the distance between the poetry of Tyrtæus and the rhetoric of Isocrates. It would seem, indeed, that, even since the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the taste of the Spartan assembly had been brought much nearer to that of the other Greeks, and that the homely brevity of the ephor Sthenelaidas would no longer have produced a like effect.\*

The permission granted by Sparta was accepted by Phlius, and some of her other allies, who sent envoys along with those of Corinth to Thebes. The Theban government at first required that they should join its confederacy; but they remonstrated against this condition, which, instead of relieving them from the calamities of war, would only have turned their arms in a new direction, and against their old ally. The Theban councils were swayed by men generous enough to respect and to spare these feelings; and peace was granted on the simple basis of mutual restitution. The treaty, however, was not in all points faithfully observed by the stronger side. The Phlians restored Thyamia to Sicyon; but Tricaranum, which belonged to them, was retained, first by their refugees, and then by the Argives, under some barefaced pretence, which, though frequently summoned, they would not submit to an impartial decision. Still, the practical operation of the treaty was nearly equivalent to a general peace, since Sparta remained on the defensive, and the jealousy which prevailed between Thebes and Arcadia secured her from danger of immediate attack. Yet—notwithstanding the language put into the mouth of Archidamus by the Attic rhetorician—we find

a fact recorded by Xenophon, which seems to indicate a degree of weakness, which, it might have been supposed, must have rendered her an easy prey to her least powerful neighbours. Though Caryæ had been taken, Sellasia, near as it lay to the capital, was, it seems, still in a state of open revolt; and it sounds still more strangely, that it was finally reduced, soon after the treaty was concluded at Thebes, not by the single force of Sparta, but with the co-operation of a fresh body of Syracusan auxiliaries sent by the younger Dionysius, who had succeeded his father, and still maintained his policy towards Sparta. But even after the recovery of Sellasia, the district of Sciritis, which had formerly contributed a very useful body of troops to the Spartan armies, remained, at least in great part, hostile.

The safety of Sparta depended less on the strength of her allies—for she now stood almost alone—than on the disunion of her enemies. But the conflicting interests of the different states, and of the opposite parties in each, afforded her a fair prospect of some favourable change; and in the oration which has just been mentioned, the discord and confusion that prevailed in those parts of Peloponnesus which had renounced their alliance with Sparta are among the grounds of hope on which Archidamus or Isocrates insists. This hope was in some degree fulfilled in the year after the treaty of Thebes (365), when the jealousy which had been long smouldering between Elis and Arcadia burst out into open war. It sprung, as we have seen, out of their rival pretensions to the Triphylian towns, but it was fostered by their political variance; for in Elis the oligarchical party was now predominant, while, in Arcadia, the maxims of the government, if not the principles of the Constitution, were strongly democratical. The first act of overt hostility proceeded from Elis; and it was connected with both these causes of mutual animosity. A party of Arcadian exiles which had taken refuge in Elis, with the connivance, and, perhaps, at the suggestion of the government, surprised Lasion, one of the Triphylian towns, and a place of great strength. The Arcadian government, having in vain applied to that of Elis for restitution, sent an army to reduce it. The Eleans marched to its relief, but with a very small force, consisting chiefly of two bands, described by Xenophon as the Four Hundred and the Three Hundred, which seem to have been formed by the oligarchs out of their own class as a standing guard, perhaps in imitation of the Sacred Band of Thebes. They were soon put to flight, with a loss of more than 200 men, by the Arcadians, who then pursued their march, making themselves masters of several places subject to Elis in their way, to Olympia, where they threw up an intrenchment on Mount Cronium, and, having left a garrison there, proceeded towards Elis. They met with no opposition until they reached the market-place. From it they were dislodged by the oligarchical troops, who earned the honours of a trophy; but their presence encouraged the democratical leaders, on a secret understanding with them, to seize the citadel. This attempt, however, was likewise baffled by the alertness of their adversaries, and they were forced to quit the

\* Among the apophthegms of Epaminondas in Plutarch's collection, one (16) is in answer to a long invective in which a Spartan had indulged against the Thebans: At least they have taught you Spartans to make longer speeches.

city with about 400 of their adherents. This party soon afterward took possession of the Elean Pylus, and was there joined by great numbers who flocked in to them from the capital. By their persuasions the Arcadians were induced to make another inroad into the Elean territory in the course of the same year. But Pellene, which had now again allied itself to Sparta, sent a body of troops to guard the city, and the invaders contented themselves with ravaging the plain. When they withdrew, they made a forced march into Achaia, and took Olurus, a place belonging to Pellene, where they collected the whole democratical party of the state, and for some time harassed the city; but the oligarchs, notwithstanding the scantiness of their numbers, at length forced them to surrender the fortress.

In the following spring (364) the Arcadians again invaded Elis. The Eleans, in the mean while, had renewed their alliance with Sparta, and a Spartan named Soclidas had been sent to direct their military operations. It was, perhaps, against his advice that the Elean general Andromachus\* ventured on an engagement with the Arcadians, in which he was defeated, and Soclidas was slain. The Eleans, now reduced to great distress, begged Sparta to make a diversion in their favour, and Archidamus was accordingly sent into Arcadia, where he took the little town of Cromnus, in the neighbourhood of Megalopolis, and, having left a garrison there, returned home. The Arcadian army, after it had ravaged Elis, marched against Cromnus, and laid siege to it. Archidamus was sent to its relief, and having attempted, without effect, to draw off the besieging army by the ravages which he inflicted on other parts of Arcadia, he advanced upon the town with the view of dislodging the enemy from an eminence over which the line of circumvallation was carried. But having entangled himself in a disadvantageous position, he was repulsed, was himself wounded, and lost some of his principal officers. In the mean while the Eleans took advantage of the retreat of the Arcadians to recover Pylus and another of their conquered towns. The garrison of Cromnus, where no provision had been made for a long siege, found means of making known to the government at home that they could not hold out above ten days more.† A small body of troops was sent for their deliverance, which forced its way by night through the intrenchments, and rescued all but about 100, whose flight was arrested by the besiegers, and who fell into their hands. It appears, from the equal distribution of these prisoners among the captors—which, as several of them were Spartans, Xenophon thinks worth notice—that Thebes, Argos, and Messene had contributed their contingents to the Arcadian army.

The Arcadians, so soon as they had recap-

tured Cromnus, again directed their whole force against Elis, and, marching to Olympia, occupied the sacred ground. An Olympic festival was approaching, and they resolved to display their strength, and to mortify their enemy in the most sensible manner by celebrating it under the presidency of Pisa, which had not forgotten its ancient title to this honour. Its claim had, as we have seen, been recognised on a former occasion by Sparta; but, though she was then very desirous of humbling Elis, she did not think it expedient to commit so important a trust as the care of the national sanctuary, with all the treasures which had been deposited there by the piety of so many generations, to the rustic inhabitants of a small canton. But the men who were now at the head of affairs in Arcadia were so far from being restrained by the same scruple, that the insignificance of Pisa, as it ensured her subservience to their views, was probably with them an additional motive for setting up her antiquated pretensions. The shadow of her name was a convenient cover for the design which they seem already to have formed of making use of the sacred treasure. The Eleans, however, did not tamely submit to the exclusion; but having summoned their Achaean allies to their aid, appeared, in the midst of the games, in battle array on the banks of the Cladus, the western boundary of the Altis. The Arcadians, who had been re-enforced by 2000 Argives and 400 Athenian cavalry, drew up their troops within the sacred precincts; and an engagement ensued, in which the Eleans routed their enemies, and pursued them until they were themselves compelled to retreat by the missiles discharged at them from the sacred buildings. During the following night the Arcadians were busily employed in throwing up an intrenchment to secure themselves from a fresh attack; and the next morning the Eleans, not deeming themselves strong enough to contend against the advantages which the enemy possessed in the ground and the buildings, returned to the city. They had hitherto passed for the worst soldiers in Greece; but on this occasion they fought with a spirit which Xenophon seems to think the favour of the gods alone could have infused into them. Something may, indeed, have been due to the inspiration of the place, where they looked upon their enemies as sacrilegious intruders; but we have already noticed another cause, which may have exerted as favourable an influence on their military character as the Sacred Band on that of the Thebans.

It was the want of money to maintain their standing army that induced the heads of the Arcadian government to have recourse to the treasures of the Olympian temple: for Xenophon, who had no bias in their favour, does not intimate that they applied any part to their private use; and we may, therefore, neglect the charge brought against them by Diodorus.\* But it seems that they might have spared this expense, if they had not chosen to enlist men whose circumstances did not permit them to serve without pay, while citizens of better con-

\* He is described, according to the present text of the Hellenice (vii., 4, 19), as ὁ Ἑλιός θραύχος—a singular title for a Greek magistrate. In Diodorus (xv., 85) we find mention of ὁ τῶν Ἑλιῶν τταύχος, and this is probably the true reading in Xenophon.

† According to a fragment of Callisthenes in Athenæus, x., p. 542, the besieged conveyed the intelligence of their condition through a herald—who, it must be supposed, received his message in the enemy's hearing—by means of an allusion to an allegorical figure of Famine, which was painted in the temple of Apollo at Amyclæ as a female in chains.

\* xv., 82. Otherwise it might not be entitled to the less attention, because, with his usual infelicity, he has fixed upon the Mantinæans as the delinquents. Τῶν Μαντινέων ἐναλαβόντων εἰς τὸν ἱεῶνα οὐκ ὀλίγα τῶν ἀνθημάτων.

dition, who would have been willing to enter the ranks at their own charge, were not called out. How far this was the result of democratical jealousy, which regarded the wealthier class with suspicion, or of an opinion that the times required men who made war their sole business, and depended on it for their livelihood, is a question which we cannot answer. And as little does Xenophon throw any light on the motives of the opposition, which began on the part of Mantinea, to the proceedings of the government with regard to the sacred treasures. The avowed objection was, of course, the religious scruple which might be felt by men of all parties; but there were probably other springs at work. A decree was passed at Mantinea condemning the sacrilege, and directing that the money required for the pay of the Mantinean contingents should be drawn from the treasury of the city. The members of the supreme government, who were responsible for the measures thus reprobated, complained that the authors of this decree were disturbing the national union, summoned them before the Ten Thousand, and, as they did not appear, passed sentence on them, and sent a body of troops to arrest them; but the Mantineans shut their gates against it. This example animated several members of the national assembly to express the same sentiments; and the tide now set in so strongly this way, that the Ten Thousand came to a vote that no more of the sacred treasure should be so employed. When this supply was stopped, that part of the soldiery which depended on its pay for subsistence quitted the service, and their place was filled by volunteers of a higher rank. The change thus effected in the composition of the army alarmed the persons who were liable to be called to an account for the spoliation of the Olympian temple, and they sent a warning to Thebes—which was, no doubt, well grounded, though Xenophon affects to treat it as a dishonest artifice—that Arcadia was on the point of returning to the Spartan alliance, and could only be restrained by Theban interference. The Theban government began to prepare for an expedition into Peloponnesus; but the party which now carried all before it in the Arcadian assembly prevailed upon the Ten Thousand first to send an embassy to Thebes, to deprecate the threatened intervention, and then to conclude a peace with Elis, and to restore the Olympian temple to her.

The treaty was ratified, not only by deputies from all the Arcadian cantons, but also by a Theban officer, who had been stationed at Tegea with a garrison of 300 Bœotian troops. The ratification, perhaps on this account, took place at Tegea, and was celebrated with general rejoicings by the Arcadians. But in the midst of their festivity, the Theban commander, who, notwithstanding his apparent concurrence, saw that the peace must weaken the Theban influence in Arcadia, and was, indeed, designed for that end, was persuaded by the Arcadian magistrates, who dreaded its effect on their private interests, to send his own men, together with some of the Arcadian soldiery who were attached to the government which had supplied them with pay, to shut the city gates, and arrest a great number of the higher class. The jail and the prytaneum were soon crowded with

prisoners. But as most of the Mantineans had been induced, by the shortness of the distance, to return home early in the day, very few of them were arrested, though it was against them that the blow was especially aimed; yet the outrage excited no less indignation at Mantinea than if the hostages taken from it had been more numerous. The Mantineans immediately called upon the other Arcadian towns to put themselves in a posture of defence, and sent envoys to Tegea to demand the release of their own fellow-citizens, and to require that no Arcadian should be illegally put to death or kept in prison; offering security for the appearance of as many as were charged with any offence, to take their trial before the great council of the nation. This firmness alarmed the Theban, so that he released all his prisoners, and endeavoured to justify his conduct by the pretence, notoriously false, that he had received information of a plot to betray Tegea to the Spartans. The Arcadians would not take their revenge into their own hands, but sent to Thebes to require that he should be capitally punished for the outrage.

It was, indeed, apparently a breach of faith, and a violation of justice, scarcely less flagrant than the occupation of the Cadmea; and it is somewhat painful as well as difficult to believe that such a man as Epaminondas should have defended the delinquent, and have vindicated the deed. According to Xenophon, he declared that the accused officer had acted more properly when he arrested the prisoners than when he released them. It was no less, he said, than treachery, on the part of the Arcadians, to conclude a separate peace without the consent of the allies who had engaged in the war on their behalf; but Thebes would, notwithstanding, send an army into Arcadia, to carry it on in conjunction with the cantons which still adhered to her.\* The character of Epaminondas, as a man, stands so much higher than that of Xenophon as a historian, that we should have suspected some misrepresentation in this statement, if we were not aware that, among the Greeks, the strongest minds and noblest spirits were seldom, if ever, capable of rising above the prejudices of a narrow patriotism, to which they often sacrificed justice and honour without shame or remorse. The language attributed to him seems to justify the suspicion which was loudly expressed by the Arcadians on the return of their envoys: that it was the object of Thebes to reduce Peloponnesus to the lowest stage of weakness, in order the more easily to subject it to her dominion. Yet Epaminondas may have seen reason to apprehend that the two great barriers which he had raised against the power of Sparta, the independence of Messenia and the union of Arcadia, were endangered by the recent turn of affairs, and needed the presence of a Theban army to secure them. A general alarm, however, was awakened throughout Peloponnesus, though Argos and Messenia,

\* But it seems quite an arbitrary assumption of Leo's (*Universal-Geschichte*, i., p. 301), that Epaminondas sanctioned the spoliation of the Olympian temple. It is by no means clear that his Pythagorean philosophy would have inclined him to regard sacrilege with indifference. But, however this may have been, it does not appear that he was called upon to express an opinion on the subject, which did not affect the question of the expedition into Peloponnesus.

and, in Arcadia, Megalopolis and Tegea, remained bound by their peculiar interests to Thebes. The Mantineans took the foremost part in the preparation for the approaching struggle. Envoys were sent to solicit succours against the threatened invasion, not only from Athens, but from Sparta. But the application to Sparta was accompanied with a condition that the supreme command should be exercised by each state within its own territory; and she was now content to renew her connexion with Arcadia on these humiliating terms.

Epaminondas seems to have felt that the juncture was critical for the ascendancy of Thebes, and that an extraordinary effort was requisite to break the new hostile coalition. The army with which he took the field in the spring of 362 included the whole force of the Theban confederacy, with the exception of the Phocians, who withheld their contingent, alleging that their alliance with Thebes was merely defensive, and did not bind them to assist her in an attack upon foreign states. But he was now no longer supported by the energy and the counsels of the friend who had hitherto shared most of his dangers and triumphs. Thebes had lost Pelopidas two years before. He fell in battle, in the moment of victory. During his absence in Persia, the tyrant of Phæræ had renewed his attacks on the liberty of the Thessalian cities, and had greatly extended and strengthened his dominion in the tributary districts. After the return of Pelopidas to Greece, he was appointed to conduct a fresh expedition, which the Thebans were induced, by the complaints of the Thessalians, or by their own jealousy, to decree against Alexander. But just as he was about to march, an eclipse of the sun spread universal dismay at Thebes (June 13, 364). Pelopidas, though probably little affected by the omen himself, did not think it safe to take the field with an army disheartened by superstitious forebodings, and resigning the command, set out for Thessaly at the head of about 300 cavalry volunteers, and a small body of mercenaries. He relied on the power of his name to unite the Thessalians against the tyrant, who he knew was not safe even in his own house. At Pharsalus he collected a force with which he thought himself strong enough to seek his enemy, who met him at Cynoscephalæ with an army twice as numerous, and had occupied an advantageous position on the heights from which the place was named. Nevertheless, he was dislodged after a hard struggle, and was slowly retreating, when Pelopidas, in his eagerness for revenge, pressed forward too far beyond his own line to force Alexander, whom he saw before him, into a personal combat, but before he could reach him was overpowered and slain by his guards. His death, however, served rather to animate than to dispirit his troops, who completed the victory which he had begun, with the total rout and a great slaughter of the enemy. The most studied honours were paid to his remains by the Thessalians; and by earnest entreaty they obtained leave from the Thebans to bury him in Thessalian ground. His death was soon after more fully avenged by his countrymen. The army which had been at first placed under his command was committed to Malcites and Diogiton, two generals not other-

wise named, and they forced the tyrant, whose strength was already broken by the battle of Cynoscephalæ, to resign his conquests, withdraw his garrisons from Phthiotis and Magnesia, and to enter into a treaty with Thebes, by which he bound himself to furnish troops for her service, in whatever war she might engage.

Thus the army of Epaminondas was re-enforced by a great number of Thessalian auxiliaries, in addition to Locrians and Eubœans. Since the treaty with Corinth the passes of the Isthmus were no longer guarded, and he proceeded without interruption to Nemea. Here he halted for some days in the hope of intercepting the Athenians, who had not yet joined their Peloponnesian allies. This delay afforded time to the Arcadians to collect their forces at Mantinea, and it did not answer its purpose; for the Athenians, having been apprized of their danger, decreed that their troops should be transported by sea to Laconia. This was, perhaps, a feint to deceive the enemy; and it induced Epaminondas to continue his march to Tegea, where he was in the neighbourhood of all his Arcadian allies, and his troops enjoyed the shelter of a friendly city. Still, his situation soon became embarrassing. A limit had been prescribed—we do not know for what reason, unless it was on account of the harvest—to the duration of the expedition; and the term was drawing near. Though on a previous occasion he had not been afraid to retain his command three or four months beyond the legal period, he seems now to have thought such a step impracticable, and perhaps had cause to apprehend that if he attempted it, he might be abandoned by a great part of his northern troops. There was also great and continually growing difficulty in providing for the subsistence of such an army; for, according to Diodorus, it amounted, after it had been joined by the Peloponnesians, to 30,000 foot and 3000 horse. On the other hand, it was necessary, no less for the interest of Thebes than for his own reputation, that so formidable a host should not have been brought into Peloponnesus without effect. Xenophon praises the judgment with which he selected Tegea for his headquarters; but at the same time intimates, that he was disappointed in the main object of his expectations, as his presence did not awe any of the hostile states into submission; and represents the resolution which he finally adopted as a sudden thought suggested by his perplexing situation. It seems, however, quite as probable that it was a design which he had long before conceived, and that he had only been waiting at Tegea for the most favourable moment to execute it. The opportunity which presented itself was, at least, one on which he might have reasonably calculated. The Lacedæmonian army, commanded by Agesilaus, was on its march to join the allies at Mantinea, and had taken the road of the upper Eurotas through Pellana. Epaminondas was informed of its movements, and when he learned that it had nearly reached the frontier, he set out in the dusk of the evening from Tegea, and having marched all night, arrived in the forenoon of the next day before Sparta.

He expected to find it unguarded and defenceless; but, notwithstanding the precautions which he had used to conceal his intention, Ag-

Agisilaus had received timely intelligence of the danger from a deserter, and appears to have returned with a part of his forces before the enemy arrived. He had at least sent advice to Archidamus, who seems to have been left at home, and preparations had been made for defence. The old men and boys were posted with missiles on the roofs of the buildings in the skirts of the city, and the avenues were guarded by troops as far as the scantiness of their numbers permitted. Epaminondas, however, crossed the Eurotas, and attempted to enter the city from the northeast. He carried one of the eminences nearest the river—perhaps that which was called the Acropolis—and thence descended upon the Agora, which lay just below. But Archidamus, at the head of a chosen band—Xenophon says, fewer than a hundred—defended its approaches with desperate valour. It was, perhaps, at this juncture that a young Spartan, Isadas, the son of Phebidas, with a form like a sculptured Apollo, rushed out of his house, where he had just been anointing himself for exercise, without any covering, but with a lance in one hand and a sword in the other, and plunging into the thickest of the fray, astonished both friends and foes, and, though he dealt many mortal blows, did not receive a wound. He was afterward crowned by the ephors for his valour, but mulcted for the imprudence with which he exposed his life.\* Yet his exploit sounds less fabulous than that of Archidamus, who with his hundred men repulsed the whole invading army, though, according to Xenophon, it had not only its vast superiority of numbers, but also all the advantage of the ground in its favour. We doubt both of these assertions, which, indeed, seem to be virtually contradicted by the historian's own admission, that when the Spartans advanced a little beyond the ground of the first encounter, they were driven back with loss. The general result, however, is unquestionable. The assault was baffled; and Epaminondas, not thinking it prudent to wait until the Spartans should have received the succours which they were expecting from Arcadia, determined to retreat. Having recrossed the Eurotas, and allowed his troops a few hours to refresh themselves, and having left a few horsemen in the camp to kindle fires for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, he set out by the same road, and made another forced night march, which brought him in the course of the next forenoon to Tegea.

He had hastened his retreat, to take advantage of the absence of the Mantineans and their confederates from their city. The infantry, after its late extraordinary exertions, needed repose; but he sent the cavalry forward without delay to Mantinea. The only object which Xenophon assigns to this expedition is plunder; and as the harvest had just begun, and the fields were full of cattle and labourers, as well as of the old and young of the free population, the prospect of booty was in itself sufficiently tempting. But other writers—who suppose that he moved forward at once with his whole force—represent him as aiming at the capture of the city itself. It seems easy to conceive that he had both objects in view, and that, after his infantry had recovered from its fatigue, he

resumed his march. But, in the mean while, his cavalry had met with an unexpected resistance. As soon as the Theban army had broken up from Nemea, the Athenians abandoned their purpose—if they ever really entertained it—of sending their troops to Laconia by sea. Their whole force amounted to about 6000 men, and it was commanded by a general named Hegesilochus, or Hegesilaus, whose celebrity, which would seem to have been considerable in the books read by Diodorus, has scarcely preserved his name from utter oblivion. The cavalry appears to have been about half a day's march in advance; for it had already taken up its quarters in Mantinea when that of Epaminondas made its inroad; and it alone is mentioned by Xenophon: but, according to other writers, the Athenian infantry made its appearance in the distance at the same juncture.\* The cavalry sallied out to protect the Mantinean fields; and notwithstanding the superior numbers and higher reputation of the Theban and Thessalian horse, after a hard-fought action, put the enemy to flight: a victory which, when we consider the effect of the surprise and the previous exhaustion on the defeated side, does not seem clearly entitled to the praise which Xenophon—as if to prove his impartiality—bestows on it in language that might have been thought inspired by patriotic enthusiasm.

This second repulse rendered it the more necessary for Epaminondas to strike some blow worthy of his threats and preparations before his allotted time expired; so that, even if the enemy had outnumbered him, he must have been strongly impelled to seek a general action. His forces, however, were so far superior as to afford a well-grounded hope of victory; for, according to Diodorus, the hostile army amounted to no more than 20,000 foot and 2000 horse. And though no reliance can be placed on this estimate, the proportion is probably not much exaggerated. He had inspired his troops of every name with that ardour and confidence in their commander by which great generals form the instruments of their success; so that even the proud Arcadians adopted the Theban device of a club on their shields.† It therefore sounds a little strange that Xenophon describes him as yielding with some degree of reluctance to the pressure of outward circumstances, while the other side made no attempt to avoid an engagement, but rather waited for it with eagerness. Xenophon's language might lead us to conjecture that he had a presentiment of his approaching fate; but he was used to say that the most desirable death was on a field of battle.‡ The movements of the Spartans and their allies during the operations of Epaminondas, which we have just described, are veiled in Xenophon's narrative as in a mist; and we are even left in doubt whether Agisilaus commanded the Lacedæmonian forces in Arcadia, for Xenophon does not again mention his name. Yet, as it is very much easier to account for the historian's silence than the king's absence, it may be considered as nearly certain that, after the retreat of the Thebans, he

\* Diodorus, xv., 84.

† *ἡ τετραπόρτος πόρτα ἔχοντες, ὡς Θηβαῖοι ὄντες*. Xenophon's brevity has conjured up a Theban band of clubmen in the mind of a modern writer, who profoundly discusses the utility of the institution.

‡ *Plut., Reg. et Imp., Ap.*

\* Plutarch, Ages., 34.

accompanied the Arcadians who came to the relief of Sparta back to Mantinea, where we next find them, prepared to accept an offer of battle. It is, however, a different question, whether the supreme command of the allied forces was assigned to him; though his rank and military reputation render this the most probable supposition.\*

After the engagement of the cavalry, Epaminondas had, it seems, taken up a position on the eastern side of the plain of Mantinea within view of the enemy. He had made known to his troops his intention of giving battle; and on the other side there was a like expectation of an immediate contest, which, it was universally supposed, would decide the destinies of Greece. But when he began to move from his encampment, instead of advancing directly towards the enemy, he turned the head of his column towards the Menalian range of hills, the western boundary of the plain of Tegea, made a circuitous march along its skirts, and at last again halted at the foot of the hills to the west of Mantinea, so as to induce the enemy to believe that he meant to encamp there, and to avoid an action, at least for that day. The consequence was, that their spirits, which had been kept on the stretch all the morning by the prospect of the approaching combat, relapsed into their ordinary tone, and their ranks fell out of fighting order; and this, it appears, was the chief object of the evolution. In the mean while, Epaminondas made fresh dispositions for battle, corresponding to those of the enemy, in whose army the Arcadians occupied the right wing, the Athenians the left; the Spartans stood next to the Arcadians, and the rest of the line was filled up with the Eleians, Achæans, and other troops of inferior repute. Epaminondas formed his phalanx in a figure which Xenophon compares to the bow of a galley, for the purpose of bearing on the right side of the enemy's line, calculating that a breach made in it would decide the fortune of the day. He collected the Bœotians and Arcadians in front, and distributed the rest, whom he did not mean to bring into action, in the back ground. The bulk of his cavalry he also formed into a solid wedge, and strengthened it by an intermixture of light infantry, trained to this kind of service. This he seems to have destined to act on the same side against which he proposed to direct his main attack. But he likewise posted a detachment of horse and foot on some eminences near the enemy's left flank, to occupy the attention of the Athenians. In this order he again moved forward to give battle. The enemy hastily recovered their ranks; but the mood in which they received his onset was no longer that of calm or eager courage. On the details of the battle Xenophon is very brief, Diodorus redundantly and childishly copious; yet he seems to have read and spoiled some better description. We may, however, collect from

both, that on the whole the plan of Epaminondas succeeded in all its parts. The Athenians were kept employed, though in the end they were so far victorious over the troops immediately opposed to them, as well as over a part of the light infantry which fell upon them from the Theban left, as to retain possession of the slain. The charge of the Theban and Thessalian cavalry, with which the battle began, was completely successful, and prepared for the deeper impression afterward made by the shock of the pointed phalanx. But in the moment of victory Epaminondas received a mortal wound, and was carried out of the field to a rising ground, from which his eye, still lighted up, while life was ebbing, by anxiety for the issue, could range over the scene of combat. He would not, it is said, allow the weapon, which was left in the wound, to be extracted until he was assured that he had won the day, and expired almost immediately after. The variations of tradition as to the hand by which he fell, prove the importance which his contemporaries attached to the event. Among the claimants were a Mantinean, a Spartan, and a Locrian of Amphissa. The Spartan's descendants became a privileged family; the Locrian received heroic honours from the Phocians; but the Athenians, and the Thebans themselves, assigned the deed to Xenophon's son Gryllus, who was slain in the action, and was honoured by the Mantineans with a public funeral and a statue, and by his fellow-citizens with a conspicuous place in a painting of the battle, representing him in the act of giving the mortal wound; yet as he served in the Athenian cavalry, it is difficult to understand how he could have encountered Epaminondas, who was at the head of the Theban infantry.

When Epaminondas fell, the action was already decided, the disorder in the enemy's line irretrievable; but he left no one capable of supplying his place. Iollidas and Daiphantus, two Theban officers whom he appears to have held in high esteem, were likewise slain; and, according to one of Plutarch's anecdotes, when he heard of their death, he observed that it was time for Thebes to make peace. None attempted to follow up the victory; the routed seem to have fled only until they found that they were not pursued; and the Athenians even remained masters of a part of the field and of the slain. It is probable, therefore, that the carnage was not much greater on the one side than on the other. Even the empty honour of the bloody game was not undisputed; both parties raised trophies; both were forced to send heralds to recover their dead. Xenophon lets the curtain drop on the field, and concludes his history with the observation that greater confusion and uncertainty prevailed in Greece after the battle than before.\* Yet it was not quite so fruitless

\* On the other hand, the student will scarcely need to be warned against the palpable mistake of Palmerius and Schneider, who imagined that they had the authority of Ephorus, as cited by Diogenes Laertius (Xenophon, 10), for the assertion that Agesilaus was commander-in-chief. Nothing can be clearer than that an Athenian general must be signified by the words *Ἕγεσιλοχος*, as Cephædorus, who is mentioned just before, is evidently the commander of the Athenian cavalry. This Hegesilaus is the Hegesilochus of Diodorus.

\* We part from Xenophon with regret, because we have no better guide, as Ephorus or Theopompus would have been, to supply his place; but with little gratitude, notwithstanding his valuable services; because we see that, if he had chosen, he might have spared us much of the difficulty and obscurity that have perplexed us while we have been trudging in his company. Wolf in his *Lectures* edited by Guenther, iii., p. 295 observes of the *Hellenica* edited by Guenther, iii., p. 295: "I have always believed that it was not a fully developed work, but a summary sketch (nicht ausgeführt, sondern summarisch entworfen); hence its great dryness." This would be an excuse for every defect but the want of honesty.

as he represents. It was followed by a negotiation, in which the Thebans and their Arcadian confederates gained at least one advantage very important to Megalopolis. They induced the allies of Sparta to acknowledge the independence of Messenia; and as Sparta, swayed by the counsels of Agesilaus, still refused to treat on this basis, she was excluded from the peace which was made the year after (361) among all the other states. She had, indeed, no reason, though thus left alone, to apprehend an immediate renewal of hostilities from any quarter; for the belligerents were all alike weary of war, and none had any definite objects beyond the maintenance of their present condition. But her contest with Thebes had been one series of disasters; and the battle of Mantinea, in which she suffered a greater loss than any of her allies, extinguished every hope, which she might still have cherished, of recovering the position which she once occupied in Greece. She had, however, the consolation to see that none of her rivals was, or would be able to supplant her. The sceptre had, indeed, been wrested from her hands; but it had at the same time been broken to pieces. Thebes was obliged to abandon the thought of that supremacy for which she had been struggling, and which seemed at one time within her grasp, and to confine her views to the north, to the security of her sovereignty in Bœotia, and the strengthening of her influence in Phocis and Thessaly. Not because, after the death of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, she was left without able men to direct her counsels and lead her armies; for Pammenes was still living, as perhaps were also Gorgidas and Ismenias; and it is probable that many good officers, as well as soldiers, had been formed in the Sacred Band; the martial spirit which had been roused by her great men, and fostered by so many victories, was not quenched, nor was her ambition moderated by the battle of Mantinea; but the events which had lately taken place must have convinced all reflecting men that it was no longer possible for any state to bring all Peloponnesus under one head; and that Thebes had accomplished the utmost she could now reasonably aim at, when she disabled Sparta from aspiring to regain her ancient supremacy.

## CHAPTER XLI.

### PHILIP OF MACEDON.

To an enlightened and patriotic Greek the prospects of his country must have appeared more gloomy after the battle of Mantinea than at any previous epoch. The most desirable of all conditions for Greece would have been, to be united in a confederacy, strong enough to prevent intestine warfare among its members, and so constituted as to guard against all unnecessary encroachment on their independence. This was the mark towards which the aims of the nation would have been most wisely directed. But though the Amphictyonies, particularly that of Delphi, afforded not only a hint, but a groundwork, which might have been enlarged and adapted to this purpose; though the Lycian colonies exhibited an admirable example of a

similar union;\* though the Persian invasion held out a strong motive, and a fair opportunity for such an undertaking; it is doubtful whether the thought had ever occurred to a single Greek statesman; and it is probable that, if it had suggested itself, it would have been rejected as a chimera. The next good to this would have been the supremacy of some Grecian state, powerful enough to enforce peace, but not to crush liberty. Nearly such had been that which Sparta exercised over the Peloponnesian confederacy before the Persian war. And, for a few years after, the division of power between Sparta and Athens might have seemed to promise the attainment of the blessing, in a different form indeed, but in one which afforded better security for freedom than could have been enjoyed under the sway of either alone. But the restless ambition of Athens soon destroyed the equipoise on which these hopes rested, and plunged the nation into greater calamities than it would probably have incurred if all its states had been left absolutely independent of each other. The only benefit which could have compensated for the evils of the Peloponnesian war, would have been the conviction, which it ought to have produced, of the necessity of national union under a mild but firm federal government. But the lessons of the past were lost upon those whose conduct was chiefly to determine the future. Sparta was not warned by the example of Athens; she threw away a golden opportunity of establishing her own ascendancy on the tranquillity and happiness of Greece, forfeited the confidence of her allies, and proved, for the instruction of those who might have fancied that the misrule which Athens exercised abroad was connected with the peculiar character of her domestic institutions, that the dominion of an oligarchy might be still more oppressive to its foreign dependants than that of a democracy. Thebes, in her turn, even under the administration of Epaminondas—though probably without any fault on his part—wasted the sympathy and admiration which she had attracted by the wrongs she suffered, and by the energy with which she avenged them, through her tyrannical treatment of the Bœotian towns, and the spirit in which she had interfered in the affairs of Peloponnesus. The time had passed by when the supremacy of any state could either have been willingly acknowledged by the rest, or imposed upon them by force.

The hope of any favourable change in the general condition of Greece was now become fainter than ever. The immediate result to be expected, unless some extraordinary interference should avert it, was, that she would gradually waste her strength away in a series of domestic wars. It was, however, possible that this lingering decay might be interrupted by a sudden revolution, which might subject her either to some native tyrant, such as Jason or Dionysius, or to a foreign yoke. But at the time which our history has now reached, no danger of this kind could be thought near enough to disturb that sense of general security which had prevailed ever since the Persian wars, and which permitted and encouraged each state and party to concentrate its attention on its own affairs, and to look with indifference on

\* See vol. i., p. 202, 203.

all occurrences which did not affect its particular and immediate welfare. Notwithstanding the destructive struggles of so many generations, Greece was still in the prime of her vigour. The forces which had been brought into the field at the battle of Mantinea, if they had been arrayed on one side, might have defied the attack of any power then known to the Greeks. Towards whatever side they might turn their view, they could descry no reasonable ground for apprehension. In the west, all the efforts of the Carthaginians had been baffled by the resistance of Syracuse. In the east, the Persian empire had owed its safety to the divisions of the Greeks, and their mercenaries formed the strength of its armies. There was, indeed, a danger, and very near at hand; but it was one which no human sagacity could yet have perceived; and the quarter from which it arose was, perhaps, the last to which a statesman would have looked for the enemy who was to crush the independence of Greece. The state of Macedonia, the seat of the new power which was destined soon to become so formidable, had hitherto been such as but very slightly to attract the attention of the Greeks, and still less to awaken their fears. Since the close of the Peloponnesian war, we have but rarely found occasion to mention it at all, and, whenever its name has occurred, we have seen it rather passively than actively connected with Grecian politics. As we are now about to enter on a period in which it will appear in a very different point of view, this will be the fittest place for such information as we are able to collect concerning the leading events of its past history, which have not been yet noticed, and which may serve to give a clearer insight into its condition at the epoch which we have arrived at.

The weakness of the Macedonian monarchy in the reign of that Perdiccas who filled the throne during the greater part of the Peloponnesian war—from 454 to 413—is betrayed, not only by the feeble resistance which it offered to the Odrysian invasion, but by the duplicity and intrigues to which Perdiccas found himself obliged to resort in his transactions with the leading states of Greece. And we learn from Thucydides, that at his death the country was extremely deficient in the means both of internal communication and of defence. A new era began with the reign of his successor Archelaus, who, according to an account which we have no reason to question as to the main facts,\* was an illegitimate son of Perdiccas,

mounted the throne by violence, and secured himself on it by the murder of the rightful heir, and, it seems, by marriage with his father's widow, Cleopatra.\* But the atrocity of the crimes by which he usurped the crown was lost in the lustre of his reign. He may be considered as having laid the foundation of Macedonia's subsequent greatness, in the roads, walled towns, and fortresses, which were his principal monuments, and by the establishment of a regular force of cavalry and infantry, stronger than had been maintained by any of his predecessors. Still, the actual power of his kingdom does not appear to have been very considerably enlarged. For we find that he was fain to terminate a war in which he was engaged with Sirras and Arrhabæus—apparently the princes of Elymea and Lyncestis—by bestowing the hand of one of his daughters on the Elymean † and when Pydna, one of the maritime towns on the Thermaic Gulf, revolted from him, he reduced it with the aid of an Athenian squadron commanded by Theramenes, and then removed it to a new site between two and three miles from the coast, where he probably expected to hold it more under his control.‡ Nevertheless, his reign seems, on the whole, to have been peaceful and prosperous; and perhaps by friendly relations to Athens, which towards the close of the Peloponnesian war was no longer formidable to him, contributed to preserve that tranquillity which enabled him not only to execute the works which we have mentioned, but to cultivate the arts of peace beyond any of his predecessors. It seems to have been his object to transplant the literature, the fine arts, and even the philosophy of Greece, particularly of Athens, into his kingdom. He induced Euripides, the favourite poet of the most refined Athenian circles, to take up his residence in Macedonia, where he ended his days. Agathon likewise, a dramatist of high reputation, and Timotheus, a celebrated master of music and of lyric song, were also among his guests. It is somewhat surprising,

chelaus, the founder of Ege, and the progenitor of the royal line, was an adventurer—though a Heraclid by birth—who, having taken refuge in Macedonia at the court of the King Cisseus, delivered him by his military achievements from the foreign enemies by whom he was threatened. The king had promised to reward him with the hand of his daughter and the succession to the throne; but having been induced by evil persuasions to break his word and to aim at his benefactor's life, he was himself killed by Archelaus, who then, under the protection of Apollo, became the founder of a new dynasty. It seems hardly credible that such a subject should have been chosen by Euripides for his drama. If the history of the real Archelaus had not presented some parallel circumstances. The details mentioned by Plato concerning the murder of Alcetas and his son—which, it ought to have been unnecessary to observe, are related, not of Perdiccas, but of Archelaus—correspond very closely with those of the catastrophe of Cisseus in the drama. The fragment xxxiv. (Matthian) *ἔκαστος ὁδοῦναις ἀντιπάλαι* may be compared with what Thucydides relates of Archelaus.

\* Aristotle, Pol. v. 8, compared with Plato, u. s.

† Aristotle, u. s., where perhaps, instead of *Σίβαν*, we ought to read *Δίβαν*: so, a few lines below, the name *Πύδαν* has been written instead of *Πύδαν*.

‡ Diodorus. xiii. 49. It was hardly worth while, for the sake of a little more railing against the Athenians, to cite Diodorus for an assertion directly contrary to that which is contained in the Greek text. It must therefore, in candour, be presumed, that the historian who informs his readers that "the Athenians excited the people of Pydna to rebellion and supported them in it," was misled—naturally enough for one who held the *idle learned* in profound contempt—by the ambiguity of the *cui* in the Latin version, which, unfortunately, might be referred either to the *urbem* immediately preceding, or to *Archelaus*.

\* Plato, Gorgias, p. 471. A writer who considers it as the great business of history to place royalty in the most favourable light, of course thinks it his duty to depreciate the credit of this story to the utmost. It would, perhaps, be sufficient for an historian, who does not write with such an aim, to observe that it is just as unlikely that the story—relating to a prince who was on good terms with Athens, and a munificent patron of Athenian arts and literature—should have become current there without a good foundation, as that it should have been invented by Plato. Mr. Clinton (F. H., ii., p. 223) contents himself with the remark that "the circumstances respecting the character of Archelaus, touched upon by Aristotle, make it credible that he might have risen to the throne by irregular means." We cannot help thinking that Plato's story is strongly confirmed by the plot of the *Archelaus* of Euripides, which he wrote, as we are informed by one of the poet's Greek biographers, in Macedonia, to gratify his patron. An outline of the argument is given by Hyginus, from which, as well as from the remaining fragments, it appears that the dramatic Ar-



but is a fact sufficiently attested, that Socrates was one of the foreigners whom he invited; perhaps because he had heard of him as the subtlest and most accomplished of the Athenian sophists. Socrates, we are informed, declined the invitation, because he would not live in a place where he must receive benefits which he could not requite; alluding, it may be, to the character of Archelaus, of whom he is said to have observed, that he had taken more pains to furnish his house than his mind. Archelaus had engaged Zeuxis of Heraclea, one of the most famous painters of the day, at an expense of nearly seven talents, to adorn his palace, which drew many strangers to Pella by the reputation of its magnificence.\* And it was, perhaps, chiefly with the view of attracting foreigners, and thus encouraging trade and commerce among his subjects, that he instituted a festival and games in imitation of those of Olympia, at *Ægæ*. But there is no reason to believe that these refinements of the court produced any sensible effect on the main body of the nation, which, so far as we can judge from the hints given by Thucydides, seems hitherto to have been very imperfectly civilized.† It probably retained its simple habits—more nearly resembling those of the heroic ages than of Greece in the fifth century B.C.—as it continued to speak a semi-barbarian dialect, compounded, it would appear, of Pelasgian and Illyrian elements, with a mixture of the later Greek. Whatever taste was introduced for the pursuits of art, science, and literature, seems to have been confined to the higher classes; and as there are strong indications that it was accompanied with great corruption of morals in the court circle,‡ it was, perhaps, happy for the people that it was not, and could not, be more widely diffused. It was partly by the indulgence of odious vices, though partly also by the abuse which he suffered Euripides to make of his favour, that Archelaus provoked a conspiracy among his courtiers, by whom he was murdered in the fourteenth year of his reign.§

If Archelaus mounted the throne in the manner which has been related on the best remaining authority, we can the more easily understand how it happened that his dynasty was of short duration. He was succeeded by Orestes, apparently his youngest son by Cleopatra. *Æropus*, the young prince's guardian, suffered him nominally to reign four years, but then despatched him, and seized the crown for himself. He was probably encouraged by the recollection that his ward's title was founded on a like usurpation. At all events, we find no need—as there is no historical evidence—for the conjecture that this change of dynasty was the result of a reaction, undertaken by a party which interest or prejudice attached to the ancient state of things, against the innovations introduced by Archelaus.

us.\* The success of *Æropus* appears to have called forth other more legitimate claims to the throne. He, indeed, died a natural death, after a reign of six years; but his son Pausanias was assassinated in the year of his accession by a representative of the old royal family, Amyntas II., whose grandfather, of the same name, was a younger son of King Alexander, the contemporary of Xerxes. The reign of Amyntas, which began 394, was disturbed by disasters and vicissitudes which we have already had occasion to notice, and which for a time threatened the existence of Macedonia as an independent state. We may here add that the Illyrians, by whom he was expelled from his dominions very soon after his accession, appear to have supported the claims of a pretender named Argæus,† who, in fact, remained in possession of the throne for two years, at the end of which Amyntas, with the aid of the Thessalians—that is, probably, of the same great families whom we afterward find connected with the kings of Macedonia—regained a footing in a part of his territories; but it was not until Sparta had broken the power of Olynthus that he was able to recover the whole. We are not distinctly informed of any subsequent irruption of the Illyrians into Macedonia; yet Amyntas must have been again threatened by them, and have felt himself too weak for resistance, if, as Diodorus relates, he consigned his youngest son Philip to them as a hostage. And we would not reject this statement because it has been combined with one scarcely credible, that the Illyrians lodged their hostage at Thebes. Amyntas continued to his death (370) in close alliance with Sparta; but he also cultivated the friendship of Athens, more especially towards the close of his reign, when the interests of Athens and of Sparta began to concur in opposition to Thebes; he professed to favour the claims of the Athenians on Amphipolis,‡ and took so much pains to conciliate the good-will of Iphicrates, that he is said to have adopted him as his son.§

These transactions do not tend to convey the impression that Macedonia was in a flourishing condition under Amyntas. It is surrounded by powerful enemies, and is only enabled to maintain a precarious existence by foreign aid. In the period which intervened between his death and the accession of his son Philip, it laboured under the evils of a disputed succession and intestine warfare, while it was still threatened by the same formidable neighbours. Amyntas left three sons, Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip, then thirteen years old. Alexander II. had arrived at manhood, assumed the reins of government without opposition, and on the occasion which drew him, as we have seen, into Thessaly to aid his father's old allies against the tyrants of Phææ, discovered signs of an

\* *Ælian*, V. H., xix., 17.

† We are unable to discover any evidence for an assertion of Droysen (*Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*, p. 37)—who in this part of his work has certainly too often suffered his theory to fill up an historical blank—that under the wise direction of Archelaus, the light of civilization was diffused into the remotest valleys of Macedonia. This is too much to infer from what Thucydides says of his works, though they do not doubt contributed something towards the civilizing of the distant provinces. See the end of note (\*), col. i, p. 35.

‡ Aristotle, *Pol.*, v., 8, and *Ælian*, V. H., ii., 31; xiii., 4.

§ Aristotle, *u. s.*

\* This conjecture is Droysen's, p. 38. He would, perhaps, not have fallen upon it if he had not neglected—either as unimportant or as unworthy of credit—the circumstances under which Archelaus mounted the throne.

† Droysen (p. 39), without alleging any authority, calls him the youngest son of Archelaus. The manner in which Aristotle (*Pol.*, v., 8) speaks of the two sons of Archelaus—Amyntas, and the one whom he had by Cleopatra, whom we suppose to have been Orestes—seems rather to imply that he had no others, at least none who could pretend any title to the throne.

‡ *Æschines*, *De F. L.*, § 35. Digitized by Google

enterprising spirit. We are not informed as to the origin of the contest in which he was engaged with Ptolemy of Alorus; we do not know whether Ptolemy was in any way related to the royal family,\* nor whether he laid claim to the crown;† but it seems clear that he was favoured by the queen, Eurydice, the widowed mother of the three princes. Perhaps it was her quarrel that he espoused against her eldest son, whose death, when he was treacherously murdered by Ptolemy or his emissaries in the second year of his reign, appears at least not to have excited her resentment against the assassin. The account of Diodorus and Plutarch, that Philip was among the hostages delivered to Pelopidas when he came to arbitrate between Alexander and Ptolemy, contradicts the testimony of the contemporary orator Æschines, who relates that Philip was still in Macedonia at the time of his eldest brother's death. The authority of Æschines, indeed, cannot be deemed conclusive as to all the particulars which he mentions, and it might, therefore, be suspected that he had been misinformed with regard to the precise date of the scene which he describes, and that it took place in the reign of Alexander.‡ But we are inclined to adopt this part of his narrative, as, on the whole, most probable in itself, though it still raises great difficulties as to the occasion on which Philip was carried away to Thebes. According to Plutarch, after the murder of Alexander, which must have happened very soon after the compromise, Pelopidas, who was in Thessaly on his second expedition against the tyrant of Phœræ, was invited into Macedonia by the friends of the deceased king, and obliged Ptolemy to enter into an engagement to preserve the crown for the younger brothers. Ptolemy, it is said, gave fifty hostages as a security for the performance of his promise, among whom was his own son Philoxenus. It seems more natural that Philip should have been committed to the custody of the Thebans, under these circumstances, than on the occasion of the contest between Ptolemy and Alexander; especially if Eurydice was generally believed to have been an accessory to her son's murder—a crime

with which she is charged by some later writers—and if she was suspected of a criminal intercourse with Ptolemy: a suspicion which seems, at least, to have been entertained at a subsequent period, and which is strongly confirmed by her acquiescence in the murderer's authority.\*

But from Æschines we learn that, soon after Alexander's death, a new pretender to the crown, named Pausanias, appeared in Macedonia, made himself master of several towns, and was supported by a very powerful party. It happened that at this juncture Iphicrates was on the coast, in command of a small squadron destined to act against Amphipolis. Eurydice sent to him to request an interview; and, when he came, placed her two sons in the attitude of suppliants at his knees, and reminding him of the proofs of regard which he had received from Amyntas, implored his protection. Iphicrates was moved by her entreaties to turn his arms against Pausanias, and expelled him from the kingdom. Æschines represents Ptolemy as at this time regent, and as one of the parties obliged by the intervention of Iphicrates;† thus clearly indicating that he made common cause with the queen. It is certainly difficult to conceive how, after this event, Pelopidas could have been invited into Macedonia in the manner described by Plutarch. But this difficulty is scarcely a sufficient ground for the supposition that Æschines was mistaken as to Philip's presence at the interview with Iphicrates,‡ especially as the orator himself alludes to a treaty into which Ptolemy afterward entered with the Thebans. It may, therefore, be safest to conjecture that Pelopidas was called in by some friends of the royal family to shield it from the danger with which it might well seem to be threatened by Ptolemy's ambition. Ptolemy kept possession of the government three years. Diodorus simply says that he reigned so long probably, however, he never assumed any other title than that of regent, though he may have had no intention of ever resigning his power to the rightful heir. And it was perhaps as much in self-defence, as to revenge his brother's murder or his mother's shame, that Perdicas killed him (364).

Concerning the reign of Perdicas III. w

\* Diodorus, xv., 71, and Dexippus, ap. Syncell., p. 500, ed. Bonn, are apparently at variance on this point: though, if Ptolemy was an illegitimate son of Amyntas, their statements may be reconciled.

† That he did so seems to have been too hastily assumed by Flathe, *Geschichte Macedoniens*, i., p. 39, who proceeds to argue that his claims must have had some foundation, because otherwise he would not have subjected them to the arbitration of Pelopidas, and then conjectures that he accepted an appanage as a satisfaction for them.

‡ Among whom, it appears from Demosthenes (*De F. L.*, § 216), was one Apollonophanes of Pydna. That Ptolemy was the principal in the plot, is proved by the testimony of Marsyas in Athenæus (xiv., p. 629), from whom we learn that the conspirators executed their purpose at a court revel, in which they performed the national war-dance. This is one of the instances from which we may learn to appreciate the value of many skeptical arguments grounded on the silence of the orators. A writer anxious to save Ptolemy's character, and ignorant of the author quoted by Athenæus, reasons, "Some notice of this crime, had it been real, could hardly have failed (qu., to be found!) among the orators, especially Demosthenes." Apollonophanes himself, as we are informed by Demosthenes, was afterward assassinated, and his relatives thought it prudent to remove his infant daughters for shelter to Olynthus. He was, therefore, most probably murdered by the friends of Alexander—perhaps by agents of Perdicas—during the regency of Ptolemy, when he could not be brought to justice.

§ But Flathe (i., p. 39) is certainly not justified in charging Æschines with deliberate misrepresentation.

\* The stories told of Eurydice by Justin may not be a true, but it is not clear on what grounds Mr. Clinton (1 H., ii., p. 226) observes that "they are virtually contradicted by the narrative of Æschines." It was surely quite possible, though she had conspired with her paramour against the life both of her husband and her eldest son, and designed to destroy the two younger, that she might still make use of them in the manner described by Æschines, to obtain the protection of Iphicrates against Pausanias. The writer, whose "accustomed judgment" Mr. Clinton commends, was at least consistent with himself, when, having—perhaps through the oversight pointed out by Mr. Clinton in a preceding note—placed the fact of the assassination of Alexander by Ptolemy among the stories of Justin and Athenæus which seem unworthy of credit, he likewise rejected the tale about Eurydice as fabulous. But Mr. Clinton, who admits that Ptolemy was the murderer of Alexander, and thinks it probable that he was appointed regent—a regular war during the minority of Perdicas, ought to have explained how it happened that Eurydice, when she was imploring the protection of Iphicrates against Pausanias, did not throw out a word about Ptolemy's crime, or the danger which threatened the young princes from a regent who had murdered their elder brother. The narrative of Æschines appears to us virtually to confirm Justin's tale, which, however, it must be remembered, consisted of many parts.

† *Ἀφίπρωτον καὶ δευρὸν ἔργον ἐπεπράξατο.*

‡ This is Flathe's way of solving the difficulty, u. s.

save but very scanty information; but all that we know of him leads us to conclude that he was not deficient in spirit and ability. He resisted the attempts of the Athenians on Amphipolis, and appears to have gained some advantage over them, either in war or by negotiation. He was also a patron of arts and letters, and, like Archelaus, is said to have shown an immoderate partiality for some of the learned men whom he drew to his court. We hear that one Euphræus, a Eubæan of Oreus, acquired such influence over him, and so foolishly abused it, as to exclude all guests from the royal table who could not contribute to the conversation by their scientific or philosophical accomplishments. Though there may be some exaggeration in this statement, it seems certain that he became powerful enough to excite vehement indignation in some of the courtiers, and that it was chiefly in revenge for the insolence which he had shown in his prosperity that he was afterward put to death at Oreus by the Macedonian general Parmenio.\* Perdiccas, however, does not appear to have neglected the duties of his station. He took the field against the Illyrians, but was defeated and slain by them in the fifth year of his reign. He left an infant son named Amyntas.†

At the time of this event Philip was twenty-three years of age. Diodorus supposes that he was still at Thebes, but that, on receiving intelligence of his brother's death, he made his escape, and suddenly appeared in Macedonia.‡ It is not difficult to understand how the story may have taken this form: a hostage so important, it might easily be supposed by writers acquainted with his subsequent history, would not have been willingly surrendered by the Thebans: it is certain, however, from better authority, that he had been already restored to his country, and, it is probable, early in the reign of Perdiccas, when the Thebans could have no motive for detaining him. Extravagantly as some modern writers have indulged their imagination with regard to the manner in which his time was employed during his sojourn at Thebes, it is hardly possible to over-

rate the importance of the opportunities it afforded him for the acquisition of various kinds of knowledge, or to doubt that he availed himself of them with all the energy and perseverance which belonged to his character. It is, perhaps, less probable that the house of Polymnis, the father of Epaminondas, should have been chosen for his residence, as Diodorus relates, than that of Pammeas, according to Plutarch's statement;\* and the fable of his Pythagorean studies—worthy of Diodorus—is below criticism.† But a certain tincture of philosophy was at this time deemed almost an indispensable requisite in a liberal education. The fame of Plato, who had, no doubt, many admirers and disciples at Thebes, could not but engage Philip's attention and awaken his curiosity. We do not undertake to determine whether the relations subsisting between Thebes and Athens, during his stay in Greece, were such as permit us to suppose that he visited Athens, or became personally acquainted with the founder of the Academy; but it seems an almost inevitable inference, from a fact attested by contemporary evidence, that some kind of communication took place during this period between Plato and Philip, which impressed the philosopher with a favourable opinion of the prince; and it is not too bold, if it be not an indispensable conjecture, that Philip's esteem and admiration for Aristotle, of which he afterward gave so remarkable a proof, had its origin in an acquaintance formed at the same epoch. Speusippus, Plato's kinsman and favourite scholar, related that, by Plato's recommendation, conveyed through Euphræus, Perdiccas was induced to bestow a principality, by way of appanage, on his brother, who was, consequently, in possession of it, and in Macedonia when the throne became vacant. The authority of Speusippus must be deemed sufficient to place the substance of this account—the grant itself, and his uncle's recommendation—beyond question; nor is there anything in the slightest degree improbable, or inconsistent with the known characters and situation of the parties, in any one of the particulars; only it may be necessary to observe, that it does not follow that Philip's return to Macedonia was effected through Plato's mediation, or that Plato had been previously in correspondence with Perdiccas. The king had no reason to be jealous of his brother;‡ and after the death of Ptolemy, the Thebans, as we have already remarked,

\* Athenæus, xi., p. 508, from Cærilius.

† Justin, vii., 5. Justin does not mention his name, which is supplied by other writers. The reader is probably aware that it has been asserted—with the assurance of contented ignorance—that "among extant ancient authors Justin alone tells of an infant son left by Perdiccas, who succeeded him on the throne, and for whom Philip acted as guardian and regent." But Justin's main act, that Perdiccas left an infant son, is fully confirmed by the testimony of Q. Curtius, vi., 9, 17; vi., 10, 24, and Polyænus, viii., 60. The former mentions the plot formed by Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, against his cousin Alexander: the latter that he married a daughter of Philip. Their evidence is illustrated and confirmed by Arrian (i., 5), from whom we learn that the princess had become a widow soon after Alexander's accession to the throne. There can, therefore, be no doubt that this is the Amyntas to whom Plutarch alludes (De Alex. M. Fortuna, i., p. 327, C.), though Wytténbach has confounded him with another Amyntas, son of Antiochus. The statement, therefore, so superciliously rejected, rests in the main on as good ground as almost any in history. But Justin's *dis* seems to proceed from some mistake, being hardly consistent with his own context.

‡ This is evidently the meaning of Diodorus, xvi., 2. To pretend that his account wants "no violence to make it accord with that of Philip's establishment in Macedonia given by Speusippus," only betrays the incapacity of the writer who makes the remark to understand a plain Greek sentence. Wesseling was indeed one of the *idle* learned, but he possessed a kind of knowledge not useless even to an historian of Greece.

\* The French author who supposed that, on account of the poverty of Polymnis, a public pension was assigned to defray the expense of Philip's education, perceived the difficulty, but was not happy in his expedient for removing it.

† It did not deserve the elaborate discussion which Wesseling has bestowed on it in his note on xvi., 2. The main fact, which is the only point of importance—Philip's residence as a hostage at Thebes—is not at all affected by the discrepancies which he notices. This is another instance which ought to teach us caution in drawing arguments from the silence of the orators. It is certainly remarkable that no allusion occurs in any of them to this period of Philip's life, especially as Dio Chrysostom (ii., p. 248, Reisk) mentions a report, which, if it had been current in the time of Demosthenes, might have afforded a topic for invective; but no intelligent critic will think this a sufficient reason for questioning the fact.

‡ It is a merely arbitrary conjecture of Flathe's (i., p. 48) that Philip's desire to obtain the government of a Macedonian province had provoked a misunderstanding between him and Perdiccas, which was adjusted by Plato's mediation.

could not have wished to detain him. It is, therefore, probable enough that the term of three years assigned to his stay at Thebes, though not on the best authority, is not far from the truth. It would be the part of his life which intervened between the age of sixteen and of twenty.

It was, undoubtedly, not the study of philosophy, either speculative or practical, that chiefly occupied Philip's attention during this period. To the society in which it was passed he may have been mainly indebted for that command of the Greek language which enabled him both to write and speak it with a degree of ease and elegance not inferior to that of the most practised orators of his day. But the most important advantages which he gained from his stay at Thebes were probably derived from the military and political lessons with which the conversation of generals and statesmen like Epaminondas, Pelopidas, and their friends, could not fail to abound. It was by them that the art of war had been carried to the highest point it had yet reached in Greece; or, rather, they, more particularly Epaminondas, had given it a new form, and the details of their battles and campaigns would be eagerly collected by an intelligent and ambitious youth. Thebes was at this time the great centre of political movements—the point from which the condition, interests, and mutual relations of the Greek states might be most distinctly surveyed. Here, too, were to be gained the clearest ideas of the state of parties, of the nature and working of republican, especially of democratical institutions: here, probably, Philip learned many of those secrets which often enabled him to conquer without drawing the sword. And as he was placed in one of the most favourable positions for studying the Greek character, so the need which his situation imposed on him of continual caution and self-control must have served very greatly to sharpen his natural sagacity, and to form the address which he afterward displayed in dealing with men, and winning them for his ends. What were the impressions made upon his taste and feelings by his residence at Thebes it would be vain to inquire; but it is remarkable that there are parts of his political conduct which it is not easy to explain, except on the supposition that he viewed Athens with a certain degree of predilection, which inclined him, where his own interests allowed liberty of choice, to favour her at the expense of her Boeotian rival.

Nature had gifted him with almost every quality that could fit him for the station which he was destined to fill: a frame of extraordinary robustness, which was no doubt well trained in the exercises of the Theban palæstras; a noble person, a commanding and prepossessing mien, which won respect and inspired confidence in all who approached him; ready eloquence, to which art only applied the cultivation requisite to satisfy the fastidious demands of a rhetorical age; quickness of observation, acuteness of discernment, presence of mind, fertility of invention, and dexterity in the management of men and things. There seem to have been two features in his character, which, in another station, or under different circumstances, might have gone near to lower him into an

ordinary person, but which were so controlled by his fortune as to contribute not a little to his success. He appears to have been by his temperament prone to almost every kind of sensual pleasure; but as his life was too busy to allow him often to indulge his bias, his occasional excesses wore the air of an amiable condescension. So his natural humour would, perhaps, have led him too often to forget his dignity in his intercourse with his inferiors. But to Philip, the great king, the conqueror, the restless politician, these intervals of relaxation occurred so rarely, that they might strengthen his influence with the vulgar, and could never expose him to contempt. From that he was secured by the energy of will, which made all his faculties and accomplishments of mind and body, and even his failings, as well as what may be called in a lower sense his virtues—his affability, clemency, and generosity—always subservient to the purposes of his lofty ambition. A moral estimate of such a man's character is comprised in the bare mention of his ruling passion, and cannot be enlarged by any investigation into the motives of particular actions; and it is scarcely worth while to consider him in any other light than as an instrument of Providence for fixing the destiny of nations.

The time had come when all these qualities and attainments were to be called forth into action, and were to be matured in a new and harder school of practical experience. The situation in which he was placed by his brother's death was one of great apparent difficulty and danger. As the nearest kinsman of the royal infant, he, of course, immediately took charge of the government; it is possible, indeed, that it was committed to him by Perdiccas when he set out on his expedition. The throne which he had to defend was threatened by enemies in many quarters. The Illyrians had not taken advantage of their victory to carry their arms farther into the country. The main body, at least, had returned home with their booty. But they were said to be collecting their forces for a fresh invasion, and from the language of Diodorus\* it would even seem as if they still retained possession of some Macedonian districts or towns adjacent to their frontier. The western provinces lay at their mercy. The Pæonians, the nearest neighbours of Macedonia towards the north, seized the opportunity to make an inroad for plunder. At the same time, the juncture invited two pretenders to put forward their claims to the crown, or, rather, to use them as a pretext for seizing it by means of foreign aid. Pausanias, no doubt the competitor of Perdiccas, who, as we have seen, had been expelled by Iphicrates, obtained promises of aid from the King of Thrace, perhaps Cotys, whose dominions included most of the maritime provinces of the Odrysian empire; and he might reckon on finding many partisans in Macedonia, where he had been so strongly supported but a few years before. Argæus, too, the old adversary of Amyntas, appears to have revived his pretensions, unless he had transmitted them to a younger claimant of the same name. Argæus, whoever he may have been, had gained the Athenians over to his interest by a promise of

some concessions with regard to Amphipolis, which had been during the last reign the main subject of contest between the republic and Macedonia. Mantias, an Athenian general, had been sent with a considerable squadron, and a force including 3000 heavy-armed, to support him. This was the antagonist immediately the most formidable, both as having disciplined troops at his command, and as being enabled, with the help of the Athenian navy, to threaten the most important provinces, and the seat of government. A war with Athens, while the kingdom was exposed to so many other enemies, was of itself greatly to be dreaded.

There was, however, one advantage which Philip drew from his alarming and embarrassing position. The evils of civil war and foreign invasion, with which the country was either threatened or actually assailed, turned all eyes towards him as the man on whom the hopes of the nation rested. The infant king was generally overlooked, and he was encouraged immediately to direct his views to the crown, and was perhaps regarded by many from the first as his brother's successor. The law of succession, though, in peaceful times and ordinary cases, it recognised the principle of lineal representation, seems not to have been more precisely determined, or, at least, more inflexible, in Macedonia than in the Greek monarchies of the Homeric ages. Still it appears that Philip did not attempt at once to set his nephew aside, or assume the regal title, which would have been impolitic while there were two other pretenders to the crown, powerfully supported from without. But he took his measures, that, as soon as these competitors should be removed, he might execute his purpose without opposition. If we may believe Justin,\* a prophecy was circulated, which, if it was really current at this period, must have been fabricated by his emissaries with this object: *that Macedonia should flourish exceedingly under one of the sons of Amyntas*. And we may collect from Diodorus† that he was at great pains to gain the affections of the army, and frequently exerted his eloquence for this purpose; though the annalist speaks of his numerous harangues as if they were only designed to infuse courage into his troops. The admiration excited by this rare talent served, at least, to strengthen the impression produced by his person and manners, and by the affability with which he tempered the strictness of military discipline.

The forces which he was able to collect would probably have been scarcely sufficient to sustain so many different attacks as now threatened him at once, and his genius inclined him to try other means of averting the danger. The Pæonian chief, whose only aim appears to have been to enrich his people with booty, having partly accomplished his purpose, was easily induced by an embassy, which carried presents and promises to him and his leading men, to withdraw his army: The King of Thrace, a weak, luxurious prince, who was hardly master of his reason, was persuaded, by a negotiation similarly conducted, to abandon the cause of Pausanias; and this pretender had no other means of enforcing his claims. Philip was thus left at liberty to direct his whole attention to

the Athenians and Argæus; and he would gladly have rid himself of them by like methods. It was the hope of recovering Amphipolis, not any wish to place Argæus on the throne, that had induced Athens to interfere; and Philip seems to have hoped, by satisfying her on this point, to detach her from the side of his rival. The language of Diodorus would of itself lead the reader to suppose that Amphipolis was at this time occupied by a Macedonian garrison, and that Philip, before hostilities had been begun by the Athenian armament under Mantias, withdrew his troops from the place, and publicly renounced his claims to it.\* Polyænus still more distinctly intimates that this was the state of the case;† and if we may believe—on still inferior authority—that Philip received divine honours at Amphipolis before he became finally master of it, this extravagant display of gratitude would seem to require the supposition of some solid and extraordinary benefit, something, therefore, beyond a mere verbal recognition of its independence. On the other hand, we have no express information, nor any other reason to conjecture that Perdicas had ever become so far master of Amphipolis; and to suppose that Philip parted with so important a place, on the chance of being able to recover it as soon as the immediate object of the sacrifice should have been attained, would be to imagine a finesse, not, indeed, too deep for his character, but still requiring stronger evidence than the fact rests on. A suspicion, indeed, will readily suggest itself to any one acquainted with Diodorus, that he has here mentioned the step which Philip took a little later, with regard to Amphipolis, prematurely. But it is not at all unlikely that, before any blow was struck, he should have endeavoured to deprive Argæus of Athenian support by a declaration which cost him nothing. Nor does it seem to have been, even at the time, altogether ineffectual. Mantias, indeed, arrived at Methone, on the Thermaic Gulf, with the pretender; but he seems to have done nothing. Argæus, who was accompanied by a number of Macedonian exiles, hoped to find partisans in the country; and it is remarkable that the place where he expected to be most favourably received was no other than the ancient capital Argæ. In that direction he set out at the head of a body of mercenaries—whether collected by himself or brought by Mantias, does not appear. Mantias remained at Methone; but he suffered some of the Athenian troops to accompany his ally. The attempt on Argæ totally failed: no one ventured to declare himself in the pretender's favour; and he was so disheartened by this repulse, that he determined to return to Methone. But in the mean while Philip had assembled his forces, and marched to cut off the invader's retreat. An engagement ensued, in which Argæus was defeated with considerable loss, and the remnant of his army forced to take refuge on an eminence, where they were surrounded and reduced to capitulate with the conqueror. They obtained leave to depart unmolested, on condition of giv-

\* xvi., 3, ἐκουσίως ἐξεχώρησε τῆς πόλεως, ἀφ' ἧς αὐτὸν ἀπέννομον.

† iv., 3, 17. Philip—while still at war with the Illyrians—being required by the Athenians to restore Amphipolis, οὐκ ἀπώλεσεν, ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἧς ἀνελθόντα.

‡ Aristides, i., p. 715, Dindorf.

ing up the exiles. Whether Argeus was one of the number, or had fallen in the battle, we are not informed: his name appears no more in history.

Among the prisoners taken by Philip on this occasion were some of the Athenian troops.\* These he detained only to distinguish them with peculiar favours; for he not only set them at liberty, but made presents to each of them equivalent to the property they had lost. They were, of course, bound to return home; and it is probable than Mantias, having no longer any mission to execute in Macedonia, led his whole armament back to Athens. The prisoners were accompanied or followed by envoys, bearing a letter from Philip to the people, in which—probably with expostulations on their unprovoked hostility—he expressed his desire to renew the friendship which had subsisted between his father and the republic. The subject of Amphipolis was not passed over in silence in this letter; though, as we are uncertain what Philip had before done with regard to it, we are the less able to determine what he now said. The sequel, however, leads us to suspect that he did not confine his professions to the declaration—now either first made or repeated—of his willingness to leave it independent, but that he threw out hints from which it might be gathered that he would not be unwilling to see it reduced under the sovereignty of Athens. However this be, it is certain that his liberality towards the prisoners made a very strong impression in his favour on the assembly, and inclined the Athenians to expect all they could desire from the friendly disposition of which, even under such provocation, he had given so striking a proof. Demosthenes intimates that the people's gratitude was, at the moment, so lively, that almost any honours might have been obtained for Philip.† If, as is probable, Argeus was no longer in the way, there remained no farther obstacle to peace; and it was soon after concluded, apparently without any express stipulation on either side with regard to Amphipolis.

Philip's victory raised the spirits of his troops, which had been cast down by the defeat of Perdiccas. The success of his negotiations secured his government from internal opposition. But still it appeared to rest on a merely precarious foundation, so long as the tranquillity of the country might be said to be purchased from one enemy, or to be due to the forbearance of another. Fortunately for him, just as he had freed himself from the burden of the Athenian war, the death of Agis, king of the Pæonians, afforded him an opportunity of invading Pæonia at the juncture when it was least capable of resisting his arms. He defeated the forces which were brought against him, and compelled the Pæonians to render him tokens of submission, which were, perhaps, chiefly important as they humbled the insolence of the nation, and encouraged the Macedonians to regard themselves as its masters. But a more formidable enemy remained in the Illyrians, who hitherto, in the wars between the two nations, had been

almost always successful aggressors, and were now in possession of many places belonging to Macedonia. Their king, Bardylis, though he still retained sufficient vigour of mind and body to discharge the duties of his station, had reached an age—ninety, it is said—in which the most restless spirits grow patient of repose. Philip's successes and increasing reputation no doubt also tended to dispose him towards peace; and hearing that the Macedonian prince was making preparations to invade Illyria, he endeavoured to avert the attack by pacific overtures. The terms he proposed were, simply, that each party should retain what it possessed. Philip, however, now thought himself strong enough to require that the Illyrians should evacuate all the territory they had conquered from Macedonia. It is not quite clear whether this demand comprised only what had been lost through the defeat of Perdiccas, or earlier conquests of the Illyrians. It was, however, rejected; the Illyrian king prepared to meet the threatened invasion, and, notwithstanding his advanced age, led his forces into the field in person.‡ According to Diodorus, the numbers of the two armies were nearly equal, and the heavy infantry in each amounted to 10,000 men. His description of the battle seems not to have been drawn so much as usual from his imagination, and suggests the idea that, on this occasion, perhaps for the first time, Philip put in practice the lessons he had learned from his Theban masters, and gained the victory chiefly by a judicious concentration of his force and employment of his cavalry—in which he seems to have been superior to the enemy—after the example of Epaminondas. The loss of the Illyrians is said to have amounted to 7000 men; and they were compelled to accept the terms of peace imposed by the conqueror. They ceded to him all that they possessed east of the Lake of Lychnus, and thus not only gave him the command of the principal pass by which they had been used to penetrate into Macedonia, but opened a way by which he might at any time descend, through their own territory, to the shores of the Adriatic.†

It may safely be presumed that, after this brilliant success, Philip no longer hesitated to assume the kingly title. His usurpation—for such it appears to have been, according to the laws of Macedon—was, however, most probably sanctioned by the unanimous consent both of the army and the nation. How secure he felt himself in their affections is manifest from his treatment of his deposed nephew. He was so little jealous of him, that he brought him up at his court, and, in time, bestowed the hand of one of his daughters on him.§ The transfer of the crown was so quiet and noiseless, that it seems not to have reached the ears of the Athenian orators; whose silence may, at all events, be admitted as a proof that there was nothing in the transaction on which they could ground a charge against Philip.

His victory over the Illyrians is connected by Diodorus with the institution of the Macedo-

\* Diodorus does not mention them: the language of Demosthenes, where his immediate object would have inclined him not to underrate the number, seems to imply that it was small. Aristocr., § 144, Ἀργαίου κاردύωνος δούλον τῶν ἡμετέρων τιμὰς πολεῖσθαι.

† Aristocr., u. s.

\* Lucian, Macrob., 10: iii., p. 215, Reiz; from which passage it may be inferred that he either fell in the battle, or died in the course of the same year. † Lucian, u. s.

‡ See Leake, Northern Greece, iii., p. 331.

§ Polyæmus (viii., 60) calls her Κυνύρα. Arrian (i., 5), Kéra. Athenæus (xiii., p. 357), from Dicaearchus, Κέρρα.

ian phalanx, which he is said to have invented. The testimony of the ancients on this point has been very confidently rejected in modern times, without any good reason. We may, indeed, doubt whether this body, as it existed in the beginning of Philip's reign, differed in any important feature from that which was already familiar to the Greeks, or, at least, from the Theban phalanx. But it is another question whether the Macedonian armies had ever before been organized on this plan; and there is nothing to prevent us from admitting the statement of authors, certainly better informed than ourselves, that it was first introduced by Philip.\* Nor is there any difficulty in believing that he at the same time made some improvements in the arms, or the structure of the phalanx, which entitled it to its peculiar epithet, and him to the honour of an inventor. Both the tactics and the discipline of the army seem to have been in a very low state under his predecessors; and this was perhaps the main cause of the defeats which they so often experienced from the neighbouring barbarians. Philip paid no less attention to the discipline than to the organization of his forces. His regulations were strict, and were enforced with inflexible severity. He forbade the use of carriages, even to his officers, allowed the cavalry only a single attendant for each man, and for the infantry but one in common to every ten soldiers, to carry the more cumbersome parts of their baggage. Examples of his rigid discipline have been preserved. He is reported to have dismissed a distinguished foreigner from his service for using a hot bath—observing, it is said, that this was a luxury which even the Macedonian women did not allow themselves—and to have banished two of his generals for having introduced a singing girl into the camp. One youth of high rank, who held an office near his person, was punished with stripes for turning aside from the line of march to quench his thirst at a tavern; and another, who, presuming on his favour with the king, had quitted the ranks contrary to orders, was put to death.†

There were some other institutions, partly civil, partly military, which contributed much to the security of the monarchy, and are attributed by ancient authors to Philip; but their origin is involved in like obscurity with that of the phalanx. According to some writers,‡ it was he who first accustomed the Macedonian nobility to send their sons to be educated at his court, where they performed menial services, like those which were required in the feudal halls from squires and pages of gentle blood. According to others,§ the custom was transmitted from earlier times; and this account, though resting on inferior authority, seems much the more probable. Yet there may have been some

ground for considering Philip as the author of this usage. The advantages of such a connexion between the great families and their sovereign must forcibly have struck a prince who had made his way to the throne through the struggles of a disputed succession, and who did not hold it by a perfectly legitimate title. Though it is scarcely conceivable that he could have introduced such a practice, he may have extended and enforced it, and perhaps made this domestic service a necessary step to the attainment of a certain military rank. The royal household was a school through which the young nobles passed into the ranks of the guard, from which they might rise into posts of honour, which in the next reign became more valuable than the crown of Macedon itself. How far the organization of the royal guard, a description of which belongs more properly to a later period, is to be regarded as Philip's work, is a question similarly doubtful; but it is certain that it was in his reign it first acquired celebrity as a distinct and formidable corps. Its peculiar appellation—equivalent to that of *COMRADES*\*—as it is the same with which Homer's chiefs address their followers, may have descended from the earliest ages of the monarchy; but the title, importing *FOOT-COMRADES*,† which was applied to the infantry of the guard, seems to be noticed by a contemporary orator as if it was of recent invention.‡

However Philip may have contributed to the formation of the Macedonian phalanx in a military point of view, there can be little doubt that it was he who first established it as a standing army. In the engagement with the Illyrians he brought, as we have seen, upward of 10,000 men into the field. This force he appears never to have disbanded, but gradually to have increased it, as he extended his conquests and multiplied his resources, until it more than doubled that number. This measure appears to have been required not merely for the objects of his ambition, but for the security of the state, especially in an age when mercenary troops, who made war their sole business, were so generally employed; but it involved important political consequences. It, in fact, converted the Macedonian government into a military despotism, tempered only by the national spirit which the soldiery retained, and by the privileges which they exclusively enjoyed. The Macedonian people, without any formally defined constitution, perhaps without any written laws, had inherited a very large share of liberty from the heroic ages. There had been from time immemorial popular assemblies, whether held periodically, or as occasion required, we cannot discover, which, among other rights, exercised jurisdiction in cases of treason; for this offence no Macedonian could legally suffer death without such a trial. It may, perhaps, be presumed

\* Eustathius on Homer, II., N., 130, φράδαντες δὲ οὐρὶ, οὐκός οὐκί τ' ὁπλοῦνται, has a quotation from Hermolitus, a writer on tactics, which is curious, and which we have not seen anywhere noticed. Hermolitus had said that Lycurgus introduced this *ἐννεακῶνος* by law among the Lacedæmonians; but Lysander ἐν ἑργοῖς εἰσάγει, καθά καί ' καμινάδας Ὀρβείους, καὶ Χαλρίδους τοὺς Ἀρκάδας τε καὶ Μακεδόνας.

† Frontinus, iv., i., 6. Bolymans, iv., c. 2, § 10, i., 2. Elian, xiv., 49.

‡ Elian, xiv., 49. Arrian, iv., 12. § Curtius, viii., 8, 2, 8. Valer. M., iii., 3, E. 1. Perizonius endeavours to reconcile Curtius with Elian—certainly against the Roman author's meaning.

\* *Ἰταῖοι, ὄνυμα τῶν ἱταίων.*

† *πῆλταῖοι.*

The testimony of the ancients—particularly that of Anaximenes quoted by Harpocration, Photius, &c.—seems clearly to prove that this title belonged only to the foot-guards, not to the whole phalanx. Yet Droysen (Alex., p. 96) adopts the latter opinion without any discussion, and yet referring to Sainte-Croix, who, on the contrary, follows the lexicographers, as does Schlosser, i., 3, p. 206. But it seems to be through mistake that the words of Anaximenes, from the first book of his history of Philip, are referred by the lexicographers to Alexander instead of Philip.

‡ Demosth., Olynth., ii., § 17.

that the character of a tribunal was not the only one which these assemblies assumed; and that they tended in various other ways to limit the royal authority. Their prerogatives, whatever they were, appear to have been all transferred to the army, which was treated as the representative of the nation, and the king's pleasure, unless it happened to clash with the will of the soldiery, seems to have been no longer subject to any restraint. During Philip's reign, however, the forms of the government retained much of the ancient simplicity, and a semblance of freedom; and it was only on extraordinary public occasions that he was distinguished from his subjects by the outward appendages of royalty.

The phalanx was drawn from the body of the freemen; the cavalry and the whole of the royal guard were selected from the higher classes, and included all the noble youths who had been educated at court. What was the origin of the Macedonian nobility, what were its privileges and distinctions, are interesting questions which we have no means of answering. The tendency of Philip's institutions was to attach it more firmly to the throne, and to raise it higher than before above the mass of the people. His nobles were no longer distinguished merely or chiefly by their descent, or their possessions, but by the superior cultivation of their minds, and their extraordinary proficiency in such parts of Grecian learning as were proper for warriors and statesmen, so that the king was able to employ them not only in the field and the cabinet, but in the most difficult and delicate negotiations with the free states of Greece.

In the course of about a year from his brother's death, Philip had freed himself from all his domestic embarrassments, and had seated himself firmly on the throne; had humbled the most warlike of his barbarian neighbours, and had extended and strengthened his frontier; he had made an honourable peace with the only Greek state that was capable of annoying him, and had secured the stability of his government by institutions which placed the whole strength of his kingdom at his absolute disposal. These were great things to have accomplished in so short a time; but a prince of four-and-twenty, who had done so much, could not rest satisfied with so little. Macedonia, notwithstanding its natural wealth and its hardy population, was still a poor and feeble kingdom. On the west and north side the barbarous hordes, though a little awed by the check which some of them had recently sustained, were still as able as before, whenever opportunity invited them, to pour an inexhaustible tide of war into its provinces. In the opposite quarters almost the whole line of its coast was occupied by independent Greeks, who prevented it from enjoying the full benefit of its natural productions, and whose coalition, not many years past, had nearly proved fatal to its political being. Nor did it require great sagacity to perceive that the peace with Athens could not last long without concessions or acquiescence such as the safety and honour of the country forbade. Even if no visions of a distant, dazzling greatness had yet begun to gleam upon his mind, the dangers and obstacles with which he was surrounded, were for Philip sufficient motives to action, and the state of

Greece afforded ample encouragement for the most aspiring hopes. The enterprises in which we have hitherto seen him engaged had been forced upon him in self-defence; the ability with which he conducted them had, indeed, raised his reputation; but little could be inferred from them as to his character and views. These began to be disclosed in the transactions which we are now about to relate.

## CHAPTER XLII.

FROM PHILIP'S ESTABLISHMENT ON THE THRONE OF MACEDONIA TO THE END OF THE SOCIAL WAR.

WHEN the Athenian orators wished to rouse the spirit of their countrymen in their contest with Philip, they sometimes reminded them that Macedonia had once been subject and tributary to Athens.\* This was, indeed, a rhetorical figure, but yet not without a substantial meaning; nor was it, as has sometimes been imagined, only applicable to the state of things in the reign of one of Philip's remote predecessors. Arrian has put a speech into the mouth of Alexander the Great, in which he mentions, among the benefits which his father had conferred upon his people, that, instead of paying tribute to the Athenians, he had reduced them to depend upon Macedonian protection.† It seems clear that these expressions can only relate to the maritime part of Macedonia; and even in that sense it is not easy to assign their exact value. It is certain, however, that Philip, at the beginning of his reign, did not possess a single place of any importance on the coast. Several maritime towns which had belonged to his predecessors were then subject to Athens, and probably contributed to the common fund of her revived confederacy. And though it does not appear that, after the Peloponnesian war, the Athenian government levied any duties in any foreign port except at Byzantium, still those with which the Macedonian commerce was burdened in the towns dependant on Athens, might, in vague language, be described as tribute which she received from Macedonia; and, so long as her fleets commanded the sea, nothing could be directly exported or imported without her permission. It may easily be supposed that one of Philip's first objects, as soon as he was at leisure to look around him, was to deliver his kingdom from this somewhat degrading and very inconvenient servitude. And this was no doubt one of the motives which led him to covet the possession of Amphipolis. Amphipolis, however, was of the utmost importance to him in several other points of view. Its situation—at the lower opening of the great fertile valley of the Strymon—rendered it highly inexpedient that it should be left in foreign hands; and to the King of Macedon it afforded a passage into Western Thrace, by which he was enabled immediately to enlarge his dominions with a most valuable conquest. It would, therefore, be no uncandid surmise, even if we had no express authority for the fact, that at the time when, to pacify the Athenians, he professed to abandon his claims to it, or actually

\* Demosthenes, Olynth., iii., § 26, ad epist., § 18. Hecæippus, De Halon., § 12.

† vii., 9.



gave up his hold on it, he had secretly determined to take the first opportunity of making it his own. But before we proceed to relate the steps by which he effected this design, it is necessary, for the better understanding of the position in which he now stood with respect both to Amphipolis and to Athens, to give an account of the attempts which the Athenians had made to recover it since the death of Amyntas. This retrospect is the more important, because, perhaps, no portion of Grecian history has been so grossly distorted as this; and apparently for the purpose of attributing to Philip a species of merit which was certainly the last he would have wished to claim.

Ever since Athens had resumed the character of an imperial state, Amphipolis had been one of the principal objects of her ambition. Its value for her arose not so much from any of those circumstances in its situation which rendered the acquisition of it so important to the King of Macedonia, as from the vicinity of the vast forests which clothed the mountains that enclose the basin of the Strymon, and afforded an inexhaustible supply of ship-timber. Philip's father, as we have seen, had recognised her claim to her colony, perhaps the more readily because he knew that the acknowledgment would not bring her one step nearer to the attainment of her wishes; and he himself was precluded by the state of his affairs from extending his views so far. Soon after his death, or immediately after that of his son Alexander, Iphicrates, as has been already related, was engaged in an expedition against Amphipolis, which led him to the coast of Macedonia, and afforded him the above-mentioned opportunity of rendering an important service to the royal family. The force under his command at this time was small, and, according to Æschines, had been sent merely for the purpose of observation. It appears to have been very soon after augmented by the addition of a body of mercenaries commanded by an adventurer named Charidemus, a native of Oreus, in Eubœa, one of those soldiers of fortune who abounded in this period; a person who henceforward fills a somewhat conspicuous part in Grecian history. But the regent Ptolemy, perhaps seeing Amphipolis in danger, did not think himself bound by the acts of Amyntas, and supported it in its resistance to the Athenian arms.\* Olynthus, which, in the decline of the Spartan power, had begun to lift up her head again, lent her aid for the same purpose, and seems to have acquired a preponderating influence at Amphipolis.† At the end of three years, during which Iphicrates continued in command, though it is probable that his attention was by no means exclusively directed to this quarter, he appears to have made but little progress towards the accomplishment of his main object. Then, however, a change suddenly takes place in the aspect of affairs. We have no information as to its causes, and may with equal probability con-

jecture that it was connected with Ptolemy's death,\* or that it arose from jealousy excited by the conduct of the Olynthians. The language in which it is related by Demosthenes, who is our only authority, would incline us to adopt either of these suppositions, rather than believe that it was the effect of any extraordinary military success obtained by Iphicrates. It seems evident that it was a change in the state of parties at Amphipolis, and that the party which wished well to the Athenians had, somehow or other, gained the upper hand. The result appears to have been that the government entered into an engagement to put Iphicrates in possession of the city, and gave hostages for its performance, which were delivered to him by one Harpalus, perhaps the leader of the dominant party. Just at this juncture it happened, through some turn of events at Athens, the particulars of which are unknown to us, that Iphicrates was superseded. Before his departure he consigned the hostages to the care of Charidemus; but a decree soon after arrived, directing that they should be sent to Athens. Very gross partiality alone could induce any one to extract a charge against the Athenians from the fact that they wished to secure these important hostages, which had been received by their general;‡ and this is all we know of their conduct in the business. As little ground is there for the supposition that this decree injured their interest at Amphipolis. It is barely possible that, following as it did the removal of Iphicrates, it might raise a suspicion that they did not mean to observe the terms of the capitulation. But it is just as probable that a reaction quite independent of this cause had taken

\* That the three years during which (according to Demosth., u. s.) Charidemus served under Iphicrates were the three years of Ptolemy's regency, and that the subsequent operations of Timotheus against Amphipolis took place in the reign of Perdiccas, are propositions which may now be considered as beyond controversy. They are of great importance to this part of our history, and the reader's attention is now called to them, because he has probably been accustomed to see these transactions placed several years later—in Philip's reign, and several conclusions affecting the character of Philip and his contemporaries grounded on this erroneous and utterly incoherent chronology. The student, after he has compared the accounts of Æschines, u. s., Demosth., u. s., and Diodorus, xv., 81, will find it useful to consult Voemel's note on the second Olynthiac, p. 83 of his edition, and his Prolegomena, p. 69.

† The accusation rests entirely on the assumption that the hostages had been specially intrusted to the faith of Iphicrates; an assumption which the learned reader knows to be purely arbitrary, but which unlearned readers would receive without suspicion, in proportion as it must seem improbable that a writer who valued his reputation should invent such a statement, when it was to ground a charge of perfidy against any of the parties concerned, even though it was the Athenian people. That an author so careless of truth and so destitute of candour should have had the hardness to talk of the *romance of the good Rollin—Quis iheros!* This reminds us that some readers may wish to know why no notice has yet been taken here of so remarkable an event as the planting of a colony of Cyrenians at Amphipolis under Lacedæmonian patronage, in number so large that occasion was afterward taken to call it a *Lacedæmonian colony*, especially as they may have seen the statement of this interesting occurrence supported by such excellent references as "Or. Inscr. ad Philipp., p. 316, t. I. Ep. Philipp. ap. Demosth., p. 164." They may, however, be assured that in the first of these passages there is only an allusion to the Lacedæmonian colony of Cyrene, for the purpose of contrasting its situation with that of the Athenians at Amphipolis. In the second, Philip alludes to the revolution effected at Amphipolis by Brasidas—an allusion which will be immediately understood by any one who compares Thucyd., v., 11. This, however, was an innocent romance, and certainly an amusing one, though quite as wide of real history as any of Rollin's narratives.

\* Æschines, De F. L., u. s.

† This, we think, may still be inferred from the manner in which Olynthus and Amphipolis are coupled together by Demosthenes (c. Aristocr., p. 669), in the words *μυστοὶ ἀπὸ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐχθροῖς, καὶ τοῖς ἐκείνων Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ Λαϊνὸν τὸν χρόνον*: though the insertion of *αἱ*, according to Bekker's reading, destroys some of the inference which had been drawn from this passage.

place at Amphipolis. We, however, have only been informed of the issue. Charidemus, who, like all men of his profession, was always looking out for the most gainful service, was induced to give up the hostages to the Amphipolitans. He was no doubt the more easily tempted to this piece of treachery, as he had a prospect, and, perhaps, had already formed the resolution of passing into the service of the Thracian king, Cotys; though such had now become the importance of mercenary troops in the wars of Greece that, notwithstanding so flagrant an act of insubordination, he might still have continued to receive Athenian pay.

Timotheus, whose friends had probably procured the removal of his ancient rival Iphicrates, had been appointed to succeed him. But we learn from Æschines that he did not immediately take the command on the coast of Macedonia. In the interval the Athenian forces there were commanded by another general, named Callisthenes, who prosecuted the war against Amphipolis. But Perdiccas, who had now mounted the throne, adopted the policy of the regent Ptolemy, and espoused the cause of the Amphipolitans so actively as to become the leading party in the contest with Athens. Æschines represents him as compelled to yield to the Athenian arms; but the orator himself throws some doubt on the truth of this statement by the fact which he subjoins, that Callisthenes was induced to consent to a suspension of hostilities on such disadvantageous terms, that afterward, when he was brought to trial, and put to death, his treaty with Perdiccas was commonly supposed to have been the principal motive, if not the professed ground, of the sentence. Timotheus arrived soon after; but, if the truce had expired, he must have deemed it hopeless forthwith to renew the attempt upon Amphipolis. He wished, but was not able to retain Charidemus, who carried away his troops to Cotys, in vessels with which he had been supplied by the Athenians, though they were now at war, or, at least, on a very unfriendly footing, with the King of Thrace. His defection contributed, perhaps, to induce Timotheus to turn his attention towards a different quarter, where he had a prospect of serving his country with more success. Diodorus informs us\* that in the first year of the hundred and fourth Olympiad, which was that in which Perdiccas mounted the throne, Timotheus besieged and took Potidea and Torone; and there is no reason to question the correctness of this date. It is probable that at this time both these towns belonged to Olynthus, or were members of her confederacy; and we learn from other authors†

that Timotheus was aided in the war which he carried on against Olynthus and the Chalcidians by Perdiccas. We must, therefore, conclude that some Macedonian auxiliaries were among the forces with which he effected these conquests, which, if we may believe his admirer Isocrates, were followed by the reduction of all the Chalcidian towns.\* The policy of Perdiccas in this transaction, though not perfectly clear, is not inexplicable. Olynthus, which in his father's reign had nearly become mistress of the kingdom, and, though humbled by Sparta, had begun to recover her strength, and probably to resume her ambitious designs, may have appeared to him more formidable than Athens; and though he did not wish to see the Athenians in possession of Amphipolis, he may have been willing to assist them in weakening the old enemies of his house. We find from Diodorus that Timotheus was called away in the course of the same year to the Hellespont, and we know that about a year later he was still fully occupied there, as we shall soon have occasion to relate. It seems to have been only towards the end of the reign of Perdiccas, in 360, that he commenced his operations against Amphipolis. Olynthus, notwithstanding the losses she had suffered, made preparations for defending it, and invited Charidemus, who was then, it appears, in the Thracian Chersonesus, to enter her service. He accepted the offer, and embarked his troops at Cardia; but in the passage fell into the hands of Timotheus, and, to avoid worse consequences, consented to serve against Olynthus.† Whether Perdiccas took any part in this contest against the Athenians, whom undoubtedly he did not assist, we are not informed. We know, however, that notwithstanding the co-operation of Charidemus, this expedition of Timotheus totally failed. It seems that he was surprised by the unexpected appearance of the enemy in greatly superior force, and was fain to set fire to his galleys in the Strymon, and to make a hasty retreat by land.‡ It is only by the subsequent transactions between Philip and the Athenians in the affair of Amphipolis, which have been already related, that we are led to conjecture that this last effort of Timotheus was defeated through Macedonian interposition, and that this was the immediate cause of the influence, apparently supreme, over Amphipolis, which we find attributed to the Macedonian government, whether that of Philip or Argæus, at the death of Perdiccas.

Such, then, so far as we are able to collect it from the scattered and very imperfect accounts remaining of these events, appears to have been the state of affairs in this quarter, when Philip, having relieved himself from the embarrassments which crowded on him in the onset, was no longer diverted by any more pressing cares

\* xv., 81.

† Polyænus, iii., 10, 14. Ulpian on Demosth., Ol. ii., § 14. It has been supposed (see Voemel on this passage of Demosthenes) that this war may have been one waged several years earlier by Amyntas, and that Perdiccas only acted as his lieutenant. But from the description of Æschines it appears that Perdiccas, even at the time of his father's death, was scarcely old enough to have commanded an army. It is proper to remark that this passage of Demosthenes (who only says, Macedonia furnished a considerable addition to our forces under Timotheus against Olynthus) is the only ground that has been alleged for the assertion that it was Philip who aided Timotheus, and enabled him to take Potidea and Torone. Yet on this assertion, which contradicts all the testimonies of the ancients on this subject, and, if received, would create inexplicable confusion in the history of this period, its author has not

scrupled to found a charge of *ingratitude* against the Athenians, whom he represents as inflicting a grievous injury on Philip (of which we shall speak shortly) at the very time that he was making conquests for them. Mr. Clinton, who now and then corrects this writer's chronological errors in less important points, passes over this matter in silence.

\* *επι δυνάμει*, § 119.

† It was in the voyage, *πλωτὴν ἑκείνην*, not after he had actually entered the Olynthian service, that he was captured by Timotheus. Demosth., Aristocr., § 176.

‡ Polyænus, iii., 10, 8. We know of no other period to which the story can be referred.

from the execution of the designs which he had formed against Amphipolis. There were, however, three parties to be considered, from whom, though their interests were widely different, he might apprehend opposition: Athens, Olynthus, and the people of Amphipolis itself. A coalition between Athens and Olynthus for the defence of Amphipolis might not only defeat his project, but raise an insurmountable obstacle to all his ambitious views; and even either singly might be able to supply Amphipolis with the means of effectual resistance. A difficulty of another kind arose from the footing on which he had hitherto stood with the Amphipolitans. At the time when he declared their independent, he must have been regarded as their protector and ally; and that act, even if it did not excite their gratitude, cannot have abated their good-will towards him. But the mere ascendancy of his party in the city, founded on such feelings, was probably not enough to satisfy his aims; he wished to rule there as master, and therefore to establish his authority on the right of conquest. It was necessary, for this purpose, that he should break with the Amphipolitans. Whether he used any artifices to accomplish this end, or the collision of parties spared him the need of such a disingenuous proceeding, and furnished him with a welcome pretext for hostilities, we do not pretend to determine. Di-odorus merely relates that the Amphipolitans were alienated from him, and afforded him many handles for war.\* This statement is equally consistent with either supposition; but that their conduct, whatever it may have been, really provoked him to attack them, when they would otherwise have been left unmolested, is an absurdity too childish for any but a fanatical partisan, such as Philip would have desired for a dupe, but would have deprecated as an historian of his actions.

After the repulse of Timotheus the Athenian interest at Amphipolis must have sunk lower than ever; and even when the amicable relations which then subsisted between the city and Macedonia had ceased, and made way for unfriendly dispositions, if not for open hostility, still it does not appear that the party which then became predominant was connected with Athens. The Athenians, as we shall see, considered themselves as entirely excluded from the place, and had but little immediate prospect of recovering it by their own arms. It is, therefore, most probable that it was a party attached to Olynthus that now prevailed, and had drawn the city into the quarrel with Philip. As soon as he had declared his purpose of reducing it by force, the Olynthians were the first to take measures for repelling his attempt; and as their own strength was hardly sufficient for the contest, they sent envoys to invite the Athenians to enter into a league with them for the

defence of what appeared to be their common interests.\* They were probably surprised to find their overtures abruptly rejected. An intrigue which they could not have suspected, and which was carefully concealed, had been carried on for some time between Athens and Philip, and stifled the uneasiness which the Athenians would otherwise have felt at the danger of Amphipolis. Philip found means to persuade them that he did not intend to keep the place; but, as soon as he had taken it, to restore it to them. This was the secret of a negotiation, concerning which our information would have been still more deficient than it is, if it had not become very celebrated through the caution with which it was wrapped in mystery. We do not know when, or by which of the parties it was opened. It may have been merely a continuation of that in which peace had been last concluded between them, when Philip had made professions with regard to Amphipolis which called for some explanation as soon as he began to threaten it with his arms. Demosthenes alludes to this famous secret,† but only discloses so much of it as was necessary to convict Philip of fraud: another very important part of the transaction which he suppresses—conscious, perhaps, that it was not honourable to the Athenians—has fortunately been preserved in a fragment of Theopompus.‡ From him we learn that Antiphon and Charidemus§ were sent on an embassy to Philip, avowedly with the general purpose of drawing the bonds of amity closer between him and the republic.¶ But they had secret instructions, and apparently large powers, to treat with him for Amphipolis. Without such authority, they probably would not have ventured to make such an offer as they are reported to have made to him; or even to have accepted the proposal, if it proceeded from him. They are said to have promised that, if he would make the Athenians masters of Amphipolis, they would put him in possession of Pydna.

Pydna, as we have already mentioned, had revolted from Archelaus, and, when he had reduced it to submission with the assistance of the Athenians, had been transferred by him to a site a little farther removed from the sea. It seems probable that the inhabitants took advantage of the weakness of the Macedonian government in the reign of Amyntas, to shake off his authority.¶ They were brought over to

\* Demosthenes, Olynth. ii., § 6.

† τὸ ἀρλούμενον ποτὲ ἀπόρρητον, u. s.

‡ Preserved, from this thirty-first book of his history, *cy* Suidas, *ri* ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν τ., tom. iii., p. 467.

§ Of course a different person from the adventurer of Orea. We must own ourselves surprised by Wachsmuth's observation (i., 2, p. 341, n. 35), "that he does not see sufficient ground for distinguishing the Eubœan Charidemus from an Athenian demagogue of the same name." Other occasions will occur in which it is scarcely possible to confound them.

¶ πρῶτοντας καὶ περὶ φίλας.

¶ This supposition certainly appears difficult to reconcile with the singular fact mentioned by Aristides (*Συμμ.*, A. i., p. 715, Dindorf), that the Pydnians had a temple in honour of Amyntas, in which a perfidious massacre was perpetrated when they surrendered to Philip. The difficulty would be less if we suppose them to have revolted in the latter part of the reign of Amyntas, and to have been afterwards admitted into the Athenian confederacy by Timotheus. This is at least an earlier solution than the one proposed by M. Cousinier, *Voyage dans la Macédoine*, ii., p. 37, who states that Pydna was conquered by Amyntas, but permitted to retain its independence on account of its alliance with

\* xvi., 8, πολλὰς ἀφορμὰς δόντων εἰς πόλεμον. For readers even, but moderately familiar with the language, it is hardly necessary to point out that the word *causas*, in the translation in Wesseling's edition, does not adequately express the meaning of ἀφορμὰς. The passage, therefore, does not warrant the statement that "the party adverse to the Macedonian interest, holding the principal power in the city, proceeded to violence which was no otherwise described by the historian than is very offensive, and giving large and repeated provocation for the direction of the Macedonian arms against them." Yet Wesseling has a note on the passage, which might have enlightened the writer's ignorance, if he was misled by the Latin translation.

the Athenian alliance, it is said, by Conon,<sup>†</sup> and perhaps at the same time returned to their old maritime position. We are, however, inclined to suspect, for reasons which we have assigned in a note, that this acquisition was made by Timotheus. They could not have been surrendered to their ancient masters by the Athenians without a gross breach of faith; and the discovery of such a design would probably have defeated it, as it would immediately have dissolved their alliance with Athens; and there is no reason to suppose that their town was occupied by an Athenian garrison. For Philip, a seaport so near the confines of Thessaly was a point of great moment; but his main object was, undoubtedly, not to acquire it by such means, but to cajole the Athenians until he should have effected the more important conquest of Amphipolis. The ambassadors, on their return, were permitted to make their report secretly to the Council of Five Hundred. The people appear to have been for some time satisfied with a general assurance, which was probably itself made as little public as possible, that Amphipolis was to be ceded to them. There was hardly any price at which they would not have been willing to purchase it; and therefore about the terms they were curious, but not uneasy. Thus it was that the Olynthian envoys were dismissed, and the Olynthians found that, if they wished to defend Amphipolis, they must prepare to sustain a conflict with Macedonia alone. Philip, however, thought it advisable to conciliate them, and to purchase their acquiescence, rather than hazard a trial of strength. The town of Anthemus—the situation of which does not seem to be yet well ascertained—had always been claimed by his predecessors,

Athens; and that it was in gratitude for this favour, as Aristides informs us (where),<sup>†</sup> that they honoured him as a god.

\* But the only authority for this fact is a passage in an oration of Dinarchus c. Demosth., p. 91. And when we compare the account there given of Conon's exploits with the enumeration of those of Timotheus in Isocrates (s. *ἐν* *ῥήτῃ*, § 115), it seems difficult to repress a suspicion, though I have not seen it expressed before, that the genitive *λαδώντος* has been substituted for the dative *λαδόντι*, which would refer the conquests there attributed to Conon to Timotheus. It is true that Diodorus (xiv., 84) likewise mentions a number of cities which were in some sense acquired for Athens by Conon; but it is remarkable that his list does not contain one of the names mentioned by Dinarchus, nor does he give any hint that in the course of this expedition Conon—who was still in company with Pharnabazus—visited the coast of Macedonia or Thrace. Indeed, his description almost excludes the supposition of that fact. Then, if we look again at the passage of Dinarchus, it seems strange, to say the least, that when the orator's purpose was to represent the services of Timotheus, he should mention only one—the voyage round Peloponnesus, which ended in the conquest of Corcyra—should then proceed to enumerate the conquests made by Conon, and yet, as if the exploits just described had been those of his son, should speak of the *στρατηγία* of Timotheus. But, moreover, the number of cities taken—according to the present text of Dinarchus—by Conon (Samos, Methone, Pydna, Potidea, and twenty others) is exactly the same as the number mentioned by Isocrates, of the cities conquered by Timotheus (*πενήντα καὶ δύο πόλιν ἑκάστην ἑξήκοντα ἑτάροντα*). This coincidence appears to me so decisive, that I think a future editor of Dinarchus would be justified, even if no manuscript authority should be found, in introducing the reading *λαδόντι* in the text. Yet Boeckh (iii., c. 17) supplies the account of Dinarchus from Diodorus without any misgiving.

† This remark is thrown out for the purpose of directing the attention of qualified judges to the question whether the Anthemus which was ceded by Philip to the Olynthians, and which had been an object of contention between them and his predecessors, can have been the inland town, the site of which—on the borders of Mygdonia, near the flowery

sors, though sometimes subject to Olynthus. It was probably at this time in his hands; for, in the successful war in which Perdiccas had co-operated with Timotheus against Olynthus, it would certainly not have been allowed to remain—if it had previously been—in the enemy's power. He now gave it up to the Olynthians, who were so much gratified by this unexpected concession, that it would have been vain to attempt to instigate them against him, especially in an enterprise of so much risk and difficulty as the defence of Amphipolis. He therefore proceeded, without interruption, to lay siege to the town. Diodorus would lead us to suppose that he achieved the conquest speedily—that he made a breach with his engines, and so, after a great slaughter among the troops which manned the walls, took it by storm; but this seems to be a too summary, if not an erroneous account of his operations. From better authority we know, that when the danger was felt to be pressing at Amphipolis, and no hope remained of succour from Olynthus, an embassy, headed by Hierax and Stratoles—who appear to have been chiefs of the party devoted to the Athenian interest—was sent to Athens, with an offer to surrender the city to the Athenians.\* It was, perhaps, to counteract this application that Philip thought it expedient to renew the promise which he had made to the Athenian envoys, in explicit terms, by a letter addressed to the people.† Yet it appears that the proposals of the Amphipolitans might not have been rejected if the attention of the Athenians had not been drawn away, by events which we shall shortly have to relate, towards a different quarter. As it was, they cast themselves upon Philip's word, and allowed him to make himself master of Amphipolis without opposition. Whether, after all, he took it, as Diodorus states, by assault, or, as Demosthenes intimates,‡ by means of a correspondence which he kept up with his partisans within, is a point which we cannot determine, and of small importance. No less difficult is it to ascertain the real foundation of the accounts which we find of his treatment of the conquered. That of Diodorus is in itself highly probable: that he banished the citizens who had distinguished themselves by their opposition to his interests,

margin of the lake Langaza—is described by Cosinery (i., p. 112) and Leake (*Northern Greece*, iii., p. 450), and which gave its name to a division of the Macedonian cavalry, the *ἡ Ἀνθίπολις*. What can have been the origin of the claim set up by Olynthus to a district so remote? Are we to seek it in the grant of land near Lake Bolbe—which is in the same vale with Langaza—made by Perdiccas II. to the inhabitants of the Chalcidian towns, who abandoned their habitations and settled in Olynthus? (Thuc., i., 56.) This grant, indeed, was only to hold for a time—as long as the war with Athens should last. But length of possession may have seemed to create a right, which Olynthus may have asserted. It is remarkable that Leland (Philip, i., p. 106), probably in entire ignorance of the geography, but with a correct fact, describes Anthemus as a city which separated Olynthus from the sea. A maritime position appears also to be required for the Anthemus which Amyntas offered to Hippias at the same time that the Thessalians offered him Iolcus (Herod., v., 94.) Mueller, in his map of Macedonia, places Anthemus on the coast south of Therma, but he does not notice any other. If it was ascertained that the Strepas mentioned by Æschines (De F. L., p. 31) was a maritime town, there could be no doubt that Anthemus was so too.

\* Demosth., Olynth. i., p. 11.

† Demosth. c. Aristocr., p. 659, r. *Ἀλόν*, § 28.

‡ Olynth. i., p. 11, *Ἀμφιπολιτῶν τοὺς παρόντας αὐτῇ τὴν πόλιν*.

but dealt mildly with the rest. It is confirmed by an inscription still extant among the ruins of Amphipolis, which records a decree of perpetual banishment and confiscation of property against Stratocles—probably the ambassador above mentioned—and one Philo, and their children; and threatens all who should give them shelter in the city, or attempt to procure the repeal of the decree, with the like penalty.\* Demosthenes, on the other hand, alludes to the event in a manner which implies that, instead of rewarding those who had betrayed their fellow-citizens, he treated them with great rigour;† that he put them to death is, perhaps, only a conjectural explanation of the orator's meaning.‡ The fact may have been, that he did not screen them from the vengeance of their political adversaries.

The conquest of Amphipolis did not immediately make a breach between him and the Athenians. It remained to be seen whether he would perform his promise; but, according to the secret compact, he was not bound to do so before he was put in possession of Pydna. Whether any steps were taken for this purpose by the Athenian government we do not know. Philip, probably, did not allow time for them. He appears to have marched against Pydna immediately after the fall of Amphipolis, and, either through terror or treachery,§ was admitted into the town. If the Pydnæans had been informed of the agreement by which their independence was to be sacrificed, it would not be surprising that they should have thrown open their gates. That he exercised any unnecessary severity towards them is certainly not to be believed on the authority of a rhetorician who lived many centuries later;|| but it would not be incredible that, at the moment of occupation, some blood was shed in a military or political tumult, which may have given Demosthenes occasion for an allusion to Philip's conduct, exactly like that which he makes on the subject of Amphipolis.¶ He, of course, considered himself as no longer bound by his promise; and it seems to have been given in such terms that, though it furnished the Athenian orators with a topic of invective against his duplicity, it could not be regarded, even at Athens, as ground for a demand.\*\* The resentment excited there by the disappointment was probably the greater on this account: the people, so far as it understood the transaction, felt itself to have been, not only injured, but overreached. It is a little surprising that we do not hear that it vented its anger upon any of the persons who had conducted the negotiation on its behalf. But Philip was henceforth viewed as an open enemy, and this was the beginning—though without any formal declaration—of a state of hostility between the two powers, which was called, from its origin, the Amphipolitan War.

Philip was aware that he could not hope any longer to pacify the Athenians by words, and all that he could do was to guard against the

effects of their enmity. He seems to have been still afraid lest a league should be formed against him between Athens and Olynthus, and resolved to avert the danger by bestowing another boon on the Olynthians, which should, at the same time, strongly attach them to him and separate them more widely than ever from Athens. He knew that they longed to recover Potidæa, and encouraged them to attack it by a promise of assistance. It was held by an Athenian garrison, but was forced to yield to the united forces of the allies. It seems as if he still wished it to be believed that he had not acted with any hostile intentions towards Athens, and was desirous of preserving peace. He forced, indeed, the Athenian settlers to withdraw, and put the Olynthians in possession of their lands and houses; but he treated the garrison in the most gracious manner, and sent it back to Athens. The loss of Potidæa was the more keenly felt there, as it must have deprived a great number of citizens of their whole property. An expedition was decreed for the relief of the place; but, if it was sent out, it arrived too late.\* Its fall was attributed, like that of Amphipolis and Pydna, to treachery. But as this was a supposition which soothed the people under such misfortunes, and served as a plea to shelter its servants, when they failed in any undertaking, from its displeasure, it must be received with caution.

What interval may have elapsed between the capture of Pydna and that of Potidæa is a question on which chronologists are at variance. It would, perhaps, imply an extraordinary rapidity in Philip's operations to suppose that both these places were taken in the same year with Amphipolis, as the narrative of Diodorus represents.† On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the three events came close upon one another, and we therefore find it difficult to adopt a tradition recorded by Plutarch, which would fix the fall of Potidæa in the early part, or about the middle of the year 356, very near the beginning of the hundred and sixth Olympiad. Plutarch relates‡ that Philip had just taken Potidæa when he received intelligence of three other happy events: a victory won by his

\* Demosth., 1. Olynth., § 9. I. Philipp., § 40. The first of these passages is cited by Sainte-Croix, *Examen*, &c., p. 589, to prove that the siege of Potidæa lasted long, and that the inhabitants made an obstinate defence. It is surprising that an assertion resting on so infirm an argument should have been adopted by Schlosser (i., 3, p. 52). But in this part of his narrative Schlosser himself has committed some oversights very unusual with him. We are, for instance, nowhere informed that the Olynthians assisted Philip to take Pydna; and it is certain that Pydna was taken before Potidæa; but it was not the garrison of Pydna, where, as we have observed in the text, the Athenians are not known to have maintained any, but that of Potidæa, that Philip so liberally dismissed. The confusion between the names Pydna and Potidæa in the text of Diodorus (xvi., 8) arose, we fear, from the author, not from a transcriber.

† Sainte-Croix's objection to this inference, grounded on the expression *ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν οὐραγῶν πάλαι περὶ πόλιν*, seems very unfavourable, in Diodorus (xvi., 8), seems to us no less futile than his argument mentioned in the last note.

‡ Alex., 3. Mr. Clinton (F. H., ii., p. 124) seems to think the authority of Plutarch decisive; and we should be of the same opinion, if no better reason could be alleged against it than the singularity of the coincidence, which alone is urged by Schlosser (u. s.), and a French writer whom he quotes, as a ground for doubting the fact. Our doubt arises from the consideration that there is no apparent reason why Philip should have delayed so long to attack Potidæa after the capture of Amphipolis and Pydna, when it evidently became his interest to set Olynthus at enmity with Athens.

\* Leake, iii., p. 187.

† Given by the Greek Scholiast.

† u. s.

‡ Demosth., Lept., p. 476, οἱ ποδόντες τὴν Πύδναν καὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν.

§ Aristides, u. s.

¶ Olynth. i., p. 11.

\*\* Hence Æschines was not able to take any notice of it before Philip in his argument, reported by himself (De F. L., § 36), in defence of the Athenian title to Amphipolis.

chariot at the Olympic games; another gained by his general Parmenio over the Illyrians; and the birth of his son Alexander, the prince who was to succeed him on the throne, and to fill the world with his fame. The prize in the chariot-race is not unworthy of notice, as it shows Philip's anxiety to claim the privileges of a Greek, and to acquire reputation among the Greeks by a kind of display suited to the national taste. Parmenio's campaign was evidently connected with a league, which, according to Diodorus, was formed against Philip, in the first year of the hundred and sixth Olympiad, between the Kings of Illyria, Pæonia, and Thrace, though he describes Philip as crushing it by an expedition which he made against them in person, while their preparations were yet incomplete. It may, however, be asked, if Diodorus was mistaken in this point, and the victory was really gained by Parmenio, what was the engagement which prevented Philip from taking the field according to his custom. If we adopt Plutarch's statement, we must, of course, suppose that he was occupied with the siege of Potidæa. But it is not necessary to resort to this explanation, for we are informed that, soon after he had reduced Potidæa, he undertook another expedition, with a very important object, which he seems to have had in view when he first meditated the conquest of Amphipolis. This was to make himself master of the mine district of Pangæus, which begins on the left bank of the Strymon, and had hitherto been in the hands, sometimes of the native Thracian tribes, at others of the Thasians, or the Athenians. The Thasians were now in possession of the most valuable portion of it, and, only three or four years before, had formed a new settlement in a place called Crenides—from its situation on a hill abounding with springs—in a plain at the eastern foot of Pangæus, which it separates from a part of the range of Hæmus. We do not hear that Philip thought it necessary to allege any pretext for this invasion. If the Thasians had dislodged one of the tribes of Hæmus,\* when they settled at Crenides, he might think that so recent an occupation conferred no title which he was bound to respect; or he may have chosen to consider them as allies of Athens, whose territory might lawfully become his by right of conquest. They were not in a condition to offer any resistance, and it does not appear that any of them were driven out of their habitations. They were only compelled to receive a numerous colony of new settlers, probably Macedonians, whom Philip sent to share the land with them. The importance of the place, thus enlarged into a considerable city, was marked by the new name of Philippi, with which he honoured it: a name destined to become more memorable after his kingdom had become a Roman province.

The mines, which had attracted the Thasians, he of course seized as crown property; and he employed so much more skill or labour than had hitherto been applied to the working of them, that they are said to have yielded an addition of a thousand talents to his revenue. This was probably the largest sum which he drew from any one mine. But it must not be

concluded, because it was on this account particularly noticed, that this was all he derived from such sources. A single silver mine, in Mygdonia or Bisaltia, had formerly produced a talent a day to his ancestor, Alexander I.\* The mines of Crenides, which had previously been in very low repute,† must have been distinct from those of Datus,‡ which were not, indeed, very far distant, but nearer the sea, and were much earlier celebrated and coveted for their extraordinary productiveness—as they undoubtedly were from those of Scapte Hyle, in which the property of Thucydides lay. Datus was proverbial for the fertility of its soil, for the richness of its gold works, and for the convenience it offered for ship building.§ It seems to have been first colonized by the Thasians—whose island stretched across the Pierian Gulf over against it—and afterward by the Athenians. If, as is probable, it was the same town as Neapolis,|| it might be looked upon as the port of Crenides, and there can be little doubt that it was seized by Philip at the same time. Philippi itself was chiefly valuable, not on account of its gold mines, or of the adjacent fruitful plain, but as a military position which commanded the passes leading into the vale of the Nestus, and so opened the way to a number of objects in the north of the Ægean, which had already—as the sequel leads us to believe—begun to inflame Philip's ambition, while it secured those which had been just acquired from the inroads of the Thracian hordes. Yet, what has been said may be sufficient to show the futility of the objections which have been raised in modern times to the uniform tradition of antiquity as to the bribery practised by Philip, on the ground that he did not possess means sufficient for it.¶ If he was not rich, it was

\* Herod., v., 17. See Leake, Northern Greece, iii., p. 212. † *πρωτοῦς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις τοῖς κατωτέραις*, Diodor., xvi., 8.

‡ We can perceive no ground for Cousinier's assertion. (ii., p. 101, n. 3): "Observons que Diodore du Sicile, qui parait avoir été copié par Arrien (he means Appian, B. C., iv., 105) confond la ville de Datus avec Crenides, lorsqu'il attribue à cette dernière ville toutes les richesses que Philippe retira généralement des mines du Pangée." How does it appear that Diodorus does this?

§ Strabo, Epit., i. vii., p. 331.

|| According to Leake's opinion (Northern Greece, iii., p. 224). Cousinier, in his discussion about Datus (ii., p. 99), seems entirely to have overlooked the *ναυπηγία* mentioned by Strabo, which prove that it was a maritime town, as it is described by Eustathius ad Dionys., p. 517. *πῶς ἐνδοξον περὶ τὴν τοῦ Στρυμόνος παραλίαν*. With singular inaccuracy, he supposes that the colony founded by Athenodorus and Callistratus (according to Isocrates, De Pac., p. 104, a.) was no other than Neapolis (p. 122), though he had before said (p. 100), "Isocrate assure qu'Athenodore et un nommé Callistrate (?) qui était banni d'Athènes, établirent à Datus une colonie." Yet he all along supposes Datus and Neapolis to have been different places. Isocrates, as everybody knows, does not name the place where Callistratus founded his settlement, but only describes it as in some part of Thrace. Mr. Clinton (F. H. ii., p. 127) supposes it to have been in the Thracian Chersonesus. But this is inconsistent with the language of Isocrates, who makes a clear distinction between the Chersonesus, which he had mentioned p. 163, d., and the rest of Thrace, καὶ τῆς ὅλης Θράκης, where Athenodorus and Callistratus had been able to found cities.

¶ It has been asserted, with the usual confidence of a writer whose assertions cost him neither trouble nor scruple, that "it was enough known that Macedonia, though greatly raised in power and rapidly thriving in circumstances, was yet a poor country, and to talk of Macedonian gold as all-powerful would have been considered as irony." Yet at the very time when this is said to have been known, Isocrates could tell Philip that he addressed him (among other reasons) on account of his pre-eminence both in wealth and power, which afforded him means both of persuasion and

\* The Salm, as Cousinier endeavours to prove, ii., p. 101.

only because his expenditure was large. We are not, indeed, able to form any estimate of the amount of his revenue; but it is evident that—unlike that of Athens—it rested on a secure basis, and was continually increasing through the whole course of his reign. It was, perhaps, in these conquests that he was engaged while Parmenio was commanding his forces against the confederacy of the northern barbarians. The establishment of the military colony at Philippi may have made a pause in his progress in this direction.\* He had paved the way for future conquests, which he might push as far as he would; but the season for them had not arrived. They would only have excited a jealousy among the Greeks, which might injure his interest more than they could promote it. Greatly as he had now increased his power and his resources, he was aware that he could yet do nothing against Greece, and that he could be nothing without Greece. It was in and through Greece that he had to seek the highest objects of his ambition. He had to make Macedonia a Grecian state of the first magnitude, and then to try if it could not swallow up the rest. For this purpose, it was expedient that he should wait quietly for an opportunity of interfering with advantage in Grecian affairs. And so he appears to have rested a while from military enterprises; but we may be sure that the interval was not idly spent; it was probably now that he began to lay the foundation of a marine, for which his recent conquests afforded abundant materials, not, perhaps, in the hope of commanding the sea, but with the view of protecting his own coasts and commerce, and of annoying the Athenians. Here, for a time, we must drop the narrative of his actions, to relate a series of events which, without his co-operation, contributed more to his final triumph than any of the victories and conquests which he had hitherto achieved.

That the state of things out of which these events arose may be more clearly understood, it will be necessary to go back into the history of the new confederacy, into which Athens had begun, as we have seen, to draw some of her old allies in 377, soon after she had entered, for the second time, into alliance with Thebes against Sparta. The states which first acceded to it were Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes, and Mytilene. They appear to have joined it spontaneously, disgusted with the treatment they had received from Sparta, and remembering the mild and equitable proceedings of Conon and Thrasylus, whose example they had reason to hope would be followed by Conon's son, and by the other able men whom they might expect to see in the command of the Athenian forces. We have seen what care was taken to secure their confidence by the conditions of the league, which were expressly framed to guard against the recurrence of the old abuses.† The participation of Thebes afforded an additional safeguard

against the encroachments of the leading maritime power. The Thebans, however, no sooner saw their territory delivered from the terror of the Spartan invasion than they began to direct their attention to the re-establishment of their authority in Boeotia, neglected the interests which they had in common with Athens, and withheld the contributions which they had paid for a time to the charges of her navy, though it had been employed, at their request, for the purpose of effecting a diversion in their favour. It would seem, therefore, as if they no longer wished to be considered as members of the confederacy, in which they occupied a subordinate station, which was probably from the first mortifying to their pride, and only rendered tolerable by the temporary pressure of distress and danger. Yet when, after the momentary peace of 374, hostilities broke out afresh between Athens and Sparta, they sent a small squadron to join Timotheus, who, however, was to provide the pay;\* but soon after their connexion with the Athenian confederacy was entirely and finally dissolved.

The change which the battle of Leuctra made in the relative position of all parties was, on the whole, very favourable to the interests of Athens. Sparta was humbled and weakened, and yet had to bear nearly the whole burden of the war. Attica was not invaded; and as the object of the Athenian policy was only to balance the power of Thebes, it did not require or permit any very costly exertions on behalf of an ally who—as appears from the negotiation which took place after the Theban invasion of Laconia—was still regarded with jealousy. When the liberty of Thebes was threatened by Sparta, after the recovery of the Cadmea, the Athenians, who felt that their own independence was at stake, had made extraordinary efforts and sacrifices. A new valuation of all private property had been made, with a view to a more equable system of taxation:‡ and though the burdens of the state were increased for a time, there can be no doubt that the result was beneficial to its finances. In the interval between the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, it must have been continually gaining strength, both at home and abroad. Its agriculture and commerce experienced no interruption, and the confederacy over which it presided received the addition of several very important members. Most of these acquisitions were due to Timotheus, whose upright and amiable character effected, perhaps, as many conquests as his military talents. The praise bestowed on him by his friend Isocrates,§ who accompanied him in some of his campaigns, wrote his despatches, and was munificently rewarded by him,¶ must be cautiously interpreted. But it affords ground for believing that he used no unnecessary violence, treated conquered enemies with

compulsion: καὶ πλεονὸν καὶ ὀνόματι κακῆς ἐκτεταμένης δόξης ἔδοξε τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ὃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων καὶ πάλαι καὶ βεβαιώτατον ἔφικεν, Philip., § 17; and again, § 156, Philip himself intimates pretty clearly that he did not want the means of bribery, in his letter, § 32.

\* Yet it is possible that the expedition related by Theopompus in the first book of the Philippics (Atheniensis, xii., c. 42) may have been made at this time, though he seems to have been speaking of Cotys as still living.

† See above, p. 22.

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\* The orator (in Timoth., p. 1188) from whom alone we learn anything about this squadron, does not mention its numbers. But we may infer that it was extremely small, since Timotheus, when pressed by the Boeotian captains for pay, was able to content them with 1000 drachmas = 10 minas. As 30 minas a month were required for the subsistence of a single galley, the half of this sum cannot have sufficed for more than five galleys above a couple of days.

† For the nature of this valuation, which was made in the archonship of Nausimachus, the reader who desires the fullest information will of course consult Boeckh's admirable discussion (Public Ec. of Athens, iv., c. 4).

‡ *respi dedit*, § 114-136. Digitized by Google

§ *respi dedit*, § 114-136. Digitized by Google

mildness, and neutral states with openness and moderation, and everywhere maintained strict discipline among his troops. The reputation which he acquired by these means, it is said by his panegyrist, induced many cities which had previously been ill-disposed towards Athens to throw open their gates to him. There are, however, two points as to which we should have desired some more particular information than Isocrates has thought fit to communicate. He extols the ability displayed by Timotheus in several important conquests, which he made without any supplies from the Athenian treasury; but he does not explain how this could be done without violence and wrong inflicted somewhere or other; and he leaves us to conjecture that the means were furnished by plunder, or forced contributions levied from the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast. He also praises the forbearance and delicacy with which his hero treated neutral Greek cities; but he has neglected to mention under what pretext he compelled those which he conquered to join the Athenian confederacy. And we can only suspect that he took advantage of their political dissensions, and, professing to side with one party, reduced all to submission.

According to Isocrates, whose calculation is confirmed, as we have seen, by Dinarchus, the number of the cities which he brought into subjection to Athens amounted to twenty-four. Æschines, indeed, speaking without any apparent intention of eulogizing Timotheus, asserts that he acquired seventy-five.\* But as the whole number of the cities which became members of the new confederacy is stated by Diodorus at seventy,† it must be supposed that it did not exceed seventy-five, and that the orator only mentioned Timotheus, because his services were the most celebrated. It is, besides, certain that many were added to the congress by other generals; as it is related of Chabrias by Demosthenes,‡ that he took seventeen; and we may safely presume that Iphicrates had many similar victories to recount. In the year 362 Timotheus, with the help of the Persian satrap, Ariobarzanes, as we shall soon have occasion to mention again, obtained possession of the Hellespontine towns, Sestus and Crithote; and, according to Isocrates, this acquisition first inspired the Athenians with the hope of recovering the whole peninsula. It seems to have been not long after that he laid siege to Samos, which had been occupied by a Persian garrison,§ with a fleet of thirty galleys, and with 8000 targeteers, and reduced it to surrender at the end of eleven months. Isocrates, who was present, and is said to have received a talent for his share of the spoil, observes, with admiration, that he drew the whole pay and subsistence of his forces throughout the siege from the enemy's country.

Of the manner in which he wrested Potidæa and Torone from Olynthus, we have already spoken. Isocrates, we must remark, does not notice the co-operation of Perdicas, but only informs us that Timotheus defrayed the whole expense himself, partly from his private resour-

ces, and partly from contributions raised in Thrace, meaning, perhaps, Thasos and its subject towns. We learn from other authors, that one of his expedients was to debase the Macedonian coin for a temporary medium of exchange.\* Whether it was in the interval between this conquest and his unsuccessful attempt upon Amphipolis, or at an earlier period, towards the end of the reign of Amyntas, that he annexed Pydna and Methone to the Athenian confederacy—if we may assume that this was his work—we cannot determine.

Thebes, though constantly occupied with the attempt to establish her supremacy in Greece on the ruin of Sparta, and though frequently engaged with the affairs of Macedonia and Thessaly, was not inattentive to the progress of the maritime power of Athens; and Epaminondas seems to have formed the design, which perhaps his death alone prevented him from executing, of transferring the sovereignty of the sea and the islands to his own city. But he probably would not have conceived this thought if he had not known that some of the leading allies of Athens had begun to be disgusted with her, which implies that some of the old grievances had been already renewed. Diodorus says, that in the year before the battle of Mantinea he made a speech which induced the Thebans to pass a decree for the building of a hundred galleys and an arsenal; and it must have been on this occasion that he used the bold figure reported by Æschines,‡ that the propylæa of the Athenian Acropolis—the emblem of the imperial state of Athens—must be transferred to the Cadmea. The same decree directed that an attempt should be immediately made to detach Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, from the Athenian alliance; and Epaminondas was appointed to the command of a squadron destined to that object.† His force was strong enough to compel the Athenian admiral, Laches, who had been sent against him, it is said, with a considerable armament, to withdraw; and Diodorus adds that he induced the three states to enter into an alliance with Thebes. This, however, must be exaggeration; otherwise we should have heard something about the event and the issue of the war. Only with regard to Byzantium we have other intimations, to be mentioned hereafter, which may be thought to confirm the statement of Diodorus. But the death of Epaminondas seems to have released Athens from all fear of Theban competition. Perhaps it also exposed her to new annoyance

\* Polyænus, iii., 10, 14. Compare § 1 of the same chapter, and Aristot., *Œconom.*, ii., 2, 23.

† De F. L., § 111. Epaminondas εἰπε διαβροῆσθαι ἐν τῷ πλῑθει τῶν Θηβαίων ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλεως προπύλαια μετανεγκῖν εἰς τὴν προσταδίαν τῆς Καδμείας. Æschines himself uses a similar figure in *Ctes.*, § 145, τὸ βουλευτήριον τὸ τῆς πόλεως μετήνεγκαν εἰς τὴν Καδμείαν.

‡ This is probably the expedition alluded to by Isocrates, *Phil.*, § 59: Θηβαῖοι . . . εἰς Βυζάντιον τριήρεις ἐπέμπεον ὡς καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης ὀρεόντες. Schliesser (i., §. p. 208) throws out a doubt as to the naval force said to have been raised by Epaminondas, and the designs attributed to him. The strength of the armament which he commanded we have indeed no means of ascertaining. Of course it must not be estimated from the terms of the decree mentioned in the text, which, perhaps, was never carried into complete execution. But as to his projects, and the fact of the expedition, even if the statements of Diodorus were less precise and apparently trustworthy, the passages we have quoted from Æschines and Isocrates would be sufficient to remove all doubt.

\* De F. L., § 73.

† xv., 30.

‡ Lept., § 89. See also § 85, where he says that the Athenians were indebted to Chabrias for the alliance of most of the islands; and compare Diodorus, u. s.

§ Demosthenes, *De Rhod. Lib.* § 10.



from another quarter; for in the same year her old ally, Alexander of Pheræ, as if sure that he should not again need her succour, ventured to it out a squadron for piratical excursions, with which he took the chief town of the isle of Teios, and enslaved the inhabitants; and in the year following he not only plundered some others of the Cyclades, and laid siege to Peparethus, but even landed a body of troops in Attica itself, and seized the port of Panormus, a little eastward of Sunium. He was, it seems, defeated by the Athenian admiral, Leosthenes, and forced to raise the siege of Peparethus; but he delivered his troops which were blockaded in Panormus, took five or six of the enemy's galleys, and, imitating the bold exploit of Teutias,\* sailed into Piræus, landed on the quay, plundered some counting-houses, and, before the forces of the city were raised, retreated in safety with the spoil. Leosthenes was charged with collusion, and sentenced to death, perhaps through the intrigues of Chares, who was appointed in his room.†

These expeditions of Alexander are significant in more than one point of view; partly as they show that Athens was not so completely mistress of the sea as she had been in former times, and partly as an example of piracy on a large scale. This was an evil which henceforward continued to increase; but it was connected with another, one of the main causes of the ruin of Greece, which has already been slightly noticed, and will now claim more particular attention. We have had frequent occasion to mention the mercenary bands, which, from the beginning of this century, take a more and more prominent part in Grecian warfare. It was, no doubt, the long continuance of the Peloponnesian war and the troubles which ensued that called them into existence;‡ but it was not in the wars of Greece alone that they found employment, nor, it would seem, did these hold out the strongest temptation to needy adventurers to enter upon this course of life. Higher pay and richer plunder were to be found in Asia, where the disturbed state of the Persian empire created almost continual occasions for the services of Greek auxiliaries, whose superiority in arms was universally acknowledged by the barbarians. Hence the number of persons who devoted themselves to an occupation which attracted ardent spirits by its dangers and vicissitudes, as well as the more sordid by the prospect of gain and pleasure, was constantly increasing. There was no state which might not carry on war with such troops, if it could only find means of maintaining them; and their regular training and experience, perhaps, gave them an advantage over the native militia of most cities. By Sparta and Thebes, which as-

siduously cultivated the art of war, and grounded all their pretensions to political pre-eminence on their military strength, they were very sparingly employed. But Athens began early to make frequent use of them, and by degrees fell into the practice of employing them oftener than her own citizens, and sometimes alone.

The pernicious effects of this system soon became manifest in a variety of ways: a greater number of citizens remained at home, not, however, engaged in useful industry, but subsisting chiefly on the pittance granted for their attendance in the assembly and the tribunals, and on the largesses which many of the numberless festivals brought with them, along with the shows and other pleasures of the day; and this was no doubt the main motive which led to the preference of mercenaries for military service. On the other hand, these men communicated their dissolute habits to the citizens who served in the same camp, and thus contributed to corrupt the manners of the city more deeply than ever. These may, perhaps, be considered as the most direct causes of that visible increase of dissipation and licentiousness which struck a Greek historian of this period in the character of Athenian society.\* But in a political point of view, the most important effect of this change of system was that which it produced on the Athenian generals, who collected and commanded these mercenary troops in the service of the commonwealth. They were led to consider themselves very nearly in the same light as the men who made the collecting and commanding of such forces a profession, and to adopt their views, and follow their example. The mercenary leaders, whatever might be the variety of their talents and characters, all perfectly resembled one another in one point: they had broken the ties which bound them to their native cities; they were under no control, and had nothing to hope and fear from their fellow-citizens: their sole object was to secure their independence, and to establish themselves in opulence and power elsewhere. There were two roads by which they were often able to attain this object. The foreign princes into whose service they entered were frequently willing to attach them to their interests by a domestic alliance and an honourable settlement.† Thus it was that Seuthes would have detained Xenophon, offering him the hand of one of his daughters, and one of his most valuable towns near the coast.‡ Several other instances of this kind will shortly occur to us. Another very common mode of accomplishing their wishes was, to seize some fortified town, and to erect a tyranny in it. So Charidemus, after he had quitted the Athenian service, crossed over to Asia, and made himself master of the towns of Scepsis, Cebren, and Ilium.§ He was encouraged to make this attempt by the unsettled state of the province, which was an object of contest between two rival Persian satraps. But like opportunities were frequently offered on the coast of Asia, which held out the strongest temptations to these adventurers by the fertility of the soil and the wealth of the cities. The orators of

\* Vol. i., p. 577.

† Diodorus, xv., 95. Polyænus, vi., 2. We have endeavoured in the text to reconcile these accounts, which at first sight may appear hardly consistent with each other. Diodorus does not expressly mention any victory gained by the Athenians over Alexander, on which Polyænus makes the tyrant's second stratagem to turn; but perhaps it may be implied in the words 'Αθηναίων δὲ βοηθούσων τοῖς Ἰλλυριοῖς.' Demosthenes, Pro Cor. Tr., § 9, alludes to the sea-fight in which the Athenians had been defeated by Alexander.

‡ The Arcadians mentioned by Herodotus, viii., 26 (ἀγιοὺς ῥυτί), are, as Wachsmuth remarks, an earlier example of the practice, but it is one which does not affect the general truth of the observation in the text.

\* Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xii., 43. Compare Justin, vi.

† Another point of resemblance to the Italian *Condottieri*.  
‡ Vol. I., p. 550. § Demosthenes, Aristocr., § 181.

this age represent such acts of violence as having become an ordinary practice. "You know," the speaker says, in an oration of Demosthenes delivered in 352, "that all these chiefs of mercenaries make it their aim to take possession of Greek cities and to rule in them; and that they go ranging about, and everywhere conducting themselves as the common enemies of all who wish to live in freedom according to their own laws."\* Isocrates represents the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast as the principal sufferers, and enters into details, which show that the treatment they received from the freebooters into whose power they fell was usually marked by the foulest excesses of wantonness and cruelty.†

It is, however, hardly possible to read the account which the same author, in a passage to which we have referred a few pages back, gives of the exploits of Timotheus, without observing that the main points which distinguished the Athenian general from such men as Charidemus, were, on the one hand, his loyalty to Athens, and, on the other, the natural gentleness and moderation of his character, which prevented him from inflicting any wanton wrong. But in other respects he conducted his operations very much after the manner of the mercenary chiefs, and was not scrupulous as to the means of finding pay for his troops. It was to be supposed that other generals, placed in a like situation, would be much less careful of the interests of Athens, and would pay much less regard to the feelings of the Greeks who might be subject to their pleasure. Accordingly, we find that Iphicrates and Chabrias spent much of their time in foreign service, and not only without any respect to the interests of Athens, but sometimes in direct opposition to them. At a time when it was very desirable for Athens to cultivate the friendship of the Persian king, Chabrias, without asking permission from the people, accepted the command of the forces with which the revolted Egyptians were making war against him. He was compelled, indeed, to return by a threatening decree which was passed in compliance with the remonstrances of the Persian court;‡ but he was a man of such dissolute and expensive habits, contracted, most probably, in his campaigns in the east, that even the liberty of Athens did not satisfy him, and he resided as much as he was able abroad.§ Iphicrates ventured still more openly to drop the character of an Athenian citizen, when it would have imposed an inconvenient restraint upon him. He not only entered into the service of Cotys and married one of his daughters, but aided him in several acts of unequivocal hostility against his country. Yet he was suffered to retain the rewards which had been bestowed upon him for his past deserts, apparently on the same ground which rendered the Athenians so indulgent to Charidemus. Chares, whom we have hitherto had but little occasion to notice, but who will hereafter be seen taking a very prominent part in the history of these times, seems to have been inferior in military and political abilities to the three men just mentioned, and much less under the restraint of

any motives of patriotism or honour. He was too indolent and too much addicted to pleasure to be keenly sensible to the spur of ambition, and was perfectly reckless as to the choice of the means by which he might gratify his inclinations. Of him, as well as of Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates, it was observed by Theopompus, that he preferred sojourning in foreign parts to living at Athens; and that Sigeum, near the mouth of the Hellespont, was his ordinary residence. The historian, indeed, puts this remark in a general form as applying to all the eminent men of Athens, and attributes the fact to the intractable temper of the people. But as the examples he adduces all belong to this period—except that of Conon, which is manifestly irrelevant—we may be allowed to believe that the cause was not one which had existed long before, and at least not in a slighter degree, but one peculiar to this age; and it may be most easily traced to the change which we have been noticing in the Athenian military system. As the commander of a mercenary force, an Athenian general, so long as he could keep his troops together, possessed almost absolute authority as far as his power reached. As the chief witnesses of his conduct were strangers, who were generally benefited by his worst proceedings, he was seldom liable to be called to account at home, unless he very grossly betrayed or thwarted the interests of the commonwealth. The Athenians were not capable of feeling much concern for the sufferings of others, and were easily induced to connive at a wrong by which they did not lose, still more easily at one by which they gained. They paid little heed to the complaints of their allies so long as their contributions were regularly brought in, still less to those of any other foreigners. Chares adopted an expedient, which, if not absolutely new, seems never to have been so largely employed before to obtain impunity and favour with the people. He spent a part of the sums which he received, and which ought either to have been paid into the treasury, or applied to the service of the state, to gain some of the venal orators, and to influence the proceedings of the tribunals.\* By these arts, and by promises which became proverbial from the readiness with which he made and broke them,† he was enabled to squander the public money on his dissolute pleasures, and still to be accounted a useful and trusty servant of the commonwealth.

In a country like Greece, the increase of piracy was necessarily connected with such a military system as we have described. Every freebooter was, or might easily become, a pirate; as Charidemus is said to have begun his career as the captain of a pirate vessel.‡ Athens, as mistress of the sea, and chief of a great maritime confederacy, ought to have removed this nuisance, or at least was bound to protect her allies from it. But her negligence, or that of her commanders, who were themselves often engaged in a kind of warfare not much more legitimate, offered it to gain ground, until, as we shall see in the sequel, it acquired a certain degree of political importance.

\* Aristocr., § 162.

† Epist., ix.

‡ Diodorus, xv., 29.

§ Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xii., 48.

\* Theopompus in Athenæum, v. s.

† *Xd' ητος βροχέλας*. Suidas.

‡ Demosthenes, Aristocr., § 173.

It is easy to conceive that out of this state of things many causes of discontent may have arisen to alienate the members of the confederacy from Athens. Among them we may notice an abuse which had crept into the naval service. It became not unusual for the citizens on whom the duties of the trierarchy devolved, to transfer them to those who were willing to undertake them at the lowest rate. By such a bargain the trierarch, who always received a certain sum from the state, might often be a gainer, independently of the exemption he enjoyed from personal trouble and risk. The other party was commonly, it seems, a needy adventurer, whose object it was to get all he could by rapine and extortion. The trierarchs, indeed, were liable to be called to account for the misconduct of their substitutes;\* but the lawfulness of the practice seems hardly to have been disputed; and the cases in which it was attended with danger to them were not those in which the evils it produced fell upon the allies of Athens. It may well be supposed that they were the more sensitive to injuries and encroachments on their rights, as she was no longer the formidable power she had once been; and that the leading states watched the manner in which she observed the stipulations of the league, with a jealousy quickened by their sense of their own importance. As to any particular provocation, however, offered to any of them, history is silent; it is chiefly from some general allusions of Isocrates that we are able to collect that the exactions of the Athenian generals, for the support of their mercenary troops, were among the principal causes of a war, which broke out in the year 357 between Athens and her allies, from whom it took the name of the Social War.† But before we enter upon the history of this war, we must relate some transactions which immediately preceded it, and perhaps contributed in some degree to hasten its outbreaking.

Among all their ancient possessions, there was none to which the Athenians looked with keener regret and more anxious longing than to the Thracian Chersonesus; and from the time that their maritime power began to revive, the recovery of this province, which was still more important with a view to the commerce of the Euxine and its vicinity to Asia than on account of the fertility of its territory, seems at least to have divided their attention and wishes with Amphipolis. When Sparta ceased to be able to protect it, it appears to have become for the most part subject to the King of Thrace; though Sestus, and perhaps some other towns, may have retained their independence. The reign of Cotys was frequently disturbed by insurrections and revolts, a fact which is sufficiently accounted for by his character. In these seasons of danger he usually endeavoured to conciliate the Athenians by friendly professions; and at one time he so far gained their confidence, that they honoured him with their franchise, and even with a crown of gold. In or before the year 362,‡ Miltocythes, who seems

to have been a powerful and popular chieftain, revolted from him, engaged a part of the kingdom in rebellion, and made himself master of a stronghold called the Sacred Mountain. He sent an embassy to Athens, and offered to purchase the aid which he requested by the cession of the Chersonesus. His proposals were favourably received; and it appears that the Athenian general Ergophilus, who was commanding off the coast of Thrace, was ordered to support him. Cotys, alarmed by this confederacy, addressed a letter to the Athenians,\* full of fair promises, which must have led them to believe that they might gain their object from him more easily than they could from Miltocythes. Ergophilus was recalled; Autocles was appointed in his room; and a decree was passed, the contents of which have not been reported, but which impressed Miltocythes with the persuasion that the Athenians had abandoned his cause. It may have been no other than that which conferred the franchise, or other honours, on Cotys. Its effect was so to dishearten Miltocythes, that he withdrew from the contest; Cotys recovered the Sacred Mountain, where he found a great treasure, and reduced the whole kingdom to obedience. The Athenians, it seems, had not expected, or desired, this result of their decree; and Autocles, who had probably only remained passive, was removed from his command, and brought to trial, on the charge of having caused the ruin of Miltocythes. Meno, and Timomachus, who succeeded him, were not able to repair the mischief, and a letter which Timomachus received from Cotys† showed that the Athenians could not reckon on any of his promises. In the great rebellion in which the principal satraps of Western Asia engaged, about the year 362, against the Persian court—which, as it is not immediately connected with the affairs of Greece, we reserve for more particular notice in another place—Cotys seems to have shown himself hostile to the revolted satraps, not, of course, through any goodwill to their master, but probably because the Athenians espoused their cause, and because the Hellespontine cities, which would not acknowledge his authority, had placed themselves under their protection. This we may at least collect to have been the case with Sestus and Crithote. With regard to Sestus, we are ex-

after the war had lasted a long while (*εὐχρὸν ἦν χρόνον*) between Cotys and Miltocythes, and just as the decree was passed which drove the latter to despair. Hence the reader may estimate the anachronism involved in the conjecture that this decree was that by which Charidemus was enabled to effect his retreat from Asia in the manner which we shall presently relate.

\* Demosthenes, *Aristocr.*, § 137.

† The Athenians and their general were probably as little surprised by these letters from a prince who cannot have been at a loss for a Greek secretary, as Philip may have been by that which he received from Cotys. But the reader may ask, Have I not been told, on the authority of Plutarch, *Apophth.*, that “the simple mention of a letter from Cotys excited wonder and ridicule among the Macedonians,” and that “its contents drew a smile from the polite Philip?” The reader may be assured that this apophthegm of Plutarch is still unedited—lying, perhaps, among the MS. of the learned and scrupulous historian who cites it. All that we know on the subject is contained in a passage quoted by Athenæus from Hecataëus, vi., c. 53: “King Philip having mentioned that he had received a letter from King Cotys, Cleisophus (a celebrated Athenian parasite) being present, exclaimed, Excellent, by the Gods! And when Philip replied, Why, what know you about its contents? he rejoined, By almighty Jupiter, a capital reproof.”

\* Dem., *De Ciron. Trier.*, § 9, and foll.

† *Ilper. clp.*, § 598.

‡ For (as we learn from Demosthenes, *Polycl.*, § 6, 16) in Metagection, the second month of the archonship of Molon (362), Meno was sent out to supersede Autocles, whose command only began (*Demosthenes, Aristocr.*, § 133)

pressly informed that it belonged to Ariobarzanes, and was besieged by Cotys, and that he was compelled to raise the siege;\* and that Ariobarzanes, to reward the services of Timotheus, put him into possession both of Sestus and of Crithote. The acquisition of these places appears to have been followed by that of Eleus. It is added, we know not how correctly, that Timotheus collected a booty from the territories of Cotys, which produced 1200 talents to the Athenian treasury.† Such a loss must have aggravated the animosity excited by the collision between his interests and those of the Athenians; but not long after Sestus was again wrested from Athens by a revolution which had its origin in Abydos, where the ruling party was always hostile to her. It aided the people of Sestus, who, in the absence of Timotheus, may have suffered some provocation from Athenian officers, to release themselves from her yoke. But they now found themselves compelled to submit to the authority of Cotys, who continued to prosecute the war with vigour; and not being able to induce his son-in-law Iphicrates to command his forces in such an expedition, engaged Charidemus, who had just returned from his adventure in Asia which has been already mentioned, to assist him in completing the conquest of the Chersonesus. Iphicrates, after the refusal, found his position so insecure that he withdrew from his father-in-law's dominion, and having no reason to expect a very favourable reception at Athens, crossed over to Lesbos, and took up his abode at Antissa.‡ Charidemus had involved himself in a very embarrassing situation in his Asiatic expedition, and would neither have been able to keep the towns which he had sieged, nor to withdraw from them in safety, but would have fallen into the hands of the satrap Artabazus, whom he had deceived and injured, if he had not induced the Athenians, who were sending a squadron under Cephisodotus to the Hellespont,§ to mediate in his behalf, by a promise that he would lend them his aid to recover the Chersonesus. He was thus enabled to effect his retreat. But when he arrived in Europe, instead of keeping his promise, he turned his arms against them in conjunction with Cotys, who proceeded to lay siege to Crithote and Eleus. The result of these operations is not related; and it is not improbable that they were interrupted by the

violent death of Cotys, which took place in the first half of 358.\*

If the stories which were current about Cotys may be believed, he must have been subject to temporary fits of phrensy, which may have been connected, as in the cases of Cambyses and Cleomenes, with the excess to which he seems to have indulged in the pleasures of the table.† It was his habit in summer to range over the Thracian woodlands in search of shady haunts watered by pleasant streams, where he would encamp, and spend several days in revelry.‡ Deep drinking was customary among the Thracians, as among their northern and southern neighbours, and the quarrels which commonly followed their long carouses were almost proverbial.§ It was probably on such an occasion that Cotys either was heated by wine and flattery into the delusion, or amused himself with the assertion, which might put the complacency of his courtiers to a new test, that he was the especial favourite of the goddess Athene; and some of his guards, who did not humour this fancy, are said to have paid for their dulness with their lives. It is also related by a contemporary, that in a fit of jealousy he murdered his wife in a most barbarous manner.|| These stories are chiefly interesting, as they mark the character of one of Philip's most powerful neighbours. His violence and cruelty were, it seems, not confined to his own subjects, whom they sometimes instigated to revolt.¶ They had fallen—in what way we are not informed—on a citizen of Ænus, a Greek town on the Thracian coast; and Python and Heracleides, the sons of this Ænian, in revenge slew Cotys.\*\* The murderers fled to Ath-

\* The expressions *ἐπολέσκει*, Demosth., c. Aristocr., § 180, and *ἐπείχετο*, *ibid.*, § 192, indicate that nothing was effected; and the orator would no doubt have mentioned any farther injury which the Athenians had suffered from Charidemus.

† Anaxandrides in Athenæus (u. s.): *Κότυς . . . γυνόμενον τῶν κρατίων πρότερον μόνον τῶν πινόντων*. These verses have been referred to as the testimony of Theopompus to the fact that Cotys was led by his disordered imagination to insist that he would wait at table upon his brother-in-law Iphicrates. They are introduced by Athenæus with the words, *Ἀναξανδρίδης . . . διαστρέφει τὸν ἱσχυρόντος γάμον συνεσθίου, ὅτε ἦτορ τὴν Κότυος θυγατέρα*.

‡ Theopompus in Athenæus, xii. c. 42. There is nothing, either in this passage or in that of Anaxandrides, to indicate that the luxury of Cotys displayed itself in anything more than a rude magnificence. Even if we could safely infer from the burlesque description of the comic poet that Greek musicians were employed at the marriage feast, this would go but a little way to prove that Cotys—according to all accounts, a brutal savage—"desired to improve the ignorance and rudeness of his people by introducing Grecian science and arts among them."

§ Horace, *ll.*, Od., c. 18:

*Sithonitis non levis Erius  
Quum fas æque nefas exiguo libidinum  
Discernunt avidi.*

o. 37: *Natis in usum letitiae scyphis*

*Pugnare Thracum est.*

|| Theopompus in Athenæus (u. s.). Compare the fact mentioned by Aristotle (*Pol.*, v., §) about Adamas as a specimen either of the humanity or the refined taste of Cotys.

¶ Aristotle, u. s.

\*\* Aristotle, *Pol.*, v., §. For the sake of a caution to unlearned readers, it may be proper to observe, that no one capable of understanding the purpose for which Aristotle collects the examples of which this is one, could think it possible that "the death of the father of the assassins may have been suffered in legal course and for just cause," though if it had been "the orator" (Demosthenes), not Aristotle, who had mentioned the motive of the deed, such a conjecture could not have been refuted. Aristotle does not say that the father was put to death: "the orator" does not allude to him at all. The oversight was certainly a very convenient one.

\* Xenophon, *Agessil.*, ii., § 36. Schneider, as if he knew of no other Cotys, supposes this to have been the King of Paphlagonia.

† Nepos, *Timoth.*, 1. Isocrates is quite silent about the satrap's assistance, though Nepos represents it as a proof of his hero's disinterested patriotism, that when he might have received a pecuniary recompense for the services which he had rendered to Ariobarzanes, he preferred making this addition to the Athenian territory or revenue: *Itaque acceptis Crithoten et Sestum*. We must not here inquire how this account is to be reconciled with that of Demosthenes, *De Rhod.* Lib., § 6.

‡ We do not collect from Demosthenes, Aristocr., § 155, that any hostilities took place between Cotys and Iphicrates, as Schlosser assumes, i., §, p. 58. Indeed, the words *ἡγομένον . . . παρ' ἐλπίσιν οὐκ ἐσφαλὲς εἶναι μῆνιν*, seem clearly to preclude such an assumption.

§ That it had not yet arrived is evident from § 194. For readers capable of understanding the Greek of Demosthenes, it might have seemed superfluous to observe that the words *ῥῆσις ἐν ἐκβίῃ: ῥῆσις παρ' ὧν*, § 184, which have been cited to prove "a decree of the people directing Cephisodotus to transport Charidemus and his troops to the European shore," only express the wish of Charidemus.

ens,\* or, rather, presented themselves there to receive the rewards which they might expect for a deed, which, according to the ordinary Greek notion, was just and pious in itself, and which had delivered the commonwealth from a formidable enemy. The avengers of their father, who were also public benefactors, were honoured with the franchise, and with crowns of gold. That under such circumstances they should have been well received at Athens was to be expected. It may seem a little more extraordinary that Python should afterward have gone over to Philip, and have been admitted, as he appears to have been, into his intimate confidence.† But this last fact, if well established, would only confirm what is sufficiently proved by Aristotle's authority, that he was known to have acted under provocation which was universally thought to justify his conduct, and that Philip, at least, can have seen nothing blamable in that of the Athenians.‡

The death of Cotys produced a change in the affairs of Thrace very favourable to the interests of Athens. His kingdom was divided, or at least the right of succession was disputed, among three princes, Berisades, Amadocus, and Cersobleptes, who, though their relation to one another is not distinctly expressed by any contemporary author, may have been brothers, all sons of Cotys, though not by the same mother. Of Cersobleptes, at least, we know that he was the son of Cotys; and we are also informed that Cotys had other sons of nearly the same age; it may therefore be thought improbable that they should have been excluded, while strangers or more distant relatives were admitted to a share in the succession.§ Cersobleptes was at this time very young,|| perhaps

hardly of age to take the government into his own hands; and Charidemus, being in command of the forces, and probably master of the prince's person, was enabled to assume the entire direction of his affairs. An alliance which he formed, after the example of Iphicrates, with the royal family, by marriage with one of the princesses,\* strengthened his influence, and at the same time connected his interests more closely with those of Cersobleptes. The Athenians, however, at first, relying perhaps on the representations of Cephisodotus, seem to have persuaded themselves that he was only waiting for an opportunity of fulfilling his promises to them; but they were soon undeceived by an attack which he made on a squadron which they had stationed at Perinthus; and they found that he was earnestly bent on excluding them from the Chersonesus. A band of pirates, who appear to have been some of those who were sent out by Alexander of Phœæ,† had occupied the promontory of Alopecœnes, on the southeast coast of the peninsula. An Athenian armament was sent to besiege them, not, of course, without the farther object of gaining a footing on the coveted ground; but Charidemus, though he had rejected proposals which he had received from Alexander, marched to the relief of the pirates, and repelled the Athenian invasion. Cephisodotus, who had been appointed to the command, perhaps, chiefly on account of his personal enmity to Iphicrates,‡ found himself so little able to make head against Charidemus, that, being probably desirous of the honour of recovering the contested territory at any rate, he consented to a compromise, by which it seems to have been ceded to Athens, but under conditions which rendered the possession almost useless. The terms, however, of the treaty have not been reported; we only collect their nature from the fact that they excited so much indignation at Athens that Cephisodotus was recalled, brought to trial and fined, and narrowly escaped a sentence of death. Another general, named Athenodorus, was sent out to take the command in his room. But it is probable that he would not have been able to bring the war to a more prosperous issue if the state of affairs had not been suddenly changed by a remarkable occurrence.

The orator from whom we derive almost all our information on this subject does not enable us to ascertain either the relation between Cersobleptes and Berisades or Amadocus, on the footing on which they stood with one another. His language, however, seems to imply that all three ruled, with the title of king, in different parts of Thrace; that they were at peace with each other, but not without mutual jealousy; and that the portion of Cersobleptes, being the largest, excited the envy of the others. He, too, may have coveted their shares; but there is no hint that he considered them as usurpers or pretenders. After the death of Cotys, M Itocythes appears to have renewed

\* That this was the case with both of them may be inferred from Demosthenes, Aristocr., § 143, *πέρσων εἰδὼς ὅτι τοὺς Πισθῶνα καὶ τοὺς δαδελφούς*.

† Python, the Ænian, after having received the Athenian franchise, became a distinguished partisan of Philip's. So much we learn from Demosthenes c. Aristocr., p. 662, § 150. Some years later we find a Python—a man of great eloquence—employed by Philip in embassies and other state matters. (Æsch., De F. L., p. 44, § 132.) But this Python is called a Byzantian. Hence it is not quite clear whether they are the same, or two different persons. The name, however, was not so common that it should be likely to have been borne by two persons so similarly situated; while nothing can be easier to suppose than that the Ænian, who, after the murder, could not have been safe at Ænus, might obtain the franchise of Byzantium, and settle there. Demosthenes, when speaking of the murder, would of course mention his birthplace.

‡ It has been made, as we are to be expected, a topic for a good deal of declamation against the Athenians, which would, perhaps, have been more impressive if the political object had been less apparent, but would still have wanted even a decent colour if the facts had been fully and correctly stated. It was necessary to overlook the authentic testimony of Aristotle as to the motive of the murder, and to omit all notice of the strong reasons which there are for believing that the murderer became Philip's bosom councillor.

§ To this argument—on which, however, with such scanty information, we cannot lay much stress—we may perhaps add the testimony of Justin, though not so precise as could be wished. But the *fratres duo, reges Thraciæ*, whom he mentions, viii., 3, seem to have been Cersobleptes and Amadocus.

|| Demosthenes, Aristocr., § 193, *μακροῦλλον καὶ πάντας αἱ τοῦ Κοτύος καὶδες*: not, however, a boy, any more than Demosthenes was at the age when he calls himself *μακροῦλλον*, Meid., § 100. And it is more probable that he was the youngest, as Voemel describes him, Proleg. in Philipp., l., p. 93, than, as Schlosser says (l., 3, p. 59), the eldest, as well on account of the order in which the names are first mentioned by Demosthenes, as because Berisades died soon after, leaving several children.

\* *Ἐγὼ σκοπὴ Κότυν, ὅτι κηδεύσας ἦν Ἰφικράτης τὸν αὐτὸν γράπον οὐκ ἔχοντος Χαρίδημου Κερσοβλήπτης*. We need not infer from this either that Iphicrates married the sister of Cotys, or Charidemus the daughter of Cersobleptes. The former supposition contradicts positive testimony, the latter chronology.

† So we explain the allusion of Demosth., Aristocr., § 192, connecting it with § 197.

‡ Demosthenes, Aristocr., § 194.

his attempts; but, soon after the treaty which has just been mentioned, he was betrayed by one of his partisans into the hands of Charidemus. Charidemus wished to be rid of him, but did not venture to put him to death, and knew that his life would be spared if he was delivered to Cersobleptes. The reason assigned for this by Demosthenes leads us to conclude that capital punishments were as little known among the Thracians as among the ancient Germans.\* It is not customary, he says, among the Thracians to kill one another. Even high treason, it seems, was not a capital offence. Charidemus, therefore, intending to accomplish his purpose without any breach of the national custom, sent Miltocythes, and his son, who had been arrested with him, to Cardia, where the ruling party was attached to his interests, and violently hostile to Athens. It found that the death of the prisoners would be agreeable to Charidemus, and knew that it would equally displease and injure the Athenians. Under the impulse of this double motive, it was not satisfied with a simple execution, but despatched its two victims with ostentatious cruelty. This inhumanity, however, defeated its end. The Thracians, among whom Miltocythes probably retained many adherents, were universally roused to indignation by the bloody deed, which they imputed, we do not know how justly, to Cersobleptes. His two rivals, Berisades and Amadocus, availed themselves of the national feeling, and combined their forces against him; and Athenodorus seized the opportunity to conclude an alliance with them. Thus threatened, Cersobleptes found himself compelled to accept the terms dictated by the Athenian general. They were: that the kingdom should be equally divided among the three princes, and that they should all concur in ceding the Chersonesus to Athens.

But when the storm raised by the death of Miltocythes had blown over, Charidemus, who had ratified the treaty in the name of Cersobleptes, delayed as long as possible to execute that part of it which concerned Athens; and Athenodorus, receiving no supplies from home, was forced to disband his troops for want of pay. He himself, however, still remained in Thrace, and, not long after, contracted a domestic alliance with Berisades, like that which Iphicrates and Charidemus had formed with the family of Cotys. Chabrias was now appointed to the command in the Hellespont; but he arrived with only a single galley. It was thought, perhaps, that the war was at an end, or that he would be able to provide for it, as Timotheus had so often done, without charge to the state. This remissness of the Athenians encouraged Charidemus openly to renounce the treaty which he had made with Athenodorus, and to propose a new one to Chabrias, which Demosthenes describes as still more disadvantageous to Athens than that which had been concluded with Cephisodotus. The ground of this complaint appears to have been that the greater part of the revenues of the Chersonesus were reserved to Cersobleptes. Chabrias, however, thought it prudent to accept these terms, as he had no means of enforcing the preceding treaty;

but at Athens, notwithstanding his reputation, and the efforts of his friends, they were disavowed, and ten commissioners were appointed to proceed to Thrace, with instructions, if they could not prevail on Cersobleptes to ratify the treaty of Athenodorus, to obtain a renewal of the engagements of the two other princes, and to concert measures for reducing Cersobleptes to compliance by arms. The commissioners found Berisades and Amadocus very willing to adhere to the compact from which they had derived such great advantages. But the negotiation with Cersobleptes was protracted without any result, until it was suddenly brought to a favourable issue, chiefly, it seems, through the success which had attended the exertions of the Athenians in a different quarter.

At the first revival of the Athenian confederacy, it was strengthened by the accession of most of the Eubœan cities, which distinguished themselves above all the rest by the zeal with which they entered into it. Hestiazæ, or Oreus, alone kept aloof,\* through gratitude to Sparta, which had, a short time before, delivered it from the tyranny of a military adventurer named Neogenes, who had seized the citadel. Chabrias, who was sent to establish the Athenian ascendancy in Eubœa, endeavoured to reduce the Hestiazæans to submission; but their resistance was so obstinate that, after having ravaged their territory without effect, he was obliged to sail away, leaving a garrison in a fort which he had built near their city to annoy them. We do not know whether they finally yielded; but it seems as if the Athenians afterward rather lost than gained ground. We have seen that they were not able to prevent Themison from making himself master of Eretria, and that he even deprived them of Oropus. Chalcis, too, had fallen under the dominion of a tyrant, named Mnesarchus, who was likewise hostile to them;† and the island appears to have been torn more and more by factions and civil wars. Such was its condition at the time when the events last related were taking place in the Thracian Chersonesus. Athens does not appear to have interfered in its affairs farther than was necessary to protect her own interests and to exclude the intervention of other powers. But the Thebans now hoped to be able to take advantage of its distracted state; they were invited by some of the contending parties, and sent a body of troops to their aid. The news of the Theban expedition roused the jealousy of the Athenians, which was inflamed by the energetic exhortations of Timotheus, who was at this juncture at Athens.‡ “Are you deliberating (he is reported to have said), when you have the Thebans in the island, what you ought to do? Will you not

\* Diodorus, xv., 30. It is a surprising instance of excessive caution, that so sagacious a critic as Wesseling should have rejected, or even questioned, the conjecture of Palmerius on this passage (*Ἀπειρώς*, *Ἀπειρώς* for *Ἀπειρώς*, *Ἀπειρώς*); on the ground that it is not necessary for the understanding of the narrative. How is it possible that Therippidas should have liberated Oropus by the siege of the citadel of Hestiazæ, or that the liberation of Oropus should have inspired the Hestiazæans with gratitude towards Sparta? It is, however, a different question whether the error is to be imputed to the carelessness of a transcriber or to that of Diodorus himself, who was, perhaps, quite capable even of so gross a blunder.

† Æschines in Ctes., § 85.

‡ Demosthenes, De Chers., § 80

\* Tacitus, Germ., 7. Compare Moser, *Ornabruische Geschichte*, 1, § 14.

cover the sea with your galleys! Will you not immediately go down to Piræus, and drag your ships out of dock!" The people caught his ardour: an armament was decreed; but it was found that so many of the wealthy citizens, on whom the duties of the hierarchy would have devolved according to law, were, or had lately been, employed in other expeditions, that there was not a sufficient number left who could be legally compelled to undertake the equipment and command of the vessels destined for Eubœa.

In this emergency the patriotism of the higher classes came to the relief of the state, in a manner which proved that there still remained much of the old Athenian feeling, not quenched by the prevailing selfishness of the age. For the first time in the annals of the Athenian navy, several citizens—among whom was the orator Demosthenes, though not one of the richest—voluntarily presented themselves to bear the extraordinary burden. And the preparations were urged with such unwonted vigour, that, on the fifth day after the assembly was held,\* the troops were landed in Eubœa. The expedition, however, was commanded, it seems, not by Timotheus, but by Diocles, with whom there is some reason to think Chares was joined.† Of the operations which followed we have but very scanty accounts, which, however, agree very well together as to the general result, though there is a little appearance of variation in the details. The contemporary orators, who may be supposed to exhibit only the bright side of the story, represent the Athenians as completely triumphant, Diocles as granting permission to the Thebans—who, of course, had been defeated—to withdraw from the island, and the whole as reduced under the power of Athens, which generously allowed all the cities to retain their free constitutions; and all this as the work of less than thirty days. But, according to Diodorus, the campaign was much less brilliant, and the issue not exactly the same. He expressly states that there was no regular battle, but only skirmishes and petty engagements, in which victory was sometimes with the Athenians, sometimes with the Thebans; and that at last the Eubœans, to deliver their island from the ravages of the two hostile armies, agreed to a general pacification, upon which both the belligerents withdrew their forces. Still, even according to this statement, the advantage would have rested with the Athenians; for the Thebans had at least been foiled in their attempt, and the state of the island was not less favourable to the interests of Athens at the close of the campaign than it had been before. The spirit displayed by the Athenians in the expedition was a topic of exultation, with which they were frequently flattered by their orators—a proof how rare such exertions had now become with them—and, perhaps, contributed more to raise their confidence and their reputation than the success with which the effort was crowned.

Whether the occupation which this contest gave to the Athenians encouraged Charidemus

to evade the execution of his treaty with Athenodorus, we are not able to ascertain. But it seems that peace was no sooner restored in Eubœa than Chares sailed, with the armament which had just been employed there, to the Hellespont, invested with absolute authority by an extraordinary commission as general *autocrator*, and that his arrival immediately changed the aspect of affairs in that quarter. Charidemus, again threatened with a combination of the forces under Chares and those of the two rival kings, at length consented to the terms imposed by the Athenians, which seem to have amounted to a simple, unconditional cession of the Chersonesus; only he was still able to carry one very important point. Cardia, which, by its position on the Isthmus, was the key to the peninsula on the side of Thrace, retained its independence, and was, consequently, more than ever devoted to Charidemus. Sestus, too, was not surrendered, and continued hostile to Athens; but she was at liberty to enforce her claims to it as she could. Though the conduct of Charidemus, as we have related it—on the authority, indeed, of a political adversary, whose statements we have no means of comparing with more impartial evidence—appears to have been uniformly hostile to Athens, it seems that he had partisans among the Athenian orators, gained, perhaps, by arts like those which were employed by Chares, who persuaded the people that they were mainly indebted to him for the recovery of the Chersonesus; and he was rewarded with the franchise, and with a crown of honour, as a public benefactor.

This acquisition appears to have been made just on the eve of the disastrous war which broke out in the course of the same year (357) between the Athenians and some of their principal allies.\* We have ventured to surmise that it may have been connected with the causes of their rupture; because it seems not improbable that one of the immediate occasions of the quarrel may have arisen from the appointment of Chares to the extraordinary command which he held when he concluded the treaty with Charidemus, and an ancient writer, though one of very doubtful authority, expressly ascribes the origin of the war to his misconduct.†

\* The greater part of the modern writers who have treated this portion of history have been misled by Diodorus, xvi., 34, to refer the cession of the Chersonesus to the year 353 (Ol. cvi., 4), when an Athenian colony was sent to take possession of it. So Wachsmuth, Plathe, Droysen, Voemel. But it is by no means clear that Diodorus himself meant this, since the particle *ἐπεὶ* may refer to an earlier period. In the date here assigned to the event, we have been guided by the narrative in the Aristocrates, which in the leading outlines bears all the marks of truth, and is quite inconsistent with the supposition that the expedition of Chares took place after the end of the Social War. This has been clearly perceived and shown by Winiewski, p. 195.

† The anonymous author of the argument prefixed to Isocrates on the Peace. According to this account, Chares had been sent against Amphipolis, which was then independent; but thinking that he would at any time make himself master of it, and being more desirous of recovering the ancient power of Athens, he attacked the Chians, Rhodians, and the other allies (1). They resisted and defeated him, so that he was at a loss how to act; for if he had retired and turned his arms against Amphipolis, they, by way of retaliation, would have invaded Attica. The Athenians, on hearing this, requested peace, which was granted by the allies; and this, the writer adds, was the Social War. There are, perhaps, some fragments of historical truth in this statement, but it is difficult to extract and put them together. It seems clear that the author has confounded dates, and had altogether but a very confused idea of the

\* Demosthenes, Androt., § 17, *ἡμεῶν πρίον*. *Æsch.* in *Clea.*, § 83, *ἐν τῷ ἡμέτερῳ*. The one seems to speak exclusively, the other inclusively, of the same time.

† Diodorus, c. Aristocr., § 306, *ἡμεῶν πρίον* *ἐν τῷ ἡμέτερῳ*, and *Χάρης* *ἡμεῶν* *ἐν τῷ ἡμέτερῳ*.

But the accounts which have been preserved of this Social War are as scanty, in proportion to its importance, as those of the event which is commonly known by the same name in Roman history. One cause of the obscurity in which its origin is involved may be that it had been kindled some years before, though it was only now that the flame burst out. The attempt of Epaminondas, already mentioned, to detach Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium from the Athenian confederacy, whatever abatement may be required for the account which Diodorus gives of its success, implies that, even so early as the year 363, these states were meditating a separation, or, at least, that their jealousy and resentment had in some way been provoked by the conduct of Athens. In the year following we find the Byzantians taking some strong measures to relieve themselves in a time of scarcity, which seem to have excited hostile feelings at Athens. They detained the cornships on their passage out of the Euxine, and their example was followed by Chalcedon and Cyzicus. A number of vessels so freighted, and belonging to Athenian owners, were stopped at the mouth of the Euxine by the dread of this violence, while the price of corn was rising in the Athenian market. This was one of those injuries which every one felt; and one of the objects for which the squadron which was sent this year, as has been related, under Meno and Timochus, to the Hellespont, was to protect the shipping.\* It is hardly possible that this should have been done so as not to leave some ill-will rankling in the minds of the Byzantians; and, indeed, we find that they repeated their aggressions after Timomachus had succeeded to the command;† and it may easily be imagined that a very slight provocation or persuasion would have sufficed to impel them into open hostility to Athens. Under such circumstances, the presence of such a general as Chares, elated with success, and clothed with unlimited power, so near at hand, was very likely to widen the breach.

But though the expedition of Epaminondas appears to have been directed principally, if not solely, to Byzantium, it is not certain that she took the lead in the confederacy formed against Athens, or that she was urged by any motives which she had not in common with most of her allies. If we are satisfied with the information which we derive from Demosthenes as to the causes of the war, we must believe that Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium all alike professed to engage in it in self-defence, to guard against the attacks with which Athens, as they thought, was threatening their independence. This, indeed, would seem to imply some injuries already suffered, but such as fell indiscriminately on all. On the other hand, the same orator leads us to suppose that it was not Byzantium, but Rhodes, that took the foremost part in the coalition, and that Rhodes herself did not act spontaneously, or under the pressure of any grievance, but was an instrument in other hands. The real author of the war, according to this account, was Mausolus, the vassal king,

or hereditary satrap of Caria. Mausolus, who had inherited an extensive territory and several strong places, among which his capital Halicarnassus was well adapted to become the seat of a great maritime power, had conceived the design of making himself completely independent of the Persian court, and of enlarging his dominions on the Continent, and among the islands of the Ægean. He had sided with the revolted satraps in the rebellion which has been already noticed, and appears to have taken advantage of it to gain some addition to his territory in Lydia, though he was defeated in an attempt to make himself master of Miletus,\* and also to establish his authority in some of the neighbouring islands. This it was his aim to do in Rhodes, which, however, he could only hope to attain with the help of a party among the Rhodians devoted to his interests; and such a party could only gain the ascendancy when their connexion with Athens should have been dissolved. The government of Rhodes was at this time democratical; but there was, it seems, a strong oligarchical faction, which entered into his views. Still, their influence would scarcely have been sufficient to effect the revolution, which was the first step towards the accomplishment of their designs, if the great mass of the people had not been already alienated from Athens, and impatient of the dependance to which it had been reduced, or apprehensive of farther encroachments on its liberty.

The first impulse, then, seems to have proceeded either from Rhodes or Byzantium; but the motives which induced Chios to enter into the league against Athens may likewise be easily imagined. It was, perhaps, more exposed than either Byzantium or Rhodes to the exactions and insults of the Athenian officers, and had more grounds of complaint. We may also collect from Demosthenes that about this time the government fell into the hands of an oligarchical party, which no doubt actively promoted the rupture with Athens. Cos also declared itself very early on the same side; it was one of the islands which are said to have been subject to Mausolus.† Hostilities appear to have begun on the part of the Athenians with the siege of Chios. According to Diodorus, Chabrias was joined with Chares in the command, and conducted the operations of the fleet, which consisted, it seems, of sixty sail,§ while the land forces were led against the city by Chares. Yet we would not reject as altogether improbable the statement of Nepos, in which he may have followed Theopompus, that Chabrias accompanied the armament in a private capacity, and only commanded his own galley as a volunteer. All authors, however, agree that he sacrificed his life at the very beginning of the siege by an imprudent display of valour. He led the way into the harbour of Chios, but was not immediately followed by the rest, and was overpowered by the enemy. Yet it seems that he might have saved his life, if he had chosen to retreat or to abandon his vessel; but, with Spartan obstinacy, he preferred to die sword in

history of the war. Yet Voemel (Proleg., p. 68) adopts so much of the narrative as relates to Chares, though without a reference, with apparently perfect confidence.

\* Demosthenes c. Polycl., § 5.

† Ib., § 22.

\* Polyænus, vi., 8, where the name *Ægyptus* is singular. Lucian, D. M., xiv. † De Rhod. Lib., § 23.

‡ Lucian, u. s. Demosthenes, De Rhod. Lib., § 34.

§ Compare Diodorus, xvi., 7 and 21.



hand. Athens thus lost one of her ablest generals; and the immediate consequence appears to have been that the attempt upon Chios was defeated, and the allies became masters of the sea. We do not know what became of Chares, or what interval may have elapsed before the Athenians found it necessary to equip another fleet of sixty sail, which was commanded by Iphicrates and Timotheus. These two generals had been for some time reconciled, and had cemented their union by an alliance between the daughter of Timotheus and Menestheus, the son of Iphicrates. According to Nepos, Menestheus was appointed to the command, but was aided by his father and father-in-law, who nominally served under him. It appears, however, from the sequel, that they must have held a public and responsible office. Still they were only associated with Chares, who had not lost the confidence of the people.

In the following year (356) Samos appears to have been the principal scene of hostilities; but it is difficult to determine the precise course which they took. According to Diodorus, the allies, whose fleet amounted to a hundred sail, after having ravaged Lemnos and Imbrus, proceeded to Samos, wasted the country, and laid siege to the city; at the same time levying contributions from other islands which adhered to the Athenians; but were at length called away to the relief of Byzantium, which the Athenians besieged for the purpose of effecting a diversion. But other accounts, not less authentic and probable, inform us that Samos likewise had revolted, and that its territory was ravaged by Iphicrates,\* and we are thus led to suspect that the Athenians were diverted from the siege of Samos by the operations of the enemy in the north of the *Ægean*. However this may be, it seems certain that the Athenian commanders united their forces near the Hellespont, within such a distance of the allies, that preparations were made on both sides for a general engagement. Chares was eager for it; but on the day when he proposed to make the attack, the state of the weather induced his colleagues to decline it. This refusal produced an open breach between them; and Chares, we are told by Diodorus, after having publicly protested against their conduct, wrote a letter to the people, in which he charged them with treachery. But here the narrative itself seems to betray some mission; for the mere postponement of a battle could hardly have been alleged as ground for such a charge; and a comparison of another account inclines us to suppose that Chares, hinking, perhaps, that his colleagues would not venture to withhold their support, led his division against the enemy, and was defeated; and then, to screen himself, laid the blame on them.† He had, as we have seen, partisans at home, who were always ready to defend his conduct; and it is possible that the real circumstances of the case, if he actually exposed himself to a risk which his colleagues shunned, may have given a specious colour to the accusation. The result was that they were recalled, and were afterward brought to trial; and Chares was left intrusted with the sole management of the war.

It seems necessary to suppose that this event took place in the latter half of 356; for the account given by Diodorus of the manner in which the contest was terminated, implies that there was an interval of at least several months between the transactions just related and the close of the war. Chares, though no longer restrained by the presence of his colleagues, neither ventured, as it appears, to attack the enemy, nor was able to find subsistence for his troops by the means which he had hitherto been used to employ. The contributions which the islands still attached to the Athenian interest could furnish, had been for the most part preoccupied by the allies, and they were strong enough to protect the others from his exactions. From Athens he could not expect a supply equal to his wants; and perhaps to have applied for it would have endangered his popularity. In this emergency he resorted to an expedient which was probably the best that the case admitted. The war between Artabazus and the satraps who acknowledged the authority of Ochus, the successor of Artaxerxes, which, as we have seen, had drawn Charidemus over to Asia, still continued. Artabazus was threatened by superior numbers, and stood in great need of a body of Greek auxiliaries, whose aid he was willing to purchase at a high price. Chares, on the other hand, only wanted a present provision for his troops, and a subsidy which might enable him afterward to prosecute the war. He did not look to any political consequences that lay beyond these immediate advantages, and perhaps could hardly have foreseen them. He entered into the service of Artabazus, and, according to Diodorus, soon turned the scale, and gained a victory which extricated him from his dangerous position: success which seems to imply that Chares was by no means deficient in military talents. The satrap fulfilled his promise, and furnished him with a sum of money which enabled him to keep his forces together. We are not informed in what manner the allies availed themselves of his absence from the theatre of war; but it does not seem that they can have profited by the opportunity for any purpose more important than that of infesting the commerce, and annoying the dependants of Athens; for the proceedings of Chares were known to the people, and were at first greatly applauded. But the aid which he had given, and might continue to give, to Artabazus, had been represented to the King of Persia as so important, that he thought it necessary to send an embassy to Athens to complain of his conduct.\* These complaints were probably accompanied with threats, more or less definite, that the king would support the confederates with his maritime power. Orders were forthwith sent to Chares to break off his connexion with Artabazus. But intelligence soon after arrived that the Persian court was fitting out an armament of 300 galleys to co-operate with the enemies of Athens. This report probably did not first suggest the desire of peace to the Athenians, who must for some time have felt the want of it; but it seems to have convinced them that they could not carry on the war any longer without extreme danger. Diodorus and another author intimate that they

\* Polyænus, iii., 9, 36.

† Nepos, Tim., iii., 4. Male re gestâ, compluribus amicis navibus, eodem unde erat profectus, se recepit.

\* Diodorus, xvi., 22.

† Argument to Isocrates, De Pac.

made the first advances; but we find that the confederates sent an embassy to Athens;\* and we can easily believe that they were little less eager for the termination of a struggle which must have cost them great sacrifices. They seem to have required nothing but the acknowledgment of their independence, and this was no doubt secured to them.

We are not informed how many states, besides the principal parties, were included in the treaty; but it seems that Athens must have lost a great number of her most important allies; for she is said to have retained none but the less considerable islands, and the amount of the yearly contributions was reduced to forty-five talents,† which, however, may have been but a temporary deficiency, arising from the pressure of the war. To her losses of this kind in the *Ægean* was added one in the west, which must have been as painful as any; one of which the Social War was probably rather the occasion than the cause; for it may be pretty clearly traced to events which had taken place a few years before, though the accounts we have of them are somewhat obscure. In 351 Chares had been appointed, as we have seen, in the room of Leosthenes, and soon after was sent—we know not whether with any other purpose than that of levying contributions—to *Coreyra*. Since its connexion with Athens had been renewed, the island appears to have been under democratical government, but there was, as at all former periods, an oligarchical party, which was now eager for a revolution. It would be hardly credible, if the testimony of ancient writers to the fact was not confirmed by the sequel, as to which there is no doubt, that this party was encouraged and abetted by Chares in a conspiracy, by which it overthrew its adversaries, and, after much bloodshed, placed itself at the head of the state.‡ This change was so clearly adverse to the interest of Athens, that we can hardly attribute the conduct of Chares to any other motive than bribery. The new rulers were not the better disposed towards the Athenian alliance for the aid which they thus received, and seem to have taken the opportunity afforded by the Social War for renouncing it.

What had been so lost there could be little hope of ever retrieving. The war expenditure must also have been burdensome to the finances of Athens; the damage inflicted on Athenian property abroad, by the navy of the allies as well as by confiscation, was perhaps still more severe; and commerce seems to have undergone a temporary stagnation. The city is described at the close of the war as deserted by the foreign merchants and the resident aliens.§ These, however, were wounds which time might heal. But it could not repair the loss of the three great commanders, who had revived the power of the commonwealth, and might, perhaps, have averted some of its subsequent disasters. The death of Chabrias was only matter for regret; but the services of Iphicrates and Timotheus were sacrificed by means as dishonourable as the end was unhappy for the state. Iphicrates was brought to trial first, with Me-

nestheus. The prosecution was conducted by Aristophon, a very eloquent orator, who, in the course of his long political life, had himself been seventy-five times impeached, and could boast of having been as often acquitted, and whose reputation renders it somewhat surprising that he should have become the coadjutor of Chares in an affair of this nature.\* Iphicrates defended himself with soldier-like eloquence, seasoned with sarcastic wit; but he seems to have been aware that the disposition of his judges was not favourable to him, and to have relied on other means of averting the danger. We may collect from Isocrates that he and Menestheus were more concerned for the safety of Timotheus than for their own. They took on themselves the whole responsibility of the joint command: Iphicrates that of the military operations, Menestheus that of the administration of the public money.† This boldness would be sufficiently explained if we believe that Iphicrates had secured the support of a body of partisans—perhaps the members of one of the clubs which still subsisted, for various purposes, at Athens—that he caused threatening rumours to be circulated before the trial, and in the course of his speech, laying his hand on his sword, hinted to his judges that they might have cause to repent if they condemned him.‡ The fact is, that both he and Menestheus were acquitted: what follows appears to prove that they owed their escape to some extraordinary means. Timotheus was afterward arraigned, likewise by Aristophon, on a similar charge, for which, according to Isocrates, there could have been no colour against him, if his colleagues were innocent. Yet he was found guilty, and condemned to the enormous fine of 100 talents. The capital article in the indictment was, that he had received bribes from the Chians and Rhodians.§ But we cannot doubt that passion, or cupidity, or factious intrigues contributed more to aggravate the sentence than the speciousness of the prosecutor's proofs. Isocrates attributes it to the offence which Timotheus had given by his lofty, ungracious deportment, and his neglect even of the fair arts by which other generals paid their court to the people, and the leading orators, whom he had made his enemies. This would account for the conduct of Aristophon, though so as to leave a blot upon his character. Timotheus was unable to pay the fine, and retired to Chalcis, where he died not long after. The injustice of the sentence was tacitly acknowledged by the people after his death. His son Canon was permitted to compromise with the treasury for a tenth part of the fine, in the honourable form of a donation for the repair of the walls restored by his grandfather.||

While the negotiation with the allies was pending, or soon after the peace, Isocrates wrote what we should call a pamphlet, in the form of a speech, intended to be delivered in the assembly held to deliberate on the treaty.

\* Isocrates, *De Pac.*, § 22.

† Demosthenes, *De Cor.*, § 293.

‡ Diodor., xv., § 25. The character of the party aided by Chares is determined by *Æneas, Poliorc.*, c. 11.

§ Isocrates, *De Pac.*, § 26.

\* *Ælian* indeed, xiv., 2, calls him *δωροφ*, but apparently with no other ground than a passage in the speech of Timotheus, which he may have misunderstood, as the same epithet is applied to Eubulus by *Athenæus*, iv., 61, manifestly through a misunderstanding of the words of Theopompus which he quotes. † *x. dvv.*, § 137. ‡ *Polyan.*, iii., 9, 29. § *Dinarch.* in *Demosth.*, § 14. *Polyc.*, § 17. || *Nepos, Timoth.*, iv., 1.

The work is of considerable value as a historical document, though it affords less information than might have been expected from it with regard to the war. Isocrates was a rhetorician by profession: the framing of sentences and turning of periods was the great business of his long life—the only one in which he was very successful; in that he attained to the highest skill labour could give, and amassed great wealth as a teacher. But he appears to have been a hearer of Socrates, was disgusted with the sophists, and had little taste for the ordinary subjects of their disputations; he was thus led to apply his art to morals and politics, not, like most of the Socratic school, in the discussion of general principles, but in practical precepts and counsels. He was the first Greek writer who employed his pen on questions which arose out of passing events.\* He seems to have believed that nothing but the weakness of his voice and the shyness and timidity of his character prevented him from taking a leading part in the public debates.† But it is very doubtful whether any strength of lungs or hardness of brow could have rendered discourses such as he has left acceptable to an Athenian assembly, at least after it had learned from Demosthenes what real eloquence was. He valued himself not a little on his political sagacity, as to which a stronger mind than his own has entertained a widely different opinion.§ But he was a respectable, well-meaning man; he deplored the evils which afflicted Greece, and thought he saw a remedy, but seems to have given little heed whether it might not prove worse than the disease. His general notion was, union under a single chief; which, however, he wished to reconcile with liberty and independence. How inconsistent the plan which he proposed was with the combination of these objects will appear in the proper place.

The advice, however, which he gives on the occasion of the peace seems indisputably good; and every Athenian patriot must have regretted that the people was so little disposed to follow it, and that, even in the most elegant diction and the most graceful periods, there is not a charm strong enough to eradicate ambition and cupidity, especially when confirmed by long indulgence, from the human breast. Its effect may have been somewhat impaired by the ambiguity of the language in which it is conveyed, which, he himself admits, had a repulsive, paradoxical sound.|| He exhorts the Athenians to cease to aim at the command of the sea, and appeals to history, both their own and Sparta's, to prove that this dazzling object of competition had only been a source of the greatest calamities to every power that had acquired it. He had before spoken with the highest approbation of the peace of Antalcidas, so far as it provided for the independence of the Greeks, and had recommended that this should be adopted as the basis of the treaty under discussion;¶ so that it might have been supposed that he wished to see the connexion between Athens and her allies totally dissolved. This, however, it ap-

pears from the sequel, was not his meaning. On the contrary, it is that she may be again at the head of a confederacy as extensive as that which she had presided over in the days of Aristides\* that he desires she should renounce the command of the sea. All that he means by the command of the sea is, an unjust domination, grounded upon and maintained by force. He would have a confederacy in which all the members should be perfectly free, willingly submitting to the supremacy of Athens, paying none but voluntary contributions, and exempt from all kinds of molestation and encroachment. His proposition, therefore, when distinctly understood, was not so paradoxical as it sounded. It was nothing more than had been done when the Athenian confederacy was revived; and all that was necessary to comply with his advice was to return and adhere to the terms then laid down. How, if the people had been really desirous of this, it was to recover the confidence of its allies, is a question which he does not discuss.

Even as to the manner in which those terms had been violated, he affords very scanty information. He hints, rather than expressly asserts, that the Athenians had suffered their citizens to acquire property in the islands, against the spirit at least of the self-denying resolution, by which they had renounced all cleruchal possessions.† He speaks also of arbitrary exactions, which have been already mentioned, and represents the allies as entirely abandoned to the discretion of the Athenian generals.‡ He is, however, more explicit as to the domestic causes of the evil, which he is aware must be removed before any salutary change can be made in the foreign policy of the state. The people must discard its dishonest counsellors, must employ men of acknowledged probity both at home and abroad; it must cease itself to be indolent, voluptuous, rapacious, ambitious, greedy of flattery, and impatient of reproof. Hard conditions, and certainly surpassing the power of such rhetoric as that of Isocrates to bring to pass; for the old abuses, which had been repressed by the public calamities, and partially reformed, had sprung up again during the more tranquil and prosperous period that followed; with fresh luxuriance, and in new, more extravagant, and odious shapes. The city was again infested with a swarm of sycophants, more shameless, active, and venomous, than in former times. The needy, idle throng which lived upon the fees of legislation, government, and justice, viewed the men whose calumnious charges gave it most opportunities of exercising its judicial functions, as its greatest benefactors.§ The wealthy were exposed to continual vexation; Isocrates does not scruple to assert that they led more wretched lives than the indigent.|| Here, however, his own example shows how cautiously his general descriptions must be received. He complains much of the annoyance which he himself had suffered from the sycophants; and certainly his wealth, his incapacity for public speaking, his connexion with Timotheus, and other distinguished citizens, and with foreign princes, and

\* Vit. X. Orat., p. 837, B.

† Pausan., § 12, 13. Philip., § 93.

‡ Niebuhr, Kl. Schrift., p. 474, and in the Philological Museum, ii., p. 402: "at least in his old age a thoroughly bad citizen, as well as an ineffectual fool." § § 77, 80. ¶ § 20.

\* § 91, 92.

† § 4.

‡ § 60.

§ § 156.

|| § 154, *ἄλλοι οὐ τοὺς οὐλοῦς κακώτεροις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκακοῦσι.*

his avowed political sentiments, must all have conspired to point him out as one of the most signal objects for their attacks. Yet in the ninety-fifth year of his age he could look back upon a life of almost undisturbed prosperity, with no other regret than that he had been debarred by his natural defects from more active participation in public business.\* So, too, it can only be considered as a rhetorical exaggeration that he represents the vilest, most profligate, and senseless demagogues as the most popular. Had things come to this pass, no room would have been left for the influence of the able and upright men, whom we shall find for several years ordinarily taking the lead in public affairs. The real ground of this statement was probably that the same decay of public spirit which appeared in the growing neglect of military exercises, and the evasion both of foreign and home service, betrayed itself in the assembly by the levity and haste with which important matters were often handled, and the applause with which indecorous sallies of gayety were received. This want of earnestness—which, however, might easily seem greater than it really was in an Athenian audience—was a subject of complaint with Demosthenes also.

In this piece Isocrates notices an innovation, which appears to him pregnant with pernicious consequences, or at least as a symptom of degeneracy, but which admits of being viewed in a different light. He speaks of it in a way which shows that he was only intent upon an antithesis; but the fact he alludes to is more clearly described and illustrated by Plutarch.† In earlier times all the great men of Athens combined the characters of the general and the statesman in one person. In the period at which we have now arrived, they were beginning to be more and more separated from each other. Many of the orators never saw the camp; the generals rarely ascended the bema. This practice was the effect, partly of the progress of eloquence, and the wider range of rhetorical studies,‡ which demanded longer preparation and more laborious exercises, partly of the new military system, which, as we have seen, tended to draw the generals away from Athens. Phocion is remarked as one of the last Athenians in whom the two characters were still blended. According to modern notions, this division of military and civil duties might be thought a great gain for the service of the state. Whatever evil sprang from it seems to have arisen from the corruption of the age. The responsibility both of the generals and the ministers—as we may call them—of the republic was lessened; and it was easy for men like Chares to find advocates, apparently disinterested, to defend all their proceedings. The worst abuse connected with it was, that military command was so much coveted that, if we may believe Isocrates, the election of generals was often determined by the most open bribery.§

If it were not that we have no hint of any negotiation between Athens and the confederates, before Chares had provoked the interven-

tion of the Persian court, we might have supposed that Isocrates wrote this oration before the threats of Persian hostility had been heard of at Athens; for he takes no notice of them, though they afforded the fairest opportunity of recommending his favourite scheme for the establishment of tranquillity and prosperity in Greece. He touches only by one slight allusion on the war with Philip and with Cersobleptes, in a way which implies that in his judgment there was no more danger to be apprehended from the one quarter than the other. He conceives that there was no essential and necessary opposition between the interests of either of these princes and those of the commonwealth, and that, if they were only convinced of her pacific disposition towards them, Philip would readily resign Amphipolis, and Cersobleptes the Chersonesus, to her.\* And his general conclusion is that, notwithstanding the great loss and damage which she had suffered in the Social War, it would be her own fault if she did not become more powerful and prosperous than ever. Let her only abstain from aggression and wrong, hold herself in readiness for self-defence, and show herself willing to protect the weak against the strong: justice would bring back an age of gold. The rich would be relieved from taxation; the poor would find employment in the arts of peace; the public revenues would be doubled; a tide of wealth would flow into Piræus;† foreign princes would pay their court to her, and would gladly purchase her favour by the cession of a part of their territories; in Thrace alone she would be able to find ample and undisputed space for any colonies she might wish to send out; and the Greeks would look up to her with reverence and attachment, as to the guardian of their liberty and rights. A picture unhappily not more sharply contrasted with the past and the present, than with the reality of the future.

## CHAPTER XLIII.

### FROM THE END OF THE SOCIAL WAR TO THE FALL OF OLYNTHUS.

WE have been used to see the Athenians making the most vigorous exertions in the midst of their greatest calamities: we might otherwise have been disposed to question the accuracy of the descriptions we have received of the disastrous consequences of the Social War; for that war was scarcely at an end before we find them again acting on the offensive, and even ready to enter into a new contest, apparently still more arduous and hazardous than that from which they had just retired with such heavy loss. There is reason to believe that in the course of the same summer in which they made peace with the allies they sent an expedition against Olynthus, as to which we are informed that it was the second occasion that called forth the services of voluntary trierarchs, and that a body of Athenian cavalry was

\* Panathen., § 9-13.

† Phocion, 7.

‡ Τῆς ἀρχαίας φιλομαχίας. As Aristotle observes, Pol., v., 4, 4, where, in the words *ὅτι ἀρχαίως τῶν πολέμων*, he may mean to indicate the progress of the art of war as another main cause of the phenomenon.

§ § 63.

\* His language (§ 28) might lead any one to infer that the Chersonesus was still in the hands of Cersobleptes, if it did not as strongly imply that Amphipolis was still in the possession of Athens, which, at least, was certainly not the case.

employed in it: \* facts which imply a considerable effort, though we have no account of the results; nor is the precise date well ascertained. Notwithstanding the peace, the public mind continued to be agitated by rumours of the Persian preparations; and it appears that there were orators—politicians, we may suppose, of the school of Isocrates—who endeavoured to instigate the people to declare war against Persia. The deliberation of the assembly on this subject is chiefly known to us as the occasion on which Demosthenes began his career as a statesman with an oration which is still extant. Our attention is thus turned towards this extraordinary man, who will henceforth occupy it more and more throughout the period comprised in this portion of our history.

Demosthenes was the son of an Athenian merchant of the same name,† who was among the wealthier citizens of the middle class. By the mother's side his blood, according to Athenian notions, was, perhaps, not so pure. His maternal grandfather, Gylon, had been charged with treason, as having betrayed the town of Nymphæum, in the Tauric Chersonesus, to the enemies of the state. He did not await a trial, and was condemned to death, but found refuge in the Greek principality on the Cimmerian Bosphorus, and received a mark of favour from its ruler, which may have been the reward of treasonable services: the town of Cepi, in the island on the eastern side of the Bosphorus.‡ Here he obtained the hand of a rich heiress, who, perhaps for no other reason than because she was a foreigner and a native of the barbarous region, was described at Athens as a Scythian. Their two daughters were sent with large portions to Athens, where one of them,

Cleobula, married the elder Demosthenes: ground sufficient for her son's political opponents to call him a Scythian, and a hereditary enemy of his country. Demosthenes, who, according to the most probable opinion, was born in the last year of the ninety-eighth Olympiad, 385,\* lost his father when he was but seven years old, and was left, with his mother and a younger sister, under the care of three guardians, two of them the next of kin, the third an intimate friend of the family, who, according to the Attic law, continued to administer his affairs until he had completed his eighteenth year. It can scarcely be doubted, though we have only the statements on one side, that they grossly abused their trust, and by waste, embezzlement, or mismanagement, reduced his ample patrimony, which ought to have been greatly augmented, to a very slender income. It is little less clear that this injury, which in ordinary cases would have been a misfortune, was among the causes which contributed most to form his character, and to lay the foundation of his greatness.

His bodily frame was in his early youth weak and sickly, and perhaps not capable of supporting the fatigue of the ordinary gymnastic exercises, or his mother's anxiety for the health of her only son prevented him from attending the palaestra; for it seems certain that in this respect his education was neglected. It would not be surprising that a nickname expressive of effeminacy‡ should have been fastened on him by his young companions, and that it should afterward have been interpreted by his enemies as a proof of unmanly luxury and vicious habits; especially as, at a later period of life, he did not abstain from certain indulgences which his fortune permitted, and perhaps his infirmities required, but which, though perfectly harmless, may have excited envy, and were sufficiently unusual to afford a subject for obloquy.‡ For military service he was, of course, the less fitted, as he wanted the training by which every Greek citizen was commonly prepared for it,§ and the consciousness of this defect might well have led him to shrink from it: possibly, too, his bodily weakness was coupled with some degree of timidity; though we have no evidence that can raise more than a faint suspicion that he was deficient in the lowest kind of courage. By these disadvantages, however, his strong mind and ardent spirit were bent the more resolutely on the cultivation of his intellectual powers, and on the civil pursuits which alone afforded him a prospect of that eminence to which he must very early have felt himself entitled to aspire. It seems probable that even during his minority he conceived suspicions of the misconduct of his guardians, or was dis-

\* Demosth., Meid., § 204, 240. The date of this expedition depends on that of the birth of Demosthenes. See Boeckh, P. E. of Ath., iv., 13.

† The term *merchant* may, perhaps, startle some readers who have been used to see the orator's father described as a sword-cutter, if not from Juvenal as a blacksmith. But it seems the most appropriate appellation for a person whose property was invested in such a variety of ways as we find his to have been from his son's statement, l. Aphob., p. 816. The sword manufactory was but a small part of it. Together with that of sofas, which he carried on at the same time, its value amounted only to six talents out of fourteen or fifteen at which the whole estate was estimated. He had considerable sums out at common interest and on bottomry.

‡ Æschines, in Ctes., § 171. The well-informed and intelligent reader knows how to appreciate the romance which has been founded on this passage by an author, of whom Mr. Clinton (F. H., ii., p. 353) observes—making free use of the *Litotes*, while he quietly exposes a combination of ignorance, rashness, and prejudice not often paralleled in historical writing—that he is *not favourable to Demosthenes*. We need hardly observe that by *ρίπαρτοι* Æschines did not mean a *Scythian king*. The use of the plural number ought not to raise any doubt that he was speaking of one of the Archæanactidae. Mr. Clinton's conjecture (F. H., ii., p. 294) that their dynasty was interrupted, between Seleucus and Satyrus I., by usurpers, to whom Æschines applied the term *tyrants*, seems quite unnecessary to fill up a chasm in Diodorus. Whether these tyrants were the same as the *enemies* to whom Gylon is said to have betrayed Nymphæum, is a different question. The predecessor of Satyrus I. may have been hostile to Athens, though the succeeding princes were her allies and benefactors. It may, however, not be superfluous to point out the fallacy of the argument, that the silence of Demosthenes on this subject, in his reply to Æschines, “amounts to an admission that the story of Gylon and his daughters was true beyond controversy.” The fact that Gylon had been condemned for treason was most likely incontrovertible: and this would be a sufficient motive for avoiding the subject, however inaccurate the rest of the story might be. Yet the passage about Gylon in the second oration against Aphobus might almost warrant a conjecture that the sentence had been rescinded before Gylon's death.

\* On this subject the reader may compare Mr. Clinton's arguments in his Appendix, c. 20, with an essay *On the Birth-year of Demosthenes*, in the Philological Museum, Febr., 1833, vol. ii., p. 389, by the author of this history, and with Westerman's *Commentatio*, prefixed to his edition of the *Vite X. Oratorum*, p. 18–21, which was published only a few months later in the same year. Westerman has shown that these Lives may be Plutarch's, and contain materials for more accurate biographies.

† Βράλος. Plut., Dem., 4. But it is more probable that it referred to the defect in his articulation. See Schæfer, *Apparat. ad Demosth.*, vol. ii., p. 251. Naake, *De Battaro Valerii Catonis*, in the *Rhenish Mus.*, vol. ii., p. 117.  
‡ Æschines, *De F. L.*, § 105. Dinarchus c. Demosth., § 37.  
§ Æschines in Ctes., § 256.

satisfied with the treatment he received from them. He charges them with having defrauded the masters under whom he studied of their dues;\* which, however, did not prevent him from receiving the best instruction in the literary part of a liberal education.† Whether the story, that he could not pay the high price which Isocrates demanded for his lessons, had any other foundation, we cannot determine. The account which he obtained from his guardians, when he came of age, must have convinced him that he had no hope of redress but through litigation; and their abilities, wealth, and influence rendered them formidable adversaries. The very institution of legal proceedings against persons so closely connected with his family by blood or friendship, wore an ungracious appearance; and the parties interested did not fail to represent it as the effect of unnatural malignity, which they seem to have expressed by another opprobrious epithet.‡

A hard contest lay before him, in which he must have been aware that the justice of his cause would avail him little without the aid of forensic skill; and it was one on which his after fortunes mainly depended. It was, therefore, for immediate use, on the most pressing occasion, that he sharpened the weapon with which he was to achieve so many memorable victories. This, however, was not the only motive which urged him to the study of eloquence. About the same time that he became his own master, he had been present at the trial in which Callistratus defended his conduct in the affair of Oropus. The impression made upon the youth by that masterly pleading, and by the admiration it excited, was like that which the hearing of Herodotus is commonly believed to have wrought on Thucydides; it was, perhaps, then first that Demosthenes felt that he too was an orator. There was, however, a wide interval, not to be surmounted without many years of laborious application, between the point which he had attained and the ideal mark which he proposed to himself. He placed himself under the direction of Iseus, an advocate of high reputation, a scholar of Isocrates, though in style much more nearly resembling Lysias. To him he may have been in some degree indebted for the grace, simplicity, and vigour which are the most conspicuous qualities of his forensic pleadings. For this purpose he could not have found a better model; nor for any practical end, any much worse than Isocrates. Yet he may have wished to obtain the instructions of so celebrated a master, and we can easily believe that, when deterred by the price which the rhetorician asked, he still diligently studied his works.§ There was also a tradition, resting, indeed, on nameless authority, that he was for a time one of Plato's hearers,|| and the difference of style would not induce us to reject it; but his acquaintance—which may safely be presumed—with the philosopher's writings would suffi-

ciently explain, if any such explanation were needed, that lofty strain of morality which pervades his great works, and which, as may be inferred from the observation of Panætius,\* he first ventured to introduce into speeches addressed to Athenian courts and assemblies—audiences which Plato himself would scarcely have deemed worthy or capable of receiving such sublime truths.

His suit with his guardians, though it was delayed three or four years by their artifices, was finally decided in his favour; and though they still evaded the execution of the judgment, he appears at length to have recovered a considerable part of his property. It would otherwise be difficult to reconcile his own statements concerning the expensive charges which he undertook in his youth,† with his account of the small remnant of his patrimony which his guardians rendered to him. The assertion made long after in general terms by one of his enemies, that he had wasted his fortune,‡ was probably drawn from the defence set up by his guardians; it may, at all events, be safely pronounced an impudent calumny, for which its authors could hardly have hoped to gain a place in history. It is refuted by the clearest evidence the case admits. Not only were the habits of Demosthenes so notoriously abstemious as to be made, on that ground, a subject of ridicule by his political opponents,§ but his early life, for about ten years after he came of age, was spent in a continual struggle with difficulties, and in the most laborious preparation for the attainment of the great objects of a noble ambition.

The success with which he had pleaded his own cause was encouraging, but not decisive as to his higher prospects. The speeches which he delivered on that occasion were deemed worthy of his master Iseus, and certainly gave proof of no ordinary talents. But a different kind of eloquence was requisite for the debates of the assembly; and defects of utterance and gesticulation which might be overlooked by a court of justice in a youth claiming redress, appeared intolerably offensive in one who presented himself as a public counsellor. The reception he met with on his first appearance before the assembled people was such as might have stifled the hopes of one less conscious of his own powers. His articulation was imperfect, his action disagreeable, his voice, natural, not strong, was ill managed; and even his style startled his hearers by its novelty, and was thought harsh, strained, and confused.¶ Though not silenced he descended from the bema in the midst of murmurs and laughter. There were, however, among his audience persons able to discern the merit of the attempt, and friendly enough to encourage and aid him with useful advice. Old men were still living who had heard Pericles in their boyhood; and one of them, it is said, cheered Demosthenes with an assurance that he reminded him of that great orator, whose fame appears to have been hitherto unrivalled at Athens. Satyrus also,

\* I. Aphot., § 53.

† It is strange that Becker, forgetting the orator's *ἰσίδωρος* (ὁδὸν ἀποδιδόναι, *lyd' d' idōtēs*), should repeat Plutarch's error (Dem., 4)—*man sah den schwächlichen Knaben in keiner Schule*. Demosthenes *als Staatsman*, p. 9.

‡ *Ἄνδρες, ἀ νίπτερ*. *Æsch.*, De F. L., § 105.

§ Callibius in Plutarch, Demosth., 5. Compare Vit. X. Orat. Dem., p. 644, c.      ¶ Plat., Dem., u. e.

\* In Plutarch, Dem., 12.

† *Æschines*, Ctes., § 173.

‡ Demosthenes, ii., Phil., § 32, De F. L., § 51, and the joke of Demades (Lucian, Demosth., Encom., § 15), *ὅς τις πύδων πρὸς ἑαυτὸν λέγοντος, τὴν ἀπονομήναι αὐτῷ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν γὰρ, αὐτ.*

† De Cor., § 239.

¶ Plat., Dem., 6.

he player, an amiable and estimable man, was believed to have directed his attention to the principal faults of his elocution. He saw all that he wanted, and, with unconquerable resolution, set himself to the task of overcoming his natural impediments, correcting his unsightly habits, and perfecting every organ and faculty which he had to employ as a public speaker. He is reported to have withdrawn for a time from society, to pursue his work without interruption; and we know that he resorted to new and very irksome methods of mastering his personal disadvantages.\* These exercises he continued until he had acquired a manner of delivery, as to which it is sufficient to say that it was thought by his contemporaries worthy of his eloquence, and that it distinguished him no less above all his rivals.†

It was not, however, merely to enable himself to satisfy the eye and ear of the public that he entered on this course of training. He had felt that the equally fastidious taste and judgment of an Athenian assembly demanded more than it had found in his first essay, which probably fell short by a much greater distance of his own idea. He applied himself to an assiduous study of all the theoretical works he could procure which could furnish him with rules and hints for the cultivation of his art, and still more diligently consulted the great models of eloquence in which he recognised a kindred genius. In Thucydides he appears to have found, as we do, the richest mine of thought and language; and the value which he set on his history is attested both by the tradition that he copied it out eight times, and could almost recite it by heart,‡ and by the evidence of his own style, notwithstanding the difference required by two kinds of composition so completely distinct. In the mean while, his pen was constantly employed in rhetorical exercises. Every question suggested to him by passing events served him for a topic of discussion, which called forth the application of his attainments to the real business of life. It was, perhaps, as much for the sake of such practice as with a view to reputation or the increase of his fortune, that he accepted employment as an advocate, which, until he began to take an active part in public affairs, was offered to him in abundance. If he viewed these occasions in this light, we might believe the story that he once furnished each of the adverse parties in a cause with a speech, and yet might not consider it as a very deep stain upon his honour. His main occupation, however, was not with forms, or words, and sentences. The profession of an advocate itself required an extensive range of information. Causes, especially, which related to contested laws or decrees, generally involved a number of questions that called for a large share of legal and political knowledge. Demosthenes, who from the first was always looking forward to the widest field of action, undoubt-

edly did not content himself with the indispensable study of the Athenian laws and Constitution, but bestowed no less earnest attention on the domestic affairs, the financial resources, and the foreign relations of the commonwealth, and on the political divisions, powers, and interests of the rest of Greece. The state of the finances, and of the naval and military establishments of Athens, the defects of the existing system, and the means of correcting them, appear more particularly to have occupied his thoughts.

Such was the process by which he became confessedly the greatest orator among the people by whom eloquence was cultivated as it has never since been by any nation upon earth. He brought it to its highest state of perfection, as Sophocles the tragic drama, by the harmonious union of excellences which before had only existed apart. The quality in his writings which excited the highest admiration of the most intelligent critics among his countrymen in the later critical age, was the Protean versatility with which he adapted his style to every theme, so as to furnish the most perfect examples of every order and kind of eloquence. They, who understood and felt the beauty of his compositions in a degree beyond the reach of the most learned foreigner, were aware that, with all their enthusiasm of delight, they could but faintly conceive the impression which that which they read must have produced on those who heard it animated by the voice and action of the orator, when he was addressing himself to real interests and passions.\* This, however, is a subject on which it would be foreign to our present purpose to enlarge. We will only observe that Demosthenes, like Pericles, never willingly appeared before his audience with any but the ripest fruits of his private studies, though he was quite capable of speaking on the impulse of the moment in a manner worthy of his reputation; that he continued to the end of his career to cultivate his art with unabated diligence, and that even in the midst of public business, his habits were known to be those of a severe student.

With so many claims to admiration on this side, he has left, we will not say an ambiguous, but a disputed character.† It would, indeed, have been surprising had the case been otherwise, with a man whose whole life was passed in the midst of the most violent political storms and the most furious party strife. His efforts to defend the liberties of Athens and of Greece against a foreign king have earned him still more virulent attacks in modern times than he experienced from the sycophants of his own day, or from his personal enemies. The extreme scantiness of our information as to his private history, and, indeed, as to the public events of his time, must always render it impossible distinctly to refute the imputations which have been thrown upon his moral worth: all that can be said in his defence is, that, so far as can be now ascertained, not one of them

\* Plut., Dem., 11, from Demosthenes himself, on the testimony of Demetrius Phalereus.

† Dionysius, De Adm., vi. dic., in Demosth., 22.

‡ See, on these reports, Krüger, *Leben des Thukydides*, p. 81, 82. Cicero, indeed, Orat. 9, when he asks, *Quis unquam Græcorum rhetoram a Thucydide quidquam duxit?* seems never to have heard of them. But at least Demosthenes might have learned as much for the purpose of his art from Thucydides as from Isocrates.

\* Dionysius, De Adm., vi. dic., in Demosth., 22.

† We need hardly observe that Quintilian's *æqui malum virum accipimus*, xii., 1, 14, as appears from the writer's annexed remark, implies no more than this, though it shows that, as usual, the scandal which Quintilian disbelieved was most eagerly read, and, of course, most frequently repeated.

rests upon any better foundation than partial statements or doubtful surmises; while whatever we know with certainty of his public life is good, and often great. That he was free from faults no one can suppose: his character was human; it was that of a Greek and an Athenian, in a corrupt and turbulent age, and in a difficult and trying station. It must not be compared with any purer models of virtue than the most illustrious statesmen of his country. From such a comparison, according to the view which he himself professed to take of his public conduct and his political aims, he had no need to shrink: for many of them had been more successful, but none in an undertaking so glorious as that in which he failed. Most of the graver charges which have been brought against him are intimately connected with his public history; and our opinion of the man must be mainly regulated by the judgment we form of him as a statesman. If he truly represented the great object of his life to be that of preserving Greece from foreign domination, and if the means by which he strove to accomplish this purpose were to husband the resources, to rouse the energies, and exalt the character of the Athenians, his own will stand in little need of an apology. This, however, is a question which it would be premature now to enter on, and which the history must decide. For the same reason, we shall not here attempt to exhibit the portraits of any of the men who became celebrated either as his coadjutors or his adversaries, but shall resume the narrative from which we have been digressing.

In the course of the preceding year Demosthenes had exhibited his powers in an oration which he delivered himself, in a public cause which excited great interest, as it was instituted for the repeal of a law lately enacted on the proposal of one Leptines, by which all exemptions from the expensive services technically termed *liturgies*, that had been granted to deserving citizens, or other benefactors of the commonwealth, were abolished, all such grants were declared illegal for the future, and even to solicit them for the people was forbidden under a most severe penalty. On this occasion Demosthenes appeared as the advocate of Ctesippus, the son of Chabrias, who was one of the principal parties to the cause, and deeply concerned in the issue, as the heir—a very worthy one—of his father's privileges. Demosthenes undertook his part chiefly, it seems, out of regard for his family, but not without a decided opinion on the inexpediency of the law which he opposed. It had been recommended by Leptines as a measure of relief to the citizens who were burdened with the charge of the public amusements; for the exemptions in question did not extend to the trierarchy, or to the war taxes. To Demosthenes it appeared that the purpose might be more equitably, honourably, and usefully answered by a fairer distribution of the burden; and, in the room of the sweeping abolition of former grants, he proposed an inquiry into the claims of those who enjoyed them. The law was repealed. We do not know whether the proposal of Demosthenes—which would probably have disclosed many abuses—was adopted; but the speech, which is an admirable specimen of his oratory, must have

raised him high in public estimation, and have inspired him with confidence to take a part in the debates of the assembly.

The oration, however, on the question of the Persian war, shows that he was much less intent on making a display of eloquence than on offering useful advice. It is calm, simple, grave, statesman-like, indicating the outlines of the policy which he ever after continued to recommend. He points out the danger to which Athens would expose herself if, relying on uncertain rumours, she should rush into a war in which Persia might be able to combine the other maritime Greek states against her. But he urges the necessity that she should immediately place herself in a strong defensive posture, not more against the attack with which she had been threatened than against those which might be made on her from other quarters which were avowedly hostile. It is a little surprising that, though this is the general purpose of the speech, the name of Philip does not once occur in it, and it contains no distinct allusion to the war with Macedonia. We may infer from this silence that Philip's proceedings, though they had provoked the resentment of the Athenians, had not yet excited any alarm even in Demosthenes. It is likewise remarkable that he speaks of Thebes, though the popular prejudice had never been more violent against her at Athens than at this period, in an extremely mild, respectful, conciliating tone. But he does not confine himself, like Isocrates, to vague general advice: the contrast between the practical statesman and the wordy rhetorician is strongly illustrated in the one's speech and the other's pamphlet, which were produced at so short an interval of time, under similar circumstances, and with views apparently not discordant. Demosthenes proposes a specific, well-digested plan, which would enable the commonwealth to equip her fleets with the least possible delay, and, if necessary, to raise her naval force to 300 galleys. Into the details of this scheme we need not enter. It was an attempt to remedy one of the crying evils of the existing system, which will be mentioned hereafter. We are not informed whether it was adopted; but the proposal of war with Persia was rejected.

The occupation which the Social War gave to the Athenians seems to have prevented them from taking advantage of the cession of the Chersonesus: after that war was ended, the losses which they had suffered in it must have rendered them the more desirous of extracting all the profit they could from their newly-acquired territory. Accordingly, in the course of the next year a body of cleruchial colonists was sent to establish themselves there. The ancient claims of Athens to the Chersonesus may have been thought to justify this measure, notwithstanding the apparent contravention of the terms on which the revived confederacy had been based: as the public necessities overruled every other consideration of policy. Not only, however, did Cardia remain independent, but Seastus refused to submit, and Chares was ordered to reduce it to obedience. He besieged and took the town; and—it appears without any instructions, but probably to gratify the resentment which it had provoked by a long course of hostility, as well as to make more



room for the Athenian settlers—he put to death all the males, and sold the women and children. A renewal of the ancient ferocity which had contributed to the downfall of the commonwealth in its most palmy state, peculiarly ill-timed when it had been so lately weakened by an unsuccessful struggle, and was still engaged in one with a most formidable enemy.

Philip seems to have kept aloof from the Social War; it enabled him, perhaps, to effect his conquests in Thrace with less interruption than he might otherwise have experienced; but after the reduction of Potidæa he remained, as we have observed, for a time apparently inactive, or wholly occupied with the internal affairs of his kingdom. There can, however, be little doubt that during this pause in his military enterprises his attention was earnestly fixed on the events which were taking place in Greece; and it was probably because he anticipated the opportunity which they would afford him for interference that he abstained from all movements which might either employ his forces, or might draw the eyes of the Greeks towards himself. Nevertheless, he did not neglect an opportunity which offered itself, in the course of the same year in which Demosthenes delivered his first public oration (354), for gaining a footing in the immediate neighbourhood of Attica, such as might for the present attract little notice, but yet might prove very useful to him in his future undertakings. The occasion was presented by the troubled state of Eubœa. Chalcis and Eretria, each under the rule of one of its own citizens, still, it would seem, retained their ancient rivalry. At Chalcis a dynasty had been established by Mnesarchus, and was maintained after his death by his sons Callias and Taurosthenes; at Eretria Themison had been succeeded—whether immediately or otherwise we are not informed—by Plutarchus. Both Mnesarchus and Themison had manifested hostility to Athens; and their successors were probably not more amicably disposed towards her. Callias endeavoured to strengthen himself by alliance with Philip, who sent a small body of troops to aid him in his quarrel with the tyrant of Eretria,\* or to extend his dominion in the island. Plutarchus was thus led to apply to Athens for protection; and the succours which his enemies had received from Macedonia may have excited a jealousy there favourable to his interest, and it seems that he had also powerful friends there to plead his cause. Yet Demosthenes declared himself against the proposition of sending an expedition to his assistance, thinking it more politic to let the feuds of the island take their natural course than to engage in a war which held out little prospect of advantage to counterbalance the expense and the danger.† He did not consider Plutarchus as a desirable or trustworthy ally; and seems either to have thought that the manner in which Philip had interfered did not deserve much notice, or to have apprehended that the proposed intervention of Athens might lead to a struggle with him for the possession of Eubœa, in which the risk would be all on her side, the gain on his.

Demosthenes, however, stood almost alone

in his opposition to the war, and only irritated the partisans of Plutarchus by the attempt. One of the foremost among them was a person named Meidias, a man of great wealth and influence, and of abilities sufficient at least to enable him to take a part in public business. He was united to Plutarchus by the bonds of friendship and hospitality, and had been for several years an open enemy of Demosthenes, from a quarrel which appears to have grown out of his suit with his guardians. We have intimations that at this period party violence ran very high at Athens. Frequent mention is made of a murder committed by one Aristarchus, apparently from political motives; and Meidias attempted to involve Demosthenes, who was connected with Aristarchus, in the same charge. We may also gather from several facts stated by Demosthenes, that while, in the administration of public affairs, the spirit of democracy was levelling the few barriers of law and custom by which it had hitherto been restrained, abuses were tolerated by which a large share of power was thrown into the hands of an oligarchical faction. We formerly noticed, as a remarkable indication of the character and aims of the individual, the license assumed by Alcibiades in his intercourse with his fellow-citizens during the early part of his life. That was a singular case, in which an extraordinary measure of popular favour was abused by an extraordinary man. But that Meidias, a person every way, except in wealth, below all comparison with Alcibiades, should have ventured on similar excesses, as he appears to have done, can scarcely be explained except by the reliance which he placed on the strength of his party. Demosthenes, who appears at all times to have distinguished himself by the liberality of his contributions both to the amusements of his fellow-citizens and the service of the state, had voluntarily undertaken to act as *choragus*—to furnish a chorus—for his tribe, at one of the Dionysiac festivals. While he was discharging this office, Meidias, who had previously offered him several gross insults of a more private nature, struck him openly in the theatre in the presence of the assembled people, and tore the rich vestment which was one of the ensigns of his official character. The fact could not be denied; and as the person of a choragus, during the performance of his functions, was sacred, it exposed the offender to the penalties of sacrilege. Demosthenes immediately commenced a prosecution against Meidias, and composed a speech for the occasion, which has been preserved, though it was not delivered, and did not receive his finishing touches; for he was induced to drop the proceedings before they came to the trial, and to accept a sum by way of compromise, so small that it could hardly be viewed as anything more than an acknowledgment of the injury. The conduct of Demosthenes in this transaction—which, however, it must be observed, was much less repugnant to the Greek ideas of honour than to those of chivalrous times—cannot be ascribed either to avarice or to forbearance, which was wholly foreign to his character. It would seem, therefore, to have been the effect of fear inspired by the party which supported Meidias. But we do not know enough of the circumstances to pronounce how

\* Æschines, Ctes., § 87. Plutarch, Phoc., 12.

† Demosthenes, De Pac., § 5.

far it may have deserved the reproach of pusillanimity. It certainly appears to confirm the suspicion which is suggested by other passages in his life, that he was naturally timid, and bold only by an effort of reflection, or under the impulse of strong feelings.

The event of the measures which he opposed seems to prove the wisdom of his counsels. An expedition was decreed, and placed under the command of Phocion, perhaps the ablest general yet remaining to the republic. He was joined in Eubœa by Plutarchus; but he suffered himself to be drawn into a perilous position near Tamynæ, where his army, if defeated, must have been entirely destroyed, or compelled to surrender; and here he was attacked by Callias with, it seems, a greatly superior force. He, however, extricated himself from this danger by his skill and presence of mind, and gained the victory in a hard-fought battle. But the conduct of Plutarchus, whose rashness nearly ruined his allies, seems to have excited a suspicion, which, however, can hardly have been well founded, that he had acted in collusion with the enemy. After the victory, indeed, it is possible that his views may have undergone a change, and he may have betrayed an alienation from the interest of the Athenians, which they would consider as treachery. The fact is, that henceforth Phocion treated him as an enemy, expelled him from Eretria, and made himself master of Zareta, a fortress in a central position between the eastern and western coasts. If we believe what Plutarch adds, that he dismissed the prisoners who fell into his hands there, through fear that the people might be induced by the orators to put them to death, we must suppose a state of excitement at Athens, for which, unless it was produced by indignation against a perfidious ally, we cannot account. After the expulsion of Plutarchus popular government was restored at Eretria;\* and perhaps the Athenian interest was at first predominant. But it was not long before Philip's partisans began to show themselves there; nor was the power of Athens completely established in the rest of the island. Phocion, indeed, left it seemingly in a tranquil state; but his successor Molossus, who probably wanted his prudence and moderation, was engaged in fresh hostilities, and conducted them so ill as to fall into the enemy's hands.†

We have neglected chronological arrangement in this part of our narrative, in order that the history of much more important events, which were at this time agitating Greece, and which took their rise some years earlier, may be carried forward without interruption. The principal of these events was a war which broke out in 357, or 356, between Thebes and Phocis, and became one of the most memorable in ancient history, under the name of the Sacred War, the second to which that epithet had been applied. With this were connected movements in Thessaly, which opened a passage for Philip into the heart of Greece, and at length made him the master of her destiny.

The main causes of this Sacred War are more clearly ascertained than its immediate occasion. Animosity had long been rankling between Thebes and Phocis under a show of

peace and amity. The Phocians had openly preferred the alliance of Sparta and Athens as long as they dared, came over to the Theban side with evident reluctance, as much as possible withheld active co-operation, and took advantage of the letter of the treaty to refuse it in the campaign which ended with the battle of Mantinea. That refusal probably excited resentful feelings, which were only restrained by the expectation of a favourable opportunity; but they appear to have been aggravated by subsequent injuries. The price which Thebes had paid for her doubtful victory in the loss of her greatest general and statesman must have revived the spirit of all her enemies; and it seems to have encouraged the subject Bœotian towns to attempt a revolt, and the Phocians to come to their aid: for such is the most probable interpretation of Justin's statement, that the charge against the Phocians, which gave rise to the war, was that they had ravaged Bœotia.\* And it is possible that the step with which the Thebans began the fatal struggle was prompted less by revenge than by precaution, in the view of disabling the Phocians from thus assailing Thebes on her tenderest side. Had Epaminondas still guided their counsels, they would scarcely have resorted to such an expedient. As it was, they seem to have hoped to obtain all the advantages of a successful war without bloodshed or risk.

It was long since the name of the Amphictyonic Council had been connected with any important events; but it still retained its existence as a venerable shadow,† and continued to celebrate its periodical meetings with harmless solemnity, and perhaps to issue decrees for the regulation of matters relating to the temple of Delphi, not devoid of interest for the little tribes which, politically insignificant, commanded a great majority of votes in its deliberations. After the decline of the Spartan power, they appear generally to have submitted to the guidance of Thebes, with which several of them were united by their common hatred of their neighbours, the Phocians. The Thebans had already made use of their ascendancy to obtain a sentence which condemned Sparta to a penalty for the seizure of the Cadmea. We do not know under what pretext the council took cognizance of this offence, which, though a foul breach of faith, was not otherwise connected with religion; and we might, therefore, be led to suspect that it grounded its claim of jurisdiction in this case merely on the sounding title which it sometimes assumed, of a national congress.‡ We may, perhaps, infer from Xenophon's silence, that these proceedings were not instituted before the death of Epaminondas, who would probably have disdained this kind of revenge.§ It may have seemed a good ex-

\* viii., i.

† *Ἡ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀκτὴ*, Demosth., *De Fac.*, ad fin.

‡ *Τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνέδριον* it calls itself in the decree cited by Demosthenes, *De Cor.*, § 198.

§ This supposition is likewise at least perfectly consistent with the language of Diodorus, xvi., 23, *Δοκεῖται μὲν οὖν τὸν Δευκρυίδην πόλεμον καὶ καταπόλεμον θέντων*. Platche's remark, i., p. 131, that the Thebans, by means of this sentence, "gained another voice on their side, and vented their hatred in a way in which they could not have vented it by arms," seems much more applicable to the period after the battle of Mantinea than to the war in which they wreaked such terrible vengeance on Sparta.

\* Demosthenes, *Phil.*, iii., § 66.

† Plut., *Phoc.*, 14.

pedient for taming the obstinacy of Sparta, when she refused to acknowledge the independence of Messenia, and suffered herself on that account to be excluded from the general peace. She paid no regard to the sentence, which, after the battle of Mantinea, there was none to enforce; but it seems to have suggested the thought that a like engine might be pointed with more effect against the Phocians. They had laid themselves open to a charge of sacrilege, having taken into cultivation a portion of the fruitful plain, which had been doomed by the decree of the Amphictyons, in the first Sacred War, to lie forever waste. Such, at least, is the account of Diodorus, which is confirmed by what we learn of the quarrels between the Phocians and their Locrian neighbours on boundary questions, coupled with the subsequent conduct of the Locrians of Amphissa.\* Thebes did not put herself forward, but probably instigated some of the Thessalian members of the council to prosecute the Phocians for this offence, and they were condemned to pay a very heavy fine.† As the delinquents did not obey the judgment, the council, probably at its next meeting, followed it up by a fresh decree, which declared that, unless the fine was paid, the refractory people should forfeit their territory to the god whom they defrauded of his due. The language used seems to have amounted to a threat of reducing the Phocians to the condition of Penests or Helots, only subject, not to private masters, but to the temple, or the government of Delphi, long, as we have seen, the bitter enemy of Phocis. Such a sentence was clearly prompted by the state which could alone have thought itself able to carry it into execution; and, under the same influence, a clause was added to it, which threatened Sparta, if she persisted in her contumacy, with a like penalty.

If Thebes was the author of these proceedings, no farther explanation is needed to account for them; nor can it be necessary to suppose that she was impelled by any other motive than the prospect of reducing the Phocians to submission, and preventing them from interfering in the affairs of Bœotia. Yet there were contemporary politicians who charged the Thebans with a deeper and more iniquitous design: that of seizing Delphi and plundering the sa-

cred treasury. We have no means of judging whether there was any ground for this charge, nor, indeed, whether it had so much as a real suspicion to rest upon, and was anything more than a calumnious fabrication of their enemies.\* But the fiction itself, if it was nothing more, seems to indicate that such an event could not have excited much surprise; and, indeed, many things had happened which might have served to prepare the minds of the Greeks for it. Delphi itself, it is true, had never been directly threatened, except by the Persians, since the barbarous ages to which tradition referred the attempts of the Phlegyæ, and other impious enemies of the Delphic god.† But it was in a period of great refinement, yet before superstition had lost any considerable part of its influence, that Hecateus advised his countrymen to apply the treasures of the same god at Branchidæ to their use in their contest with the Persians. On the eve of the Peloponnesian war, we have seen that a similar proposal was made concerning those of Olympia and Delphi in a congress at Sparta by the Corinthian deputies, though disguised under the pretext of a loan. Still more recently, after the foundations of religion and morality had been shaken by the speculations of the sophists, and by the crimes, convulsions, and calamities of half a century, Jason was so strongly suspected of sacrilegious designs against the Delphic treasury that, perhaps in the hope of deterring him, the oracle was consulted on the subject, and the god was made to answer, as of old, that he would take care of his own.‡ A party in Arcadia, with the tacit sanction of Thebes, had actually laid violent hands on the Olympic treasury. After such precedents, it required no extraordinary sagacity to foresee that the riches of Delphi would not long be protected by the sanctity of the place, if those who were able to seize them should ever be tempted to the sacrilege by any urgent occasion.

Such an occasion had now arisen. The Phocians, threatened by the Amphictyonic decree, and by the powerful enemies who were eager to execute it, saw the need of a vigorous effort,

\* Pausanias, iii., 9, 9, attributes the origin of the war which recalled Agœilaus from Asia to a boundary feud between the Phocians and the Locrians of Amphissa. Xenophon, on the contrary, names the Locrians of Opus (Hel., iii., 3, 3); and we do not know how Winiewski (p. 45), referring to this passage of Xenophon, can say, "ager ille Cirrhus idem fuisse videtur, de quo continus Locros inter et Phocenses erat controversia, quo Olymp. jan. xvi. anni Thebanis prebuit ad bellum contra Lacedæmonios commovendum," unless he would have the words *τοῖς Ὀρευστοῖς* expunged from Xenophon's text. But they are placed beyond suspicion by the subsequent account of the operations of Gylis (iv., 3, 21), which were clearly directed against the Eastern Locrians; otherwise he would have accompanied Agœilaus to Delphi, which was close to the Ozolian frontier. See vol. i., p. 569. It seems, therefore, that Pausanias must have been mistaken as to this point; and yet his statement that the Phocians had a contest about land with the Locrians of Amphissa may have been very well founded.

† Pausanias's conjecture (p. 125) that the sentence against the Phocians had been passed in much earlier times, and had lain dormant, has nothing to support it; against it we might remark that, if this had been the case, it would probably have been revived sooner: for instance, on the occasion mentioned in the last note.

\* A writer, whose assertions should always be viewed with most suspicion when they profess to be supported by authorities in the margin, observes, "That it (the treasure at Delphi) was now the object of the Theban rulers is asserted equally by Demosthenes, at the head of one party in Athens, and by Isocrates at the head of the opposing party." The margin refers to Demosth., De Legat., p. 317, Isocr. Or. ad Philipp. The reader who is able to consult these passages (that of Isocrates occurs p. 93, b., § 60) in the original language, will find that Demosthenes is not delivering any opinion of his own, but only reporting the language of *Aschines*; and that Isocrates is so far from making the assertion attributed to him, that he says just the reverse, viz., that the Thebans made war with the Phocians, trusting that they should be able to get the better of the treasures of Delphi by their own funds: *ὡς τῶν χρημάτων τῶν τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς περιεσφραγισμένων τοῖς ἐκ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δυνάμεις*. Whether any Latin translation may be accountable for a part of these mistakes, we have not time to inquire. But it is surprising that Flathe also (p. 138) should have cited Isocrates as evidence of the general suspicion, and still more that Schlosser (i., 2, p. 317) should have copied both the erroneous quotations. Pausanias (x., 2, 2) makes Philomelus tell the Phocians, *ὁρίσασθαι, καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος καταραστὴν ἐφίη τις πόλιν, περιεσφραγίσθαι καὶ ἀρσενὶ ὀφθαλμοῖς δυνάμει χρημάτων*. We take this opportunity of warning the reader that he is not to expect any discussion of what Schlosser (i., 2, p. 317) justly calls the ridiculous conceit (*den lächerlichen Gedanken*) of the bank at Delphi. A romance, as we find frequent occasion to observe, cannot be refuted.

‡ Xenophon, H., vi. 4, 30.

† Vol. i., p. 65.

and were ready to listen to bold counsellors. A man equal to the emergency seems at this time to have filled a high office in the commonwealth, Philomelus of Ledon, the son of Theotimus. He was probably general, or in some station of equivalent dignity, which our imperfect knowledge of the Phocian constitution does not enable us to ascertain. In a general assembly which was held to deliberate on the state of affairs, he pointed out the injustice of the decree, the enormous disproportion between the penalty and the offence, and urged the necessity of resistance. To render it effectual, he showed that they had only to assert their ancient rights, and take possession of Delphi, where they were entitled to the presidency of the oracle, which would enable them to reverse the proceedings of the Amphictyons. If they would intrust him with the enterprise, he pledged himself to bring it to a prosperous issue. These assurances inspired his hearers with confidence, and he was created commander-in-chief of the national forces, or, if he before held that office, was now invested with new and unlimited authority.

His first step, according to Diodorus, was to proceed to Sparta, and communicate his plans to Archidamus, who, it is said, declined openly to sanction them, but promised all the aid he could give, short of avowed co-operation, and furnished him with an immediate subsidy of fifteen talents. If this account is to be believed, it seems an almost unavoidable inference, that Philomelus had already formed designs which he had not ventured to disclose to his countrymen, but which he so far intimated at Sparta, that Archidamus, notwithstanding their common interest, shrank from the danger of an open alliance with him. But as it is probable that he did not suffer any longer interval than was absolutely necessary to elapse between the announcement of his purpose in the Phocian assembly and the attempt to execute it, we are inclined to suspect that the interview with Archidamus took place before he was raised to the supreme command, and that with the supplies he received, and his private resources, he made preparations which enabled him, as soon as he had obtained the consent of the people, to strike the meditated blow. It certainly fell very suddenly on Delphi, and, if it had been expected, might, it seems, have been easily warded off; for it was with no more than 1000 Phocian peltasts, and perhaps an equal number of mercenary troops, that he marched to surprise the city of Apollo; and he appears to have met with no resistance from the mass of the inhabitants, who, it may be supposed from their manner of life, were among the least warlike of the Greeks.\* Only the ruling families, which, apparently through a traditional connexion with the Thracians of Daulis,† bore the name of Thracidæ, relying, perhaps, on the sanctity which they derived from the temple of which they were hereditary guardians, made an impotent struggle, which provoked Philomelus to put them to death. That he ever entertained the thought

of destroying the city, killing the men, and enslaving the women and children, is highly improbable; and little less so the account that he was diverted from this useless atrocity by the intercession of Archidamus.\* We can much more readily believe Diodorus, who represents him as cheering the Delphians with assurances of safety.

The Locrians of Amphissa were first roused by the news, and immediately marched to the deliverance of Delphi, but they were defeated, and forced to retreat with great loss. After the victory Philomelus proceeded to destroy the records of the Amphictyonic judgment against Phocis. At the same time, he publicly declared that he did not intend to rob the temple, but only to reinstate the Phocians, its ancient and legitimate guardians, in their rights. Yet it can scarcely be doubted that, while he was making these professions, he had already begun to touch the sacred treasure, unless it be supposed that the confiscated property of the Thracidæ was sufficient for his immediate wants. He certainly required considerable sums; for he not only continued to enlist fresh mercenaries, whom he invited by the addition of one half to the ordinary pay, but fortified the temple with a new wall. But he seems at least to have resolved not to take more than he found absolutely necessary for self-defence, and to keep even this measure secret as long as he could. It was partly, perhaps, with this view that, having raised his forces to the number of 5000, he invaded and ravaged the Locrian territory. In this expedition the peculiar character of the war began to display itself. The Locrians in some trifling engagement had been left in possession of a few of the enemy's slain; and when the herald came with the usual application for their interment, refused to give them up, alleging that, according to Greek usage, men guilty of sacrilege were not entitled to funeral rites. But Philomelus, having soon after gained a victory, and remaining master of the field, obliged them to consent to an exchange of the dead. He led his army back to Delphi laden with the spoil of Locris, which may for some time have supplied him with the means of paying it at the enemy's expense.

The interval of repose which followed this expedition was spent in active preparations for war, which, however, he conducted so as to show his intention of sparing the temple as long or as much as possible. He was evidently anxious to avert the odium of sacrilege from his cause, and had not yet despaired of escaping it. It may, however, have been less with this view than to quiet the scruples of his own followers that he determined to employ the machinery of the oracle; possibly not much caring whether he gained its authority in his favour, or so shook it in the attempt, as to render it harmless for the future. He compelled the prophetess by threats to mount the tripod, and pronounce a declaration, importing, as we gather from Diodorus, that all his proceedings were agreeable to the will of the god, and encouraging him to persevere, or, as his enemies, perhaps, expressed it in derision, to do as he would. The oracle was no doubt couched in more decent terms; and he published it with great solemnity in an

\* See Athenæus, iv., 74.

† Schloesser, i., 2, p. 216, ridicules this opinion, which was not recommended to him by the character of the work in which he found it. But it has been lately defended and illustrated by Huellmann, *Wuerdigung des Delphischen Orakels*, Bonn., 1837, p. 5.

\* Paus., iii., 10, 4.

assembly which, though chiefly composed of his soldiers and partisans, was probably open to all the Greeks then present at Delphi, and may have been meant to represent an Amphictyonic *ecclesia*.<sup>\*</sup> Propitious omens likewise were not wanting, nor kept secret.<sup>†</sup> But with these appeals to superstition he coupled other less ambiguous expedients for increasing the moral strength of his cause. He sent envoys, carefully chosen from among his friends, to all the principal states of Greece, Thebes itself not excepted, to defend his conduct. They were instructed to declare that he had only taken possession of Delphi to do justice to Phocis; that he had no intention of spoiling the temple; that he was ready to produce an inventory of all its treasures, minutely describing their number and weight, and to give an account before all Greece of his custody of them. In the mean while he proceeded to levy fresh troops, and, to meet his growing expenses without a breach of his recent declaration, or, at least, to save appearances, and at the same time to punish his bitterest enemies, he laid heavy contributions on the wealthy Delphians. The Locrians, who had hitherto received no assistance, still thought themselves able to cope with him, and renewed their invasion. Another obstinate battle was fought near Delphi, in which they were completely routed;‡ and now despairing of the success of their solitary efforts, sent ambassadors to Thebes to implore succours in the name of the god.

The reception which the envoys of Philomelus met with was, of course, determined by the previous wishes and interests of the states to which they addressed themselves. But his moderation and fair professions encouraged those who were favourable to him to declare themselves without reserve. At Athens and at Sparta he was readily accepted as an ally; but at Thebes it is probable that his ministers could scarcely obtain an audience, and they were certainly dismissed with hostile threats. Yet it seems as if the imputation of sacrilege was not thought sufficient to excite the popular indignation to the proper pitch, and that a story was spread at Thebes of an outrage committed by some Phocian on the person of a Theban lady.§ The request of the Locrians was eagerly granted; and Thebes now came forward as the principal party to the contest, and herself sent envoys to Thessaly to rouse not only the Thessalians, but all the little tribes in that quarter which had a voice in the council, to arm for the holy war. All obeyed the summons; and they alone, probably, among the belligerents were animated by some degree of religious zeal; though with most of them the Phocians, not the enemies of the god, were the real object of hatred. Thus, Philomelus saw almost

the whole of northern Greece leagued against him; his enemies surrounded him on all sides, and were urged to the utmost exertions by the strongest motives of interest, passion, and prejudice, while from his allies he could look for little assistance. Athens, weakened by her Social War, and intent on different aims, was not disposed to engage very actively in a cause of ominous aspect, and not immediately touching her interests. Sparta could not but view the cause as her own; but, with Messene and Megalopolis at her side, could promise little, and might be disabled from stirring at all. There were, indeed, some other Peloponnesian states which wished well to the enemies of Thebes; but no expectations of important succours could be safely founded on their friendly dispositions.

Thus, then, the time had come when one help alone remained to save the Phocians from destruction. They had need of a powerful army to face the confederacy formed against them, and they had no means of raising or maintaining one, unless the god lent them his treasures, as he had already granted them his sanction. Philomelus now threw off all disguise. It was, indeed, necessary for his purpose that it should be generally known that he possessed the power of enriching all who might enter his service, and that he would no longer shrink from using it. As soon as it became notorious that the temple treasure was the fund from which his soldiers were to draw their pay, adventurers flocked to his standard from every part of Greece. That they were men of a worse character than any others of the same class, may be considered as a hostile exaggeration;\* yet it is credible enough that the large pay by which they were attracted, and the cause in which they fought, concurred to promote a more than ordinary degree of licentiousness among them. Having thus raised his forces to upward of 10,000, Philomelus again invaded Locris, where the enemy had already been joined by a body of Theban troops. Notwithstanding the excellence of the Theban cavalry, he defeated them in a combat of horse, and gained another victory after they had been re-enforced by 6000 men from Thessaly. He himself soon afterward received a re-enforcement of 1500 Achæans; but the arrival of a fresh army—according to Diodorus, 13,000 strong—from Boeotia, compelled him, it seems, to take up a position where he remained for a time on the defensive.

While the two armies were encamped here at no great distance from each other, the character of the war displayed itself in deeds more atrocious than either party had hitherto ventured on. The Thebans, confident in their strength, but perhaps not so much to gratify their hatred as to intimidate the enemy, and to deter others from entering into the Phocian service, brought out some mercenaries whom they had taken in foraging excursions, and, having made a proclamation that the Amphictyons condemned them to death as abettors of sacrilege, massacred them all in cold blood in the presence, it seems, of both armies. The soldiers of Philomelus were, as might have been expected, not dismayed, but violently ex-

\* Which bore the same relation to the *συμπλοκή* as that of a *δῆμος* to its *βουλή*. † Diodorus, xvi., 27.

‡ Flathe, l., p. 143, brings a charge of *savage cruelty* against Philomelus, which has no other ground than a misconception of the meaning of Diodorus, xvi., 28. Diodorus clearly means, not, as Flathe supposes, that Philomelus put his prisoners to death, but that many of the Locrians in their flight were driven—as Philomelus himself afterward was—over the precipices near the field of battle. Flathe has confounded the two chapters in Diodorus, 25 and 28, and represents this imaginary cruelty of Philomelus as a retaliation for the denial of sepulture to his troops.

§ Duriis in Athenæus, xiii., 10. The accompanying parallels do not speak much for the truth of the story.

\* Diodorus, xvi., 30.

asperated by this cruelty, and demanded vengeance for the blood of their comrades. Retaliation was absolutely necessary for his own safety. The mercenaries exerted their utmost efforts to collect as many prisoners as they could; and Philomelus led them all out to public execution, according to the example set by the Thebans. This measure did not, of course, tend to allay the mutual animosity, but it prevented the repetition of the crime which had been perpetrated in the name of religion. We have no connected account of the military operations which ensued, and cannot determine the object of the movements by which the two armies were again brought into each other's presence near the town of Neon or Tithorea, which lay at the foot of a precipice in one of the upper valleys of Parnassus.\* The meeting is said to have been unexpected; we might conjecture that Philomelus was taking the mountain road for the purpose of invading Boeotia, while it was left unguarded. The enemy was far superior in numbers, and the engagement, which followed without any previous arrangement, ended in the defeat of the Phocians. Philomelus himself, after having fought with desperate valour, and received a number of wounds, was hurried along, it is said, in the general rout among the mountain crags, and perished. According to Diodorus, he found his flight stopped by a precipice, and threw himself over its edge. Pausanias† gives a more marvellous colour to the event; as if, by a preternatural instinct, he had sought the very kind of death which, by ancient custom, and by the decree of the Amphictyonic council, was the appointed penalty of sacrilege;‡ and we find this view of the subject still more distinctly expressed in another tradition, that the rock on which he stood rolled down and crushed him with its ruins.§ Perhaps Justin's simpler statement, that he died fighting in the thickest of the battle, may be not less deserving of credit.

Philomelus, it is said, was the eldest of three brothers; and Onomarchus, one of the younger, commanded a division of the Phocian army. It seems not to have taken so active a part in the battle as that which was immediately under Philomelus; he effected a safe retreat, and collected many of the fugitives. The victory was not so decided as to encourage the Thebans

to attempt the recovery of Delphi; and they returned home to await the effect which the loss of Philomelus might produce on the enemy's counsels.\* Onomarchus led his army back to Delphi, and immediately called an assembly to deliberate on the state of affairs. A division, which had probably existed for some time before among the Phocians, but had been suppressed by the authority of Philomelus, now came openly into light. There was a party strongly desirous of peace; willing, perhaps, to purchase it by any concessions not inconsistent with the national honour and independence, and averse to the war, not merely through fear of a disastrous issue, but on account of its peculiar character, and of the consequences which were to be apprehended even from the most favourable event. There were no doubt many who were struck with religious scruples by the spoliation of the temple, and who thought, at least, that nothing could justify it but the most urgent necessity. But there were, perhaps, still more who were jealous of the power which the war, if successfully conducted, was likely to place in the hands of a single family, and contemplated with alarm the prospect of a dynasty resting on the support of a greedy and licentious foreign soldiery. On the other hand, the house of Philomelus was strong in its hereditary and newly acquired influence, and in the cause itself, for it still preserved the aspect of a just and noble resistance to oppression; and whoever else might hope for safety in submission, the leaders in such a contest had no choice between their perilous eminence and a ruinous fall. The popular feeling was probably with Onomarchus; his adherents prevailed, and he was elected to fill the place of the deceased autocrat.

In military and political talents, in prudence and energy, he seems to have been not inferior to Philomelus. But he wanted the moderation and self-command which, even through the shade of adverse statements, may be clearly traced in the conduct of his predecessor. Philomelus was ready to sacrifice all that others held sacred to the interest of the state, perhaps to that of his own ambition. But Onomarchus was addicted to vicious pleasures, and reckless as to the means of indulging in them; and he appears, from the first, to have regarded the treasures of the temple as a patrimony which he might spend as he would, and as a mine which he needed not fear ever to exhaust. The common metals of the sacred offerings furnished arms; the gold and silver not only pay for his troops, but presents, with which he endeavoured to gain partisans, to conciliate enemies, and to quicken the zeal of his friends throughout Greece, and with which he did not scruple to reward the ministers of his sensual enjoyments. It was probably from him that Chares at one time received a sum, it is said, of sixty talents, with which he gave a feast to the people in honour of some not very important advantage gained over a body of Philip's troops:† an ex-

\* Paus., x., 32, 9.

† x., 2, 4.

‡ Elian, xi., 5, calls it Delphic law; but from Paus., v., 417, we may perhaps infer a more general usage.

§ Philo, in Wesseling's note to Diodorus, xvi., 31.

¶ We have adopted this statement on the authority of Diodorus, xvi., 36, 61; but we cannot help expressing surprise at the unhesitating assent it has received from, we believe, every modern writer who has had occasion to mention it. Flatie alone is silent; whether from doubt, does not appear. It is, at least, very strange that Diodorus should mention the relation between Onomarchus and Philomelus for the first time in this incidental way, and have said nothing of it before, when the name of Onomarchus was first introduced to the reader (xvi., 31); and equally strange that Pausanias is silent about it, though he takes care to mention that Phayllus was the brother of Onomarchus, as does Diodorus in the proper place, that is, on the earliest occasion (xvi., 30). A slip of the pen of such a nature would not be surprising in Diodorus. If Onomarchus was not the brother of Philomelus, he may have been the son of Euthykrates mentioned by Aristotle, Pol., v., 3, 3, whose quarrel with Mnaseas gave rise to the Sacred War; which Wesselingh (i., 2, p. 374, n. 47) denies, only because Onomarchus the general was a son of Theotimus, citing Pausanias, x., 2, 1, where the parentage of Philomelus alone is mentioned.

\* Flatie, i., p. 147, thinks it evident that the cause which prevented the Thebans from making use of their victory was that the Thessalians were called away to serve against the tyrants of Phere, and that they were probably followed by many of the northern allies. But this is surely too much to assume without authority.

† Theopompus in Athenæus, xiv., 43, from a book *κατὰ τὸν ἐκ Δελφῶν ἐσθλοτέρων χρημάτων*. There is nothing in it

ample which may serve to illustrate the rate at which the Delphic treasures were lavished. At the same time, his domestic administration assumed a more despotic character than his predecessor's. Philomelus had treated the Delphians with great rigour; but they were enemies, who had only submitted to force, and their property might seem less sacred than that of the temple: Onomarchus ventured to arrest the principal Phocians of the opposite party, to put them to death, and confiscate their estates, whether with or without the forms of a trial, matters little. Considered even as the work of a faction, still, under the direction of such a chief, it amounted to little less than an act of military despotism under a thin disguise. The profusion, however, with which he lavished his gold, answered his immediate ends. It enabled him to recruit his army, and probably to increase it; so that, after the retreat and separation of the confederates, he was able to fall upon them singly at a great advantage. He invaded both the western and the eastern Locrians, extorted humiliating concessions from those of Amphissa, and took Thronium, one of the Epicnemidian towns, and reduced its population to slavery: Doris, too, and its little townships, he laid waste with fire and sword. He then advanced into Bœotia, and made himself master of Orchomenus, now, perhaps, inhabited by a Theban colony. He next undertook the siege of Chæronea, but was compelled to raise it by the approach of a Theban army, and to retire with some loss into Phocis.

It was at this juncture that a new party entered into the contest. Philip's eye had, no doubt, been fixed on it from the beginning; and he must soon have perceived that it was likely to afford him an opportunity of acquiring an influence in Greece such as none of his predecessors had possessed or aspired to. It was so evenly balanced, that he might throw a decisive weight into either scale. But it was first necessary that he should be brought nearer to the scene of action, from which he was separated by Thessaly; and it happened, through a singularly opportune combination of events, that, at the very time when it was most important to him to gain an entrance into that country, the way was opened for him by the state of its affairs. He had previously done all that rested with himself for this end, having removed the last obstacle that lay between him and the Thessalian frontier. This was the town of Methone, which had long shown a very hostile spirit, and afforded a shelter to his enemies, which enabled them to annoy him greatly. He laid siege to it, perhaps so early as the spring of 353, but the inhabitants made so vigorous a defence as to occupy him for the greater part of a year; and it seems he had not yet made himself master of the place, when the events occurred which called for his presence in Thessaly. It was, perhaps, a consequence of the eagerness with which he now urged the attack,

that he needlessly exposed himself to danger, and received a wound from an arrow which deprived him of an eye.\* Not long after, the place surrendered at discretion. A weaker prince might have been irritated by its long resistance and his personal hurt. Philip did not lose his self-command, and in his treatment of the besieged took a course equally removed from imprudent lenity and from the appearance of cruelty. According to the Greek usages of war, it was an instance of praiseworthy moderation, that he spared their lives—all but that of Aster, the archer who had aimed at him with deadly purpose—and permitted them to depart. The town he abandoned to pillage, and then razed it to the ground, and gave the land to a Macedonian colony.

Thus the road to Thessaly was cleared, and it seems to have been almost immediately afterward that he began his march southward, on an expedition undertaken at the request of the northern Thessalians, the old enemies of the dynasty of Phæræ, who had besought his aid. The tyrant Alexander, after having made himself an object of general dread and hatred to his subjects and to foreigners, by his cruelties and piracies, at last wearied out the patience, or excited the fears, of his wife Thebe, a daughter of the celebrated Jason. She had three half brothers, named Tisiphonus, Lycophron, and Pitholaus, whose lives, as well as her own, her husband is said to have threatened. She was a woman of masculine spirit; and one night, having secured his sword while he slept, and removed the fierce dog which usually guarded his chamber, she introduced the three brothers, whom she was forced to urge to the deed by threatening to alarm the tyrant, and stood by while they despatched him. His corpse was cast into the street and treated with the utmost contumely; but the Phæreans appear to have made no attempt to free themselves from monarchical government. Thebe gained the officers of his mercenary troops by threats and promises, and induced them to acknowledge the authority of Tisiphonus, whom she guided with her counsels, or exercised her power under his name.† But his reign lasted not long. Towards the end of 353, we find Lycophron at the head of affairs, and hear no farther mention of Thebe. It seems that the new dynasty soon became, if not so wantonly cruel, yet as arbitrary, and almost as oppressive, as that which it supplanted. We do not know whether it had given any new provocation to the Aleuads and its other enemies, or whether, after the death of Alexander, who must have possessed some abilities with his fearful energy of character, they conceived hopes of a more prosperous issue in a struggle with his successors; but, at the juncture we have mentioned, when the Sacred War had begun to take a turn very unfavourable to their allies, they invited Philip to espouse their cause against Phæræ. Phæræ

the passage to mark the date, and not the slightest reason for referring it to the period of the Olynthian war, in which the Phocians had but a remote interest. It seems most probable that it belongs to the time of Philip's first invasion of Thessaly, when we know Charæ was commanding against him. Westermann (*De orationum Olynthiacarum ordine*, p. 37) supposes the victory to have been gained by Charæ when Philip was repulsed from Thermopylae.

\* The story in Plutarch, *Par.*, 8, is not only fiction, but nonsense. Timotheus once said (*Plut.*, *Apophth.*), when he heard a general boasting of a wound before the people, I took shame to myself when a bolt from a catapult fell near me at the siege of Samos. As to Philip's imprudent bravery, see Isocrates, *Ep.* ii. § 3, Polyænus, *ix.*, 2, 15. Leland's remark on the strength of Methone (*Life of Philip*, i., p. 214) is one of the passages which beguile the reading of a not very interesting book.

† Canon, 54.

had not taken any part in the Sacred War with the rest of Thessaly, perhaps had already entered into alliance with the Phocians; and it is not improbable that the fear of this confederacy between their domestic enemy and the new power which was becoming so formidable, may have been the motive that induced the Aleuads to address themselves to Philip, whom they might otherwise have justly considered as a very dangerous auxiliary.\*

This conjecture is confirmed by the subsequent events. As soon as Philip entered Thessaly, Lycophron, it is said, sent for succours to Phocia, which seems to imply a previous compact for mutual aid. Onomarchus ordered his younger brother Phayllus to join him with a body of 7000: a proof that the Phocian army had been greatly increased since the death of Philomelus. Philip, however, defeated Phayllus, and compelled him to retreat from Thessaly, and then made himself master of the important town of Pegasæ, the seaport of Phæræ. This conquest, which cut off the tyrant's communication with the sea, rendered his situation alarming; and Onomarchus thought his alliance so valuable as a counterpoise to the hostility of the other Thessalians, that he determined to bring all his forces to his relief. Philip, who, it seems, had received little support from his Thessalian allies, found himself very inferior in numbers to the enemy. He did not, however, shrink from an engagement, but fought two battles, the first, of course, with no decided result; but in the second, the victory was so clearly on the side of Onomarchus, that the king was with difficulty able to effect his retreat into Macedonia.† Onomarchus did not attempt to avail himself of his success for any farther enterprises in Thessaly, but, leaving Lycophron to recover Pegasæ, and humble the Aleuads as he could, again carried the war into Bœotia. A victory which he obtained over the Thebans enabled him to reduce Coronea, or induced it to open its gates to him; but not long after he was called away by the intelligence that Philip had re-entered Thessaly with a more numerous army, and was preparing to renew his attack upon Lycophron, and immediately advanced to meet him, now at the head of 20,000 men. Philip had not only recruited his forces in his own kingdom, but on his return to Thessaly had urged his allies to more vigorous exertions in the common cause; and they had so far complied with his demands, that he could bring into the field 20,000 infantry, and 3000 Thessalian cavalry. Now too, perhaps, he thought it expedient more distinctly to assume the character of a champion of religion, and made his soldiers wear wreaths of laurel,‡ plucked, per-

haps, from the hallowed groves of Tempe, to mark that they were going to fight for the god.

Onomarchus, equally strong in infantry, had only 500 horse, probably of inferior quality. If the loss of the battle which ensued was not the consequence of this deficiency, it probably rendered the defeat more decisive, and more disastrous to the vanquished. The Phocians were completely routed, and as the field of battle was not far from the coast—probably of the Pagasæan Gulf—off which Chares was cruising with an Athenian squadron, they mostly fled towards the shore, and many of those who reached it cast away their arms and attempted to swim to the friendly vessels. Six thousand were slain, or perished in the waters; and 3000 were taken. Onomarchus himself was among the dead; but his body, though he too is said to have plunged into the sea, fell into the enemy's hands. Philip ordered it to be fastened to a cross, and, if we may believe Diodorus, caused all his prisoners to be drowned, as guilty of sacrilege. But though it would be likely enough that his Thessalian allies might have instigated him to such an atrocity, which was sanctioned by the decree of the Amphictyons, and by the example of the Thebans, as it is not evident that policy required it, and there was in his case neither passion nor superstition to prompt it, we cannot but suspect that the story may have arisen out of a misunderstanding, by which the fate of the prisoners was confounded with that of the fugitives who were driven into the sea.\*

By this victory, Philip had made himself master of Thessaly. Lycophron and Pitholaus surrendered their capital to him, but stipulated for leave to depart, and retired with 2000 mercenaries, to join their allies in Phocia. Philip wished to be considered as a liberator; and he restored popular, or, at least, republican government at Phæræ;† but he kept possession of Pegasæ and took Magnesia, which had also belonged to the tyrants, and occupied it with a garrison. After having thus settled the affairs of Thessaly, he began his march southward, apparently with the design of overpowering the remnant of the Phocian forces, and putting an end to the war. But in the mean while, the Athenians had been roused by the exigency, and prepared to meet it with unusual alertness. The squadron under Chares, which was lying off the coast near the field of battle, had probably been sent to protect Pegasæ, but had arrived too late. It would carry the news of Philip's victory to Athens, and there was every reason to expect that he would speedily advance to dictate terms of peace to the Athenians and their allies. To avert this danger, an armament was promptly equipped and despatched to the Malian Gulf; and when Philip reached Thermopylæ, he found the pass strongly guarded. It is possible that he might have been able to force it, and that it was not fear of the Athenians that hindered him from making the attempt. But there is some reason to doubt that he was desirous of making an immediate end of the war. Had he been earnestly intent on this object, he would probably have followed

\* Several modern writers, and among them—which is surprising—Flathe, i., p. 115, have been misled by the expressions of Diodorus, xvi., 14, into the belief that Philip entered Thessaly on this invitation in the year 357. But it is clear from numerous passages of Demosthenes that he never invaded Thessaly before the capture of Methone in 353; and it is evident that Diodorus, in the passage which has been understood as an account of an earlier expedition, is only giving a general view of the course of events in Thessaly, and does not mean to confine it to the year of Alexander's death.

† It is perhaps to the last of these battles that we should refer the narrative of Polyænus, ii., 38, 2, where Philip is made to say, I did not fly, but fell back like the battering rams, to give a more violent shock another time.

‡ Justin viii., 2.

\* It would be a mistake just like that of Flathe's, mentioned in a preceding note, p. 95.

† Diodorus, xvi., 38, ἡ πόλις τῆς Διοφύλειαν ἀνέσχετο.



up his victory with more rapidity. A struggle that was wasting the strength of Greece was not at all adverse to his interests: it was, perhaps, only at the request of the Thessalians that he had made the movement which the Athenians anticipated; and he may have been secretly well pleased to find a fair pretext for desisting from it. At Athens, however, the result of the expedition to Thermopylæ was regarded as a happy deliverance and a glorious triumph. It in some measure consoled the people for the losses and insults which they had suffered not long before in several quarters, where they could least have apprehended an attack from him. He had either fitted out a naval force of his own, or having, by the capture of Pagasæ, become master of that with which Alexander had so much annoyed the Athenians, he likewise turned it against them. His galleys invaded Lemnos and Imbrus; and among the spoil, carried away several of the inhabitants. They also captured a number of Athenian merchant vessels, richly laden, off Geræstus, in Eubœa; and a little later ventured to appear in the bay of Marathon, and made a prize of the Paralus, which was lying there.\*

In the mean while, the Phocians had time to repair their losses; and, as the sacred treasury was still rich, for they did not want the means, Phayllus, the surviving brother of the ruling house, had probably conducted the wreck of the defeated army home; and he was appointed, it seems without opposition, to succeed Onomarchus. He immediately began to make fresh levies, and, though he found himself obliged to raise the pay of his troops to double the usual rate, collected a large body of mercenaries. He also called upon his allies for assistance; and as his applications were seconded by a lavish distribution of money or presents, not in vain. In the profusion both of his public and his personal expenditure, he seems to have surpassed his predecessor. Sparta sent 1000 men; 2000 came from Achaia; but Athens furnished the most liberal succours: an army of 5000 infantry and 400 horse under the command of Nausicles. It was probably not pure anxiety for the safety of the Phocians, who, after Philip's retreat, were no longer in imminent danger, that impelled the Athenians to this effort; nor need we suppose that it was suggested by venal orators, though Phayllus may have had some in his pay; but it was manifestly desirable to maintain such a body of troops at the expense of the Phocians. Phayllus soon found himself in a condition to invade Bœotia; and though Diodorus describes him as defeated by the Thebans in three successive battles, it is remarkable that the account given of them proves that he was not only able to remain in Bœotia, but to keep advancing towards Thebes; for the first took place near Orchomenus, the second on the banks of the Cephissus, the third near Coronea. It would seem as if the Thebans had only succeeded so far as to protect their own land from invasion; for we next find Phayllus, not retreating homeward, as might have been expected, but marching into the Epicnemidian Locris, where he is said to have made himself master of all the towns ex-

cept Naryx, which he besieged. Bribery may have contributed to the rapidity of these conquests, as Naryx had nearly been betrayed to him. Diodorus is very confused in his description of the rest of the campaign; but we may perhaps collect from it that the Thebans made an inroad into Phocis, and having thus drawn him with his main force away from Naryx, marched upon it to raise the siege. But his activity disconcerted their plans; he suddenly appeared again before the place, defeated their army, and then stormed the town, which he razed to the ground. If his habit of body was sickly, the fatigue of these marches and counter-marches may have hastened his death: he was carried off in the course of the same year by a disease in which his enemies discerned the finger of Heaven.\* His office seems scarcely to have been considered any longer as elective; it passed, as by inheritance, to Phalaesus, a son of Onomarchus,† who was still so young as to need a guardian; and Mnaseas, to whose care he was committed by Phayllus, prosecuted the war as his lieutenant. But he was soon after killed in one of the night combats which at this stage of the war seem to have become very frequent; and his ward then, notwithstanding his youth, took the command in person.

Before Philip's intervention had begun to alarm them for their own safety, the Athenians had not felt any deep interest in the Sacred War. They looked on without expectation of any positive advantage from it, unless it might be the acquisition of Ôropus, and were only anxious that the Thebans might not prevail. Sparta both felt a livelier sympathy for the Phocians, and was more immediately interested in the contest, not only by her fears, but by her hopes. It opened a prospect for her of recovering her ascendancy in Peloponnesus, and of demolishing the barriers within which she had been confined by Epaminondas. Little credit, therefore, seems due to a story which was among the scandalous anecdotes collected by Theopompus concerning the Sacred War, that Archidamus had been induced to give his countenance to the Phocians by presents made to himself and his queen Dinicha. He, at least, discerned the interest of Sparta too clearly to need such an impulse. If the Thebans were occupied at home, or if she was supported by her northern allies, she might still hope to reduce, first Megalopolis, and then Messene. Both these new stations depended mainly on Theban protection. The population of the Arcadian city was composed, as we have seen, of very diverse elements, which had been brought together partly by a temporary political excitement, and partly by force. There was a party, not inconsiderable in number and influence, which earnestly desired to dissolve the community, and to be restored to the ancient seats, where the wealthier class had probably enjoyed more independence and a larger share of power. Soon after the battle of Mantinea this party had openly declared itself. The terms of the treaty were capable of a construction favourable to its wishes,

\* Νόσος φθινάδι, Diodorus, xvi., 38; φθορῶν νόσος, Pausanias, x., 2, 6.

† According to Diodorus, xvi., 38, whose authority on this point seems preferable to that of Pausanias, x., 2, 7, who calls him the son of Phayllus: this was the more natural error.

\* Demosthenes, i., Phil., § 35, 39. Compare Strabo, ix., p. 437.

and a great number quitted the town to settle again in their native cantons. The rest would not consent to this migration, and attempted to bring them back by force. The malecontents implored the protection of the Mantineans, and of the other Peloponnesians who had sided with them in the late war; and the Megalopolitans were obliged to call upon Thebes for aid. The Thebans sent Pammenes, with 3000 foot and 300 horse, to support them.\* It must have been the name of Thebes, still formidable in Peloponnesus, which enabled him with so small a force to overcome all resistance. He laid waste some of the refractory townships, to strike terror into the rest, and finally compelled the seceders to return to the capital.

Sparta, it seems, kept aloof from the struggle: a sign of conscious weakness; for she was principally concerned in the result. But when the Sacred War began to take a turn unfavourable to Thebes, she bent her arms against Megalopolis, and, not finding her own strength sufficient, called on Athens for assistance. The principle now put forward to gain the concurrence of the Athenians was, a general recognition of ancient rights. Elis was to recover the part of Triphylia which she claimed: Phlius, the fortress of Tricaranum. On the same ground, Athens would be entitled to Oropus; and Sparta tendered her aid towards the attainment of this much-coveted object of Athenian policy. Then it was represented that the same principle required the restoration of Thespiæ and Platea, which Athens no less ardently desired, as the surest means of permanently humbling and curbing Thebes. But the farther consequences of the proposal, the dissolution of Megalopolis and the reduction of Messene, as they were the points which Sparta had solely in her own view, she appears to have kept as much as possible out of sight.

The Megalopolitans, notwithstanding their connexion with Thebes, ventured to send envoys to Athens to oppose this application, and to solicit the Athenians to espouse their cause. Demosthenes on this occasion delivered a speech which has been preserved, and is interesting, as exhibiting the view which he took at this time of Grecian politics. He argues the question on the simple ground of expediency, but his calculations are entirely formed on the ancient state of things, only a little modified by the passing events of the Sacred War: it seems as if the power of Macedonia was not at all taken into the account. He, at the outset, lays down the principle that the interest of Athens required that both Sparta and Thebes should be weak.† The situation of Thebes was, at this juncture, very critical, and the general belief in Greece appears to have been that she would

sink in the struggle she was carrying on.\* On the other hand, if Sparta succeeded against Megalopolis, she would find it less difficult to reduce Messene; and this addition to her strength, when that of Thebes was impaired, would destroy the balance which Athens must wish to preserve. On these grounds, the orator supported the proposal of alliance with Megalopolis.

It seems that it was not carried; but neither was any help given to Sparta. After the defeat of Onomarchus, however, the Thebans were able to send a body of 4500 infantry and 500 horse to the aid of the Megalopolitans, who were likewise joined by all the forces of Argos, Sicyon, and Messene. The Spartans also received a re-enforcement from Phocis of 3000 foot and 150 of the Thessalian cavalry, who had followed Lycophron and Pitholaus from Phæræ. The two parties were now so evenly balanced that, after two campaigns, in which several battles were fought—though, it seems, with little bloodshed—the Spartans consented to a truce with Megalopolis, and the tranquillity of Peloponnesus was for a time restored.

Philip was probably the less inclined to put an end to the Sacred War, as he had plans in his mind which would be the more easily executed the more the attention of the Athenians was occupied near home. It was quite sufficient for his purpose to have gained a sure footing in Greece, with a pretext for interference which he might use at his pleasure. There he aimed at nothing more than political ascendancy and control; his views of conquest were all directed towards the north and the eastern coasts of the Ægean; and he had probably begun already to look beyond to still more dazzling prospects. Before his expedition to Thessaly his amicable relations with Olynthus had ceased, and she had concluded an alliance with Athens. The cause of this change in her policy is not mentioned by the extant authors: to say that it was an effect of the predominance of a new party explains nothing. We may, indeed, safely attribute it to jealousy of Philip, for which there were ample grounds: but there must have been some special occasion; and we have some inducements to conjecture that this was no other than a conquest which he had made in Chalcidice, which might well appear to indicate designs threatening the independence of the other towns, and, notwithstanding his professions, that of Olynthus herself. We do not know the precise time when he made himself master of Apollonia, but the fact is mentioned in a manner which indicates that it took place at no long interval from the capture of Methone;† and the fall of so important a town, which it will be remembered, had resisted Olynthus at the height of her power, justified the gloomiest apprehensions, which Philip, it seems, took no pains to remove. He had no longer the same motives for conciliating the Olynthians, and, perhaps, was not loth to come to an open rupture with them.

They, however, were not now the immediate object of his attention. The state of affairs in Thrace held out an opportunity to him of gaining a footing there, as he had just done in The-

\* According to the received reading of Diodorus, xv., 94, it was not the Thebans, but the Athenians, who sent Pammenes to Megalopolis. But it seems absolutely necessary to substitute *Θεβαίους* for *Ἀθηναίους*, unless we ascribe the error to Diodorus himself. Wesseling observes, "*Demostor Demosthenem, Or. de Megalopoliti., nihil horum attingere. Occasione certe quidem accomodata erat.*" Well indeed might he wonder exceedingly: and he might have added, that the whole tenour of the oration is inconsistent with the supposition that Megalopolis had ever received such succours from Athens, or applied to her for help before. When we farther consider the name of Pammenes—the celebrated Theban general—hardly any doubt can remain on the point.  
† Pro Megalop., § 6, *δὲ* *δὲ* *δὲ*. In Aristotle, § 126, the same sentiment is expressed by the terms *μη* *λεχέειν*.

\* § 36, *ἡ δὲ ἀντιπαράστασις τοῦ Θεβαίου καὶ οὐδὲν ἴσως.*

† Dem., iii., Phil., § 34. *Οὐκ ἔστιν ἂν καὶ Μαθώνιον καὶ Ἀπολλωνίαν καὶ τὴν ἐν Ὀλυνθῷ πόλιν καὶ Ὀλυνθὸν αὐτὴν.*

saly, perhaps of extending his dominions to the Hellespont, where he might assail Athens in a vital point, and afterward open a road to greater enterprises. After the cession of the Chersonesus, Cersobleptes had for a time continued on good terms with the Athenians, and even obsequiously courted them; kept in awe, as Demosthenes represents,\* by the presence of their forces in the Hellespont, where, it seems, they had a squadron always stationed during the Social War, perhaps also foreseeing that an occasion might arise in which he might need their favour. Such an occasion arose not long after the end of the war, and perhaps about the same time that they sent their colony to the Chersonesus. Berisades, one of the rival princes, died, leaving his children under the guardianship of Athenodorus. This event rekindled the ambition of Cersobleptes, and gave him hopes of enlarging his territory at the expense of the orphans. Athenodorus was faithful to his trust, but, as he was an Athenian citizen, he might be expected to pay deference to the will of the people, if it should be strongly declared on the side of Cersobleptes. Charidemus, as well as his master, had endeavoured to ingratiate himself with the Athenians, and appears to have formed a party among the orators, through whom he prepossessed the people with a high opinion of his talents and influence, so as to induce a general belief that he was the man best able to cope with Philip, and to recover Amphipolis, still the object of their anxious regret. He had already received the Athenian franchise, and had been honoured with a crown and other marks of popular favour. The expedient now devised for the professed purpose of attaching him more closely to the Athenian interests, was to pass a decree declaring his person inviolable, and making any one who should kill him amenable to justice from every state in alliance with Athens. The decree was moved by one Aristocrates, and carried, but was afterward subjected to revision by an impeachment brought against him as the author of an illegal measure; and the prosecutor, an obscure person, was furnished by Demosthenes with one of his most elaborate orations. It no doubt expresses the view which the advocate himself took of the question as affecting the public interest. We do not learn from it what reasons Aristocrates had assigned for the extraordinary safeguard which he proposed to throw round the person of Charidemus; but we collect that it had been represented partly as the reward of his past services, and partly as the price of others which might be expected from him. We have already seen the main facts by which Demosthenes proved that Charidemus was a worthless and dangerous adventurer; he pointed out with great acuteness the objections to which the decree was liable on the ground of law and justice; but the main question, in his view, was the effect which it was likely to produce on the Athenian interests in Thrace. He contends that it was meant to intimidate Athenodorus, and the other generals who were serving the rivals of Cersobleptes, and would probably, if confirmed, overpower all opposition, and put him in possession of the whole kingdom of Cotys; in that case the Athenians, who owed

the Chersonesus to his weakness, might speedily lose it again.

We are hardly able to appreciate the force of the political argument, or to judge of the real tendency of the measure. But the speech incidentally mentions a fact, which would alone be sufficient to account for the hostility of Demosthenes to Cersobleptes and his minister. Philip, it seems, on some former occasion, probably in the course of the year before the decree was passed, had advanced with his army into Thrace as far as Maronea, and here was met by an agent of Cersobleptes with overtures of alliance, the purpose of which, according to Demosthenes, was a combined attack on the Chersonesus, and would have been carried into effect if Amadocus, whose territory Philip would have had to cross, had not refused to give him passage. There is also an obscure allusion to a similar negotiation, which had been carried on at the same time with Pammenes, the Theban general, who was then serving in Asia under Artabazus against the Persian king.\* These would, indeed, have been substantial grounds for withholding confidence from Cersobleptes and Charidemus. Yet they indicated that Philip's intervention might soon render it necessary for Athens to take some decided part in the contest between the Thracian princes. And this occasion arrived very soon after, hastened perhaps by the issue of the trial, on which depended the validity of the decree, and all the measures connected with it. We are not, indeed, expressly informed what the issue was; but facts which will be hereafter mentioned render it nearly certain that Demosthenes failed, that the decree was confirmed, and the alliance between Cersobleptes and Athens cemented by a new bond. It was, perhaps, a consequence of this decree that Amadocus, seeing the Athenians pledged to the support of his rival, threw himself upon the protection of Macedonia,† and that Philip henceforth became the declared enemy of Cersobleptes. Soon after his return from Thessaly, he set out on an expedition to Thrace, which is one of the most obscure passages in his history. It is only from some very vague oratorical allusions we are able to collect that, though his design of invading the Chersonesus was sufficiently manifested to alarm the Athenian colonists, he for some time found occupation for his arms in the interior,‡ where he penetrated, perhaps, to such a distance from the coast that no certain intelligence of his movements could be procured at Athens; and various rumours were spread, humouring the people's wishes, sometimes of his death, sometimes of his illness. An expedition which threatened the most valuable of the state's foreign possessions seemed only to furnish matter for idle talk.

\* Aristocr., § 219. Diodorus, xvi., 34.

† Theopompus in Harpocration, 'Αμαδοκός: from which we learn that Amadocus, Philip's ally against Cersobleptes, was the son of another Amadocus; but which of them it was that succeeded Cotys, does not appear. The one mentioned by Demosthenes may have died about the time of Philip's expedition, related in the text, and have left a son of the same name, otherwise he cannot have been a son of Cotys.

‡ Demosthenes, Olynth., i., § 13, τοὺς μὲν ἑλθεῖν, τοὺς δὲ καταστῆναι τῶν βασιλέων. This can hardly refer to the war with Cersobleptes. Isocrates, however, Philip, § 23, also says, ἀνέστη τῆς Θράκης οὗτος ἡβουλῆς δεσπότης ἀντιπύριος.

\* Aristocr., § 214.

It was at this juncture, and while the public mind was thus suspended between hope and fear, conscious of a great danger hanging over it, but disinclined steadily to consider the means of averting it, and seeking relief from its anxiety in a forced credulity, that Demosthenes came forward with the first of the orations which, from their exclusive reference to the contest with Philip, received the name of the *Philippics*.\* It marks a great epoch in the orator's life; for it is the first indication of a change which must have taken place not long before in his political views. It seems clear, as we have already intimated, that when he made his speech on the affair of Megalopolis, he had not yet begun to look upon Philip as the one truly formidable enemy of Athens and of Greece. An ambitious, restless, troublesome neighbour, whose encroaching spirit required to be watched and checked, the king must, of course, have appeared to him from the beginning of the transactions relating to Amphipolis. But that the power of Macedonia was the element of prime moment in the Greek political system, that Philip could never endanger the freedom of the nation, that the struggle between him and Athens was not for power or honour merely, but for life, was a conviction which probably never entered his mind until Philip began to take a part in the Sacred War. Nor can we charge him with any lack of political sagacity on this account, when we reflect how small were the beginnings of Philip's greatness, and how short a time had elapsed since Macedonia had been little more than a province of Olynthus. This has not always been duly considered by those who, taught by the event, have condemned him as either a fanatic or a traitor, who hurried his country into a contest which could not but terminate in her ruin. But the events which had lately happened had in a great measure opened his eyes to the extent of the danger which now threatened Athens, as they had in fact entirely changed Philip's position with respect to Greece. He had become master of Thessaly; it could hardly be questioned that he held the scales in the war between Thebes and Phocis; he had a fleet which was already able to annoy and insult Athens, and he was now engaged in an expedition which, if it succeeded, might not only deprive her of the Chersonesus, but establish his sway in the countries on which she mainly depended for the means of subsistence. Demosthenes saw all this, like many other men; and he also looked round him, and observed the resources, and the spirit which Athens possessed for self-defence; his merit was, that he neither shut his eyes to the danger, nor viewed it with indifference, nor submitted to it in passive despair; but set himself manfully to face it, and to wrestle with it.

This it was that distinguished him not only from the selfish and time-serving orators of his

day, but also from men of equal integrity with himself, but who were deficient in this kind of courage. There may have been others of this class among the political adversaries of Demosthenes, but the only one whose character has been transmitted to us in broad and clear outlines, and with features which cannot be mistaken, is Phocion. Phocion rose, it seems, from a rank in society somewhat lower than that to which Demosthenes belonged. The trade which his father followed was accounted so mean, that Plutarch thought it incredible that the son of such a person could have received so liberal an education as Phocion undoubtedly enjoyed. But neither poverty nor low birth would have prevented him either from seeking or gaining admittance to the school of Plato, where his character, naturally simple, candid, and upright, yet mild and benevolent, was formed by philosophical reflection to a more austere and rigid virtue. From the lessons of the Academy, however, he derived not only principles of conduct for his own guidance, but likewise views of society, which, though they did not deter him, like his master, from engaging in active life, inspired him with a deep contempt for the age, the people, and the institutions, in which his destiny had fixed his sphere of action. There was no doubt much in the character of his contemporaries to provoke such a feeling; but there was something too much like pride and peevishness in the manner in which he displayed it. His public deportment was marked by a stern and inflexible gravity, which was never known to be relaxed either into smiles or tears. This repulsive exterior—especially as it concealed a kind and generous heart—was perhaps a privilege of philosophy; as was the extraordinary simplicity of his manner of living, in which he adopted the habits of Socrates. More questionable appears the prudence of the sarcastic bitterness with which he on all occasions expressed his scorn of the multitude. An oracle, it is said, warned the people against a man who alone was opposed to the whole city; Phocion claimed the honour of such singularity for himself. When one of his proposals was received with unusual approbation, he turned round to his friends, and asked whether he had let anything escape him that was wrong. In his speeches he carefully avoided all rhetorical embellishments, which he had learned from Plato to consider as a kind of flattery unworthy of an honest man, and studied a sententious brevity, which, however, was so enlivened with wit and humour, as often to make a deeper impression than the most elaborate periods. It was even observed by one of his adversaries, that Demosthenes was the best orator, but Phocion the most powerful speaker. And Demosthenes himself, it is said, trembled for the effect of his own eloquence when Phocion rose after him, and would whisper to his friends, Here comes the hatchet to my speech.

Yet, with all this sharpness of language and roughness of manner, Phocion, against his will, was a favourite with the people, which he despised, and in return for his professions of disdain received the most solid proofs of its esteem. He possessed considerable military talents, which he had cultivated by the side of his friend Chabrias; and though he never solicited any public employments, in a period when the

\* It has been justly observed, that "through the celebrity of these speeches their title of *Philippic* became a common term for orations abounding in acrimonious invective." But it would have been no more than candid to add, that the original *Philippics* abound in no such matter; that Philip's personal character is but very sparingly alluded to in them; and that the tone in which he is mentioned is mild, not only as compared with Cicero's against Antony, but with that of Theopompus in his description of Philip's court and character.

higher offices of the state were more than ever coveted, and often purchased by bribery, he was forty-four times elected general. In the assembly, too, as we have seen, he obtained more than a patient hearing, and on the strength of his personal reputation could say many things with safety, which would hardly have been tolerated from any other man. A tribute, it must be admitted, to virtue, which was, unhappily, rare; but one, surely, which proves that the men who paid it were not absolutely worthless or hopeless. Yet this was the supposition on which Phocion throughout his life regulated his political conduct. He did not, indeed, withdraw from the service of his country; he discharged his duties assigned to him uprightly and zealously; he conciliated the allies of Athens by mild and just treatment; the counsels which he gave to the people were the pure dictates of his sincere convictions, and designed to promote its welfare. But he early despaired of the commonwealth: he did not think it capable or worthy of any great effort: he connived at the grossest and most pernicious abuses at home, and gave the sanction of his name to their authors and advocates, because reform could effect no permanent good: amid the evils with which Greece was afflicted and threatened, he saw no better course than to sit quiet and wait for the flood, and patiently to bow the head to it when it came. And thus the austere philosopher, the incorruptible patriot, became the associate of the most profligate and venal demagogues and parasites, of a Eubulus and a Demades, and the submissive subject, and even the willing tool, of a foreign master.

The first Philippic was the effusion of a different spirit, the language of a man who would not lose all without a struggle, who thought the liberty and honour of Athens still well worth a vigorous effort to save them, and hoped that his fellow-citizens might be roused by the emergency to exertions worthy of the cause. He was not blind to their degeneracy; but he thought it possible that the impulse which forced them into an unwonted course of action might produce a salutary effect on their moral constitution, and might give them strength and energy to shake off some of the worst abuses of their political system. The speech contains a plan calculated not only to meet the impending danger, but to check Philip's attempts against their foreign possessions for the future. The people needed encouragement, that it might not make its despondency a pretext for inertness; it perhaps still more needed to be convinced, that without a vigorous change of measures it ought not to cherish hope. The orator dispenses consolation and reproof with masterly skill. He reminds his hearers that not many years had gone by since Sparta was as formidable as Philip had become; but they had not quailed under her superior power; they had ventured to resist it, and had overcome. Still more recently, Philip was the weaker party, and, surrounded as he was by enemies, might well have shrunk from a contest with Athens. Courage and activity had enabled him to aggrandize himself with possessions wrested from her grasp; but there was no divinity about his greatness to exempt him from the common vicissitudes of human affairs. If, indeed, they had already put forth

all their strength, made use of all their means of resistance, they would have had cause for dejection; but they might cheer themselves with the remembrance of their past errors, if they would only henceforth adopt a wiser course. It was their tardiness and negligence that had made Philip powerful; and as long as they remained passive, he would continue to encroach. Unless they would bestir themselves, fortune could do nothing for them. Even if the news, which they caught so greedily, of Philip's death, should prove true, it would avail them nothing; another Philip would start up in his place. Even if an opportunity offered itself of recovering Amphipolis (as they hoped to do with the aid of Charidemus), they would be unable to profit by it.

He then proceeds to unfold his plan, and to point out the particular defects in their system of warfare, to which he ascribed their past reverses. The fault had been not so much that they had done little, as that they had done nothing at the right time. They had always been talking when they should have been acting, and only began to move when the season for action was past. Like unskilful boxers, it was only after they had received a blow that they made a stroke at the quarter from which it came. They had always followed the enemy's movements, and at a distance which rendered it impossible to counteract them. The expeditions which they had sent to the relief of the places attacked by Philip had all arrived too late. Why, but because their preparations for the defence of the state were so much worse regulated than those by which they provided for the celebration of the festivals, on which such enormous sums were spent. There every man knew his place and his part beforehand, and therefore all was executed with unfailing exactness; but when an expedition was decreed, there were questions to be discussed, disputes to be settled, ways and means to be found, and the preparations were never completed until the object was lost. The remedy which he proposes is, that an armament of fifty galleys should be kept in constant readiness for sailing, together with horse-transports, and that the citizens should be compelled by law to man them in a certain order, whenever their services might be required. This was one part of his plan; the other was, that a small squadron should be constantly stationed at some point near the coast of Macedonia, as well for the purpose of annoying the enemy by sudden descents, as to protect the Athenian shipping from attacks such as it had lately suffered. He desires no more than ten galleys and 2000 soldiers, with 200 cavalry, for this service; but then he insists, as on the most important head of his project, that one fourth of the men should be Athenian citizens. The force he proposed would, he was aware, appear contemptibly small, after the great armaments which the orators were used to talk of, but it was as large as the state of their finances could then support, and not too small to answer its end. But the main point was that the citizens should not shrink, as they had been used to do, from military duty, but should begin again, in part at least, to fight their own battles; and that the military officers who were elected every year should be able to find fitter employment than the superintendence of a civic procession

or a religious ceremony. Unless every army they employed included a body of Athenian troops, however small might be its proportion to the whole, they could have no security for the conduct of the soldiers they paid, or of any general, though a citizen, that they could appoint. The mercenaries would still plunder their allies instead of seeking the enemy; and, if their pay was not regularly furnished, would engage in a more profitable service, and—as had happened in the case of Chares towards the end of the Social War—would force their commander along with them.

This was the argument which was likely to be most felt by his hearers; but the orator's principal aim in both parts of his plan was, perhaps, to break the habits of indolence and luxury which were fostered by the exclusive employment of mercenary forces, and gradually to inure his fellow-citizens to military service. He speaks as a young counsellor who is obliged delicately to insinuate advice which he knows to be unpleasant, and cautiously to feel his way. Hence, perhaps, rather than because means were deficient, the inconsiderable amount of the standing force which he proposed to raise; and yet he takes care to add that he means the time of service for the citizens should be short. On another very important subject—the waste of the public money in shows and feasts—he is still more guarded. The contrast, indeed, which he points out between the order and efficacy of the preparations for the amusement of the idle, and the confusion and delay of those which were made for the safety of the state, must have excited a feeling of shame; and when, after having mentioned the poverty of the treasury, he spoke of the great resources of the people, the seeming contradiction could scarcely fail to suggest the question, How were those resources employed? But this was very dangerous ground. According to the ancient law, the whole surplus of the yearly revenue left after the necessary expenses of the civil administration had been defrayed, was in war time appropriated to the defence of the commonwealth, or carried into what was called the Military Fund. But the men who were charged with the administration of the fund destined for the public amusements, and whose interest it was to augment it as much as possible, had by degrees, it seems, induced the people to divert all that could be spared from the other branches of expenditure into this, until at length the Theoricon swallowed up the whole surplus, and the supplies needed for the purposes of war were left to depend on extraordinary contributions. But it was reserved for the demagogue Eubulus to perpetuate this abuse, which not only drained the resources of the state, but retarded all its military movements, and was a main cause of that frequent waste of precious opportunities which Demosthenes deplored. He was the author of a law which made it a capital offence to propose that the Theoric fund should be applied to the war service, or converted into a military fund. This expression was probably chosen to give a colour to the measure, as if it was designed to guard against an innovation, instead of establishing one of the most pernicious tendency. Not long before the first Philippic was delivered, when Philip's enterprises

against Lemnos and Imbros had excited alarm and indignation at Athens, one Apollodorus, a member of the Five Hundred, had carried a decree empowering the people to determine whether the surplus revenue should be thrown into the Military or the Theoric fund.\* The proposition was so guarded as to secure him from the capital punishment denounced by the law of Eubulus; but he was impeached and fined as the author of an illegal decree,† which, of course, became void. The subject, therefore, was one which required to be approached with the utmost caution; and Demosthenes did as much as prudence permitted when he so clearly intimated his opinion and wishes.

We cannot speak with certainty of the immediate effect produced by his oration. The obscurity which was hanging over Philip's movements may have served as a welcome pretext for delay. But news which came from the north towards the end of 352 roused the people into a mood for vigorous efforts. Philip, it was ascertained, had laid siege to a fortress called Hereum, on the Propontis, not far from Perinthus, on the side of Byzantium. We can only judge of its importance from the alarm which the intelligence is said to have excited at Athens. It appears to have been held by an Athenian garrison; but it is not clear whether it was of moment chiefly as a factory for commercial intercourse with the interior of Thrace, or on account of its vicinity to Perinthus, which may have been involved in its danger.‡ Under the first impulse of its feelings, the people decreed an armament of forty galleys for the relief of the place, a general levy of the serviceable citizens under five-and-forty to embark in the expedition, and an extraordinary war-impost of sixty talents. The command, it seems, was assigned to the same Charidemus who, as we have seen, had been taken under the peculiar protection of Athens by the decree of Aristocrates, which Demosthenes had fruitlessly opposed. It appears that this adventurer wished to combine the authority of an Athenian general with that which he possessed as the chief counsellor of Cersobleptes; or, beginning to apprehend danger from Philip's hostility to the Thracian prince, desired to secure a retreat for himself in the favour and confidence of the Athenian people. This may suffice to explain his presence at Athens at this juncture, without any conjecture as to the particular business on which he had come. The preparations, however, for the execution of the vigorous measure that had been decreed proceeded slowly as usual, the more as the season was unfavourable; and, before much progress had been made, fresh tidings came, which for a time entirely suspended them. A report was again spread, first of Philip's death, then of his illness. There may have been some foundation both for this and for the earlier rumours of the same kind. The king's health may have suffered from a wound or a neglected disorder, which more than once might confine him to his bed, and interrupt his military operations. Whether, how-

\* In *Nesm.*, § 7.

† But Boeckh has committed an oversight (ii., 7) in the statement that Apollodorus was actually fined fifteen talents; this was the prosecutor's estimation of the penalty; the court reduced it to one.

‡ See *Vossii*, *Proleg.* in *Philol.* i., § 29.

ever, he was thus compelled to abandon the siege of Heræum, or made himself master of the place while the Athenians were waiting for fresh news, so that the object was lost before the preparations for the expedition were renewed, is doubtful. It is only certain that the spring and summer of 351 were allowed to pass without any attempt to counteract Philip's enterprises in Thrace, and, as far as we know, in total inaction, except that a body of troops appears to have been sent under Nausicles for the protection of Imbros. It was not until the latter end of September that Charidemus set sail for the Hellespont. Not, however, with forty galleys, but with ten; not with an Athenian force, but with orders to collect mercenaries; and yet, not with sixty talents, but with five. Possibly the title and the power were what he most coveted; and he may not have regretted the absence of the Athenian citizens, which left him at perfect liberty to act as he would.

Still it may be inferred, from the scantiness of these supplies, that the Athenian possessions in the north were no longer considered in immediate danger; and, in fact, during the next two years Philip's history is a mere blank, which we can neither fill up nor satisfactorily explain. It is scarcely conceivable that the state of his health, which in general was very robust, can have kept him inactive for any great part of this time.\* His Thracian expedition seems, indeed, to have been so far successful that, when he returned to his own dominions, he carried away with him a son of Cersobleptes as a hostage;† but, even if he had accomplished all that he thought immediately desirable in Thrace, it might have been expected that the war with Athens would have given rise to some occurrences deserving a place in history, especially as it appears that the fleet which attended the army on its march homeward was threatened by Chares, who was cruising, with a squadron of twenty galleys, off the coast of Thrace about Neapolis, and was only delivered by a stratagem of Philip.‡ Yet it is not merely the silence of Diodorus that proves he knew of no important events connected with the struggle between Philip and Athens in this period: the fact that, in the course of these two years, Phocion was carrying on a war in Cyprus on behalf of the Persian king points to the same conclusion. It is confirmed by the conduct of Demosthenes himself, recorded in one of his extant speeches, which was delivered in one of these two years. After the death of Mausolus the democratical party at Rhodes had conceived hopes of overthrowing the oligarchy, and, it appears, had applied to Athens for aid.

\* Yet this may seem to be implied in the summary account of his enterprise given by Demosthenes, Ol. i., § 13, *ἐπεὶ δὲ ὅραμεν εἰς τὸ πρῶτον πάλιν βασιλεὺς ἐκείνῳ τῷ βασιλεὺς ἀνέστηναι, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν Ὀλυνθίους ἐπεχείρησεν*. This is at least proof that Philip was confined by a severe and tedious illness.

† *Æsch.*, De F. L., § 86. The words, indeed, might leave it doubtful whether it was on the first or the second embassy that *Æschines* saw the young prince at Philip's court. *Plat.*, p. 303, supposes the second; but, what could have induced the orator to mention the first, if it could only serve to vindicate his conduct, if it was referred to the first embassy, and then it seems to justify the statement in the text.

‡ *Polyænus*, iv., § 22. We know of no other period to which this story can belong. May the presence of Chares in the north of the *Ægean* serve to account for the delay in the sending of Charidemus?

Demosthenes thought it an opportunity, which ought not to be neglected, for restoring the Athenian influence in that island, and seems to have hoped that the example of the democratical Rhodians, if they succeeded, might shake the oligarchical governments of Chios and Lesbos, which were the chief obstacles to the renewal of their alliance with Athens. The principal argument that had been urged on the other side was, that the interference of Athens might involve her in war either with the Persian king—who, it seems, had taken the ruling party in Rhodes under his protection—or with Artemisia, the widow of Mausolus, who now reigned alone in Caria. The orator endeavours to show that Artemisia would probably remain neutral, and that the risk of provoking the king ought not to deter the Athenians; and he is thus led to remark, that there were persons who often affected to treat Philip with contempt, while they represented the Persian as a formidable enemy; so that the people, if it listened to these counsellors, would take no precautions against the one, and make no resistance to any pretensions of the other.

Such a remark could only have been made at a period of comparative repose, when no immediate danger was apprehended from Philip; and though the speech contains no definite plan, yet, as it recommends that the people should vigorously espouse the cause of the Rhodian democracy, it implies that, in the orator's opinion, there was at the time no more pressing occasion for the exertion of its strength. It is not improbable that the state of the Persian empire, which had encouraged the hopes of the democratical Rhodians, was also connected with the long pause which interrupted the course of Philip's enterprises against Athens and Greece. The king was engaged in a war, which he conducted in person, with Egypt and other revolted provinces; and when Demosthenes made his last-mentioned speech the issue of the contest was doubtful, and the Persian throne was commonly supposed to be in great danger.\* That Philip kept his eye attentively fixed on the progress of these important events cannot be questioned; but perhaps he was not a mere spectator, ready to take advantage of any sudden revolution: the shelter which he gave to the rebellious subjects of the Persian king raises a suspicion that he may have been previously in secret correspondence with them. On the other hand, there is some reason to think that his own kingdom was not perfectly tranquil during this period; for we hear of three princes of the royal blood, sons of Amyntas, who had excited his jealousy, so that he put one of them to death, and the two others took refuge in Olynthus.

The shelter which they found there was, according to Justin, the occasion of the war which at length broke out between Philip and the Olynthians, and ended in their destruction. Whether it served him as a pretext we cannot decide; but his attack on Olynthus had probably been long meditated, and the chief difficulty is, as we have just seen, to explain why it was so long delayed. Olynthus, it seems, had renounced her alliance with him before his

\* De Rhod. Lib., § 13, *ἐπὶ τῷ πρῶτῳ βασιλεὺς ἐκείνῳ τῷ βασιλεὺς ἀνέστηναι, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν Ὀλυνθίους ἐπεχείρησεν*.

expedition to Thessaly; and the pains which he had once taken to conciliate her friendship prove that he could not have viewed her hostility or estrangement with indifference. Perhaps, however, during the two years which are left vacant as to actions of his by Diodorus, he was not only making preparations for the execution of his design, but had actually entered upon it, and had begun to encroach upon the territories of the Greek towns near his frontier, yet so that Olynthus, though disquieted, might not think it necessary to interpose. If any farther explanation of his seeking inactivity were needed, it might be found in the state of affairs in Thessaly, which, though it did not yet demand his presence, was such as to afford him frequent occupation, and to require constant vigilance. The Thessalians are represented as a restless, turbulent, fickle people. Those of his party, when they called him in as an ally, did not mean to make him their master. But his conduct, after the expulsion of the tyrants, soon began to awaken their distrust. He continued to occupy Pagasæ, and began to build new fortifications at Magnesia: a strong intimation that he considered it as his own, and had no intention of abandoning it. He likewise continued to receive a large portion of the revenues of the country, which, it appears, had been ceded to him for a time to meet the expenses of the war with Phœræ. These indications of designs inconsistent with the independence of Thessaly appear to have excited uneasiness, which vented itself in murmurs, complaints, and even remonstrances; and he was obliged to pacify his discontented allies with assurances of his honourable intentions as to Magnesia, and with promises of farther aid in the Social War.\*

There was, probably, at Olynthus, as at Athens, a party which dreaded a war with so formidable a neighbour, hoped that it might be averted, and flattered itself with the belief that Philip, who had once shown such disinterested friendship, even now harboured no hostile purpose against the city. This party had, no doubt, opposed the peace with Athens, and had laboured, hitherto with success, to preserve neutrality; for no alliance had yet been concluded with Philip's enemies. We do not even know whether the reception given to his two half-brothers—supposing the fact certain—preceded the open rupture. But in 349 Philip began to manifest his designs in a manner which nothing but wilful blindness could mistake, by an attack on one of the cities of the Chalcidian confederacy, which Olynthus was bound both by honour and interest to defend. Diodorus calls the place Geira, a name otherwise unknown, for which it has been proposed to substitute that of Stageira, Aristotle's birthplace. The place was evidently of some importance; for, when Philip had taken it, and razed it to the ground, the terror inspired by its fate induced several of the neighbouring towns to submit without resistance to the conqueror. This aggression, which, as far as we know, was totally unprovoked, seems to have been considered by the Olynthians as manifestly directed against themselves; and it probably for a time silenced the party which had hitherto advocated neutrality.

An embassy was sent to Athens to propose an alliance, and to request succours. Philip, however, affected indignation at the suspicions of the Olynthians, and sent envoys to vindicate his conduct and exhort them to peace. His object in this step was, perhaps, not so much to deceive the people and prevent the alliance with Athens, as to gain some of the leading men by corruption, and to afford them a colour for openly espousing his cause; and it happened, opportunely for such a purpose, that at this juncture the affairs of Thessaly rendered his presence necessary there. Pitholaus, aided, perhaps, by the discontent which prevailed even among the partisans of Macedonia, had recovered possession of Phœræ. We might almost suspect Philip of having connived at this enterprise, which was in every way most favourable to his interests. To expel the intruder cost him little more than the march: Pitholaus seems to have withdrawn at his approach. But the service thus rendered to Thessaly, the danger which this event proved to be still hanging over it, stifled the murmurs of the Thessalians, gave him a pretext for deferring the execution of his promises, and for extending his encroachments on their liberty, and enabled him to prosecute his designs against Olynthus without fear of interruption from that quarter.

The Olynthian embassy was welcomed at Athens by all who viewed the growth of Philip's power with dread. If out of Greece there was any state that could oppose an effectual barrier to his progress, it was supposed to be Olynthus, once the mistress of a great part of his kingdom, still strong in herself, and at the head of a confederacy which included thirty-two of the neighbouring Greek towns, some of them places of considerable note. We can hardly adopt the statements of Demosthenes, when he represents Olynthus as in a more flourishing condition at the beginning of the war with Philip than she had been before she was conquered by Sparta.\* But still there was enough in her past history and her present resources, seemingly, to justify the hopes of the Athenians, who were not yet able to estimate the full difference between Macedonia as it had been under Amyntas, and what it had become under his son. An alliance with Olynthus, for offence and defence against Philip, had for some time been regarded by most Athenian statesmen as the best safeguard of Athens;† nor had efforts probably been wanting to secure it for her. What had been so ardently desired now unexpectedly offered itself: there could be little question whether it ought to be accepted. We hear, indeed, of opposition made to the advocates of the proposed alliance by Demades,‡ a man of no ordinary talents, but still more distinguished in the worst times of Athens by a degree of impudence and profligacy, public and private, which exceeded all former examples. But as we do not know the grounds of his opposition, it may have been directed, though probably with the most perfidious intention, not against the measure itself, but against the plans proposed for the attainment of its objects.

Demosthenes appears to have taken the lead

\* Diod. xiv. Olynth. i., ii.

† De F. L., § 301.

‡ Demades, Δυνατός.

† Olynth., iii., § 38.



in the debates which arose on this question : it was against him that Demades made his stand. He has left three orations, delivered at different times, all within a year, on this subject. Unhappily, the order in which they were produced has been long matter of a controversy which is not yet settled. This uncertainty detracts not a little from their historical value ; for though the reader may form a decided opinion on the point, the historian cannot consider his own as beyond dispute. We shall, however, notice their contents in that order which appears to be the most probable, but shall as much as possible avoid resting any conclusions on this assumption. The oration which seems to have been delivered on the occasion of the embassy by which the Olynthians sought alliance with Athens, though it opens with a congratulation in the favour of Heaven shown in the opportunity just presented, proceeds as if it was designed to animate the Athenians to a contest from which they were disposed to shrink through fear of Philip's overwhelming power : it is chiefly occupied with a view of his history and character adapted to this purpose. Yet it is hardly credible that, at this juncture, the mood that prevailed in the people can have been one of despondency, for which there was no apparent cause, either in the recent occurrences or in the events of the last two or three years. The fears, however, to which the orator professes to address himself, were in themselves very reasonable ; and the less they were really felt by his hearers, the more advisable he might think to suggest them—not, of course, in order to damp their spirit, but to rouse them to an effort worthy of the greatness of the struggle. There were some, as he had observed in his speech in the Rhodians, who were used to represent Philip as a despicable antagonist : this he knew to be a false and dangerous way of inspiring the people with courage. He wished that they should recognise Philip's power as truly formidable, but that they should be convinced it had become so only through their own remissness or unwise policy ; that they should believe it might be overthrown, but not without a complete change in their measures and habits. It is, in substance, the argument of the first Philippic. The general effect is encouraging ; but the encouragement is directly subservient to the practical exhortation. Demosthenes shared the hopes which had been awakened by the Olynthian embassy, but he was aware that their fulfilment depended on the manner in which Athens availed herself of the opportunity, and this was the conclusion to which he points throughout the speech. The contest is a hopeful one, because Philip's power, overgrown as it is, does not rest on secure foundations : his artifices are detected and spent : his promises and professions can deceive none of his neighbours any longer : his Thessalian allies are growing impatient of his yoke : even his Macedonian subjects are becoming weary of the burdens which his ambition imposes on them : his personal character does not inspire either love or respect : his ablest officers are disgusted by the jealousy which he betrays of their merit, and by the favour which he shows to the vilest parasites and the coarsest buffoons. Fortunately, indeed, he has been, but his good fortune

has been the folly and negligence of the Athenians, and will last as long. If they would recover what they have lost, they must shrink from no sacrifices, no labours : their property, their personal services must be freely devoted to the common weal.

The speech, however, contains no specific proposal, unless it be that an embassy should be sent to instigate the Thessalians against Philip. But even this suggestion seems to have been made chiefly for the sake of the condition annexed to it. Such an embassy, he observes, will avail nothing, unless it be supported by efforts which would prove that the people had at length roused itself from its lethargy, and was prepared to exert itself to the utmost in behalf of its allies. The measure finally adopted was far from corresponding to these exhortations, and cannot have been proposed by Demosthenes. The succours decreed consisted in a fleet of thirty galleys, manned, indeed, from Athens, but bearing no greater military force than 2000 mercenary pelists. The expedition was placed under the command of Chares.\* As to its issue we have no express information ; it is only from the sequel that we find it must have proved altogether fruitless, and that Philip, on his return from Thessaly, prosecuted the war more vigorously than ever against the Chalcidian cities, still, however, abstaining from the invasion of the Olynthian territory, and from a declaration of war against Olynthus itself. His conquests did not the less, on this account, alarm the Olynthians for their own safety ; and they sent a second embassy to Athens, to solicit more effectual succours. It is not clear whether any blame was due or was imputed to Chares ; perhaps he had done all he could, but found himself unable, with his small land force, to relieve any of the threatened towns against Philip's army. On the other hand, it does not appear that he incurred any considerable loss, and therefore had probably sent an account of his operations to Athens which flattered the people's hopes. In his oration on the second embassy, Demosthenes speaks as one who was much less confident than his hearers, and who dreaded the effect which might have been produced on them by the language of preceding speakers, who talked of punishing Philip. He endeavours to convince them that this is not the tone which befits their present circumstances ; that they might well be satisfied for the present, if they could provide for the safety of their allies, and that even their own was in great danger, unless they would adopt some new and extraordinary measures. He thinks it necessary to crave indulgence for his boldness, and a patient hearing, before he ventures to make the proposition on which he grounds all his own hopes of success in the contest with Philip ; not merely because it was in itself unpopular, but because it would expose him to the resentment of a powerful faction which, on this subject, had the ear of the assembly. He does not name Eubulus, but clearly describes the arts by which he and his party had gained the people's favour, had enriched themselves at its expense, and, by humouring its love of ease and pleasure, kept it in a degrading dependence

\* Philochorus ap. Dionys. ad Amm.

on themselves. A regulation made for financial purposes, by which 1200 of the wealthier citizens were divided into classes, had given rise to oligarchical cabals, of which Demosthenes had complained in his former speech, and it seems that Eubulus found these classes convenient instruments for his purposes. The maxim of his administration was, to keep the people satisfied at home by his distribution of the public money, and to deprive it as much as possible of all means of controlling the conduct of its servants abroad. Works of more show than use or cost, for the ornament of the city, were frequently undertaken, and were represented as proofs of prosperity. In the mean while all the great interests of the state had been neglected; its most valuable possessions lost; 1500 talents had been wasted in a disastrous war; and the poorer citizens, who were supposed to be chiefly benefited by these abuses, were wretched as well as idle in the midst of luxury and splendour. The remedy which the orator proposes is a revision of the law of Eubulus, and of the other pernicious innovations which supported this destructive system. But though he distinctly urges the people to this step, he contends that the authors of those laws, as they had hitherto enjoyed the popularity arising from them, ought to be forced to undertake whatever risk might be necessary in order to procure their repeal.

The diffidence which he expresses in several passages of his speech as to the power of his eloquence, was too well grounded. It was not able to overcome the indolence of the people, or the influence of the prevailing faction. This was probably the occasion on which Demades distinguished himself by his opposition to Demosthenes. The question was not whether fresh succours should be sent to Olynthus: on that, as Demosthenes observes, all were agreed; but as to the ways and means. It was still thought most convenient to employ a mercenary force of the same description as that which had served under Chares; but the number now added to it was 4000, and 150 cavalry, with eighteen galleys to strengthen the fleet, which probably remained on the same station. But Chares himself was recalled, not, as the sequel proves, because he had forfeited the confidence of the people, but apparently because the partisans of Charidemus thought this a fair opportunity of giving him employment in a country where he was well known, and where his services had been sought many years before, when Timotheus prevented him from taking the command there. He himself, it seems, was still in the Hellespont; \* but he was called away to put himself at the head of the new expedition. Concerning his campaign at Olynthus, we are not left so totally destitute of information as about that of Chares; but the few facts which we learn of it provoke rather than satisfy our curiosity. It appears that he made an inroad into the adjacent districts of Bottiaea and the peninsula of Pallene; and it is said that he ravaged them, as if this had been his only object; which would imply that they were already in the enemy's possession; but in that case, Olynthus must have been already besieged. We are, therefore, led to suspect that

these movements were designed to repel the incursions of the Macedonians, and were, in some degree, successful; for we also hear of Macedonian prisoners, who, at this time had fallen into the hands of the Olynthians, with Derdas, probably the commander, and a man of rank.† But from the same authority we learn that Charidemus, while he commanded at Olynthus, not only indulged in the most shameless profligacy, but treated the Olynthian magistrates with an insolence, which, unless that which we read was a solitary example, must have given great offence.

It was, perhaps, as well the indignation excited by such conduct as the progress of Philip's arms, that induced the Olynthians again to apply to Athens, with an earnest request to send, not a mercenary force, but one composed of Athenian citizens. The application was made in terms which implied that they considered themselves as now in extreme danger. Philip was gaining ground, partly by force, partly by corruption, which had procured him partisans in Olynthus itself. Before the third embassy to Athens, it appears that they had ventured to propose negotiation with the enemy;‡ nor is it certain that they had not carried this point, for we hear of a violent struggle between them and the friends of Athens, which ended in the expulsion or disgrace of one of their principal adversaries named Apollonides,§ and may have turned on the question of war or peace; though if this Apollonides was the same who is elsewhere described as an emissary of Charidemus,¶ his banishment may have proceeded from a different cause. The Athenians were now, it seems, for the first time sensible of the impending danger, and ready to listen to Demosthenes, when he told them they had to choose between war before Olynthus and one at their own door, and that they must no longer commit their defence to other hands, but must arm themselves in their own cause. A small force would be of no avail, nor would a single armament be sufficient: two expeditions must be fitted out at the same time, one to protect Olynthus, the other to attempt a diversion by the invasion of Macedonia. An embassy also must be sent to cheer and rouse the Olynthians with assurances of support, and thus to coun-

\* Theopompus in Athenæus, x., 47. It must be noticed, however, that neither the name of the person nor the date of the story is mentioned in the extract. But as to the person, the description Athenæus gives of him, as *Charidemus of Oreus on whom the Athenians bestowed their franchise*, is too precise to admit a suspicion of mistake. And until some other epoch is found to which the presence of Charidemus at Olynthus under such circumstances can be referred, we must conclude that the occasion was the one stated in our text. † We infer this from I Olynth., § 4.

‡ Demosthenes, Phil., iii., § 67, 70. It must, however, be observed, that the word used in both passages, *ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐκβαλόντες*, does not imply that Apollonides was obliged to seek his safety by flight from Olynthus, any more than Demosthenes means that Æschines was actually forced to quit the theatre when the spectators *ἐκβαλλον αὐτόν*. De F. L., § 389, or Æschines that Demosthenes was forced to fly out of court when he says, De F. L., § 4, *ῥοθὴν δὲ αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς γίγλης οὐρα ταύτης ἐκβαλλεῖν*, and afterward, § 163, *ἐθ' ὡ μεταδὲ μὲν λέγων ὅφ' ἰδὼν ἐκέρβηται*. Nevertheless, as we find from the speech in Neem., § 121, that Apollonides received the Athenian franchise, which was afterward taken from him by the decision of a tribunal, it is certainly not improbable that he withdrew from Olynthus on this occasion.

§ Demosthenes c. Aristocr., § 219. Vaguel, Prolegom. in Philip., § 1., p. 27, calls him a Cardian, but cites no authority.

\* Philochorus, *Χαρίδημον τὸν ἐν Ἑλλάσποντὶ στρατηγόν*.

teract the persuasions of those who might advise them to negotiate with Philip, and the artifices by which he might tempt them to renounce the alliance with Athens, and to throw themselves on his mercy. As to the financial question, that, in so pressing an emergency, is not of the first importance. A fund must be provided: if they chose to raise one by extraordinary taxation rather than use that which was already at their disposal, and which they spent upon their pleasures, they must do as they would; but the crisis admitted of no delay.

The case itself spoke no less forcibly than the orator. The people decreed a fresh squadron of seventeen galleys, a body of 2000 heavily-armed infantry, and 300 horse, all Athenians: Charidemus, it seems, was superseded, and Chares—perhaps the oldest general that could be found—was restored to the command. This re-enforcement might have been sufficient to sustain, though not to end the war, if it had been well employed, and the Olynthians had been all true to themselves. But in the spring of 348, Philip, having made himself master of Mecyberna, the port of Olynthus, as he had of Torone, by bribery,\* advanced to lay siege to Olynthus itself. And now for the first time, perhaps, he threw off the mask, and declared—whether in answer to any overtures from the besieged, we do not know—that either they must quit Olynthus, or he Macedonia.† Twice they drew out their forces to give him battle, but were as often defeated; yet even after this hope had failed, they made a vigorous defence, and the besiegers were often repulsed with great loss. But two men, who filled some of the highest stations, Lasthenes and Euthycrates, had sold themselves to Philip, and now concerted a plan for betraying the city. Lasthenes, who had the command of the cavalry, under pretence, it seems, of a sally, contrived to place a body of 500 in such a position that they were forced to lay down their arms. After this piece of treachery, it is probable he did not return to Olynthus; but his friends who remained there completed what he had begun, and found means of admitting the Macedonians into the town. Possibly they had deluded themselves with the belief that they were averting greater evils, which were likely to ensue upon a longer resistance. But the conqueror had resolved that Olynthus should never more endanger or disturb his kingdom, or become a rallying-point for his enemies. He levelled it with the ground, and—whether swayed by resentment or policy—sold the captive population. Their lands served to reward his officers, more especially the foreign adventurers in his service, on whom he bestowed large estates.‡ So the chief of the Chalcidian cities was swept from the earth. Those which did not share its fate were reduced to helpless subjection; and the whole of the tripartite peninsula, which had so long separated Macedonia from the sea, became one of its fairest provinces.

It has been hastily inferred from a strong expression of Demosthenes,§ that the traitors

Lasthenes and Euthycrates were put to death, or, at least, severely treated by Philip, when he had no farther need of their service. The real state of the case is more truly indicated by one of Plutarch's anecdotes, which represents them as complaining to Philip that some of his courtiers had called them traitors. The Macedonians, he is said to have replied, are blunt, rough folks: they call a spade, a spade. Nothing worse appears to have befallen them than the disappointment of their ambitious aims, in the utter ruin of the city where they had probably hoped to rule, and the condition of exiles, with the consciousness that they were abhorred by the friends of their country, and despised by its enemies. At Athens they were outlawed, as Arthmius of Zelea had been.\* Yet even this decree was afterward reversed. That was the work of Demades:† it was reserved for a modern historian to make the still bolder attempt to reinstate them, as honourable men, in the estimation of posterity.

The king solemnized his triumph with great magnificence at Dium, near the border of Thessaly, by the ancient festival in honour of the Muses, which Archelaus had ordered after the model of Olympia, and which Philip celebrated on this occasion with extraordinary pomp, of banquets, games, and theatrical entertainments. Artists and spectators flocked to the spectacle from many parts of Greece. All found a hospitable and courteous reception. Philip entertained the most distinguished foreigners at his table, honoured them with liberal presents, won them by the affability and grace of his manners. He gained still more applause by an act of clemency which he performed at the request of Satyrus, the player, the early friend of Demosthenes, who was one of his guests, and took this opportunity to intercede in behalf of a friend's daughters, who, though not Olynthians by birth, were among the captives doomed to slavery. Philip granted the request, which was made before a numerous company, though their father had been one of the murderers of his brother Alexander.‡ The occurrence is perhaps chiefly remarkable, as it proves the rigour with which the sentence he had passed upon the conquered city was carried into execution.

The princely and soldierlike liberality which Philip displayed on such occasions was no doubt congenial to his nature; but it was not the less adapted to promote his political ends. It served as a public invitation to needy and unprincipled adventurers of every class who were able to serve him, whether with the sword, or the tongue and the pen. Men of a higher character might be more liable to be seduced by the address of the giver than by his gifts. It probably required no little strength of republican virtue to withstand the corrupting influence of such a court as the Macedonian had now become. Theopompus has, perhaps, exaggerated its profligacy; but if its manners were not so gross as he has painted them, its splendour,

\* Diodorus, xvi., 53.

† Demosth., iii., Phil., § 16; Cherson., § 60.

‡ Theopompus in Athenæus, vi., 77.

§ De Cherson., § 40, *ἐπειδὴ τὴν πόλιν πρὸς ὅσαν πάντων ἀδυστὶ ἀρολέσθαι*. But the orator himself has fully explained his meaning in another passage, De Cor., § 58-60.

\* Suidas, *Δημόδωρος*, i., p. 537, confirmed by Demosthenes, De F. L., § 303, *κατὰ τὴν Ὀλυνθίου προδοσίαν πολλὰ καὶ δαυὰ ἐκέρχισατο*. The *ἀρμία* is explained by Demosthenes, Phil., iii., 54.

† Suidas, u. s.

‡ Demosth., De F. L., § 213-216. The variation in *Æsch.*, De F. L., § 168, must either have been fabricated by the orator, or belonged to a different occasion.

gayety, and freedom might be so much the more attractive, and might render it the more dangerous a residence for a patriotic Greek.\*

\* Though the view here presented of Philip's war with Olynthus is in substance the same as appears to have been universally received until late times, yet, as many readers may have been rendered more familiar with a totally different account of these transactions, it may not be useless to subjoin a few remarks. The more a narrative, professedly historical, assumes the license of a romance, the more difficult it is to refute, and the more tedious to criticise it; and it may be added, the more hopeless must be the attempt of a later hand to transform it into a history, by here and there inserting in brackets, at the bottom of a page, some of the facts which have been neglected or distorted by the original author, though they may be useful as samples of his ignorance or partiality. For this reason we shall abstain from all comment on supposed intrigues between the *war-party* at Athens and the *war-party* at Olynthus, which every well-informed person knows to be mere products of a heated imagination. There are some other points on which it is more practicable to ascertain the truth.

1. The statement of Philochorus (ap. Dionys. ad Amm., 9), whose authority is not questioned, contradicts, as clearly as words can do, the assertion that the Olynthians were the aggressors, and that Philip did not begin the war until his territories had been invaded by Chares. Yet in the margin of the text which contains this assertion there is a reference to Philochorus. 2. That the forces described by Demosthenes (De F. L., p. 426) as sent to the relief of Olynthus were all decreed at one time, is a blunder which it might have been thought could not have occurred to any one who had once read the Olynthiaca, even in a translation. 3. The nature of the treachery to which Demosthenes ascribes the rapidity of Philip's conquest of the inferior Chalcidian towns, as it cannot be safely inferred from his expressions, must be left open to conjecture. But with regard to Olynthus itself we are better informed. The assertion that Apollonides commanded the Olynthian cavalry, that it deserted while under his command, and that he was afterward obliged to seek his own safety by flight from Olynthus, &c., as the learned reader knows, a sheer fiction, distinctly contradicted by the statements of Demosthenes, who, nevertheless, is cited in support of it. From him we learn, that after Apollonides had been forced to withdraw, Lasthenes was elected commander of the horse (Phil., iii., § 79: καλὸς Ὀλυνθίων ἐπέτατο τὸν τὴν μὲν δαπάνην ἱκετάχον χειρονομήσαντων, τὸν δὲ Ἀπολλωνίδην ἰκετάχοντων), and that after this appointment a body of 500 cavalry laid down their arms (De F. L., u. s.), which was the immediate occasion of the loss of the city. (Phil., ii., § 67.) From these facts we may conclude that Euthyrates and Lasthenes were not raised to power for the very purpose of surrendering the place to the King of Macedonia. The desertion of the cavalry would in that case have been, to say the least, superfluous. It would scarcely have enabled Lasthenes and Euthyrates to obtain more favourable terms. 4. The whole hypothesis of the favourable disposition to Philip which prevailed at Olynthus, and was hardly kept down by the *war-party* and their Athenian auxiliaries, is overturned by Philip's declaration that—not the *war-party*, but—the Olynthians must quit the city, or he Macedonia. He must, at least, have discovered his popularity from the deserters; and if he had made the threat in ignorance, would surely not have carried it into effect. 5. Hence his treatment of the conquered city becomes a question of some importance for the determination of many other contested points. The assertion that "support was only fails among the orators of the day for the report of the finalist of three centuries after, that he plundered the town and sold the inhabitants for slaves," is surprising even in a work in which we are used to see ignorance and prejudice screening each other by turns from the suspicion of deliberate falsehood. The story of Satyrus, though told by Demosthenes, is confirmed by Æschines as to the state of things implied in it, which being a circumstance material to the charge, he was concerned, if he could, to deny; and though it is Demosthenes who mentions the Olynthian woman brought to Athens by Philocrates (De F. L., § 352), there is no reason for questioning the truth of the report he gives of the speech of Æschines, in which he had described the sight he witnessed on his embassy to Peloponnesus—the thirty Olynthian captives, boys and women, whom Atreusidas had received as a present from Philip; and it is simply confirmed by his adversary's silence. Still stronger, perhaps, is the confirmation which the fact receives from the allusion of Dinarchus, in Demosth., § 27, where he compares the fate of Olynthus with that of Thebes; not to mention the story of the Olynthian girl in the preceding page of the same speech. Support, therefore, does not wholly fail for the annalist's report among the orators of the day. Nor is there confirmation wanting: e. g., the language of the Ætolian orator Chimeras at Sparta, in Polybius, ix., 22 (Ὀλυνθίων) ἐκράπατο-

## CHAPTER XLIV.

FROM THE FALL OF OLYNTHUS TO THE END OF THE SACRED WAR.

It is peculiarly necessary, in this period of Greek history, to distinguish between the impression made by the events on the mind of the reader, who reviews them at a distance of many ages, and that which they produced on the chief actors and their contemporaries as they occurred. To us the fall of Olynthus, which completed the subjugation of the Chalcidian peninsula, may seem to have decided Philip's contest with Athens, and virtually to have made him master of Greece. Theasaly might be considered as already almost a province of Macedonia. The struggle between Thebes and Phocis had reached such a point, that the one party needed assistance, and the other could not hope to withstand the force with which he was able to support its antagonist. Then, if his arms terminated the conflict, the use to be made of the victory would depend on his will, and there remained no Greek state capable of resisting him. In Peloponnesus there was a similar division of strength and interests; and the side on which he threw his weight must prevail. He had already formed a considerable marine, which, after the conquest of the Chalcidian towns, he had means of continually augmenting, and which enabled him to threaten and molest the foreign possessions of Athens. The road to Thrace lay open to him; he had already gained a strong footing there: the rival princes were either his humble allies, or enemies who lay at his mercy. We see little prospect that the Greek cities on the Hellespont should long preserve their independence, or Athens the Chersonesus, if it should be his pleasure to expel her colonists. Even the principal channel through which she receives the means of subsistence may soon be closed against her commerce.

There was apparently only one event which could oppose any serious obstacle to his progress; this was a coalition among all the principal states of Greece, directed against him, animated by a spirit capable of vigorous efforts, and guided by a master mind. But it was not their clashing interests and mutual jealousy alone that rendered such an event improbable, but still more, perhaps, the difficulty of awakening them to a lively sense of their danger. The rise of the Macedonian power was too recent, and had yet been too gradual, to be at once gen-

διόμηνος Φίλιππος καὶ παράδειγμα ποιήσας, in which his antagonist Lyciscus does not seem to have perceived any exaggeration, though he uses the milder expression ἀνέγκη. The accusation brought against Aristotle, κατασκευάσεις Ὀλυνθίου μὴσεν ἐπὶ λαφυροποιεῖσιν Φιλίππῳ τοῦς πλουσιωτάτους τὸν Ὀλυνθίων. Aristotle ap. Euseb., P. E., x., 2. (Wesseling on Diodorus, xvi., 53.) And it must be remembered that, if the report had stood quite alone, there would have been nothing to shake its credit. The suspicion that the story told by Diodorus may have been merely a licentious paraphrase of an expression of Demosthenes in the second Philippic, προδοθέντες ἢ ἀλλήλων (οἱ Ὀλυνθιοὶ καὶ πρᾶβιντες, was indeed natural enough for a person who despised the idle learned, and probably found it was difficult to read the Greek language as to write his own; but Diodorus could do both. We do not dispute the justice of the comparative eulogy pronounced by Mr. Clinton (F. H., introduction, p. xxiii.) on the author who has given occasion to this note; but certainly it was not without reason that he was called by Dobree (Adversaria, i., p. 128) *historicus Græcæ corruptior loquacissimus*.

erally viewed in the true light. The Peloponnesians could scarcely see beyond the politics of their own peninsula. Whatever was passing in or out of Greece, was in their eyes important only as it affected the relative strength of Sparta and her hostile neighbours. They looked upon the Sacred War with interest only so far as the issue might make Peloponnesus once more the theatre of war between Thebes and Sparta, or might release Sparta from all fear of her most dangerous rival. Philip, too, was deemed worth notice merely as he might be a useful ally, or formidable enemy, to either of the contending Peloponnesian parties. The increased power of his kingdom was not contemplated as bringing it into any new relation to Greece as a whole. It was not so long since his father had owed his throne to the protection of Sparta; and even after the power against which she had defended it was laid in the dust, she could not easily bring herself to think of the son of Amyntas as a patron or a master. The case was not very dissimilar with the parties immediately concerned in the Sacred War. The Phocians, indeed, conscious of the insecure ground on which they stood, dreaded his enmity, though it was but lately that their forces had met on equal terms, and that each side had been by turns victorious; but they did not wholly despair of propitiating it; for Thebes might more reasonably excite his jealousy. On the other hand, Thebes was aware that her success depended on his aid; that his opposition would defeat all her plans; but more than this could scarcely enter into her calculations. Not many years had gone by since she had disposed of the Macedonian sceptre; still fewer since he himself had been a hostage within her walls.

Besides these more evident causes of a false security, there were others, which may have operated not the less forcibly because they were but indistinct feelings, scarcely ever reduced to a shape in which they could become a subject of sober reflection. Demosthenes has been charged with a gross want of candour, because, in defiance of good historical testimony, proving the Hellenic origin of the royal family of Macedonia, he sometimes called Philip a barbarian.

The charge is childish, as well as false, and can only serve to keep the real state of the case out of sight. Demosthenes everywhere speaks, not of the man, but of the king, the chief of the nation, and attributes its character to him; with perfect justice in respect of his subject.\* But the very judgment which was supposed to establish Philip's Hellenic descent, implied that his people were considered as barbarians. His ancestor had only been acknowledged as a Greek, because he had been able to make it appear that he was not by blood a Macedonian.†

\* If, in the reign of Peter the Great, the power of Russia had been known to threaten the liberty of Europe, would an English orator have been guilty of falsehood or exaggeration who should have spoken of the Czar as the Muscovite, the barbarian? Or would the ascendancy of such a power cease to be accounted a less terrible calamity if it were wielded by a prince of Teutonic blood, and conversant with all the refinements of European culture?

† Niebuhr questions the truth of the story about the Argive descent of the Macedonian kings, and thinks it arose out of the epithet *Ἀργεῖται* which is given them in the verses of the Sibyl, quoted by Pausanias, vii. 8, 9. But it is surely more probable that the epithet alludes to the received tradition. Wachsmuth, *Europäische Sittengeschichte*, i., p. 16, likewise treats the story as an idle tale.

To our present purpose it is immaterial whether, in Philip's age, the line which parted the Macedonian from the Greek was narrow or broad, whether there was any real affinity of genius and character between them, or the resemblance was only produced by a slight varnish of Greek civilization spread over the surface of a part of Macedonian society. The Greeks had certainly some reason for thinking so, since they saw that the Macedonian princes were obliged to borrow from them the things on which they prided themselves most, the works of their fine arts, and the skill of their artists, and that, though Philip might gain a victory over them, he could not celebrate it as he wished without their help. But we are here speaking only of the universal feeling, or, if it was no more, the vulgar prejudice, according to which the Macedonians were an inferior race, whose dominion would on that account, indeed, be the more odious, but, until it had become inevitable, was probably the less apprehended. With this pride of birth there was coupled a consciousness of national unity, still subsisting notwithstanding the discord which prevented union; there was still always a possibility that, whenever an adequate occasion should arise, a confederacy might be formed capable of resisting any foreign power, as their forefathers had repelled the Persian invasion. If the forces which met in hostile conflict a few years before at Mantinea had been arrayed on one side, what Macedonian army could have faced them?

Philip himself, though fully sensible of his own advantages, certainly did not think meanly of the strength which Greece still possessed, and would have been very unwilling, from regard to his own safety, to provoke a coalition among the principal states which might call it into action. It seems equally clear that his designs towards Greece were never hostile, any farther than his interests required. We ought rather, perhaps, to say that his disposition towards Greece was positively friendly, so far as his interests permitted. There can be little doubt that he valued himself upon his ancestry, through which he traced his pedigree up to Hercules, not less than upon his royal dignity. His blunt, rough Macedonians, who called a spade, a spade, made loyal subjects and brave soldiers; but he liked to think of himself as a Greek; and it is not an extravagant supposition, that his respect for Athens, as the centre of Grecian art, knowledge, and refinement, was constantly counteracting the resentment she provoked by her determined hostility. It is also nearly certain that Greece was never the ultimate end of his ambition. We cannot, indeed, pretend to determine the time when the great designs which he afterward disclosed first took a definite shape in his mind; but from the beginning of his reign so many occasions were continually arising to draw his attention towards the East, that we may fairly presume these designs were in some measure blended with his earliest views of conquest and aggrandizement. But, at least at the epoch which we have now reached, they must have been fully matured; for they became shortly after, as we shall see, a subject of reflection and discussion, of earnest

\* Which, however, is not only attested, but avowed by Isocrates, by way of compliment to Philip. Philip, § 143.

desire and confident expectation to others, who assuredly did not either see farther than Philip, or outstrip his wishes and hopes. But that he might enter on the projected undertaking with safety and a reasonable assurance of success two things were necessary: that he should be master of the European coast of the Hellespont, and that Greece should be reduced to such a state that he might have no hinderance or interruption to apprehend from her. Just to this point, if it could be found, he would have wished to see her sink; beyond this he cannot have thought it politic to degrade or hurt her. We cannot be surprised that, with such views, he should have preferred the way of negotiation, whenever it would serve his purpose, to that of arms, especially as he was conscious of extraordinary talents for diplomacy; or that, notwithstanding his success in the war with Athens, he should have taken the first opportunity, after the conquest of Olynthus, to signify his desire of peace. A closer inspection of the state of affairs in Greece at this time will, perhaps, enable us to understand both the motives which induced the Athenians gladly to listen to his overtures, and some of the especial temporary purposes with which he made them.

It was at Athens that the national consciousness, fostered by the inexhaustible recollections of the Persian war, and by the sight of no less glorious monuments of genius and art, which, above all other trophies, attested the superiority of the Greek over the barbarian, was always most lively.\* It was there, too, that the extent of Philip's power was best understood, and the danger with which his ambition threatened Greece was most clearly perceived; for the encroachments which he had been incessantly making on the Athenian empire were at once provocations and warnings. And, accordingly, it was in the minds of Athenian statesmen that, while others thought only of deprecating his hostility or conciliating his favour, the project of a confederacy for the purpose of barring his progress seems first to have arisen. In the oration which we supposed to be the last of the Olynthiacs, Demosthenes urged the expediency of sending embassies, wherever there was a prospect of success, to instigate the other Greeks against Philip. This advice appears to have been generally approved, and especially after the fall of Olynthus to have been regarded as the last remaining resource of the state. It was warmly adopted by Eubulus and his party, opposed as they were on other questions to Demosthenes, and they even brought it forward in a more definite shape as their own. Hence we may infer that the measure was very popular; but yet we shall see reason to believe that Eubulus did not on this occasion act merely in compliance with the wishes of the people, but had an object in view which he did not yet venture to unfold, but which he hoped to accomplish by means of this proposition. We find that his first step was taken in concert with a party at Megalopolis, where, as might be expected, there were some who—whether honestly or from impure motives—desired the aid of Philip in their contest with Sparta, while others, prob-

ably the greater number, preferred the more congenial and safer alliance of Athens. Ischander, a son, perhaps, of the celebrated actor Neoptolemus,† seems to have been sent on a secret mission into Arcadia, and on his return made a report favourable to the views of Eubulus. The occasion is memorable, as the first on which Æschines, afterward the celebrated rival of Demosthenes, is known to have taken a prominent part in public affairs.

Æschines was the son of an honourable citizen, Tromes, or Attometus, who seems to have been connected by birth with one of the most illustrious priestly houses, but, after having lost his property in the Peloponnesian war, was forced to quit Athens during the government of the Thirty, served for a time as a mercenary in Asia, and on his return was forced, if we may believe Demosthenes, to seek subsistence in a somewhat disreputable occupation. The orator's mother, too, appears to have been forced by poverty to earn her living in the service of a foreign form of superstition, which was generally regarded as despicable. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, Æschines, who was gifted with an uncommonly fine person, sonorous voice, and talents only inferior to those of Demosthenes himself,‡ acquitted himself honourably of the ordinary duties of a citizen, served abroad in several campaigns, and sometimes earned the distinguishing notice of his commanders. At home, it seems that in his youth he was fain to be satisfied with very humble employment for his voice and person, sometimes in the office of a public clerk, sometimes as an actor of third-rate parts in the theatrical entertainments of rural festivals. The works he has left, however, indisputably attest the diligence with which he must have cultivated his great abilities; and he must have found opportunities of displaying them which recommended him as an able coadjutor to Eubulus; the more readily, perhaps, as he had signalized himself in the last-mentioned campaign in Eubœa, so as to earn public honours and the esteem of Phocion. This may have been the accident which determined the outset and the direction of his political career. He undertook the part of introducing Ischander to the council and the assembly, warned the people against the arts by which Philip was extending his secret influence in Greece, and proposed that embassies should be sent in all directions to counteract them, and that all the Greek states which were open to persuasion should be invited to a congress to be held at Athens, to deliberate on the means of prosecuting the war with Philip. This proposition appears to have been carried. It amounted to nothing more than an extension of the congress in which the allies of Athens had been used regularly to meet and discuss their affairs; though possibly these consultations had been suspended since the Social War. Eubu-

\* But we do not know that he was himself a player, as Leland calls him (L. of Ph., ii., p. 29), deceived by the sarcastic title *θεατρικὸς ἄνθρωπος*, by which Demosthenes (De F. L., § 10) manifestly alludes to the ancient profession of Æschines. Grynæus, indeed, *De Græcorum tragædiâ quâlibet fuit circa tempora Demosthenis*, p. 7, adopts a punctuation (*ἰσχυρὸν τὸν νεοκράτορα θεῶν, ἄνθρωπον*), according to which Ischander would be described by his scenic relation to Neoptolemus; but this seems improbable.

† *Μετὰ Δημοσθένει μὲν εὐδὲς ὁ δὲ τριτοῦς*. Dionys., *De Adm.*, vi. dic. In Dem., 35.

\* Οὐσίῃς Ἀθηναίων, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες ἐν πόλει καὶ λόγους, καὶ θεωρητάς τῶν τῶν ἐπὶ πόλεως ἀρχῶν βουλευμάτων ὅσοι. Demosth., De Cr., § 53.

Ins himself proposed an embassy to Megalopolis, which was decreed; and Æschines was appointed one of the envoys. His task was to rouse the Arcadians against Philip, and he appears to have performed it with great energy. In the account which he gave of his embassy on his return, he laboured no less vehemently to inflame the indignation of the Athenians, by the description of a piteous spectacle which had met his eye on his journey homeward, when he saw one Atrestidas travelling with a herd of Olynthian captives, about thirty women and boys, whom he was said to have brought from the Macedonian court. The story gave occasion for a strain of invective against Philip, in which, if we believe Demosthenes, he did not spare the most opprobrious epithets, and excited the people to demand justice from the Arcadians on the traitors who sold their country to the bloodstained barbarian.\*

Whether this mission of Æschines was attended with any practical results we are not informed; in general, as he himself testifies, whatever attempts were made to rally the Greeks round Athens entirely failed.† But the proposal of Eubulus seems to have been connected with another more important object, which Demosthenes attributes to him, apparently on grounds which rendered the fact notorious. An alliance with Megalopolis was hardly consistent with that by which Athens was still united with Sparta. A rupture with Sparta seemed a step which must sooner or later lead to a reconciliation with Thebes; and to promote an alliance with Thebes was, Demosthenes asserts, a main aim of the policy of Eubulus.‡ So far we see a probable connexion between two well-attested facts; but we are left to conjecture for an explanation of his ulterior views. It seems most likely that he wished to detach Athens from the Phocian alliance; and he may have hoped that, as the price of her accession to the Theban side, she might obtain terms of safe and honourable peace for the Phocians, which would deprive Philip of all pretext for interference. The alliance with Thebes had also, as we learn from the same authority, been a favourite measure with Aristophon; it was the only political question on which he and Eubulus always agreed. He, however, may have thought it desirable, simply as more conformable to the institutions of Athens than the connexion with Sparta, which brought her into conflict with Argos, Messene, and the democratical states of Peloponnesus, her natural allies. But Demosthenes himself is charged by Æschines with a strong leaning towards the Theban interest,§ and is said to have betrayed it at a time when it was hardly safe openly to acknowledge it, and even to have connected himself with Thebes by ties of public hospitality.|| His object must have related chiefly to the contest with Philip, and can scarcely have been any other than to prevent the Thebans from casting themselves on the king's protection. He cannot have intended or have expected that the people would consent

to sacrifice the Phocians to the revenge of their enemies. But it may have appeared to him that Thebes, if the sovereignty of Bœotia was secured to her, might now be willing to adjust her quarrel with Phocis on more equitable conditions, and perhaps to cede Oropus to Athens, as the reward of her mediation.

It is at least certain that the turn which the Sacred War had taken about the time of the fall of Olynthus was more favourable than ever to such a project. After the death of Mnaseas, the two principal belligerents had continued to spend their strength in unavailing efforts. The young general, Phalæcus, conducted the war, it seems, with no less ability than his predecessors, but, like them, without any decisive success. Each party by turns was victorious in some trifling engagements; the Phocians maintained their footing in Bœotia, and continued to make attempts on the towns still subject to Thebes; the Thebans regularly invaded and ravaged Phocis, but were sometimes attacked in their retreat, and suffered more damage than they had inflicted.\* It would have been very difficult to explain by what means they were enabled to sustain the conflict so long, with an enemy who had such resources at his disposal, if we had not been informed that they received 300 talents from the Persian king, as the price, partly of their forbearance, and partly of the succours which they sent to him in his expedition to Egypt:† and we may reasonably conjecture that they had reaped similar, if not equal profit from the important services which their general, Pammenes, rendered some years before to the revolted satrap Artabazus.‡ Still, the burden of the war became every year more and more oppressive, as the prospects of aggrandizement with which they had entered on it, and even their hopes of recovering the ground they had lost in Bœotia, were dimmed. On the other hand, the profusion with which the treasures of Delphi had hitherto been scattered was beginning to approach its natural term. The administration of Phalæcus was, in proportion to his means, not less wasteful than that of his predecessors.§ It might, without any greater misconduct, have given more offence, if he found himself forced to resort to precious and revered relics, which they, in the midst of abundance, had been able to spare. Yet it is probable that discontent arising from this cause would have been easily stifled, if the pay of the soldiery had continued to flow as regularly and copiously as at first. But as soon as murmurs began to be heard in the camp, the party in the state which had opposed Onomarchus before his accession seems to have been encouraged to renew its attacks on the ruling dynasty, and was now able to effect a revolution. Phalæcus was charged with embezzlement, and with the additional impiety of having caused excavations to be made in the inmost sanctuary of the temple for treasures which, on the authority of some Homeric lines, were be-

\* Βάρβαρον τε καὶ ἀλστρον, Demosth., De F. L., § 347, without contradiction. Æschines (De F. L., § 33) expressly admits the main fact. † De F. L., § 84.

‡ Demosth., De Cor., § 907.

§ De F. L., § 113. Πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους κακοὺς βουλευμένους. † 146, 151. Τὴν πρὸς Θεβαίους προέβλεπον, τοῦ Θεβαίου προέβλεπον.

\* Diodorus, xvi., 56. Isocrates, Philip., § 61.

† Diodorus, xvi., 40, 44. ‡ Diodorus, xvi., 34.

§ On this subject Diodorus forgets himself: xvi., 30, he says that Philomelus was obliged to lay hands on the sacred treasure; c. 56, that he obtained from it. In c. 56 it is Onomarchus; in 61, Phayllus, who spent the largest amount. Ephorus in Athenæus, vi., 22, represents Phalæcus as equaling the prodigality of Onomarchus and Phayllus.

lieved to lie buried there. The shock of an earthquake, it was reported, had put a stop to the sacrilegious search. Phalæcus was forced to abdicate his office, or to retire from Phocia, and three new generals were elected in his room. This could scarcely have happened unless he had been abandoned by the greater part of his troops; and it is not difficult to collect how they were tempted to take part with his adversaries. It was alleged, it seems, that the treasure would have been still sufficient for the pay of the army, if it had not been diverted to the private uses of the general and his friends. A severe inquiry was instituted into the mode of its application.\* One Philo, who had been intrusted with the management of the largest portion, and was the agent employed by Phalæcus in his sacrilegious search, was convicted of malversation, and, having been put to the torture, disclosed the names of his accomplices. All were obliged to refund as much of the spoil as remained in their possession, and then suffered the punishment of sacrilege.

These proceedings seem to show that it was the object of the new government to throw the odium of the spoliation of the temple as much as possible on their predecessors. Perhaps they wished it to be supposed elsewhere that they had always disapproved of the violation of the sacred treasure altogether; but at home they can hardly have taken such high ground, but must have made a distinction between the legitimate use for the defence of the state, and the sacrilegious waste for private gratification. In the mean while, the confiscation of the property of the offenders yielded a supply which they might employ for the public service without open participation in their guilt. This change of administration seems to have taken place soon after the fall of Olynthus; and it opened a prospect of a speedier termination of the war than could have been expected from the dynasty of Phalæcus. It was clear that the new government, whether it abandoned or renewed the expedients hitherto used, could not stand long in its own strength; and there was reason to conclude that it would be glad, for the sake of peace and amnesty, to surrender the Bœtian towns to Thebes, and to make such concessions with regard to the temple as might satisfy the demands of the Thessalians. Nevertheless, we do not find that they made or received any pacific overtures, or that this revolution in Phocia immediately excited much attention, or gave rise to any new political calculations at Athens. But by Philip it was certainly not overlooked; and it probably had considerable influence on the subsequent course of his policy.

The longer his war with Athens had lasted,

\* The remark of Diodorus, xvi., 56, that Philomelus abstained from the sacred offerings, cannot, of course, warrant the assertion that "the tribunal to which the inquiry was referred completely acquitted the memory of Philomelus, declaring that his administration was found pure." This is one of those arbitrary strokes which efface the limits that ought to separate history from romance. It may, however, be proper to observe, that if this was the result of the inquiry, it would only prove that Philomelus had not been found to have embezzled any of the sacred treasure, not that he had abstained from using it. Diodorus distinctly mentions that the subject of the inquiry was the embezzlement that had been practised. If, as we have seen reason to suspect, Philomelus was not related to his successors in office, we can the better understand why no imputation was cast on him.

and the heavier the losses she had sustained in it, the more, of course, was the resentment of the people kindled against him; and it seems that some violent men, to humour the prevailing temper, had threatened to impeach any one who should propose to open a negotiation for peace.\* After the fall of Olynthus, nothing could be expected but that he should press the enemy, over whom he had gained such a momentous advantage, with fresh vigour. Unless a league could be brought about to resist him, the very existence of Athens might be threatened. It was, therefore, with joyful surprise that, in the course of the following summer (347), the Athenians received intimation, through several channels, that he was willing to treat with them. According to Demosthenes, it would appear that the Athenian prisoners taken in Olynthus afforded him the first opportunity of disclosing his pacific dispositions.† The friends of some of them prevailed on the people to send an agent, clothed with the character of an ambassador, to treat for their ransom; and the player Aristodemus, who was known to Philip in the exercise of his art, and perhaps had been engaged for the festival at Dium, was appointed on this mission. If, however, we believe the statement of Æschines, that the petition thus granted was actively supported by Demosthenes and Philocrates, one of the orators who were the chief authors of the ensuing peace, we can hardly doubt that the object of this embassy was purely political, and that it was a consequence of some earlier hints which had been received of Philip's intentions. The first, according to Æschines, had been conveyed by envoys from Eubœa, who came to treat for their own states, but, as allies of Macedonia, announced that they had been instructed by Philip to inform the Athenians that he wished to adjust his differences with them. It may have been upon this encouragement that Aristodemus was sent, with the tacit, but notorious object of ascertaining the truth. Before his return, however, it appears that other assurances to the same effect were received. The player Neoptolemus obtained leave to make a journey to Macedonia, under pretext of recovering a sum which was due to him there; and he also, on his return, made a report concerning Philip, calculated to produce so favourable an impression, that Demosthenes was convinced, and the event seems to have proved, that he was bribed for the purpose. Finally, one Phryno, having been captured by Philip's troops, either during the Olympian truce or during that which he had proclaimed—in imitation of the Olympic law—for the celebration of his festival at Dium,‡ induced the

\* Yet it is by no means certain that even so much as this is implied in the language of Æschines, *De F. L.*, § 13. It is, perhaps, no more than a hyperbolical description of the implacable enmity professed against Philip by demagogues like Lycinus. But at least, if he had meant to speak "of a savage decree forbidding the entrance of a herald from Macedonia upon the Athenian territory" he would not have used such an expression as *ἀπὸ τῶν καὶ αὐτῶν τοῦ ἐκωλύετο ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ*—not to mention the difficulty of supposing that, while such a decree remained in force, any individual should have petitioned the people to send an ambassador on his behalf to Philip, and that the petition should have been granted before the decree was rescinded.

† *De Cor.*, § 26.

‡ This supposition (which is Corsini's, *F. A.*, p. i., *Diss.* iii., p. 139) seems rather preferable, chiefly because it is difficult to conceive how Phryno could have been taken by Philip's soldiers on his way to Olympia; and if the capture



people to send him back in the quality of an ambassador, accompanied by Ctesiphon, for the professed purpose of recovering the ransom which had been exacted for his release. Philip granted his request in the most obliging manner, restored the property which had been taken from him, with excuses for the mistake of his soldiers, and dismissed the two envoys with professions of like import to those already mentioned.

From first to last the chief doubt felt at Athens seems to have been, whether Philip was in earnest, and might be safely trusted. That peace was, at this juncture, highly desirable for the republic scarcely admitted a question; and as soon as it was ascertained that it might be had, the people were unanimous in their will to obtain it. The war had been one series of losses and disasters: notwithstanding the subsidies received from Delphi, it was computed that it had cost 1500 talents, of which 200, said to have been spent on the expedition to Thermopylæ, were, perhaps, the part least unprofitably employed, and that 150 galleys had been sent out which had never returned. The Chersonesus, the only important acquisition that had been made, had been so threatened, and was still in such danger, that Æschines affirmed, probably not wholly without foundation, that it had been abandoned by the Athenian colonists.\* For the Athenians, therefore, even a short suspension of hostilities, not requiring any farther sacrifice, but leaving both parties as they stood, would be a clear gain; and it seemed reasonable to presume that Philip did not expect they should purchase the peace which he so freely offered by any injurious or degrading concession. Such were manifestly the views of Demosthenes himself: however little he might be inclined to believe Philip's professions of goodwill, he thought it plainly expedient to meet his advances so far as to discover on what terms he was willing to treat.

But the motives which induced Philip to wish for peace with Athens were by no means equally evident; for there can hardly have been any of his contemporaries—unless, perhaps, Isocrates—who attributed his offers to pure generosity; and but few of the more intelligent who really believed—though Demosthenes professed to think so—that the damage which his coasts and commerce suffered from the Athenian cruisers and privateers drove him to this mode of seeking relief.† On the other hand, it would be rating Philip's sagacity too highly to suppose that, when he first invited the Athenians to negotiation, he clearly foresaw the advantages which he was to reap from it. Demosthenes, in a later review of these transactions, ascribed Philip's offers, not to the annoyance which he suffered from the Athenian privateers, but to his fear that the Thebans, exhausted by the Sacred War, might be forced to take refuge in the protection of Athens.‡ But even this explanation, though it no doubt comes much nearer to the truth than the other, is not satisfactory, unless we take into the account some of the facts which have been mentioned, which

seem to throw the requisite light on it. The weakness of Thebes in itself was certainly no reason why she should seek an alliance with Athens. Unless she had some ground to expect that the Athenians would acknowledge and support her claim to the sovereignty of Boeotia, it was more likely that she should address herself to Philip, who had already declared himself on her side. But the connexion which he saw the Athenians endeavouring, not without an appearance of success, to form with Megalopolis, beside that it interfered with his views in Peloponnesus, might well alarm him, as a step towards a reconciliation with Thebes. And if about the same time a revolution took place in Phocis, which placed the supreme power in the hands of men who discovered a more tractable spirit, while it proved that a settlement of the quarrel could not be long delayed, this must have quickened his apprehensions, and have afforded an additional motive for the attempt to divert the Athenians from this project by the prospect of peace. He might foresee that, if they were thus relieved from their fears of him, they would never consent to any measure which would strengthen the neighbour whom they still hated and dreaded.

Thus, then, to us Philip's object may appear sufficiently intelligible; but it was scarcely possible that it should be suspected by the mass of the Athenians, or, perhaps, by their most sagacious statesmen, until it was partially revealed by subsequent events. Hence arose, as we have observed, the distrust with which they received his friendly messages as news too good to be believed; and it was, probably, rather to satisfy the people than because they were credulous themselves that the orators suggested the thought, which was the most flattering to Athenian pride, that Philip was no less distressed and weakened by the war than Athens, and that peace was a boon which he solicited from Athenian generosity. It was, apparently, to strengthen this persuasion that Philocrates now moved a decree, which was voted unanimously, that Philip should have leave to send a herald and ambassadors to Athens to treat for peace. Notwithstanding this unanimity, there were, it seems, orators who thought this a favourable opportunity for a display of extraordinary patriotism, which could not be better shown than by professions of implacable animosity towards Philip. One Lycinus impeached Philocrates as the author of an illegal decree—assuredly not because negotiation with Philip had ever been expressly forbidden, but on the ordinary ground of objections on the score of policy. The tone taken seems to have been, that it was degrading to Athens to meet the advances of the barbarian until she had humbled him still more, and had avenged herself for the wrongs she had suffered from him.\* Philocrates, disabled by the state of his health from pleading his own cause without assistance, called in Demosthenes as his advocate: proof, undoubtedly, that Demosthenes was already decided in favour of peace; for between him and Philocrates—a man, it seems, of notoriously profligate character—there was no bond of union except a temporary coincidence on a political question. The defendant was

had taken place, OI., c. viii., 1, and was only used as a pretext, the petition might have seemed to have been too long deferred.

\* De F. L., § 302. De Cor., § 185.

† De Cor., § 23.

\* De F. L., § 73.

\* Æschines, De F. L., § 77.

acquitted, and Lycinus did not even obtain the number of votes necessary to screen him from the penalty of a calumnious charge. Not long after, Aristodemus returned from his embassy. His report was anticipated by one of the prisoners in whose behalf he had been sent, who, having been released without ransom, brought an account of Philip's amicable professions which was fully confirmed by Aristodemus, when he appeared before the Five Hundred, with the addition that Philip had expressed, not only much good-will towards Athens, but a wish to become her ally. Demosthenes was a member of this council, which had just entered into office, and he proposed that the honour of a crown should be bestowed on Aristodemus: a token of satisfaction, not only with his conduct, but with the result of his embassy.

Sufficient ground had now been laid for the final step. A decree was carried, on the motion of Philocrates, for the appointment of ten ambassadors, who were to treat with Philip, and to desire him to send ambassadors to Athens, with full powers. The envoys appointed were all men of eminence for station or ability, or recommended by the share they had taken in the preliminary proceedings. Their names were, Ctesiphon, Aristodemus, Phrynon, Iatocles, Philocrates, Demosthenes, Æschines, Nausicles, Dercylus, Cimon. With them was joined Aglaocreon of Tenedos, as the representative of the allies who held their congress at Athens.

The services of Aristodemus were deemed so valuable that, on the motion of Demosthenes, envoys were sent to several cities where he was engaged for the exercise of his art, to obtain his release from the penalties under which he had bound himself to appear there on the stage.\*

Such was the origin of that famous negotiation which some years later gave occasion to the two pleadings of Æschines and his great adversary, who prosecuted him for misconduct in the discharge of his commission. To these speeches we are principally indebted for our information on the transactions now to be related; and they abound in details which would have rendered them even more valuable than an ordinary history, if, unhappily, the opposite views and interests of the orators had not led both of them to suppress or distort the truth, and to contradict one another and themselves in a manner which renders it one of the most difficult historical problems to extract a clear and consistent story from their conflicting statements. The event so utterly disappointed all the hopes with which the negotiation was open-

ed by the Athenians, that each felt it necessary to disclaim as much as he could of the part he took in the steps which led to such a disastrous result. Demosthenes charges Æschines with a corrupt and treasonable attempt to deceive the people on a point of vital importance to its interests. Æschines defends himself with the plea that he shared a common delusion, from which his accuser was not exempt more than others. Demosthenes, with regard to his posthumous reputation for patriotism, might safely have admitted all that is alleged against him by his adversary on this subject; for, if true, it proved nothing either against his honesty, or even his sagacity, but only that he had been deceived by artifices through which it was scarcely possible for any human discernment to penetrate, and had not discovered a secret which no one suspected. Here we see traces of a weakness which must not be palliated as the infirmity of a noble mind, and which evidently betrayed him into disingenuous concealment of truth, if not into positive falsehood. Nor, even while we must admire his eloquence, can we sympathize with the tone in which he attacks his adversary, which is in disadvantageous contrast with the moderation and dignity which he preserves in his deliberative orations. We cannot help suspecting that he feels less indignation than he expresses; and we see that he is accommodating his language to a vicious moral taste, which delighted in virulent invectives, and countenanced the widest departure from truth for the sake of oratorical effect. All this, indeed, is equally apparent on the other side; and, therefore, independently of the deep shade of suspicion which rests on the political honesty of Æschines, we cannot without prejudice admit the graver charges which he brings against his enemy's private character. These, indeed, would cast an indelible stain on it; but they may be all mere calumnies; they can neither be proved nor refuted. All that we must disapprove in Demosthenes belongs, as we have already remarked, not simply to the man, but to his country, his age, and the sphere in which he moved.

The commission of the ten envoys is only described to us in general terms; we do not know the expectations with which they set out, or the instructions which they had received;\* only it seems that the people had been encouraged to hope that Philip might consent to the restitution of Amphipolis. With respect to Thrace, the chief object must have been the security of the Chersonesus. Cersobleptes was not an ally for whom much anxiety could be felt, except so far as his territories might be considered as bulwarks of the Athenian possessions and the Greek cities on the Hellespont, against Macedonia. But as to the most interesting question, the manner in which the affairs of Thebes and Phocis were to be adjusted, it is very doubtful whether the people at large, or

\* Leland (ii., p. 57) and a later historian infer, from the allusive allusions which Demosthenes makes to the theatrical performances of Æschines, that he held the profession of Aristodemus in contempt, and that it was esteemed degrading even at Athens; as if no profession could be reputable that was ever practised by bunglers. The instance before us certainly does not favour the supposition that the art which had been practised by Æschylus and Sophocles had fallen into contempt. Of Demosthenes Grynæ observes (u. a., p. 35): *Is quanto studio hosce homines (histriones) prosequens sit, quis est qui nesciat?* The well-known remark of Nepos (*Prof.*), *In scenam prodire nemini in eisdem gentibus fuit turpissimum*, might seem sufficiently decisive as to this point. Aristotle's observation (*Probl.*, xxx., 10: *Aul. Gell.*, N. A., xi., 14) on the ordinary habits and character of actors in his day—which is equally applicable in modern times—does not affect this question.

\* Hence it has been observed, "Immediate deputies of a multitude, they appear to have received no precise instructions;" as if the immediate deputies of a multitude might not, in the decree which appointed them, receive instructions as precise as the ambassador of a sultan. It seems to have been only on points on which secrecy was necessary that Athenian envoys were left to their own discretion. Æschines. *De F. L.*, § 107: *Ἀνεγνώσθη μὲν τὸ ψήφισμα καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νόμῳ, καὶ τὰ προεταγμένα ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ δόκου ἀπολαβεῖν ἐννεμηθρομένη.*

any party, was conscious of a distinct plan, or had formed more than general hopes or wishes, which were to remain in suspense until Philip's intentions should be discovered. The uncertainty and confusion which had hitherto prevailed on this subject had been much heightened by the new turn which events had taken in Phocis about the same time that the embassy was decreed. Through some reaction, the causes of which are entirely unknown, Phaleucus had been reinstated in his office, and had recovered his power. Diodorus mentions the fact without the slightest explanation, and does not give so much as a hint to assist conjecture.\* He represents the new government as having mercenaries in abundance at its command, and as so prosperous in the war that the Thebans were now forced to implore succour from Philip, who sent some troops, but in very small numbers,† merely sufficient to show a decent interest in their cause. That he should not have sent a larger force, when he was looking forward to a negotiation with Athens, is intelligible enough; but the total silence of the orators renders the statement of Diodorus on this point extremely suspicious; for, however trifling the effects of Philip's interference at this time might be, it was still an indication of design, which must have excited much attention at Athens, and, we should have supposed, have been eagerly seized as a handle for reasoning or declamation. We next hear of a defeat which the Phocians suffered at Abæ, where they were building a fortress, perhaps to curb the town, which—whether through religious associations maintained by its temple, or from any other cause—was known to be adverse to the war. But there is no reason to imagine that this reverse—which seems to have been chiefly memorable because it was attended with an accidental conflagration of the temple, where some of the Phocian troops took refuge—at all shook the credit of the government. We must, therefore, confine ourselves to the bare fact that it was forced to give way, and that, on the eve of its fall, it applied to the Athenians for aid, and offered to put them in possession of Alponus, Thronium, and Nicæa, three places on the eastern coast, which commanded the pass of Thermopylæ. They, of course, gladly embraced an offer which placed so important a barrier in their hands. Proxenus, their general, was ordered to take possession of the towns; and a fleet of fifty galleys, and a general levy of citizens under the age of thirty, was decreed for the expedition.‡

Whether resistance was apprehended, as these preparations may seem to indicate, we are not informed. Proxenus, however, set out with a much smaller force, but arrived too late. He found the government changed, and the three towns occupied by the adherents of Phaleucus. The envoys who had invited the Athenians were thrown into prison on their return, and Athens was openly treated as an enemy by the restored general, and even insulted in the persons of her heralds, who, about this time, were proclaiming the solemn truce of the Eleusinian mysteries. Phaleucus, however, had given no farther intimation of the course he meant to pursue. The Athenians, though offended with his conduct, may have distinguished between his party and the public cause; and, even if their resentment was kindled against the Phocians, it was certainly not strong enough to overpower their jealousy and hatred of Thebes. Their position between the belligerents had by this revolution been rendered more unsettled and perplexing than before.

So great was the general eagerness for the treaty at Athens, that the envoys did not wait for the return of a herald, who had been sent before them to obtain a safe-conduct, and who was appointed, it seems, to meet them at Oreus, in Eubœa; they did not even stop when they reached Oreus, but immediately crossed over into Thessaly, though a Macedonian army under Parmenio was at this time besieging Halus, which lay on their way, and they were obliged to obtain the general's permission to pass through his lines. It is to the accidental mention of this fact, with which Demosthenes illustrates the zeal shown by his colleagues on this journey, that we owe our information on Philip's proceedings in Thessaly. He had undertaken the siege of Halus, not, it appears, on account of any provocation which he himself had received, but because it resisted the claims of the Pharsalians, who, as old enemies of the tyrants of Phœræ, were probably his firm allies. It was one of the welcome occasions which the state of Thessaly might frequently furnish him for armed interference. Halus, on the other hand, had entered into alliance with Athens, but not, it seems, on terms which entitled her to demand succours. He himself remained at Pella, partly, perhaps, to receive the Athenian embassy; but he was also making preparations for another expedition into Thrace. The envoys, having met their herald at Larissa, proceeded without delay to the Macedonian court. During the journey it appears, from the reluctant admission of Æschines, that he and Demosthenes were apparently on a footing of closer intimacy with each other than with most of their colleagues, for only Iatrocles and the Tenedian shared their repasts, though each of the orators is anxious to make it appear that the other made the first advances. If we may believe Æschines, the main subject of their conferences was the claim to Amphipolis, as to which, when one of their colleagues expressed his fears that Philip might have the advantage in argument, Demosthenes boasted that he should be able to silence him, and to induce

\* He only says, xvi., 59, that when Philip afterward came to invade Phocia, he found Phaleucus *αὐτὸν τῆς στρατηγίας ἔχοντα*. Gemistius Pletho, indeed, iii., 14, fills up the blank thus: *Φαλαίκος δὲ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῃσιν ἰδίᾳ τι ἐκλεχόμενος τῶν χρημάτων, ἀλλ' ἐς τὴν στρατιάν ἀπαντα ἀνέλασεν, ἐς τὴν στρατηγίαν αὐτὸς δὲ ἀποκρίσθη*. But it is uncertain whether this is anything more than an inference which he drew from Diodorus; and even if Diodorus had made the statement, we should not the less have suspected that the restoration of Phaleucus was not brought about in so quiet and legal a manner as it seems to imply. The proceedings against the other culprits, who were evidently treated as his friends or ministers, had been too violent.

† His words, indeed, xvi., 58, are *οὐκ ὀλίγους*; but the context plainly requires the omission of the negative.

‡ Æschines, De F. L., § 140. It surely requires a singularly jaundiced eye to perceive *scandalous perfidy* in this transaction; and all the boldness, as well as ingenuity, of a practiced sycophant were needed to represent the revolution which restored Phaleucus as the motive that induced De-

mosthenes to favour the negotiation with Macedonia, of which Æschines shows he had been a principal mover long before.

him to restore it to Athens. But there is reason to suspect that *Æschines*\* either devised or overcharges this anecdote, to heighten the effect of the scene which he next describes, in which he endeavours to place his adversary's behaviour in the most odious and contemptible light.

It is, however, from him alone that we have any account of the audience in which the main business of the embassy appears to have been transacted; and the silence of his rival on this subject in some degree confirms his report, as it proves that Demosthenes could advance nothing concerning it which he thought favourable to himself or his cause. On the other hand, *Æschines*, whose sole object was to exhibit a contrast the most honourable to himself between his adversary's conduct and his own, has dwelt on matters either merely personal or comparatively unimportant, and has passed over the substance of the negotiation in total silence. It had been agreed among the envoys that they should address the king in the order of seniority; and Demosthenes happened to be the youngest. It therefore fell to the turn of *Æschines* to speak before him; and in his defence of himself he reports what he must have deemed the most important part of his speech. It was entirely confined to the question of Amphipolis, entered at large into all the grounds, mythical and historical, on which the Athenians rested their pretensions to the place, and recounted the services which Iphicrates had rendered to the royal family after the death of Amyntas. The orator does not intimate that he touched upon any other subject; yet Demosthenes could afterward assert that he had not so much as mentioned this;† but this is apparently no more than a violent exaggeration of the admission which *Æschines* afterward made, that he had not said all he could on this head, which his adversary seems to have distorted into a confession that he said nothing at all on it.

At last Demosthenes rose. We can easily believe that the expectations both of the king and his court had been highly excited, not, as *Æschines* insinuates, by what they had heard of his boastful professions on the journey, but by the fame of his eloquence, which may by this time have begun to spread over Greece; and it is not difficult to imagine that his consciousness of the peculiar attention which he drew from hearers, who, he was aware, listened to him with no friendly curiosity, and the anxiety which he must have felt to support his reputation on this new occasion, may have deprived him of his presence of mind, and have deranged the whole order of his thoughts. According to *Æschines*, after a short and very confused opening, he hesitated, grew more and more embarrassed, and at last was obliged to break off; and, though Philip politely encouraged him to recollect himself and proceed, could not recover the thread of his speech. The envoys were then desired to withdraw, to allow the king time to consider his answer.

The only reason we have for doubting the truth of this story is that *Æschines*, as he himself avows, made an entirely different report on

his return in the assembly, and that he explains this contradiction by a pretence which is utterly incredible, and not very honourable to him if believed. After a short interval, during which he represents himself as taxed with rashness by Demosthenes for the freedom with which he had pleaded for the rights of the commonwealth, the envoys were recalled into the presence-chamber, and were addressed by Philip in a long speech, in which he noticed all the principal arguments he had heard; but it was more especially to those of *Æschines*, according to his own account, that the reply was directed: to Demosthenes there was nothing to be said. Amphipolis, therefore, we are led to conclude, was the main, if not the only subject of the king's answer. Yet it was known that Philip was on the point of marching to Thrace; and the danger which threatened the Chersonesus was not overlooked: Philip promised that he would not invade it until the question of peace or war should have been decided at Athens. Some discussion also must have taken place on the subject of Cardia, since its independence was expressly recognised in the subsequent treaty. As to the part taken by Aglaocreon, we have no information; nor as to the nature of the interests which he represented. Yet his presence seems to imply that one of the questions which had been expected to arise related to the allies of Athens, who were to be included in the treaty. If this question was agitated, it could scarcely, we should suppose, have failed to bring the affairs of Phocis under consideration. And the sequel appears to show that something was said on this subject, though Philip did not unfold his views. The ambassadors, on their departure, were charged with a letter from him to the people, and he promised that his ministers should speedily follow them to Athens.

It was natural to suppose that Demosthenes, if he had experienced so mortifying a failure, should have been anxious to conceal it. But the artifice which *Æschines* represents him to have practised for that purpose on the journey homeward is so grossly improbable, that it leads us to suspect violent exaggeration, at least, in the preceding part of his narrative. Demosthenes, we are told, now endeavoured, by flattery and affectation of extraordinary good-humour, to ingratiate himself with his colleagues, more particularly with *Æschines*. In a convivial hour, when they were all conversing on the subject of their audience, he playfully alluded to his own embarrassment, and expressed the highest admiration for Philip's talents and address: *Æschines* was thus induced to make a remark on the king's retentive memory and ready eloquence; and Ctesiphon, who was the eldest among them, declared that in the course of his life he had never met with a person of such gracious and winning manners, especially at the festive board. This gave Demosthenes an opportunity of challenging them to repeat these praises before the Athenian assembly: they were simple enough to fall into the snare, and engaged to do so; and *Æschines*, at the earnest entreaty of Demosthenes, promised to report to the people that he too had spoken in vindication of the claim to Amphipolis, and that he himself had purposely left some

\* De F. L., § 20. Dem., De F. L., § 12.

† De F. L., § 264.

part of the subject in his hands:\* as if this collusion could have stopped the mouths of their colleagues, whom Demosthenes, if we believe the story, was about to provoke by a malignant and wanton attack.†

The ambassadors on their return first made a summary report of their proceedings, and presented Philip's letter to the council; and Demosthenes, as a member, moved the ordinary compliment of an honorary chaplet, and an invitation to the public table, accompanying the motion, according to Æschines, with a high eulogy on the talents and fidelity with which all his colleagues, and Æschines in particular, had discharged their commission. But when they appeared before the assembly to give a fuller account of their embassy, where they delivered their reports in the order of seniority, they were surprised to find his tone entirely altered. The praises which, in fulfilment of their imprudent stipulation, they bestowed on Philip only afforded Demosthenes an opportunity of decrying his merit—a topic more welcome to his audience—and in answer to Æschines, who, according to his promise, threw a veil over his failure at Pella with some sacrifice of his own credit, he denied the obligation with an insulting remark, that it was one which it did not belong to his colleague's character to confer: he liked to display his eloquence too well to part with a subject for any one's sake. Æschines, with reason, bids his hearers observe the capricious inconsistency, as well as the perfidious cunning of his adversary; and we must add that the conduct imputed to Demosthenes does not fall within the range of ordinary human motives. These unprovoked affronts, offered to persons on whose forbearance his reputation depended, were not necessary for any purpose that Æschines assigns. The most important part of the business for which the assembly was called was left by the preceding speakers to Demosthenes. It was on his motion that the Macedonian herald, who, it seems, had accompanied the Athenian envoys, was received with the usual forms, that a safe-conduct was granted to the expected ambassadors, and that two assemblies were appointed to be held to decide on the proposals of peace and alliance, on two successive days, which, as they were known to be already on their road, were fixed on the eighteenth and nineteenth of the month, leaving an interval of nine or ten days, which, it was supposed, would be sufficient for the remainder of their journey.

Æschines does not mention any debate as having arisen on the motion; and yet it seems to have involved the only question on which any difference of opinion remained. The people had already determined for peace, and knew the conditions on which Philip insisted; that it must abandon its claims to Amphipolis, and recog-

nise the independence of Cardia; but it probably felt much less interest in either of these subjects than in the issue of the struggle between Thebes and Phocis. Jealousy of Thebes was still the prevailing political feeling at Athens; and though Thebes had been brought very low by the war, it was easy to foresee that the Phocians could not hold out much longer, and that, if they should be forced to yield, either through the failure of their resources, or by Philip's intervention, their enemy might not only speedily recover the Bœotian towns which had been wrested from her, but might acquire a great addition to her power. Such an event would put an end to all the hopes which the Athenians never ceased to cherish of regaining Oropus, would endanger their possessions in Eubœa, and would leave Thebes again predominant, and enable her to renew her attempts to establish her influence in Peloponnesus. The Phocian cause, therefore, was not to be abandoned; the triumph of Thebes was to be prevented at any risk; but it was an important and very difficult question, whether the better way of attaining the object was to make an open stand in favour of the Phocians in the pending negotiation, and to get them included in the treaty, or to trust to certain appearances, which were thought to portend a favourable termination of the contest, and to render all exertions of the Athenians unnecessary in their behalf. The decision of this question was seen to depend on Philip's intentions with regard to the contending parties; but at Athens these were still only matter of conjecture. If it had been known that he was not only hostile to the Phocians, but disposed to promote the interests of Thebes, then, if peace with him was still considered desirable, it would at least have been fit that it should be accompanied with every possible precaution against the dreaded danger. But if, on the contrary, Philip's views coincided as to the main point with those of Athens, if he was no less averse to the extension or restoration of the power of Thebes, then it might be unnecessary, and even impolitic, to make any stipulations on behalf of Phocis, and it might be expedient that her name should not be mentioned in the treaty.

At Athens, however, Philip's designs could only be matter for very uncertain conjecture. Yet there were indications, which, even if they had not been interpreted by eager wishes, might have seemed to warrant a persuasion that more was to be hoped than to be feared from him. It did not appear that his interest could be promoted by the aggrandizement of Thebes. On the contrary, the same policy which induced him, as well as Athens, notwithstanding her alliance with Sparta, to take part with Messene, would, it might be supposed, lead him to protect the independence of the inferior Bœotian towns. In the long contest between Thebes and Phocis he had hitherto kept aloof; for, though he had repelled the Phocians from Thessaly, he had done nothing in behalf of Thebes. The letter, too, which he had sent by the Athenian ambassadors contained a passage, cited without contradiction by Demosthenes, which seemed to favour these hopes. It expressed a desire for alliance, as well as peace with Athens, and hinted at some important benefit which he designed to confer on her, as soon as their amicable relations were

\* This is clearly the meaning of the text, § 46, *ἵεσθαι μὴ παραλίπειν*, κ. τ. λ.; but it seems as clearly to need emendation to reconcile it with § 51, 55, and with Demosth., De F. L., § 284.

† It appears that in Valckenaer's time there were doubts about the truth of the story. He says in a note to his *Orat. De Phil. Maced.*, p. 276, "De re que coram tot testibus evenit, quamquam negare nunquam sustinuit Demosthenes (how could he, when his adversary had the last word!) *quæ a nonnimine dubitatum memini, verba quedam adscribam accurate quæ euenit narratio*—who, does the reader suppose?—Æschines." A strange authority to silence such doubts.

firmly cemented. But whether the expectation was reasonable or absurd, we have sufficient evidence that it existed at Athens; for even in the first Philippic Demosthenes mentions it as one of the reports of the day. And the sequel will be found to render it probable that some pains had been taken to impress the Athenian ambassadors with the same belief during their stay in Macedonia. But if such were Philip's intentions, he could not openly declare them, so long as it was convenient to him to keep up an appearance of friendship with Thebes; and to introduce an article into the treaty which would force him prematurely to disclose them, must have appeared to those Athenians who believed they were in the secret the very way to frustrate their own wishes.

Such seem to have been the views with which Demosthenes himself returned from Philip's court, and by which he was governed in all the steps which he took to hasten the conclusion of the treaty. He does not venture to acknowledge the delusion by which he had been misled, pardonable as it was, because the confession would have strengthened his adversary's plea; but his conduct can hardly be explained on any other supposition. It appears likewise to furnish a key to the meaning of several statements in which the rival orators most directly contradict each other and themselves. *Æschines* asserts that ambassadors had been sent from Athens into various parts of Greece to excite the Greeks against Philip, who had not yet returned when he and his colleagues reached home. He makes it the ground of a grave charge against Demosthenes, that by his precipitate measures he prevented the people from waiting for the return of these envoys, and thus deprived it of the advantage which it would have gained if it had treated in concert with other states; he appeals to a state paper, the existence of which is attested by Demosthenes himself, and which seems at first sight conclusive evidence of the fact. The deputies of the states which still adhered to the Athenian confederacy were at this time assembled at Athens; they had probably been summoned for purposes connected with the treaty; and, according to *Æschines*, they passed a resolution in their congress, in which they mentioned that embassies had been sent to rouse the Greeks to the defence of their liberty, and had not yet returned; and recommended that when the ambassadors should have returned, and have made their reports, two assemblies should be held to consult on the proposed treaty with Philip. That such a congress was sitting, and that it made some proposal relating to the treaty, is admitted by Demosthenes, who asserts that he supported the same measure. But he denies that any envoys had been sent on the mission mentioned by *Æschines*, which, as he observes, would have been a piece of most shameless and useless treachery, if the Athenians were at the same time negotiating for peace. Yet in his accusation of *Æschines* one of his charges is, that, after his return from Macedonia, he made an offensive speech in the presence of the envoys who had been invited to Athens from various Greek states, on his own proposal, made before he had sold himself to Philip. *Æschines*, in answer, challenges him to produce the name of any one

such envoy who was present on the occasion, and is willing to stake his cause on this fact.

On the part of Demosthenes, however, the seeming contradiction may be resolved into a very slight exaggeration. The envoys of whom he speaks were probably not the ministers of any independent states, but the deputies of the allies of Athens, who were undoubtedly in the city at the time; so that he might consistently deny that any others were expected. But *Æschines* likewise, in the course of the same speech, distinctly contradicts the statement which he pretends to prove by the proposition of the congress; for he defends himself against the charge of political apostasy by a plea, which clearly implies that, after his embassy to Peloponnesus, no farther attempt had been made to instigate any Greek states against Philip.\* It is also clear that he knew of but one resolution of the congress relating to this subject; but on another occasion he gives a totally different account of its contents, according to which it made no allusion to any past embassies, but simply proposed that any Greek state might be admitted to a share in the treaty which should apply for leave within the next three months.† Which of these is the more correct report is a question of little importance; the great difficulty lies in the fact that the congress did make one or other, or both, of these propositions. That they should have proceeded from independent states in alliance with Athens, which might wish as many others as possible to be associated with them in the treaty, would, indeed, be easy enough to understand; but it is not so clear with what object they could have been made by the deputies of the tributary allies, who had little concern in the war with Philip, or must have wished to see it brought as soon as possible to an end: and if the measure was not their own spontaneous act, it would still remain to be explained how, and from what motive, it was suggested to them. We might, perhaps, have suspected that the design of its authors was merely to invite some of the northern maritime states—as the Greek cities on the Hellespont—to take part in the treaty, both with the view of protecting them from Philip's encroachments, and to unite them more closely with Athens. But if this had been the object, some allusion to it would probably have been found in one of the orators; and certainly this was not the subject which was at this time uppermost in the minds of the Athenians; their attention was, we know, more anxiously directed to objects nearer home: to the fate of Phocis and of Thebes. We are, therefore, led to conclude that the real aim of those who framed the resolution of the congress was no other than to invite the Phocians to share the benefits of the treaty. There may have been many men of all parties at Athens who thought this expedient, and it is possible that the congress was only employed as an instrument to effect their end, in what might appear the fittest manner, on account of the ambiguous relation in which Athens had stood to Phocis since the restoration of *Phalæcus*. But there is also another way in which it seems possible to account for this extraordinary ac-

\* De F. L., § 84, στένους ἀνθρώπων ἐπικουρούμενος πᾶσι.  
† Ctes., § 70.

tivity of an assembly which was usually very insignificant, and which appears in this instance to be moving out of its sphere. If the congress was on this occasion attended by a Spartan deputy, he might well think that, for the interests of Sparta, it was highly desirable to place Phocis under the protection of the treaty; and the resolution may have been adopted on his motion.

Whatever may have been the views of Demosthenes, there can be no doubt as to one part of his conduct—that he exerted himself strenuously to promote peace, and that he supported the proposal, which was deemed much more questionable, for alliance with Philip. Soon after the day of the assembly in which he and his colleagues made their report, Philip's ambassadors arrived. They were three of the most eminent among the many able generals and statesmen in his service—Antipater, Parmenio, and Eurylochus. It was not, it seems, within the legitimate functions of any Athenian magistrate to provide for the reception of foreign ambassadors. This charge was usually undertaken by some citizen who was connected by the kind of private alliance which has been often mentioned with the state that sent them. We must suppose that the King of Macedonia had no proxenus at Athens; for we find that Demosthenes took upon himself all the offices of hospitality which it would have belonged to such a person to perform towards the Macedonian envoys. They fell, indeed, on him with a certain propriety, as he was a member of the council—it seems the only one—who had been on the late embassy to Macedonia. The attentions which he paid to them were the more conspicuous, because it happened that they arrived just on the eve of the great Dionysiac festival. It might, indeed, be considered incumbent on him to present them to the council, to make the ordinary motion by which they were invited to the seat of honour in the theatre, and to conduct and attend upon them there. But it seems that even in this respect he did more than was necessary or usual; though we need not believe his adversary's assertion, that there was anything so extravagant in his civilities as to incur public disapprobation. He himself, however, did not scruple to avow that he entertained them,\* and with extraordinary magnificence. The Macedonians prided themselves on the splendour of their hospitality; and he thought it proper, he says, to show them that an Athenian citizen could display as much liberality and good taste. But this was probably only one of his motives; and it can hardly be doubted that it was his wish, by these signal marks of respect, to testify as strongly as he could his anxiety for peace. Of this, indeed, if we might believe his adversary,† he had given a still more striking proof in a motion by which he proposed the eighth day of the month for the deliberation on the treaty; for this was a festival of Æsculapius, on which an assembly had never been held before.

The proceedings of the two assemblies on the eighteenth and nineteenth are so distorted by the contradictory statements of the rival ora-

tors, that it is hardly possible to discover the real course of the debates, or the precise nature of the questions which were agitated. Each is anxious to shift the odium of the measure which was finally carried, and of all association with its author Philocrates, from himself on the other: each represents himself as supporting, and the other as opposing, the proposition of the allies. The truth evidently lies between them, but apparently more on the side of Æschines. By the proposition of the allies, the treaty would, it seems, have been delayed, either for three months, or for an indefinite time; and this was certainly contrary to the views of Demosthenes. There was room, indeed, to apprehend that such a delay would afford Philip a pretext for invading the Chersonesus, which he had not promised to spare as long as it might suit the interests of the Athenians to keep the negotiation in suspense. But the principal question that arose on the terms of the treaty concerned the Phocians. Philip's ambassadors had declared that he would not permit them or Halus to be included in it among the allies of Athens. Hence the orators seem to have been divided into three parties on this subject. There were some, it appears, who made this and the other demands of Philip—as the cession of Amphipolis, the recognition of the independence of Cardia—a ground for breaking off the treaty. It was probably to repel their attempts that Æschines entered into a review of the various occasions on which the people had been misled by evil counsellors to reject advantageous offers of peace,\* and that Eubulus bade the assembly consider how it was to provide for the cost of a fresh war.† But, on the other hand, Philocrates proposed not only to accede to all Philip's demands, but even expressly to exclude the Phocians and Halus from the treaty. To this extreme it is probable Demosthenes and Æschines were both opposed: and thus we see how the arguments of each might have a double aspect, which made it easy, with some colour of truth, to exhibit them in opposite lights. Philocrates found that, on this point, the sense of the people was against him, and he was obliged to drop both the names. Another difference of opinion which divided those who were in favour of peace arose on the question of alliance. Æschines says that when the first day's assembly broke up, the general impression was that a peace was to be concluded, but that the alliance was to be declined, and that the peace was to be shared by every Greek state that wished to be included in it, and that the alliance was only carried by an artifice of Demosthenes, who the next day called up Antipater before the assembly, and, by means of some preconceived questions, persuaded the people that the peace could not safely be separated from the alliance.‡ Thus both were decreed, and, it appears, on the terms dictated by Philip.

\* De F. L., § 78, foll.

† Dem., De F. L., § 332.

‡ Here is a point in which Æschines betrays the weakness of his own defence. Demosthenes (F. L., § 17) charged him with speaking on the second day on the side of Philocrates, in contradiction to the opinion he had delivered the day before. The defence of Æschines is, that the second day, according to the decree moved by Demosthenes, was to be entirely occupied with voting, and that no speaking was then allowed (ἀγῶν μὴ προσηύθυνεν, τὴν δὲ προσηύρων ἀκούων, οὐκ ἔφη εἰσέν, F. L., § 69). Yet in Ctes., § 71,

\* Εἰθύια, F. L., § 200. But it does not appear that, as Leland supposes, they were lodged at his house.

† Ctes., § 67.

A strong indication that the affairs of Phocis were the main subjects of discussion in these debates is, that throughout them, according to Æschines, no mention was made of Cersobleptes. He had at this time no representative to protect his interests at Athens. But before the day came on which the deputies present in the congress were to take the oaths in ratification of the treaty to the Macedonian ambassadors, one Critobulus of Lampsacus appeared on his behalf; and, in an assembly in which Demosthenes happened to preside, a motion was made that the treaty should be ratified by his envoy, together with the other allies of Athens. This motion, if we believe Æschines, was carried, though Demosthenes, as long as he safely could, resisted the wishes of the assembly; but if this was the case, we must suppose that Philip's envoys afterward refused to let Critobulus take the oath; for that he should have been prevented by either of the orators, as each asserted of the other, sounds quite incredible; and it is certain that his name was not annexed to the treaty. It appears that there was ground for a question whether Cersobleptes was entitled to be considered as an ally of Athens; and, in a letter written some years afterward, Philip alleges that the envoy of Cersobleptes was prevented from taking the oath by the Athenian generals, the board before which the treaty was ratified. But the generals could no more than either of the orators have taken upon them to decide such a question, especially against the decree of the assembly: the objection must have been raised by the Macedonians, and, perhaps, was reserved, by mutual consent, to be discussed in a conference with Philip, for which it was expected that an early opportunity would be afforded, when he signed the treaty. Demosthenes continued his hospitable attentions to the Macedonian ambassadors as long as they remained at Athens, and, on their departure, he not only procured beasts for their journey, but himself accompanied them a part of the way on horseback.\*

Within a very few days after peace was decreed, if not in the same assembly, an embassy was appointed to proceed to Philip's court, to receive the ratification of the treaty from him and his allies. Ten ambassadors were again chosen, and certainly the greater part, probably all, were the same as had been sent on the first embassy:† Aglaocreon also again accompanied them, as the representative of the allies. Demosthenes afterward wished it to be believed that the debates on the peace had raised such suspicions in his mind as to the integrity of his former colleagues, especially Philocrates and Æschines, that he would have declined the office, if he had not undertaken to procure the release of some of the Athenian prisoners who were detained in Macedonia.‡ Æschines treats

he relates that on the second day Demosthenes got the start of all the other speakers—*προκαταλαβάνων το βῆμα, οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων παραλαβὼν λόγον.*

\* Æschines (Ctes., § 76) says εἰς ὄψας—a specimen of rhetorical exaggeration.

† Sprengel (*Ueber die Pseudopsephen*, Rheinisch Museum, ii., p. 383) thinks there could be no need of a fresh election; that the ten ambassadors, who had acquitted themselves in their first mission to the satisfaction of the people, would be confirmed in their office for the purpose of receiving the oaths, as a matter of course.

‡ The account he gives of this transaction is extremely

this as an empty pretext, because Philip had never been used to exact ransom for his Athenian prisoners during the war; and a promise had been given, in his name, that all should be released as soon as peace should be concluded. But it is clear that this related only to those whom he kept in his own hands; and Æschines himself admits that, among the instructions of the second embassy, one was to negotiate for the release of the prisoners. That Demosthenes, however, was especially charged with this commission does not appear,\* though he affects to consider it as the only business for which he could justly be held responsible; and, notwithstanding his vehement obtestation, we cannot believe that he accepted his commission with reluctance, or would willingly have foregone the opportunity of watching the proceedings of his colleagues.

Before their departure, according to Æschines, news arrived from Thrace, which represented the affairs of Cersobleptes as in an utterly desperate condition. It was contained in a despatch from Chares, who, it seems, was still commanding a squadron near the Hellespont. It was, perhaps, not very long before, when Philip's intention of invading the dominions of Cersobleptes became known at Athens, that the people had been obliged to send in search of Chares, with the singular message, that they wondered, when Philip was on his march to the Chersonesus, that they had not so much as been informed where their general and his armament were. Chares had probably been since observing Philip's movements, and the first intelligence received from him was, that Cersobleptes had lost his kingdom, and that Philip had taken possession of the Sacred Mountain, one of the most important places in it. This is the defence which Æschines sets up against his adversary's charge, that Cersobleptes was ruined through his delays. He wishes to prove that nothing remained to be saved in Thrace. This, however, does not follow from the language of Chares, even if he has reported it faithfully. It seems to imply nothing more than that Philip was rapidly advancing towards the conquest of the kingdom; and this is the very ground on which Demosthenes professes to have urged his colleagues to hasten their departure. Even if it had been too late to protect Cersobleptes, there might have been time to interpose between the conqueror and some of the Greek towns on the Thracian coast. Such seems to have been the general impression at Athens, notwithstanding, or, perhaps, in consequence of the intelligence; and, on the motion of Demosthenes, the coun-

perplexing. From F. L., § 169, it would seem that on the first embassy he had promised some of the prisoners to return with their ransom. Yet the narrative in § 166, which appears to be meant as an explanation of this engagement, must be referred to the second embassy, which was the only occasion on which he could say, *ἐν ὧν οὐκ ἔπαυσε τῶ Φιλίππου διατίβων ἐν Πέλλῃ.* Voemel (Proleg. in Orat. de Pace, p. 250) supposes him in these words to be speaking of the first embassy, but has not noticed the extreme difficulty of reconciling this supposition with the context, in which the orator had clearly been describing the occurrences of the second embassy. Nor is there the slightest reason to imagine that Philip was away from Pella when the first embassy arrived there.

\* Winiewski (p. 92, foll.), conjectures that four of the others were likewise charged with special commissions. But the conjecture seems unnecessary, and his arguments for it are all fallacies.



cil, which had been empowered to give such instructions, made an order, on the third of the next month (April), that the envoys should depart without delay, and that Proxenus, who was stationed at Oreus, should convey them to any quarter where they might hear Philip was. In obedience to this order they immediately proceeded to Oreus; but, instead of embarking for the Hellespont, which, Demosthenes says, they could have reached in two or three days, they first lingered in Oreus, and then took a circuitous route to Macedonia, so as to consume three-and-twenty days in the journey. When they arrived at Pella, Philip had not yet returned from Thrace, and they still had to wait nearly a month for him there. *Æschines* admits the waste of time, but pleads that the order of the council did not direct them to go to Thrace. This certainly looks like a paltry evasion, for they were ordered to seek Philip wherever he might be found; and the length of the interval seems to confirm the statements of Demosthenes as to the consequences of their neglect, or, at least, to render it probable that everything was not lost in Thrace before they set out from Athens.

Philip, on his return, found his court crowded with envoys from all parts of Greece; among the rest, from all the states principally concerned in the Sacred War; from Thebes, Thessaly, Phocis, and Sparta. It was now universally notorious that he was about to take some decisive step towards the termination of the contest; the eyes of all Greece were anxiously fixed upon his movements; but his designs were still wrapped in impenetrable obscurity. The Athenian ambassadors, though the express object of their mission was only to procure the ratification of the treaty, and to transact some other business of a formal nature, had received instructions *to promote the interests of the commonwealth in any other way as they might find opportunity*; and the meaning of this clause was sufficiently intelligible at a time when public attention was engrossed by one subject. *Æschines*, however, takes credit to himself for the sagacity with which he discerned the secret object, which it would not have been prudent to intimate more distinctly in the decree under which he and his colleagues were to act; and in a conference which they held together before they were admitted to an audience, he represented to them that it was their duty to plead the cause of the Boeotian towns, and to instigate Philip against Thebes. We collect from his report of the conversation which ensued, that Demosthenes thought nothing would be gained by such an attempt, and that it could only serve to exasperate the Thebans. It was finally agreed that each should use his own discretion in the choice of the topics on which he addressed the king. At the audience, according to *Æschines*, Demosthenes—not abashed by his previous misfortune—though confessedly the youngest, forced his colleagues, notwithstanding the unfriendly terms on which he now stood with them all, to allow him to speak first. But we could more easily believe the story of his failure on the former occasion than what his adversary relates of this; that he excited the ridicule of the by-standers, and put his colleagues to the blush, by a fulsome enumeration

of the good offices he had rendered to Philip's ambassadors at Athens. It was certainly not for such a purpose that he demanded the first turn. *Æschines* is probably more faithful in his report of his own speech. It turned, it seems, on the history of the temple of Delphi, and the Amphictyonic league, and its object was to convince Philip that by the destruction of Thebes and Platæa the Thebans had violated the fundamental laws of the league, and had broken the oath which had been handed down from the times of Amphictyon or Acrisius for the security of the Amphictyonic cities against each other's hostile violence. He acknowledged that the war with Phocis was just and pious; that the Amphictyonic council ought to be reinstated in its ancient authority, and the authors of the sacrilege—the guilty individuals, not the state, if it surrendered them to justice—to be punished; and he exhorted Philip not to sanction the injustice of the Thebans, whom, moreover, he seems to have charged with a design of seizing the sacred treasure for themselves. Excellent arguments, no doubt, for the purpose of enlightening Philip's conscience, but so wide of every other, that when we remember they were addressed to the conqueror of Methone and Olynthus, the orator's simplicity is almost enough to awaken a doubt about his honesty.

For the more private scenes which passed during the embassy's stay at Philip's court, we can still less rely on the statements of either orator. Demosthenes accuses his colleagues, especially *Æschines*, of bribery, and a treasonable clandestine correspondence with Philip; but he seems to admit that the charge rests mainly on his construction of their subsequent conduct. Philip did not ratify the treaty at Pella, but induced the Athenian ambassadors to accompany him on his march through Thessaly as far as Phæræ. The pretext which he alleged for this delay was, that he desired their mediation between the Pharsalians and Halus; but his motive seems clearly to have been that which Demosthenes assigns; he did not wish them to return to Athens before he was ready to invade Phocis.\* The place in which he at length signed the treaty was, according to Demosthenes, one not at all proper for such a solemnity, but favourable, perhaps, to his object; a common inn at Phæræ. Here, it seems, he demanded that the Phocians and Halus should be expressly excluded from the treaty; and Demosthenes says that his colleagues consented

\* The manner in which Demosthenes (De Cor., § 40) has expressed himself on this subject has afforded a handle for an imputation on the Athenians, of ignorance even grosser than might be expected in an English county meeting. Demosthenes, it seems, trusted that his audience were not aware "that nothing could so effectually check the hostile preparation of a power desiring that its preparation should remain a secret, as the presence of the embassies from powers interested to oppose the purpose of the preparation." This ignorance would indeed be surprising in the Athenians, since *Æschines* informs us (Ctes., § 83) that Demosthenes himself used to warn them that Philip's ambassadors were spies. But the wonder ceases when we observe that Demosthenes represents his colleagues as all in Philip's interest; and with regard to himself, he explains how he was prevented from sending home information, unless he had chosen to convey it in a separate despatch. (F. L., § 192.) Why he should not have ventured to take that step is a different question. We have already intimated that he was probably not yet aware of the object of Philip's expedition himself; and this, not the actual preparation, was what Philip desired to keep secret. But on the face of his own statements there is at least no absurdity.

to accept the ratification in this form; and that this was the fact which first roused his suspicions that they were lending themselves to Philip to accomplish the ruin of Phocis.\* Philip, however, had from the first declared by his ambassadors that he did not mean to treat with the Phocians;† and perhaps he was forced, by the remonstrances of the Thebans and the Thesalians, to insist upon this correction of the treaty, though it seems hardly credible that the Athenian ambassadors should have ventured to permit it; so that this fact did not much alter the previous state of things, and could not be considered as a decisive indication of his designs. It is probable, therefore, that the suspicions of Demosthenes were still but feebly excited. He says, indeed, that he proposed a draught of a letter to the people, which his colleagues rejected, and that they sent another instead, full of delusive representations. But we neither hear what were the contents of his letter, nor why he did not send one privately on his own behalf to communicate his doubts and fears. He also asserts that he wished to leave his colleagues, and to return home by himself, and that he had hired a vessel for this purpose, but was not suffered to embark; but any one who is familiar with the manner of the Attic orators will be inclined to suspect that this may have been only a strong way of expressing the fact that, after the ratification of the treaty, he endeavoured as much as he could to hasten the departure of the embassy, and perhaps threatened to return alone. We do not know how long it remained at Phæræ after it had transacted its business; but it set out for Athens, where it arrived on the 10th of June, about the same time that Philip began to move towards Thermopylæ.

The crisis was near at hand; yet Demosthenes contends that there was still time left to avert it, if the Athenians and their allies had not been blinded to the danger by the perfidious arts of Æschines. If the Phocians had united their forces with those of Athens to resist Philip's progress, he would probably have been compelled to abandon his attempt; but even an Athenian armament, not supported by the Phocians, might at least have opposed a formidable obstacle to his passage. He had, however, taken measures to secure himself on both sides, and found means, at the same time, to lull the Athenians into inaction, and to allure the Phocians into submission. The result is much clearer than the machinations by which it was accomplished; yet, with respect to Athens, even these are so plainly disclosed by the concurrent testimony of the two rival orators, that there can be little doubt as to their general nature.

The envoys, on their return, made their re-

port, as on the former occasion, first to the council and then to the assembly. The council-chamber, Demosthenes says, was thronged with spectators;\* perhaps an unusual indication of the public anxiety; and he took this earliest opportunity of protesting against the conduct of his colleagues; and, as he obtained a patient hearing, his charges produced such an effect on the council, that it withheld the vote of thanks, and the invitation to the public table, with which every embassy on its return was usually honoured. The assembly was held on the thirteenth; and here Æschines was heard first. The only difference between him and his adversary, as to the substance of his speech, relates to a point of very slight importance. They perfectly agree as to the main fact: that all he said was adapted to raise expectations in the minds of the people, which proved completely fallacious. Demosthenes asserts that Æschines professed to be thoroughly acquainted with Philip's designs, and assured the people that they might safely remain quiet, and that within a few days they would have news exactly to their wish: Thespiæ and Platææ were to be restored; Thebes to be humbled, deprived of her sovereignty over Bœotia, and even to be called to account for the designs imputed to her on the Delphic temple. The Eubœans, too, as he had learned from one of their ambassadors at the court of Macedonia, were aware that Philip meant to give up their island to Athens as a satisfaction for Amphipolis. Nor were the benefits which they were to expect from him to end here: there was still another in reserve, which the orator had laboured to obtain for them, but which he would not yet mention—a hint, which no one could mistake, at the recovery of Oropus. According to his own account, Æschines had given no pledges, had held out no promises, but had simply related what he had said himself, and what he heard from others on his embassy; he had thought it his duty to inform the people of all the reports which were current among the Greeks on a subject which so deeply interested Athens.† But in another part of the same speech he rests his defence on a very different ground. He asks whether, at the time when he is accused of deceiving the people, all Greece was not under the same error? whether it was not notorious that the Spartan ministers at the Macedonian court were confident and threatening, the Thebans dejected and alarmed? whether the Thessalians did not exultingly proclaim that Philip's expedition was undertaken only on their account! whether some of Philip's chief courtiers had not expressly declared to some of the Athenian ambassadors that their master meant to restore the Bœotian cities! and whether it was not the universal expectation at Athens that he would humble Thebes! That it was, appears certain; but another question is, whether it was not by Æschines himself that it had been so widely diffused! Philip himself was clearly much more guarded; the letter which he sent with the envoys on this occasion was, according to Demosthenes, less encouraging than the for-

\* De F. L., § 49, ἐκ τοῦ, ὅτε τοὺς ὄρκους ἤμελλε Φίλιππος δυνάμει τοῖς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἐκπόνους ἀποφανθῆναι τοὺς θωακίας ἐπὶ τοῦτον, ὁ οὐκ ἔπειν καὶ ἑὴν εἰκὸς ἦν, εἴπερ ἤμελλον σὺλζεσθαι. We have transcribed the passage, that the reader may be able to judge at once whether the following comment on it—though by a contemner of the *idle learned*—can have been the effect of simple carelessness or of honest ignorance. "We find him (Demosthenes) acknowledging that the interest of the Phocians was totally unprovided for in the treaty with Macedonia, and this he justifies so far as to avow that he imputed no ill even to Æschines on that account: οὐκ ἔπειν καὶ ἑὴν εἰκὸς ἦν; it was very well to be silent about it and let it alone."

† Demosth., F. L., § 368, οἱ παρ' ἐκείνου πρέσβεις προύλαγον ὅτιν ἐπὶ θωακίας οὐ προδίδχεται Φιλίππος συμμάχους.

\* De F. L., § 19, μετὸν ἰδιωτῶν, not as Voemel (Proleg. ad Orat. de Pace, p. 267) explains it, *referte imperitiis aemulatoribus*.

† F. L., § 126, βελήφειν οὖν τὴν πόλιν μὲν οὐδὲν λόγου Ἑλληνικοῦ ἀνέκον εἶναι.

mer one. It contained an apology for the delay of the embassy's return, which he took upon himself; threw out a hint about the prisoners, tending to depreciate the merit of the services rendered to them by Demosthenes,\* and gave the most obliging assurances of good-will, but in language which evidently meant nothing. Yet, in the mood which Æschines had inspired, even such professions might seem to confirm his report. Demosthenes says that he endeavoured in vain to awaken a more sober and cautious spirit; he was heard with impatience when he declared that he knew nothing about the truth of the report made by his colleagues; but when he added that he did not believe it, his voice was drowned by popular clamour, which, aided by the taunts of Æschines, and the jests of Philocrates, who said it was no wonder that he and a water-drinker were not of the same way of thinking, reduced him to silence; and the manner in which Æschines meets this assertion confirms rather than disproves it. The prospects which had been exhibited were too dazzling to be readily exchanged for a reality very unwelcome in itself, and imposing the necessity of immediate vigorous exertion. The people rested complacently on its hopes. The interests of the Phocians were an object of subordinate importance; provided Thebes was not exalted by their fall, they might safely be abandoned to Philip's justice and generosity. A decree was carried, on the motion of Philocrates, in which Philip was praised and thanked, and the peace and alliance were extended to his successors; and it was declared that, unless the Phocians consented to deliver up the temple to its rightful guardians, the Amphictyons, Athens herself would lend her aid to compel them. Another embassy was immediately appointed to present this decree to Philip, and, it seems, to attend the council of the Amphictyons, which, it was expected, would shortly be convened to deliberate on the affairs of Phocis. Æschines and Demosthenes were both nominated as ambassadors; but Demosthenes solemnly declined the commission, on a plea confirmed by his oath, as the law in such cases required. Æschines, according to his own account, had returned in ill health from the second embassy, and, though he did not decline the new office, was unable to set out immediately, and obtained leave to stay behind. His adversary treats this as a mere pretext; and it seems probable that, if Demosthenes had gone, he would not have stayed at home.

Thus, then, Philip's object was completely attained at Athens, and the Phocians were deprived of the aid of their nearest and most powerful ally. How far their deliberations were swayed, or their fate determined, by these proceedings of the Athenian assembly, is still a doubtful question, on which we cannot come to any satisfactory conclusion, because we are not sufficiently acquainted with the state of parties in Phocis, or with the situation of Phalæcus. It suited the purpose of Demosthenes to take no notice of him, but to represent all that he did as the act of the Phocian people, and as the effect of the treachery of Æschines and the cre-

dulity of the Athenians. Æschines contends that, before his first embassy, Phalæcus had manifested his distrust of Athens, and his inclination to place confidence in Philip; and the first part of this assertion, as we have seen, was certainly true; but that he was at first more disposed to trust Philip is not so clear. It seems, indeed, that while Philip was on his march towards Thermopylæ, the Phocians were joined by a Lacedæmonian army commanded by King Archidamus. Diodorus says that they had sent for these succours; which might be naturally conjectured, but is rendered very doubtful by the sequel. A hint of Demosthenes\* inclines us to believe that, when Philip was known to be preparing an expedition to Phocis, the Spartans sent this force either on a secret understanding with him, or on the strength of the assurances which they received of his favourable intentions from their ambassadors at Pella. When Philip drew near, Archidamus—possibly with an honourable purpose of making the best terms for the Phocians—proposed to Phalæcus to garrison the frontier towns which commanded the pass of Thermopylæ. But Phalæcus did not find his account in a plan which would have deprived him of the means of bargaining for himself; and it seems that he rejected the offer with a taunting admonition, that it would be better to look to the dangers which threatened Sparta at home than to concern himself about those of Phocia.† Archidamus, either conceiving some suspicion of treachery, or seeing no prospect of serving the Phocians, withdrew.‡ Nevertheless, we cannot but suppose that Phalæcus wished to remain in his country, and to retain his dignity, and that he would not have rejected any aid for this purpose which did not endanger his independence. But when he saw Philip advancing, with the avowed intention of putting an end to the war, and restoring the authority of the Amphictyonic council, it became necessary for him to make his choice. It may, indeed, be doubted whether, if he had been sure of support both from Sparta and Athens, and had not been conscious that he had personally alienated both states, he would have ventured to defy the power of Macedonia, though it appears that, after his restoration, he had carried

\* De F. L., § 86, τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μετὰ/μικτοὺς πάντα τὰ πράγματα προσχόμενος πρὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ: which has been construed into an invitation to the Spartans to take the lead in settling the Sacred War.

† Δυσχερὲς αὐτῷ τὴν Σπάρτην διὰ δόξαν, καὶ μὴ (τὰ Cod. Reg.) παρ' αὐτοῦ. (Æsch., De F. L., § 140.) We have ventured on the interpretation given in the text of this difficult passage—which seems also to have been Taylor's, who says, *verba sonant: res vestras curate*—notwithstanding Weiske's admonition, De Hyperbola, ii., 23, n. 21. It may, independently of the context, be more natural to supply *φαειότες* than *ἐλασιότες*; or *ὧς οἱ*: but the latter construction is certainly admissible (on the infinitive used for the imperative, see Matthiæ, Gr. Gram., § 547), and the sense appears to require it. If the subject of *δόξαν* is Phalæcus (of *ῥύπαντος*), the answer seems absurd, whatever sense be given to τὴν Σπάρτην διὰ. Weiske's proposal, to read καὶ τὰ μὴ παρ' αὐτοῦ, with the sense *periculosos sibi esse graves esse Spartanos, etiamsi procul sint, nedom si in Phocidæ aut in Pylæicis castellis, is at least as surprising as any of those which he rejects.*

‡ We refer the story to this epoch, though Æschines, De F. L., § 143, seems to intimate that the affair took place before he was appointed on the first embassy to Philip. But he was probably tempted to apply to Sparta what he had only proved with regard to Athens; and it seems clear that Demosthenes is alluding to the expedition of Archidamus, apparently with the meaning we have assigned, De F. L., § 86.

\* Yet the brevity of the quotation, τοὺς ἀρχαίους οὐδ' ὀνομαζέσθαι φησι λέγουσιν (F. L., § 44), renders it difficult to understand how it could have such a tendency.

on the war in Bœotia with unabated success. But if he had wavered before, the proceedings at Athens after the second embassy, as they proved that he had nothing to hope for from that quarter, must have decided him. It was now evident that his only chance of safety lay in timely submission; and even a purely patriotic feeling might have deterred him from prolonging a useless contest. He had envoys, or, at least, couriers<sup>\*</sup> at Athens on the thirtieth of June, from whom he received early intelligence of all that took place in the assembly on that day. It need not be supposed that he had been in suspense up to that moment; but the accounts he heard, while they satisfied his own mind, enabled him to quiet the doubts and scruples of others, and perhaps for the moment to reconcile the great body of the people to the step he was about to take. He had no doubt been for some time in negotiation with Philip, and the final compact was soon adjusted. Phalæcus was permitted to retire with his troops, and led 8000 mercenaries away with him to seek his fortunes in Peloponnesus. He afterwards crossed over into Crete, where, after several vicissitudes, he was killed while besieging Cydonia, as some believed, by fire which fell from heaven; according to other accounts, by one of his own soldiers. Philip took possession of Alponus, Thronium, and Nicæa, and advanced without delay into the heart of Phocis. No conditions, it seems, had been made on behalf of the Phocians; and on the approach of the Macedonian army, which was now re-enforced with Thessalian and Theban troops, most of the towns surrendered at discretion. There were, however, some which, either irritated by the presence of their inveterate enemies as Philip's allies, or instigated by some leading men, who may have had private grounds of alarm in the consciousness of their past conduct, made a fruitless attempt at resistance. They were taken by storm, and razed to the ground, and the inhabitants were reduced to slavery. Philip himself avows this proceeding; and as it was not more rigorous than his treatment of other places, which gave him no greater provocation, there is no reason to attribute it to the influence of the Thebans or Thessalians. He then proceeded to take possession of Delphi, and convened a council of the Amphictyons, to sit in judgment on those who had incurred the guilt of sacrilege.

The tidings of these events, which were successively brought to Athens, roused the people from a pleasing dream to a bitter feeling of disappointment, fear, and resentment. It seems that, before they learned the decisive blow, they received a letter from Philip, in which he invited them to join their forces with his. Demosthenes, indeed, speaks of two such letters; and perhaps that which was brought by the second embassy contained such an invitation. But if so, it appears from Æschines that it must have been repeated after the treaty with Phalæcus. Æschines contends that, if the Athenians had complied with it, they might have counteracted the control which the Thebans and Thessalians exerted over Philip, and have enabled him to fulfil the intentions which

he had intimated, and really entertained; but that Demosthenes and his party excited a suspicion that he meant to seize the Athenian troops as hostages.\* On the other hand, Demosthenes professes to believe that, even after Philip had penetrated through Thermopylæ, a vigorous effort on the part of Athens might have encouraged the Phocians to resist him, and have enabled them to sustain his attacks until scarcity of provisions, in a country which had so long been the theatre of a wasting war, would have forced him to retreat.† We can hardly decide which supposition is the more improbable; but it seems clear that the course which the Athenians adopted was the most unwise that could have been suggested to them. They received the first intelligence, if not of Philip's convention with Phalæcus, at least of his hostile march through Phocis, from Dercylus, one of the envoys, who had proceeded on their way to the Macedonian camp as far as Chalcis, in Eubœa, where they heard the news, which seemed to render it necessary that they should obtain farther instructions from home. Dercylus seems to have been sent forward, and reaching Athens on the twenty-fourth, found the people in assembly on some business concerning the arsenal in Piræus. He reported, perhaps with some exaggeration, the accounts he had heard, which seemed to indicate that Philip had declared himself unreservedly on the side of Thebes; and it is probable that he now made no secret of his intentions as to the Bœotian towns, if he did not, in the course of his march, compel some of them to admit Theban garrisons. Still, if we may rely on the narrative of Æschines, the news did not seem so certain or so decisive as to call for an immediate demonstration of public feeling, or even to prevent the embassy from renewing its journey to attend the council of Amphictyons; and Æschines, having now recovered his strength, did not shrink from the duty of accompanying them, though it compelled him to witness the extinction of all the hopes which he had, at least, helped to raise as to the issue of the war. After their departure, it seems that either the first tidings were confirmed, or new and more alarming reports received; for the people was induced to manifest its grief and consternation by a decree, which directed all the preparations usually made when a hostile army was about to invade Attica. It ordered the fortresses on the frontier to be put in a state of defence, the fortifications of Piræus to be repaired; women and children, and moveable property, to be brought within the walls; and that a festival of Hercules, which usually took place in the country, should be celebrated in the city. This measure was no doubt less an effect of a real panic than a burst of ill-humour, which it would have been wiser to suppress. It afforded Philip occasion for expostulation, which must have inflamed the people's anger the more, as it admitted of no reply. He addressed another letter to them, in which he calmly apprized them of the manner in which he had occupied Phocis, and the punishment he had inflicted on the towns which resisted him. He had heard that they were

\* Demosthenes calls them *πρίστεις*, Æschines *δρομοκλή-  
πυκς*.

\* De F. L., § 145. The sense of the passage is clear enough, but it seems necessary to insert *§* before *μεταπει-  
ποιμένον*. † Ibid., § 135.

preparing to succour the Phocians, and wrote that they might spare themselves so useless a labour. It was hardly right, just after they had made peace, to go forth to battle, especially as the Phocians were not comprehended in the treaty; so that all they would gain by their interference would be the shame of an unavailing aggression.

It seems very improbable that Philip or his allies should have waited for the ordinary time of an Amphictyonic meeting, which would not have arrived before the autumn, to accomplish their several ends. The Thebans and Thessalians were burning for revenge on the Phocians; and Philip had an object in view, for the sake of which he was willing to gratify their wishes. The Amphictyonic council, reinstated in its ancient authority with a force such as it never before had at its command to execute its decrees, first deliberated on the penalty due to the impiety of the Phocians. The states which it represented on this occasion were all, except Athens, bitter enemies of the conquered people. But it is remarkable that among them all none exhibited such violent animosity as the tribes of Mount Ceta. Their deputies, according to Æschines, proposed to inflict the extreme punishment of sacrilege—precipitation from the rock—on the whole adult male population, at least of some Phocian towns. Æschines claims the merit of having successfully interceded to avert this bloody sentence, which probably never entered into the minds of any of the leading members of the council, and would not have been sanctioned by Philip. Their hatred was satisfied with a milder doom, which, as far as was possible, erased the name of Phocis from the list of Greek states, and crushed its independence forever. All the Phocian cities except Abæ, twenty-two in number, were condemned to be levelled with the ground, and the population to be dispersed in villages at a certain distance from each other, and none containing more than fifty dwellings. They were to pay a yearly tribute of sixty talents to the temple of Delphi, until they should have restored the whole amount of the plundered treasure, which was estimated—and there was no one to control this valuation—at 10,000 talents, and in the mean while they were not allowed to possess arms or horses; the persons who had taken the principal part in the spoliation of the temple, and who had fled the country, were to be pursued and brought to justice. Finally, the Phocians were deprived of all access to the temple and of their seat in the Amphictyonic council; and the two votes which they had possessed were transferred to the King of Macedonia and his successors. Sparta was also deprived of her share in the Amphictyonic privileges of the Dorian race.\* The honour of presiding at the Pythian Games was henceforth to be shared by Philip with the Thebans and Thessalians.†

Thus, then, Philip had attained an end which he had probably been long aiming at, but which was nevertheless of such a nature that it was not easy for any one else to divine it; and this was the great advantage which contributed

more, perhaps, than any other to his success. He had little need of any deeper artifices than silence and patience. While he kept aloof from the chief scene of action, which secretly engaged the largest share of his attention, and extended his power in other quarters, and suffered the Greeks to form their conjectures on his designs, with perhaps no more encouragement than a few hints dropped by his generals and ministers, the course of events was quietly working in his favour, and put him in possession of all that he desired almost without a struggle. Perhaps he might have preferred, if he had been able, to recognise the independence of the Bœotian towns; but the good-will of Thebes was at this juncture more important to him than that of Athens, and he could still wait and be silent. And hence we are led to doubt whether, in this transaction, he resorted to the arts of corruption which Demosthenes imputes to him, as, on the other hand, we see nothing clearly proved in the conduct of Æschines up to this point that affords a fair ground for the charge of treasonable collusion with Philip. That he consented, under such circumstances as we have mentioned, to go on the third embassy; that he accepted grants of land from Philip;‡ that henceforth his tone and conduct with respect to Macedonia became so different from what they had been at the time of his mission into Peloponnesus: these may seem to be facts, which, coupled together, testify strongly against him; and they do, indeed, raise suspicions of his integrity which can never be wholly removed. But it would be unjust not to observe that the period was now approaching, when upright men might more and more doubt the expediency of a contest with Macedonia; and that it was peculiarly difficult for a personal enemy of Demosthenes not to feel some prepossession for Philip.

The object which Philip had accomplished was important to him in several points of view. The honour of a seat in the Amphictyonic council, though conferred on the king, reflected upon his people: it was equivalent to an act of naturalization, which wiped off the stain of its semi-barbarian origin: the Macedonians might henceforward be considered as Greeks. He probably also reckoned that it would afford him pretexts, occasions, facilities, for interference, as often as he might desire it, in the affairs of Greece. It was, likewise, a step towards a higher object, which now, at least, stood distinctly before his view, as the mark towards which all his future enterprises were to be directed. He had now a clear prospect that, at no very distant time, he should be able to begin his mediated attack on the Persian empire in the name of Greece, and with all the advantages that were to be derived from the consent, whether real or apparent, of the nation. This project, which he had probably long harboured, had been recently presented to his mind by Isocrates, in a pamphlet written during the interval between the conclusion of the peace with Athens and the end of the Sacred War, and addressed to him in the form of an oration, exhorting him first to interpose his authority to

\* PAULI, x., 8, 2.

† Diodorus (xvi., 60) adds as a reason, because the Phocians had taken part in the impiety of the Phocians—as though he had previously presided at the Pythian Games. Eusebius Diodorus confounded them with the Isthmian.

‡ The charge is made by Demosthenes with a distinct specification of the yearly value, half a talent (F. L., § 158), and is not contradicted by Æschines.

bring about a general pacification in Greece, which would follow as soon as he had healed the breaches that separated the leading states, Thebes and Athens, Sparta and Argos, from one another; and then to place himself at the head of the national confederacy for the invasion of Persia. This national war with Persia was the great thought which haunted Isocrates almost all his life, though perhaps he took it up at first merely as a theme for a rhetorical exercise.\* In it he saw the only remedy for all the evils that afflicted Greece: a bond of union between the ambitious rivals whose discord had hitherto wasted her strength—a channel by which the hosts of restless adventurers who preyed upon her resources might be drawn off to more alluring fields, and the needy citizens, whose poverty rendered them the ready tools of political intrigues, to foreign settlements, where they would find an ample and secure provision, and through which a portion of the wealth of the East might flow into Greece. He had recommended his project to public notice on various very different occasions. While Sparta was at the height of her power, and, by the humiliation of Olynthus, was breaking down one of the barriers which she would afterward gladly have seen standing between her and Macedonia, Isocrates, in an oration professedly designed to be recited before the spectators assembled at the national games, urged the expedience of a coalition between Sparta and Athens for a war with Persia. Again, after Sparta had been reduced to the lowest stage of weakness, when Archidamus had mounted the throne, the rhetorician seems to have persuaded himself, and attempted to persuade the Spartan king, that the enterprise of pacifying Greece and conquering Persia did not exceed his means. But when Philip's successes had turned the eyes of all Greece towards him, Isocrates, too, could not doubt that this was the hero destined to execute his favourite plan. As long, however, as the war lasted between Athens and Macedonia it would have been useless, and, perhaps, hardly safe, to propose it. The peace encouraged him to speak out.

The rhetorician lays great stress on Philip's pretended descent from Hercules, as a motive both for his good offices in behalf of the four states which in various ways had been so closely connected with his divine ancestor, and for an undertaking in which he would be emulating the glory of that mighty conqueror. And Philip, though he could not be touched by the argument, may not have been insensible to the flattery implied in it. But we can better understand the force of his appeal to history, when he encourages Philip by the examples of Jason, Agesiulus, and the Ten Thousand. Perhaps, however, the most remarkable passage in the whole is one in which he alludes to certain suspicions which were current, he says, among the malignant or credulous, as to Philip's intentions. There were persons, it seems, lovers of trouble and confusion, who affected to believe, and others so senseless as to be persuaded by them, that the growth of Philip's power was dangerous to Greece; that his object was

to set the Greek states at variance with each other, in order to reduce them all to subjection; as, for instance, that he professed to side with the Messenians against Sparta, to make himself master of Peloponnesus. Isocrates would hardly have deigned to notice these absurd suspicions, which Philip himself, in his consciousness of the purity of his intentions, might be inclined to despise, if they had not been so widely spread among the multitude by the arts of the designing. But the plan which he has suggested of uniting Greece and conquering Persia is the surest way to refute such calumnies.

It cannot be doubted that he was perfectly in earnest, and that he expressed all that he thought, though his infatuation may seem hardly credible, and it is not easy to find a parallel that would completely illustrate its extravagance. The Italian cities in the Middle Ages had reason to rejoice when an emperor who threatened their liberties could be forced to embark in a crusade, because it was known that such an expedition was likely to weaken his power. But they would have suspected the sanity of a citizen who should have advised them to combine their forces to put the German emperor in possession of the Greek empire, as we should that of a modern politician who should propose a confederacy among the European states to aid Russia in the conquest of Turkey, Persia, and India. Isocrates unquestionably believed that Philip was sure of success in the enterprise he recommended, and that, when he had made himself master of Asia, he would still be a safe neighbour to the Greeks, and would look upon himself only as the general of their confederate army. Nor can it be said that he only erred through excessive confidence in Philip's generosity, for this could not ensure the moderation of his successors. Perhaps the best excuse that can be offered for the rhetorician is, that he could not conceive the thought of Greece subject to a foreign master.

The Amphictyonic decree relating to Phocis appears to have been soon carried into execution, so far as was deemed necessary. But we may collect, even from Demosthenes,\* that the condemned cities were not totally razed to the ground, but only their fortifications dismantled; and, possibly, a small remnant of the population was left in each. According to Demosthenes, Thebes was permitted to add a part of Phocis to her territory; but it is not clear whether this statement, which he makes in very vague language, is to be taken in a literal sense, or had any real foundation.† She, however, certainly recovered Orchomenus, Coronea, Coroneæ, and whatever other places she had lost in Bœotia; but those of the inhabitants who dreaded her resentment were allowed to withdraw: a numerous body of Bœotian, as well as Phocian exiles, took refuge in Athens, where their presence must have excited feelings by no means friendly towards Philip. He, however, returned to Macedonia, as Diodorus says, with a great

\* It had before been treated by *Georgia*, from whose declamation Isocrates is said to have borrowed. Vit. X. Orat. p. 637. F. Philostratus. De Vit. Suppl. i. 17, 8.

\* For it is more probable that he exaggerates where, as De F. L., § 154, he speaks of the destruction as total—*ἐλκεν τῶν τοιούτων καὶ πόλεων ἀναιρέας*—than that he falls short of the truth where he only mentions the demolition of the walls, as F. L., § 373.

† F. L., § 120. *τῆς Φωκίας χώρας ἐκπαρτίς γεγονάκει*. But § 154, he has *τῆς τῶν Φωκίων χώρας ἰσάτης βόβοις οὐκ*.

increase of reputation; and there can be no doubt that he carried with him the praises and blessings of the Thessalians and Thebans, who extolled the gratification of their revenge and ambition as a work of piety, and were blinded, by the temporary advantage they had obtained for themselves, to the irreparable evil they had brought upon Greece.

## CHAPTER XLV.

FROM THE END OF THE SACRED WAR TO THE RENAISSANCE OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN PHILIP AND THE ATHENIANS.

THE state of public feeling in Athens at the close of the Phocian war may be easily conceived, it was a struggle between fear and resentment. Fear of an enemy who had been irritated by a long conflict, had become more powerful than ever, and, while his forces had been brought nearer to the confines of Attica than they had ever before advanced, had given a fresh specimen, in the political extinction of another Grecian state, of the fearful lengths to which his animosity might be carried, or to which he might even be led by the cool calculations of his ambitious policy. Resentment, which was so much the keener, because the injury that provoked it was one which afforded but slight ground for remonstrance, or even for complaint. One of the consequences of this state of feeling was, that the peace just concluded, though almost universally admitted to be necessary, became generally odious, and its authors and promoters—the orators who proposed and recommended it, and the negotiators who brought it about—extremely unpopular. Demosthenes, as one of the ambassadors who had been engaged in this business, must have shared the odium to which his colleagues were exposed if he had not been able to separate his case from theirs, and if the whole tenor of his past public life had not exempted him from all suspicions of a leaning towards the Macedonian interest. But the part which he had hitherto taken in opposition to Philip had been so decided, and his conduct throughout the negotiation, as to the main points, so clearly patriotic, that the unfortunate issue seemed to afford fresh proof both of his integrity and sagacity, and served to raise him in the favour and esteem of the people.

Philip's policy during the ensuing period is much more difficult to explain. There can be no question, as we have already seen, that the project of an expedition against Persia had by this time been formed in his mind into a settled plan; and we cannot but ask, Why did he not immediately proceed to execute it? The only reason that can be assigned seems to be, that the state of affairs in Greece was not yet, in his judgment, ripe for such an undertaking. It may seem presumptuous for any one, with our limited means of information, to raise a doubt as to the sufficiency of the grounds which determined the measures of so great a statesman and general as Philip. Yet, when we consider the extent to which his influence prevailed in Peloponnesus—where, if not absolutely predominant, it was at least strong enough to coun-

teract all hostile movements—and that in the north of Greece there was no state of any moment, except Athens, with which he had just made peace, that was not devoted to his interest; none that would be expected actively to thwart it, we can hardly refrain from thinking that it would not have been difficult for him, before he withdrew his forces from Phocis, to have procured the title which he afterward obtained, to be conferred on him with a fair appearance of unanimity, and that he might afterward have embarked in his enterprise without fear of a more formidable opposition from the enemies whom he left behind him than he must have reckoned on in any case that it was possible to foresee. We may at least venture to believe that his son, if he had found himself, on his accession to the throne, in just such a position, would not have waited for more favourable circumstances in the state of Greece: as we know that those under which he actually invaded Persia were by no means free from difficulty and danger. Either Alexander was rash—which the event seems to disprove—or Philip needlessly cautious.

So to pronounce would, in fact, be to call his sagacity very little in question. His apprehensions, however ill-founded they may have been, would only prove the great weight which the name of Athens retained after she had lost so much of the substance of power; for it is clear that she was the only enemy he had in Greece formidable enough to occasion the delay which cost him so many precious years. It is less difficult to account for the course which, under this supposed necessity, he adopted in the next period of his contest with her. We shall find that he did not for a long time attempt to bring it to an issue by a direct attack, but sought to compass his object by intrigues and negotiations designed to strengthen his footing in her neighbourhood, and to insulate her more and more from the other states of Greece, or by blows aimed at her distant possessions, her commerce, and necessary supplies. His motive for preferring this slow and laborious process, even when he stood with a powerful army within a few days', or, rather, hours' march of her border, was probably not any scruple about breaking the peace just concluded, or the difficulty of finding a decent pretext for an immediate renewal of hostilities, but a sober calculation of the risk he should run if he invaded her territory and laid siege to the city, of rallying the other Greeks around her, and of being at length compelled to retire with loss and dishonour. But by this winding policy a new and wide field was opened for the exertions of Demosthenes, where he was able to display his energy and talents in a manner the most glorious to himself, and the most useful to his country; for to baffle Philip's machinations, to keep him at a distance, and constantly occupied, were objects within the reach of the orator's activity and eloquence, and by these means he might postpone, and perhaps avert, the commencement of an undertaking, which, if successful, would surely prove fatal to the liberties of Greece.

Within a year—perhaps within a few weeks—after the end of the war, two transactions occurred which throw light on that state of

feeling which has been mentioned as prevailing at Athens, and on the growing influence and the political views of Demosthenes. The Pythian games were celebrated under the presidency of Philip or his ambassadors by virtue of the Amphictyonic decree, which conferred that honour on him, the Thessalians, and Bœotians, to the exclusion of all the other Amphictyonic states.\* On this occasion, the Athenians—perhaps the most superstitious people of Greece, who, moreover, prided themselves on their peculiar mythical connexion with the Delphic god—withheld the solemn deputation, composed of the members of the Five Hundred, and of the six archons called Thesmothetæ, which they had been always used to send to represent them at the spectacle. The second transaction was this: an embassy was sent to Athens, consisting of Macedonian, Thessalian, and Bœotian envoys, to demand from the Athenians a formal sanction of the decree by which the King of Macedonia had been admitted a member of the Amphictyonic league.

So imperfect is our acquaintance both with the history of this period and with many public usages of the Greeks, which were universally notorious, that we are not sure whether these two occurrences took place in the order of time in which they have just been related; for we know neither the exact date of the embassy, nor the season of the year at which the Pythian games were held.† It is, however, at least the most probable conjecture that the omission of the Athenians to send their envoys to the games was the very occasion which gave rise to the embassy;‡ and it must be owned that this affair is one of the examples which tend to confirm the opinion that the games were cele-

brated either in summer or autumn; since it seems most likely that this departure of the Athenians from their ancient custom was the first intimation they had given of their disposition to reject the acts of the Amphictyonic council, partial and violent as its proceedings had been.

It was evidently necessary to come to a common understanding on this point as soon as possible, and therefore there is no need to suppose that Philip had any farther views in this embassy; yet it is probable enough that he would not have been displeased if the Athenians had resisted his demand, and had thus embroiled themselves in a fresh quarrel with their northern neighbours, and had afforded a pretext for treating them as contumacious offenders against the majesty of the Amphictyonic council. It was well understood at Athens that the question imported nothing less than peace or war. Yet so strong was the indignation felt against Philip, that not only were opinions divided in the assembly, but the general sentiment appears to have been in favour of a direct refusal. Indeed, if we may believe Demosthenes,\* the only speaker who ventured to support Philip's claim was Æschines, and he could hardly obtain a hearing, and descended from the bema amid a tumult of opprobrious clamour; but he was overheard remarking to the Macedonian ambassadors, that there were many voices to brawl, but few hands to fight. On the other hand, there were orators who represented the required concession as a disgrace, to which the people ought never to submit on any terms; and it seems that this language was received with applause. Demosthenes himself concurred with Æschines in his practical conclusion, though, it must be supposed, on widely different grounds. His own we know from his oration *On the Peace*, which he delivered on this occasion.† In this speech we find him assuming a tone of authority and confidence which we do not observe in any that preceded it. He appeals to the proofs of foresight and penetration which he had given in the affair of the Eubœan Plutarchus, in the debates which led to the opening of the negotiation with Philip,

\* Brueckner (Philipp., p. 195, n. 84) conjectures that the presidency may have been exercised by the Amphictyonic states in rotation, and that this may account for the statement of Diodorus, xvi., 60, about the Corinthians, which perplexed Wesseling so much, and on which I have offered a guess, *ent*, p. 127. Brueckner's would hardly explain the language of Diodorus, who evidently meant to speak in each case of a permanent institution. But it agrees extremely well with the passages of Demosthenes in which Philip is mentioned as if he had been the sole *ἀγωνοθέτης*, which he would have been in his turn. It is difficult to say where Vogel (*Philippus*, p. 153) found authority for his assertion that the presidency had been previously exercised by the Athenians.

† Τὸν Ἀπὸλλων τὸν Πύθιον, δε παρ' ἑσθὲς ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει. Demosth., De Cor., § 180. See a little tract by Baehr, *De Apolline Patricio*.

‡ Mr. Clinton's opinion on this subject, that the games were celebrated in autumn, is adopted by Brueckner (Philipp., p. 201), who observes that the passages of Thucydides, vol. i., 19, on which Boeckh mainly grounds his opinion that they were celebrated in spring, have been better explained by Krueger—Mr. Clinton's German translator—in favour of his author's view. Brueckner seems not to have seen Dr. Arnold's Appendix to the 2d vol. of his Thucydides, where he contends that the games were celebrated about Midsummer, or the beginning of July. But he rightly remarks, that the manner in which Demosthenes (*De Pace*, § 23) alludes to Philip's celebration of the games strongly suggests the impression that it had already taken place. Perhaps we may add that the same supposition affords the most natural explanation of the fact that Thessalian and Theban (called Bœotian) ministers accompanied those of Macedonia in the embassy.

§ But, at all events, Flacchius commits a palpable mistake, into which he was probably drawn by Demosthenes, *De F. L.*, § 140, 141, who, however, does not warrant such an inference, when (i., p. 210) he represents the embassy which gave occasion to the oration *De Pace*, as proceeding that of the Athenians, in which Æschines interceded, according to his own account (*De F. L.*, § 149), in behalf of the Phocians. It seems clear that their fate had been decided when Demosthenes made his speech.

\* *De F. L.*, § 122, *συνεῖπε μόνος τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πάντων ἀνθρώπων*.

† The assertion quoted in the last note, compared with the oration *On the Peace*, raises a difficulty which has perplexed critics from the time of Libanius, who thought it impossible that the speech could have been delivered, since its inconsistency with the charge against Æschines would have been too glaring. Later writers seem to have been generally inclined to believe that the contradiction is only an apparent one: but the solutions they propose are various. There are probably many more than I know of, but none that I have seen satisfy me. Downes, for instance (*Demosthenes*, *De Pace*, p. 112, ed. Beck., Lipsæ, 1799), observes that there is a wide difference between supporting a measure after it has been carried and first proposing it, as Æschines perhaps (*ut ille fortasse*?) had done. Jacobs (*Demosthenes*, *Stasistæden*, p. 241) imagines that, though Demosthenes mentions no other object for the embassy than the demand about Philip, the envoys may have made other claims which were advocated by Æschines. For, he asks, though Æschines had been imposed upon by Philip, why should this have prevented him from maintaining the expediency of recognising Philip as an Amphictyonic? It must be owned that this would depend entirely on the manner in which the thing was done. Demosthenes certainly did not adopt the arguments of Philip's envoys, as, if we believe his account, Æschines probably did. But it is hard to conceive that he would have described the business of the embassy by a reference to any other subject than that on which Æschines spoke so as to offend his audience.



and in his warnings against the delusion which had been practised on the people, when they were made to believe that the war would be terminated according to their wishes; claiming, however, no higher merit than that his judgment had never been biased by corrupt motives. As to the subject then under discussion, he promised that, if he recommended the maintenance of the peace, it was not that he thought it advantageous or honourable; but it might sometimes be ill to undo what it would have been better not to have done. If ever they renewed the war, they should take care that it was not on an occasion like this, which would unite other Greek states in a common interest with Philip against them. To stand out against the decree of the assembly, which had usurped the title of an Amphictyonic council, would be to challenge the hostility of all who were parties to it; especially as the Thessalians and Thebans were already exasperated by the shelter which Athens had afforded to the Phocian and Boeotian exiles. Were they then, it might be asked, through fear of war, to submit to commands? They must remember that they had made much more important sacrifices for the sake of peace with particular states; and that it would be strangely absurd to go to war now with a whole confederacy about the *shadow at Delphi*. This simple and statesmanlike view of the question appears to have enlightened and calmed the public mind: the assembly decided for peace.

The scanty notices remaining of the history of this period being chiefly rhetorical allusions—which are often extremely vague, and were seldom meant to convey the simple truth—do not permit us to follow Philip's movements step by step. We perceive, however, very clearly that he was constantly endeavouring to extend his power and influence, either by arms or negotiation, on every side of his dominions. We hear of expeditions or intrigues directed towards the north and the south, the east and the west: and though their immediate objects were apparently widely remote from each other, they seem all to have tended towards one end: that of weakening and curbing Athens, which, if these projects had succeeded, would at length have found herself completely enclosed in the toils before she had received a wound. It is probable that Philip's eye embraced all these points at one view, and that he was continually prosecuting his designs in opposite quarters, though we happen to find them mentioned only in succession. It is to Peloponnesus that our attention is first directed, as the scene of a diplomatic contest which portended a fiercer struggle. Here Philip had succeeded, almost without an effort, to the sway which Thebes had won through the victories of Epaminondas; for Sparta, weakened as she was, was still an object of jealousy to her neighbours, whose independence she viewed with a malignant eye; and since Thebes, having in her turn sunk from the height of her power, was no longer able to afford protection to her Peloponnesian allies, they naturally transferred their confidence to the King of Macedonia, on whose aid even Thebes had been forced to cast herself. We are not informed of any new occasion of hostilities that arose between them and Sparta im-

mediately after the close of the Phocian war. Yet it appears that they found, or thought themselves in danger, so as to be led to cultivate Philip's friendship. He espoused their cause without reserve, declared himself the protector of Messenia, and called upon the Spartans to renounce their claims upon her; and when his demand was rejected—as it seems to have been, in a somewhat contemptuous tone\*—both supplied his allies with troops and money, and announced his intention of leading a much larger force into Peloponnesus in person.† It may easily be supposed that these favours and promises rendered him highly popular throughout the confederacy of which Messene, Megalopolis, and Argos were the leading members, and that he was extolled as the friend of liberty, the champion of the oppressed. Demosthenes himself, in a speech delivered about three years after the end of the war,‡ mentions, with indignation, that many of the Arcadian commonwealths had decreed brazen statues and crowns in honour of Philip, and had resolved, if he should enter Peloponnesus, to admit him into their towns; and that the Argives had followed their example.

These proceedings, of course, soon became known at Athens, and excited no little anxiety there. An embassy was sent into Peloponnesus, with Demosthenes at its head, to counteract the progress of the Macedonian influence. He went to Messene, and, it seems, to Argos; perhaps to several other cities. In one of his extant speeches he has given a specimen of the manner in which he endeavoured to rouse the jealousy of the Peloponnesians against Philip. He referred to Philip's conduct in the case of Olynthus, as a proof that no reliance could safely be placed on his professions, or even his acts of friendship, which were all meant to inveigle those who trusted to them into bondage or ruin. Whether he appealed to the example of the Thessalians for the same purpose must remain doubtful; since the principal fact, which he represents himself to have stated concerning them, certainly occurred later. But it appears that he dwelt much on the bad faith which Philip had shown in his dealings with Athens, either in his promises about Amphipolis, or in those by which he had deceived the people through their ambassadors in the negotiation for peace. The natural and necessary hostility between a monarch—whether king or tyrant—and all free and legal governments, was also a topic by which the orator strove to alarm republican prejudices. But though he affirms that he was heard with applause, he admits that his warnings had produced no practical effect, and that Philip continued after, as before, to enjoy the confidence of his Peloponnesian allies; and some embassies, which were afterward sent with the same view, were attended with no better result. Philip did not let these attempts pass unnoticed. Even if he did not deem it necessary for his honour to repel the charge of perfidy which had been so publicly brought against him, he

\* That is to say, if there is any foundation for the anecdotes related by Plutarch, *De Garrul.* p. 511, A.; for this should be the occasion to which the second belongs. Philip is there made to write to the Spartans, "Αν' ἰννοει Λακωνία ἰ will destroy you" (Αἱ ἐπιδόλαι εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἀναστρέφουσιν ὑμᾶς νοσήσω). The laconic answer was, Ἀίκα, 'Αν' ἰφ." † Philipp., ii., § 15-17. ‡ *De F. L.* § 326.

may have thought it a favourable opportunity for displaying, and thereby strengthening his connexion with Peloponnesus. He sent an embassy to Athens, which seems to have been headed by Python, whose eloquence could sustain a comparison with that of Demosthenes himself;\* and it was no doubt at Philip's instigation that his envoys were accompanied by those of Messene and Argos. The Macedonians were instructed to expostulate on the groundless accusations which had been brought against their king, and formally to deny that he had ever broken his word to the Athenians; the Peloponnesians were to complain of the countenance which Athens had given to the attempts of Sparta against their liberty.

This embassy gave occasion to the second Philippic of Demosthenes, which seems to have been the speech with which he prefaced a motion for the answer which he proposed to give to the ambassadors. It is possible that more than one assembly was held on the business—one, perhaps, to consider each subject—and that on one of these occasions Python vindicated his master's conduct in a speech which Demosthenes afterward describes as bold and vehement, though he himself met it with a reply which extorted tokens of approbation even from the ministers of Philip's allies.† But this was evidently not the occasion of the second Philippic. That is addressed to the people, not in reply to the foreigners, but to the Macedonian, Philippizing faction at home, and more particularly to Æschines, who, it seems, had recently taken Philip's part, and had supported Python's arguments with his testimony. Its main object is to excite the suspicion and resentment of the Athenians, on the one hand against Philip, and on the other against the orators who had served as his instruments to overreach them. He contends that the motive which had induced Philip to prefer the interest of Thebes to that of Athens at the end of the war was not the presence of a force which restrained him, still less any regard to justice—for he who maintained the independence of Messenia against Sparta could not consistently aid the Thebans in reducing the other Boeotian towns to subjection—it was, that he expected the one state, if its own interests were but secured, would be readily subservient to his designs against the liberties of Greece, while he knew that no prospect of selfish advantage would ever bribe Athens to resign her glorious inheritance, the foremost post of resistance to foreign attacks on the national independence. There were rumours afloat of a breach between Thebes and Philip, and that he intended to restore the fortifications of Elatea; but it was not likely, when he adopted their quarrel with Sparta as his own, that he should thwart their views nearer home. All this, however, is but subordinate and introductory to the concluding passage, in which the orator reminds his hearers of the disappointment they had suffered, and points their indignation against its authors. He does not name either Philocrates or Æschines, but alludes in a manner which could not be mistaken to the ribaldry with which the one had silenced his warnings, and to the solemn assurances, or dexterous insinuations, by which the other had

quieted the people's apprehensions. "The men who had thus involved the state in its present embarrassments ought," he says, "to be charged with the task of defending its conduct against those who questioned it. But, at least, it was fit that the language by which they had caused so much mischief, which was not yet ended, should not be forgotten." It is to be regretted that the proposed reply has not been preserved; it probably contained a manifesto which would have thrown some light on the history of this period. The tone of the speech leads us to suppose that it made no material concession; there is rather, as we shall see, reason to believe that it advanced some new claims; yet it so far satisfied Philip and his allies as to avoid an open rupture.

Philip, indeed, may at this juncture have been the more easily satisfied, because he was engaged in an expedition against the Illyrians, for which we hear of no motive, save the inveterate enmity between the two nations. His invasion of Illyria, however provoked or coloured, seems to have been completely successful, though not attended with any very important result; he ravaged the country, made himself master of several towns, and returned laden with booty (B.C. 344).\* It appears to have been not long after that a fresh occasion arose to call for his presence in Thessaly. We gather from the statements of Demosthenes and Diodorus,† that either the family of tyrants, or the party which supported them in Phœræ, had recovered their power there, and, perhaps, in other towns, and that Philip once more marched to dislodge them. This he seems to have effected with as much ease as at any former time; but he also found the circumstances of the country more favourable than they had ever been before for a new settlement of its affairs, which was calculated to render it more thoroughly subservient to his interests, and, indeed, reduced it nearly to a Macedonian province.

It was probably not long after the end of the Phocian war that he fulfilled the promise which he had made during his contest with Olynthus, of evacuating Magnesia.‡ There was, indeed, no farther pretext left for delay; yet this step may not have been purely voluntary: and it may have been by some signs of impatience appearing among the Thessalians that he was induced to gratify them by a boon which seemed more spontaneous, the cession of Nicæa, one of the frontier towns near Thermopylæ, which had been surrendered to him by Phalæcus. We find an intimation, which probably rests on good authority,§ that the Thessalians had hoped to be put in possession of this place; and their disappointment in this affair was perhaps one of the first causes that alienated them from Philip. But though he granted it nominally to the Thessalians, it seems that he continued to occupy it with a Macedonian garrison.¶ The great families in the north of Thessaly, who had been his most active partisans, cannot have wished to sacrifice their country's independence more than was necessary to purchase their own security; and if, after the subjugation of Phocis,

\* Diodor., xvi., 60.

† U. s., Demosth., Philipp., iii., § 17.

‡ See ante, p. 106.

§ Though in an oration which is justly suspected: Ad Philipp. Epist., § 8.

¶ Demosth. ad Epist., u. s.

\* Diodorus, xvi., 86.

\* De Cor., § 173.

they had not been threatened with any fresh danger they might have begun to resist the foreign ascendancy to which they had so long submitted. But the revolution at Phere forced them again to seek aid from Philip, and afforded him means of establishing his sway on a firmer basis. After the expulsion of the tyrant dynasty, he did not, as before, leave the place open to new attempts of the same kind, but garrisoned the citadel with his own troops.\* This measure was probably very unwelcome to those of the Aleuads who were clear-sighted enough to perceive that it implied the permanent subjection of Thessaly; and it was followed by another, which seems not to have been carried without strong opposition, nor without the help of corruption and intrigues. Yet it was one which must have won a popular aspect; for it was professedly a restoration of an ancient order of things, which was ascribed to Aleuas, the celebrated prince, from whom the house of the Aleuads derived its name. The division of the country into four districts, each of which was called a *tetras*,† subsisted, indeed, still, but rather as a geographical than a political arrangement. Philip revived the distinction of the *tetradarchies*. How far he endeavoured to restore the old institutions connected with them cannot be ascertained; but the principal object which he had in view seems to be disclosed in a statement of Theopompus, which informs us that he placed some of the chiefs of the Aleuad faction—of course, his most devoted adherents—at the head of the four governments.‡ Three of these persons may be named with tolerable certainty: Eudicus, Simus,§ and Thrasydæus. The first two are branded by Demosthenes as traitors to their country; and this seems to have been the main work for which, if the charge is well founded, they sold their services to Philip. There is an anecdote in Polyænus|| that, during his stay at Larissa, he attempted, under pretence of sickness, to draw the Aleuads to the house where he lodged, that he might make himself master of their persons; but that, having received timely notice of his designs, they avoided the snare. The story may belong to this period, and would accord very well with the other intimations which we meet with of the state of things at this time in Thessaly. The final result is described by Demosthenes, perhaps with no great exaggeration, as the total subjection of the land to Philip, whom it supplied with excellent troops, and it seems, also, with a considerable addition to his revenues; for, besides the harbour duties and customs which had been formerly granted to him,¶ and which he no doubt retained, we find that he took possession of the tribute which Larissa had received, ever since the conquest, from her subject Parrhæian cantons.\*\*

It seems to have been while he was still occupied with the affairs of Thessaly, or, at least, before he withdrew from the country, that he made an attempt in another quarter, which, if it had succeeded, would have brought him nearer, by a great step, to one of his principal objects. Megara was at this time, as it had probably never ceased to be, divided between rival factions, which, however, seem not to have been so turbulent as to prevent it from enjoying a high degree of prosperity,\* and there are indications that its form of government was not unhappily tempered.† The old animosity against Athens had perhaps now in a great measure subsided; Philip, indeed, had his adherents, but there was a strong party which opposed them, and which looked to Athens for protection. The contending interests, however, seem not to have been exactly those of democracy and aristocracy, or oligarchy; Philip's leading partisans appear to have been some of the most powerful citizens, who hoped with his aid to rise to sovereign power, which they would have been content to hold under him. Ptoëdorus, the foremost man in Megara, in birth, wealth, and reputation, was, according to Demosthenes,‡ at the head of a conspiracy for the purpose of placing the city in Philip's hands, and had opened a correspondence with him, in which he employed another Megarian, Perilaus, as his agent. Perilaus was brought to trial for his unauthorized dealings with a foreign court, but was acquitted through the influence of Ptoëdorus, who sent him again to obtain a body of Macedonian troops, while he himself stayed to prepare for their reception at Megara. The plot appears to have been baffled by some unusually vigorous measures of the Athenians. It is difficult to determine whether an expedition which they made about this time to their frontier, on the side of Drymus and Panactus,§ was connected with these movements at Megara;|| and equally uncertain, though, perhaps, more probable, that it was on this occasion Phocion was sent, at the request of their Megarian partisans, to guard the city. Though he could not secure it from treachery within, he took the most effectual precautions against a surprise from without; he fortified Nicea, and again annexed it to the city by two long walls. How-

\* Isocrates, De Pace, § 143. *Μεγαρίαις . . . ψυλίστους οἴκους τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐκτίθηται*. κ. τ. λ. Cf. Demosthenes, Aristocr., § 256.

† There was a council of Three Hundred, which possessed judicial authority. Demosth., De F. L., § 337.

‡ De F. L., § 337. § Ibid., § 374.

|| This is Winiewski's conjecture, p. 147. But the language of Demosthenes, *περὶ Δρυμὸν καὶ τῆς πρὸς Πανὰκτου χώρας*, would rather incline one to suppose that the expedition was sent to resist some aggressions of the Tholæans on the debatable frontier. Both Winiewski, p. 146, and Voemel (in Orat. de Halonneso, p. 46)—who also believes that these forces were sent to oppose the passage of Philip's troops to Megara—conceive that this Drymus lay on the confines, not of Attica and Bœotia, like Panactus, but of Phocia and Doris. Their only reason for this opinion seems to be the ascent. *Δρυμὸς* is mentioned by Herod., viii., 23, as a Phœcian town on the Cephissus. Whether a town of that name existed there in the time of Demosthenes is doubtful. The place seems then to have been called *Δρυμῶνα*. Pass., x., 2, 2. But Harpocration has *Δρυμὸς, καὶ μετὰ τὴν Βοιωτίαν καὶ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας*. *Δρυμὸς* seems to be the name of the place. Even independently of this authority, it seems hard to believe that Demosthenes would have coupled the name of a place in Phocia with that of one on the Attic frontier, as Win. and Voemel suppose him to have done.

\* Hegesippus, De Halonneso, § 33.

† Hellanicus, Harpocrat., *Τετραρχία*. ‡ Harpocrat., u. s.

§ Simus, being coupled by Demosthenes with Eudicus, was probably as well rewarded. As to Eudicus and Thrasydæus there is express testimony of Harpocrat., *Εὐδίκης*; and of Theopompus in Athenæus, vi., c. 35, where Thrasydæus is said to have been appointed *τῶν τεσσάρων τέρματων*.

|| iv., 2, n. But there is no reason for supposing with Buttmann, *Mythologus*, ii., p. 289, that the Aleuads here mentioned were Eudicus and Simus. If so, at least, they would not afterward have been intrusted—as Buttmann himself states—with authority by Philip.

¶ Demosth., Olynth., i., § 23.

\*\* Strabo, ix., p. 440.

ever this may be, the attempt of Ptoëdorus failed, and Philip's hopes in this quarter were, for the time, frustrated.

The object for which he desired to obtain possession of Megara was, undoubtedly, not merely to gain a position which would enable him to annoy Athens, but also, and perhaps principally, to open a communication with Peloponnesus. Having been defeated on this side, he turned his attention to another, where he saw a prospect of accomplishing this and several other important purposes at once. Alexander, the brother of his queen Olympias, was, it seems, already at this time (B.C. 343) in possession of a part of Epirus, where his uncle Arymbas, or Arybas, reigned over the rest of the dominions which they inherited from their common ancestor, Alcetas, the father of this Arybas, and of Neoptolemus, the father of Alexander and Olympias.\* But the district of Cassopia, which contained three half Greek cities, said to have been founded at a very early period by Elean colonists, Bucheta, Pandosia, and Elatrea,† did not acknowledge Alexander's authority, and he had, perhaps, sought Philip's aid to reduce it to subjection. This, at least, was, it appears, the main avowed object of an expedition which Philip made from Thessaly into Epirus. He ravaged the Cassopian territory, took the three towns, and gave them up to his kinsman.‡ But his own views stretched much farther. He found a pretext—whether in succours given by the Ambracians to the Cassopian towns, or in some other provocation, we know not—for marching against Ambracia. The possession of this place would have opened the way for him into Acarnania and Ætolia, for he had entered into negotiation with the Ætoli-ans, and had won them over by a promise to aid them in wresting Naupactus from the Achæans; § he might thus have been enabled to cross over to the western side of Peloponnesus at his pleasure; and there the troubled state of Elis, at this time, afforded an excellent pretext for his intervention.

The oligarchical party in Elis had, as we have seen, maintained its ascendancy, notwithstanding the efforts of its adversaries, in the struggle which took place not long before the battle of Mantinea. We do not hear of any subsequent revolution which restored the exiled faction before the time at which we have now arrived; but it seems that here, as elsewhere, the contest of parties had changed its character since the power of Macedonia had risen to its new height. At Elis, also, Philip had gained partisans, several of whom, perhaps, cherished hopes similar to those which appear to have animated his adherents at Megara. The struggle henceforth was not so much between oligarchy and democracy, as between Philip's party and

those who were jealous both of it and of him. Hence it is probable many citizens had been forced into exile who did not belong to the democratical party, while the government at home fell into fewer hands. After the death of Phalæcus in Crete, a body of his mercenaries were brought over to Peloponnesus by the Elean refugees, to make war on the oligarchical rulers. And they would, perhaps, have been the stronger side, if the democratical Arcadians, who only saw in them Philip's enemies, had not thrown their weight into the opposite scale. A battle was fought, in which the exiles were defeated, with great slaughter of the mercenaries, 4000 of whom were taken, and distributed between the allies. The Arcadians sold their prisoners; the Eleans, more irritated as they had more to fear, massacred theirs in cold blood, under the pretence of punishing them for sacrilege.\*

Notwithstanding this event, which established Philip's predominance at Elis, affairs still continued so unsettled there—perhaps through the growing ambition of his principal partisans—as to afford an additional occasion for his presence in Peloponnesus. From this motive chiefly he coveted the acquisition of Ambracia, and of Leucas, which he likewise hoped to gain either by arms or intrigues. It is probable that his expectations were, in a great measure, grounded on the support of a faction devoted to his interests in both places. They were, however, disappointed, through the energy which now displayed itself in the counsels of Athens. An embassy, in which a principal part was borne by Demosthenes, who mentions Polyæuctus, Hegesippus, Clitomarchus, and Lycurgus, as his colleagues, was sent both into Peloponnesus and Acarnania.† They were aided in their negotiations by Callias the Eubæan, whose motives will be explained hereafter. Their aim was to form a league to repel Philip's encroachments; and they brought back large promises of contributions, both in men and money, from some of the Peloponnesian states, from Megara, and Acarnania. As to Megara, this was a natural consequence of the turn which events had lately taken there. In Peloponnesus these assurances of support came chiefly, if not exclusively, from the Achæans, who were doubtless alarmed by the prospect of losing Naupactus. In Acarnania, jealousy of the Ætoli-ans, and fear of Philip, probably combined to dispose the whole people to enter heartily into the proposed alliance; and to encourage them, a body of troops was sent from Athens, chiefly, perhaps, for the defence of Ambracia, or to secure it against domestic treachery.‡ We do not know whether it was for the sake of a diversion that another Athenian force, under the command of Aristodemus, marched, as it seems, about the same time, into Thessaly, and made an attempt on Magnesia, which was strongly censured by the

\* See a note of Boissierius on Justin, xvii., 3, 9. Justin, viii., 6, relates that Philip expelled Arybas from his kingdom, and bestowed it on Alexander. This is probably a mistake, and there appears to be no reason for questioning—with Winiewski, p. 156—the accuracy of Diodorus, who states, xvi., 72, that Arymbas, king of the Molossians, died Ol. cix., 3 (5 years after Philip's expedition to Epirus), and was succeeded by Alexander.

† So this name was written by Theopompus (Harpocration, *ÆAdreia*). It is, at least, convenient thus to distinguish it from the Phocian Elates. Strabo, vii., p. 324, adds *Beryia* to the number of the Cassopian towns.

‡ Orat. de Halonneso, § 33.

§ *Ante*, p. 52.

§ Philipp., iii., § 44.

\* Diodorus, xvi., 63.

† Philipp., iii., § 85, where Winiewski, p. 172, would substitute *Ἀκαρνανίαν* for *καρρυόλια*. But the present text seems sufficiently defended by a passage in Demosthenes, De Cherson., § 27, *τὴν οὖν πρυτανεὺς καὶ κατὰ νόμον*; though the embassy to Acarnania is attested by Æschines in Ctes., § 97.

‡ This fact, which is mentioned incidentally by Demosthenes in Olympiod., § 27, was, I believe, first noticed in connexion with Philip's expedition by Winiewski, p. 137. The date (of the archon Pythodotus) is fortunately known from the context.

orators of the Macedonian party, as an infraction of the treaty with Philip. Aristodemus, however, though apparently unsuccessful in this enterprise, was honoured on his return with a crown, on the motion of Demosthenes.\* He might have deserved it, if his expedition served to hasten Philip's retreat from Epirus.† It is certain that he was obliged to drop his designs against Ambracia and Leucas.

Such proceedings as these, however they might admit of a diplomatic vindication, manifestly tended to put an end to all friendly relations between the two powers; and the negotiations which were carried on between them during the same period had no other effect than to aggravate their mutual resentment and distrust. We are unable to determine whether the answer given by the Athenians to Philip's remonstrances induced him to send Python on a fresh embassy, to propose an adjustment of their differences, or whether this minister had been instructed on the former occasion, while he complained of the ill treatment his prince had suffered from the license which the Athenians gave to their orators, to declare his willingness to accede to any reasonable proposal for an amendment of the last treaty. Python certainly executed such a commission, and the offer which he made in Philip's name was received with great applause in the Athenian assembly.‡ The result was that an embassy, of which Hegesippus, an active orator of the anti-Macedonian party,§ appears to have been the leading member, was sent into Macedonia to communicate the demands, or, at least, the wishes, of the people to the king. They fell under various heads. One related to the old dispute about Amphipolis. The Athenians were advised to claim it on what seems a grossly sophistical construction of the article in the treaty, which provided that each party was to keep all that it had at the time. The orators contended that this did not entitle Philip to have what was not his own, which Amphipolis had never been, since it had always belonged of right to the Athenians; an argument which would sound much more plausible in the Pnyx than in the audience chamber at Pella; and they proposed, instead of the clause, that each have what he had,

to substitute the more correct phrase, that each have his own. Another object was to recover the property which their citizens had lost when they were expelled from Potidæa. There were other grounds of complaint of more recent origin. One concerned the places in Thrace conquered by Philip after the ratification of the treaty at Athens; another the Thracian Chersonesus. Not long after the end of the war, a colony of cleruchial settlers had been sent thither under Diopithes,\* who remained there invested with a military command for their protection. Disputes soon arose between them and the people of Cardia about the limits of their territory. The Athenians, indeed, maintained that Cardia itself belonged to them, as included in the Chersonesus; while Philip acknowledged both the independence of the Cardians, who were his allies, and the validity of their claims. Another topic of controversy arose out of the little island of Halonnesus, situate in the north of the Ægean, between Scopelus and Peparethus. It was one of the fragments which the Athenians preserved of their maritime empire, until a pirate chief, named Sosstratus, took possession of it, and made it the headquarters of his piratical excursions. Philip, whose coasts and shipping he infested, expelled the pirates from their nest, and kept it in his own hands. The Athenians conceived that these transactions could not affect their right to the island, and that, as soon as the hostile force was removed, it ought to have been restored to its legitimate sovereign. Finally, the ambassadors were to require that an article should be inserted in the treaty, recognising the liberty and independence even of those Greek states which were not included in it by name, and pledging all who were parties to it to defend them if they should be attacked. The main object of this demand was clearly to restrain Philip's enterprises, more particularly against the Greek cities in the north and the west. But it is probable that the application of the principle to the Boeotian towns was not overlooked.

Philip, when he professed his readiness to consent to an amendment of the treaty, could hardly have expected to receive such proposals as these; and it seems that he did not attempt to conceal his displeasure, but vented it in a manner remarkably opposite to his usual mildness and moderation, for he is said to have banished the Athenian poet Xenocides from his dominions because he entertained the envoys in his house;† and this is mentioned by Demosthenes as only one notorious instance, among many, of the rough treatment they met with at Pella. Philip, however, sent an embassy to Athens in return, charged with a letter, in which he discussed the Athenian demands, and stated the concessions which he was willing to make. This embassy gave occasion to a speech, which has come down among the works of Demosthenes, as the one on Halonnesus, but is now, on very satisfactory evidence, generally attributed to Hegesippus, to which we owe all our knowledge of the contents of Philip's letter. Philip, it appears, first addressed himself to the question of Halonnesus, which thus suggested the title of the oration. He de-

\* Æschines in Ctes., § 83. This is Winiewski's opinion, p. 157, which certainly derives some confirmation from the fact of the expedition to Acarnania. Bruckner, however (p. 277), supposes this expedition of Aristodemus to have been the same which Philip mentions in his Letter, § 5, as directed against the towns on the coast of the Gulf of Pagæ, but which was conducted by Callias. But, besides the difference in the name of the general, it seems clear that the expedition of Callias was a naval one, which does not so well suit the term *ἐπιπλοῦν* in Æschines. His expression, *τὴν συμφορὰν καὶ τὴν πύλινον παρεκκλίαν*, does not prove, as Bruckner seems to infer, that this expedition took place shortly before the war broke out. Yet it must be owned that the coincidences between this and that of Callias are striking enough to render the question very doubtful.

† But it may have been sent earlier, while Philip was engaged in reducing Phæra, to support the tyrants; only we hear no complaint from Philip on this subject.

‡ Orat. de Halon., § 23.

§ He was also nicknamed *Crobylus*, in allusion, it is said, to the fashion in which the Athenians anciently tied up their hair—*κροβύλλος*, Thucyd., i. 6. What might be the force of the allusion in this case we do not know. It seems as if it must have been aimed at some kind of affectation, either in his habits or his language. But of the latter there is no trace in his extant oration. A different explanation of the nickname, more conformable to the usual tone of the Attic orators, is suggested by the character of the person to whom it is applied in Plutarch, Alex., 22.

\* Demosthenes, De Cherson., § 6. Philipp., iii., § 20.

† Ibid., De F. L., § 380.

clared himself willing to make a present of the island to the Athenians, but contended that they had lost their right to it when they suffered it to be taken from them by Sostratus; that he had made it his own by a fair conquest from an open enemy; and was ready, if his claim was disputed, to submit it to arbitration. The orator endeavoured to expose the fallacy of this argument by a supposed case. If it had been a place on the coast of Attica that had been seized by the pirates, and Philip had dislodged them, would he have been entitled to retain a part of the Attic territory? It was a mere pretence; and the king's real object was to show to all Greece that the Athenians were fain to owe even their maritime possessions to Macedonian generosity. It would be little less dishonourable and unwise to consent to the arbitration which had been insidiously proposed with a similar view, even if there were no danger that the arbitrators might be corrupted by Philip's bribes.

There can be no doubt that this language expressed a strong popular feeling of jealousy on a point which touched Athenian pride most sensibly; and that the distinction, which became so celebrated as to furnish the comic poets with a fertile topic for playful allusions,\* that the island should be not *given*, but *restored*, not *accepted*, but *recovered*,† was not a cavil suggested by the orators. And so, when the speaker rejects with equal scorn, and on like grounds, another proposal contained in the letter for a combination between Philip and the commonwealth to guard against pirates, he no doubt had all the natural prejudices of his audience on his side.

It would seem that Philip made no mention of Potidæa. But it was understood to be with reference to this subject that his ambassadors were instructed to propose certain terms as the basis of a commercial treaty,‡ under which the disputed question might be judicially decided; and the orator contends that, as these terms were to be sanctioned by Philip, they would certainly be so framed as, by implication, to exclude the claims of the Athenian citizens on the property they had lost at Potidæa, which, after the fall of Olynthus, had passed into the conqueror's hands.

With regard to Amphipolis, it may be collected that Philip denied he had ever authorized his ambassadors to promise for him that he would consent to alter the treaty in so material a point. He insisted on the right he had acquired by the plain language of the article in question, as it then stood. From the orator's reply, one might conjecture that the Macedonian envoys had either spoken indiscreetly, or had overlooked the slight change proposed by the Athenians, or had not perceived its scope. The orator endeavours to prove that the original words could not have the effect of making anything to be Philip's which had not been so before; and refers, among other arguments, to Philip's previous declaration and promises in confirmation of the Athenian title to Amphipolis.

The letter gave a full assent to the proposition concerning the liberty and independence

of the Greeks; but the orator, to prove the insincerity of these professions, compares them with Philip's recent treatment of Phære and the Cassopian cities. Philip repeated the complaint which he had before made through his ambassadors about the charge of bad faith, with which he was so often assailed by the Athenian orators, and again professed that nothing but the people's want of confidence in his friendly disposition prevented him from proving it by signal benefits. The orator reminds his hearers of the promises contained in a letter preserved in the state archives, which Philip had written before the peace, and of the manner in which he had performed them.

The affair of the Thracian towns, which, as the Athenians maintained, he had taken after the peace was ratified, Philip offered to refer to arbitration; but the orator will not listen to the proposal of debating a question which he considers as clearly settled by the simple comparison of dates. So, too, he rejects as an insult Philip's recommendation that they should bring their differences with the Cardians before an impartial tribunal, and his offer to compel Cardia to submit to this mode of decision; as if, he observes, Athens was not able to force the Cardians to do her justice. Yet he admits that there was a decree of the people unrepealed, which recognised the title of the Cardians to their territory, and that he himself had impeached its author, Callippus, on this ground without success.

The nature of the motion which was introduced by such a speech may be easily imagined; and this most probably contained the official reply that Philip received. It did not so much widen as lay open the breach; for all the sentiments which the orator delivered had long been familiar to the people, and were well known to Philip. Yet the frequent discussion of such topics tended to inflame the public irritation; and this was the effect of the struggles that had been carried on ever since the peace between the two parties, which were divided chiefly on the question of the policy to be observed towards Philip. It was nearly about this time that the people's attention was deeply excited by a cause in which the parties put forth all their strength, and their two most celebrated orators their highest powers of eloquence. This was an impeachment brought by Demosthenes against Æschines for misconduct and corruption in the second embassy on which they were sent together to Philip's court. It has been seen that a great part of the second Philippic was distinctly pointed against Æschines and Philocrates, and that the main object of the whole was probably to rouse the public indignation against them. Philocrates, it appears, made no secret of his corruption, and not only accepted large sums of money and grants of land in Phocis from Philip, but displayed his new resources, with scandalous ostentation, in the increased splendour of his style of living.\* He was therefore selected as the first object of a legal prosecution, which was undertaken by Hyperides, an orator of great ability, who was long closely attached in political sentiments, and perhaps by private friendship, to Demosthenes. The Athenian law af-

\* Athenæus, vi., p. 223.

† Μη λαβόντων ἅλ' ἀπολαβόντων: μη λαβόντων, εἰ δὲ δώσωσι, ἅλ' ἀποδοῦσιν.

‡ Σύνθεσις.

\* Dem., F. L., § 194, 196.

furnished many common ways of bringing such an offender to justice; but Hyperides adopted a species of indictment\* which was, in the first instance, submitted to the cognizance either of the council of Five Hundred, or—which was the course he took—of the people in assembly, and always suggested the notion of an offence either wholly unheard of, and not yet provided for, or peculiarly aggravated in its circumstances. The assembly entertained the indictment, and, according to the ordinary practice, the next step was, unless it chose to sit in judgment on the case itself, to appoint another tribunal, and to fix the day of trial. The accused, in the mean while, was either committed to prison, or compelled to find sureties for his appearance. Which of these courses was taken with Philocrates we are not informed; probably the latter; for it seems that, notwithstanding his uncommon assurance, and the strength of the party from which he might have looked for protection, he avoided the trial by a voluntary exile.†

When this indictment was brought before the assembly, Demosthenes openly declared that there was only one thing in it with which he was dissatisfied; and this was that it had been brought against Philocrates, who was certainly not the sole criminal among the ambassadors; and he called upon those of his colleagues who disapproved of his conduct to come forward and declare themselves. No one thought fit to answer to this summons. The expressions which the orator reports himself to have used on that occasion strongly intimate that he had then already conceived the design of bringing a formal charge against some of them. Perhaps he was only waiting for the opportunity, which would be afforded whenever Æschines should appear before the proper court, to render an account of his conduct in the embassy. The time of doing this was left by the law—strange as it seems—to his discretion; and he put it off for nearly three years after the end of the war, hoping either to avoid it altogether, or that the popular mood might become more favourable to him. During this interval, however, an incident appears to have occurred which exposed him to fresh suspicion and reproach. He had been elected to represent the interests of the commonwealth in a contest with the Delians concerning the superintendence of their temple. Before his departure on this embassy—as to which we are not sure whether it was sent to Delos or to Delphi—information reached Demosthenes that a man named Antiphon was lurking in Piræus with the intention of firing the arsenal. Demosthenes, having discovered his hiding-place, did not scruple to arrest him and bring him before an assembly, which was probably summoned in Piræus expressly on this business. He had, perhaps, collected very little evidence in support of the charge, and Æschines, protesting loudly against the illegal violence he had used, induced the assembly to dismiss the culprit. Soon after, however, Demosthenes obtained stronger proofs of Antiphon's guilt, which he laid before the Areopagus, by whom he was again apprehended

and brought before the assembly, which, after he had been put to the torture, condemned him to death. What he confessed, we do not know; much less what he had done or designed to do. Demosthenes, in a speech made many years after, asserts that he had promised Philip to set fire to the arsenal.\* But it is possible that this was a mere suspicion, resting on no evidence; and, accordingly, we do not find any allusion to the fact in the Philippics, where it would have had so appropriate a place. The result, however, was that the Areopagus, to which the management of the Delian business had been committed, deprived Æschines of his honourable office, and appointed Hyperides in his room. Though, as will be seen in the note, there is considerable doubt about the date of this transaction, it is certain that, not long before he was brought to trial by Demosthenes, Æschines had suffered an affront of this nature, and vented his resentment against his rival in threats which he never executed.†

It seems to have been a disputable point of law whether the ambassadors, who had been sent twice to Philip on the affair of the peace, were liable to give a separate account of each embassy. Demosthenes, at least, asserts, that when he himself tendered his account of his own conduct in the second embassy, Æschines contended that it ought not to be received, because he had already obtained a legal discharge on the first.‡ When, however, this objection was overruled, he probably thought it necessary to encounter the same trial. The proceeding was, in effect, a public challenge to any citizen who wished to impeach the conduct of the responsible magistrate. There were two who declared themselves ready to accuse Æschines: Demosthenes and Timarchus.

It is painful to see such names coupled together; for Timarchus was a man so recklessly and notoriously addicted to the foulest pleasures as scarcely to be tolerated by public opinion at Athens, notwithstanding its extreme laxity on such points, and as legally to have disabled himself from taking part in judicial proceedings or political business. He was, nevertheless, a very active orator, and had long been engaged in public affairs. He had thrown himself on the side of the anti-Macedonian party, no doubt because it was the most popular, and had distinguished himself as a member of the Five Hundred, by a motion which he appears to have carried, for a decree forbidding the exportation of arms and marine stores for Philip's service under pain of death. It was fortunate for Æschines to have such an enemy, and he availed himself of the exception which the law allowed him against

\* De Cor., § 168.

† Dem., F. L., § 231, τὸ τοῖνον τελευταῖον ἵστε ὅπως πρῶτον ἐν Πειραιεὶ, ἐπ' αὐτὸν οὐκ εἰσὶν πρεσβύται, βουλὴν δὲ εὐαγγέλιον καὶ τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ. The mention of Piræus in this passage seems to connect this scene with that of Antiphon's arrest. But there are other grounds for believing that the date of the transaction was that assigned in the text. Plutarch, Dem., 14, remarks that his proceeding in the case of Antiphon was σφόδρα ἀριστοκρατικὸν πολιτικόν, and this is a consideration which would incline us to date it as late as possible. But a weightier argument seems to be that the story implies a state of enmity between Demosthenes and Æschines, which did not arise before the peace. Winiewski, p. 52, thinks it evident that it could have been only at a time when Athens was at war with Philip that Antiphon could have offered to engage in such an undertaking; but it seems too much to assume both Antiphon's guilt and Philip's participation in the plot. De F. L., § 234, 234.

\* Εὐαγγέλιον.

† Æschines adv. Ctes., § 79. Φιλοκράτης . . . φεύγει; ἀν' εὐαγγέλιον γυμνάσει. De F. L., § 126.

his accuser. Timarchus was put upon his trial under a law of Solon, which forbade any one who had committed such excesses to mount the bema : a proof, by-the-way, that the case of Timarchus must not be considered as an indication of a more corrupt age. It is remarkable that his prosecutor offered no evidence of the charge but public notoriety. He alludes slightly to his private grounds of enmity towards the defendant, and wishes it to be believed that his chief motive was a disinterested concern for the public morals ; but towards the close of his speech he betrays the real state of the case by bitter invectives against Demosthenes, who appeared as one of the advocates of Timarchus, and by anticipations of the charges with which he himself was threatened. He expects that, even on the trial of Timarchus, Demosthenes will attempt to divert the attention of the court from the real merits of the cause to the peace made by himself and Philocrates, and to the fate of the Phocians, and that Philip's name will be frequently introduced to raise a prejudice against him. Yet he does not shrink from avowing that he commends Philip for his professions of good-will to the commonwealth : "if his actions correspond to his promises, he will afford solid and ample ground for praise."

Timarchus was disfranchised ;\* and Æschines not only gained the advantage of silencing a hostile voice, but probably raised a strong prepossession in his own favour among the friends of public decency and order. In his defence of himself, he mentions his prosecution of Timarchus as an obligation conferred on the state. His own trial came on not very long after. His speech and that of Demosthenes, on this occasion, are among the most admirable specimens of their eloquence, and the most valuable materials for the history of the times. It is in the latter point of view alone that they can be noticed here ; and to enter into the argument would be to repeat much of what has been already said on the subject of the two embassies. It only remains to mention the issue. Æschines was acquitted, it is said, by a majority of only thirty votes. This may, perhaps, on the whole, be regarded as a proof that the popular suspicions were very strong against him ; for his party, including the friends of all the other ambassadors who were virtually implicated in the charge, made the most active efforts to save him : the austere Phocion, and Eubulus, the liberal distributor of the public money, united their influence in his behalf ; but he probably owed his acquittal, in a great measure, to his own talents, and to the peculiar difficulties of his adversary's case. Demosthenes felt himself obliged not only to convict Æschines, but to defend himself. He was anxious to clear himself from the suspicion of a connexion with Philocrates, whom, nevertheless, he, as well as Æschines, had supported in the measures which led to the peace ; and, in his account of the embassies, it was necessary, and yet not easy, to represent himself as overreached by his colleagues, notwithstanding his zeal and vigilance, as continuing to act with them when he no

longer trusted them, as having witnessed their intrigues and foreseen the result, though he did not disclose his suspicions and forebodings till it was too late to avert the danger. This appears to have been the cause of the perplexity which strikes every reader in his narrative, and must have produced a no less unfavourable impression on his audience, especially when contrasted with the clearness and apparent simplicity of the defence. The event left the two parties opposed to each other as before, with unabated confidence and redoubled animosity.

We must now return to Philip. The events which had occurred since the end of the war, though they had strengthened his power, had not brought him much nearer to the object he had in view in the south of Greece. He had been baffled in his attempts to establish a communication with Peloponnesus, both on the eastern and western side of Greece, and in that which he made to gain a footing in the immediate neighbourhood of Athens. Only in Euboea he had been more successful, in an enterprise against Eretria, which it will be more convenient to relate hereafter. In the mean while he had been building arsenals and ships of war in his newly-acquired ports, and making active preparations for a naval expedition.\* This enlargement of his marine was no doubt designed to promote his operations in the north, towards which he now began to turn his chief attention. Conquests in this quarter might not only prepare the way for his invasion of Persia, but might enable him to overcome or overawe the resistance of Athens. It appears to have been in the spring of 342 that he set out on an expedition which was professedly directed against Thrace. We are very imperfectly acquainted with the state of that country at this time. It is, however, certain that Cersobleptes had been gaining strength, and had shaken off his subjection to Philip. We do not know what foundation there may have been for a statement, found only in Diodorus,† that he had begun to annoy the Greek cities on his coasts, and that Philip marched against him to protect them. Philip's subsequent conduct towards the principal of these towns renders this account extremely doubtful. It is possible, however, that something had happened which afforded him such a pretext for the invasion of Thrace. But it was not against Cersobleptes only that his arms were turned.

A prince named Teres, who reigned in the more northern or western regions of Thrace, and who had been his ally in his war with Athens, had, it seems, now become hostile to him ;‡ having perhaps been induced, by a sense of their common interest, to unite with Cersobleptes. Philip was thus led to carry the war into the heart of Thrace, where he is said to have defeated the barbarians in several engagements. But his views were not now confined to victories, ravages, and plunder. He meditated a permanent conquest ; and for this purpose not only imposed a tribute of a tenth of the produce on the conquered territory, but also founded a number of new towns, or military colonies, in the interior.§ But such a situation was one in

\* According to one account, he put an end to his life : a sign of greater sensibility than might have been expected from so profligate a man. The allusions of Demosthenes are ambiguous as to this point.

\* Orat. de Halon., § 16. † xvi., 71. ‡ Phil., Epist., § 8. § Diodorus, u. c., ἐν τοῖς ἐλευσίνοις πόλεσι κτίσας ἀποικίας.



which few Greeks would have been tempted to settle, even by the offer of lands and houses: it sounded as emigration to the inland regions of Australia to a Frenchman; and it seems that he was driven to some extraordinary measures for peopling his new colonies. Demosthenes\* mentions three towns, Drongile, Kabyle, and Mastira, as among the wretched places which Philip had been taking and settling in Thrace. As to one of these, Kabyle or Kalybe, which stood on the River Taxus, and belonged to the Astian tribe, whose land stretched towards Byzantium, we are distinctly informed that he planted a colony there which was peopled with the refuse of society.† And such, we may infer from the nickname it derived from the character of its inhabitants (Poneropolis, Roguetown), must have been the case with another city, built at the foot of Rhodope, which he himself honoured with the name of Philippopolis.‡ If we connect these hints with Justin's rhetorical description of the tyrannical violence with which, after the end of the Phocian war, he transported his subjects into new seats as suited his pleasure,§ we shall be inclined to conclude that the population of these places was composed partly of needy vagabonds, or even pardoned convicts, but partly, too, of the inhabitants of conquered Greek cities, whom he tore from their homes, and whose property he distributed among his officers.||

These conquests, and, still more, the measures taken by Philip to secure them, could not but alarm both the Athenians and the Greek cities on the coast, especially Byzantium, which lay not very far from the borders of the conquered territory. If the barbarians were troublesome neighbours, Philip was much more to be dreaded when he occupied their land. It was manifest to every one that his ultimate object could not be merely to subdue and colonize the wilds of Thrace; that this was but a step towards the reduction of the powerful and opulent maritime towns, which were so important in a contest either with Persia or Athens. At Athens, all who were not blinded by prejudice saw that both the Bosphorus and the Chersonesus, and with them the naval power, the commerce, the very subsistence of the people, were exposed to imminent danger; the more so as Byzantium, which had been alienated from Athens by the Social War, was still in alliance with Philip. In the mean while, occurrences had taken place which rendered the condition of the Chersonesus peculiarly alarming. Diopithes, who appears to have been a well-meaning and zealous officer, but not very discreet or scrupulous, had been engaged in constant warfare with Cardia, and had collected a body of mercenaries to maintain the conflict, for whom he was obliged to provide, as well as he could, in the manner which had been long practised by

Athenian commanders. Philip, after his proposals for an arbitration had been rejected, sent some forces to the aid of the Cardians; and these troops soon found themselves engaged in hostilities with those of Diopithes. The Athenian general, however, did not confine himself to the defence of his colonists, or to aggression against Cardia, but, when Philip invaded Thrace, thought himself at liberty actively to espouse the cause of the Thracian princes, who had both, it seems, been admitted to the Athenian franchise,\* made inroads into the part of Thrace which Philip had conquered,† and, in the course of these expeditions, committed sundry acts of violence on the property and persons of Macedonian subjects, and even detained an envoy, named Amphilocus, who came to treat with him for the release of the prisoners, and forced him to pay a heavy ransom.‡

Philip sent a letter, complaining of these injuries, which gave the signal to the orators of his party at Athens loudly to denounce the conduct of Diopithes, and to press for his recall and for the dismissal of his mercenaries. Some proposed to send another general, with a force sufficient to compel him to obedience. Demosthenes spoke on this occasion, not so much in defence of the general as against the policy recommended by his adversaries. His oration is that *On the Chersonesus*. His object is to show that the real question which the people had to consider was, not whether Diopithes had acted well or ill, but how they might best guard against the danger with which they were threatened by Philip's ambition. He wishes to make it appear that Diopithes had as much right to assist the Thracians as Philip to attack them; for, though it was not Attic ground that Philip had invaded, there could be no doubt that he was fighting in Thrace for the mastery of Athens. In other respects Diopithes had only followed the example of all the Athenian generals who had ever commanded mercenary troops; for none had ever scrupled to levy contributions from the cities of the coast of Asia. But even if it were admitted that Diopithes had violated law and justice, the people could at any time both put a stop to his misconduct and punish him for it; but, in the present posture of affairs, to disband the troops he had collected, or even to weaken his authority and credit by an expression of their displeasure, would be to inflict an irreparable injury on themselves. Philip was then wintering in Thrace with a large army; and he was credibly reported to have sent for a great additional force from Macedonia and Thessaly. As soon as the Etesian winds set in he might lay siege to Byzantium, which would then assuredly come to its senses again, and call upon Athens for succour; but if their armament was withdrawn from the Hellespont, and these succours were to be brought at that season from Athens, they might arrive too late; or, in the same case, what was there to prevent Philip from falling immediately on the Cherso-

\* De Cherson., § 44, καὶ ἂν οὐκ ἔλαρ καὶ κατασκευάσαι. The last word may perhaps allude to Philip's new establishments.

† Strabo, vii., p. 320. Harpocration, s. v.

‡ Steph. Byz. Pliny, N. H., iv., 11.

§ viii., 5. Reversus in regnum ut pecora pastores, nunc in hibernos, nunc in æstivos saltus trajiciunt, sic ille populos et urbes, at illi vel replenda, vel derelinquenda quæque loca videbantur, ad libidinem suam transferunt.

|| Theopompus in Athenæum, vi., 77: οἰμαὶ τοὺς τράιους, οὐ πλείονας ὅρας κατ' ἐκείνους τὸν χρόνον ἐκτακεῖσθαι, ὅτε ἔλαττε κατελθεῖν γὰρ ἢ μῆλινος τὸν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ πλείστην χώραν κατεκρήμινους.

\* Philippi, Epist., § 3.

† Argum. Or. de Cherson. But it seems very doubtful whether the inroad mentioned by Philip in his letter, § 3, where Diopithes is said to have taken Crobyle and Tristania, and to have ravaged the adjacent part of Thrace, ought to be referred to this period. The mention of the Byzantine galleys which occurs just before, § 2, seems to imply that it took place when Philip was at war with Byzantium.

‡ Philippi, Epist., § 8.

nesus—from carrying the war into the neighbourhood of Attica, and renewing his attempts on Megara and Eubœa, where he was already but too powerful! Prudence required that, instead of disbanding and disheartening troops of which they had such urgent need, they should raise more to re-enforce them, and should supply their commander with money, which would relieve him from the necessity of extorting it elsewhere. They ought to be aware that Philip was the implacable enemy of a state to which all the other Greeks naturally looked up as a champion of freedom; and that, whether far or near, every blow he struck was aimed at Athens. They must make up their minds to great sacrifices and hard struggles, for this was the price of liberty and honour, and not listen to the slavish counsels of those who only calculated the expense of a war. It was high time to make a stand against their insidious and restless foe: if they waited for a declaration of war from him, they might see him first—as had been the case with Olynthus and Phœræ—at their gates. The sum of the orator's advice is, that they should decree a war-tax, keep up their army—correcting, nevertheless, any abuses which they might discover—and send ambassadors to every quarter, to awaken the other Greeks to a sense of the common danger, and to obtain all the help that could be procured. Above all, they must restrain the venality of their counsellors by rigorous punishments. There might then be a chance of better days; otherwise he saw no possibility of deliverance.

Diopithes retained his command, and it may be presumed, after such a mark of his sovereign's approbation, was not much more circumspect in his conduct. There can be no doubt that he had given cause for just complaint, and that, in his invasion of Thrace at least, if not in his hostilities with Cardia, he had violated both the letter and the spirit of the treaty with Philip. The wisest, as well as the most honourable course would have been to disavow his proceedings and remove him from his command. Demosthenes, we may be sure, would have been very willing that an armament should have been sent under another general to supply his place; but he knew that a decree to this effect would probably be only so far executed as to disarm Diopithes, and to leave the Athenian interests near the seat of war unprotected. How far he was misled by the fallacy of his own reasoning, which appears to a modern reader flagrantly sophistical, we cannot determine. His view, however, of the perilous position of his country is not the less sound, and may be admitted as an excuse for some indistinctness of ideas as to the precise line of separation between offensive and defensive measures. Philip's movements, during the greater part of the year following the delivery of this speech, are involved in great obscurity. He did not make any hostile demonstration against Byzantium at the season mentioned by Demosthenes; and we are at some loss to guess how he was employed during the greater part of 341, unless it was in providing for the security of his conquests and newly-formed settlements in Thrace. No visible change appears to have taken place in the state of affairs, when Demosthenes made another appeal to the people, sim-

ilar to that which had been occasioned by the affair of Diopithes, but in a tone of still graver warning and more stirring exhortation. The object of this speech—the third Philippic—is simply to rouse the Athenians to action. What may have been its immediate occasion—whether an application which had been made by their citizens in the Chersonesus for protection\*—we do not know. The orator would be sufficiently urged by the intelligence of Philip's warlike preparations, and by the approach of the season for a new campaign.

He sets out with the startling assertion that, though in every assembly they had held since the peace, Philip's enterprises had been the grand subject of discussion, and none could deny the necessity of curbing and humbling him, their affairs could not have been in a worse condition if it had been the express object of all their deliberations to ruin them. For this there may have been many causes; but it was to be ascribed chiefly to the orators, who, either because their influence depended on the continuance of peace—an allusion, probably, to Eubulus—or through party malice and jealousy, laboured to defend Philip, and represented those who endeavoured to counteract his designs as the authors of war. If the people looked at actions rather than words, they must be convinced that Philip had, in fact, been waging war against them from the very beginning of the nominal peace; and they had seen but too many examples—as in the case, among others, of Olynthus and the Phocians—how little dependance was to be placed on his pacific professions. With Athens it was much more his interest to dissemble as long as their patience or credulity lasted. Wonderful, indeed, had been the growth of his power; and, in that distracted state of Greece, what remained for him to do, to make himself master of the whole, was less than he had already done. But still more wonderful was the license which had hitherto been granted to him, as if by universal consent—such as had never been assumed by either Athens or Sparta in their most flourishing period—of dealing with the lives, fortunes, laws, and liberty of Greeks as he would; and this, which would have been intolerable even in a Greek state, was permitted to a barbarian, whose people had always been accounted vile even among barbarians. This could never have happened if the ancient spirit of honour and patriotism had not so far degenerated that it had almost ceased to be a reproach to public men to sell and to be sold. Again, attempts were made to underrate Philip's power, which had been represented as less formidable than that of the Lacedæmonians when they were at the head of the Peloponnesian confederacy. These reasoners forgot the difference of the times and the modes of warfare; the difference between the military operations of a league which could only keep its forces, all heavy-armed citizens, together during a short summer campaign, and those of a monarch, who could take the field at all seasons, with a host of light troops, and who pushed his conquests by means of gold and intrigues, engines unknown to the ancient simplicity and virtue. From such an enemy they could only

\* As Wislowski, p. 176, suspects, on account of § 67.

be safe while they kept him at a distance, and took advantage of the nature of his country, which lay so peculiarly open to the attacks of a maritime power. They should take warning, while it was yet time, from the fate of so many cities, which had perished through the readiness with which the people had lent an ear to dishonest counsellors. If they asked what was to be done, his reply was, that they must try to unite the Greeks in a general league against Philip. They must send embassies, not only to Peloponnesus—where the last had not been fruitless—but to Rhodes and Chios (the old allies of Byzantium); and even to the Persian king, who was likewise concerned in checking Philip's progress. But, above all, it was necessary that, while they called upon others for this purpose, they should set them an example by their own preparations, and should spare neither money, nor ships, nor personal advice in a struggle in which they had most to lose, and in which it became them to take the lead.

One part, at least, of this advice appears to have been taken. We do not know what other embassies were sent, though it is probable that Demosthenes was employed at this time in some of his many missions; but a negotiation was certainly opened with the Persian court, most likely through some of the satraps of Western Asia;\* a measure which afforded a topic for much plausible declamation to the orators of the Macedonian party, who affected to talk of the Persian king as the common enemy of Greece.† A passage in a letter, which we shall soon have to notice again, of Philip to the Athenians, renders it not improbable that Philip was induced by these diplomatic movements to send another embassy to Athens, which was attended, at his request, by the ministers of all his allies, for the purpose, as he professed, of coming to an agreement about the Greeks—that is, perhaps, on all matters as to which he was at variance with the Athenians; and this may have been the occasion on which Demosthenes boasts of having extorted the approbation even of the foreign ministers by his confutation of Python.‡ Philip might hope by this step to gain credit with the Greeks at large for good intentions, and to counteract the efforts of the Athenian envoys. Possibly it may have led him to delay the opening of the next campaign. If so, Demosthenes accomplished one of the objects which he mentions in the third Philippic, as likely to be attained by the proposed negotiations, that of gaining time, which, as he observes, in a contest between a state and one man, was not useless. Nevertheless, as it was easy to foresee that this discussion would end as so many had ended before, there can be no doubt that Philip both continued his preparations without intermission, and did not let the summer pass before he began the expedition, which he was known to be meditating, against the Greek cities north of the Hellespont. In the interval he seems to have sent his fleet to

recover Halonnesus from the Peparrethians, who had taken possession of it, and to ravage their own island by way of punishment for the obstinacy with which they had refused to restore the other, and the prisoners they took in it. They complained at Athens of the treatment they had suffered, and an Athenian general was ordered to make reprisals on Macedonia.\*

Diodorus concludes his short account of Philip's expedition to Thrace with the words, "Wherefore the Greek cities (on the Thracian coast), having been released from their fears (of Cersobleptes), entered with the greatest readiness into alliance with Philip."† In any other writer one might be surprised to find that the transaction in Philip's history, which he relates next, is thus described: "Philip growing more and more powerful, marched against Perinthus, which was beginning to oppose him, and to lean towards the Athenians."‡ We happen, indeed, to know that Perinthus was not the first of these cities against which he turned his arms; that he first laid siege to Selymbria, which lay on the coast of the Propontis, between Perinthus and Byzantium. But we are not informed what was the occasion or pretext of his hostilities against either. Both were in alliance with Byzantium; but Philip had not yet come to an open rupture with the latter city, if we may rely on a statement of Demosthenes, which implies that he only declared war against it just before he besieged it.§ It seems most probable that, as his expedition was undoubtedly viewed by the Greek cities in this quarter with very different feelings from those which Diodorus attributes to them, they did not rest mere passive spectators of his progress, but endeavoured in some way or other to oppose it, either by succours furnished to the Thracian princes, or by some co-operation with Diopithes. While the siege of Selymbria was proceeding, an Athenian squadron of twenty ships was sent under the command of Laomedon, with the avowed object of bringing corn from the Hellespont to Lemnos. Philip was apprized of its approach, and suspecting—perhaps with good ground—that it was designed to relieve Selymbria, ordered his admiral Amyntas to intercept it; and it was accordingly carried into a Macedonian port. As the decree under which Laomedon had sailed related only to the professed purpose of his voyage, it is possible that the seizure may have appeared to the people in general an unprovoked outrage, and have excited vehement indignation. Therefore, perhaps, it was that Eubulus himself proposed to send an embassy to Philip, to demand satisfaction, and to learn whether any blame was imputed to Laomedon. Three envoys were sent, who brought back a letter from Philip, in which he told the people that they must be very simple if they supposed he was not aware that the ships had been sent for the relief of Selymbria, though Laomedon had received no public orders to that effect, and had only acted in secret concert with some individuals—magistrates and private citizens—who desired to kindle a war by which they hoped to profit. He

\* Philipp., iv., § 36. Though this oration is generally admitted to be spurious, it is not without historical value. Winiewski, p. 169, observes of it, "*Vera orationis Demosthenicæ partes aliquas continet, sed aliarum orationum lacrimis consarcinatas.*" It is of little importance for our purpose whether we adopt this opinion or Bruckner's, who (p. 278) thinks it contains traces of historical sources now lost. He has given a critical analysis of it in an appendix.

† U. a., § 36.

‡ This is Bruckner's opinion, p. 271.

\* Philipp., Epist., § 12.

† xvi., 71.

‡ xvi., 74.

§ De Cor., § 100, *παρελθὼν ἐπὶ Θράκης Βυζαντίου . . . ἤλθον συγκαταλεῖν τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς πόλιν, ὥς δ' οὐκ ἔθελον . . . ἵσταμενα βαλόμενος πρὸς τῇ πόλει καὶ μηχανήματα ἐκιστάσας ἐπιβόρως.*

would restore the ships, and, if the Athenians would check their evil counsellors, would endeavour, on his part, to preserve the peace.\*

Selymbria appears to have fallen either towards the end of 341, or very early in the ensuing spring; and Philip then proceeded to lay siege to Perinthus. He expected, perhaps, that this would prove an easier conquest than Byzantium, and would aid him greatly in the reduction of the latter place. It was, however, extremely strong by nature—being built on an isthmus, in the form of a theatre, on a series of terraces rising from the sea, which washed it on two sides—and well fortified.† The co-operation of a fleet was necessary for the siege, and the Macedonian admiral was ordered to sail into the Propontis. It was, however, discovered or suspected that the officer, probably Chares, who commanded an Athenian squadron in the Hellespont, was preparing, in concert with Diopithes, to oppose his passage through the straits, and had called upon the Byzantians for aid.‡ In this intelligence or surmise, Philip found a pretext for sending a body of troops into the Chersonesus to protect the passage of his fleet; and, of course, did not withdraw them after this had been effected. Perinthus, however, made an obstinate resistance. Though Philip's army was too strong to be met in the field, it appears that the besieged were not driven within their walls without a hard struggle;§ and when the engines had made a breach in the outer enclosure which admitted the Macedonians into the town, they had only reached the foot of a new rampart, loftier and more solid than the last, formed by a line of houses standing on higher ground, and connected together by walls carried across the intervening streets; and this but the lowest range in a series of similar barriers. Nevertheless, Philip's superiority in numbers, and, perhaps, we may add, in artillery of the newest invention, might have enabled him to overcome all these obstacles if the city had been left to its own resources. But it was supplied with troops and ammunition by the Byzantians; and the Persian court, roused perhaps by the representations of Athens, ordered the satraps of the western coast to make the most strenuous exertions in its behalf; and Philip could not prevent them from introducing a body of mercenaries, together with arms, money, provisions, and stores of all kinds. He now found the difficulties of the undertaking so much increased, that he resolved to try a new expedient. The submission of Byzantium would probably involve that of Perinthus, and was in itself much more important. He therefore divided his army; left one half under some of his ablest generals, to carry on the siege of Perinthus, and with the other marched against Byzantium. His appearance was unexpected, and the city, having made great efforts for the defence of Perinthus, was but ill-prepared to sustain a siege. Yet it was not dismayed by the king's threats, and refused to purchase its safety on the terms he proposed, which seem to have been, that it should enter into an al-

liance, both defensive and offensive, with him. Philip immediately began to invest it on the land side, and probably brought up a part of his naval force to blockade its port.

While Philip was thus occupied on the coast of Thrace, the Athenians had been gaining some important advantages nearer home. About the same time that the Macedonian party was overpowered in Megara, a similar faction at Eretria prevailed over its adversaries, and expelled them from the city. It seems that they then made a stand in Porthmus, the Eretrian Piræus; for a Macedonian general, Hipponicus, who was sent with 1000 mercenaries to the aid of their enemies, razed its walls to the ground. Three of Philip's partisans, Hipparchus, Automedon, and Clitarchus, then shared the government for a while among them; but repeated attempts were made to dislodge them, which induced Philip to send first Eurylochus, and afterward Parmenio, with fresh re-enforcements. The supreme power seems to have remained at last with Clitarchus alone.

It has been already mentioned, that when Philip was threatening Ambracia, the Athenian negotiators in Peloponnesus were supported in their attempts to bring about a confederacy against him by Callias of Chalcis. Callias, it appears, aimed at reducing Eubœa under his own authority; and, as he could not expect Philip's concurrence in this design, planned a league among all the cities of the island for the protection of their independence. They were to send their deputies to a congress in Chalcis, where he might expect that they would be, in a great measure, subject to his influence. Demosthenes entered into this scheme, which held out a prospect of a permanent barrier against the Macedonian ascendancy, and induced the people not only to consent to it, but to transfer the yearly contributions which they received from Eretrias and Oreus to Chalcis. Clitarchus, it seems, wished, notwithstanding his connexion with Philip, to keep on good terms with Athens, and was so far considered as her ally, that an embassy was sent to him as well as to the people of Oreus, to obtain his compliance; the project, however—which Æschines\* represents as a signal proof of dishonesty in Demosthenes, because the Athenian treasury was to lose a revenue of ten talents through it—fell to the ground: perhaps partly in consequence of a revolution which took place not long after in Oreus, where the Macedonian faction, with the help of Parmenio, became predominant. Their most active opponent was that Euphræus, Plato's scholar, who has been already mentioned† as a favourite of Perdicas, and as having given great offence to the Macedonian nobles and generals by his injudicious zeal for learning. He ventured to impeach Philistides, the leader of the adverse faction, and some of his friends, for treason; but they were already so powerful, that they were able to throw him into prison as a mover of sedition. Soon after Parmenio appeared with his forces before the gates: they were opened to him by treachery; and Philistides, with four colleagues, assumed the government. The disaffected were banished or put to death. Euphræus, according to Demosthenes, killed himself: another account

\* Demosth., De Cor., p. 251.

† Diodorus, xvi., 76.

‡ Philippi, Epist., § 17.

§ Plutarch, Alex., 70, mentions a sally and a battle, in which Antigonus lost an eye.

\* Ctes., § 100.

† Ant., p. 61.

states that he fell a victim to Parmenio's inveterate hatred.\*

Thus two of the principal cities of the island were in the hands of Philip's creatures when he set out on his Thracian expedition. Demosthenes, in his speech on the affair of Diopithes, reproaches the Athenians, in the name of the other Greeks, with supineness for allowing this state of things to continue so long, even while Philip was engaged at a distance. In the course of the next autumn (341), he carried a decree for an expedition to Eubœa. Clitarchus and Philistides, despairing of timely aid from Philip, endeavoured to avert the danger by an embassy to Athens, where Æschines entertained their envoys in his house, and perhaps pleaded their cause.† But the expedition was sent, and under the command of Phocion, who expelled the tyrants from both cities. Yet the chief merit of this success seems to have been ascribed to Demosthenes, for he was honoured with a golden crown; and Æschines himself, by the pains he takes to exhibit the affair of Callias in the worst light, seems tacitly to acknowledge the value of his rival's services towards the recovery of the island. This stroke was followed up by another. A squadron under the command of Callias—whether the Chalcidian, or an Athenian general of the same name, is not known—sailed into the Gulf of Pagasæ, took all the towns on the coast, seized the merchant-ships bound for Macedonia, and sold the crews as slaves. Decrees were passed, by which the people praised him for these proceedings; but it does not seem that they had been previously authorized, even if Callias was indeed the general, and not simply an independent ally of the commonwealth.

It was now manifest that the name of peace could not be much longer preserved between two powers whose mutual relations and measures were so decidedly hostile. Philip probably received intelligence which convinced him that a war with Athens was unavoidable: he cannot have supposed that reasonings or expostulations could now alter the course of the Athenian policy; yet, as it appears, without any fresh occasion, he sent a manifesto, in the form of a letter, to the people, complaining of the acts by which they had violated the treaty. There can be little doubt that his object in this remonstrance was partly to impress the whole of Greece with a favourable opinion of his own good faith, patience, and moderation, but chiefly to afford materials and arguments for the orators who would plead his cause at Athens, whose efforts, even though they should not avert the war, might procure a delay, which at this juncture would have been extremely convenient to him.

The genuineness of this paper has been questioned, but, it seems, without any good ground. It was very likely drawn up by Philip himself, and may be considered as a fair specimen of the correctness and elegance with which he wrote the language; nor does it contain anything unsuited to his circumstances, or unworthy of his reputation as a statesman.

He begins with a complaint that the many embassies which he had sent for the mainte-

nance of the peace had all proved fruitless, and assigns this as the reason which had determined him to exhibit the injuries he had suffered from them in one clear statement. He first alleges that a herald named Nicias had been carried off from his dominions to Athens, and that the people, instead of punishing this outrage, had detained Nicias ten months in custody, and had ordered the letters with which he was charged to be read from the bema.\* They had permitted the Thasians to harbour the galleys of the Byzantians, and even pirate vessels. They had sanctioned the inroads made upon his territory by Diopithes, the seizure of Amphilochus, and the aggressions of Callias on the coast of Thessaly—all breaches of the treaty, and, in part, of the law of nations, such as they themselves had made a capital ground of implacable resentment in their quarrel with Megara.

His next head of complaint is the embassy which had been sent to invite the Persian king into a league against him. He reminds them that not many years before, when rumours were spread of a Persian invasion, they had resolved, if it should be needful, to call upon him for aid against the barbarian. He attempts to shame them by the example of their forefathers, who had treated the application which the Pisistratids made for Persian succours, as one of their gravest offences.

He vindicates his right to make war on Teres and Cersobleptes, and shows that they had no claim on the Athenians for assistance, since Cersobleptes had not been included in the treaty—had, in fact, been rejected by their own generals when he wished to be admitted into it—and Teres had been then in alliance with Macedonia. They might as well have expected that those who expelled Evagoras from Cyprus, and Dionysius from Syracuse, should have consented to restore them to power, because each had received the Athenian franchise, as that he should give up his conquests in Thrace, merely because they had chosen to adopt Teres and Cersobleptes.

Having defended his conduct in the affairs of Cardia and Peparethus, he proceeds to complain of the hostilities by which he had been compelled to send his troops into the Chersonesus for the protection of his fleet, and takes credit to himself for the forbearance he had nevertheless shown to them, when it was in his power to invade their territory, and to inflict great damage on their navy, if not to take their city.

The instance in which they had perhaps displayed the most shameful disregard even of the appearance of equity, was when they rejected the proposals made by his ministers and those of all his allies, to secure the independence of the other Greek states. And in this instance it was evident how widely the interests of the people differed from those of their orators. To the people it would have been advantageous to have come to an amicable settlement of this question: not so to the orators. To them, as he had been informed on good authority, peace was war, and war peace; for they drew an un-failing revenue from the generals, whom they

\* Among them was one directed to Olympia: this the people would not suffer to be opened; Plutarch, *Fræg. Ger. Reip.*, 3: An anecdote which most probably belongs to this occasion.

\* Carystius in *Athenensis*, xi., c. 119.

† Demosth., *De Cor.*, § 102.

either supported or threatened with calumnious charges, and gained popularity as friends of democracy by incessant abuse of their most eminent fellow-citizens, and of the most illustrious foreigners. He could, indeed, at a small expense, easily have stopped the invectives of these men against himself, and have turned them into praise. But he scorned to purchase the good-will of the people from such persons—men who were even shameless enough to lay claim to Amphipolis, notwithstanding the title which he inherited from his ancestor Alexander, who had conquered the site of the city during the Persian invasion, and that which he himself had acquired by the fortune of war, and which they themselves had confirmed by the last treaty.

"These," he concludes, "are the charges I have against you : and since my forbearance has only encouraged you to persevere more actively in your aggressions, and to do all the harm you can to me, I will assert my just cause by force of arms, and appealing to the gods as my witnesses, will bring our controversy to an issue."

This language amounted to a declaration of war, and yet did not absolutely preclude fresh negotiations. Demosthenes, however, prevailed on the people not to defer a measure which they would still find to be unavoidable, when it could no longer be useful to them, but to accept Philip's challenge while they had so fair a prospect of victory. He carried a decree which directed that the column containing the treaty with Philip should be taken down, that a fleet should be equipped, and all other preparations for war vigorously made.\* The immediate object of this armament was, of course, to relieve Byzantium. But so deep had been the alienation produced by the Social War between the two cities, that it was doubtful, as Demosthenes intimates,† whether the Byzantians would consent to accept succours from Athens. He himself, it appears, undertook an embassy for the purpose of forming an alliance with them.‡ Yet, when he had effected this object, the fruit of his negotiation had wellnigh been lost, through factious intrigues and mismanagement. Chares had so much interest as to procure himself to be appointed to the command of the expedition. It was scarcely possible to have made a more unhappy choice; for, besides his general defects of character and capacity, he was the very man who, above all others, had provoked the enmity of the Byzantians, and contributed to kindle the Social War.§ The consequence was that all his operations failed: the allies to whose aid he was sent dreaded him scarcely less than they did the enemy, and refused to receive him; and he employed his forces to exact *benevolences*—that was the Attic term for this kind of robbery||—from the defenceless.

It may easily be supposed that Chares, in his despatches, laid the blame of his miscarriages on the distrust of the Byzantians; and the Athenians were at first almost as indignant at the affront as when their troops were dismissed

by the Spartans from the siege of Ithome. They were inclined to recall their forces, and to leave the Byzantians to their fate; but Phocion pointed out the real cause of their failure, and the just motives which their allies had for suspicion. The people was still capable of listening to truth, though harshly expressed. It decreed a fresh armament, and appointed Phocion himself to the supreme command. This appears to have been very expeditiously fitted out, and when it joined the other, they amounted together to 120 sail. They carried heavy-armed troops, who were Athenian citizens, arms, and provisions. Phocion, on his arrival at Byzantium, encamped without the walls, and did not demand admittance for his men. His fame, however, had gone before him, and it chanced that Cleon, one of the leading citizens, had been his bosom companion at Athens when they studied together in the groves of Acadamus. He undertook to answer for Phocion's good faith, and the Athenians were admitted into the city, where they won universal good-will and esteem, as well by their zeal and bravery as by their orderly behaviour.\* Philip was forced to raise the siege both of Byzantium and Perinthus:† his troops were driven out of the Chersonesus;‡ and Phocion not only captured several of his ships, but landed on many parts of the coast, expelled the Macedonian garrisons from some of the towns, and made destructive inroads into the interior. In one of these he was so severely wounded as to be obliged to return home.

It was long since Athens had seen herself standing in so proud a position. Her restless enemy, notwithstanding his victorious campaigns, had been baffled in his main attempts at Megara, in Euboea, and in the west of Greece, and had now been completely defeated in the most important enterprise he had yet undertaken. The glory was almost all her own, though Chios, Cos, Rhodes, and some other states had sent succours to Byzantium. Byzantium and Perinthus expressed their gratitude by a joint decree, which conferred the amplest privileges of isopolity on the Athenians, and directed that a group of three colossal statues should be erected in Byzantium, representing the Athenian People receiving a crown from each of the rescued cities; and that a solemn deputation should be sent to each of the four public games of Greece to proclaim the benefits they had received, and the honours with which they had requited them. A golden crown, of the value of sixty talents, and an altar consecrated to Gratitude and the Athenian People, were decreed by the colonists of Sestus, Eleus, Madytus, and Alopecoonessus.

It seems probable that the success of the expedition was, in a great measure, due to Demosthenes, not only as the mover of the decree which ordered it, but still more on ac-

\* Plutarch, Phocion, 14.

† Fluthe, i. p. 226, surely places this event in a false light when he says that Philip withdrew his forces to show the two cities that he did not aim at an immediate possession of them. The decree in Demosth., De Cor., § 112, expresses that his object was their destruction.

‡ It is not quite clear how this fact, which is proved by the decree of the Chersonesians (Dem., u. a.) is to be reconciled with Justin's assertion, ix. 1, that Philip marched from Byzantium into the Chersonesus, and took many cities there.

\* Philochorus ap. Dion. Hal., Ep. i., ad Amm., 11.

† De Cherson., § 14.

‡ De Cor., § 304. Though the embassy here mentioned may have taken place a little earlier.

§ See ante, p. 81.  
|| Demosth., De Cherson., § 25, *φασὶ δ' ἐνέολας δίδουσι, καὶ τοῦτο τοῖνυν ἐξαιτῶν τὰ λήματα ταῦτα.*

count of a law which he procured to be passed nearly at the same time, and which effected a most important reform in the naval service of Athens. Down to this time a regulation had subsisted, which affords a remarkable instance how, even under the most purely democratical institutions, the grossest injustice may be authorized by the laws in favour of the wealthy. The citizens who were liable to the charges of the trierarchy were distributed into classes, each of sixteen members, without any respect to difference of fortune. By the existing law these sixteen were made to contribute equally to the expense of one galley. Demosthenes had attempted at an earlier period to remedy this abuse, which was, of course, cherished by many powerful patrons. We do not know whether his proposal was rejected, or whether means were found to evade the execution of it. The evil seems, at least, to have been as crying as ever, when the necessity of a vigorous effort in behalf of Byzantium enabled him to carry his plan. Its object was to distribute the whole burden of the trierarchy with reference not to persons, but to property; so that he part which fell on each contributor should be in exact proportion to his means. Demosthenes himself spoke with exultation of the success of his measure;\* and the charges by which his adversaries endeavoured to detract from his merit are hardly intelligible, and are he less deserving of notice, as they do not seem to impeach the equity and utility of the reform.†

## CHAPTER XLVI.

FROM THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN PHILIP AND THE ATHENIANS TO HIS DEATH.

A GREEK who had been watching the course of Philip's movements must have been surprised to hear that, after having raised the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus, on which he had spent so much time and money, if not any lives; after having been driven out of the Chersonesus; and when his own territories were suffering from the enemy's inroads, instead of making any attempt to retaliate on the Athenians, as he had boasted it was always in his power to do, his next enterprise was an expedition against the Scythians. The motives assigned for this expedition seemed by no means urgent. Atheas, king of the Scythians, pressed by the tribes on the banks of the Danube, had sought aid, through the mediation of the Greeks of Apollonia, from Philip, and a body of troops had been sent to support him. That the Scythian promised, in return for his help, to adopt him as heir to his throne, sounds hardly credible. The danger, however, which threatened the Scythians had ceased before their allies arrived; and Atheas sent them back with an insulting message, by which he disclaimed all connexion with Philip. Philip,

it is said, then demanded compensation for the cost of their march, which was likewise scoffingly refused. He was now bent on revenge; and, after he had withdrawn from Byzantium, sent an embassy to Atheas, with a request that he might be allowed to erect a statue of Hercules at the mouth of the Danube, which he had vowed during the siege. The sagacious barbarian replied, that if the statue was brought to him he would set it up, and would engage to protect it, but he would not let an army cross his border; and if Philip should come and erect it by force, he should find, on his return, that the brass had been melted down to point the Scythian arrows. On this challenge Philip led his army across the Danube, defeated the Scythians by a stratagem, and carried away an immense booty of flocks, herds, and slaves.

The plain between the Danube and the Balkan was at this period occupied by the Triballians, who had been not long before forced out of their ancient seats in the interior by the irruption of the Celts.\* Seeing that Philip's march was encumbered by the spoil, they demanded a share as the price of his passage through their country. This he refused, and a battle ensued, in which he was so severely wounded that a report spread through the field of his death; and the consternation thus caused in his army enabled the enemy to carry off all the booty.

The motive to which Justin attributes this campaign may, probably enough, have had some weight with Philip. It is, that the expense of the siege had drained his coffers, and that he sought to replenish them, partly by piracy and partly by the plunder of the Scythians. What Justin terms piracy may have been open and legitimate warfare against the maritime states, particularly the islands, which had sided with Byzantium. It is said to have recruited his finances with the sale of 170 prizes. But there is reason to believe that this was, at least, not the only or the chief motive of his Scythian expedition. Events which took place in Greece, while he was thus engaged, raise a very strong suspicion that his principal object was to divert the attention of the Greeks for a while from himself, and to lull them into security as to his designs.

In the spring of this year (339), Æschines had been appointed, with three others, to represent Athens in the Amphictyonic council. Among his colleagues, one was that same Meidias who has been already mentioned as a violent enemy of Demosthenes. The office seems always to have been accounted of little importance; and it was probably not difficult for any party to fill it with their own adherents. Demosthenes, who had himself held it some time before, intimates that the election of Æschines was effected by some such intrigues. Diognetus was the hieromnemon, Thrasycles the third pylagoras; nothing farther is known of their political bias. Æschines informs us that, on their arrival at Delphi, Meidias and Diognetus were prevented by illness from attending the council; but that he himself had received notice, from persons well disposed towards Athens, that it was the intention of the deputies from Amphissa to charge the Athenians with

\* De Cor., p. 262.

† Æschines in Ctes., § 232. Unless, indeed, this passage—as the expression *νομιζόμενος καὶ τῶν τραπέζων*—is inclined more strongly to suspect—alludes to the proposition contained in the oration De Symmoris. Dinarchus, in loc. cit., § 43, charges Demosthenes with having repeatedly forced his own law to be altered, so as to suit the interest of those who bribed him.

\* Niebuhr, *El. Schrift.*, p. 275.

a profane neglect of a religious ceremony, and to demand that they should be punished with a fine of fifty talents. A new chapel, it seems, had been built at Delphi, and, before it was finished or consecrated, the Athenians had dedicated there some golden shields—perhaps in the place of others which had been removed during the Sacred War—with an inscription commemorating their ancient victory over the Persians and Thebans. *Æschines* insinuates that the Thebans, who were affronted by this inscription, had instigated the Locrians of Amphissa to seize this pretext for gratifying their revenge. Why they should have chosen them as their instruments, instead of directly exerting their own influence, does not appear. But there was, according to *Æschines*, a very strong motive to withhold the Locrians from making such an attack on Athens; since, as he asserts, they were themselves conscious that they had incurred the penalties of sacrilege, and had even bribed *Demosthenes*, when he was sent as *pylagoras*, and some of his colleagues, to hush up the matter, and to espouse their cause at Athens, if they should be threatened with a prosecution.

It seems that, after the subjugation of the Phocians, the Locrians had taken possession of the land which had afforded the pretext for the Sacred War, and continued to cultivate it for their own benefit, relying, perhaps, on the connivance of the states with which they had co-operated against the common enemy. If they still dreaded the enmity of Athens, it seems strange that they should have wantonly provoked it, and no less so that they should have thought to screen themselves by bribing a few of her Amphictyonic deputies. *Æschines*, however, himself, according to his own statement, had not at first intended to denounce their impiety, but was only induced to take this step by an unexpected provocation. The *hieromnemon*, to whose office, perhaps, it would have more properly belonged to vindicate the Athenians in the business of the shields, sent for him, and begged him to undertake the task. He had himself purposed to do so, and had begun to plead with great earnestness, when he was interrupted by an Amphissian deputy, in rude and intemperate language, telling the assembly that they ought not to tolerate the name of the Athenians, but to exclude them from the holy ground, as laden with the same curse as their allies the Phocians. Then, *Æschines* says, he could no longer contain himself, and it occurred to him to direct the attention of the audience to the sacrilegious cultivation of the devoted plain, studded with rural buildings, and to the state of the harbour of Cirrha, which, though it had been solemnly doomed to perpetual desolation, was in complete repair, and frequented by ships: objects which were within view from the place of meeting. He reminded them of the dreadful curses which had been pronounced, after the first Sacred War, on all who should either do what the Locrians had done, or should connive at it. Roused by this appeal, the council became impatient to punish the offenders. A proclamation was made that very day, summoning all the Delphians who were of military age, and not only the freemen, but slaves, to meet the next morning at day-

break, with spades and pickaxes; and notice was given to all the members of the council to lend their aid in behalf of the god and his land.

The next day, this motley crowd, headed by the Amphictyons, marched down to the sea-side, demolished the mole of the harbour, and set fire to the adjacent houses. But as they returned from this pious work, they were met by the Locrians, who had issued, with their whole force, from Amphissa for the protection of their property, and narrowly escaped from their vengeance by a precipitate flight to Delphi.\* The day after, *Cottypus*, the president of the council—a Pharsaliant either by birth or settlement—convoked the Amphictyonic ecclesia, an assembly composed nearly of the same persons whose lives had been so recently threatened. There, says *Æschines*—and this we can easily believe—many accusations were brought against the Amphissians. The conclusion was a decree which fixed a day before the regular time of the next meeting, when the deputies were to assemble at Thermopylæ with proposals, sanctioned by the states which sent them, for bringing the Amphissians to justice.

Such is the account which *Æschines* gave of this transaction, in a speech, delivered several years later, in his own defence. It seems to have been his wish to inspire his hearers with a pious horror for the profaneness of the Locrians, and yet to represent his own impeachment of them as the sally of the moment, when indignation had thrown him off his guard. As to the sincerity of his piety, and his patriotic sensibility, we are unable to judge; but *Demosthenes* assigns a reason, drawn from the absence of a form required by the ordinary procedure in Amphictyonic prosecutions, for rejecting the story of the charge which the Locrians meant to bring against Athens as a mere fiction. It is, at least, an assertion which, like the others, rests entirely on his own credit. Nor was it easy to disprove his statement as to the provocation he received from the Locrian deputy. All that is certain is, that the consequences were such as Philip must have desired very much to bring about, and that *Æschines* had previously incurred a strong suspicion of being ready to act as his instrument. Nor was it difficult to foresee them, since they were partly predicted by *Demosthenes*. It may, indeed, be pleaded in behalf of *Æschines*, that the dispute with the Locrians, which he had excited, might have been terminated without Philip's intervention. But this would only prove that, if there was a plot to call in Philip, he was not the only agent employed in it.

*Æschines* and his colleagues, on their return to Athens, laid the decree of the Amphictyons before the people. He wishes it to be supposed that the measure, and his account of his own proceedings, were received with general approbation, and that the only dissentient voice was that of *Demosthenes*. From *Demosthenes*, in-

\* So *Æschines* adv. Ctes., § 123, an eyewitness, who was not disposed to soften the violence of the Locrians. The Amphictyonic decree in *Demosthenes*, De Cor., p. 279, has τῶν δὲ καὶ τετραμνησίων.

† *Æschines*, Ctes., § 128. The Amphictyonic decree, u. s., calls him an Arcadian: a singular description, even if correct, not to mention that the Arcadians had no voice in the council.



deed, we learn that he immediately exclaimed in the assembly, "You are bringing war into Attica, Æschines, an Amphictyonic war." The result is only related by Æschines, who asserts that Demosthenes got a bill to be clandestinely passed by the Five Hundred, which he then huddled through the assembly, just as it was breaking up, so that it became a decree before any one was aware of its contents, enacting that the deputies sent by Athens to the Amphictyonic council should proceed to Thermopylæ and Delphi at the season prescribed by hereditary usage. He adds that there was a clause which forbade them to take any part in the deliberations, acts, and proceedings of the other deputies who were to assemble at Thermopylæ. Though, however, his statement may prove that an important measure might be so carried at Athens, it is certain that it might be repealed by a criminal prosecution of its author, which is not said to have been instituted on this occasion.

In obedience, however, to this stolen decree, the Athenian deputies remained at Athens, while the council held its extraordinary meeting. It was attended by those of all the other states except Thebes,\* which was neither hostile to Amphiassa, nor desirous of a new Sacred War. War was decreed against the Amphiassians, and Cottyphus was appointed to the command of an Amphictyonic army, destined to reduce them to obedience. He accordingly marched with all the forces he could collect against their city. His campaign, according to Æschines, was prosperous; but it seems as if he had owed its success more to their intestine discord than to the strength of his army. They appear to have offered little resistance, and submitted to a fine which the Amphictyons laid on them, to be paid by instalments; but, at the same time, one party, which was charged with the sacrifice, was forced to go into exile, and another, called by Æschines the Pious, was restored. Perhaps this was merely a feint, made to gain time; for the Amphictyonic forces had not long withdrawn before the exiles were recalled, the Pious sent into banishment. The fine remained unpaid; but, if we believe Demosthenes, the enterprise totally failed through the difficulty which Cottyphus found in collecting an adequate force.

During these transactions Philip was still engaged in his Scythian expedition; but he had probably returned to Macedonia before the next regular meeting of the Amphictyons, at whatever time we may suppose this to have taken place; for it is a disputed question, on which the language of the orators throws scarcely any light, whether the ordinary autumnal meeting was held in 339, or it was meant that the extraordinary one should be substituted for it; so that the next took place at Delphi in the spring of 338. It is certain, however, that at one of these seasons Philip was elected general of the Amphictyons, probably with unlimited powers, and requested to carry the decrees of the council into effect against Amphiassa. We cannot, indeed, draw any inference from this fact as to the date of his commission, unless we lay what seems an unnecessary stress on the language of Demosthenes, who says that after his elec-

tion he forthwith collected his forces, and marched into Greece. Even if he had been elected in the autumn, when we consider that he returned from Thrace severely wounded, that he had been long absent from his kingdom, that his army must have needed some repose, and that winter was approaching, it would rather seem strange if he had not deferred an expedition in which he was to traverse a mountainous country to the ensuing spring. Nevertheless, it appears, on the whole, most probable that he was not formally elected before 338. Since, however, he had good reason to calculate on this event, he had time enough to make his preparations, so as to be in readiness immediately to comply with the desire of the Amphictyons.

We are here led to touch on another disputed question, which is more important than the one just considered. Diodorus relates that, after the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus were raised, Philip made peace with the Athenians, and the other Greeks who had opposed him in the war. The reader is by this time aware that such a statement, if it rested on no other authority, would be extremely questionable; and, in fact, none of the other writers from whom we derive our knowledge of the history of these times takes any notice of this transaction. Philochorus\* was evidently ignorant of it. The two orations of Æschines and Demosthenes, in which they profess to review all the leading occurrences of this period, are silent about it, though they must both have taken an active part in the deliberations concerning it, and it would seem that it must have supplied them with many topics for mutual accusation. It can scarcely be reconciled with Plutarch's account, which we have no other reason to question, of Phocion's operations after the relief of Byzantium. In fine, the fact is in itself hardly credible. It is very unlikely that, at the juncture mentioned by Diodorus, either party should have made proposals for peace. The Athenians were probably too much elated with their success; and for this very reason Philip would have been unwilling to make the first advances. There is only one quarter from which the slightest confirmation can be found for the statement of Diodorus. Certain state records, cited at full length in the speech of Demosthenes, and so apparently recognised by the orator himself, allude to a treaty as still subsisting between Athens and Philip in the interval between his return from Thrace and his next expedition to Greece. Attempts have, indeed, been made to explain these allusions, so as to dispense with the supposition of a formal treaty. But it seems alike clear that the peace of 346 was considered on both sides as completely at an end, and that the language of Demosthenes, as to the relations between the two powers, implies that it was not renewed before Philip's last campaign in Greece. It only remains, then, that we must reject the monuments which contain these allusions as spurious; and they are found in company with so many others, which are also very suspicious,† that when opposed to every other au-

\* In Dionys., Ep. i., ad Amm. 11.

† As Brueckner has shown by a careful analysis of them in an appendix to his work. *Plathe*, i., p. 237, infers from the decrees cited by Demosthenes that no formal rupture

\* Æschines adv. Ctes., § 128.

thority, except the solitary testimony of Diodorus, they cannot be allowed to stand.

The position, then, of Philip towards the Athenians at the beginning of 336 was one of open hostility. They were conscious that they had provoked his resentment to the utmost, and must have expected that he would give it vent as soon as he could find a convenient opportunity. Therefore it was that Demosthenes exclaimed so loudly against the madness or the treachery of *Æschines*, which threatened Attica with an Amphictyonic war. Without such a pretext Philip, however eager for revenge, or impatient of the obstacles which they opposed to his plans, would, it was known, find it very difficult to reach them. In an expedition directed avowedly against Attica, he could no longer reckon on the aid of the two powers which had been his main support in the Phocian war. It was doubtful even whether he could procure the general concurrence of the Thessalians, notwithstanding the influence he had gained over them, in such an undertaking.\* It was certain that the Thebans would view it with fear and aversion. Since the Phocian war a great change had taken place in the sentiments with which he was regarded at Thebes. He had, indeed, been a useful ally; but he was something more; he was a powerful protector. They had received an obligation which humbled them, and therefore inspired them rather with jealousy than with gratitude. They could not but feel that they had sunk, and that he had risen into their place. Out of *Boeotia* they were powerless; within it, they owed their sovereignty to his favour. In such a mood men easily take offence, and are deeply wounded by slight provocations. The Thebans had expected that *Niceæ* would have been ceded to them; Philip, as we have seen, had annexed it to Thessaly. They had a claim to *Echinus*, a town on the *Malian Gulf*, or, as Demosthenes intimates, were actually in possession of it; Philip took it away from them.† These injuries might not have been so grievous to them if they had not been inflicted by the hand of their benefactor. But, independently of these, they were not at all disposed to contribute to his farther aggrandizement. Their old grudge against Athens, though still rankling, began to appear trifling in comparison with these grounds of alarm and resentment. They had already given some intimation of the policy which they meant to pursue, when they kept aloof from the extraordinary meeting held on the affair of *Amphissa*.

This new turn of Theban politics had not escaped observation at Athens. Demosthenes and his friends were eager to take advantage of it, and it seems that even orators who did not properly belong to the anti-Macedonian party, and who only desired peace, were not less anxious for alliance with Thebes.‡ Several attempts, it appears, were made to effect this object—some, perhaps, as soon as it became known that Philip was appointed general of the Amphictyons—but without success.§ The Thebans were too cautious wantonly to pro-

had taken place; Winiewski, that a fresh peace had been made.

\* Demosthenes, *De Cor.*, § 187, foll.

† Philipp., ii., § 44. ‡ Demosthenes, *De Cor.*, § 207.

§ *Æschines* adv. Ctes., § 136, 139.

voke his resentment; and he probably required nothing more from them for the time than that they should not go over to the side of Athens. He knew that he should be able to negotiate with them to greater advantage when he had an army near their frontier.

Very early, then, in 336—perhaps in February—he set out on his march towards the south, with the professed intention of waging war with *Amphissa*. In Thessaly his presence overawed all opposition, and he probably received all the re-enforcements the country could afford. After he had crossed the ridge which separated the territory of the *Epicnemidian Locrians* from the vale of the *Cephus*, his road passed by *Elatea*, the chief town in the east of *Phocis*, as *Delphi* in the west, and so situate as to command the defiles which are the principal entrance to *Phocis* and *Boeotia* from the north.\* And now, instead of proceeding westward, he took possession of *Elatea*, and immediately began to restore its dismantled fortifications. It was an unequivocal sign that his views were directed, not towards *Amphissa*, but towards *Boeotia* and *Attica*.

The news reached Athens probably the next evening. The *prytanes*, to whom it was first brought, were at table in their council-hall. They instantly rose, and gave orders betokening a crisis of extraordinary and imminent danger. The market-place was forthwith cleared of the petty traders who exposed their wares there, and the officers even set fire to their wicker stalls. The generals were summoned, the trumpeter was ordered to be in attendance; but he was hardly needed to sound an alarm through the city.† The precise nature of the danger was probably understood by few; the general opinion was, perhaps, that Philip was in full march for Attica. All waited impatiently for the morning. At daybreak the Five Hundred were assembled, while the people flocked to the *Pnyx*; and the seats were already filled by a curious and anxious multitude, before the council had gone through the preliminary forms required to introduce the business. At length the council entered; the bearer of the news was produced, and made to repeat his story; then followed the herald's invitation, *Who will speak?* An unusually long pause ensued; the herald reiterated his question; but no one came forward out of the crowd of orators and official persons present, until at last Demosthenes mounted the bema.

He himself has preserved some fragments of the speech which he made on this occasion, or, rather, an outline of its contents. His first object was to calm the people's worst fears, which arose from the suspicion that Philip was acting in concert with the Thebans. He pointed out that, if such a concert had existed, the seizure of *Elatea* would have been unnecessary; he would already have been on the borders of Attica. There was, however, a faction at Thebes subservient to his interests, and the object with which he had taken up his threatening position was to animate his partisans, and to strike terror into those whom he could not corrupt or deceive. The course, then, which it became Athens to pursue, was clear; all feelings of ri-

\* Strabo, ix., p. 418.

† As Diodorus, xvi., 84, says was done all night long.

valry and ill-will towards Thebes must be laid aside; they must consult as if less for their own safety than for hers, which was in more immediate danger. And first of all, they must make a display of strength, which would encourage the friends of liberty at Thebes as much as its enemies were elated by the neighbourhood of the Macedonian camp. He proposed that their whole force, infantry and cavalry, should march out as far as Eleusis, and that ten ambassadors should be appointed to go to Thebes, who should likewise have a voice in the council of the generals with respect to the movements of the army. And the language of the ambassadors, when they came to Thebes, should be that of men who were not asking a favour, but offering a benefit. The proposal of the embassy, at least, was unanimously adopted, and the orator himself was elected one of the envoys. We hear of two other decrees which he appears to have carried either at this time or a little earlier, when it was known that Philip was on the point of invading Greece. The works which were going on about the docks and the arsenal were suspended, that the money employed on them might be devoted to purposes of more pressing importance; and this measure introduced that which Demosthenes had so long had at heart; the surplus which had hitherto been swallowed up by the theoric fund was now, at last, appropriated to the maintenance of the troops.\* A body of 10,000 mercenaries had, it seems, already been collected.

The envoys, no doubt, repaired to Thebes without delay; but they found an adverse embassy already there, composed of Macedonian and Thessalian ministers, with those of some other states, probably the little tribes north of Phocis, which had displayed so much zeal in the last Sacred War, and still regarded Philip as the champion of religion. They demanded either the co-operation of the Thebans against Athens, or, at least, a free passage through Bœotia. It was a difficult question; and the friends of Athens had to defend a bold step, when they proposed to defy a king who was within one or two days' march of the city, with an army of nearly 30,000 men. We may well believe that opinions were so nearly balanced in the Theban assembly that the eloquence of Demosthenes may have contributed not a little to turn the scale. But perhaps the intelligence which he brought of the vigorous preparations which Athens was making may have weighed still more on the same side. The terms, also, of the alliance proposed were very favourable and honourable to Thebes. Æschines—who has probably not reported them quite correctly—makes them a topic of reproach to his adversary.† But perhaps nothing more was conceded than was imperatively required; and certainly it was no time for haggling, either about the expenses of the war, or about claims of precedence. Æschines asserts that the Thebans were allowed by the treaty to share the command of the naval force, though Athens was to bear all the charges; and that the army was placed entirely at their disposal—evidently a gross exaggeration, which, however, shows

that Thebes was to pay her own troops. A more important article was one which guaranteed the sovereignty of the Bœotian towns to the Thebans, and pledged the aid of Athens to reduce any that might revolt from them to obedience.

The result of this negotiation seems to have changed Philip's plans. He did not think it advisable immediately to invade the Theban territory, or to force his way into Attica, but resolved first to strengthen himself with such reinforcements as he could obtain from Peloponnesus, and in the mean while to turn his arms against Amphissa; perhaps both for the purpose of convincing his allies that he had not dropped the professed object of his expedition, and with the hope that his movements in this quarter might draw the enemy into some disadvantageous position. If this was his expectation, he was not wholly disappointed. He immediately sent a manifesto to his Peloponnesian allies, in which he represented the cause of religion as the only one that had moved him to take the field, and requested their aid.\* His application seems to have been but coldly received, and few Peloponnesian auxiliaries joined his army. On the other hand, Athens and Thebes did not fail to send their ministers into Peloponnesus to counteract his efforts, and to obtain succours for themselves. They appear to have been rather more successful, since we hear of a body of Corinthian troops among their forces;† and the Achæans, at least, had stronger motives for taking a part in the struggle.‡ But it is probable that most states kept aloof, less from indifference than through fear.

It was not Philip's interest, in this state of things, to bring the war with Amphissa to a speedy end. The Amphissians sought assistance from Athens, and it appears that Demosthenes exerted his influence in their behalf. Æschines§ alleges that it was he who, through corrupt motives, caused the 10,000 mercenaries, who were at this juncture so much needed for the defence of Athens itself, to be placed at their disposal. It would seem, from a hint given by Polyænus,|| that the Athenian and Theban generals, Chares and Proxenus, had hoped to entangle Philip in the defiles leading to Amphissa, but that Philip drew them out of their position by a stratagem, and afterward defeated them, and made himself master of the city. And this account is in some degree confirmed by Æschines, who mentions a defeat which the mercenaries suffered at Amphissa.¶ Demosthenes, on the other hand, passing over this disaster in silence, speaks of two engagements\*\* in which the allied forces gained some

\* The letter in Dem., De Cor., p. 290, is perhaps not genuine. But so much appears from the orator's text.

† Strabo, ix., p. 414, speaks of them as if they were the only Peloponnesian auxiliaries. Philip, he says, at Chæronea defeated Ἀθηναίους καὶ Βοιωτίους καὶ Κορινθίους.

‡ That the Corinthians did not come alone, may perhaps be inferred from Pausanias, viii., 6, 4, where it is said of the Arcadians, Φιλίππῳ δὲ καὶ Μακεδόσιν ἐν Χαιρώνειά οὐκ ἐπαχέσαντο πρὸς Ἕλλησιν, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐναντία ἐτάξαντο.

§ Ctes., § 146.

|| iv., 2, 8.

¶ Ctes., § 147.

\*\* De Cor., § 274, μέγας τὴν ῥ' ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ τῆς χειμερίων. The meaning of this epithet is questionable; the interpretation, *battle of the storm*, not quite satisfactory; but any explanation is preferable to that of the *winter battle*; as if the other, which, it is manifest from the orator's description, took place within a short time of it, had been fought at a different season.

\* Philochorus in Dionys., Ep. i., ad Amm., 11.

† Ctes., § 142, foll.

advantage over Philip, sufficient to occasion public rejoicings at Athens, and to induce Philip to renew his application to his Peloponnesian allies in still more pressing language. It is certain that he had recourse once more to negotiation with Thebes, where his party, though it had been forced to yield, was still powerful, and might be strengthened as long as an avenue was kept open for bribes or persuasions. Some of the Æeotarchs leaned to his side, or, at least, began to waver as to the expediency of prosecuting the war.\* Hitherto the union with Athens had been wonderfully cordial. The Athenian troops had even been received into the city, and quartered in the houses, while the Theban army was in the field; and here, as at Byzantium, they had shown themselves worthy of such confidence by their orderly behaviour.† But now symptoms of jealousy appeared. A body of troops, which had been sent, perhaps, to counteract the effect of Philip's proposal, was turned back by the Theban magistrates.‡ Demosthenes, who had probably begun to hope for a decisive victory, which might secure the liberty of Greece, became uneasy. Æschines describes him as protesting with outrageous violence against peace, though at Athens it had not yet been mentioned. How it was that Philip's attempt failed, we must not expect to discover. Æschines, though he denies with scorn that the eloquence of Demosthenes had any share in bringing about the alliance, would persuade us that his clamour deterred the Theban government from listening to Philip's overtures.

However it may have been that this danger was averted, it may have seemed to prove the necessity of risking a battle, while the alliance which was thus threatened still subsisted. The military council of the allies appears to have resolved to seek the enemy without delay, and when the Athenian forces next left the city, it was with a general expectation of a decisive engagement. There were, of course, many forebodings of disaster, and attempts were made to arrest the march of the army by superstitious scruples. A fatal accident had occurred during the mysteries which had been recently celebrated. It was proposed to consult the Delphic oracle on so sinister an omen. Demosthenes resisted the motion with an expression which disgusts Æschines by its homeliness, but which seems to have conveyed a very notorious fact: *the priestess philippizes*. Unquestionably the oracle was in Philip's power. The sacrifices, too, preceding the march were pronounced unpropitious. Demosthenes is said to have cited Homer's verse, and the examples of Pericles and Epaminondas, and to have urged the departure of the troops.§ He himself served, on foot, in the ranks. The two armies met in the plain of Cheronea; a temple of Hercules, on the banks of the little river Hæmus, a tributary of the Cephissus, marked, while it stood, the encampment of the Greeks: as an aged oak, on the banks of the Cephissus, was believed, in Plutarch's time, to have overshadowed Alexander's tent.

The really bad omen for the cause of Athens and Thebes was, that they had neither a Pericles nor an Epaminondas at the head of their

army. Thebes possessed at this time no general of sufficient note to be even mentioned, except Theagenes, who is named only to be branded as a traitor;\* and the names of Chares, Lysicles, and Stratocles, who commanded the Athenians, could inspire little confidence. In numbers they appear to have at least equalled the enemy;† but though the Sacred Band still preserved its excellent discipline and spirit, the Athenians, who had now for many years been little used to military service, were ill-matched with the Macedonian veterans, led by their king, and by the able officers formed in his school, and animated by the presence of the young prince Alexander, whom his father intrusted with the command of one wing, where, however, some of his best generals were stationed at his side. We know very little more of the causes which determined the event of the battle; and these are amply sufficient to account for it. If we may believe Polyænus, Philip at first restrained the ardour of his troops, until the Athenians had spent much of the vigour and fury with which they made their onset.‡ Then, it appears, Alexander made a charge, which broke the enemy's ranks, and decided the fortune of the day.§ The Thebans seem to have kept their ground longest, and probably suffered most. The Sacred Band was cut off to a man, but fighting where it stood. Demosthenes was not a hero of this kind; but he was certainly reproached with cowardice, because he escaped in the general flight, only by those who wished that he had been left on the field. Of the Athenians not more than 1000 were slain, but 2000 were taken prisoners: among these Demades fell into the enemy's hands. The loss of the Thebans is not reported in numbers; but the prisoners were probably fewer than the slain.

It was not the amount of these losses that gave such importance to the battle of Cheronea, that it has been generally considered as the blow which put an end to the independence of Greece,|| any more than it was the loss sustained by Sparta at Leuctra that deprived her of her supremacy. But the event of this day broke up the confederacy which had been formed against Philip, as it proved that its utmost efforts could not raise a force sufficient to meet him, with any chance of success, in the field. Each of the allied states, therefore, was left at his mercy. The consternation which the tidings of this disaster caused at Athens was probably greater than had ever been known there

\* Dinarchus in Dem., § 75. Yet it appears from Plutarch, Alex., 12, that Theagenes fell in the battle. But compare the passage in Polyænus, viii., 40, which will be mentioned again in a subsequent note.

† Diodorus, xvi., 85, says that Philip, whose army consisted of more than 30,000 foot and not less than 2000 horse (this last number is probably wrong), was superior in numbers. Justin, ix., 2, on the contrary, says that the Athenian army was far more numerous. On what authority Droysen, p. 15, fixes the number of the allies at 50,000, he, as usual, leaves his readers to discover.

‡ iv., § 7. I will not attempt to conjecture how this fact is to be reconciled or combined with another which he has preserved, viii., 40, where he says that Theagenes was asked how far he meant to pursue, and answered, *as far as Macedonia*.

§ Diodorus, xvi., 86. Alexander was in the wing opposed to the Thebans, and first charged the Sacred Band.

|| So Lycurgus c. Leocr., § 50: *ἡμας οὐκ ἔτι (the slain at Cheronea) τὴν βίαν μετέλασαν καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος εἰς δουλείαν μεταστῆσαν συνεστήθη γὰρ τοῖς τοῦτον σώμασιν ἡ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα ἐκείνη.*

\* Æschines, Ctes., § 149. † Demosthenes, De Cor., § 278.  
‡ Æsch., Ctes., § 150. § Plutarch, Dem., 30.

except after the loss at *Ægospotamos*. Two remarkable instances have been preserved, which may serve to illustrate the effect which they produced on different minds. A citizen of good condition, named *Leocrates*, who had, no doubt, made preparations for flight, when the news arrived, collected his moveable effects and transported them on board a vessel which was lying off the coast bound for *Rhodes*. On his landing there he spread a report, which he probably expected would be soon confirmed by the event, that the city was taken, and *Piræus* besieged. This was not a solitary case; for we find that the *Areopagus*, exerting the extraordinary authority which it had often assumed in similar cases, arrested and put to death several persons who had attempted to quit the city; and one *Autolycus* was brought to trial and condemned, because he had removed his family to a place of safety. It was even thought necessary to pass a decree subjecting emigration to the penalties of treason;\* and *Leocrates*, when he returned home seven years afterward, was capitally impeached for his flight.

*Isocrates* was still living at Athens, in good health, and in full possession of his faculties, although in his ninety-ninth year, when he heard of the battle. The tidings went to his heart, and induced him to put an end to his life by voluntary abstinence.† He was a sincere patriot, notwithstanding the pains he took to forward Philip's ambitious designs. The event which had now established a new relation between his country and Macedonia dissolved the bright vision, on which his fancy had so long dwelt, of a Greek war against Persia under a Macedonian leader. The tomb of the wealthy rhetorician was adorned with a lofty column, surmounted by a colossal figure of a siren:‡ an emblem meant by his friends to signify the fascinating power of his eloquence, and which was no less appropriate with respect to the fatal tendency of his political counsels.

Athens, however, was not yet deserted by the ancient spirit which had borne her up under so many disasters. In the first dismay of the ill news an extraordinary assembly was summoned, and a decree passed, on the motion of *Hyperides*, directing a series of measures for the defence of the city.§ That the Five Hundred should go down in a body, armed, to *Piræus*, to provide for the security of the ports. That the women and children, and certain sacred treasures, should be lodged in *Piræus*|| That the generals should have power to exact the service of all persons, whether citizens or foreigners, to keep guard, as they thought fit.¶ That the slaves should be emancipated, the resident aliens admitted to the franchise, and the citizens who had been degraded restored to their privileges.\*\* The military duty—at least before the fugitives had begun to flock in from *Chæronea*—fell almost entirely on the old men; and it seems that envoys were sent to *Andros*, *Ceos*, *Troezen*, and *Epidauros*, as the nearest

friendly places, to implore succours.\* *Demosthenes*, when he came back, carried a decree which assigned a sum of ten talents for the repairing of the walls and for a new ditch and rampart; he was appointed to superintend the work, and laid out three talents of his own on it.† It was carried on in a spirit of patriotic devotion: no hand was idle, no property was spared; timber was taken from the adjacent groves or olive grounds; stones from the tombs, arms from the temples.‡ *Demosthenes* had infused his own energy into the people; he and his friends, though he might naturally have been considered, and was loudly denounced by his political opponents, as the author of the calamity, had never exercised greater influence than in this season of alarm and distress. He was, indeed, assailed with repeated prosecutions, but passed triumphantly through all;§ and not long after he received the most signal token that could be given of public confidence and esteem: he was appointed to deliver the funeral oration at the solemn obsequies which were celebrated over the citizens who fell at *Chæronea*. On the other hand, *Lysicles*, the general, was brought to trial and put to death for his conduct in the battle. We do not know why he was singled out for punishment, or whether his colleagues did not venture to return; but that his life was not sacrificed to a blind resentment, seems sufficiently proved by the character of his prosecutor, the upright and noble-minded *Lycurgus*.

As long as it remained unknown what use Philip would make of his victory, there was certainly reason to fear the worst; and if it be true that at first he rejected the application of the heralds who came from *Lebadea* to ask leave to bury the slain,|| we might suppose that he wished to keep the vanquished a while in suspense as to their fate. That he should even have forgotten himself for a time, on the scene of his triumph, intoxicated by the complete success which had suddenly crowned the plans and labours of so many years, would not be at all inconsistent with his character. He is said to have risen from the banquet to visit the field of battle, and, as he passed among the slain, though the sight of the Sacred Band drew from him an exclamation of sympathy, to have sung a verse in derision of the decrees of *Demosthenes*.¶ This anecdote is more credible than that he exposed himself to the rebuke of *Demades* by his behaviour to his prisoners.\*\* It would be absurd to suppose, with *Diodorus*, that such a man as *Demades*, however the king might be pleased at such a moment with his freedom and his wit, could have had any influence over him; but it seems that Philip did not disdain to gain him for his own ends, and to communicate his designs to him, and employ him as his agent.

The manner in which he finally treated his conquered enemies excited general surprise, and has earned, perhaps, more praise than it deserves. He dismissed the Athenian prisoners without ransom, several of them even newly

\* *Lycurgus* c. *Leocr.*, § 52, 53. *Autolycus* was a member of the *Areopagus*; *Plutarch*, *Vit. X. Orat.*, *Lycurgus*, p. 843, D.

† *Pausanias*, i., 18, 8. *Plutarch*, *Vit. X. Orat.*, *Isocrates*, p. 838, B. ‡ *Plutarch*, u. s., C.

§ *Lycurgus* c. *Leocr.*, § 37.

|| *Plut.*, *Tit. X. Or.*, *Hyperides*, p. 849, A.

¶ *Lycurg.*, u. s., § 16. \*\* *Ubi sup.*, § 41.

\* *Ubi s.*, § 43.

† *Demosthenes*, *De Cor.*, p. 266.

‡ *Lycurgus*, u. s., § 44.

§ *Demosthenes*, *De Cor.*, § 209, 210.

|| *Plut.*, *Vit. X. Orat.*, *Hyperides*, p. 849, A.

¶ *Διπολιτὴς Δημοσθένους Παιδείας τὰς διὰ τὴν Πλάτωνα*, 20. Digitized by Google

clothed, and all with their baggage; and sent Antipater, accompanied, Justin says, by Alexander, to bear the bones of their dead whom he had himself buried,\* to Athens, with offers of peace, on terms such as an Athenian would scarcely have ventured to propose to him. The commonwealth was required, indeed, to resign a great part of its foreign possessions, perhaps all but the Chersonesus, Lemnos, Imbros, and Samos,† where a fresh cleruchial colony had been planted after the Social War, which rendered it an object of prime importance; but it was left in undisturbed possession of all its domestic resources, and its territory was even enlarged by the addition of Oropus, which Thebes was now forced to resign.‡ The value of these concessions was greatly enhanced by comparison with the conditions on which peace was granted to the Thebans; they were obliged to ransom not only their prisoners, but their dead. Not only Oropus, but the sovereignty of the Boeotian towns was taken from them. Plataea§ and Orchomenus|| were restored to as many as could be found of their old inhabitants: at least, filled with an independent population implacably hostile to Thebes. She lost not only power, but freedom. She was compelled to admit a Macedonian garrison into the citadel, and to recall her exiles. The government was lodged in their hands: a council of Three Hundred selected from them was invested with supreme authority, both legislative and judicial.¶ Some of their adversaries had, it appears, been put to death by Philip's orders before their return; but the rest might safely be committed to the mercy of such a tribunal. The scenes which took place after the former occupation of the Cadmea were no doubt daily renewed. But it was now more difficult to find a place of refuge, and there was less room for a hope of deliverance.

Philip's treatment of the Athenians has been commonly accounted magnanimous. It may, indeed, be said that in them he did honour to the manly resistance of open enemies, while in the case of the Thebans he punished treachery and ingratitude; and knowing the people to be generally hostile to him, crushed the power of the state, and used the faction which depended on him as the instrument of his vengeance. On the other hand, it must be remembered that, when this was done, he had the less reason to dread the hostility of Athens: he might safely conciliate the favour of the Greeks by a splendid example of lenity and moderation. It is not improbable that this was the course to which he was inclined by his own prepossessions.\*\* But had it been otherwise, there were reasons enough to deter so wary a prince from violent measures, which would have driven the Athenians to despair. He had probably very early intelligence of the preparations for defence which they had begun while they expected an invasion. He might, indeed, have ravaged

Attica, and have carried on a Decelean war; but it was by no means certain that he could make himself master of the city and Piræus; and nothing but a very clear prospect of immediate success could have rendered the attempt advisable. The danger of a failure, and even the inconvenience of delay, were far greater than the advantage to be reaped from it. For he had now more brilliant objects in view: time was doubly precious to him; and it would have been wantonly to tempt his fortune if by too grasping a policy he had raised unnecessary hinderances to his own designs.

His offers were gladly, if not thankfully, accepted at Athens. Demades, who had there the credit of having disposed the king towards peace, and who appears to have been sent with Æschines to conclude it, rose high in popular favour, though not so as to counterbalance the influence of Demosthenes.\* Philip now saw his road open to Peloponnesus, and he proceeded to Corinth, whither he had invited all the states of Greece to send their deputies to hold a congress, as in the time of the ancient league against Persia. The avowed object of this assemblage was, indeed, to settle the affairs of Greece, and to put an end to intestine feuds by the authority of a supreme council. But it was well known that Philip meant to use it for the purposes of his enterprise against Persia. It was attended by ministers from every Greek state except Sparta, which could not expect that any measures would be carried there but such as were opposed to her interests.† At Athens, when Demades proposed that they should take part in the congress, some opposition was made from a quarter in which it could hardly have been looked for. Phocion, who, as a moderate adherent of the Macedonian party, had gained increased authority from the new turn of affairs, advised the people to wait until they knew what demands Philip would make on the members of the confederacy. His objections, however, were overruled. The people regretted, when it was too late, that they had not listened to his warnings.‡

Their absence, however it might have displeased Philip, would not have thwarted his plans. The congress would have been neither more nor less ready to comply with his wishes. As it was, all his proposals were adopted. War was declared against Persia, and he was appointed to command the national forces with which it was waged; each state was to contribute a fixed contingent of ships or men, according to the nature of its resources.§ One object only now remained to detain Philip in the south of Greece—to fulfill the promises which he had made some years before to his Peloponnesian allies, to animate them by his presence, and to make Sparta feel the effects of his displeasure. His march through Peloponnesus was, for the most part, a peaceful, triumphal progress. Hence it may be that so few traces of it are left in our historical fragments. It is chiefly by some casual allusions in Polybius and Pausanias that the fact itself is

\* Polybius, v., 10.

† Plutarch, Al., 29.

‡ Paus., i., 34, 1.

§ Paus., iv., 27, 10; ix., 1, 8. Plutarch, Alex., 24, says that it was Alexander who gave the Plataeans leave to rebuild their city. Both accounts may be true. Philip's decree may not have been executed until some years later. Yet we find troops of Plataea and Orchomenus at the capture of Thebes.

|| Paus., iv., 27, 10; ix., 37, 8.

¶ Justin, ix., 4. Trecentos exules iudices rectoresque civitati dedit.

\*\* See ante, p. 62.

\* Demosthenes, De Cor., § 352. Δημόδωρον, ὅστις περικηδεύει τὴν πόλιν. † Arrian, i., 1. ‡ Plutarch, Phoc., 16.

§ Diodorus, xvi., 69. Justin, ix., 6, adds the whole amount of the promised auxiliaries, 300,000 foot and 15,000 horse. The exaggeration seems so monstrous that one suspects a mistake in the numbers.

ascertained. By their light, we are just enabled to track his course through Arcadia into Laconia, and then back again along the western coast. The site on which he had encamped, not far from Mantinea, was remembered in the time of Pausanias,\* when a spring, near which the royal tent had been pitched, was still named after him. In Laconia he made a longer stay, and had to encounter some resistance. The Eleans, though they had not joined him at Chæronea, were induced, either by fear or resentment, to co-operate with him in this invasion.† About the time of the battle of Chæronea, according to some accounts on the same day, King Archidamus, who had been sent to the aid of Tarentum against the Lucanians, was slain in Italy—an event which, though he died fighting with Spartan valour, was attributed to celestial vengeance, because the auxiliaries whom he took with him were mostly Phocian mercenaries, and shared his fate.‡ Sparta was, perhaps, a little the weaker for his absence, though he could not have made any stand against the Macedonian army, which was probably re-enforced by all the hostile neighbours of the state. Philip, however, appears not to have made any attempt against the capital. His object undoubtedly was, not to crush this power, which strengthened his own by the jealousy it inspired, but to humble it, and to secure his allies against its encroachments. He advanced, therefore, ravaging the country, as far as the seacoast near Gythium, where Pausanias saw a trophy which had been erected for a victory obtained over a detachment of his army.§ It appears, however, that in the end Sparta submitted to the terms which he prescribed. According to one account, he did not evacuate her territory before he had contracted its limits by concessions which he forced her to make on three sides—to Messenia, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Argos; but it seems that he used the congress as his instrument in this partition.|| He then pursued his march, through Olympia and Elis, to the Isthmus. There can be little doubt, at least, that it was on this occasion that he founded a circular building, called the Philippeum, which was long adorned with the statues of the Macedonian princes, within the sacred precincts in which the Olympic games were celebrated,¶ as the Megalopolitans gave his name to a portico in their market-place.\*\* The western states, beyond the Isthmus, likewise acknowledged his authority; the leaders of the anti-Macedonian party in Acarnania were driven into exile, and Ambracia consented to receive a Macedonian garrison.†† Byzantium also, it seems, entered into an alliance with him, which was little more than a decent name for subjection.‡‡ Thus crowned with new honours, having overcome every obstacle, and established his power on the firmest foundation

in every part of Greece, he returned, in the autumn of 338, to Macedonia, to prepare for the greater enterprise on which his thoughts were now wholly bent.

This brilliant fortune, however, was, before long, overcast by a cloud of domestic troubles. Philip, not less from temperament than policy, had adopted the Oriental usage of polygamy, which, though repugnant to the ancient Greek manners, did not in this age, as we find from other examples, shock public opinion in Greece. Thus, it seems, before his marriage with Olympias, he had formed several matrimonial alliances, which might all contribute to strengthen his political interests. An Illyrian princess, a Macedonian lady, apparently of the Lyncestian family, which had some remote claims to the throne, and two from Thessaly, one a native of Phærx, the other from Larissa, are mentioned before Olympias in the list of his wives. After his marriage with Olympias, he did not reject the hand of a Thracian princess, which was offered to him by her father. In each of these cases, however, there was an apparent motive of policy, which may have rendered the presence of so many rivals more tolerable than it would otherwise have been to Olympias, a woman of masculine spirit and violent passions, and who, as a daughter of the house of Epirus, which traced its pedigree to Achilles, no doubt regarded herself as far superior to them all in rank, and as Philip's sole legitimate consort. But after his return to Macedonia from his victorious campaign in Greece, perhaps early in the following spring, he contracted another union, for which it does not appear that he had the same excuse to plead. Cleopatra, the niece of Attalus, one of his generals, had, it seems, attracted him by her beauty. He sought her hand, and their nuptials were celebrated with the usual festivities, in the palace at Pella, where, perhaps, Olympias was residing. This would not be stranger than it is that Alexander was present at the banquet, which, according to the custom of the court, was prolonged till both Philip and his guests were very much heated with wine. Attalus had secretly cherished the presumptuous hope that his niece's influence over the king might induce him to alter the succession, and to appoint a child of hers heir to the throne. When the wine had thrown him off his guard, he could not refrain from disclosing his wishes, and called on the company to pray that the gods would crown the marriage of Philip and Cleopatra by the birth of a legitimate successor to the kingdom. Alexander took fire at this expression; and exclaiming, "Do you, then, count me a bastard?" hurled the goblet out of which he was drinking at Attalus. The hall became a scene of tumult. Philip started from his couch, and, instead of rebuking Attalus, drew his sword, and rushed at his son, but, before he reached him, stumbled and fell. Alexander, before he withdrew, is said to have pointed to his father, as he lay on the floor, with a taunt, "See the man who would pass over from Europe to Asia upset in crossing from one couch to another."\*\*

The quarrel did not end with the intoxication of the evening, as the offence which had been given to the prince was much deeper than the

\* viii., 7, 4. † Paus., v., 4, 9. ‡ Diodorus, xvi., 88. § Pausanias, iii., 24, 6. This seems sufficient evidence that the expedition was not conducted in so peaceable a manner as Lyciscus found it convenient to represent. Polybius, ix., 27.

|| Compare the statements of Chlameas and Lyciscus in Polyb., ix., 23, 27.

¶ Paus., v., 17, 4; v., 20, 10, *ἐν τῇ αἰσθητῇ*. He observes of the *στέδ* at Megalopolis, *ὅτι φιλίππος ἐποίησεν*.

\*\* Paus., viii., 30, 6. †† Diodorus, xvii., 3.

‡‡ This supposition seems necessary to explain the assistance afforded to Alexander in his expedition to the Danube. Arrian, i., 3.

momentary provocation. He and his mother quitted the kingdom; she found shelter at the court of her brother Alexander, who, after the death of Arybas, had succeeded, through Philip's intervention, to the throne of Epirus, having supplanted Æacides, the lawful heir. Alexander took up his abode in Illyria. It seems as if both the mother and the son had endeavoured to kindle a war in these countries against Philip. Of Olympias it is expressly related,\* and may be easily believed, that she instigated her brother to avenge her wrongs with the sword. As to the motive of Alexander's sojourn in Illyria, there may be more room to doubt; but it clearly seems to have been connected with the occasion of a battle in which Philip was about this time engaged with the Illyrians.† He was obliged, at last, to employ the good offices of a Corinthian, named Demaratus, to induce his son to return to Macedonia.‡ It was not so easy to appease Olympias; and it was most likely with a view to baffle her intrigues that Philip negotiated a match between his brother-in-law and their daughter Cleopatra. When Alexander had been gained by this offer, his sister saw that she must defer her revenge, and returned, apparently reconciled, to her husband's court. Her resentment was implacable; Alexander, too, after his return, still harboured suspicions of his father's intentions with respect to his inheritance.

These unhappy differences, and perhaps the continued apprehension of hostile movements on the side of Illyria and Epirus, may have been the causes which prevented Philip from crossing over to Asia in person in 337; though, if he waited for the arrival of his Greek confederates, their tardiness might fully account for the delay. But in the course of this year he sent over a body of troops under the command of Parmenio, Amyntas, and Attalus,§ whom, perhaps, he was glad to remove in this honourable manner from his court to the western coast of Asia, to engage the Greek cities on his side, and to serve as a rallying-point for all who were disaffected to the Persian government. This measure was the more expedient, because the Persian court, which had been for some time aware of its danger, might be expected, and had, in fact, begun to take some steps to avert it; though its hope seems to have been rather to detain Philip in Europe by means of gold and intrigues, which might raise fresh enemies to keep him occupied at home, than to stop his passage into Asia by its military or naval force. The beneficial consequences of this movement appeared in the prospect which it opened of detaching a very important province from the Persian empire without a blow. Ada, the sister, and, according to a widely-prevalent Asiatic usage, wife of Idræus, who had succeeded his sister Artemisia, the widow of his elder brother Mausolus, in Caria, survived her husband, and was appointed by him his successor: an arrangement which might somewhat displease her Greek subjects, but was not at all repugnant to the ideas of the Carian population.¶ Ada, however, seems not

to have inherited the masculine energy of the elder Artemisia: she was deprived of her dominions, only retaining the strong fortress of Alinda, by her brother Pixodarus. Still, the usurper felt his footing insecure, and looked about him for foreign support. He had to choose between submission to Persia and an alliance with Philip as the price of protection; he decided on the latter measure, probably as that which held out the fairest prospect of independence, and proposed to give his eldest daughter to Arridæus, Philip's son by his Lariæsean wife, Philinna,\* a youth of imbecile intellect. Olympias was, or affected to be, alarmed by this negotiation; several of Alexander's young companions shared her suspicions, and their insinuations persuaded him that the intended marriage was a step by which Philip designed to raise his half brother to the throne. Under this impression, he despatched Thessalus, a Greek player, who was exercising his profession at the Macedonian court, on a secret mission to Caria, to induce Pixodarus to break off the match with Arridæus, a half-witted bastard, and to transfer his daughter's hand to Alexander himself. Pixodarus joyfully accepted the prince's offer. But Philip, having discovered the correspondence, shamed his son out of his suspicions by an indignant expostulation, which he addressed to him in the presence of his young friend, Parmenio's son Philotas, on the unworthiness of the connexion which he was about to form with a barbarian who was not even an independent prince, but a Persian vassal. Alexander dropped the project, which so strongly excited his father's resentment, that he wrote to Corinth to demand that Thessalus should be sent to him in chains, and banished five of Alexander's companions, Harpalus, Nearchus, Phrygius, Ptolemæus, and Lamedon, from Macedonia:† to one of them the beginning of a wonderful elevation. So passed the year 337.

Towards the end of the next spring, Philip's preparations for his Asiatic expedition were far advanced. He had summoned the Greek states to furnish their contingents, and, as became the general of the Amphictyonic Council, had consulted the Delphic oracle on the event of his enterprise; and, it is said, had received an answer worthy of its ancient reputation for politic ambiguity: *Crowned is the victim, the altar is ready, the stroke is impending*:‡ though the event renders this anecdote somewhat suspicious. It only remained to take the precaution which he had meditated for securing the peace of his dominions in his absence by a closer alliance with the King of Epirus, which might also soothe Olympias. The day of the marriage was fixed, and Philip determined to celebrate the event with the utmost splendour. It afforded an opportunity, which he never let slip, of attracting Greeks from all parts to his court, of dazzling them by his magnificence,

\* Justin, ix., 7.

† Diodorus, xvi., 93.

‡ Plut., Alex., 9.

§ Diodorus, xvi., 9. Justin, ix., 5, 8.

¶ Arrian, i., 23. Compare vol. i., p. 562.

\* Plutarch's description of Philinna (Alex., extr.), *γυνὴ ἀδόξου καὶ κοινῆς*, is contradicted by the much higher authority of Satyrus and Dicaarchus in Athenæus, xiii., 5, from which it appears that Philip married Philinna, *οὐκ ὠσαύτως βίβλου τῶν Γερραίων ἔδωκε*. He would not have chosen a woman of mean rank for such a purpose.

† Plut., Alex., 10. Arrian, iii., 6.

‡ *Ἐστηνται δὲ τὰς πολεῖς, ἔχει πλοῖος, ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος*. Diodor., xvi., 91. Digitized by Google



and winning them by his hospitality. A solemn festival—either the national one of the Muses, or the Olympic games instituted by Archelaus—was proclaimed to be held in the ancient capital, *Ægæ*. Musical and dramatic contests were announced, for which artists of the greatest celebrity were engaged. When the time arrived the city was crowded with strangers; not only guests invited by the king and his courtiers, but envoys deputed by most of the leading cities of Greece, to honour the solemnity, and to offer presents, chiefly crowns of gold, to the king. Among the rest Athens sent a crown, and with it a decree, which was publicly read by the herald, enacting that any one who should form a design against Philip, if he fled to Athens, should be given up. In the banquet which followed the nuptials, Philip desired the player, Neoptolemus, to recite some piece of poetry appropriate to his approaching expedition against the Persian king. The player chose a lyrical piece, which seemed strikingly applicable to the power, the pride, the wealth, and luxury of the monarch who was now threatened with a sudden fall; it also spoke of death, which, approaching unseen, by hidden paths, with rapid step, cuts off in a moment far-reaching hopes.\*

On the morrow an exhibition was to take place in the theatre: it was filled at an early hour with spectators. The entertainments began with a solemn procession, in which, among other treasures, were carried images, of exquisite workmanship, and gorgeously adorned, of the twelve Olympian gods; a thirteenth, which seemed to be somewhat profanely associated with them, represented Philip himself. The shouts of an admiring, applauding multitude then announced the king's approach. He advanced in white robes and festal chaplet, with his son and the bridegroom on either side a few paces behind him. His guards he had ordered to keep at a distance, that all might have a view of his person, and that it might not be supposed he doubted the universal good-will of the Greeks. This was the moment when a young man stepped forth from the crowd, ran up to the king, and drawing a Celtic sword from beneath his garments, plunged it into his side. Philip fell dead. The murderer rushed towards the gates of the town, where horses were waiting for him. He was closely pursued by some of the great officers of the royal body-guard, but would have mounted before they had overtaken him, if his sandal had not been caught by the stump of a vine, which brought him to the ground. In the first heat of their passion his pursuers despatched him.

His name was Pausanias: the motive that impelled him to the deed was, that he had suffered an outrage from Attalus, for which Philip had refused to give him satisfaction. So much we know with certainty from the unquestionable authority of Aristotle,† who may have been

an eyewitness of the scene. Whether or not he filled a post in the royal guards, as Diodorus relates, is not so certain, and is a point of little moment. It appears that he was a youth of noble family.\* The preparations made for his escape seemed to imply that he had accomplices, and grounds were discovered for suspecting that two or three members of the Lyncestian family were privy to his intention. It was also remembered that he had once asked the sophist Hermocrates how one might become most conspicuous, and had been answered that the surest way was to take the life of the man who had achieved the greatest things. But the gravest suspicions rested on persons nearer to the throne—on Olympias and Alexander. Of the guilt of Olympias there could be no doubt, if we were to believe all the stories reported by Justin, which appear to have been current not long after the murder: that it was she who provided horses for the assassin's flight; that she placed a golden crown on his head as he hung on the cross; that she caused his body to be burned on the spot which contained her husband's ashes, and even honoured his memory with yearly rites, and dedicated the sword with which he had stabbed the king to Apollo. But the first of these alleged facts, which would be the only unequivocal proof of a criminal participation, can never have rested on anything more than a vague suspicion; and the rest only prove, what may, indeed, be easily believed, that this vindictive woman made no secret of the joy she felt at her husband's death. It was, indeed, an event which she must have ardently longed for; since it afforded her the means of sating her thirst for revenge in the blood of persons who were the objects of her still deadlier hatred. She seized the earliest opportunity of Alexander's absence to murder her rival Cleopatra, and an infant which she had borne to Philip.†

p. 33), seems not to have been aware of this decisive passage, and tells his readers, "We have no account of the conspiracy against Philip's life from any author of credit. The authorities followed by Plutarch, Diodorus, and Justin were evidently some low writers of Southern Greece, totally ignorant of the very constitution of the Macedonian court. According to them, the death of Philip was an act of private vengeance, perpetrated by the youthful Pausanias, whom a denial of justice, under the most atrocious injuries, had driven to the act of assassination." It is amusing to observe how directly every one of these assertions is contradicted by Aristotle's short sentence: "Ἡ δὲ Φιλίππου βρὴν Ἰλαεὺς ἄνθρωπος, οὗ τὸ δόγμα ἐβόησεν ὅτι τὸν τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀρρύου. It seemed worth while to quote them as another instance how dangerous it may be to take it for granted that these low writers draw their statements from the worst sources, because we do not possess—or, perhaps, have not read—the earlier authors. Perhaps even as to the constitution of the Macedonian court, some of these low writers were not quite so ignorant as Mr. Williams believes. They might have been able to give him some information on the subject which he himself would have found useful. They could, perhaps, have told him that the term *συναρπάζειν* was not confined to the great officers in the Macedonian army, whose rank answered nearly to that of adjutants or field-marshal; and that Pausanias might have been a young man, and yet a *συναρπάζειν*. (See Arrian, i. 6, 8; Diodor., xvi., 93; Plut., Alex., 51; Schmieler on Q. Curtius, iv., 13, 19; vi., 8, 17.) One can hardly help considering it as a just retribution, that Mr. Williams, through his eagerness to fix an indelible stain on the moral character of Demosthenes, should have been led into oversights and mistakes, which a little damage his own reputation as a critic and a scholar.

\* For the assertion that he was an *Orestian prince*, we should require better authority than that mentioned in the last note. Diodorus (xvi., 93) only says, *Μακεδόνος, ἐκ τῆς Ὀρεστιάδος, καὶ ὀνομαζόμενος*. Justin (ix., 6), *nobilis ex Macedonibus adolescens*.

† Plut., Alex., 10. Pausanias (viii., 7, 7) says that she

\* Diodorus, xvi., 93.

† One much longer than the common Greek sword: *μάχαιρα μακρά*. Strabo, iv., 4. Niebuhr (ii., p. 525) compares the Highland claymore. The hilt of the one used by Pausanias was, it seems, adorned with the figure of a chariot. So there was a story that Philip had been warned by the oracle of Trophonius to beware of a chariot, and never mounted one. *Ælian*, v. H., iii., 45. *Cicero*, *De Fato*, 4.

‡ Pol., v., 8, 10. *Schnr*. Mr. Williams, in his entertaining *Life of Alexander the Great* (3d ed. in the Family Library,

If, then, we inquire how Alexander incurred the like suspicion, we find that Pausanias was said to have complained to him of his wrongs, and that he quoted a verse of Euripides, which might be construed as an exhortation to revenge.\* If the anecdote were authentic, the quotation might have been pointed at Attalus and Cleopatra. Beyond this, it can only be said that Alexander, as well as his mother, had been deeply provoked; slight ground for such a presumption even against Olympias, but which, with respect to a character like his, which instinctively recoiled from every species of base-ness, we are hardly permitted to mention.† That he was jealous of his father's conquests, and never regarded him, either during his life, or after his death, with much affection or reverence, may be true; but Philip had not taken any great pains to secure his filial duty. We read among Plutarch's anecdotes, that he one day told the prince, that the more rivals he met with, among his other children, for the throne, the more he might owe it to his own merit; but he bade him attend to Aristotle's precepts, which would teach him to avoid many things which he himself repented of.

Thus, in the forty-seventh year of his age, the twenty-fourth of his reign, perished Philip of Macedon: at the end of one great stage of a prosperous career, near the outset of another which opened immeasurable room for hope. A great man, certainly, according to the common scale of princes, though not a hero like his son, nor to be tried by a philosophical model. But it was something great, that one who enjoyed the pleasures of animal existence so keenly, should have encountered so much toil and danger for glory and empire. It was something still greater, that one who was so well acquainted with the worst sides of human nature, and who so often profited by them, should yet have been so capable of sympathy and esteem. If we charge him with duplicity in his political transactions, we must remember that he preferred the milder ways of gratifying his ambition to those of violence and bloodshed; that he at least desired the reputation of mercy and humanity. If he once asked whether a fortress was so inaccessible that not even an ass laden with gold could mount to it, we may as well believe the anecdote which relates of him, that he replied to his counsellors who urged him to treat Athens with rigour, they were advising him to destroy the theatre of his glory:‡ The many examples of generous forbearance reported in Plutarch's collection of his apophthegms cannot be all groundless fictions; and the less restraint he set on many of his passions, the more amiable appears, by contrast, the self-control which he exercised when he was tempted to an unjust or harsh use of his power. He is one of the men of whom we wish to know more, whose familiar letters and conversation must have been worth preserving. But even the history of his outward life is like an ancient statue, made up of imperfect and ill-adjusted fragments.

roasted them alive. Justin (ix., 7) only relates that she made the mother hang herself, after having killed her child (according to him, a girl; according to Pausanias, a boy) in her lap.

\* Plut., Alex., 10.

† Yet Niebuhr, in his Lectures, expresses a suspicion, almost amounting to a full conviction, of Alexander's guilt.

‡ Plut., R. et I., Apophth., xi.

He left the task of his life unfinished, and his death must have appeared to his contemporaries premature. We must rather admire the peculiar felicity of the juncture at which he was removed to make room for one better fitted for the work. What he had done, his successor would, perhaps, not have accomplished so well. What he meditated was probably much less than his son effected, and yet more than he himself would have brought to pass. If he had begun his enterprise, he would most likely have done little more than mar some splendid pages in the history of the world.

## CHAPTER XLVII.

FROM ALEXANDER'S ACCESSION TO THE TAKING OF THESSALY.

FROM the remotest ages of Pelasgic antiquity down to the time of the Roman Empire, the holy island of Samothrace, the seat of an awfully mysterious worship, accounted equal to Delphi in sanctity, and an inviolable asylum, continued to be visited by pilgrims, who went to be initiated into the rites which were believed to secure the devotee against extraordinary perils both by sea and land, and, in the later period, to fix his destiny, after death, in some brighter sphere. It had probably been always held in great reverence by the Macedonian kings, as it was here that the last of them sought refuge in the wreck of his fortunes. Here, it is said, Philip first saw Olympias, when they partook at the same time in the Cabirian mysteries, and resolved to seek her hand.\* For him such a scene may have had little other interest; but Olympias seems to have taken delight in such ceremonies, and to have given herself up with fervour to the impression they produced. She loved the fanatical orgies celebrated by the Thracian and Macedonian women in honour of their Dionysus, and is even said to have introduced some of the symbols of this frantic worship, the huge tame snakes, which the Bacchanals wreathed round their necks and arms, into her husband's palace. It is a stroke which agrees well with the other features of her wild, impetuous character. Who can estimate the degree in which this irritable, uncontrollable nature may have contributed one element towards that combination of ardent enthusiasm with the soberest forethought, which distinguishes Alexander, perhaps, above every man that ever filled a like station!

The anecdotes related of Alexander's boyhood are chiefly remarkable as indicating what may be fitly called a kingly spirit, which not only felt conscious that it was born to command, and was impatient of all opposition to its will, but also studied how it might subject all things and persons around it to its own higher purposes. This inborn royalty of soul could hardly have failed to find its way to fame, had it even been originally lodged in an obscure corner. But Alexander grew up with the full consciousness of his high rank and his great destiny. There is no reason to believe that Philip ever wavered in his choice of his suc-

cessor, so far as this depended on himself. Indeed, he must have been well aware that he could not deprive Alexander, if he survived him, of his birthright. The utmost he could have done would have been to make such dispositions as would have kindled a civil war after his death. But we are informed that he announced the prince's birth in a letter to Aristotle, in terms which implied that he looked on him as his heir.\* When the boy tamed the brave horse, Bucephalus, which afterward bore him through so many battles, and which no man in the court had been able to mount, Philip is said to have embraced him with tears of joy, bidding him seek a kingdom worthy of him: Macedonia had not room for him.† He advised him to cultivate the favour of the people, while he was not responsible for any acts that might displease them;‡ and did not even take it ill when he heard that the Macedonians called Alexander their king, Philip their leader.§

The education of the prince in his childhood was placed under the superintendence of one of his mother's kinsmen, named Leonidas, a nobleman of austere and parsimonious character, who carefully retrenched the luxuries which his pupil would have enjoyed through his mother's indulgence, and inured him sometimes to Spartan-like habits of hard exercise and simple fare—Leonidas, he once said, when an Asiatic table was spread for him, had provided him with the best cooks; a night's march before breakfast, a scanty breakfast to season his supper||—and checked his inclination to excess in his expenditure; yet it seems so as rather to spur than curb his ambition. "Wait," he said to him one day, when he threw more frankincense than seemed needful into the censer, "until you are master of the land where it grows." When Alexander became lord of Asia, he sent a hundred talents' weight of aromatics to Leonidas, with a request that he would no longer grudge incense to the gods.¶ Under Leonidas, whose discipline was thought by a philosophical observer to have left injurious traces in his character,\*\* he had another governor of a different turn, an Acarnanian, named Lysimachus, who recommended himself to the boy by a peculiar species of flattery, which touched the right chord in his fancy: calling himself Phoenix, the king Peleus, Alexander Achilles. That the most skillful masters to be found in Greece were procured to instruct him in all liberal exercises and studies, may be safely presumed. Of his taste for music and poetry we have some early intimations. Philip himself somewhat valued himself on his knowledge of music:†† and when he entertained the Athenian ambassadors, among whom Demosthenes and Æschines were present, Alexander, who was then about

eleven years old, played on the lyre, and sung or recited in concert with another boy of the same age, for the amusement of the company.\* How much he lived in Homer's poetical world may be partly inferred from the story of Lysimachus just mentioned. It was, above all, as we know from more distinct evidence, the image of Achilles that captivated his boyish fancy. But it was no common interest that he took in the poet's creation: Achilles, according to the traditions of his mother's house, was his own ancestor. He felt the hero's blood in his veins. He, too, preferred glory to length of days; he, too, knew the delight of a glowing and constant friendship. At an age when it would not have been surprising if these bright visions had so occupied his imagination as to leave little room for the realities of life, he found an opportunity, in his father's absence, of conversing with some ambassadors who had been sent from Persia to the court of Macedonia. They could have told him of many wonders of the gorgeous East, which were celebrated in Greece; of the hanging gardens and golden plane-tree, and all the state and splendour of the great king. His curiosity was directed to subjects of quite another kind: it was about the roads, the distances, the force of the armies, the condition of the provinces, about their master's skill in arms, that he questioned them, with an eagerness which alarmed them, it is said, more than Philip's sagacity, of which they had heard so much.†

But the prince, who was destined to effect so great a change in the state of the world, was to be committed to the care of the man whose spirit was not less active and ambitious, who also, in the range of his intellectual conquests, had never been equalled, and who found a much more lasting empire in the sphere of thought. Never, before or since, have two persons, so great in the historical sense of the word,‡ been brought together—above all, in the same relation—as Alexander and Aristotle. It is difficult to repress a curiosity which it is, nevertheless, hardly possible to satisfy, as to the influence which the philosopher exerted on his pupil's mind and character. The inquiry, however, would be fruitless, unless we first endeavour to ascertain the limits of their intercourse with each other.

Aristotle's father, Nicomachus, a native of Stagira, one of the towns destroyed by Philip in the Olynthian war, was a physician, employed in that capacity, but also honoured as a friend, by Philip's father, Amyntas. Aristotle and Philip were nearly of the same age: a few years only before Philip was sent as a hostage to Thebes, Aristotle settled at Athens to pursue his studies under the guidance of Plato. It is not improbable that they were acquainted

\* Aul. Gellius, ix., 3.

† Plut., Alex., 6.

‡ Plut., R. et L., Ap., 16.

§ Plut., Alex., 9. One may add R. et L., Alexander, 1.

|| Plut., Alex., 22.

¶ Plut., Alex., 25.

\*\* Diogenes of Babylon, according to the report of Quintilian, i., l. 2. Sainte Croix's suspicion (Ex., p. 194) that Leonidas is here confounded with Lysimachus, is utterly groundless, and sprang only from his schoolboy notion of Alexander. It seems not improbable that the pernicious tendency of the rough discipline of Leonidas is indicated by Plutarch (Alex., 7): a passage, by-the-way, which seems to overthrow Mr. Williams's conjecture about the share taken by Aristotle in Alexander's early education.

†† Plut., R. et L., Ap., 20.

\* Æschines, Timarch., § 268.

† Plut., Alex., 8. It must, however, be observed, that there is hardly any other period to which this anecdote can be assigned than that during which Philip was absent from his dominions on his expedition to Thrace, when he left Alexander regent, who was then sixteen years old: at least, if we may take the term *ἑξέτης* in the literal sense.

‡ The reader who may think this epithet not sufficiently definite will find it very instructively explained in an article by Gervinus, entitled *Ueber die historische Grossen*, in Schloesser's *Archiv*, v., p. 423, foll. There is an academic oration by Schleiermacher (among those which he delivered in honour of Frederic the Great), in which he handles the same subject in his own manner.

with each other in Macedonia, and that, while they lived so near to one another in Greece, some intercourse took place between the prince and the young client of his house. This would be the most natural explanation of a fact otherwise strange, that on the birth of Alexander, Philip, in a letter by which he communicated the tidings to him, declared that he thanked the gods less for the son they had given him, than that he had been born when he might have Aristotle for his teacher. The genuineness of this letter is, indeed, very suspicious; but the fact it implies, that Philip had very early designed to place his son under Aristotle's care, is not the less credible. Aristotle's change of residence, from Athens to Asia Minor, where he spent some years before he returned to Macedonia, may have delayed the execution of this purpose. But still Alexander was but thirteen years old when he became the philosopher's pupil;\* and, perhaps, this was an earlier age than in any other case would have been ripe for such instructions. For surely what Aristotle was called to impart was not what might have been learned from ordinary masters. This relation appears to have subsisted between them for no more than three successive years. It is a pleasing, and not an improbable conjecture,† that during this period they spent most of their time at Stagira, which Philip had been induced, by Aristotle's request, to restore, and where he had laid out a kind of Lyceum, with shady walks, and stone seats, on ground belonging to a temple of the nymphs. But Alexander was only sixteen when Philip set out on his expedition to Thrace, from which he only returned in the autumn of 339, and he was intrusted with the regency of the kingdom, probably under the direction of a council, during his father's absence. He was then, of course, occupied with affairs of state; and in the course of this time a revolt of one of the conquered tribes, probably on the Illyrian frontier, afforded an occasion for his first essay in the art of war. He reduced the insurgents, took their chief city, expelled its inhabitants, and planted a new colony there, to which he gave the name of Alexandropolis.‡ In the interval between the battle of Chæronea and his father's death, he was engaged, as we have seen, in transactions quite alien from philosophical or literary pursuits. It is very doubtful whether he saw Aristotle again before he came to the throne. Their personal intercourse must, at least, have been confined to occasional interviews.

When we consider the shortness of the time, and the early age to which this part of Alexander's education was limited, we might be inclined to think that Aristotle's influence over his mind and character can scarcely have been very considerable. Nevertheless, it is, at least, certain that their connexion lasted long enough to impress the scholar with a high degree of attachment and reverence for the master—of whom he used to say that he loved him no less than his father; for to the one he owed life, to the other the art of living—and even with some interest in his philosophical pursuits.§ It must be remembered, on the one hand, that Alexander's faculties ripened with extraordinary rapid-

ity, as seems to be proved by the trust which his father reposed in him, and the affairs in which he was engaged at the age of sixteen: on the other hand, that Aristotle also was capable of doing much in a short time with such a pupil, to whom he devoted his whole attention: that his method of teaching was probably calculated to convey much knowledge in a narrow compass; and that no time was consumed in those merely preliminary studies which occupy so large a part of a modern course of liberal education.

If we inquire what were the peculiar advantages which Alexander was likely to derive from such a teacher as Aristotle, and which could not have been expected from any other of that day, we are led to remark that, as none of his contemporaries had taken in so wide a compass of knowledge, none, like him, had ranged over every intellectual field then open to human curiosity, with as lively an interest in each as if it had been the object of his undivided attention, there was none who was less likely to give any partial bias to his pupil's studies. And, again, as there was no man who better understood what belonged to every station of life, none less inclined to exaggerate the importance of his own occupations, it may safely be concluded that all the instruction he gave was adapted with the most judicious regard to Alexander's station and prospects. The boy came into his hands already formed by the attainments which were deemed indispensable for every ingenuous youth of his years. It was not certainly from Aristotle that he learned to love Homer, though the copy of the *Iliad*, which he used to place under his pillow, and which he deposited in the precious casket which he found amid the spoils of Darius, had been corrected by Aristotle's hand. Yet his strong taste for reading, which made him feel the want of a library in the midst of his conquests,\* may have been both cherished and directed by the man who, so many centuries after, gave laws to the poets and critics of some of the most polished nations of Europe, as his talent for speaking was, no doubt, carefully cultivated by this great master of scientific rhetoric.† If Aristotle himself had any scientific bias, it was, perhaps, a hereditary one for the studies connected with medicine; and, accordingly, we find it expressly stated, and, indeed, proved by facts, that the prince caught some measure of this predilection from him, so that he afterward thought himself qualified to give his opinion to physicians on matters belonging to their art.‡ So he seconded Aristotle's researches in natural history with an expenditure for the purpose of collections, which is remarkable even among the examples of his munificence.§ These facts suggest an interesting question, which, however, we can but propose; whether a passion for discovery, an eagerness to explore the limits of the world, was not combined as a distinct motive with his thirst for conquest and dominion, and whether for this he may not have been largely indebted to Aristotle.

\* Plut., Alex., 8.

† Though the treatise on the subject addressed to Alexander, among Aristotle's works, is probably by a different hand.

‡ Plut., Alex., 41.

§ Athenæus, ix., p. 396, E. Pliny, N. H., viii., 17. Alexandro magno regis inflammato cupidine animalium naturas noscendi, &c. Indeed, the fact seems to imply personal curiosity.

\* Apollodorus ap. Diog. Laert., Aristot. Stahr, *Aristotelia*, p. 66. † Stahr, p. 105. ‡ Plut., Alex., 9. § lb., 8.

tole's conversation? If we might depend on the genuineness of two letters which appear, at least, to have been early current under the names of Alexander and Aristotle,\* we should conclude that Aristotle admitted his pupil even to a knowledge of his more abstruse speculations, which related to subjects that lay the farthest of all from any practical application to human affairs. Alexander complains that Aristotle had published some of his works which before had been reserved for the use of his hearers, and had thus deprived him of a distinction which he had before enjoyed. The reply is, at least, not unworthy of the philosopher: he remarks that the books he had published were still, in one sense, unpublished, inasmuch as they were intelligible to none but his hearers. It is, perhaps, difficult to believe that Aristotle wished to turn his pupil's attention so early to the highest and most subtle results of investigations, which had, no doubt, occupied the greater part of his life. But it would not be incredible that the ambitious youth should have desired to be initiated in these philosophical mysteries, and have listened with eager curiosity to his master's solutions of some of the difficulties which he found in the nature of things. It would then still be doubtful whether these questions led to any inquiries concerning the objects of religious belief: whether Aristotle thought it expedient to give his pupil any hints of his own theory as to the divine nature, or taught him to reconcile a devout adherence to the traditional forms of worship with the notion of a single eternal fountain of life.† We may more safely adopt the opinion, that the study of man and of society was that which the royal youth was led most assiduously to cultivate. We may, indeed, smile at Plutarch's rhetoric, when he enumerates Aristotle's divisions of virtue, as if they were so many qualities which Alexander acquired from his instructions;‡ but still we need not deny that the striking contrasts through which Aristotle endeavours to unfold the nature of moral excellence might not only enlarge his pupil's knowledge of mankind, but might aid him in the regulation of his passions. And who shall pretend to estimate the value of the theories and precepts of government which fell into such ears from the author of the *Politics*, illustrated by such a stock of examples as he had at his command, in the history and constitution of 158 states, which he had described in their minutest details?§ It is pleasing to find it recorded that still he wrote a book on the office of a king expressly for Alexander. Nevertheless, we have unquestionable proof that, even on this head, the force of nature was stronger than that of education. Aristotle's national prejudices led him into extravagant notions as to the superiority of the Hellenic race over the rest of mankind; as if the distinction between Greek and barbarian was nearly the same as between man and brute, person and thing: hence slavery appeared to him not a result of injustice and cruelty, but an unalterable law of nature, a

relation necessary to the welfare of society. Hence, too, he deduced a practical maxim, which he endeavoured to inculcate upon the future conqueror of Asia, that he should treat the Greeks as his subjects, the barbarians as his slaves.\* The advice was contrary to Alexander's views and sentiments: it did not suit the position which his consciousness of his own destiny led him to assume. He acted, we know, on a directly opposite principle.

We have, at least, reason to believe that Alexander, though he was but twenty years old at his father's death, had learned, thought, seen, and done more to fit him for the place he was to fill than many sovereigns in the full maturity of their age and experience. Like his father, he found himself, on his accession to the throne, in a situation which called forth all the powers of his mind, and all the energies of his character. Macedonia, though nominally at peace with all its European neighbours, was surrounded by enemies, who had only been forced by the success of Philip's arms to dissemble their hostility, and might be expected eagerly to seize the opportunity which seemed to offer itself, now that the crown had devolved on a stripling, to shake off a yoke which they had endured with ill-disguised impatience. In the kingdom itself there were powerful families, which, though they had submitted to the ascendancy of Philip's ability and fortune, had not forgotten the times when they aspired to independence, if not to the possession of the throne. Amyntas, too, the son of Perdiccas, was still living, and might be tempted to assert his claim. There was ground to apprehend that, as at Philip's accession, if these or any other pretenders should start up, they might be enabled, by the support of foreign powers, to involve the country in a civil war. It was known that the court of Persia was on the watch to avert the peril with which it was threatened by Philip's preparations, and would spare no cost for the purpose of throwing new obstacles in his successor's way.

The young king's first object was to secure himself at home: the next to overawe his hostile neighbours, and to extort from them such an acknowledgment of his superiority as would place him in the position which his father was occupying at the time of his death. In Macedonia, though there might be some ambitious and disaffected nobles, the mass of the people both recognised his title, and were attached to his person. He had won their hearts, in his father's lifetime, by his munificence, which was, perhaps, a simple effect of his natural disposition, though it had incurred Philip's censure, and possibly excited his jealousy. They had also seen sufficient proofs of his extraordinary genius to satisfy them that he was worthy of the throne. Nevertheless, it appears that there were some grounds for apprehension, which, for a time, disquieted Alexander himself, and, probably, still more his most faithful friends and counsellors. As long as the motives which had impelled Pausanias were unknown—and it may have been some time before they were ascertained—there was, apparently, reason to suspect that he was only the chief actor or instrument

\* Plut., Alex., 7. Aul. Gell., xx., 5.

† The philosopher's observation on the pre-eminence of theology over mathematical and physical science (*Metaph.*, v. (vi.), 1) bears on this question, though, on account of the unhappy parenthesis, not decisively. Compare, in the same work, i., 2; x. (xi.), 7; and xi. (xii.), 7.

‡ De Alex. Fort., i., 4.

§ Diog. Laert., Aristot.

\* Plut., De Alex. Fort., i., 6: τοῖς μὲν Ἕλλησιν ἡγεμονικῶς, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάρους δεσποτικῶς.

of a conspiracy which might not yet have accomplished all its objects. An inquiry was instituted, and the result is said to have been, that proofs were discovered which implicated Heromenes and Arrabeus, two of the sons of Æropus the Lyncestian, and, it seems, some other persons, in the plot. It would be rash to decide on the weight of evidence which we have not seen. But it is difficult to resist a suspicion that it was not much stronger than that on which, as we shall find reason to believe, several very innocent lives were sacrificed in the course of Alexander's reign. Alexander, the brother of the two Lyncestian nobles, was the foremost, after the murder, to offer his services to the young prince. He instantly buckled on his armour, and conducted him as his sovereign to the palace. Therefore, it is said, though his innocence was not clearly established, his life was spared. But, besides the presumption which this fact raises in his favour, and, consequently, in favour of his brothers, it seems almost incredible that Pausanias, whose motive was revenge for a personal injury, and who had resolved to seek it at the risk of his life with his own hand, should have disclosed his design to persons who might betray, but could scarcely further it. Yet it was given out that the murder had been preconcerted, not only with these accomplices, but with the Persian court or its emissaries. The fact may have been, that the Lyncestians had been engaged in some intrigues with the Persian government, and this may have appeared a sufficient ground for charging them with a share in the guilt of Pausanias. Whatever may have been their crime, their punishment answered several useful purposes: it satisfied the multitude, vindicated Alexander's own character, awed the discontented, and inflamed popular resentment against the treacherous and cowardly barbarian. It seems that about the same time, Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, was put to death on a charge of a plot against Alexander's life.\*

After these acts of justice, and after the last honours had been paid to his father, the king showed himself in a general assembly of his people, and declared his intention of prosecuting his predecessor's undertakings with like vigour, and, it is said, granted a general immunity from all burdens except military service.† He dismissed the Greek envoys to their homes with gracious language, and with messages by which he requested each state to maintain the friendly relations in which it stood to his house.

\* Droysen, *Alex.*, p. 55, seems to think that Amyntas was executed as one of those who had conspired against Philip; and refers to Polyanius, viii., 60, who does not even give any hint that he came to a violent death. In Curtius, vi., 9, 17, Alexander only mentions his cousin's plot against himself. Photius, *Cod.*, 92, from Arrian's work, *τὸ μὲν Ἀλεξάνδρου* (p. 70, Bekk.), says of Cynane, that she was the wife of Amyntas, *τὴν ἑξῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου κτείνει, ὅπου εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν ὄδωσαν*. He proceeds (and this decisive testimony should have been added to those produced, *ante*, p. 61, note 1, col. 1), *ὅπου δὲ Παρδάκου παῖς ἦν, δόξατος δὲ Φιλίππου Παρδάκας, ὅς ἐστιν Ἀμύνταν τὸν ἀνθρώπον Ἀλεξάνδρου ἀνεψίον*.

† Justin, xi., 1. *Macedonibus immunitatem cunctarum rerum, præter militis vacationem, dedit*. But it is hardly possible to believe this statement in its literal sense, nor would it be consistent with the exemptions bestowed on the families of the slain at the battle of the Granicus. Arrian, i., 16. The truth may have been that the Macedonians in actual service were declared to be exempt from all taxes.

But as he could not place much reliance on the effect of such an exhortation, his chief care was to keep up the martial spirit of the army by frequent reviews and assiduous training. Soon, indeed, it appeared that this was his only security.

The news of Philip's death had excited a general ferment throughout Greece. The gloomy prospect, which, since the battle of Chæronea, must have saddened so many hearts: the thought that the flower of the Grecian youth were henceforth to shed their blood for the execution of projects which threatened their country with perpetual subjection, was suddenly exchanged for the liveliest hopes of deliverance from the foreigner's power. In all the principal states language was heard, and preparations were seen, denoting a disposition to take advantage of the unexpected opportunity. In Peloponnesus, not only Sparta, but Argos, and Elis, and almost all Arcadia, showed themselves ready to renounce their forced alliance with Macedonia. Perhaps Messenia and Megalopolis alone adhered to it. In the west more decided movements took place. Ambracia expelled the Macedonian garrison, and re-established its democratical institutions. The Acarnanian exiles who had taken refuge in Ætolia prepared to return, and the Ætolians in their congress voted succours to reinstate them. Even Thebes, notwithstanding the presence of the garrison in the Cadmea, rose against the oligarchical government. An assembly was held, which passed a decree by which it resolved to recover the citadel, and to resist Alexander's claims to the title and authority which the congress at the Isthmus had conferred upon his father. Athens, however, took the lead in these movements, and, indeed, seems to have been the centre from which they proceeded.

Among the Athenian envoys who had been sent to congratulate Philip was Charidemus: whether the Eubœan adventurer, or the Athenian general of the same name, is a doubtful point. He was, it seems, an intimate friend, or, at least, a political ally of Demosthenes; and, being at Ægæ at the time of Philip's death, lost no time in despatching a courier, who was directed to carry the news to Demosthenes before he communicated it to any one else. It happened that the orator was, at this juncture, mourning the loss of an only daughter, who had died but seven days before; but his private sorrow gave way to public cares. He undertook to publish the intelligence himself; and though the time prescribed by custom for the rites due to the deceased had not yet expired, he immediately laid aside his weeds, came out dressed in white, with a festive wreath on his head and a joyful countenance, and was seen performing a solemn sacrifice at one of the public altars. In order to give greater effect to the momentous tidings, the orator appears to have resorted to a stratagem, which proves that he knew his countrymen to be still as superstitious, and almost as credulous as they were in the days when Pisistratus rode into Athens with the goddess by his side. He appeared before the council of Five Hundred, and declared that it had been revealed to him in a dream by Zeus and Athene, that some great good was about

to happen to the commonwealth.\* Messengers soon after arrived with the news which fulfilled the divine announcement. It was apparently the object of Demosthenes, by this artifice, to impress the people with his own view of the change which Philip's death had made in the situation and prospects of Athens. It was, at least, as harmless an imposture as was ever practised; and, if fraud could ever be pious, might deserve that epithet. The same purpose appears in the measures which he afterward proposed in the assembly. The council had, it seems, already appointed a sacrifice to celebrate the glad tidings: he now moved that the people should proclaim its joy by the like ceremony, and, moreover, that religious honours should be decreed to the memory of Pausanias.†

This conduct of Demosthenes was strongly censured by his contemporaries on various grounds, though not on those which render it most repugnant to the maxims and feelings of civilized society in modern times. Yet we know that, even under the better light which we enjoy, not only the massacre of the Huguenots was celebrated with public rejoicings and thanksgivings in the capital of Christian Europe, but the assassination of the Prince of Orange, and that of Henry III. of France, were openly applauded, and John Baptist Gerard and Clement treated as heroes.‡ Perhaps, however, the plea of political fanaticism cannot properly be alleged in behalf of Demosthenes; it is much more probable that he acted on a sober calculation of expediency. But the head of his offending is, still, that he suffered patriotic motives to overpower every other consideration. It is remarkable that the only thing which Æschines reprehends in his adversary's behaviour on this occasion, beside the forgery of the dream, is, that he had betrayed such unnatural insensibility to his domestic loss: a reproach which Plutarch justly repels with the remark, that it had always been accounted unseemly to bury private affliction in concern for the public welfare. He himself condemns Demosthenes on the score of ingratitude towards a prince who had used his victory with such magnanimous forbearance. We might, perhaps, observe, that generosity and gratitude are terms which, when applied to the transactions of states and princes with one another, belong rather to the style of a manifesto than to that of a history. Phocion objected to the proposed demonstrations of joy on two accounts: first, because such exultation over an enemy's death was dastardly, and then, because the force which had won the day at Chæronea had only been diminished by the loss of a single life.§ The last of these objections was surely sophistical, and tended to weaken the first, which, in itself, was certainly well-founded. He might,

indeed, fairly argue that the joy which the Athenians might express would betray the fears which they had hitherto felt, their aversion for the power to which they had submitted; would prove that their late presents and compliments to Philip were nothing but hollow flattery, covering real hatred. But who had ever doubted that this was the case? They had not even attempted to disguise their displeasure at the contributions laid on them by the congress. On the other hand, that the loss which Macedonia had sustained by Philip's death was only to be reckoned as that of a single soldier, was manifestly false; and the best excuse that can be offered for Demosthenes is, that he wished to place the event in a different light: one which he might well believe to be the true one. We cannot, indeed, be sure that he entertained so low an opinion of Alexander's abilities as he thought it expedient to profess; though it appears that the impression made on him by the young prince, when he saw him at his father's court, was not favourable; and on his return from his embassy he turned his boyish performance into ridicule.\* It was true that Alexander had, at least, acted the part of a man better than himself at Chæronea; but his real character and the promise of greatness which he held out, could not yet be known at Athens. Perhaps some report of his multifarious studies and attainments had been heard there, which afforded a handle for Demosthenes to compare him with Margites, the hero of a burlesque poem attributed to Homer, who knew many things, but none well;† and the orator now ventured to assure the Athenians that they had nothing to fear from the young king, who would never stir from Macedonia, but would remain at Pella, dividing his time between his peaceful studies and the inspection of victims, which would never permit him to undertake any dangerous expedition.‡

Such insinuations would undoubtedly have been as presumptuous as they were fallacious, if they had contained the whole ground on which Demosthenes rested his hopes. But however he might be mistaken as to the character of Alexander, he had seemingly good reason for the inferences he drew from the facts which were known of him, his age, and his position. That a youth of twenty, who had succeeded to a throne vacated by a murder, and who had so many enemies and rivals to fear, both at home and abroad, would be able to maintain the ascendancy which his politic father had with so much difficulty acquired over Greece, might well seem improbable enough to justify the most sanguine expectations from a vigorous, well-concerted resistance. There were, besides, engines which the orator was able to set at work against him, which were known only to himself, and which he was obliged to keep secret, but which might reasonably strengthen his confidence. He was in correspondence with the Persian court, and had, it seems, already received sums of money from it, to be distributed at his discretion, for

\* Plutarch, Demosth., 22: *ὅς ἑναρ ἡμετέρας, ἀπ' οὗ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀφ' ὧν ἡμετέρας ἀφ' ὧν*. Æschines, indeed, Ctes., § 77, seems to assert that he announced Philip's death; but this is probably rhetorical exaggeration. Æschines still was not sagacious enough to see that his rival must have been in the plot against Philip's life; though indeed, that he should have announced it before he had heard that it had taken place, would have been, not impudence, but folly.

† *ἱππὶς ἰσχυρὸς Πάριον*. Æschin., Ctes., § 160. This is more intelligible than Plutarch's statement, Demosth., 22, that the people decreed a crown to the dead murderer.

‡ Ranke, *Geschichte der Pöbelthei*, ii., p. 106, 171. The action of Muretus, xxii. (ed. Ruhnkens, i., p. 177), hardly needs to be referred to.

§ Plutarch, Phoc., 16.

\* Æschines, Timarch., § 268.

† *ἰάλλ' ἡμετέρας ἱππας, καὶ οὐδ' ἡμετέρας πάρας*. Compare Aristotle, Eth., vi., 7. The story told by Eustathius on Od. K., p. 1669, 47, can hardly have been taken from the poem, nor even have belonged to the character of the hero.

‡ Æschines, Ctes., § 160.

the purpose of thwarting Philip's enterprise against Asia.\* The conduct of Demosthenes in this transaction—if we consider that he was carrying on a clandestine negotiation with a foreign state against which his own had declared war, to injure a prince who was the ally of Athens—cannot be vindicated on the principles which regulate the intercourse of civilized nations in modern times. But how little were such scruples heeded when Napoleon's disasters opened a prospect of restoring the independence of Germany!

The people, however, seem to have retained too lively a recollection of the consternation which had followed the battle of Chæronea, to pledge themselves hastily to a renewal of the contest with Macedonia. The language of Æschines inclines us to believe that they did not adopt the motion of Demosthenes with respect to Pausanias.† But he prevailed on them to send envoys to many of the Greek states with secret instructions, which were probably dictated by himself; and to these agents we may ascribe a large share in the proceedings hostile to Macedonia, which have been already related. The Persian gold, or the promise of subsidies, may have opened the way, and have overcome many obstacles. There was another quarter in which the Athenian emissaries might still more safely reckon on a friendly reception. Attalus, Alexander's personal enemy, was commanding a body of troops in Asia. Little encouragement could be necessary to induce him to revolt against the sovereign whom he had unpardonably offended. A negotiation was opened with him by means of a letter from Demosthenes, and nothing, probably, but want of time prevented its success;‡ for all these plans and preparations were disconcerted and suppressed by the rapidity of Alexander's movements. It seems as if his elder counsellors, who had been long used to Philip's cautious policy, advised him to leave the Greeks for the present to themselves, and not to make any attempt to force them to obedience until he had established a good understanding with the barbarian tribes on his northern frontier, which, after Philip's death, had begun to assume a threatening aspect.§ Alexander, however, saw that, if he should adopt such a course, the work of his father's reign might be undone in a few months; he saw that his presence was immediately necessary in Greece, and he set his forces in motion without delay. In his passage through Thessaly, he endeavoured to conciliate the ruling families by promises, and by flattering allusions to the twofold relation by which he was connected with them through his paternal and maternal ancestors, Hercules and Achilles. This appeal to their vanity, seconded by a formidable army, could not be withstood. All the concessions that had been made to Philip were renewed to him; their revenues and troops were placed at his disposal.|| At Thermopylæ he assembled the Amphictyonic Council, per-

haps before the ordinary time of the autumnal meeting, with a view to secure the adherence of the northern tribes which had votes in it; and from them, it seems, he received the title which had been conferred on his father in the Sacred War.\* He then advanced by rapid marches to Thebes, where, as no preparations had yet been made to execute the resolution which had been precipitately adopted, his presence awed the disaffected into entire submission. His approach produced a like effect at Athens. The people hastened to appease him by an embassy, which they sent to apologize for their late proceedings, and to offer him all the honours they had conferred on Philip. Demosthenes himself was appointed one of the envoys—perhaps through the intrigues of his adversaries; and he even proceeded as far as Cithæron, on his way to the Macedonian camp. We do not know whether it was his own reflections on the dangers of his mission, or some hints which he received as to Alexander's intentions, that induced him to find some excuse for turning back. The rest of the ambassadors, however, found the king ready to accept their excuses and promises, perhaps were led to believe that he had never suspected the commonwealth of any hostile designs. Yet, according to Diodorus, it must have been about this time that Attalus—possibly disheartened by the intelligence he received from Europe—determined to attempt to make his peace with him, and, as a proof of his sincerity, sent him the letter of Demosthenes. Alexander, however, does not appear to have made any complaints to the Athenians on the subject; but he despatched a trusty officer, named Hecateus, over to Asia, with orders either to arrest Attalus and convey him to Macedonia, or to put him to death. It seems that Attalus had so won the affections of his troops that Hecateus thought it safest to have him secretly killed.

Alexander had sent envoys before him to summon a fresh congress at Corinth. He found this assembly as obsequious as that which had been called by his father, and was invested by it with the same title and authority for the prosecution of the war with Persia, as had been bestowed on Philip. Sparta alone either refused to send deputies to the congress, or instructed them to disavow its proceedings. She had been used—such was still her language—herself to take the lead among the Greeks, and would not resign her hereditary rank to another.† Alexander, perhaps, smiled at these pretensions of a state which was hardly able to protect itself, but did not think it worth while to put its resolution to the test, by an invasion of its territory. So, too, the revolt of Ambracia did not appear to him important enough to detain him so long as would have been necessary to crush it. He even condescended to assure the Ambracians that they had only forestalled his intentions; that he should of his own accord have restored their democratical institutions.‡ It was a concession which his commanding posture enabled him to make with dignity, and therefore without danger. Having thus, in the course of a few weeks, settled the affairs of Greece, he re-

\* Plutarch, Demosth., 20. Droysen, p. 81, affects to consider this fact as involving an imputation on the integrity of Demosthenes. Yet he does not pretend to show that the orator did not apply the money to the purposes for which he received it.

† *ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ἐπαγγελίῳ συνέλας τὴν βουλὴν κατέστη*—not, therefore, the people also.

‡ Diodorus, xviii., 3.

§ Plut., Al., 11.

|| Justin, xi., 3.

\* Diodorus, xvii., 4.

† Arrian, i., 1.

‡ Diodorus, xvii., 4.



turned to Macedonia, with the hope that in the following spring he might be able to embark for Asia.

But when the season for military operations drew near in 335, reports were heard of movements among the Thracian tribes and the Triballians, which seemed to render it necessary, for the security of his kingdom during his absence, that he should spread the terror of his arms in that quarter before he began an expedition which would carry him so far away from it. The Triballians had not only resisted Philip's passage through their territory with impunity, but had deprived his army of the booty collected in the Scythian campaign. The Thracians, in whose land he had planted his colonies, were, no doubt, impatient to ease themselves of the tribute which he had imposed on them, and of the foreign settlers, whose presence made the yoke more galling; and those whose independence had only been threatened, were admonished by the fate of their neighbours to secure themselves against like attacks. The Illyrians, too, hereditary enemies of Macedonia, had begun to entertain hopes of recovering the districts which had been wrested from them by Philip. Early in the spring Alexander set out on his march towards the Danube. A small squadron of ships of war was ordered to be fitted out at Byzantium, and to sail up the river to meet the army. In ten days, having crossed the Hebrus at Philippopolis, it reached the foot of the Balkan. Here the Thracians had collected their forces to guard the defiles, and were seen intrenched behind their wagons on the summit of the pass. As the road which led up to it was extremely steep, they had formed the plan of rolling their wagons down on the enemy as they advanced, and then falling on their broken ranks. Alexander perceived the object of their preparations, and provided against the danger. The heavy infantry was ordered, where the ground permitted, to open their files and make way for the wagons; where this was not practicable, to throw themselves forward on the ground, and link their shields together over their heads, so that the descending masses might bound over them. The shock came and passed in a few moments, leaving the men unhurt; they closed their ranks, and rose from the ground with heightened courage. The enemy were soon dislodged from their position by a skillful and vigorous charge, leaving 1500 slain; the fugitives easily escaped; the camp, in which were their wives and children, fell into the hands of the victors.

Having crossed the mountains without farther interruption, Alexander descended into the Triballian country to the River Lyginus,\* at a point three days' march from the Danube. Syrmus, the king of the Triballians, had sent the women and children of his tribe to an island of the Danube which our authors call Peuce, and, on the enemy's approach, himself took refuge there with his immediate followers, and several of the neighbouring Thracian hordes. But the bulk of his own people, when Alexander moved forward to overtake him, fell back upon the Lyginus, where the woods near the river afforded a secure shelter. Alexander, however, who

was apprized of their motions, and was only a day's march in advance, suddenly retraced his steps, and encamped on the plain skirted by the forest. The manœuvres of his light troops drew the enemy out of their lurking-place, and they were then easily routed; 3000 were slain; the fugitives were mostly able to reach the forest, into which their pursuers, as it was growing late, did not venture to follow them.

Alexander now resumed his march, and in three days reached the right bank of the Danube, where he found the galleys which he expected from Byzantium. If the Danube was not navigable for the ancient galleys of war above the modern port of Galatz\*—which lies between the Sereth and the Pruth, where the river makes its sudden bend eastward—it would be difficult to understand his previous movements unless we suppose that, before he met the ships, he had marched for several days along the river. On the other hand, the island, or network of islands, formed by the Danube just above Galatz, would seem to have presented a very suitable place of retreat for the fugitives whom Alexander was pursuing.† In the galleys, however, he embarked with a body of heavy-armed infantry and bowmen, and endeavoured to effect a landing on Peuce. But the current was strong, the banks were steep, and lined with enemies, who far outnumbered the detachment which his little squadron could contain; after some fruitless attempts, he found himself forced to abandon the undertaking. He had also another more interesting object in view. He wished to cross the great river, the boundary of so many warlike tribes, and to make an incursion into the land of the Getae, who were now seated either in Walachia, or, if Peuce lay lower down, in Moldavia or Bessarabia, and whose forces, 10,000 foot and 4000 horse, were drawn up, as in defiance of him, on the opposite side. He himself, and a part of his troops, embarked in the galleys; the rest found a passage either in canoes used by the natives, of which he collected a great number, or on hides stuffed with straw. Under favour of night, they crossed over unmolested, and landed in fields of standing corn. This the phalanx levelled, as it marched through, with its spears, the cavalry following until they reached the open ground, where the enemy, astonished and dismayed by their unexpected appearance, did not even wait for the first charge of the horse, but took refuge in their town, which lay but a few miles off. Even this—for it was poorly fortified—they abandoned at Alexander's approach, and taking as many as they could of the women and children on their horses, retreated in the wilderness. The town was sacked and razed to the ground, and Alexander, having sacrificed on the right bank of the Danube to the gods who had granted him a safe passage, returned to his camp on the other side.

Here he received embassies, with submissive, or, at least, pacific overtures, from Syrmus, and from many of the independent nations bordering on the river. His chief object was attained in the proof thus afforded of the terror inspired

\* As Niebuhr conceived, *Kl. Schr.*, p. 376.

\* Its modern name is not known; but it must have been a tributary of the Danube.

† I am referring to a map of Turkey in Europe (according to its condition in 1898), published by Cotta at Munich, which I believe may be trusted.

by his arms. Among the tribes which had been agitated by the report of his expedition were the Celts, who had migrated to the east of the Adriatic.\* They came professedly to seek his alliance; perhaps, in fact, rather to ascertain what they might have to apprehend from him. Alexander was struck with their gigantic forms, and, with some self-complacency, asked them what they feared most in the world. Their pride was equal to his ambition: they answered, "Lest the sky should fall."† All were dismissed with assurances of friendship.

He now turned his march westward, to reach the borders of Illyria, through the country of the Agrianians and Pæonians, on the western side of the mountains which contain the springs of the Hebrus and the Nestus. On his road he received advice that Cleitus, king of the Illyrians, the son of his father's old enemy, Bardylis, was up in arms, and had leagued himself with Glaucias, king of the Taulantians. The Autariates, too, through whose land he had to pass, were ready to fall on him in his way. From this last hinderance, however, he was relieved by his faithful ally, Langarus, king of the Agrianians, who had formed a personal attachment to him in Philip's lifetime, and now came to join him with a body of his choicest troops, and undertook to find sufficient employment for the Autariates, who were accounted by their neighbours an unwarlike tribe in their own country. He fulfilled this promise by an invasion, which effectually diverted them from their meditated attack on the Macedonian army. Alexander would have rewarded his zeal with the hand of his sister Cynane, the widow of Amyntas; but before the time came, Langarus was cut off by sickness. The king, however, was thus enabled to pursue his march without obstruction up the valley of the Erigon, towards the fortress of Pellion, which, as the strongest position in the country, had been occupied by Cleitus. It stood on high ground, in the midst of lofty wooded hills, which were also guarded by Illyrian troops, so as to command all the approaches of the place; and the barbarians had sought an additional safeguard against the assaults of the Macedonians, in a sacrifice which they celebrated on the hill-tops, of three boys, three girls, and as many black rams. Yet all these precautions proved fruitless, and Alexander, after he made himself master of the adjacent hills—where he found the victims of those horrid rites—was proceeding to invest Pellion itself, when the arrival of Glaucias, with a numerous army, compelled him to retire, that he might provide for his own safety. We shall not dwell on the evolutions by which he extricated himself from a most perilous position. It is sufficient to mention that he first penetrated through a difficult defile, and crossed a river in the presence of an enemy greatly superior in numbers, and three days afterward, having suddenly returned, fell upon the allies, whose camp was carelessly guarded, in the night, and broke up their host. Glaucias fled towards his own

home, and was pursued by Alexander, with great slaughter, as far as the mountains which protected his territories. Cleitus at first took shelter in Pellion, but soon despairing of his own resources, set fire to the fortress, and retreated into the dominions of Glaucias.

The accounts which reached Greece of Alexander's operations in these wild and distant regions were, it may be supposed, very imperfect and confused; and at length, during an interval of which no news was heard of him, a report of his death sprung up, or was studiously set afloat. It was, at least, either belief of the report, or confidence in the effect which it was likely to produce in others, that seems to have encouraged a party of Theban exiles, in concert with some of their friends at home, who were no less impatient of the Macedonian yoke, to enter the city by night, and attempt a revolution. They began, in an unhappy spirit, with the massacre of two officers of the Macedonian garrison, whom they found in the streets unaware of the danger. They then summoned an assembly, and prevailed on the people, chiefly by the strong assurances which they gave of Alexander's death, to rise in open insurrection, and lay siege to the Cadmea. The citizens who were still in exile were recalled, the slaves enfranchised, the aliens won by new privileges. Whether Demosthenes had been previously apprized of their design is doubtful; but when they had taken the decisive step, he certainly aided them to the utmost of his power. He furnished them with a subsidy which enabled them to procure arms for all who were able to bear them,\* many of whom, perhaps, had been deprived of their own by the oligarchical government, and he induced the Athenians to enter into an alliance with them, and to promise them support. He himself, probably, believed the rumour which he must so earnestly have wished to be true; and it was, no doubt, this that emboldened the people, on his motion, to decree an expedition in aid of the Thebans. This decree, however, was not carried into effect: before the people could be brought actually to take the field, news arrived which put a stop to their preparations. Elis, too, which seems to have fallen again into the hands of the anti-Macedonian party, openly espoused the cause of the Thebans, so far as even to send their forces as far as the Isthmus, where they were joined by those of some Arcadian states. But here their generals were induced to halt, by the tidings which reached them of Alexander's return.

He was still at Pellion when he heard of the revolt of Thebes. He knew that unless it was crushed in time it would probably spread, and he was anxious about the garrison of the Cadmea. He therefore set out immediately for Bœotia. In seven days, having traversed the upper provinces of Macedonia, and crossed the Cambunian range towards its junction with Pindus, he reached Pelinna in Thessaly. Six days more brought him into Bœotia. So rapid were his movements, that, before the Thebans had heard that he had passed Thermopylæ, he had arrived at Onchestus. The authors of the insurrection would not at first listen to the news of his approach; they gave out that it was an

\* Niebuhr, u. s.

† Mr. Williams, p. 37, thinks that the real meaning was, *We fear no enemies but the Gods*. It is a question that might deserve investigation for some of the learned associates of the Cymrygiddion.

tipater who commanded the Macedonian army; and then that Alexander, the son of *Æropus*, had been taken for his royal namesake. But when the truth was ascertained, they found the people still willing to persevere in the struggle, which had now become so hopeless. Alexander, on the other hand, wishing to give them time for better counsels, now moved slowly against the city, and even when he had encamped near the foot of the *Cadmea*, which they had encompassed with a double line of circumvallation, waited some time for proposals of peace, which he was ready to grant on very lenient terms. There was a strong party within which was willing to submit to his pleasure, and urged the people to cast themselves on his mercy; but the leaders of the revolt, who could expect none for themselves, resisted every such motion; and as, besides their personal influence, they filled most places in the government, they unhappily prevailed. It was their object to draw matters to extremities. When Alexander sent to demand *Phœnix* and *Prothytes*, two of their chiefs, they demanded *Philotas* and *Antipater* in return; and when he proclaimed an offer of pardon to all who should surrender themselves to him, and share the common peace, they made a counter-proclamation from the top of a tower,\* inviting all who desired the independence of Greece to take part with them against the tyrant. These insults, and especially the animosity and distrust which they implied, put an end to all thoughts of peace, and Alexander reluctantly prepared for an assault.

The fate of Thebes seems, after all, to have been decided more by accident than by design. *Perdiccas*, who was stationed with his division in front of the camp, not far from the Theban intrenchments, without waiting for the signal, began the attack, and forced his way into the space between the enemy's lines, and was followed by *Amyntas*, son of *Andromenes*, who commanded the next division. Alexander was thus induced to bring up the rest of his forces. Yet, at first, he only sent in some light troops to the support of the two divisions which were engaged with the enemy. When, however, *Perdiccas* had fallen, severely wounded, as he led his men within the second line of intrenchments, and the Thebans, who at first had given way, rallied, and, in their turn, put the Macedonians to flight, he himself advanced to the scene of combat with the phalanx, and fell upon them in the midst of the disorder caused by the pursuit. They were instantly routed, and made for the nearest gates of the city in such confusion that the enemy entered with them, and being soon joined by the garrison of the *Cadmea*, made themselves masters of the adjacent part of the city. The besieged made a short stand in the market-place; but, when they saw themselves threatened on all sides, the cavalry took to flight through the opposite gates, and the rest as they could find a passage. But few of the foot combatants effected their escape; and the conquerors glutted their rage with unresisted slaughter. It was not, however, so much from the Macedonians, as from some of their auxiliaries, that the Thebans suffered the utmost excesses of hostile cruelty. Alexander had brought with him a

body of Thracians among his light troops, and he had been re-enforced by the *Phocians*, and by all the *Boeotian* towns hostile to Thebes, more especially by *Orchomenus*, *Thespie*, and *Platæa*. The Thracians, impelled by their habitual ferocity, of which they had shown so fearful a specimen many years before, at the capture of *Mycalæssus*, the *Boeotians*, eager to revenge the wrongs they had endured from Thebes in the day of her prosperity, revelled in the usual license of carnage, plunder, and wanton outrages on those whose age and sex left them most defenceless. The bloodshed, however, was restrained by cupidity, that the most valuable part of the spoil might not be lost. The number of the slain was estimated at 6000; that of the prisoners at 30,000. The Macedonians lost about 600 men.

It only remained to fix the final doom of the conquered city. Alexander, who had probably made up his mind on it, referred it to a council of his allies, in which the representatives of the *Boeotian* towns took a leading part. The issue of their deliberation might be easily foreseen, and did not want plausible reasons to justify it. There was a sentence which had been hanging over Thebes ever since the Persian war, in which she had so recklessly betrayed the cause of Grecian liberty.\* It had never been forgotten, and calls had been heard from time to time for its execution.† And the city which had so long been permitted, by the indulgence of the Greeks, to retain a forfeited existence, had nevertheless been distinguished by her merciless treatment of her conquered enemies. In the case of *Platæa* she had not only instigated the Spartans to a cold-blooded slaughter, forbidden by the usages of Greek warfare, but she had destroyed a city which, by its heroic patriotism, had earned the gratitude of the whole nation, and was itself a monument of the national triumph. Nor was it forgotten that, when Athens was at the mercy of its enemies, she alone had proposed to sweep it from the face of Greece. It seems that these old offences were placed in the foreground, while little notice was taken of the later acts of violence and oppression towards the *Boeotian* towns, which were the real grounds of their implacable resentment. The decree of the council was that the *Cadmea* should be left standing, to be occupied by a Macedonian garrison; that the lower city should be levelled with the ground, and the territory, except the part which belonged to the temples, divided among the allies; the men, women, and children, sold as slaves, all but the priests and priestesses, and some citizens who stood in a relation of hospitality to Philip or Alexander, or held the office of *Proxenus* to the state of Macedonia. Under this head were probably included most of the conqueror's political adherents. He made one other exception, which was honourable rather to his taste than his humanity. He *bade spare the house of Pindarus*, and as many as were to be found of his descendants. The council likewise decreed that *Orchomenus* and *Platæa* should be rebuilt. The demolished buildings of Thebes may have furnished materials for the restoration of *Platæa*.

It can hardly be doubted that policy had a large share in this rigorous measure, and that

\* *Diodorus*, xvii., 9.

\* See vol. i., p. 262.

† See ante, p. 30.

Thebes was destroyed chiefly because it would not have been safe to leave it standing, and that the example of its fate might strike the rest of Greece with a wholesome awe. Alexander himself, in his subsequent treatment of individual Thebans, tacitly acknowledged that his severity had been carried to an extreme which bordered upon cruelty. But the harshness which he displayed in this case enabled him to assume the appearance of magnanimity and gentleness in others. All the Greek states which had betrayed their hostility towards him now vied with one another in apologies, recantations, and offers of submission. A reaction immediately took place at Elis in favour of the Macedonian party; and in the Arcadian towns which had sent succours for the Thebans, the authors of this imprudent step were condemned to death. The Ætolians, too, who had shown some symptoms of disaffection, sent an embassy to deprecate the king's displeasure. Athens, however, had most reason to dread his anger, and strove to avert it by a servile homage, which at once marks the character of the man who proposed it, and the depth to which the people had fallen since the battle of Chæronea. When the first fugitives arrived from Thebes, the Athenians were celebrating their great Eleusinian mysteries. All fled in consternation to the city, and removed their property out of the country within the walls. An assembly was immediately called, in which, on the motion of Demades, it was decreed that ten envoys, the most acceptable that could be found, should be sent to congratulate Alexander on his safe return from his northern expedition, and on the chastisement which he had inflicted on Thebes. The king discovered no displeasure at this piece of impudent obsequiousness, but in reply sent a letter to the people, demanding nine of the leading anti-Macedonian orators and generals: Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Hyperides, Polyæctus, Chares, Charidemus, Ephialtes, Diotimus, and Mærocles, whom he charged both with the transactions which had led to the battle of Chæronea, and with all the hostile measures that had since been adopted at Athens towards his father and himself, particularly with the principal share in the revolt of Thebes. In the assembly which was held to consider this requisition, Phocion, it is said, both counselled the people to surrender the objects of the conqueror's resentment or apprehensions, and exhorted the elected victims to devote themselves spontaneously for the public weal. Demosthenes is reported to have quoted the fable of the wolf who called on the sheep to give up their dogs. The people wavered between fear and reluctance, till Demades stepped in to remove the difficulty. He undertook—it was commonly believed for a fee of five talents—to appease Alexander, and save the threatened lives. He found the king satiated with the punishment of the Thebans, and disposed for an exercise of mercy, which might soften the impression it had produced on the minds of the Greeks. He remitted his demand with respect to all except Charidemus, who, perhaps, had incurred his peculiar displeasure by his conduct at Ægæ after Philip's death, and who now embarked for Asia, and proceeded to the Persian court.

The conqueror celebrated his return to Ma-

cedonia with an Olympic festival at Ægæ, and with games in honour of the Muses at Dium in Pieria. The inhabitants of Dium held the memory of Orpheus in great reverence, and boasted of the possession of his bones. At the time of the games it was reported that a statue of the ancient bard, which, perhaps, adorned his monument near the town, had been seen bathed in sweat. Alexander's Lycian soothsayer, Aristander of Telmessus, bade him hail the omen: it signified that the masters of epic and lyric poetry should be wearied by the tale of his achievements.\* These achievements will now for some time claim our undivided attention.

#### CHAPTER XLIV.

##### RETROSPECTIVE SURVEY OF THE HISTORY OF PERSIA, FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS TO ALEXANDER'S ACCESSION.

ALEXANDER'S invasion of Asia might well form the subject of a separate work;† but it belongs rather to universal history than to the history of Greece. The Greeks, indeed, were deeply interested in the event; but the effect it produced on their condition might be sufficiently understood from a very summary account of the transactions by means of which it was brought about. Still, it was not without reason that writers of Grecian history thought themselves called upon to relate this great triumph of Grecian arts and arms—for such it was, though they were employed by a people whom the Greeks themselves did not account worthy of their name—which spread a Greek population over the fairest provinces of Asia, and carried the Greek language, manners, and modes of thinking from the shores of the Mediterranean to the banks of the Indus. It is now scarcely permitted to one who is traversing the same field to depart from their example. The reader, however, will not expect to see this subject treated here even with all the fulness of details into which we have entered in other portions of our narrative, which were more essential parts of a history of Greece. Our aim must be confined to a survey of the leading features of this ever memorable conquest, which may enable us to understand the spirit in which it was accomplished, and, perhaps, to judge of the designs as well as the achievements of the conqueror.

But before we proceed, it will be necessary, both for the sake of connexion and to illustrate the state of the Persian empire at the period when it was attacked by Alexander, to take a review of the principal events which befell it during about half a century before, or from the time of the peace of Antalcidas.

We have had occasion, in a former part of this work,‡ to mention hostilities in which Evagoras of Salamis was engaged with Persia in the reign of that Artaxerxes whom Cyrus attempted to dethrone. It may now be proper to say something more about the circumstances

\* Pausanias, ix., 30. 7. Plut., Alex., 14.

† It has been handled admirably, on the whole, by Droysen, though he sometimes shows himself as much prejudiced on the side of Alexander as Sainte Croix against him.

‡ Vol. i., p. 576.

under which Evagoras rose to power at Salamis. The Greek princes, who traced their origin to Teucer, had been expelled by a Phœnician chief, who, to secure his own authority, acknowledged himself the vassal of the Persian king. Evagoras, when he had made himself master of Salamis, both restored the ancient power and splendour of the city, which, under its Phœnician rulers, had lost its Greek manners and its maritime occupations,\* and endeavoured to extend his dominion over the rest of the island. He succeeded so far, that only Amathus, Soli, and Citium held out against him, and they found themselves compelled to seek protection from Artaxerxes. He willingly promised them succours; for not only had the revolution, by which his Cyprian vassal had been dethroned, deprived him of an important island, but Evagoras had formed connexions with the King of Egypt, and, it seems, had engaged in enterprises which threatened Phœnicia and Cilicia. Artaxerxes, therefore, made the cause of the Cyprian cities opposed to Evagoras his own, and ordered the satraps of the nearest maritime provinces, and Hecatomnus, the prince of Caria, to prepare an expedition for the invasion of Cyprus. But these preparations appear to have been delayed by his war with Sparta; and one of the reasons which made the peace of Antalcidas welcome to him was, that it left him at liberty to prosecute this undertaking, and, as his title to Cyprus was expressly acknowledged in the treaty, debarred Evagoras from all farther succours which he might have obtained from his Greek allies. After the peace, the preparations were carried on with increased vigour, and at length a great armament was brought together; it is said upward of 300,000 men and 300 galleys, to which the Ionian cities contributed most largely.† The army was placed under the command of Orontes: the sea force was committed to Teribazus, under whom Gaoe, his son-in-law, though with inferior rank, seems to have had the chief direction of the naval operations. Evagoras, on the other hand, had obtained considerable succours from the Egyptian king, Acoris; and even Hecatomnus had privately furnished him with a subsidy, which enabled him to take a large body of mercenaries into his pay. If we may believe Isocrates,‡ he had invaded Phœnicia, and made himself master of Tyre by force of arms. His authority was certainly acknowledged there, and in some other Phœnician cities, and a Tyrian squadron of twenty galleys came to his aid against the Persians.§ His fleet, however, with this addition, amounted only to ninety sail. His native troops were about 6000 men; but, besides the mercenaries, he received re-enforcements from many quarters—for all who were disaffected to the Persian government were his natural allies—among the rest, from a chief who is called King of the Arabians.

Still, when the Persian armament had crossed over to Cyprus, Evagoras was not in condition to cope with it openly either by sea or

land, and for a time confined himself to the object of intercepting the enemy's supplies with his cruisers. In this he was so successful that he reduced them to great distress, which caused a mutiny in their camp, and compelled them to return, with their whole fleet, to Cilicia for a fresh stock of provisions. Meanwhile, he received a re-enforcement of fifty galleys from Acoris, and having fitted out sixty more himself, thought himself strong enough to risk a battle. He chose his own time, and took the Persians by surprise; but the inequality of numbers was, perhaps, still too great; he was defeated, and besieged in Salamis by sea and land; but he made his escape by night, with ten galleys, leaving his son Phnytagoras to govern in his absence, and proceeded to Egypt to press Acoris for fresh succours. The Egyptian, however, seems no longer to have trusted in his fortune, and only furnished him with a scanty supply of money, with which he returned to Salamis. His affairs might now have seemed hopeless, and there can hardly be a doubt that, if the siege had been prosecuted with due vigour, the city must have surrendered at discretion. But, happily for Evagoras, the two satraps who commanded the Persian forces were jealous of each other, and each anxious for the credit of putting an end to a long and expensive war; so that, when he made overtures of peace to Teribazus, they were more favourably received than the state of his affairs would have entitled him to expect. Teribazus would have permitted him to retain Salamis, on condition that he should pay a yearly tribute, and acknowledge himself the subject of the Persian king. Evagoras was willing to accept all the other conditions, but would not submit to this last clause, and claimed to be treated as a sovereign prince, the great king's equal in rank and title. This was a concession which Teribazus did not venture to make. In the meanwhile, however, Orontes sent secret despatches to the court, in which he charged Teribazus with wilful remissness in the management of the war, and with treasonable designs. Artaxerxes, who was himself about to undertake an expedition in person against the Cadusians, was alarmed by these insinuations, and ordered Orontes to arrest Teribazus, and send him a prisoner to court. This order Orontes immediately executed, and his rival was detained in custody until the king's return from his campaign. He himself succeeded to the sole command of the armament. But Teribazus had made himself popular among the troops—as, indeed, one of the charges laid against him was, that he had endeavoured to corrupt their loyalty—and they showed so much dissatisfaction at his disgrace, that Orontes feared he should be compelled to abandon the siege. He therefore made advances to Evagoras, and offered him the possession of Salamis on the terms which he himself had accepted from Teribazus. Evagoras, if he had known the state of things in the enemy's camp, might, perhaps, have risen in his demands; but he acquiesced in these proposals, which seemed no less advantageous and honourable to him than they were degrading to the majesty of the Persian crown, which had never before been known to treat on such terms with a rebel, as Evagoras

\* Isocrates, Evag., § 23, 55.

† Isocrates, Paneg., § 154: τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τὸ πλείστον ἀπ' Ἰωνίας συμπέλεικεν. The armament was assembled on the western coast (ἐν Φωκαίᾳ καὶ Κέρῳ. Diodor., xv., 3), and thence proceeded to Cilicia.

‡ Evag., § 75.

§ Diodorus, u. s.

was styled. Thus ended the Cyprian war, which lasted ten years, and during a part of this time employed a large share of the forces of the Persian empire against a single town,\* and is said by a contemporary to have cost 15,000 talents.† This sum, indeed, was not much more than the value of the ornaments which the great king constantly wore about his person;‡ it would hardly have been missed from his treasury. But it proved the incapacity of the government to wield the resources of the state.

The danger which hung over Teribazus alarmed his son-in-law Gaos, and drove him into treason through fear lest he should himself be charged with it. He won over several of his captains, and entered into correspondence with the King of Egypt, and with Sparta, for aid against his master. This rebellion, however, was, not long after, stifled by his death—the work, probably, of assassins hired by the court—though Tachos, one of his officers, who succeeded to his command, still maintained an independent footing for a short time, in a fortress which he built on the coast of Ionia. In the mean while, Artaxerxes, having returned from his expedition, ordered Teribazus to be brought to trial, and appointed three Persians, of the highest reputation for probity, as his judges. It was not long before, that one of those horrible punishments, which were equally to be dreaded from the justice and from the caprice of this barbarous government, had been inflicted on some of their predecessors in office, who had been flayed alive, that their skins might cover the seat of justice. Teribazus obtained an impartial hearing, and completely refuted the calumnies of his accuser. He was received again into the royal favour, and Oromtes was banished from the court in disgrace.

The recovery of Egypt was an object which had never ceased to occupy the attention of the Persian government since its revolt in the reign of Darius, the father of Artaxerxes. Before the Cyprian war, an expedition had been sent against it, under three generals, accounted the ablest in the king's service, Abrocomas, Tithraustes, and Pharnabazus; but with such ill success, that the Egyptian prince was encouraged to act on the offensive, and to aim at extending his dominion over other provinces of the empire. Acoris, as we have seen, was ready to furnish powerful aid to the enemies of Artaxerxes in every quarter, and he even entered into alliance with the Pisidian mountaineers, who paid not even nominal obedience to the great king, and were at all times easily induced to attack his more peaceful subjects.

\* But I do not think it can safely be inferred from the language of Isocrates (Paneg., § 163), as Mr. Clinton supposes (F. H., ii., p. 280. Append., c. 12: *On the Cyprian War*), that the sea-fight had taken place six years before the time when that passage of the Panegyric was written. At all events, it is very doubtful whether the siege of Salamis lasted so long. That Artaxerxes ever landed in Cyprus I utterly disbelieve. The testimony of Diodorus (xiv., 98), so oddly worded (αὐτὸς δὲ τὰς ἐν ταῖς ἀνα σαρραπείλαις πόλεις ἐκπεριεμύνησεν μεγάλας δυνάμεις διαβαίνειν εἰς τὴν Κύπρον), is not sufficient to prove so strange a fact, of which he takes no farther notice, and which is not mentioned either by Plutarch or Isocrates: for the expression *σπαρταίος*, u. s., no more proves this, than it proves that Artaxerxes was present in person during the whole of the siege.

† Isocr., Evag., § 73.

‡ Plut., Artax., 24.

About the year 377, when it appears that Artaxerxes was meditating a fresh attempt upon Egypt, Acoris collected a large body of Greek mercenaries, whom he tempted by uncommonly liberal pay; and, by the like attraction, he induced Chabrias to take the command of them. Athens, however, was at this time desirous of keeping on good terms with Persia, and, on the complaint of Pharnabazus, not only ordered Chabrias to quit the service of Acoris, but promised to send Iphicrates to act with the king's generals in the reduction of Egypt. An army of 200,000 men was raised for the next invasion, which was to be conducted by Pharnabazus, but was so long delayed, that Iphicrates, who was to support him at the head of 20,000 Greek mercenaries, could not help remarking, in conversation with him, on the difference between his words and his deeds. "The reason," answered the satrap, "is, that I am master of my words; my deeds depend upon the king."\* The best plans, it seems, were always liable to be suspended and defeated by the interference of the court, which, as in the case of Teribazus, was always open to insidious suggestions against its most active and faithful servants.

The army at length began its march from Acé, in Syria (Acre), the place of rendezvous, towards Egypt, accompanied by a fleet of 300 galleys of war, 200 smaller vessels, and innumerable transports. Acoris was no longer on the throne of Egypt; but his successor, Nectanabis, had had ample time for preparation, and had taken every precaution to secure himself against the threatened invasion. He had intersected the approaches to his kingdom on the side of Pelusium with deep ditches, had laid the adjacent country under water, and barred the passage of the canals. The invaders found the Pelusiatic mouth of the river so strongly fortified, that they did not venture to make an attempt here. But Pharnabazus and Iphicrates embarked with a body of troops, and, landing at the entrance of the Mendesian arm with 3000 men, immediately proceeded to attack the fortress which guarded it. Nectanabis sent a small detachment of his army to its relief, and an engagement took place, in which the Egyptians, overpowered by the superior numbers of the enemy, who were re-enforced from their vessels, were routed, and fled towards the fortress, so hotly pursued that the conquerors entered along with them, made themselves masters of it, and razed it to the ground.

But now a difference arose between the Persian general and his Athenian colleague. Iphicrates having heard, from one of the prisoners, that Memphis had been left unguarded, proposed immediately to sail up to it and surprise it. Pharnabazus did not think it safe to undertake such an expedition until they were joined by the remainder of their forces; nor would he consent to let Iphicrates make the attempt, though he engaged to take the city with his mercenaries alone. His zeal even exposed him to suspicions of sinister aims; and the sharpness of his remonstrances offended Pharnabazus, who had, indeed, reasons for caution, as the servant of a jealous and ill-informed despot, which did not affect the Athenian. During this dispute the

\* Diodorus, xv., 41.

Egyptians had time to send a garrison to Memphis, and then advanced with all their forces to the scene of their late defeat, where, though no general battle was fought, the nature of the ground gave them a great advantage over the enemy in a number of petty encounters.\* At length, when the season of the inundation arrived, Pharnabazus, finding the country inaccessible, determined to abandon the enterprise, and led the armament back to Syria. Iphicrates, fearing Conon's fate, took the first opportunity of escaping from the Persian camp, and, embarking by night, sailed away to Athens. Pharnabazus, indeed, laid the blame of the failure entirely upon him—not, perhaps, either maliciously or ignorantly, but to screen himself—and sent ministers to Athens to complain of him. The people promised to punish him as he should appear to deserve, but shortly after appointed him to the command of their own fleet.

Towards the end of his long reign Artaxerxes saw his throne beset with greater dangers than had ever yet threatened the Persian monarchy. About the year 362, the satraps of Asia Minor conspired together in a general insurrection, and entered into alliance on the one hand with Sparta, on the other with Tachos, who had now succeeded Nectanabis in Egypt. Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, Orontes of Mysia, Autophrodates of Lydia, Datames of Cappadocia, and Mausolus, prince of Caria, are mentioned as the leading members of this coalition. No other motive need be sought for this conspiracy than the natural desire of these powerful chiefs to take advantage of the weakness of the government, and of the king's advanced age and domestic troubles, in order to erect their provinces into independent kingdoms. In the case of Datames, however, we find another example of the common effects of a wretched system. He was a man of extraordinary abilities, had served the king with the utmost loyalty, and might have been the firmest bulwark of his throne. But the calumnies of some envious courtiers had excited the suspicions of Artaxerxes against him, and Datames saw himself obliged to revolt to escape disgrace and ruin. The insurrection spread along the whole Asiatic coast of the Mediterranean, from Ionia to Egypt. It seems, indeed, that the court hardly retained its authority in any of the provinces west of the Euphrates. Half the revenues of the empire ceased to flow into the royal treasury. Its remaining forces were not sufficient to suppress the rebellion.

But, even in this emergency, there remained one hope for the government, and, happily for it, one which it required no exertion of prudence or energy to realize. Though it did not know how to preserve the fidelity of its honest servants, it was able to reward the services of traitors. Such were found among the confederate satraps. Orontes, who had been invested with the supreme command, and intrusted with the treasure collected for the pay of the mercenaries, on whom they chiefly relied, tempted by the prospect of promotion, betrayed his friends, their towns, and troops, into the king's hands. His example was followed by Rheo-

mithres, who had been sent by the confederates to Egypt, and returned with a subsidy of 500 talents, and fifty galleys, which he received from Tachos. But immediately afterward he found means to decoy several of the insurgent chiefs into his power, and sent them in chains to Artaxerxes. These instances of treachery seem, either by fear or contagion, to have dissolved the league. The rebels, one by one, hastened to make their peace with the king, that they might not be deserted or betrayed by their associates. Datames, however, would never again trust himself into the power of the prince who had so ill requited his faithful services; and Artabazus, who commanded the royal forces, was ordered to invade Cappadocia.\* But here, too, more dependance was placed on treachery than on arms. Mithrobarzanes, a kinsman of Datames, whom he had intrusted with the command of his cavalry, was induced to go over to the enemy. Datames, however, contrived, by a stratagem which showed extraordinary presence of mind, to defeat and punish his perfidy. He advanced to attack the enemy just at the moment that Mithrobarzanes was joining them, and persuaded his troops that the movements of the cavalry had been preconcerted with himself. On the other hand, their simultaneous approach led Artabazus to suspect a double treachery, and Mithrobarzanes found himself repelled by the Persians. In his perplexity he turned his arms against both sides, and fell, with a great part of his troops. The remaining adventures of Datames,† so far as they have been preserved, deserve to be mentioned here, because they illustrate the character of the Persian government. After he had been deserted by his eldest son, and, it appears, by most of his forces, he still guarded the approaches of his province against the royal army, and so harassed and reduced it by a series of actions, in which the nature of the ground always gave a decided advantage to his little band, that Autophrodates, his former associate, who now commanded against him, was obliged to invite him to make his peace with the king; of course, on his own terms, which left him really independent. The court was just so far sensible of its humiliation as to be still bent on the only kind of revenge which it was able to take on the rebellious subject whom it had reluctantly pardoned. It laid continual snares for his life, which, however, he eluded with his wonted forethought and address. At length, another traitor of high rank, Mithridates, a son of his old ally, Ariobarzanes, was found willing to undertake the office of assassin. But it was not by any ordinary means that he could obtain access to Datames, who was constantly on his guard. It was not enough that he pretended to have revolted from the king, and to seek an alliance with Datames for his protection. He could only win his confidence by a series of hostile inroads, which, with the secret sanction of the court, he made into the neighbouring provinces. When he had infested and plundered them for a long time, and had given a share of the spoil and several captured fortresses

\* The reading, δὲ τῶν τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, in Diodorus, xv., 43, though Weeseling passes it over in silence, seems clearly to require correction. It should be τῶν τοῦ.

\* Diodorus, xv., 91. Nepos, Datames, 6, mentions Pistidia as the scene of this occurrence, and says nothing about Artabazus. Polyneus, vii., 21, 7, assigns no place to it.

† Related by Nepos, and Polyneus, vii., 20.

es to Datames, Datames began to believe that he was sincere in his professions of enmity to the king, and acceded to his proposal of a private conference, to which they were to come unarmed. The place was fixed by Datames himself; but Mithridates caused some weapons to be hidden there beforehand, and when their interview was over, pretending that he had still something to say, killed him with a sword which he had drawn out while his back was turned.

This event took place, perhaps, under Ochus, the son of Artaxerxes, to whose character this crooked policy was peculiarly congenial. Artaxerxes died in 358, at the age of ninety-four, yet, it is said, of a broken heart, the father of 118 children, three of whom were accounted legitimate, and capable of succeeding to the throne. To prevent a civil war, such as had disturbed the beginning of his own reign, he adopted the extraordinary resolution of proclaiming Darius, the eldest, king in his own lifetime, permitting him to wear the tiara upright, hitherto an exclusive privilege of the reigning prince. It was customary for the successor, when appointed in the reign of his predecessor, to name a present which he desired from the sovereign. Darius, on this occasion, made a request which deeply offended his father: he asked for Aspasia, a beautiful Ionian, who, after the death of Cyrus, had been transferred from his harem to his brother's. The king, indeed, did not express his displeasure by words; but he first bade Aspasia make her choice of a master, and when she decided in favour of his son, did not suffer him to possess her long. He appointed her priestess of Anaitis, the goddess worshipped at Ecbatana, whom the Greeks compared to their Artemis, and whose ministers were devoted to perpetual celibacy. Darius, irritated by his disappointment, lent a credulous ear to the suggestions of Teribazus, whom Artaxerxes had provoked by a similar breach of promise, and who now persuaded the prince that he was in danger of being supplanted by his youngest brother Ochus. Thus he was instigated to conspire against his father's life; but was betrayed by one of his servants, and put to death, it was said, by the king's hand.

There now remained but two barriers between Ochus and the succession. Ariaspes, the second legitimate prince, was generally beloved on account of the mildness of his character, and desired by the people as their future king. The favourite of Artaxerxes himself was another son named Arsames, whose abilities made him doubly formidable. Ochus, indeed, had a friend in the palace, who supported his interest, the Princess Atossa, whom her father, either licensed by the Magian doctrine, or careless of all restraints, had added to the number of his wives. But he did not rely upon her influence: he determined to rid himself of his two rivals. Ariaspes he alarmed by false reports of the king's displeasure, and threats against his life, until he drove him to suicide. Artaxerxes could only bewail his loss, and suspect the cause; but he clung the more fondly to his favourite son. Ochus now grew more reckless, and employed a son of Teribazus to despatch Arsames. The old king saw himself bereft of his last hope, and surrounded by as-

sassins: he sank under the shock; and Ochus, who also assumed the title of Artaxerxes, mounted the blood-stained throne. A general massacre of his father's surviving children, and of all who were connected with them, or had in any way incurred his suspicions, was the first act of his reign.

Such a character would not have been ill suited to a station which, above all things, required energy and decision, if he had not provoked enmity by his wanton cruelty. But Artabazus, who had defended his father's throne against the rebellious satraps, himself raised the standard of revolt against him. Two or three years before the death of Artaxerxes, Tachos had fitted out a fleet of 200 galleys, had raised an army of 80,000 Egyptians, and had sent to Sparta for aid, with pay for 10,000 mercenaries. After the general peace which followed the battle of Mantinea, from which Sparta was excluded because she would not acknowledge the independence of Messenia, she was reduced to a state of discontented feebleness, unable either to give up her projects of ambition and revenge, or to move a step towards the execution of them. Only one prospect seemed open for her: the hope of relieving her poverty by the subsidies of her Asiatic allies. With this view, the overtures of the revolted satraps had been favourably received, and the request of Tachos was readily granted. Agesilaus himself, notwithstanding his advanced age, superintended the levies, and took the command of the troops, which included a thousand men furnished by Sparta, destined to serve in Egypt,\* where he expected that the conduct of the war would be entirely committed to him. Tachos, however, had engaged Chabrias, who was always ready to accept a foreign commission, to command his fleet: Agesilaus was keenly mortified by this disappointment; and, it is said, was also wounded, on his arrival in Egypt, by an indirect jest with which Tachos expressed his surprise at the diminutive and deformed person of so renowned a general.† As on many former occasions, he allowed his personal feelings to affect his political measures. Tachos, against his advice, made an expedition into Phœnicia, leaving his brother to govern in his absence. This man seized the opportunity to transfer the crown to his own son Nectanabis, who had accompanied the king, his uncle, into Phœnicia, and had been sent by him at the head of the Egyptian troops to reduce some cities of Syria. With such advantages, Nectanabis soon won over the army, and was acknowledged as king by the people: his next object was to gain the Greek mercenaries and their leaders; and he sent his emissaries to sound Chabrias and Agesilaus. Chabrias would not desert his employer; but Agesilaus, cloaking his prejudices under a show of patriotism, declared that he, being not a private adventurer, but sent out on a public mission, could only consult the interests of Sparta, and would not decide between the rivals until he had received instructions from home.

\* I have combined the account of Diodorus, xv., 92, and Plutarch, Ages. 36.

† Theopompus (and an Egyptian historian, Lycæus of Naucratis) in Athenæus, xiv., 6. One might infer from the story that Tachos spoke Greek, and even read Greek authors, for he is said to have quoted the line, *ἄδριος ὄφρα, Ζεὺς δ' ἐθέλοιτο, ρὴ δ' ἔρκεαι πᾶν*.



The answer which the government made to his inquiry left him at full liberty to use his own discretion; and he then openly joined Nectanabis with all his mercenaries. Thus abandoned, Tachos fled to Artaxerxes, who, hoping to make good use of him for the recovery of Egypt, gave him a gracious reception.

In the mean while, however, a new pretender arose in Egypt to dispute the crown with Nectanabis. He appears to have been the more popular candidate, for his forces far outnumbered those of his rival; and he was not without hopes of gaining Agesilaus over to his side. Nectanabis himself entertained suspicions of his ally, which, indeed, his late conduct too well justified; and Plutarch intimates that it was chiefly dread of the shame which would have attended a second desertion that prevented him from going over to the side which fortune now seemed to favour. He had not been able, at first, to prevail on Nectanabis to attack the enemy's undisciplined troops: he was dismayed by their superiority in numbers, and suffered himself to be shut up and besieged in his capital. A trench was begun round it, which, when completed, would have cut off all hope of relief. Nectanabis was now eager for a battle, as his last chance of stopping the circumvallation, which would soon have forced him to surrender, as the place was not stocked with provisions for a siege. But Agesilaus, notwithstanding the expostulations and reproaches of the Egyptians, and the impatience of his Greek troops, refused to lead them out until the two ends of the trench were only separated from each other by an interval just sufficient to allow room to form them in battle array. He then, by skilful manœuvres, drew the enemy into an engagement on this ground, where the greatest part of their forces was useless, while the rest, crowded together, were exposed to the attack of his little army, which was covered on either flank by the trench. The result was a complete victory, which secured the throne to Nectanabis. Agesilaus then set out homeward with 230 talents, which he received as the reward of his services. But he was taken ill in his passage, and died at a desert place on the coast of Africa, called the Harbour of Menelaus. His body—preserved in wax, as honey was not to be procured—was carried to Sparta to receive its royal obsequies. We have already had occasion to notice that Artabazus maintained himself for a considerable time, though with various success, against the court, chiefly by the help of Greek soldiers and generals, as Chares and Pammenes, and that Ochus was obliged to threaten Athens, and to conciliate Thebes by a subsidy, to deprive the rebel of these resources.\* With a view, no doubt, to strengthen his interest among the Greeks, Artabazus had married a Rhodian lady, whose brothers, Mentor and Memnon, for a time aided him actively in his enterprises. At length, however, his fortune deserted him, and he found himself obliged to fly from Asia, and took refuge with Memnon at Philip's court. Mentor entered into the service of Nectanabis as the commander of his Greek troops, and soon found an opportunity of benefiting his kinsman in a way that he could least have expected. Ochus,

in the beginning of his reign, renewed the attempts which had been so often made for the recovery of Egypt, but with even worse success: the generals he employed were so signally defeated, that he himself incurred the ridicule of the Egyptians, and other provinces were encouraged to follow their example. The insolence and exactions of the Persian satraps and generals, who had their headquarters at Sidon during the preparations for the war with Egypt, roused the city to an insurrection, which soon spread throughout Phœnicia. The Sidonians not only seized and put to death many of the Persians who had provoked their resentment, and burned a magazine of fodder which had been collected for the next campaign in Egypt, but, personally to insult the king, cut down the trees of a park in the outskirts where his predecessors had sometimes lodged. They entered into alliance with Nectanabis, and began to build galleys, and to lay in ammunition and provisions, and to assemble mercenary troops. Ochus was so much incensed at their conduct, that he resolved to undertake an expedition against them in person, and, at the same time, to revenge the affronts he had suffered from the Egyptians.

In the mean while the example of Phœnicia animated Cyprus to revolt. The island was at this time divided among nine petty princes, who had all acknowledged the sovereignty of the Persian king, and now leagued themselves together to assert their independence. Ochus sent orders to Idrieus, prince of Caria, to collect an armament, and suppress the Cyprian insurrection; and Idrieus, having assembled forty galleys and 8000 mercenaries, placed them under the command of Evagoras, a son, it appears, of the prince whose actions we have already related, and of Phocion, who may, perhaps, have been induced, by friendship for Evagoras, to engage in this expedition, which otherwise must, we should suppose, have been somewhat repugnant to his feelings and principles. They landed in Cyprus, and found so rich a booty, that adventurers from various quarters, desirous of a share, flocked to their camp, and soon doubled the force of their army. The Cyprian princes were unable to make head against them; and after having reduced the rest of the island to submission, they sat down before Salamis, which—we know not through what vicissitudes—had now passed into the hands of Pnytagoras, a relative, it seems, of the royal house.\* Yet Evagoras was not destined to recover his patrimony. He himself fell under the suspicions of Ochus, was first obliged to accept a government in Asia by way of compensation, and, being charged with some misconduct in it, fled to Cyprus, where he was arrested and put to death. Pnytagoras was pardoned, and allowed to retain Salamis.

While Ochus was assembling his forces in Babylon, the insurgents in Phœnicia carried on a successful warfare with the satraps of the neighbouring provinces, Belesys of Syria, and Mazæus of Cilicia. Sidon, like the other Phœnician cities, was governed by a magistrate, who—probably with very limited authority—bore the title of king. Sidon, Tyre, and Ara-

\* *Ante*, p. 83, 111.

\* Perizonius ad *Ælian*, V. II., vii., 37.

dus formed a league, which seems to have ruled the rest of Phœnicia; and their princes held regular meetings in Tripolis, a joint colony, as the name (Triburg) imports, of the three leading cities.\* Tennes, who was now King of Sidon, had received succours from Egypt, consisting of 4000 Greek soldiers, under the command of Mentor the Rhodian. But though, with the aid of these auxiliaries, his affairs went on prosperously, and the enemy was not able to gain a footing in Phœnicia, Tennes, alarmed at the approach of a great army led by the king himself, and perhaps distrusting his confederates, determined to secure for himself the advantages of the first act of treachery. He despatched a trusty messenger, named Thessalio, to Ochus, with the offer of surrendering Sidon, and aiding him in the recovery of Egypt, where, from his knowledge of the country, his services would be peculiarly valuable. Ochus joyfully accepted these proposals, which promised the fullest gratification of his revenge against Sidon; though he was at first so indignant at the demand of the solemn pledge—the king's right hand—which Thessalio was instructed to ask for, that he was on the point of putting him to death. Prudence, however, got the better of his pride, and he gave the royal surety, which had always been held inviolably sacred: as the engagement of a king whose people deemed truth the first of virtues. Tennes, before he took this step, had made himself sure of Mentor's concurrence, on which he reckoned for the execution of his design. When Ochus appeared before Sidon, which, in the mean while, had been fortified with a triple trench, and with higher and stronger walls, and abundantly provided with all necessaries for sustaining a long siege, Tennes went out, on pretence of attending the congress at Tripolis, with an escort of 500 men, probably mercenaries devoted to his interest, and accompanied by 100 of the principal citizens as his counsellors, leaving Mentor to guard the city.† But when he approached the Persian camp, he caused his counsellors to be arrested, and delivered them up to Ochus, who immediately ordered them to be put to death.

Tidings of this event were, it seems, soon carried to the city; and though the Sidonians had been so resolutely bent on resistance as to burn their ships to prevent any citizen from seeking safety in flight, they were so dismayed by the treachery of Tennes, that they descended to implore the enemy's mercy, and sent out 500 of their remaining chief men, with the ensigns of supplicants, to the Persian camp. When they drew near, Ochus asked Tennes whether he engaged to put him in possession of the city; and, having received that assurance, commanded the ambassadors to be cut in pieces. He then marched up to the quarter where the Greeks were on guard, and Tennes required them to open the gates. The citizens could not prevent them from obeying this order, which was enforced by their own chief; they could only disappoint the tyrant's revenge by a voluntary death. By a unanimous resolution, they set fire to their houses, and perish-

ed with their wives and children in the flames. Instead of a wealthy and populous city, Ochus found little more than the ashes of a vast funeral pyre containing the remains of more than 40,000 dead. The treasure contained in the conflagration was so great that he sold the ruins for a vast sum. It is some satisfaction to know that, notwithstanding the royal hand, probably in the first transports of his baffled rage, he put Tennes to death. Mentor was too important an auxiliary to be so treated; his troops were incorporated among the other mercenaries of the Persian army; for Ochus had sent envoys to all the principal Greek cities to levy soldiers for the expedition to Egypt. Athens and Sparta had declined to spend the blood of their citizens in such a cause. But Thebes had sent 1000 heavy-armed under Lacrates, and Argos furnished 3000 under a leader named Nicostratus, of extraordinary bodily strength and prowess, which, however, if he, indeed, wore a lion's skin, and armed himself with a club, in mimicry of Hercules, must have been far greater than his discretion. Six thousand more were contributed by the Greek cities on the coast of Asia, and all joined the Persian army soon after the capture of Sidon. Ochus then began his march towards Egypt. In the approach to Pelusium he lost a great number of men in the marshes formed by the overflowing of the Nile,\* according to Diodorus, through ignorance of the country; though it seems difficult to conceive how, in a road which the Persian armies had so often traversed of late, he can have been in want of guides; perhaps the difficulties and dangers of the ground itself were subject to variation. On his arrival, he divided his Greek forces into three columns, each placed under the command of two generals, a Greek and a Persian. The first of these divisions, which was destined to act against Pelusium, consisted of the Boeotians under Lacrates, and a great body of barbarian infantry and cavalry, under Rhosaces, a Persian of the highest rank, a descendant of one of the Seven who conspired against the Magians. We are not distinctly informed as to the relation in which these two officers stood to each other; but the expressions used by Diodorus† seem to imply that the military operations were to be conducted by Lacrates, subject to the control of his colleague. The second division contained the Argives, and was commanded by Nicostratus and a Persian named Aristazanes, who held the office of Eisangeleus, one of the highest dignities of the court. The third was committed to Mentor and the king's chief favourite, the eunuch Bagoas, under whom were placed the Asiatic Greeks. The king himself, with the remainder of his forces, stayed behind to await the issue of their operations, and to watch the turn of affairs. On the other hand, Nectanabis had made active, and, it seems, judicious, preparations for the defence of his

\* The βάρβαροι. Diodorus, xvi., 46: κατὰ γὰρ τὴν μεγάλην λίμνην, καθ' ἣν ἵσται τὰ καλούμενα βάρβαροι. But Strabo (xvi., p. 371, Tauchn.) places them nearer to Pelusium. After the Serbonic Lake and Mount Casius comes ἡ ἐπὶ Πηλουσίῳ ὁδός, where are τὰ πρὸς ἡλλοδαμοῖς βάρβαροι, ἃ ποιεῖ δὲ παρεχόμενος Νεῖλος; φασὶ καὶ οὐκ ἂν δύνατον εἶναι τὴν ὁδόν.

\* Diodorus, xvi., 45. Strabo, xvi., p. 363. Tauchn.

† Diodorus (xvi., 45) says μέρος τῆς πόλεως. This may have been either some quarter, or the citadel.

xvi., 47: στρατηγὸν μὲν ἔχοντος Λακράτην, ἡγεμὸν δὲ Ψωδάκην.

kingdom. He had taken 20,000 Greeks and as many Libyans into his pay, and had 60,000 Egyptian troops. The whole eastern side of the Delta was protected by a chain of fortresses, as well as by new canals, and a great number of boats had been collected to guard the passages of the river.

The invaders made their attack in three directions. While the first division remained before Pelusium, Mentor and Bagoas marched southward, along the eastern side of the Delta towards Bubastus; Nicostratus and Aristazanes, taking Egyptian guides, whose families were left behind as hostages, embarked their troops, and endeavoured to find an entrance through one of the more western branches of the river. The success of this last expedition decided the event of the war. They landed their forces unperceived, and encamped within the Delta; were attacked by a body of Greek mercenaries under Clinius, a Coan, but defeated them with great slaughter, and killed their general. This disaster dismayed Nectanabis, who imagined that there was no longer any obstacle to prevent the whole Persian army from penetrating into the heart of his kingdom, and, instead of advancing with the main body of his army to repel Nicostratus, fell back upon Memphis. Diodorus thinks that he would not have committed this error if he had taken some Greek general for his counsellor, but that the success with which he had resisted the preceding invasion, when he was aided by two experienced Greek officers, Diophantus the Athenian, and Lamius the Spartan—names else unknown—had elated him with a false confidence in his own abilities. The effect of this step was to dishearten his best troops. Hitherto Pelusium had been vigorously defended. The Bœotians, who had thought to take it by assault on their first arrival, found themselves repulsed by a sally of the garrison, and obliged to resort to a surer but tardier mode of proceeding. Lacrates diverted the stream which protected it into another channel, raised a mound across its bed, and then battered the walls with his engines. But the Greeks, to whom the defence of the place was intrusted, raised new walls and wooden towers behind the breaches, and continued to fight manfully, until they heard of the retreat of Nectanabis. They then thought themselves abandoned, and made overtures to Lacrates, who engaged that they should be allowed to return to Greece with all their property. But Bagoas, whom the king sent to take possession of the place, allowed his barbarian troops to plunder them as they marched out; and Lacrates was so indignant at this breach of the capitulation, that he ordered his troops to fall upon their allies and protect their countrymen. Bagoas himself was obliged to fly, and complained of the conduct of Lacrates to the king; but even the influence of the favourite could not lead Ochus to overlook the necessity of keeping on good terms with his Greek generals: he reproved Bagoas, and punished the other offenders with death.

Bubastus, on its huge brick terraces,\* might likewise have sustained a long siege, if its gates had not been opened by fear and treachery.

\* Ritter, *Africa*, p. 825.

Mentor spread a report through his camp that it was the king's purpose to pardon all who should surrender their towns to him, but that those who held out should suffer the fate of Sidon; and he connived at the escape of his Egyptian prisoners, that they might carry this intelligence to their homes. The consequence was, that, as in all the towns the garrisons were part natives, part Greeks, each race became eager to get the start of the other, and secure the royal favour for itself. Hence at Bubastus the Egyptians clandestinely sent an envoy with an offer of surrender to Bagoas: but the Greeks having seized him, and detected his commission, fell upon the Egyptian garrison, and forced it, after some loss of killed and wounded, to take refuge in one quarter of the town. Each party then hastened to surrender. The Egyptians called in Bagoas, the Greeks treated with Mentor. There was, however, a similar rivalry between the two generals on the Persian side: each desired the honour of the conquest for himself. Mentor secretly encouraged the Greeks to attack Bagoas as soon as he should have entered the city. Accordingly, when he had marched in with a part of his troops, expecting no resistance, the Greeks suddenly shut the gates, cut his men to pieces, and took him prisoner. Mentor had the merit of procuring his release, and the glory of receiving the surrender of the city; and by this device won the friendship of Bagoas and the favour of Ochus, and thus rose to posts which had never before been conferred on a Greek. The other fortified towns followed the example of Bubastus; and Nectanabis, despairing of Memphis in the midst of so general an abandonment of his cause, gave it up himself, and fled into Ethiopia, or—according to an Eastern legend which would have made Alexander an Egyptian—to the court of Philip.\* Ochus, having thus become master of Egypt almost without a blow, indulged his revenge in the wildest excesses of tyrannical cruelty and insolence. He delighted especially in wounding the religious feelings of the conquered people, while he gratified his rapacity by the plunder and profanation of their sepulchres and temples. Even the archives of the temples became a treasure to Bagoas, to whom the Egyptian priests afterward paid large sums for the sacred records which had been carried away into Persia.†

\* Syncellus, p. 487, ed. Bonn.: he adds, *ἡλικα καὶ Ὀχυρῶν μὲν πύλεις διὰ γυναικας πύλιν ἔργον Ἀλεξάνδρον*. The well-known story in Herbelot (*Bibliothèque Orientale*, DARR) was invented by Persian vanity in the same spirit. Darab (Darius) has conquered Filikous (Philip), and demands his daughter in marriage. Darab ayant reçu la fille de Philippe pour sa femme, et s'appréciant dès la première nuit de ses nocces que cette princesse avoit l'haleine mauvaise, résolut de la renvoyer à son père, quoiqu'elle fût déjà enceinte. Philippe la fit soigneusement garder jusqu'à ce qu'elle se fût délivrée de son fruit. Elle accoucha d'un fils, qui fut nommé Alexandre lequel Philippe déclara lui appartenir. So an old Saxon legend traced the conqueror's origin to Alfred (Thierry, *Hist. de la Conquête*, l. viii., t. 3, p. 77, Br.). The anecdote preserved by Athenæus (iv., c. 33) from the *Ægyptiaca* of Lynceus, that Ochus took the Egyptian king prisoner, only proves that this is a writer of little authority.

† The recovery of Egypt is assigned by Diodorus to the year Ol. cviii. 3 (B.C. 350). Mr. Clinton (F. H., ii., Appendix, c. 18, *Kings of Persia*, p. 316) mentions this date without any objection, and apparently only to confirm its accuracy. I do not know whether it has been observed that it is utterly irreconcilable with the received date of the *Des-*

Mentor was rewarded with a satrapy which included all the western coast of Asia Minor. He also obtained the pardon of his brother and of Artabazus, whose eleven sons he advanced to high military rank. This promotion, however, was no doubt owing to the fear, rather than to the gratitude of Ochus, who had now begun to entertain serious apprehensions of Philip's designs, and felt the need of an able officer in this station, the rather as there were still some insurgents remaining, who did not acknowledge his authority. Mentor was the better qualified for such a post, as he was not restrained by any scruples from promoting his master's interests. One example of his mode of proceeding deserves notice from its connexion with the fortunes of Aristotle. A Bithynian adventurer, named Eubulus, had founded a little principality on the coast of Mysia, including the strong towns of Atarneus and Assus, and at his death transmitted it to his favourite servant Hermias. Hermias had received a liberal education at Athens, and, as a disciple of Plato, had become acquainted with Aristotle. When he had succeeded to the government of his little state, he invited both Aristotle and Xenocrates to his court, where they stayed until his misfortunes compelled them to make a precipitate flight. The independence of Hermias appeared to insult the majesty of the empire, and Mentor determined to put an end to it. But he did not think himself strong enough to effect his purpose with the forces he had at his disposal, or preferred artifice as the easier course. He affected to seek the friendship of Hermias, who was generous and guileless, and probably placed more confidence in the Greek than he would have done in a Persian satrap. He suffered himself to be drawn into an interview with Mentor, and was immediately arrested. Mentor used his ring to accredit

letters forged in his name, which induced the garrisons of his fortresses to open their gates to the Persian troops, and then sent him in chains to Ochus, who put him to a cruel death.\* The two philosophers had just time to make their escape with Pythias, the sister of Hermias, whom Aristotle generously married in her poverty and exile; and he celebrated the virtue of his deceased friend in an ode which is still extant.

Bagoas ruled in the upper provinces with a still more extensive authority than Mentor in the West, with whom he preserved a close alliance, which contributed to the power of each. Between them, it seems that Ochus retained little more than the name of king, though with ample means of indulging his ferocious temper. He became so odious that Bagoas thought it expedient to remove him, apparently not from any personal offence, but that he might not be anticipated by other hands. He took him off by poison, and raised his youngest son, Arses, to the throne, but put to death all his brothers, that the new king might be the more dependant on himself. Arses, however, showed signs of uneasiness under this patronage, which alarmed Bagoas, who caused him to be murdered, with all his children, in the third year of his reign. The person whom he next chose to fill the vacant throne was a member of the royal family, named Codomannus, a grandson of Ostanes, the brother of Artaxerxes II., and had acquired some reputation for personal courage, chiefly through an exploit which he had performed in one of the expeditions against the Cadusians, when he accepted a challenge from one of their stoutest warriors, and slew him in single combat. This, however, can scarcely have been the quality which recommended him to Bagoas; but it is said that they had previously been friends, and perhaps there was no other prince of the blood on whose gratitude he could so safely rely. Codomannus on his accession, which took place about the time of Philip's death, assumed the name of Darius. He soon discovered that Bagoas, who may have intended at length to mount the throne himself, designed that he should share the fate of his last two predecessors. A cup of poison had been prepared for him; but having detected the plot, he called Bagoas into his presence, and compelled him to drink the deadly draught. This was the king—a popular and honoured prince, who had freed the throne from a degrading subjection, and was thought well qualified to defend it—who governed the Persian Empire when Alexander was on the point of invading it.

There are two reflections which are naturally suggested by this sketch of Persian history. One is, that there was no longer any internal principle of unity in the monarchy sufficient to keep it together. For many years it had been saved from the dissolution with which it had been constantly threatened, not by the strength of the government, but by the want of good faith and mutual confidence among its most powerful subjects; and the single advantage it possessed, in its power of rewarding those who came over

roy of Isocrates (B.C. 346), which I have adopted with Mr. Clinton, on the ground of internal evidence which he states in his Tables under that year. But in this work, which, on these suppositions, was written four years after the recovery of Egypt, Isocrates speaks of it as still independent, and as having defeated the last armament with which it had been attacked by the King of Persia, so as to be more than ever inclined to despise him (611f, 118). Wesseling, in his note on Diodorus, xvi., 48, thinks that this was the expedition there mentioned by his author, in which Nectanebis was aided by Diophauntus and Lamias. If so, either Diodorus was mistaken in his statement that the first occasion on which Ochus invaded Egypt in person was that of the conquest, or else Isocrates has, with more than usual neglect of historical accuracy, misrepresented the fact which he mentions, since he most plainly expresses that the king commanded in person, and had been most disgracefully repulsed. Egypt, he says, had been in a state of revolt, καὶ ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον—that is, of the peace of Antalcidas: οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐφόδοντο μὴ ποτε βασιλεὺς αὐτῶς πορευόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνατολήν. . . . τὸν δ' ὅστις ἀπέλαλθεν αὐτοῦ τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦτο. συμπαράσκευσάντων γὰρ ἰσχυρῶν ἐκείνῳ οὐδ' ἔτι πλείονα, καὶ στρατὸς τε αὐτοῦ, ἀπῆλθεν ἐκείνῳ ἐν μόνον ἡττάδι, ὅλα καὶ καταγλασθεὶς καὶ δόξας οὕτε βασιλεὺς οὐτε στρατηγὸν εἶναι. But, whatever liberties Isocrates might take with history as to circumstances, it is impossible he could have written these words, if four years before Egypt had been conquered by Ochus, and was then groaning under a most oppressive yoke. It would seem, therefore, that the recovery of Egypt must have taken place later than 346, though, as Mr. Clinton observes, from the passage he quotes in Philip's letter, before 340 B.C. But if we may depend on the dates given by Apollodorus (in Diog. Laert., Aristot.) for the Life of Aristotle, according to which the philosopher was driven from Atarneus through the fall of Hermias (Ol. cviii., 4, B.C. 345), Egypt must have been then conquered. So that we might suppose Isocrates to have written just before the expedition of Ochus. *Ante*, p. 105, I followed the common chronology. If the argument stated in this note is valid, the words which he conducted in person should be omitted in that passage.

\* κρημασθεὶς ἀνάσσει. Strabo, xiii., p. 610. The expression denotes crucifixion, not strangling, as Stahr, *Aristoteles*, p. 76, renders it. Strabo mentions Memnon as the author of the stratagem. Diodorus, xvi., 52, Mentor. The difference is of no moment, as the two brothers were now reunited.

to its side, might easily be turned against itself whenever it should be attacked by an enemy who offered a rallying-point for all malecontents, was strong enough to protect those who joined him, and had means of requiting their services. The empire comprehended a number of provinces, which, though it claimed dominion over them, were inhabited by perfectly independent tribes, which disdained even the show of submission; and others governed by satraps, who transmitted their authority by hereditary succession, and held themselves as well entitled to it as the great king to his throne. Those who received their governments from the court were always ambitious to convert them into similar sovereignties, and were encouraged by the example of numberless successful insurrections; while obedience and loyalty were never secure from the fate of rebels and traitors.

Another observation which is not less forcibly impressed on us by this retrospect is, that in all his military enterprises the Persian king depended much more on his Greek mercenaries and their leaders than on his native troops and generals. Still, as Greece abounded in adventurers who were always ready to enter into his pay, it might have been supposed that the military force of the empire would have been at least equal to any that could have been opposed to it. But we have also seen that none of the Persian kings had yet conceived the thought of maintaining a standing army of Greeks. They contented themselves with occasional levies, drawn from many quarters, and varying in numbers according to the temporary exigency. It was owing to a like cause that in Greece itself no attempt had hitherto been made to adopt the arms and tactics which constituted the strength of the Macedonian army. It is true that even a Greek force similarly organized, in Persian pay, would have been much less serviceable, as well as trustworthy, from the utter want of national spirit, and the unavoidable tendency of such a soldiery to consult their own safety in preference to their employer's interests. But hence resulted a twofold advantage to the king of Macedonia. He commanded an army, the main body of which was drawn from his own people, a hardy and warlike race, and one which had been receiving continual improvement in its structure and mode of armour, was in a state of the highest discipline, and physically superior to every Greek army of equal numbers that could have been brought against it. It will be convenient here to notice the leading features in the composition of the Macedonian army, such as it was when Alexander set out on his expedition to Asia.

The main body, the phalanx—or quadruple phalanx,\* as it was sometimes called, to mark that it was formed of four divisions, each bearing the same name—presented a mass of 18,000 men, which was distributed, at least by Alexander, into six brigades of 3000 each, formidable in its aspect, and on ground suited to its operations, irresistible in its attacks. The phalangite soldier wore the usual defensive armour of the Greek heavy infantry, helmet, breastplate, and greaves; and almost the whole front of his person was covered with the long shield called the *aspis*. His weapons were a

sword, long enough to enable a man in the second rank to reach an enemy who had come to close quarters with the comrade who stood before him,\* and the celebrated spear, known by the Macedonian name *sarissa*, four-and-twenty feet long. The *sarissa*, when couched, projected eighteen feet in front of the soldier; and the space between the ranks was such that those of the second rank were fifteen, those of the third twelve, those of the fourth nine, those of the fifth six, and those of the sixth three feet in advance of the first line; so that the man at the head of the file was guarded on each side by the points of six spears.† The ordinary depth of the phalanx was of sixteen ranks. The men who stood too far behind to use their *sarissas*, and who, therefore, kept them raised until they advanced to fill a vacant place, still added to the pressure of the mass. As the efficacy of the phalanx depended on its compactness, and this again on the uniformity of its movements, the greatest care was taken to select the best soldiers for the foremost and hindmost ranks;—the frames, as it were, of the engine. The bulk and core of the phalanx consisted of Macedonians; but it was composed in part of foreign troops: these were, no doubt, Greeks. But the northern barbarians, Illyrians, Pæonians, Agriarians, and Thracians, who were skilled in the use of missiles, furnished bowmen, dartsmen, and slingers: probably, according to the proportion which the masters of tactics deemed the most eligible, about half the number of the phalanx. To these was added another class of infantry, peculiar, in some respects, to the Macedonian army, though the invention belonged to Iphicrates. They were called *HYSPASISTS*, because, like the phalangites, they carried the long shield; but their spears were shorter, their swords longer, their armour lighter. They were thus prepared for more rapid movements, and did not so much depend on the nature of the ground: they formed a corps of about 6000 men. The cavalry was similarly distinguished into three classes by its arms, accoutrements, and mode of warfare. Its main strength consisted in 1500 Macedonian and as many Thessalian heavy horse. Both the rider and his horse were cased in armour; and his weapons seem to have corresponded to those of the heavy infantry. The light cavalry, chiefly used for skirmishing and pursuit, and, in part, armed with the *sarissa*, was drawn from the Thracians and Pæonians, and was about a third of the number of the heavy horse. A smaller body of Greek cavalry probably stood in nearly the same relation to the other two divisions as the *hypaspists* to the heavy and light infantry.‡

To the *hypaspists* belonged the royal foot body-guard, the *Agema*, or royal escort, and the *Argyraspides*, so called from the silver ornaments with which their long shields were enriched. But the precise relation in which these

\* Arrian, *Tactica*, 18.

† *Ibid.*, 19.

‡ *Λογιστὴν καὶ ὑπασπύστην*. Arrian, *Tact.*, 18, 30.

§ Here we should have mentioned the *δρυμῆται*, who, according to Pollux, x., 5, § 132, and Curtius, v., 13, § (where see Schmieler's note), were a species of dragons: a permanent body invented by Alexander, who fought either on foot or on horseback, as occasion required; if Arrian's silence on occasions where the name must have occurred if the thing had existed (i., 6, 8, 9; iii., 21, 12), did not render it almost certain, as Droysen observes, p. 100, that this was no more than a temporary expedient.

\* Arrian, *Tactica*, 15.

bodies stood to each other does not appear very distinctly from the descriptions of the ancients. The royal horse-guard was composed of eight Macedonian squadrons,\* filled with the sons of the best families. The numbers of each are not ascertained, but they seem in all not much to have exceeded or fallen short of a thousand.†

The whole force with which Alexander crossed over into Asia amounted to little more than 30,000 foot and 5000 horse. Of the infantry only 12,000 were Macedonians: 7000 are described as allied troops, 5000 as mercenaries, collected, perhaps, by the subsidies of those states which did not furnish contingents of men. Experience, however, had proved that such an army might safely defy any force which a king of Persia had ever yet brought into the field; and, in this respect, Alexander might feel a reasonable confidence of success. Nor did the low state of his treasury at all affect his prospects: it was a deficiency which might be abundantly supplied by the first fortunate campaign. There were, however, some grounds for apprehension, which might have induced a more cautious prince to hesitate. His marine was so inferior to that of Persia, that he had cause to fear lest his communication with his own kingdom might be cut off, and lest his hostile neighbours might be excited, and enabled, by Persian succours, to invade it in his absence. But he justly thought, that if such dangers were allowed to suspend the execution of his plans, they would never be realized; and he wisely determined to commit himself at once to the resources of his own genius and energy. He would not listen to the advice of his elder counsellors, who wished him, before he quitted his dominions, to marry, and leave an heir to his throne. He felt no misgivings to prompt him to such a delay. As the time of his departure drew near, the great objects of his ambition engrossed his mind as with a real presence. Though he had only seventy talents left in his coffers, he distributed almost all the remaining property of his crown—lands, houses, and customs—among his friends; and when he was asked by Perdicas what he reserved for himself, answered, *MY HOPES*.

## CHAPTER XLIX.

### ALEXANDER'S EXPEDITION IN ASIA, TO THE BATTLE OF ISSUS.

EARLY in the spring of 334, Alexander set out on his march to the Hellespont, leaving Antipater, with an army of 12,000 infantry and 1500 horse, regent in Macedonia, and to keep a watchful eye on the affairs of Greece. Parmenio, who, after Philip's death, had returned from Asia, commanded the phalanx under the king: his son Philotas, the Macedonian cavalry, and another son, Nicanor, the hypaspists. The Thessalian horse were placed under the command of Calas, son of Harpalus; the Greek under Eriguius; the Thracian and Pæonian light cavalry under Cassander, son of Antipater. In twenty days the army reached Sestus, where a fleet of 160 sail, including twenty Athenian

galleys, and a great number of transports, had been provided for its embarkation. Parmenio was ordered to superintend the passage of the main body of the infantry, and of the cavalry, to Abydos, while Alexander himself proceeded to Elæus to sacrifice in the sanctuary of Protesilaus, and to pray for a happier landing than had been vouchsafed to that hero on the shore of Asia. Here he also erected an altar to commemorate his departure from Europe, and then embarking and steering his own galley, made for the harbour on the opposite coast, which tradition had fixed upon as the landing-place of the Achæans in the Trojan war. In the middle of the Hellespont he sacrificed a bull, and made libations from a golden goblet to Poseidon and the Nereids. As his galley approached the land he hurled his spear into the ground, and leaped ashore the foremost in his armour, as if to take solemn possession of Asia. Another altar, dedicated to the propitious gods, marked the place of his landing.

He then proceeded a few miles towards the southeast to visit the village, which its inhabitants, perhaps with real, but certainly interested credulity, gave out to be the site of the ancient city of Priam, where there was a temple of Athene, and where the altar was shown at which Priam was said to have been slain by Neoptolemus. Alexander would, probably, have been little inclined for antiquarian researches if any doubt had been suggested to him about the locality which has been the subject of so much controversy; but he felt an interest in the scene, such as no one who ever visited it before or after him could have experienced. To suppose that the marks of enthusiasm which he displayed were merely, or chiefly the results of a politic calculation, designed to rouse the spirit of his followers, and to win the favour of the Greeks, by connecting his expedition with that which was celebrated in their earliest heroic song,\* seems an opinion which places his character in a false light, and brings him down too near to the level of an age in which poetry is entirely excluded from the sphere of war and politics. He, undoubtedly, trod the plain of Troy with the feeling that it had been the scene of the exploits of his ancestors, which he was about to emulate. He sacrificed to Athene, dedicated his own panoply in her temple, and in its place took down some of the arms which hung there, as the Ilians pretended, from the time of the heroes, and ever afterward had them borne before him, by some of his guard, into his battle-fields. He also endeavoured, by propitiatory rites, to avert the wrath which, as a descendant of Neoptolemus, he might dread from the shade of Priam. But he had not gone to indulge a frivolous curiosity; and when one of the villagers offered to show him the lyre of

\* As Schlosser intimates, l. iii., p. 99, though somewhat ambiguously, recognising, indeed, Alexander's *poetical nature*, but saying that he made a brilliant use of it. One objection to this view is, that he was not accompanied by his army; its enthusiasm, therefore, could not be roused by the spectacle. Still less can I adopt Flathe's supposition, l. i., p. 263, that his main object was to obtain an announcement of victory from the gods, and that the priests of the temple at Ilium *Macedonised*. This is really not only laying undue weight on the story in Diodorus, xvii., 17, about the fallen statue of Ariobarzanes, but misinterpreting it. For it was not the priests, but Alexander's own soothsayer, Aristander (see Wesseling's note), who made the prediction.

\* *Dez.*

† *Sainte-Croix, Eranen, p. 433, foll.*

Paris, he refused to look at it. "He would gladly have gazed on the relic if it had been that to which Achilles sang the deeds of the brave." To this his great progenitor, he paid the most affectionate honours. Descending to Sigeum, he anointed and crowned the column which marked the barrow supposed to contain the remains of Achilles. His most intimate friend and inseparable companion, Hephestion, adorned the monument of Patroclus in like manner. On one account only, he was heard to say, he envied Achilles, that his achievements had been celebrated by Homer.

The historian to whom we are indebted for the most ample and authentic information we possess concerning Alexander, Arrian of Nicomedia, takes this occasion to remark, that in this respect the Macedonian hero had, indeed, been singularly unfortunate; since even the expedition of the younger Cyrus, and the return of the Ten Thousand, had been rendered by Xenophon's pen more renowned than the incomparably greater actions which he himself was about to record. The remark itself strikes us as somewhat strange, when we reflect on the immense mass of historical writings which, in Arrian's time, were still extant, relating to Alexander's reign, and that among the contemporary authors who treated this subject, two were eminently qualified, by their station and opportunities, to do it justice. Two of his generals, Aristobulus and Ptolemy, who held one of the highest posts in the army, and afterward became King of Egypt, undertook the office of relating his conquests; and they both wrote after his death, when they were no longer subject to the strongest of the motives that might before have induced them to swerve from the truth. Nor was it without reason that Arrian himself observed that Ptolemy's royal dignity was an additional guarantee of his veracity; not, indeed, because of the keener sense of honour which it inspired, but as more completely establishing his independence, and raising him above petty temptations to falsehood. It is possible that the literary attainments of these writers were very inferior to their means of knowledge; but if Alexander's achievements are now less known than they deserve, it is not certainly because he wanted a bard like Homer, but because they were related by many of his historians in a strain of rhetorical exaggeration. Hence, according to Arrian, no story had been oftener told, or with more contradictory statements. Even Aristobulus and Ptolemy frequently differed from each other. We, however, must account it a misfortune that their works have not come down to us; though the loss may have been owing to the superior merit of Arrian's narrative, which was probably found a more pleasing composition,\* and is possibly more valuable than either of them would have been by itself; for Arrian, a soldier, statesman, and philosopher, who governed the province of Cappadocia in the reign of Hadrian, while he emulated Xenophon's style, also exercised a critical judgment on the discrepancies of his

predecessors. Still, a modern reader may be excused for regretting that he has not the means of deciding for himself.

From the plain of Troy Alexander turned northward to rejoin the main body of his army, which he found at Arisbe, not far from Abydos. He then bent his march along the coast of the Propontis, receiving in his way the submission of Priapus,\* which opened its gates to a detachment of his forces. Amyntas, son of Arrabæus, was sent forward with some squadrons of light horse to scour the country, and collect intelligence of the enemy's movements. The two satraps whose provinces lay on the western coast, Spithridates of Lydia and Ionia, and Arsites of Phrygia on the Hellespont, with several other Persian generals, and Memnon the Rhodian, who had succeeded to Mentor's authority after his death, which happened about the time of Alexander's accession, had assembled 30,000 Greek mercenaries, and about an equal number of native cavalry, and were encamped near the town of Zelea, on the right bank of the Granicus, a small stream which flows from Mount Ida into the Propontis to the west of Cyzicus. Here, when the news arrived that Alexander had crossed the Hellespont, they held a council of war. Memnon advised that they should avoid a battle, for which, with such inferiority in the numbers of their infantry, they were not prepared; and, retreating, should lay waste the country, and even destroy the towns in their line of march. The want of provisions would prevent Alexander from pursuing them, and from remaining where he was. It seems doubtful whether this plan, if it had been adopted, would have had any effect beyond that of delaying an engagement. It could scarcely have been executed on such a scale as to hinder Alexander from penetrating by another route into the interior. But the Persians, who were jealous of Memnon's influence, and suspected that he wished to protract the war on which it so much depended, treated his proposal as degrading to their master's dignity. Arsites declared that he would not allow a single house in his province to be burned; and his sentiments were unanimously applauded by his countrymen. It was determined, therefore, to await the enemy's approach on the Granicus, where, with a greatly superior cavalry, they would have the advantage of a strong position.

Alexander had advanced near to the river, when his scouts brought word that the Persian army was drawn up on the other side; and he immediately began to form his own in order of battle. Parmenio advised him to encamp on the left bank. The enemy would not venture to remain where they were, from fear of surprise in the night; and thus he would be able to effect his passage, without danger or molestation, the next morning. If he should attempt it then, a repulse might ensue from the difficulties of the ground, ominous for his enterprise and disheartening to his troops. Alexander admitted the force of these arguments, considered from Parmenio's point of view; but for him what seemed to the old general an objection, was the strongest motive for an immediate attack. To be stopped by an appearance

\* Yet it must be owned that his simplicity is sometimes rather too meagre, and that, without the details which Curtius, through his superior liveliness of imagination, was happily led to preserve, Arrian's narrative would often afford but a faint and colourless outline.

\* There can be no doubt that Πρίαπον, not Πρίδρον, should be substituted for Πρίαπον in Arrian's text.

of difficulty and danger at the outset of his enterprise was the worst of all omens; and it was to no purpose that he had crossed the mighty Hellespont, if he was now to be detained by a paltry brook.

Yet the obstacles were not trifling. The stream was in many places evidently too deep to be forded, and the opposite bank was high and steep. The Persians had posted their cavalry—the arm on which they chiefly relied—on its edge, the Greek mercenaries at some distance in the rear. Alexander had drawn up his phalanx in six divisions in the centre,\* flanked on the right by the Macedonian and Pæonian cavalry, and by the greater part of the light infantry, on the left by the Thessalian, Greek, and Thracian horse. He committed the command of the left wing to Parmenio, and put himself at the head of the right. He was soon recognised by the enemy from the brilliance of his armour, and the respectful attention of the officers who surrounded him; and as they concluded that the brunt of the attack would be on the side where he stood, they strengthened their left wing with some additional squadrons of their best troops. There was a short pause of silent expectation while the two armies, which were to begin the conflict for the dominion of Asia, stood face to face, separated by a narrow stream. It was broken by Alexander, who, having mounted his horse and addressed a few words of exhortation †: his nearest followers, ordered Amyntas, son of Arrabæus, with his light cavalry, and Socrates, with a squadron of the horse-guards, supported by a division of the hypaspists under Ptolemy, son of Philip, ‡ to advance into the water; he himself followed at the head of the phalanx, to the sound of the trumpets and amid the war cries of his men, moving in a slanting direction up the bed of the river, § to prevent the Persians from taking him in flank on his landing.

Amyntas and Socrates, when they reached the opposite bank, were received with a galling shower of darts and a vigorous charge, against which they had to contend with very inferior numbers, and under the disadvantage of ground which was at once lower and less firm. They

were, it seems, barely able to maintain their footing until Alexander came up to their relief. He immediately charged into the thickest of the fray, where the principal Persian leaders were engaged. His life was at one moment in imminent danger. He had advanced to meet Mithridates, a nobleman allied to Darius, who was coming up in front of his squadron, and had brought him to the ground with the shock of his spear. At this instant he received a blow from Rhæsaces on his helmet, which broke off a part of the crest, and nearly pierced it. Him, too, Alexander unhorsed with a javelin wound in his breast. But while he was busied with this enemy, Spithridates, coming behind, had raised his cimeter over his head for a stroke which would probably have descended with deadly effect on his shattered helmet, had not Cleitus, the brother of Alexander's nurse, Lanice, intercepted it by a cut of his sabre, which severed the Persian's right arm from his body.\* While the cavalry was thus engaged, one division after another of the phalanx effected a landing: the light troops with which the Macedonian horse was interspersed annoyed the enemy greatly with their missiles; and it was found that the strong javelin, † with which the Macedonian troopers could thrust at the faces of their antagonists, was a much more efficacious weapon than the slight dart with which the Persians were armed. Their centre gave way to Alexander's impetuous attack, which was sustained by still increasing numbers; and the disorder soon spread to the extremities of the line, till all were put to flight. Alexander, however, did not suffer his troops to pursue the Persian cavalry to a great distance, but returned to attack the mercenaries, who had kept their ground rather through amazement at the sudden issue of the first combat, than with any deliberate purpose. While he moved against them with the phalanx, he ordered the cavalry to attack their flanks and rear. Thus surrounded, they were almost all cut to pieces: very few escaped among the wounded, and only 2000 were taken prisoners. The loss of the Persians amounted only to about a thousand; but it included a great number of their chief officers. Alexander lost only some five-and-twenty of his horse-guards—who fell at the first landing, and whom he honoured with brazen statues, which were still standing in Arrian's time at Dium, the workmanship of the king's favourite sculptor Lysippus—sixty of his other cavalry, and thirty of the foot. All these he interred the next day with martial pomp, and granted an exemption from every kind of tax and charge to their parents and children. He visited the wounded in person; and, while he inspected their wounds, made inquiries which gave them a welcome opportunity of relating their exploits. Nor did he withhold the rites of burial from the enemy's dead. But he sent the Greek prisoners in chains to Macedonia, to be kept to forced labour, as guilty of bearing arms against their country, in contempt of the decree of the na-

\* It seems clear that the names of Craterus and Philip have been repeated, through some mistake, in Arrian's enumeration of the *φάλαγγες*, i. 14, and that the *ῥάγεις*, brigades of the phalanx, were here, as at Issus and Arbela, six in number, and each of 3000 men. Mr. Williams has been led by this accidental error to describe the Macedonian phalanx generally as "composed of eight brigades, containing 3000 men each." Yet at Issus he can find only five brigades, though there six are distinctly enumerated.

† This appears to have been the state of the case, though there is an obscurity in Arrian's expression, i. 14, *τὴν Σωκράτους, Ἀμύντου Προλαίμωνος τὸν Φιλίππου ὄντονα*, which might lead one to suspect that some words had dropped out of the text.

‡ Arrian adds, *ἡ παρέλκετο τὸ βέδνα*. I do not understand in what sense the stream could be said *παρέλκεν*, and rather wonder that no critic has suggested the obvious correction *παρέλκετο* or *παρέλκε*, as the stream (which had *πᾶσα βάθος*, i. 13) permitted. So, i. 21, it is said of the towers, *παρέλκετο ἀκροβολίζεσθαι*. Neophytus Ducas, who published an edition of Arrian's works, with a translation of the Anabasis, and notes, and some tactical illustrations in modern Greek (*Ἐν Βιζόντῃ τῆς Ἀνστασίας*, 1809), translates *εἰς τὸν δάκτυλόν τοῦ ἀνέκαυτος*; and in the note, he seems to wish to express the same meaning by *εἰς ἀντὶ πρόχωρον*, which would indeed be a correct paraphrase of *ἡ παρέλκετο τὸ βέδνα*. *Παρέλκε*, as coming still nearer to the present reading, would perhaps be preferable if *τὸ βέδνα* were away, as ii., 22, *δοιοὶ παρέλκετο*.

\* Flathe's skepticism about this incident seems a little strained. He cites Diodorus, Plutarch, and Justin, as if it was not mentioned by Arrian.

† *Εὐρέα κεραιὶνα*. Gronovius observes that their strength consisted, not in the material, but the form. Yet the cornel has been always noted as a very hard wood; and otherwise, Arrian would not have mentioned it.



tional congress. To identify his cause in another manner with that of Greece, he sent 300 suits of Persian armour to Athens, to be dedicated to the tutelary goddess in the Acropolis, with an inscription, expressing that they had been taken from the barbarians of Asia by Alexander, the son of Philip, and the Greeks, all but the Lacedæmonians : a stigma, as he could not but account it ; which, however, Sparta might as justly reckon among her titles of honour. In the joy of his first victory, he likewise remembered Ilium ; enriched its little temple with offerings, and ordered the village to be transformed into a city, which he honoured with extraordinary privileges and immunities.

Arsites had fled, after the battle, into Phrygia ; but there, it was said, overpowered by grief and shame by the disaster, which he attributed to his own counsels, laid violent hands on himself. Alexander bestowed his satrapy on Calas, encouraged the barbarians, who had fled to the mountains, to return to their homes, and ordered the tribute to remain on its ancient footing. Parmenio was detached to take possession of the satrap's residence, Dascylium. The king himself, bending his march southward, advanced towards Sardis. The news of his victory produced such an effect in the capital of Lydia, that, when he had come within eight or nine miles of it, Mithrines, the commander of the garrison, accompanied by the principal inhabitants, met him, with a peaceable surrender of the city, the citadel, and the treasure. He retained Mithrines on an honourable footing near his person, and committed the command of the citadel to Pausanias, an officer of his guard. He appointed Nicias to superintend the collection of the revenue, and Asander, son of Philotas, to the satrapy of Spithridates. To conciliate the Lydians, he restored their ancient laws ; that is, most probably, abolished all the restraints which the policy of the Persian government had imposed on them, when it crushed their rebellion after the first conquest ;\* while, perhaps to make them more familiar with Greek usages, he ordered a temple to be built on the citadel to Olympian Zeus. A body of cavalry and light troops were placed at the disposal of Asander, and the Argive contingent was left as a garrison in the citadel. Four days after, Alexander arrived at Ephesus. There, too, as soon as the tidings of the battle arrived, a body of mercenaries, who had been stationed there by Memnon, took ship with Amyntas, son of Antiochus, a Macedonian emigrant, who had fled his country to avoid the effects of the king's displeasure, or because he was conscious of a share in some of the plots formed against him. Ephesus was divided between an oligarchical and a democratical faction, which seem nearly to have balanced each other. The oligarchy had been sustained by the power of Persia : their adversaries, therefore, looked forward with hope to the impending invasion, and had probably received promises of support from Philip. Violent tumults had taken place, in which the oligarchs, aided by Memnon's troops, had prevailed, forced many of their opponents to leave the city, threw down a statue of Philip which stood in the temple, committed other acts of sacrilege there, and broke open the tomb of Heropythes,

a great popular leader, who had been buried in the market-place. A complete reaction ensued on Alexander's arrival : democracy was formally restored, the exiles returned to their homes, and the triumphant party became eager for revenge on their vanquished oppressors. One of the oligarchical leaders, with his son and nephews, was dragged out of the sanctuary, and stoned to death. Alexander then interfered to prevent farther bloodshed, and forbade any proceedings to be instituted for the punishment of political offences. The city was permitted to expend the tribute which it had before paid to the Persian government on its new temple, which was not yet finished. At a later period he offered to defray the whole expense of the building, on condition that his own name should be inscribed on it as its founder : an offer which the Ephesians were too proud of this great ornament of their city to accept, and declined with ingenious flattery.\* Before his departure, he celebrated a great sacrifice to the goddess, with a solemn procession of his whole army in battle array. By like measures, especially by the establishment of democracy, and remission of tribute, he endeavoured to gain the good-will of all the other Greek cities on the coast, which was of great importance to him at this juncture, while the naval power of Persia was still formidable.

In the mean while, he had received offers of submission from Magnesia and Tralles, in the vale of the Mæander, and had sent Parmenio forward to take possession of them. He had also, at first, reason to hope that Miletus would be as quietly surrendered to him ; for Hegesistratus, who commanded the garrison, had made him like offers by letter. But the approach of a Persian armament, which was on its way from Phœnicia, encouraged Hegesistratus to change his intention, and defend his post. Nicanor, however, Alexander's admiral, got the start of the barbarians, and arrived, with his fleet of 160 galleys, at Lade before they appeared ; and Alexander forthwith secured the island, which commanded the entrance of the port of Miletus, with a detachment of 4000 men. The Persians, finding themselves shut out, came to anchor at Mycale. Their fleet amounted to 400 sail. Yet, notwithstanding this great inequality, Parmenio advised the king to hazard a sea-fight. A victory, he thought, would be attended with the greatest advantages, while defeat would not make the state of his naval affairs much worse ; since, as it was, the enemy were masters of the sea. An omen, too, which he had observed, confirmed him in his opinion. Alexander pointed out to him that it might be otherwise interpreted, and that his arguments were not sounder than his rules of divination. The Macedonian fleet was inferior, not only in number, but in nautical skill and training to the Phœnician and Cyprian galleys. It would be mere foolhardiness to seek a battle under such disadvantages ; and a defeat, far from leaving him in nearly the same condition as he now stood in, might involve consequences no less important and disastrous than a general insurrection in Greece. The eagle which had been seen to perch on the beach behind the royal galley signified that he

\* See vol. i., p. 222.

\* It did not become one god to dedicate offerings to others. Strabo, xiv., p. 641.

was destined to overcome the Persian navy by his operations on land.

Miletus was divided into two distinct cities by an inner wall, which appears to have been much stronger than the outer one, if, indeed, what was called the outer city was not a mere open suburb. Alexander had taken it by assault on his first arrival, and then prepared to besiege the other. The townsmen came to a compromise with the garrison, and, by mutual consent, they deputed one of the most eminent citizens to the king, with an offer of neutrality, which he rejected, bidding them prepare to sustain an immediate attack. His engineers soon made a breach in the wall, which his troops mounted before the eyes of the Persians, who were unable to relieve their friends; for, to cut off all chance of succour, Nicanor had moved up to the mouth of the inner harbour, and laid some galleys across it, side by side, so as effectually to bar entrance or escape. The citizens and the garrison, when the besiegers began to pour in through the breach, fled towards the sea; some put off in boats, but found the harbour's mouth closed before they reached it; about 300 of the mercenaries swam to a rocky islet within the harbour, and prepared to defend themselves there, until Alexander, admiring their courage, permitted them to purchase their lives by entering into his service. The Persian fleet continued for some time moored at Mycale, in the hope of drawing the enemy into an action; but as it was forced to fetch its water from the mouth of the Mæander, Alexander ordered Philotas to proceed to the place, with a body of infantry and cavalry, and to hinder the crews from landing. The fleet was, consequently, obliged to go over to Samos for provisions. It returned, indeed, shortly after, and attempted to surprise the Macedonians in the harbour; but, having been foiled in this attempt, withdrew from the coast of Miletus.

Alexander now perceived that his fleet would be of little service to him, while the state of his finances was such that he could ill bear the cost of it. On the other hand, he hoped to shut out the Persians from all the ports of Asia, and thus to disable them from continuing their naval operations. He therefore resolved to dismiss his fleet, retaining only a small squadron, which included the Athenian galleys, for the transport of his besieging machines, and to confine his attention to the prosecution of the war on the southern coast. His first object was the reduction of Halicarnassus, where the enemy had now collected almost all the strength which he had remaining in this quarter. Memnon, who, after the battle of the Granicus, sent his wife and children as pledges of his fidelity to Darius, and had been invested by him with supreme authority in the west of Asia, and with the command of all his naval forces, had been long making preparations for the defence of the place, where he himself, with the Persian Orotobates, who had married the daughter of Pixodarus, and had succeeded him as satrap of Caria, and a numerous garrison of Greeks and barbarians, awaited the invader's approach. They were animated by the presence of two Athenians, Ephialtes and Thraσύbulus, who had come to offer their services against the common enemy. The fleet, too, lying at the mouth

of the harbour, was capable of rendering good service during a siege. The city, built on heights which rise abruptly, in the form of a theatre, from the sea, was naturally strong, and had been elaborately fortified, both with walls and a ditch forty-five feet in width, and about half as many in depth, and contained two citadels, one on the heights at its back, the other, celebrated for the enervating spring of Salmaeis, which rose there, at the northern extremity of the great harbour;\* a smaller harbour was sheltered by an island called Arconessus,† which was also a place of great strength. Alexander, on his march from Miletus, made himself master of all the towns that lay between that city and Halicarnassus; and on his entrance into Caria he was met by Ada, the widow of Idrieus, who surrendered her fortress of Alinda to him, begged leave to adopt him as her son, and placed herself under his protection. He then advanced towards Halicarnassus, and encamped at about half a mile from the walls. On the day of his arrival he encountered a brisk sally from the garrison, which, however, was easily repulsed. But before he commenced his operations here, having received some offers which led him to expect that he should gain admittance at Myndus, a town which lay a few miles westward on the coast, he made an attempt on it in the night, but, not meeting with the promised support from within, while succours were introduced by sea from Halicarnassus, he withdrew, and applied himself wholly to the siege of the capital.

He began by filling up the ditch, so as to enable his engines and wooden towers to approach the walls. The besieged made many vigorous sallies for the purpose of setting fire to the machines, but were always repulsed, and sometimes with great loss. Once a mad attempt of two Macedonian soldiers,‡ who, having challenged one another over their cups to a trial of valour, undertook to storm the citadel on the land side alone, brought on an engagement, which was near becoming general, and might have ended in the capture of the city; for two towers and the intervening wall had been battered down by the engines; but, before advantage was taken of the breach, the besieged built another brick wall in the form of a crescent behind it. Twice they made a desperate attempt to destroy the engines which Alexander brought to play on this new wall: the second time, at the instigation of Ephialtes, with their whole force; but they were defeated with great slaughter, in which Ephialtes himself fell; and it was believed that Alexander might then have stormed the place, but was induced to spare it

\* Vitruvius, ii., 8. Strabo, xiv., p. 656, 657.

† Which, according to Pliny, N. H., v., 31, contained a town called Ceramus; but as there was certainly another town of that name on the adjacent coast of Caria, this is probably a mistake. It does not appear that Strabo speaks of this island as a fort (as Mr. Williams supposes, p. 80). His two citadels are no doubt those described by Vitruvius, both on the main land.

‡ So Arrian. But by Diodorus, xvii., 25, they are described as *ρυγῆς*, and soon after as *κόλλοις*. They also make their attempt by night. This is the action after which, according to him, Alexander applied for leave to bury some of his dead, who had fallen close to the walls, but was refused through the influence of the two Athenians. I will not undertake to decide on the probability of Mr. Williams's conjecture, p. 81. But the story is hardly reconcilable with Arrian's narrative.

by the hope that it would soon surrender. In fact, Memnon and Orontobates now despaired of defending it much longer, and resolved to abandon it. In the dead of the night they set fire to a wooden tower, and to some of the houses and magazines near the wall, and, while the conflagration spread, made their escape, and crossed over to Cos, where, it seems, they had previously deposited their treasures.\* The garrison took refuge, some in the citadels, some in Arconnesus. Alexander immediately entered the city, and checked the progress of the flames; but, as soon as he had become master of it, he razed it to the ground. He did not, however, think it worth while to stay until he had dislodged the enemy from their remaining strongholds; but having committed the province to Ada, he left her, with about 3000 foot and 200 horse, under a Macedonian officer, to reduce them.† He himself pursued his march along the south coast of Asia Minor, to make himself master of the ports which might harbour the Persian fleet.

But as winter was now approaching, he determined, before he left Caria, to send a part of his troops, who had lately married when he set out on his expedition, back to Macedonia, to pass the winter at home. He gave the command of them to three of his generals, who were themselves in the same case, directing them, on their return, to bring with them as many fresh troops as they could raise. The measure was politic as well as gracious; for his army had been much weakened to supply so many garrisons as were required for the conquered cities; and nothing was more likely to promote the levies in Macedonia than the rescue of the victorious warriors, whose return attested at once his success and his liberality. Another officer was sent to collect all the troops he could in Peloponnesus. Parmenio was ordered to proceed, with the greater part of the cavalry and the baggage, to Sardis, and thence into Phrygia, where he himself, after he should have traversed the coast of Lycia and Pamphylia, designed to meet him in the spring.

In his march through Caria he met with a stout resistance from the garrison of the strong fortress Hyparna, and, according to Diodorus, turned aside to punish the insolence of the inhabitants of Marmora in Persæa, who, relying, perhaps, on the strength of their town, which stood on a high rock by the sea-side, had ventured to annoy the rear of his army, and had not only plundered some of the baggage, but killed several men. When besieged, they defended themselves with great obstinacy, and at length the young men set fire to the town, and, forcing their way through the enemy's lines, took refuge in the neighbouring mountains. On his entrance into Lycia, Telmissus capitulated; and, after he had crossed the Xanthus, he received the submission of most of the Lycian towns. Phaselis even presented him with a golden crown, and the motive which led it to pay him this honour may help to account for

the ready submission of the other Lycians. The people of Phaselis had suffered much from the incursions of their neighbours, the Pisidian mountaineers, who had even taken up a fortified position in their territory, for the purpose of continual molestation. They hoped that Alexander would deliver them from this annoyance, and they were not disappointed; for, on his return from an expedition, which, notwithstanding the lateness of the season—it was now about mid-winter—he had undertaken into the interior, to reduce the Milyans, who inhabited a tract of Phrygia on the confines of Phrygia and Pisidia,\* he took the fort.

He was still in the neighbourhood of Phaselis, when he was apprized of a plot which had been formed against his life by his namesake, the son of Æropus, whom he had appointed to command the Thessalian cavalry in the room of Calas, the new satrap of the Hellespontine Phrygia. It appears that, notwithstanding this favour, the Lyncestian either could not forgive the king for the execution of his two brothers, or could not forget the ancient pretensions of his family to royal dignity. He had entered into a negotiation with the Persians court through the fugitive Amyntas, and Darius had sent down an agent named Asisines, to obtain a secret interview with him, and to offer, if he killed his sovereign, to raise him to the throne of Macedonia, or, at least, to aid him in the attempt to secure it, with a thousand talents. The Persian emissary had fallen into the hands of Parmenio, and revealed his business; and Parmenio had sent him to the king. Alexander held a council on the subject, and by its advice despatched orders to Parmenio to arrest the Lyncestian and keep him in custody.

Between Phaselis and the maritime plains of Pamphylia, the mountains which form the southern branch of Taurus descend abruptly on the coast, leaving only a narrow passage along the beach, and this never open but in calm weather, or during the prevalence of a northerly wind. The promontory was called Mount Climax. At the time when Alexander was about to resume his march eastward, the wind was blowing from the south, and the waves washed the foot of the cliffs. He therefore sent the main body of his army over the mountains to Perge, by a circuitous and difficult road,† which, however, he had ordered to be previously cleared by his Thracian pioneers. But for himself he determined, with a few followers, to try the passage along the shore: danger and difficulty had a charm for him which he could scarcely resist. Perhaps the wind had already subsided; soon after it shifted to the north—a change in which he recognised a special inter-

\* It is not easy precisely to trace the boundaries of the Milyas; but Droysen, p. 136, apparently confounds Telmissus with Telmissus, mistranslates the last sentence of Strabo's thirteenth book, and then finds fault with Colonel Leake's map.

† Colonel Leake (Asia Minor, p. 190) has been misled by a false reading in Arrian, i. 26, *χαλεπὴν ἄλλως καὶ οὐ μακρὰν*. This would contradict Strabo, xiv., p. 666, *περίσταν ἔχει* (which Colonel Leake renders correctly, p. 175), as well as his own map. But the negative is not found in the best manuscript of Arrian, and unless it is omitted, *ἄλλως* has no meaning, though Ducas, having translated *ἦν ἡν μὲν σύντομος, ἀδελφότερος ἦν* ἄλλως, in his note gives the explanation, *χαλεπὴν ἄλλως (μὴ ὡς συντομικῶς ἀπλοῦς) ἦν μακρὰν ἢ ὅτι χαλεπὴν μὲν, οὐ μακρὰν δέ*. He adds, *ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις εὐρίσκειται τὸ μακρὰν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ, ὅτι*.

\* Diodorus, xvii., 37. His account, however, differs materially from Arrian's, for he omits the fire.

† Strabo, xiv., p. 657: *ἀδελφότερος τῆς πόλεως, πλεονεξίας δὲ διὰ τὴν δὲ ἑκείνην πολιορκεῖν ἔδεικεν ἄλλως δὲ ὁλίγωτερον καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, προς ὀργὴν ἦσαν καὶ ἀπεχθύναν τῆς πολιτείας γενόμενης*.

position of the gods. Yet, according to Strabo's authors, he found the water still nearly breast high, and had to wade through it for a whole day. As he advanced from Perge, he was met by an embassy from the neighbouring town of Aspendus, which lay a little farther eastward, near the mouth of the Eurymedon, offering to acknowledge his authority, but praying that they might not be compelled to receive a Macedonian garrison. This request he granted, but, in return, demanded a contribution of fifty talents, and the tribute of horses which they had been used to pay to the Persian king. These terms were accepted, and Alexander, passing Aspendus, proceeded along the coast to Side, a barbarized colony of Cuma, which he took and garrisoned. The neighbouring fortress of Syllium he found prepared to repel his first attack, and he soon after received intelligence that the Aspendians refused to execute their engagements, and were making preparations to sustain a siege. He therefore retraced his steps, and, to their surprise, suddenly appeared before their walls. They hastily abandoned the lower town, and retired into the citadel, which stood on a steep rock overhanging the river. Alexander, with his army, took up his quarters in the houses below, and the Aspendians, now repenting of their levity, sent another embassy to sue for peace. He granted it, but on harder terms, requiring 100 talents and yearly tribute, and exacting hostages for their performance. Then, having returned to Perge, he began his march towards Phrygia.

His road led through the heart of Pisidia, where he was the more desirous of striking terror, as its fierce and lawless inhabitants, secure in their mountain barriers and almost impregnable fortresses, had constantly defied the power of the Persian government. Yet he could not spare the time which would have been necessary to reduce all its strongholds. Termessus, situate on a steep rock, commanding a narrow pass which led from Pisidia into Phrygia, appeared to him too strong to be attempted, though he had dislodged the barbarians from the position which they had taken up without the walls, and made himself master of the pass. But the resistance of Termessus procured for him offers of alliance from its enemy, Selge, another of the principal cities, which proved very useful to him. He stormed Sagalassus, though, besides its natural strength, its inhabitants were accounted the most warlike of the Pisidians; and this success was followed by the submission of most of the smaller towns. He then advanced by the Lake Ascania\* to Celæne, where the citadel, on an almost inaccessible rock, was guarded by a garrison of 1000 Carians, and 100 Greeks, placed there by the satrap of Phrygia. It, however, offered to surrender unless it should be relieved within sixty days; and Alexander thought best to accept these conditions, and having left a body of 1500 men to observe it, and appointed Antigonus, son of Philip, to the important satrapy of Central Phrygia, he prosecuted his march to Gordium, where he had ordered Parmenio to meet him.

Arrian does not expressly state the object of

this movement, which, as Alexander designed next to make for the coast of Syria, involved an enormous circuit. It is hardly credible that he was deterred from advancing directly into Cilicia by the difficulty of passing through the mountain region (the Rugged Cilicia), which immediately follows Pamphylia; or that he marched so far north merely for the sake of better quarters to refresh his troops in during the remainder of the winter.\* There were other motives which might lead him to penetrate so far into the interior of Asia Minor, and to traverse it in two directions so distant from the line of march that would have led to the point which he had mainly in view. He probably thought it necessary to establish his authority in the central provinces, so far, at least, as to break off their relations with the Persian government, and thus to secure the Greek cities on the western coast from the attacks which might have been made on them from this quarter, if the peninsula, east of Lydia, had remained subject to Darius. The central situation of Gordium also afforded means of easier communication with Macedonia, and which the movements of the Persian fleet in the Ægean rendered very desirable, while it enabled him to negotiate on a more advantageous footing with the satraps of the provinces on the Euxine, who, when they saw him so near, might apprehend an immediate invasion. Accordingly, it seems to have been from Gordium that he sent Hegelochus to the coast, with orders to equip another fleet for the protection of the islands which were threatened by the Persians. Here he was rejoined by the troops whom he had sent to winter by their own hearths, accompanied by the new levies, 3000 Macedonian infantry and 650 horse, 300 from Macedonia, 200 from Thessaly, the rest from Elis. Here, also, he received an embassy from Athens, which came to request that he would release the Athenian prisoners who had been taken among the mercenaries in the battle of the Granicus, and had been sent to Macedonia. Alexander did not think it prudent, while he was on the eve of a decisive contest with Darius, to relax his severity towards the Greeks who took part with the barbarians, but he gave the Athenians leave to renew their application at a more seasonable juncture.

Gordium had been, in very early times, the seat of the Phrygian kings, and was supposed to have derived its name from Gordius, the father of the more celebrated Midas. In the citadel was preserved, with religious veneration, a wagon, in which, according to the tradition of the country, Midas, with his father and mother, entered the town, at a time when the people, who were distracted by civil discord, were holding an assembly. They had been informed by an oracle that a wagon should bring them a king who should compose their strife. The sudden appearance of Midas convinced them that he was the king destined for them; and when he had mounted the throne, he dedicated the wagon in the citadel as a thank-offering to the king of the gods, who, before his birth, had sent an eagle to alight upon its yoke, while

\* These are Flathe's suppositions, i., p. 292.

\* Which the reader will not confound with the northern lake of the same name.

† See Colonel Leake's observations on the position of Juliopolis, which, in the time of the Roman Empire, occupied the site of Gordium.—*Asia Minor*, p. 81.

Gordius was ploughing, as a sign of the honour reserved for his race. This legend had given rise to a prophecy, that whoever should untie the knot of bark by which the yoke was fastened to the pole must become Lord of Asia. Alexander did not leave Gordium before he had proved that this prophecy related to himself. He went up to the citadel, and separated the yoke from the pole. Whether he loosened the knot by drawing out a peg,\* or cut it with his sword, his own followers were not agreed. But all the spectators were convinced that he had legitimately fulfilled the prophecy, and a storm of thunder and lightning, which took place the same night, removed every shadow of doubt on the subject (333).

He now resumed his march eastward, and at Ancyra received an embassy from Paphlagonia, promising obedience on the somewhat ambiguous condition that he should abstain from entering their country. The subjugation of this extensive and very mountainous region would have detained him much too long from the more important objects which he had in view, and he therefore contented himself with this show of submission, which, at least, heightened, while it proved, the terror inspired by his name, and annexed Paphlagonia to the satrapy of Calas. As he advanced through Cappadocia towards the passes of Taurus, he met with no resistance; and his authority was, at least nominally, acknowledged to a great distance beyond the Halys, so that he could appoint a satrap of Cappadocia, whose name, Sebictas, indicates that he was an Asiatic, and who, perhaps, possessed influence enough to render him a useful ally in a country so imperfectly conquered. Near the entrance of one of the defiles or gates which led into the plains of Cilicia he encamped, on the same site where Cyrus had halted,† and here he found that the pass was strongly guarded. He therefore left Parmenio behind with the phalanx, and, taking only a part of the light troops, set out at nightfall to surprise the enemy at the Gates. His approach, however, was not unperceived; but it inspired so much alarm that the guards abandoned their post; and at day-break, having been overtaken by the rest of his army, he began to descend into the plain. On his way he received tidings from Tarsus, that the satrap Arsames, having heard that he had passed the Gates, was about to quit the city, which at first he meant to defend, and, it was feared, would plunder it before his departure. Hereupon Alexander pushed forward with his cavalry and the lightest part of the infantry at full speed for Tarsus, and Arsames, whatever his intention may have been, fled, leaving the city unhurt, to join the army of Darius.

Alexander, on his arrival at Tarsus, while his blood was still violently heated by these

extraordinary exertions, had been tempted to plunge into the clear and limpid waters of the Cydnus, which flowed through the city. This imprudence was generally supposed to have been the cause of a fever which seized him immediately after,\* and which soon became so threatening in its symptoms that most of his physicians despaired of his life. One, however, an Acarnanian named Philippos, who stood high in his confidence, undertook to prepare a medicine which would relieve him. In the mean while, a letter was brought to the king from Parmenio, informing him of a report that Philippos had been bribed by Darius to poison him. Alexander, it is said, had the letter in his hand when the physician came in with the draught, and, giving it to him, drank while he read: a theatrical scene, as Plutarch unsuspectingly observes, but one which would not have been invented but for such a character, and which Arrian was therefore induced, though doubtfully, to record.† The remedy, or Alexander's excellent constitution, prevailed over the disease; but it was long before he had gained sufficient strength to resume his march. In the mean while he sent Parmenio forward, with about a third of the army, to occupy the nearest of the maritime passes leading out of Cilicia into Syria. He himself, when sufficiently recovered, proceeded westward with the rest of his forces to Anchialus, where he beheld the statue of its reputed founder, Sardanapalus, the voluptuous king, who judged so differently from himself—as the Assyrian inscription on his monument and the figure itself attested—of the value and use of life. At Soli, where he arrived next, he found a strong leaning to the Persian interest, which induced him to place a garrison there, and afforded him a fair ground for demanding a contribution of 200 talents. Yet it seems to have been only an oligarchical party that had favoured the Persians; and perhaps the penalty was levied on them alone; for he established a democratical government, and the garrison may have been needed for its security. Before he returned to Tarsus, he made an inroad with a division of his forces into the mountains of the Rugged Cilicia, and, in the course of seven days, reduced their wild inhabitants, by force or terror, to submission. On his return to Soli, he received the agreeable intelligence that Oronotobates had been defeated, in a hard-fought battle, by Ptolemy and Asander, and that the cita-

\* Aristobulus, however, attributed it solely to fatigue; and Captain Kinnair, who bathed in the Cydnus, close by Tarsus, on the 3d of November, declares that its waters did not seem colder than those of any other stream in the country.—*Journey*, p. 121.

† Flathé, i., p. 298, questions the fact, for a singular reason; because Alexander affected to consider his life as threatened by the secret machinations of Darius, and therefore would not have given such a proof of confidence in any of his servants—the very thing which the story, if true, disproves. This is a historical *petitio principii*. I do not quite understand what Parmenio was doing, that he should not have come himself instead of writing. One sees from Curtius, iii., 6, how the story was embellished. In Arrian, ii., 4, Parmenio's letter only mentions a report which he had heard, that Philippos had been bribed. In Curtius, it asserts that he had been promised a thousand talents, and the hand of the sister of Darius. There was certainly some confusion between this story and that of Alexander's Lyncestian. Seneca, *De ira*, ii., 23, says that it was Olympias who sent the warning letter about Philippos; Diodorus, xvii., 32, that it was she from whom (immediately after his recovery) her son received notice of the Lyncestian's treasonable designs.

\* As Aristobulus related, Arrian, ii., 3. Droysen, p. 152, justly observes that the other version is much more appropriate to the character and destiny of the conqueror, and would have been more readily believed by the army. But, critically considered, this is a reason for preferring the account of Aristobulus, whom Droysen elsewhere, as if in dispraise, styles the sober.

† The younger according to Arrian, but the elder according to Curtius, iii., 4, who is supported by Mr. Williams in his learned Essay on the Geography of the Anabasis, p. 101, where he contends that Alexander could not have entered Cilicia by the pass described by Xenophon, and that Xenophon's Dana is not Tyana, but must be sought near the modern Eragli.

del of Halicarnassus, and the other places which he had retained on the coast of Caria, had fallen.\* Darius had previously suffered a much greater loss in the death of Memnon, who was carried off by a sudden illness, while engaged in the siege of Mitylene, which, after having made himself master of Chios through treachery, and of the rest of Lesbos, he had invested closely by sea and land. Alexander, before he left Soli, celebrated the victory of his generals, and at the same time testified his gratitude for his own convalescence by a solemn sacrifice to Esculapius, with a military procession, a torch-race, and musical and gymnastic contests. He then marched back to Tarsus, and, sending Philotas forward, with the bulk of the cavalry, across the Aleian plain, himself took a more circuitous route along the coast, through Magarsus, to Mallus, a town which claimed the Argive hero Amphilochus as its founder. On this ground, as himself descended from the Heracleids of Argos, he both healed its intestine disorders, and exempted it from the tribute which it had paid to the Persian government.

At Mallus, for the first time, he received certain intelligence of the approach of the great Persian army commanded by Darius in person. It can, however, hardly be doubted that he had long before been apprized of its movements, and had been expecting to fall in with it. Whether he delayed his departure from Cilicia, in the hope that the Persian king might be induced to advance until he was drawn into a disadvantageous position within the mountains, as was at last the case, is a question which cannot be decided with certainty, but his operations in Cilicia undoubtedly show that, if he did not calculate on this result, he was willing to take the chance of it. Darius had advanced from Babylon, according to Arrian, at the head of 600,000 fighting men, with the usual train and equipage which had ever been deemed necessary to the state of the great king in all his expeditions. Indeed, when we compare the description which Curtius gives of the retinue of Darius with that which we read in Herodotus of the procession with which Xerxes moved from Sardis, we find reason to think that the pomp and luxury of the Persian court had been continually increasing. The symbols of the Magian religion, also, seem to have been exhibited more conspicuously, and with greater magnificence. An image of the sun, we are informed, glittered on the top of the royal pavilion. The sacred fire was borne on silver altars at the head of the column, followed by Magians chanting their hymns; and 365 youths of the same caste, in scarlet robes, representing the days of the year, marched before the sacred chariot. The bands of horse and foot which escorted the king's were dazzling, as heretofore, in their clothing and arms. They were followed by 400 of the royal horses. Then came the carriages which contained the mother, consort, and children of Darius, with

their attendants, and after these the royal harem, almost in equal number with the priests. Six hundred mules and 300 camels bore the treasure. The Persian grandees likewise brought each his household along with him. Darius had probably expected to meet Alexander on his road towards the Euphrates, in some of the plains eastward of Cilicia. He came with full confidence of victory, notwithstanding the experience of former ages, for princes do not always gain wisdom from the lessons of history, and it is even possible that the chronicles of Persia had failed to inform him how often such mighty hosts had been vanquished by a handful of men. When the Athenian Charidemus, who had taken refuge at his court, ventured to suggest to him that his glittering array would not strike terror into the Macedonian phalanx, he was so incensed that, in the first transports of his indignation, he ordered him to be put to death. Nevertheless, he at first listened to the counsel of the Macedonian fugitive, Amyntas, who advised him to await Alexander's approach in a great plain, two days' march from the pass of Amanus, which Arrian, who describes the place of his encampment only by this distance, and by the obscure name of Sochi, calls the Assyrian Gates.

He was still at Sochi when Alexander reached Mallus; but he had then been for some time in that position, and had grown impatient of farther delay. He had begun to attribute the tardiness of his enemy's advance to fear; and when he heard of Alexander's illness at Tarsus, of his expedition against the western mountains of Cilicia, and of the festivities at Soli, he suspected that these were but so many pretences used to cover his real motive. It was in vain that Amyntas assured him that Alexander would not shrink from giving him battle on any field. His courtiers now easily persuaded him that he had only to appear and trample down the Macedonians with his cavalry. He resolved to wait no longer inactive, but to cross the mountains in quest of his hesitating foe. On the other hand, Alexander seems to have been convinced that Darius had adopted what was evidently the wisest plan, and was determined not to advance any farther westward, but to preserve the advantage of a position which enabled him to make the best use of his vast superiority in numbers. He held a council of war at Mallus, and, having announced the intelligence which he had received, consulted it on the course which he should take. There was but one voice among all present, that he should lead them immediately to seek the enemy. At Castabalus, where he encamped on the second day after his departure from Mallus, he was joined by Parmenio, who, after having occupied the nearest maritime pass, had taken possession of Issus, and then, advancing along the coast, dislodged the barbarians—probably part of the troops of Arsames—who still remained posted on the hills near the coast, and cleared and secured the whole road as far as the second maritime pass, the Gates of Syria and Cilicia. At Issus Alexander left the sick and wounded, and two days after passed the Gates, and encamped not far from Myriandrus. A violent storm of wind and rain, which occurred in the course of the

\* Such, undoubtedly, is the impression conveyed by the language of Arrian, ii., § 5; and one does not understand why the places held by Orontobates should be mentioned, if they were not taken after his defeat. Yet it is perplexing to find Coe and Halicarnassus spoken of soon after, iii., 13, as if they were still in the hands of the Persians. Droysen passes over this difficulty in silence. Fluthe, i., p. 306, supposes that they had recovered Halicarnassus.

next night, delayed his march, and seems to have prevented him from beginning the ascent of the mountains, which he would otherwise have crossed into the vale of the Orontes.

In the mean time, Darius had been making a nearly parallel movement in the opposite direction, on the eastern side of Amanus. He did not attempt to pass the mountains by the southern defile, which would have brought him down to Myriandrus, either because he knew that the maritime Gates had been occupied by the enemy, or because the road which he took led more directly into the plains of Cilicia, where he expected to find Alexander still lingering; for farther to the north is another pass, the Amanic Gates, which crosses Amanus a little above Issus. Why Alexander neglected to secure it, or did not take this road to Sochi, if it was that which Darius preferred as the shortest, does not distinctly appear; and if it were not for the invalids whom he left at Issus, his movement along the coast would give some colour to the suspicion that he had received information which led him to hope that Darius was about to quit his position at Sochi. Even if it were so, we might still understand the mixture of surprise and joy with which, while detained near Myriandrus by the weather, he received the tidings that the Persian army had passed through the Amanic Gates, and was on its march along the coast to overtake him. He immediately ordered some of his officers to embark in a small vessel,\* and proceed towards Issus to reconnoiter, and not until they returned and reported that they had seen the enemy, that Darius was at hand, would he believe what he so eagerly desired. Darius, before he moved from Sochi, had sent his treasure, and a part of his baggage, with the superfluous followers of his camp, and the wives and children of his principal officers, to Damascus: yet he was still accompanied by his mother Sisymbria, his consort Statira, and his children, two princesses, and a son six years old. When he had crossed the mountains, and learned that Alexander had passed before him on the road to Syria, he immediately advanced in the same direction. At Issus he found the defenceless Macedonian invalids, and was persuaded by his courtiers to order them to be put to death with cruel tortures.† The next day he moved forward until he reached the Pinarus, a small stream descending between steep and high banks from the side of Amanus to the sea, which is here parted from the foot of the mountains by a narrow plain.‡ Here he encamped on the right bank of the river, and soon discovered that the enemy whom he had supposed to be flying before him was on the way to meet him.

Alexander, as soon as he had ascertained the fact, assembled his principal officers to prepare them for the approaching battle, or

rather, perhaps, to suggest to them the topics by which they might animate their men. He reminded them of the many reasons they had to be confident of victory;\* of the victories which they had already gained over the same enemy; of the infatuation by which Darius had been led to pen up his army in a narrow space, where, though it was large enough for the evolutions of the phalanx, the greater part of his host would be utterly useless; of the difference between the Medes and Persians, who were enervated by inveterate habits of luxury, and the hardy Macedonians, who had been so long inured to martial toils; between slaves and freemen; between the Greeks, who fought for a wretched hire on the side of the barbarians, and those who had willingly lent their aid to the national cause; between the warlike races on the northern frontier of Macedonia, and the herds of feeble and timid barbarians, whom the Persian king collected from the provinces which acknowledged his authority; in fine, between Alexander himself and Darius. He also pointed out the greatness of the prize which was now at stake; that they were not now to encounter the satraps of Darius with a small body of cavalry and mercenaries, but Darius himself, with an army composed of his choicest troops; so that nothing less than the dominion of Asia depended on the issue of the conflict. He added grateful recollections of their past exploits, with modest allusions to the share he himself had taken in all their dangers; and he appealed to the example of the Ten Thousand, who had trodden the ground where they were then standing, and, under circumstances so much less favourable, had successfully defied the whole power of Persia.

His address was received with ardent congratulations and assurances, and with an unanimous request that he would lead them against the enemy without delay. He first sent forward a small body of cavalry and bowmen to ascertain that the road was clear, and then, having sacrificed by torch-light on a neighbouring hill to the gods of the country,† set out, after the evening meal, towards the Gates, which he reached about midnight; and, the pass being secured, allowed his troops to repose there till morning. At daybreak he resumed his march, at first in column, the cavalry in the rear; but, as the ground opened between the mountains and the sea, gradually extended his front, until he had drawn up his whole army in battle array in the plain of the Pinarus, where Darius was making his dispositions to receive him. To gain time and detain the advancing enemy, he had sent a body of 30,000

\* Droysen, p. 161, finds, in the beginning of the speech which Arrian records—I suppose in the words *καταλέγετε Σαφείν*—a confirmation of the hint which Curtius gives, that the unexpected appearance of the Persian army produced a temporary uneasiness in the Macedonian camp. But Curtius speaks not of the soldiery, as Droysen describes, but of Alexander himself—evidently for the sake of rhetorical effect. Arrian's expression, *ii. 7, δυνάμεις ἄλλαις ἐλπίσιν ἐν χειρὶ δὲ τοῦ Δαρείου*, shows what was the feeling of the army: he had Darius within arm's length.

† Curtius, *iii. 8, 28*, who adds—with reference, probably, to the place of the sacrifice—*patrio more*. I do not know whether Droysen intentionally varies in his statement of this circumstance from Curtius, the only author, I believe, who mentions it. Mr. Williams also, p. 105, describes the sacrifice as performed at the defile.

\* He did not embark himself, as Fluthe represents, *i. p. 299*, in his eagerness to prove a stratagem.

† So Arrian. Curtius says that, after they had been mutilated (*instructa purpuratorum*), he ordered them to be led through the camp, and when they had thoroughly surveyed it, to be sent on to relate what they had seen to Alexander.

‡ That in which Kinnear, Travels, p. 138, recognised the field of battle, is described by him as varying in breadth from one and a half to three miles. But the identity is very doubtful.

cavalry and 20,000 infantry across the river, ordering the infantry to be posted at the foot of the hills which bound the plain on the south side, and form a bay as they verge towards the sea: so that when the Macedonian army had entered the plain, they were in the rear of its right wing. On the right bank he found room for 60,000 of his best Persian troops, who were distinguished by the title which the Greeks write Cardaces,\* and for 30,000 Greek mercenaries, commanded by Thymondas, a son of Mentor, who had formed part of Memnon's forces in the Ægean, but after his death and the reduction of Mitylene, had been ordered to join the royal army. These, as the chief strength of his line, he posted in the centre, where they would be opposed to the Macedonian phalanx. Behind, the length of the plain was filled with the remainder of his host, distributed in masses according to their nations, but without any means of taking a part in the fight. He himself, in his state chariot, according to invariable Persian usage, took his place in the centre of the whole line. But he had prepared, not for attack, but for defence: he had thrown up some intrenchments where the bank was least difficult of ascent; a symptom of misgiving which greatly encouraged the Macedonians. When his dispositions were completed, he recalled his cavalry from the other side of the river, and stationed the main body in front of his right wing, near the sea, the rest on his left, at the foot of the mountains.

Alexander had drawn up the phalanx, as usual, in six divisions in the centre, taking the command of the right wing himself, which was flanked by the hypaspists, and by the Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry. He had given the command of the infantry on the left to Craterus, under Parmenio, who commanded the whole of the left wing, and whom he charged to keep close to the shore, that the enemy might not take him in flank. The cavalry of the Peloponnesians and of the other allies were stationed at this end of the line. A small body of cavalry and light troops were posted in front of the Persian division, which occupied the recess at the foot of the hills. But when Darius, finding that the ground did not afford sufficient room for the evolutions of his cavalry on his left wing, sent it to join the main body by the sea-side, Alexander also ordered the Thessalian cavalry to move round by the back of the line to support Parmenio. And as his right wing appeared to him still in danger of being outflanked, he strengthened it with two squadrons of his horse-guard, and with some of the light troops and Greek mercenaries, which he withdrew from other parts of his line. The division which he had opposed to the Persians in his rear had made a charge which forced

the enemy to retreat to the higher ground, where 300 horse were sufficient to watch them, and he was thus enabled to employ the light troops at the extremity of his right wing.

His plan was first to attack the enemy's left, which was the weakest part of the Persian line, and, when it was routed, to turn upon the right, which would then be exposed on two sides. He advanced, at first, slowly, to preserve the order of the phalanx, to within a short distance of the river side, and rode up and down, scattering words of exhortation, which were answered by a shout that expressed the universal eagerness for the battle: but as soon as they had come within reach of the Persian arrows, which instantly began to shower upon them, he led the way at full speed into the water, and in a few minutes was in close combat with the enemy. Their left wing was almost immediately broken by the impetuosity of his charge; but his own was exposed to great danger by the rapidity of this movement, which in the passage of the river disordered the phalanx and left a gap in its centre. Thymondas and his Greeks took advantage of this opportunity to make a vigorous attack on the divisions to the left, which had been detained by greater difficulties in the crossing, and had not been able to keep up with those on the right. National emulation and animosity exasperated the conflict. The Greeks were eager for a trophy over the hitherto invincible phalanx; the Macedonians, resolute to maintain their own honour, and not to fail their king and comrades in the moment of victory. The issue might have been doubtful had not Alexander, after the enemy's left was put to flight, wheeled round and fallen upon the rest of his line, taking the mercenaries in flank. But the fortune of the day was decided sooner than it would have been by the mere efforts of the combatants, through the timidity of Darius, who no sooner perceived the rout of his right wing than he ordered his charioteer to turn the heads of his horses for flight. His cavalry had crossed the river to charge Parmenio's divisions, and was engaged in an obstinate combat; but when it was seen that the great king was quitting the field, and that the mercenaries were overpowered by Alexander, it also gave way and joined the crowd of fugitives, through which it vainly endeavoured to find a passage.

The aspect of the plain over which this vast multitude was flying in all directions, but chiefly towards the northern outlet, may be imagined, but cannot be adequately described in words. The carnage among the cavalry, which was encumbered with heavy armour, seems to have been greater in proportion than that of the infantry. It was estimated at more than 10,000 men: 100,000 are said to have fallen in the whole; and we need not suspect much exaggeration in Ptolemy's assertion, that in the pursuit he crossed a gully which was filled up with heaps of slain. Darius pushed across the plain in his chariot, until he reached the foot of the northern hills; he then laid aside his bow, his shield, and his royal robe, and mounted a horse, which soon carried him out of the reach of his pursuers. His pusillanimity on this occasion seems to belie the reputation which he had gained for personal valour. Yet

\* Strabo, xv., c. 3, p. 327, Tauch., describes the *Κάρδακες* as the Persian militia, which received an education exactly similar to that of the Spartan youth. The description, *ἀπὸ κλονίας τρεφόμενοι*, may refer to a part of their early training, which coincided with the famous institution of Lycurgus; but, according to Ælius Dionysius, in Eustath., p. 368, *κάρδαξ* was the name by which the Persians called *εὐετρα* *τὸν ἀνδρῶν καὶ κλέρα*. Theopompus (quoted in the same passage) seems to have described them as barbarian mercenaries. A thousand *Κάρδακες* composed part of the army of Antiochus in Polyb., v., 79, who seem not to have been Persians, since the Persians are mentioned in another place.



it is not difficult to conceive that the courage with which, in his private station, he met a single enemy in equal combat, might fail him when he was set up in his chariot of state and his royal robes as part of a military pageant.

Alexander, though he had received a slight wound in his thigh, joined in the pursuit till it was too dark to distinguish the objects before him. He could not come up with Darius himself, who had taken flight too early in the battle, but he lighted on the chariot which contained his arms and his robe, and sent them back to the camp. On his return, he found that the Persian camp had been plundered by his soldiers—and to the Macedonians, though the most valuable part of the baggage had been sent to Damascus, it must have seemed to contain inestimable treasures—but the royal tent, with all its furniture, was reserved for himself. From a bath, prepared with all the appliances of Eastern luxury, and steaming with the richest perfumes, he passed into the gorgeous pavilion, where a table had been spread as for the supper of Darius. And now, for the first time, he learned what, in the eyes of his new subjects, belonged to the dignity of the great king in his hours of recreation and privacy.\* But before he began to refresh himself, after the fatigues of the day, his ears were struck by the wailings of women in an adjoining tent; and, on inquiry, he learned that the mother and wife of Darius, having been informed that his chariot and arms were in the possession of the conquerors, had concluded that he had been slain, and were mourning over their supposed loss. Alexander immediately sent Leonnatus, one of the great officers who bore the title of *somatophylax* (body-guard), to undeceive them, and to assure them that he did not mean to deprive them of any part of their ornaments, or of the honours of royalty. It was no personal enmity, but an honourable ambition, that had moved him to make war on Darius. The Greeks added a pleasing story, which to many readers has conveyed one of their earliest and not least correct impressions of Alexander's character: that the next morning he himself visited the captive princesses, attended by Hephæstion, whom, as there was no difference in their dress, they at first mistook for him; that he saluted Sisymbria with the title of mother, caressed the young prince, who, he observed to his followers, showed a manlier spirit than his father, and assured all of his protection and favour. Yet this anecdote, if true, would scarcely have been omitted both by Ptolemy and Aristobulus; and, perhaps, Alexander showed a more delicate generosity if he abstained from a visit, which, however kind and condescending his language and behaviour, could not but carry with it something like the air of a triumph.

It is better attested that his chief attention was devoted, on the day after the battle, to the care of the wounded and the burial of the dead, which was splendidly solemnized with the attendance of the whole army drawn up in battle array; that he publicly praised and rewarded

those who had distinguished themselves, and made several promotions among his officers. Balacrus, son of Nicanor, was appointed satrap of Cilicia, and Menes somatophylax in his room. He also celebrated his victory by an act of grace. He remitted fifty talents, which were still in arrear, of the penalty which he had laid on Soli, and restored its hostages. Before he withdrew from the field of battle, he erected three altars on the banks of the Pinarus to the same deities—Zeus, Hercules, and Athens—to whom he had dedicated those which marked the places of his embarkation and his landing on the Hellespont. A new city, called Nicopolis, was afterward founded as a more durable monument of the victory; but its site is no longer known. That which still preserves the conqueror's name (Scanderoon, the Issic Alexandria) was perhaps built on a different occasion.

He then took the road to Phœnicia; but sent Parmenio forward, with a small detachment, including the Thessalian cavalry, whom he selected for this service as a reward for their good conduct,\* to seize the first fruits of his victory, the treasure deposited at Damascus. It included, besides the military chest, the most costly part of the wardrobe and furniture, both of Darius and his chief nobles. With it were a number of Persian ladies of the highest rank, with their children and retinues; several Persians of the first quality, who had probably taken refuge there after the battle; and envoys of Sparta and Athens, with two Thebans, who had accompanied Darius from Babylon. The number of persons of a lower class, including several hundred ministers of royal luxury—music girls, cooks, confectioners, chaplet weavers, perfumers, and the like†—amounted to 30,000.‡ On his road, Parmenio fell in with a courier, who was bearing a letter to Alexander from the governor of Damascus, containing an offer to betray the treasure into his hands, and desiring him to send one of his generals with a small body of troops. Parmenio having read the letter, sent the courier back to Damascus. The treacherous governor, under pretence of flight, brought out the treasure—a load for 7000 beasts of burden—besides the Gangabæ (packmen), and the whole train of persons of all ranks who had accompanied it. Parmenio, as if believing that they had come out with hostile intentions, ordered his cavalry to charge the defenceless multitude. This was a signal for indiscriminate plunder, in which a great part of the precious spoil was wasted. But upward of 3000 talents, together with the principal captives—among whom were three daughters of Ochus, three of Mentor, Memnon's widow and infant son, a niece of Darius, and the Greek ambassadors—were preserved for the king. Darius had one consolation under this misfortune: the traitor was killed by a loyal subject, who abhorred his perfidy, and laid his head at the feet of his injured master.

\* Plut., Alex., 24.

† Parmenio's letter, in Athenæus, xiii., 87, gives the precise numbers: 339 music girls (καλαϊκῶδες μουσουργοί), 46 chaplet weavers, 40 unguent makers, and 406 persons who, under various denominations, for which we have hardly corresponding terms, belonged to the great king's maison de bouche.

‡ Curtius, iii., 12.

\* This, perhaps, is the meaning of the exclamation attributed to him by Plutarch, Al., 30, *ῥῶτ' ἤν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ βασιλεύειν*, which otherwise would sound like either childish wonder or philosophical irony.

## CHAPTER L.

FROM THE BATTLE OF ISSUS TO THE TAKING OF  
PERSEPOLIS.

THE spoil of Damascus was not the most important advantage which Alexander reaped from the battle of Issus. It averted a danger which, notwithstanding Memnon's death, had continued to give him occasion for much uneasiness; for he was still threatened with a diversion in his rear—a general rising of the Greeks, and an invasion of Macedonia—which might have interrupted, even if it did not finally defeat, his enterprise.

Memnon, on his deathbed, had appointed his nephew Pharnabazus, the son of Artabazus, to succeed him in his government until the king's pleasure should be known. Pharnabazus and Autophradates prosecuted the siege of Mitylene with such vigour that the inhabitants were reduced to capitulate, on the conditions that the mercenaries in their pay should be allowed to depart; that they should take down the columns which contained their treaty with Alexander, and should enter into alliance with Darius on the terms of the peace of Antalcidas, and should recall their exiled citizens—the anti-Macedonian party—and restore one half of their confiscated property. But the Persian generals were no sooner masters of the town, than they introduced a garrison commanded by an officer of their own, created Diogenes, one of the exiles, tyrant, and levied arbitrary contributions, both on the city and on opulent individuals. Pharnabazus was soon after confirmed by Darius in the authority which he had received from his uncle, and, having sent Datames, a Persian officer, with ten galleys, to the Cyclades, sailed at the head of one hundred, with Autophradates, against Tenedos, which was forced to submit on terms similar to those which had been accepted by Mitylene. Datames, however, was surprised near Siphnus by Proteas, a Macedonian officer, who had been sent by Antipater to collect ships from Eubœa and Peloponnesus, and was returning with fifteen galleys, with which he took eight out of the Persian squadron, with all their crews. Datames himself escaped with two to the main fleet. Pharnabazus and Autophradates then bent their course southward, and having, in their passage, left a garrison in Chios, where a part of their navy was stationed, they despatched a squadron to Cos and Halicarnassus, and themselves, with one hundred of their fastest sailers, made for Siphnus. Here they received a visit from Agis, king of Sparta, who came in a single galley to request a subsidy, and as large an armament as they could spare, for the purpose of withdrawing Peloponnesus from the Macedonian alliance. It was at this juncture that the news of the battle of Issus was brought to the fleet. It immediately put an end to whatever plans had been concerted for hostile operations in Greece. Pharnabazus sailed back with twelve galleys to Chios, where he feared that the intelligence might produce a reaction in favour of Alexander. Agis received thirty talents and ten galleys from Autophradates, but did not himself return with them; he sent them to his brother Agesilaus, who was at Tenarus—a great place of rendezvous for mercenary

troops—and directed him to sail with them to Crete, and secure it for the Spartan or anti-Macedonian interest. He himself, after some stay in the islands, followed Autophradates to Halicarnassus.

Thus, then, Alexander had nothing more to fear on this side for the present. But it was not the less his foremost object to guard against the recurrence of this danger, and to deprive the Persian government of all means of aiding the Greeks in their attempts for the recovery of their independence. He saw that if he once made himself master of Phœnicia and Egypt, the Persians would be deserted by the best part of their galleys, which were furnished by the Phœnician cities, and would be unable to repair the loss. His authority would then be undisputed in all the provinces of the empire west of the Euphrates.

Darius had continued his flight without intermission until he had crossed the river at Thapsacus, where he arrived with about 4000 fugitives, who had successively joined his train; and then first felt himself out of immediate peril. The rest of the barbarian host was probably, for the most part, irretrievably dispersed; though Curtius speaks of a body which was again collected by some of the surviving generals in Cappadocia, and which they found means of recruiting by fresh levies in that and the adjacent provinces. Four of the Greek officers, Amyntas, Thymondas, Aristomedes, a Thessalian of Phœræ, and Bianor, an Acarnanian, with about 8000 mercenaries, taking a circuitous route over the mountains, came down to Tripolis, on the coast of Phœnicia, before Alexander had quitted the field of battle. Here they found the ships which had brought their men from Lesbos, and having seized as many as they required to embark in, burned the rest, and crossed over to Cyprus. Amyntas, it seems, conceived the bold project of making himself master of Egypt. Whether he obtained the concurrence of his colleagues, does not appear; but he certainly took the lead in the enterprise. Sabaces, the satrap of Egypt, had fallen in the battle; and Amyntas, pretending that he had a commission from Darius, gained admittance at Pelusium. He then dropped the mask, and calling on the Egyptians to shake off the hated yoke of Persia, marched against Memphis. He was joined by a great number of the natives, and Mazaces, the Persian commander of Memphis, having marched out to give him battle, was defeated, and forced to take shelter behind the walls; but the victors were elated with this success, and thrown off their guard. They suffered themselves to be surprised by Mazaces, while dispersed in quest of booty in the neighbourhood of the city, and Amyntas was slain, with almost all his men.

Darius, indeed, had the force of the greater part of his empire still entire, and at his command. The troops of the eastern satrapies, including some of the most warlike in his dominions, had already been summoned to the royal standard; and it was only the length of time necessary for bringing them together that seems to have prevented him from marching into Cilicia with this additional encombrence. They were now on their way towards Babylon; and he might expect, in the course of a few

months, to see himself at the head of a still more numerous host than he had commanded at Issus. He appears to have believed, at first, that Alexander would follow up his victory without delay by an active pursuit; and it was, perhaps, partly with the view of gaining time, that he no sooner reached a place of safety than he began to sound Alexander's temper by overtures of negotiation. Even, however, if his army had been already assembled, he would certainly not have been eager to renew the contest. He had probably not made up his mind as to the full extent of the sacrifices which he would submit to for the sake of peace; and he therefore sent two envoys to Alexander—who had now reached Marathus, a Phœnician city on the coast, over against the Isle of Aradus—with a letter, couched in terms which pledged him to nothing, but opened the way for a pacific discussion. He assumed the tone of remonstrance, as one who had suffered an unprovoked aggression. He reminded Alexander that his father had been on terms of peace and alliance with Ochus, but, on the accession of Arsēs, had commenced hostilities, without any just cause, against Persia; and that, since he himself had mounted the throne, Alexander, instead of sending an embassy to renew the ancient amicable relations between the two kingdoms, had invaded his territories, and forced him to wage war in self-defence. He was now reduced, by the chance of war, to make a request—such, however, as one king might becomingly address to another—that Alexander would restore his mother, wife, and children. He himself was willing to become Alexander's friend and ally, and desired that he would send ministers with the two Persian envoys to treat with him.

The Persian envoys had been instructed to urge the request contained in their master's letter by word of mouth. Alexander sent Therapsus along with them, charged with a letter to Darius, but with orders to abstain from oral communications on the subject. The letter was a kind of manifesto, in which he vindicated the justice of his proceedings by various reasons, as good, at least, as the strong are usually able to find for attacking the weak. He began like the wolf in the fable. The ancestors of Darius had invaded Macedonia and Greece, and he had been appointed by the Greeks their general, and had come over to Asia to avenge their wrongs and his own. Ochus had furnished succours to Perinthus and the Thracians against Philip. It was through the machinations of the Persian court that Philip had been murdered; and his death had been made a subject of boastful exultation in its public letters. Darius himself had been the accomplice of Bagoas in the murder of Arsēs, and had usurped the throne of Persia; he had endeavoured to excite the Greeks to war against Macedonia, and had offered subsidies to Sparta, and to other states, which, indeed, had been accepted only by Sparta; but his agents had succeeded in corrupting many private persons, and had been incessantly labouring to disturb the tranquillity of Greece. His invasion, therefore, had been undertaken on just grounds. But since the gods had crowned his arms with victory, none of those who had trusted themselves to his clemency had found

reason to regret their choice. He, therefore, invited Darius himself to come to him, as to the Lord of Asia. He might beforehand receive pledges of his personal safety, and might then ask with confidence for his mother, wife, and children, and for whatever else he could desire. In future he must address Alexander as the King of Asia, in the style, not of an equal, but of a subject, or must expect to be treated as an enemy. If, however, he disputed his claim to sovereignty, let him wait for his coming, and try the event of another contest. He might rest assured that Alexander would seek him, wherever he might be found.

At Marathus Alexander likewise received the Greek envoys to the Persian court, who had been taken at Damascus: Euthycles, the Spartan; the Thebans, Thessaliscus, son of Ismenias, and Dionysodorus, who had gained an Olympic prize; and Iphicrates, a son of the famous general of the same name. The Thebans he immediately released, both in pity to Thebes, and because it seemed excusable that men whom he had deprived of their country should seek what aid they could obtain for themselves and for it from his enemies. The high birth of Thessaliscus, and the Olympic victory of Dionysodorus, also, it is said, weighed with him in their favour, though he did not share the admiration with which gymnastic feats were commonly regarded. Iphicrates he retained at his court; but, both for his country's sake and his father's, always treated him in the most honourable manner, and after his death sent his bones to his family at Athens. Euthycles, as a citizen of an avowedly hostile state, who had no personal claims on his indulgence, he for a while kept in confinement, though not, it is added, in chains; and even him he released when his fortune had reached a height from which he might safely despise such enemies.

On his road to Phœnicia, Alexander had been met by Straton, son of the King of Aradus, Gerostratus, whose territory included Marathus and several other towns on the main. Gerostratus himself, with all the other Phœnician and Cyprian princes, was serving in the Persian fleet, under Autophradates. Yet Straton brought a golden crown to the conqueror, and surrendered all the cities in his father's dominions into his hands. As he advanced from Marathus, Byblus capitulated to him, and Sidon, where every heart burned with hatred of Persia, hailed him as her deliverer. Thus he proceeded without resistance towards Tyre. And even from this great city he received a deputation on his way, composed of the most illustrious citizens, among whom was the king's son, bringing a golden crown, and a present of provisions for the army, and announcing that the Tyrians had resolved to obey all his commands.

It seems that the language in which this message was conveyed intimated something as to the limits of that obedience which the Tyrians were willing to pay. It was not meant that it should extend so far as totally to resign their independence. This Alexander probably understood, and nothing could satisfy him short of absolute submission, and full possession of so important a place. But he met the offers of the Tyrians as if they had been made in the sense which he required; and bade the envoys

apprize their fellow-citizens that it was his intention to cross over to their island, and offer a sacrifice to Melkart, the Phœnician Hercules, whom he chose to consider as one with the hero of Argos and Thebes. This was, perhaps, the least offensive way of bringing the matter to an issue; and it obliged the Tyrians to speak their mind more plainly. They now informed him that in all other points he should find them ready to submit to his pleasure, but that they would not admit either a Persian or a Macedonian within their walls; and they begged that he would celebrate the sacrifice which he wished to offer in Old Tyre, which lay on the coast opposite to their island-city, where their god had another, and, probably, a much more ancient sanctuary. Alexander indignantly dismissed their ambassadors, and called a council of his principal officers, in which he declared his intention of besieging Tyre, and thought fit to explain the reasons which rendered this undertaking necessary, arduous as it was. He observed that it would be unsafe to invade Egypt so long as the Persians commanded the sea, and that to advance into the interior against Darius, while Tyre remained neutral or vacillating, and while Cyprus and Egypt were in the enemy's hands, would be to let the war be transferred to Greece, where Sparta was openly hostile, and Athens only withheld from the avowal of her enmity by fear. On the other hand, the reduction of Tyre would be attended with the submission of all Phœnicia, and the Phœnician fleet, the strength of the Persian navy, would soon pass over to the power which possessed the cities by which it had been equipped, and to which the crews belonged. Cyprus would then speedily fall, and there would be no farther obstacle to the conquest of Egypt. They might then set out for Babylon, leaving all secure on the side of Greece, and with the proud consciousness that they had already severed all the provinces west of the Euphrates from the Persian Empire.

The motives which induced Alexander to undertake the siege of Tyre are more evident than those which led the Tyrians to defy his power, after so many of the other Phœnician cities had submitted to him. We cannot, indeed, be surprised that they should not have been more willing than the people of Aspendus to admit the Macedonians within their walls; but still, it was probably something very different from an instinctive love of independence that animated them to resistance. The main ground of their conduct seems to have been more in the nature of a commercial calculation of expediency. The issue of the contest between Alexander and Darius was still doubtful; notwithstanding his past success, the Macedonian conqueror might meet the fate of the younger Cyrus in some future field of battle. If the Persians should ever recover their lost provinces, Tyre might look forward to the remission of her tribute, the extension of her territory, and other rewards of her fidelity shown, as it would have been, at so perilous a juncture. Perhaps she even indulged a hope that she might have the glory of arresting the invader's progress, and of giving a decisive turn to the war in favour of Darius. In any case, the Tyrians believed their city to be impregnable so

long as they were superior at sea, and they did not anticipate the manner in which the state of affairs, in this respect, was soon to be changed. It is highly probable—though the fact is not mentioned by Arrian, who touches very slightly on their motives—that they were encouraged by promises of succour from their powerful colony Carthage,\* which assiduously kept up her connexion with her parent city by periodical embassies and pious offerings. Still, it seems that there was a numerous party within which disapproved of this policy; for we are informed that many of the citizens dreamed that Apollo—whose statue, part of the spoils of Gela,† they had received from the Carthaginians—had declared to them that he was about to leave the city. And it was thought necessary, either for the purpose of detaining the god, or of quieting the popular uneasiness, to adopt an expedient similar to that which many years before had been employed by the Ephesians in a like emergency§—to fasten the statue of Apollo, who was denounced as a friend of Alexander,|| by a golden chain to the altar of Melkart. On the other hand, Alexander seems to have thought it prudent to raise the spirits of his troops by assurances of divine assistance, in an enterprise which appeared to surpass human ability. He, too, related that he had seen Hercules, in a dream, taking him by the hand, and leading him within the walls of his city; a sign, as Aristander interpreted it, of success, though in a Herculean labour.

An ordinary conqueror might, indeed, himself have needed such assurances to encourage him, when he was about to attack a place so prepared for defence as Tyre at this time was, both by nature and art. The island on which the city stood was separated from the main by a channel half a mile broad, through which, in rough weather, the sea rushed with great violence. This strait was, indeed, shallow on the side of the Phœnician coast, but near the island became three fathoms deep. The walls, which rose from the edge of the cliffs, were 150 feet high on the land side, and composed of huge blocks of stone, cemented with mortar. The city was abundantly stocked with provisions and military stores, contained a number of copious springs, was filled with an industrious and intelligent population, expert in all the arts of naval warfare, and possessed mechanists and engineers not inferior, it seems, to any that were to be found in the Macedonian camp. Though the greater part of the Tyrian fleet was absent in the Persian service, there still remained a sufficient number of galleys of war, and of smaller craft, both for the defence of the harbours—for there were two, one on the north, the other on the south side of the island—and for the annoyance of the enemy.

Alexander had no naval force which he could immediately oppose to this. His plan was soon formed: he resolved to carry a causeway through the channel, and when it had reached the foot of the walls, to batter them from it with his engines. To provide materials for the work, he demolished the remaining buildings of

\* Curtius, iv., 2, 11.

† Plut., Alex., 24. Curtius has only one dreamer.

‡ Diodorus, xiii., 108.

§ See vol. i., p. 221.

|| Plut., u. s., Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Ἀπολλῶνος.

Old Tyre. The forests of Libanus furnished an ample supply of timber. The real difficulty of the undertaking was not perceived until the dam had been carried half way across the water; for so long the depth was trifling, the piles and stones were easily sunk and firmly fixed in the muddy bottom, and the work was carried on without hindrance. But as the depth increased, while the work itself became more and more laborious and difficult, it was at the same time exposed to all the interruptions which the besieged could devise to retard its progress. It now came within reach of the missiles which they discharged from the top of the walls; and the Tyrian galleys, taking their station at a short distance, incessantly annoyed the workmen, who were not armed to sustain these attacks. Alexander, however, ordered two wooden towers to be erected near the extremity of the mole, covered with hides, and surmounted with engines, so as both to shelter the workmen and to repel the assailants. The Tyrians now prepared a more formidable mode of attack. A horse transport was filled with dry twigs and other combustibles, over which they poured pitch and brimstone. In the fore part an additional space was enclosed, so as to form a huge basket for the reception of these materials, in the midst of which were fixed two masts, which at the end of their yard-arms supported two caldrons filled with an inflammable liquid. The stem was raised high above the water by means of ballast heaped near the stern. The besieged, having waited for a favourable breeze, towed the ship behind two galleys towards the mole, and, when it came near, set it on fire, and, seconded by the wind, ran it in on the end of the mole between the towers. The flames soon caught them; but the conflagration did not reach its full height until the masts gave way, and discharged the contents of the caldrons on the blazing pile. To render it the more effectual, the men on board the galleys, from a convenient distance, plied the towers with their arrows, so as to defeat every attempt that was made to extinguish the fire. A shoal of boats now came off from the harbours filled with people, who soon tore up the piles, and set fire to all the machines which had not been overtaken by the flames of the burning ship. The ruin of the work which had cost so much time and labour was completed in a few hours. Alexander, however, was not disheartened: he gave orders that a new mole should be begun, of greater breadth, so as to be capable of receiving more towers, and that new engines should be constructed. But as he now became aware that, without some naval force to oppose to the Tyrians, he should find the difficulties of the siege insurmountable, he repaired in person to Sidon, with a detachment of light troops, to collect as many galleys as he could. Here he found himself already in possession of one of the advantages which he had expected from the reduction of Tyre, which, accruing earlier than he had hoped, proved the main instrument of his success.

Gerostratus, king of Aradus, and Enylus of Byblus, as soon as they heard that he had become master of their cities, quitted the Persian fleet, with their squadrons, and with a part of the Sidonian galleys, so that Alexander was joined

at Sidon by eighty sail of Phœnician ships. About the same time came in ten from Rhodes, as many from Lycia, three from Soli and Mallus, and his own victorious captain, Proteas, from Macedonia; and these were followed not long after by the Cypriot princes with 120 galleys. He had now an armament of nearly 250 sail at his orders. While it went through a course of training for a sea-fight, and while the machines were in preparation, he made an excursion, with some squadrons of horse and a body of light troops, into the range of Anti-Libanus, and having reduced the mountaineers to submission, within eleven days returned to Sidon, where he found a re-enforcement of 4000 Greek soldiers, who had been brought by Cleander from Peloponnesus. He then set sail for Tyre in line of battle, himself, as on shore, commanding the right wing, and Craterus the left. The Tyrians, it seems, expected his approach, and were prepared to meet him; but they had not heard of the arrival of the Phœnician and Cyprian galleys, which, perhaps, they rather hoped to have seen on their own side; and, when they saw the numbers which he brought with him, they gave up all hope of resistance, and only used their galleys to block up the mouths of their harbours. Alexander, when he came up, found the northern harbour too well secured to be attacked, though he sunk three of the enemy's galleys which were moored on the outside, and captured one which was consecrated to the tutelary god. The next day, he stationed the Cypriots, under the command of Andromachus, near the entrance of this harbour, and the Phœnicians near the other, in the same quarter where his own tent was pitched.

In the mean while the mole had been restored, and was actively carried forward: mechanists had been collected in great numbers from Phœnicia and Cyprus, and had constructed abundance of engines, which were planted, some on the mole, others on transports and the heavier galleys. These vessels, at first, found the approach very much impeded by a bed of stones which the besieged had carried out into the sea from the foot of the cliffs; and the attempts which the Macedonians made to remove this obstacle were for some time thwarted by the dexterity and boldness of the Tyrian divers, who cut the cables of the ships which were anchored for the purpose of drawing up the stones. Chain cables were, at length, substituted, and the passage was then rapidly cleared by machines, which raised the stones out of their bed, and hurled them into the deep water. The walls were now assailed by the engines on every side, and the contest grew closer and hotter than it had ever been. Every contrivance that ingenuity, quickened by fear, could suggest, was tried by the besieged to ward off these attacks. Very famous, in particular, was one, which is not the less credible because Arrian's authors seemed to have passed it over in silence—the invention of shields filled with heated sand, which they were made to discharge on the assailants, and which, penetrating through their armour and their skin, inflicted indescribable tortures. Still, the means of attack kept growing on the resources of defence. Dejection began to spread within the walls; and there were some who proposed to renew a horrid rite, which had long

fallen into disuse—the sacrifice of a boy of good family to Moloch. It does honour to the Tyrian government, that it did not either humour this bloody superstition, or give way to despair; it was policy, perhaps—to check all thoughts of capitulation—rather than ferocity that induced it to execute its Macedonian prisoners on the top of the walls, and to cast their bodies, in the sight of the besiegers, into the sea;\* but it directed the energy of the people to better expedients. It made a vigorous attempt to surprise the Cyprian squadron stationed near the northern harbour, and would have gained a complete victory over it; but Alexander, having received timely notice of the sally, sailed round, unobserved, turned the fortune of the day, and sunk or took most of the enemy's ships. All hopes from offensive measures were crushed by this blow; the safety of the city now rested chiefly in the strength of its walls.

Even these, after several fruitless attempts had been made in other quarters, began to give way on the south side; and a breach was opened, which Alexander tried, but did not find immediately practicable. Three days after, however, when a calm favoured the approach of the vessels, he gave orders for a general attack. It was to be made on all sides at once, to distract the attention of the besieged; and the fleet was at the same time to sail up to both the harbours, in the hope that in the midst of the tumult it might force an entrance into one of them. But the main assault was to be directed against the breach that had been already formed. The vessels which bore the engines were first brought up to play upon it, and, when it had been sufficiently widened, were followed by two galleys, with landing-boards and the men who were to mount it. One was commanded by Admetus, and was filled with troops of the guard, and in this Alexander himself embarked. The other bore a detachment of the phalanx belonging to the division commanded by Cenus. Admetus and his men were the first to effect a landing, animated by the immediate presence of their king, who, after he had paused a while to observe and animate the exertions of his warriors, himself mounted the breach. When the Macedonians had once gained a firm footing, the issue of the conflict, notwithstanding the desperate resistance of the besieged, did not long remain doubtful. Admetus, indeed, who led the way, was slain; but Alexander soon made himself master of two towers and the intervening curtain, through which the troops from the other vessel poured in after him, and he then advanced along the walls to the royal palace, which stood on the highest ground, that he might descend from it with the greater ease into the heart of the city. The Tyrians, seeing the wall taken, abandoned their fortifications, and collected their forces in one of the public places, where they gallantly made head against their assailants. But, in the mean while, both the harbours had been forced, their ships sunk or driven ashore, and the besiegers landed to join their comrades in the city. It soon became a scene of unresisted carnage and plunder. The Macedonians, exasperated by the length and labours of the

siege, which had lasted seven months, and by the execution of their comrades, spared none that fell into their hands. The king, whom the Greeks call Azelmicus, with the principal inhabitants and some Carthaginian envoys who had been sent with the usual offerings to Melkart, took refuge in his sanctuary; and these alone, according to Arrian, were exempted from the common lot of death or slavery. It was an act of clemency, by which the conqueror at the same time displayed his piety to the god. Of the rest, 9000 perished in the first slaughter, and 30,000, including a number of foreign residents, were sold as slaves. But, if we may believe Curtius, 15,000 were rescued by the Sidonians, who first hid them in their galleys, and afterward transported them to Sidon, not, it must be presumed, without Alexander's connivance or consent.

It sounds incredible that he should have ordered 2000 of the prisoners to be crucified, though he might have inflicted such a punishment on those who had taken the leading part in the butchery of the Macedonians; but, after the king and the principal citizens had been spared, it is not easy to understand why any others should have suffered on this account.

So fell Tyre, the rich, and beautiful,\* and proud, in arts and arms the queen of merchant cities. The conqueror celebrated his victory with a solemn military and naval procession, sacrifice, and games, in honour of the tutelary god who had thus fulfilled his promise, and, though after the labour of so many months, had at length brought him into his city. He dedicated the engine which had first shattered the wall, and the sacred galley, in the sanctuary of Melkart. Tyre was still occupied as a fortress, and soon recovered some measure of her ancient prosperity, which it preserved for some centuries under the shade of the Roman empire; and, after a long period of almost utter desolation, seems again to be lifting up her head, though in a very humble condition, in our days. But Alexander's work, which changed her island into a peninsula, put an end forever to her power and independence, and is now almost the only monument remaining of her ancient greatness.†

We do not know how far the delay which she opposed to the progress of the Macedonian arms engaged the attention of the Persian court; but if Darius ever conceived any hopes from it, or ever thought of taking advantage of it, this can only have been so long as his fleet continued to command the sea. When it was deserted by the Phœnician and Cyprian galleys, he had no longer any means of relieving Tyre, unless by an expedition over land, which certainly never entered his thoughts. On the contrary, before the siege was ended, though probably after Alexander had been joined by the

\* Ezekiel, xxvii.

† There seems to be little doubt that Sour occupies the place of Tyre; though Niebuhr, who visited it in 1766, and found there a spring (which has been described by other travellers) rising out of a basin of large hewn stones, observes, vol. iii., p. 78, that the isthmus seemed to him a natural one, which had been once intersected by an artificial channel that had afterward been choked up with sand, and he therefore questions the site. Sour was then a rising village: in 1816 Mr. Buckingham found it a well-built, thriving town, of about 800 houses. Niebuhr's stay seems to have been too short for accurate observations.

\* Arrian, ii. 24. Curtius, iv., 2, 15, makes them to be heralds.

squadrons of Cyprus and Phœnicia, he sent another embassy to him with more definite overtures. His ambassadors now offered 10,000 talents as the ransom of his family, the cession of all the provinces west of the Euphrates, and the hand of his daughter Barsine,\* as conditions of peace and alliance. Alexander laid these proposals before his council, and Parmenio declared that, if he were Alexander, he should accept them. So should I, the king is reported to have answered, were I Parmenio. His own prospects stretched far beyond the old man's desires, and the acquisition did not tempt him the more because it might be made without farther toil or danger. He replied in the same strain as before. The gold and the land which Darius offered were already his own; nor would he accept a part of his treasures or his empire instead of the whole. If he chose to marry the princess, he did not need her father's consent. If Darius desired to receive his favours, he must come in person as a suppliant. Darius was now convinced that he had no alternative besides submission or another trial of strength, and he applied his whole attention to his military preparations.

In the summer of 332 Alexander set forward on his march towards Egypt, accompanied by the fleet, which he had placed under the orders of Hephæstion. But he was still to be detained by another obstacle in Syria, for Darius had subjects who were more faithful to him than he was to himself. A eunuch named Batis,† who had the command of Gaza, near the southern frontier of Palestine, trusting to the strength of the place, which was built on an artificial mound rising out of a sandy level partly covered by the inundations of the sea, and fortified with a very high wall, having taken a body of Arabians into his pay, and laid in a stock of provisions sufficient for a long siege, resolved to defend it. Alexander immediately ordered engines to be constructed for an assault; but his engineers declared that they were unable to invest any of such power as to make an impression on walls of such height. He then ordered a mound to be raised to the foot of the walls on the south side, where they were most accessible, to afford a basis for his machines; and when it had reached a sufficient height the engines were brought up to batter them. Alexander had been induced to keep for a time out of the reach of the enemy's missiles by his soothsayer Aristander, who discovered, from the fall of a stone which a bird dropped on him while he was sacrificing, that he should take the place, but that his own person was in danger. The assault, however, had not long begun before the besieged made a sally with lighted torches, and set fire to the machines, while, having the advantage of the higher ground, they drove the Macedonians towards the edge of the terrace. Alexander no longer heeded the soothsayer's warning, but hastened up with his guard to support them; and, though he could not save the engines, forced the enemy back within their walls. But during the combat he was wounded by a dart from a machine, which penetrated both through shield

and corselet into his shoulder. The wound, however, though severe, animated him with a joyful hope that the rest of the prediction would be fulfilled; and while he himself remained under the hands of his surgeons, who found the cure slow and difficult, he ordered the engines which he had used at the siege of Tyre, and which he had left there, to be fetched, and the mound to be carried on until it had reached a height of 250 feet and the breadth of a quarter of a mile.\* When his preparations were completed, and he himself was again able to take the field, he renewed his attack both by battering and undermining the walls. Thrice, nevertheless, the assailants were repulsed; but in the fourth attempt a great breach was opened, which enabled them to fix their scaling ladders. Neoptolemus, a relative of the king by the mother's side, was the first who reached the top: he was followed by many, who soon opened the gates from within to their comrades. Yet the besieged still fought until every man was put to the sword: the women and children were sold. Alexander introduced a new population into the place from the neighbouring towns, and used it as a fortress.

A Jewish tradition preserved by Josephus,† related that, after the reduction of Gaza, Alexander again turned northward, and marched to Jerusalem, where the high-priest Jaddus, from whom he had demanded troops and a supply of provisions during the siege of Tyre, had ventured to resist his will, pleading the loyalty which he owed to his lawful sovereign, the Persian king. As he approached the Holy City, he was met by the greater part of the inhabitants in their white feast-day robes, and by the priests and Levites, with the high-priest at their head, in their sacerdotal vestments. The Chaldeans and Phœnicians—ancient enemies to the Jewish name—who accompanied Alexander, hoped for leave to plunder the city, and to execute his vengeance on the refractory high-priest. But the conqueror—like Attila at the sight of Leo and his clergy—was struck with pious awe by the spectacle, and, to the surprise of his attendants, was seen to advance alone towards the high-priest, and to bow as in adoration before him. He afterward declared that such was the figure which he had seen in a dream at Diium, when it had cheered him with a promise of success in the enterprise which he was then meditating. Having been thus convinced of the power of the Deity whom Jaddus served, he went up to the temple and sacrificed according to the Jewish ritual; honoured the priests with munificent gifts, and the nation with extraordinary privileges, which he denied to the envious and malignant Samaritans, though they pretended affinity with the Jews.

We cannot be surprised that a story so exactly fitted to please Jewish ears, that the Samaritans, only changing the scene and persons, applied it to themselves, should not be found

\* Arrian, ii., 27, seems to say that it was carried all round the city (*ἐν κύκλῳ τῆς πόλεως*). Droysen objects that such a work was unnecessary, and would have demanded a much longer time than was occupied by the siege. In this he is probably right; but it is another question whether Arrian's words will admit the sense which he assigns to them: that the mound was *concentric* with the city wall.

† Antiq., xi., 8, 5.

\* Curtius, iv., 5, 1; and Plutarch, De Alex. Fort., 11, 6, calls her Statira.

† According to Josephus, Ant. Jud., xi., 8, 3, Balmeseth.

either in Arrian or Curtius. On the other hand, it certainly is strange, if there was any foundation for the story, that no mention should have been made by our best authors of any visit of Alexander to Jerusalem. Arrian, indeed, seems to contradict the main fact related by Josephus; for he says that, after the fall of Tyre, all the cities of Palestine, except Gaza, submitted to the conqueror. If so, Alexander's appearance before Jerusalem cannot have been a threatening one; and the motive of his visit would seem to have been only the satisfaction of a natural curiosity. But, then, Josephus must have been mistaken as to the time of the occurrence, which must have happened either before the siege of Gaza—as Arrian may be supposed to intimate—or some months later, in the army's second passage through Palestine. It is difficult to decide between these two conjectures; but in other respects the story, notwithstanding the silence of the Greeks, is probably well founded. The respect paid by Alexander to the Jewish religion, and even the fiction of the dream, are perfectly consistent with his character and policy, if they do not stamp the substance of the narrative with an unquestionable mark of truth. It is certain, however, that Syria was left subject to Andromachus, who succeeded Parmenio in the government of Damascus.

The siege of Gaza had occupied, it seems, three or four months; and it was, perhaps, not before December, 332, that Alexander began his expedition to Egypt. Here he might safely reckon not merely on an easy conquest, but on an ardent reception, from a people who burned to shake off the Persian tyranny, and had even welcomed and supported the adventurer Amyntas. Mazaces himself, as soon as he heard of the battle of Issus, became aware that all resistance to Alexander would be useless, and met him with a voluntary submission. At Pelusium he found the fleet, and, having left a garrison in the fortress, ordered it to proceed up the Nile as far as Memphis, while he marched across the desert. Near Heliopolis he crossed the river, and joined the fleet at Memphis. Here he conciliated the Egyptians by the honours which he paid to all their gods, especially to Apis, who had been so cruelly insulted by the Persian invaders; but at the same time he exhibited a new spectacle to the natives, a musical and gymnastic contest, for which he had collected the most celebrated artists from all parts of Greece. He then embarked, and dropped down the western or Canobic arm of the river to Canopus, to survey the extremity of the Delta on that side, and, having sailed round the Lake Mareotis, landed on the narrow belt of low ground which parts it from the sea, and is sheltered from the violence of the northern gales, which would otherwise desolate and overwhelm it, by a long ridge of rock, then separated from the mainland by a channel, nearly a mile (seven stades) broad, and forming the Isle of Pharos. On this site stood the village of Racotis, where the ancient kings of Egypt had stationed a permanent guard to protect this entrance of their dominions from adventurers, especially Greeks, who might visit it for the sake either of plunder or commerce; while, for greater security, they

granted the adjacent district to a pastoral tribe, which regarded all strangers as enemies. Alexander's keen eye was immediately struck by the advantages of this position for a city, which should become a great emporium of commerce, and a link between the East and the West—one of the great objects which already occupied his mind—while it secured the possession of Egypt to his empire, and transmitted the name of its founder to distant ages. He immediately gave orders for the beginning of the work, himself traced the outline, which was suggested by the natural features of the ground itself, and marked the sites of some of the principal buildings, squares, palaces, and temples. The two main streets, which intersected each other at right angles in a great public place, one traversing the whole length of the city, and forming a series of magnificent edifices, provided for health and enjoyment by a free current of air, and the inundations of the Nile secured it from the pernicious effects which would otherwise have arisen from the vicinity of the lake. A causeway connected the island—on which, it is said, Alexander at first thought of building the city—with the main, and divided the intervening basin into two harbours, which were only joined together by a canal near either end. By the continual accumulation of sand, this isthmus has been so enlarged, that it now forms the site of the modern Alexandria. Still, there were two defects to counterbalance so many advantages of situation. The harbour was on both sides difficult of entrance, and there was no other within a great distance either on the east or the west. This inconvenience could never be wholly remedied, though the danger of the approach from the sea was afterward much lessened by the erection of a magnificent beacon-tower, on a rock, near the eastern point of Pharos, which threw out its light to the distance, it is said, of nearly forty miles. The other defect was the want of water: and for this ample provision was made by a new canal, branching from the Nile, which brought a constant supply into the cisterns over which the houses were built. Yet Alexandria was thus placed at the mercy of every enemy who could make himself master of the canal, and deprive it of a main necessary of life. It was a part of Alexander's plan to people the city with a mixed colony of Greeks and Egyptians, in which the prejudices of the two races might be effaced by habitual intercourse, though Grecian arts and manners were to give their character to the whole: and, therefore, among the temples of the Grecian gods, he ordered one to be founded for the worship of Isis.

A favourable omen is said to have afforded a presage of the prosperity which awaited the new city. When he was about to trace the course of the walls, no chalk was at hand for the purpose, and it was found necessary instead to make use of flour, which soon attracted a large flock of birds from all sides to devour it. Aristander—who was never at a loss—construed this incident as a sign of the abundance which the city should enjoy and diffuse. That, indeed, probably far exceeded its founder's most sanguine hopes; but still less could he have foreseen or calculated all the el-



ements of a new intellectual life which were to be there combined, and the influence which it was to exert over the opinions and condition of a great part of the world.

He was still thus engaged when Hegelochus arrived with the news that the Persians had been dislodged from the last holds of their power in the *Ægean*. Tenedos had revolted from them as soon as it became sure of Macedonian protection. At Chios the democratical party had risen against the government established by the Persian satraps, and had taken Pharnabazus himself prisoner; and soon after Aristonicus, the tyrant of Methymna, having sailed into the harbour, before he had heard of the recent revolution, with some pirate ships, fell into their hands. The crews were all put to death; he himself, together with the oligarchical leaders who had betrayed the city to the Persians, were sent to Alexander to receive his sentence. Mitylene, too, where Chares, the Athenian general, commanded the garrison, had been forced to capitulate, and the whole of Lesbos had been recovered. Hegelochus had likewise left his colleague, Amphoterus, in possession of Cos, which the islanders had freely surrendered. There Pharnabazus had made his escape; but he had brought the other prisoners with him, among whom, besides Aristonicus, were several tyrants who had ruled under Persian patronage. These Alexander abandoned to the mercy of the cities which they had governed, and they all suffered a cruel death; the Chians, as both enemies and traitors, he sent under a strong guard to a wretched exile in the stifling island prison of Elephantine.

He was now on the confines of Egypt and Libya. In the region which lay not many days' march to the west, as some Greek legends told, Hercules and Perseus had pursued their marvellous adventures; both, it was believed, had consulted the oracle of Ammon in the heart of the Libyan wilderness. Alexander may have been desirous of emulating the achievements of his two heroic ancestors; or, if he had not heard of them, might still have been attracted by the celebrity of the oracle, and by the difficulty of reaching it. That he was impelled by curiosity about its answers is very doubtful; but it is highly probable that he did not overlook the advantage which he might derive from them, however they might run, and the mysterious dignity with which the expedition itself might invest him in the eyes of his subjects. If, however, to these motives for the enterprise it should be thought necessary to add any others of a more intelligible policy, it might be conjectured that he also wished to impress Cyrene with respect for his power, and to show that even her secluded situation did not place her beyond the reach of his arms. It may, at least, be presumed that this was one of the grounds which induced him to take the road along the coast, to the Oasis of the temple of Ammon. Accordingly, on his march to Paratonium he was met at about midway by envoys from Cyrene, who brought a crown and other magnificent presents; among the rest, some of the productions for which their country was most famed—300 war-horses and five chariots. They are said to have requested him to honour them with his

presence; and, if they wished to escape a visit, it was certainly safer, as the examples of Tyre and Aspendus had shown, to invite than to deprecate it. After a march of about 200 miles along the coast—perhaps nearly as far as the eastern frontier of the territory of Tripoli—he appears to have taken the direction towards the southeast, which leads, in five or six days for a private caravan, to the Oasis. It was now, for the first time, that the Macedonians became acquainted with the face of the Libyan desert, its pathless sands, naked rocks, burning sky, and delusive images. That the journey should have furnished numberless stories for the entertainment of the camp may easily be supposed. It is more difficult to understand how Alexander could have been at a loss for guides well acquainted with the way, as both Ptolemy and Aristobulus represented; though the one related that the perplexity of the wanderers was relieved by two great serpents, which pointed out the track, and were heard even when they could not be seen; the other described two ravens as performing the same office. Whether these are mere fictions of an idle fancy, or cover some fact which we are not able to ascertain, it is hardly worth while to inquire.\* That the army was refreshed with the extraordinary occurrence of a shower of rain, in which it saw a manifest interposition of the gods, cannot reasonably be doubted. At length it descended safely into the green, well-watered, and richly-cultivated valley, where, imbosomed in thick woods, stood, within the same enclosure, the palace of the ancient priestly kings, and, close by, the temple of Ammon.

It was a visit such as Ammon had probably never before received, and the priests, no doubt, did their utmost, both to welcome the royal pilgrim with due honours, and to impress him with the highest veneration for their oracle. It was not, it seems, always in the temple itself that answers were given. The god chose the place of his revelations for himself. His visible symbol, a round disk formed of precious stones,† was placed in a golden ship, from which, on each side, hung sacred vessels of silver; and borne on the shoulders of eighty priests, attended by a train of virgins and matrons, who accompanied the procession with sacred chants, in which they implored a propitious and certain answer, according to the secret impulses of the deity which directed their steps. By such a procession Alexander seems to have been met, as he approached at the head of his army, and to have been conducted into the temple, where his questions were answered by the chief priest. What these questions and answers were was, perhaps, never known to any but the interlocutors. It is, indeed, in itself by no means improbable that the priest saluted him as a hero of divine origin, and promised him the empire of the world; the address would not have been

\* As to the ravens, there is no reason to doubt the literal fact. It appears that these birds are looked upon as indicating the vicinity of a well in the African desert. Two ravens met Belzoni as he was approaching the Oasis El Wak.—Ritter, *Afrika*, p. 909.

† *Umblicus*, Curtius, iv., 7, 23, which the commentators think may be illustrated by the rude stones worshipped at Emesa and Paphos. But the description, *amaragdo et gemis coagmentatus*, does not seem to favour this conjecture. I suspect that this *umblicus* was a scarabeus.

more flattering, nor the prophecy bolder, than the Greek oracles, which were less safe from exposure, had sometimes ventured on. But it is well attested that Alexander did not, at least at the time, disclose what he had heard; but merely declared to his followers that he had received such answers as he had desired, and showed his satisfaction by his offerings and donations.

Aristobulus, perhaps, only expressed himself carelessly when he said that the army returned by the same route; we cannot hesitate to prefer Ptolemy's statement, that it took the direct road to Memphis; unless, indeed, we should adopt a supposition which might render the two accounts more consistent: that Alexander struck across the desert in a third direction, which leads directly to the Lake Mareotis.\* At Memphis he received re-enforcements which had been sent to him by Antipater, and embassies to present congratulations or petitions from several states of Greece; among them, it seems, one which brought a golden crown, that had been decreed by a congress assembled at the Isthmus on the occasion of the Isthmian games. It now only remained for him to settle the mode of administration by which Egypt was to be governed in his absence. It was his object at once to gain the good-will of the Egyptians, and to secure a province so important, and so easily defended, from the ambition of his own officers. The system which he established served, in some points, as a model for the policy of Rome under the emperors. He retained the ancient distribution of the country into the districts called *nomes*, and not only permitted them to be still governed by the native magistrates, the *nomarchs*, but placed them all under the authority of two Egyptians; one of them afterward resigned his office, and the whole devolved on his colleague. But garrisons were stationed at Memphis and Pelusium, commanded by two Macedonians; and a body of mercenaries was placed under the orders of an Etolian named Lycidas, who was himself controlled by a Macedonian commissary and two inspectors. The country on the western side of the Delta was committed to the care of Apollonius; that on the east, towards Arabia, to Cleomenes, an Egyptian Greek of Naucratis, who afterward became unhappily celebrated for his rapacity and financial stratagems; and he was appointed to receive the tribute collected by the *nomarchs*, but with orders not to alter that arrangement. Still, an army was left under the command of Peucestes and Balacrus, and a fleet under that of Polemo. The mutual jealousy of these officers was a sufficient pledge for their loyalty.

In the spring of 331 he set out from Memphis on his return to Phœnicia. At Tyre he found his fleet arrived, and celebrated another sacrifice to Melkart, and received an embassy which had been brought over from Athens in the Paralus. Its chief object was to obtain the release of the Athenian prisoners taken at the battle of the Granicus; and this Alexander now granted, with several other requests which were

urged by the crew of the Paralus, who accompanied the envoys in a body. The accounts which came from Peloponnesus indicated that it was threatened with a commotion through the restlessness of Sparta; and Amphoterus was ordered to lead a squadron to the aid of the Peloponnesians who were well affected towards the Macedonian interest, and the war with Persia, and to recover Crete from the Spartans. A new fleet of 100 sail was ordered to be fitted out in the ports of Phœnicia and Cyprus to follow and re-enforce Amphoterus. Whether on this occasion Alexander visited Jerusalem is doubtful; but it seems that he made an expedition into Samaria to punish the Samaritans, who—goaded, perhaps, by ill treatment—had revolted against Andromachus, had taken him prisoner, and burned him alive. On Alexander's approach, the authors of this atrocity were delivered up to him, and tranquillity was restored. He then began his march towards the Euphrates, and before the end of August arrived at Thapsacus.

A body of troops had been sent forward to throw a bridge across the river. Two had been begun, but not carried quite over, because Mazæus, a Persian officer, who had been intrusted by Darius with the defence of the passage, was posted with about 3000 cavalry, two thirds Greeks,\* on the other side. As soon, however, as he heard that Alexander was approaching, Mazæus, whose force seems, indeed, so small that it could hardly have been meant to dispute the passage, but rather to observe the enemy's movements, retired, and the bridges were finished without interruption. When he had crossed the river, Alexander did not follow the route which Cyrus had taken through the Mesopotamian desert, but directed his march towards the northeast, through a country which afforded a more abundant supply of food for man and beast, and where the army had less to suffer from the heat of the summer. On the road some Persian scouts fell into his hands, from whom he learned that Darius, with an army far greater than he had before brought into the field, lay on the left bank of the Tigris, prepared to guard the passage against him. He now advanced at full speed towards the Tigris; but when he reached it, found neither Darius himself nor any hostile force, and met with no other obstacle in the crossing than the rapidity of the stream. On the left bank he gave his troops a few days' rest after their forced march, during which there occurred an eclipse of the moon. Aristander expounded it as a sign that, during that month, the Persian monarchy was destined to lose its power and glory; and when Alexander sacrificed to the moon, the sun, and the earth, as the powers which concurred to produce the portent, the victims were found to announce a victory. He then marched southward along the river, and four days after his reconnoitering parties brought word that a body of

\* The same by which General Minutoli returned from Siwah; though Ritter, *Afrika*, p. 978, is inclined to think that this was the very road by which Alexander reached the Oasis.

\* Arrian, iii., 7. Gronovius, to bring these numbers nearer to those of Curtius, who (iv., 9, 7) has 6000, would insert *ἑνὶ* or *ἐν* before *τοῦτον*, and this last conjecture Droysen, p. 218, thinks evidently right, because the Greek mercenaries did not serve as cavalry. Yet soon after, in the description of the battle, we have *οἱ μισθοφόροι ἑνὶς* commanded by Menidas, and *ἡ ἐνὶς* *ἑνὶς* *ἡ τὴν μισθοφόρων* commanded by Andromachus. It is, moreover, extremely doubtful that Arrian would have used either *ἑνὶς* or *ἐν* in such a sense.

cavalry was in sight. He immediately drew up his army in order of battle; but, being presently informed that the enemy's cavalry then in sight did not appear to exceed 1000 men, he rushed forward with a few squadrons of his own to meet them. They fled at his approach, but some were overtaken, and slain or made prisoners. From these he learned that Darius, with his whole army, was encamped at no great distance.

The Persian king had employed the long interval allowed him by Alexander's operations after the battle of Issus to collect the remaining strength of his empire, and he had assembled a host with which, if superiority of numbers could have ensured success, he might reasonably have hoped to crush his adversary. It was also composed, for the most part, of more warlike troops. The division which was most formidable, both for numbers and martial qualities, consisted of the hardy tribes which inhabited the plains on the eastern side of the Caspian, and the valleys above Cabul, on the borders of India. They were led by Bessus, the powerful satrap of Bactria; and he was also followed by a body of horse-bowmen, furnished by the Sacæ, who wandered in the valleys east of Transoxiana, and, though they did not acknowledge his authority, willingly joined him as allies for the sake of pay and plunder. All the provinces between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and from Syria and Cappadocia to the mountains west of the Indus, had poured forth their choicest warriors. The whole amount was stated by some authors at a million of foot and 40,000 horse: this may be a great exaggeration, but it was probably reduced as much too low by those who reckoned no more than 200,000 infantry. There were, besides, 200 scythed chariots and fifteen elephants brought from the west of India. With this host Darius had encamped in one of the wide plains between the Tigris and the mountains of Kurdistan, near the Bumodus, a tributary of the Lycus, and a village named Gaugamela (the camel's house\*), which should have given its name to the battle fought near it, but was forced, through a caprice, of which we have many examples, to surrender this distinction to the town of Arbela, which lay more than twenty miles off, where Darius had left his baggage and his treasure. He had been persuaded by his courtiers that his defeat at Issus was entirely owing to the disadvantage of the ground, and he had, therefore, chosen a field on which he might fully display his forces, and where the enemy would have neither sea nor mountains to cover his flanks; and he had ordered a large tract of the plain to be cleared and levelled for the evolutions of his cavalry and chariots.

Alexander, having ascertained the enemy's posture, gave his army four days' repose before he advanced, and fortified his camp; intending to leave the invalids, the prisoners, and the greater part of the baggage behind him there,

that his troops might march to battle without any unnecessary encumbrance. He then set out soon after midnight, that he might come up with the enemy by daybreak. Some hillocks intercepted the view of the Persian camp until he had approached within three or four miles of it. He then looked down upon the plain in which the mighty host was drawn up in battle array. The centre was occupied, as usual, by Darius himself, surrounded by his horse-guard of a thousand noble Persians, who were honoured with the title of the royal kinsmen, by the foot-guard, which was distinguished by the golden knobs of its lances, and by some other picked troops. Behind it was posted a deep mass composed of Urians, Babylonians, and some adjacent tribes. In front of the royal station were ranged the elephants and fifty of the war chariots; but on either side was a body of Greek mercenaries, according to Curtius, 50,000,\* who were esteemed the only troops capable of withstanding the Macedonian phalanx. At the extremity of the left wing, which it was known would be opposed to Alexander himself, who always took his station in the right, were placed the Bactrian and Scythian cavalry, with a hundred chariots; on the right that of Armenia and Cappadocia, which seems to have stood next to them in reputation, with fifty of the chariots. The forces of the other nations were drawn up successively, horse and foot together.

As soon as he came within sight of the enemy, Alexander halted and called a council of war, to propose the question whether he should immediately offer battle. Most of his officers wished him to engage without delay; but Parmenio advised him to encamp on the spot, and, before he advanced, to explore the ground on all sides, to ascertain that no snares had been laid for the cavalry, and to obtain a more distinct view of the enemy's preparations. Alexander adopted this advice, and spent the rest of the day in riding over the field with his cavalry guard and a part of the light infantry. On his return, he again assembled his officers, and addressed them with a few words of exhortation; not, he said, so much because he deemed it necessary for their own encouragement—they had already given sufficient proofs of valour, and needed no incitement—but that they might convey his words to the divisions under their command. It was to be remembered that they were now about to fight, not for the possession of Syria, or Phœnicia, or Egypt, but for the entire dominion of Asia. With such a prize before them, they had chiefly to urge the necessity of the strictest order, and the utmost harmony in every movement; that the silence of the march must be deep, the shout and the war-song at the onset loud and fearful. The officers themselves must be alert both to receive and communicate their orders. The universal feeling should be, that the issue depended on the manner in which each man did his duty.

When the king had retired to his tent, Parmenio came to him, it is said, with another proposal: to attack the Persian army in the

\* Or, rather, according to Plutarch, *Al.* 31, the drummers. There was a legend that a drummer, which had preserved the life of some Persian king by its speed, had this village assigned for its abode, and the revenues of an adjacent district for its maintenance. Strabo (*xvi.*, p. 234, *Tibich.*) refers it to Darius Hytaspæ, whom the camel had accompanied on his expedition to Scythia, bearing the provision for the royal table.

\* *v.* 11, 5.

† The ὁπλοὺς, which his soldiers assured him the enemy would not be able to stand, *Plut.*, *R.* et *l.*, *Ap.*, *Alex.*, 12. It seems to have been a Macedonian word, though Strabo has not inserted it in his list. Schneider, too, omits it in his *Lexicon*.

night. Alexander declared that he would not steal a victory; he must conquer openly, and by a fair trial of strength. He could not have been satisfied, nor could any victory have been deemed decisive, until he had extorted from the vanquished a confession of their inferiority. A nocturnal attack would, as Arrian observes, have exposed him to the risk of an ignoble disaster, and its success, however complete, would have afforded but an imperfect triumph. There was more of cunning than of wisdom in Parmenio's project; and Alexander's reply showed no less prudence than magnanimity. He probably felt as secure of victory as before the battle of Issus. When his generals came to his tent the next morning at daybreak to receive his orders, they found him still in a profound sleep. Parmenio, it is said, was at length obliged to rouse him, and expressed his surprise that the king should have slept as well, at so critical a juncture, as if he had just gained the victory. Is it not as good as a victory, was the answer, to have overtaken the enemy!

His order of battle was, in general, similar to that which he had adopted on former occasions, from which he never deviated without some peculiar grounds. The phalanx occupied the centre in six divisions with the hypaspists, and the Macedonian cavalry under Philotas in the right, where Alexander commanded in person; on the left were the Thessalian cavalry and that of the other allies; on this side, Craterus commanded the foot under Parmenio. Some light troops, archers, and dartmen were posted in front of the Macedonian cavalry, with a view, more particularly, to ward off the attack of the chariots. But on this occasion Alexander thought it necessary to guard by a new precaution against the imminent danger with which he was threatened of being taken in the rear. For this purpose he formed a second line, composed of some brigades of the phalanx in the centre,\* with a part of the light troops, the Pæonian cavalry under Aretas and Aristot, and the mercenaries, horse and foot, under Menidas and Cleander, on the right, and on the left the Thracian infantry under Sitalcas—another division had been left to guard the camp and the prisoners—supported by three bodies of cavalry, Odrysians, mercenaries, and allies. The object of this arrangement was to counteract the preponderance of the enemy's masses, by the rapid movements of these light troops in any direction in which an attempt might be made to attack the flanks or the rear of the main body of the Macedonian army. His whole force, according to Arrian, amounted to no more than 40,000 foot and 7000 horse.†

\* Arrian's description, iii., 12, clearly implies that the *δεξιπαις*, by which the phalanx was rendered *δεξιπαις*, was distinct from the light cavalry and infantry, which were stationed on either flank *ἐξ ἐπικαυρήν*, as, indeed, its destination was manifestly quite different; but he does not mention how it was composed. Hence Droysen has been led to confound it with the troops which were placed *ἐξ ἐπικαυρήν*.

† Flatche, i., p. 324, endeavours to bring the numbers of the two armies as near as possible to one another, but by means of assumptions for which he does not show sufficient grounds. He thinks it probable that the Persian army was not so numerous as at Issus, because there had not been so long a time for assembling it. But the levies in the eastern satrapies had probably begun long before the first battle. He also conceives that Alexander had already a strong body of barbarian auxiliaries in his army, and that the second line was chiefly composed of them. But the only evi-

It was a maxim of Persian warfare never to encamp within such a distance of an enemy as to be exposed to the danger of surprise in the night; and Darius, apprehensive of such an attack as Parmenio was said to have suggested, had ordered his whole army to remain all night under arms in order of battle. A bad preparation, both of body and mind, for the approaching combat. The king, indeed, is said to have passed along the line during the night by torch-light, cheering his troops by his presence and his words. Yet the morning found them not only wearied by want of sleep, but dispirited by the long anticipation of the deadly struggle.

As the two armies drew near to each other, Alexander saw himself with the extreme squadrons of his right wing, in front of the Persian centre, outflanked by the whole length of the enemy's left wing. He advanced, therefore, by an oblique movement towards the right, and continued still to move forward in the same direction after the Scythian cavalry had begun to charge those which were posted in front of his line. The tract which had been cleared and levelled for the operations of the chariots did not extend much farther on this side; he had nearly reached its limits, when Darius, fearing that this arm, on which he placed great reliance, would become useless, ordered the Scythian and Bactrian cavalry, which were stationed in advance of the rest, to wheel round and take the enemy in flank. Alexander first sent Menidas with the mercenary squadrons to meet this attack, and then seeing him nearly overpowered by superior numbers, ordered Ariston and his Pæonians, with Cleander's infantry, to support him. On the other hand, the rest of the Scythian and Bactrian cavalry advanced to the aid of their comrades, when they began to give way, and a warm engagement ensued, in which the Macedonians with great difficulty maintained their ground; for their antagonists were not inferior in courage, and both men and horses were clad in armour. It seems to have been by the skill and precision of their movements that the Greeks were enabled first to sustain their charge, and then to rout them. At the same time the chariots were set in motion against the phalanx. Darius had hoped that they would throw it into confusion, and thus break the firmest part of the enemy's line; but they were met midway by the light troops which had been directed to watch them. Most of them were stopped or turned back by the loss of their drivers, and those which reached the phalanx passed harmlessly through the avenues which it opened for them, and then were easily secured.

In the mean while the main body of the Persian army was advancing, and was near coming into action; its left wing still stretched far beyond the head of Alexander's column, and an-

dence he can produce for this assumption is, that Alexander demanded a supply of troops from the Jewish high-priest for the siege of Tyre; that Jews actually served in his army in Palestine (Joseph. c. Ap., i., 22); and that a Phœnician fleet was sent against Peloponnesus. Arguments apparently too slight to be opposed to the silence of all the historians. Arrian's description does not suggest any such idea as that of which Flatche exposes the absurdity, that the Persian line was no longer that of the Macedonians: he expressly asserts the contrary, and shows that it was only by extraordinary efforts, as well as through the superiority or ability of their commander, that the Macedonians were able to avoid being surrounded.

other body of cavalry made a movement as with the design of taking him in the rear. Aretas was still in reserve with his light horse in the second line, and Alexander now ordered him to charge these assailants. Another division of the Persian cavalry which was posted nearer to the centre now quitted the ranks to join in the combat with Aretas. Their movement left an opening in the Persian line, which, as Alexander instantly perceived, afforded an opportunity for a decisive attack. He immediately formed his Macedonian cavalry into a pointed column, and charging into the vacant space, soon began to make havoc among his ranks on his left, which stood between him and Darius. Shortly after, the phalanx came up and began to press the enemy in front with the irresistible weight of their bristling sarissas. The Persians, and even their Greek mercenaries, were unable to withstand the double shock. Disorder and consternation soon spread through their left wing, and Darius saw the danger approaching his own person. It, no doubt, realized his secret forebodings, and it appears that he had made careful preparations for flight. He alighted from his chariot, mounted a fleet and eager courser,\* made his way through the column in the rear, and was some miles on the road to Arbela, while a part of his troops were still engaged, and not without a prospect of victory.

For, though the left wing was soon utterly broken, especially after Aretas had put the enemy's cavalry to flight, the battle seemed for a while to be taking a different turn in other parts of the field. The Armenian and Cappadocian cavalry, on the extremity of the Persian right, had turned the left wing of the Macedonians, and began greatly to distress Parmenio. The first consequence of their partial success was, that two divisions on the left of the phalanx, those of Simmias and Craterus, were restrained from advancing with the rest to support Alexander's charge, and a wide breach was thus opened in the Macedonian line. This was observed by the commanders of the Indian and Persian cavalry, which occupied the centre immediately in front of Darius, and they directed a furious charge through the midst of the phalanx. But instead of joining in the attack on the Macedonian left, which, had it been thus supported, would, perhaps, have put it completely to the rout, they did not stop until they had reached the camp on the neighbouring heights, where the Thracians were keeping very negligent guard, and, in imagined security, were mostly unarmed. They would have been the less able to defend it, as the prisoners, who were numerous, took part to the utmost of their power with the assailants, and the two divisions of heavy infantry in the second line, changing their front, had not come up to their relief, and, falling on the Persians as they were busied with plunder, killed many, and put the rest to flight. It might have seemed natural that an attempt should have been made to rescue the royal captives; but Arrian's silence leaves us in some doubt whether they had not been left behind at the fortified camp. Yet some authors related that Sis-

gambis refused to fly. The queen—the most beautiful woman in Asia—had died not long after the battle of Issus in childbirth. Darius, it is said, heard at the same time of his loss, and of the noble treatment and the magnificent burial which she had received from the conqueror; and, though at first incredulous and suspicious, when he was at length satisfied by the report of a faithful slave, lifted up his hands to heaven, and prayed to Oromasdes, that if his kingdom was to pass from himself, it might be transferred to Alexander.

Alexander was recalled from the pursuit of the routed Persians and of Darius by a message from Parmenio, requesting succour, and immediately hastened, though, as may easily be supposed, very reluctantly, with the cavalry of his guard, towards that part of the field.\* But in his way he encountered the fugitives who had been dislodged from the camp, and who, finding themselves intercepted, made a furious effort to break through. The combat was close and hot. Sixty of the Macedonians fell, and Hephæstion and two other generals were wounded. The loss on the other side was, no doubt, much greater; but a part of the Persians forced their passage through, and escaped. Alexander, as he was coming up to his left wing, learned that the gallant exertions of the Thessalian cavalry had already delivered Parmenio from his danger; though their victory was probably owing, in a great measure, to the dismay which seized the Persians when they heard of their king's flight, especially as a report seems to have prevailed of his death. The rout was now complete in every part of the field, and Alexander again set out in pursuit of Darius. He continued it as long as the light lasted, and then halted to rest the men and horses till midnight on the left banks of the Lycus (the Greater Zab), while Parmenio took possession of the Persian camp. The passage of the Lycus had been more destructive to the fugitives than the swords of their pursuers. The bridge was soon blocked up by the numbers who made for it as their only refuge, and the rest, in blind terror, cast themselves into the rapid stream, and, encumbered by their armour, strove in vain to reach the opposite bank. At midnight, Alexander resumed his pursuit of Darius, whom he hoped to overtake at Arbela. There, indeed, he found the whole of the royal treasure and baggage; but Darius himself had continued his flight without intermission, accompanied by the Bactrian cavalry and a part of his guards, and by about 2000 Greek soldiers, who had joined him on the road. He had bent his course over the mountains towards the capital of Media: a route by which it was scarcely practicable to follow him with an army.

Knowing so little as we do of the numbers which Darius brought into the field on this eventful day, we can as little rely on any of the statements which we find as to the amount

\* So Arrian, iii., 15, with whom Curtius, iv., 16, 3, and Plutarch, Al., 33, agree, though they mention Alexander's reluctance, which Arrian omits. Diodorus, xvii., 60, says that Alexander never received the message. It seems strange, therefore, that Droysen, who professes to follow Arrian's account of the battle, should relate, p. 228, that Alexander received it just as he was about to charge, but dismissed the bearer with the remark that Parmenio must have lost his senses.

\* A mare which had been taken from her foal, according to Plutarch. Al., 33.

of his loss. But it is somewhat surprising that Arrian, whose judgment in other points is usually so clear, should have related, in a manner which betrays no doubt, that the Persian slain amounted to 300,000, and the prisoners to a still greater number, while the Macedonians lost only about 100 men.\*

This day, however, decided the contest, though the escape of Darius disappointed one of the conqueror's most cherished hopes. Alexander was not so eager to secure the person of Darius as to neglect the more important fruits of his victory which lay before him in the southern provinces of the empire: the possession of the capitals which contained the immense treasures that had been piled up by the Persian kings for many generations. These might have been exposed to danger, if the news of his own approach had not quickly followed that of the battle which put an end to the authority of the ancient government. He therefore postponed the pursuit of Darius, and continued his march towards Babylon. He had been prepared to expect resistance, since Mazæus had taken refuge there after the battle. But at no great distance from the city he was met by the whole population, with the priests and magistrates, and Mazæus himself, and Bagophanes, the commander of the citadel, at their head, bringing rich presents, and surrendering the city, the citadel, and all the treasures it contained. Thus attended, the conqueror made his triumphal entry, the army following his chariot, through streets strewn with flowers, and lined with silver altars smoking with incense, amid the songs of the priests. Babylon had never been well affected to the dynasty of the Achæmenids, and had suffered much from their resentment. Xerxes, in a fit of despotic caprice, or instigated by his Magians, had persecuted the religion of the Chaldæans, and had pulled down the temple of Belus, and others, which had never afterward been restored, but remained, in their ruins, monuments of the tyranny of the government, and motives of animosity to the people. Alexander here found himself in a position very like that which had been so advantageous to him in Egypt, and he made an equally judicious use of it. One of his first measures, after he entered the city, was to give orders for the rebuilding of the demolished temples; and to place himself under the direction of the Chaldæans for the purpose of sacrificing in the most acceptable manner to Belus. At the same time, he provided for the security of the capital by a distribution of powers according to the maxim which the Persian kings had once adopted, but too often neglected. He appointed Mazæus satrap of Babylon, and Apollodorus of Amphipolis to command the forces which he left with him, but committed the citadel and the garrison—700 Macedonians and 300 Greeks—to Agathon, and charged Asclepiodorus with the collection of the tribute.

The army was permitted to revel for some time in the enjoyments which the most splendid and voluptuous of Eastern cities offered in profusion to the bewildered senses of the rough

soldiers of the North, who, inured from their childhood to poverty and hardship, found themselves suddenly transported into the lap of ease and luxury. Alexander probably considered this as a reward due to the fatigues which they had lately undergone to place him on the throne of the East; and he added a donative from the treasures of Babylon, which must have amounted to several thousand talents. Perhaps he believed that this short taste of pleasure would serve to animate them under the toils and dangers which they had still to encounter in the remoter and wilder regions of Asia, by the remembrance of the delights which awaited them on their return. Nor, in fact, under such a leader, was much danger to be apprehended from the effect of this sojourn on the habits of the common soldier; more might be feared from the change it was likely to make in the views and characters of their chiefs, who now saw themselves raised to almost princely rank, in the possession of boundless wealth, and surrounded with all the instruments of sensual gratification the most refined and intoxicating. To Alexander himself, however, this interval was not one of indolent repose; perhaps not much longer than was necessary for transacting the various affairs which had been accumulating during his march from the coast of Syria. Babylon itself was chiefly interesting to him, as he probably, at the first sight of it, conceived the design of making it the capital of his empire: a purpose for which it was manifestly adapted beyond any of the other great cities of the East, not so much by the inexhaustible fertility of its territory, or by the strength of its walls, and the magnificence of its buildings,\* as by the advantages of its position, its comparative vicinity to Europe, and its more immediate connexion with the sea, which—as he may already have divined—opened a passage to India, the remote goal of his ambition.

It was about the middle of November when he set out for Susa. Rich as Babylon was, its treasures were small in comparison with those which were known to have been amassed in the palace at Susa; and it had, therefore, been his first care, as soon as he gave up the pursuit of Darius, to despatch one of his officers, named Philoxenus, to make himself master of them. On his road he met a courier, whom Philoxenus had sent with the agreeable tidings that the satrap Abulites had surrendered Susa without resistance, and that the whole of the treasure was in safe custody. In twenty days after his departure from Babylon he arrived at Susa. The sum which he found here amounted to 40,000 talents of uncoined gold and silver, and 9000 in the gold pieces called Darics. The value of the other parts of the royal hoard may be, in some degree, estimated from the fact, that among the property of Bagoas, which he bestowed on Parmenio, was a wardrobe worth 1000 talents. At Susa had been preserved the spoils which Xerxes had carried off from Greece; among them, the brazen statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton: Alexander now sent them back to Athens, where Arrian saw them in the Ceramicus.

Soon after his arrival he received the reinforcements which he had been expecting from

\* Droysen, however, takes no offence at these numbers.

† Diodorus, xvii., 68, says, more than thirty days. It is, however, a little suspicious, that the news of the surrender of Susa had not arrived before Alexander left Babylon.

\* Strabo, xv., p. 323, Tauch.

Europe. They were conducted by Amyntas, son of Andromenes, and consisted of 6000 foot and 500 horse from Macedonia, 3500 Thracian foot and 600 horse, and 4000 foot, with 380 horse, from Peloponnesus. The general was accompanied by fifty noble Macedonian youths, to serve as the king's pages. He also brought a present to the king from his sisters; some articles of dress, the work of their own hands: employment which, Alexander now learned, was deemed degrading by the Persian ladies.\* But Amyntas was, it seems, also the bearer of important news from Greece. Threatening movements had taken place in Peloponnesus under the influence of Sparta; and Antipater, though he was obliged to send his levies to the army, was preparing for a war at home. Alexander now sent Menes down to the coast of the Mediterranean, to take the government of Syria, Phœnicia, and Cilicia, with 3000 talents, part of which was to be transmitted to Antipater, and the rest to be employed in the collecting of fresh troops, which were continually required to fill the place of those which were left as garrisons, or in occupation of the newly-conquered countries. The arrival of the re-enforcements under Amyntas enabled him to reward the most deserving of his old soldiers with military commands: he seems to have instituted a new subdivision of the cavalry in order to multiply the number of the officers, and to have departed from the ancient usage, according to which, they were always taken from the district which furnished the troops, and to have thrown all places open to merit.† He rewarded Abulites with the satrapy of Susiana, but appointed Artabellus general of its forces, and Masarus, another Macedonian, commander of the citadel. Then, having celebrated the acquisition of Susia with sacrifices and games, leaving Sisymbrius and her grandchildren in the palace of their ancestors, he took the road to Persepolis, the still more ancient seat of the Achæmenids, where they ruled, not as conquerors, but as heads of their own nation. Between the plains of Susiana and those of the proper Persia lies a mountainous region, then inhabited by the Uxians, who were in possession of a defile through which the high road passed. The Uxian mountaineers—for a part cultivated the plain—were a poor but hardy race, which had never been subdued; and the great king, when he travelled from his Persian to his Susian capital, had always been obliged to pay the tribute which they demanded. When Alexander entered their country, they sent to inform him that he would not be permitted to pass the defile without the usual acknowledgment. The Persian kings had, probably, disguised the weakness betrayed by their compliance with the name of munificence; but Alexander saw it in its true light, and he had never yet won a passage by any instrument but the sword. Suppressing his indignation, he bade the Uxians meet him at the pass, and receive their dues. But, in the mean while, setting out by night with his guard and other pick-

ed troops, in all about 8000, he struck into a rugged track which led into the heart of the mountains, and the next morning fell suddenly on the Uxian villages, which he laid waste, driving off the flocks and herds, which formed the chief wealth of the natives, and putting all who fell into his hands to the sword. He then left Craterus to take possession of the heights, to which he expected the enemy would retreat, and himself hastened forward to seize the pass. The Uxians, who had levied all their forces to receive the tribute, when they came up, found the Macedonian army posted on the strong ground in which they had placed their whole confidence. Though they were, probably, far superior in numbers, they did not venture to try their strength, but immediately took to flight. Many were overtaken by their pursuers, others perished among the precipices; but a still greater number, flying to the mountains, fell into the hands of Craterus. The rest sent a suppliant embassy to Alexander: their leader, Madates, had married a niece of Sisymbrius, and the queen mother was induced, it is said, to intercede for them. They were permitted to retain their land, subject to a yearly tribute of horses, sheep, and cattle.

Between the Uxian defile, or, as it was called, the Gates of Susia, and Persepolis, there were two routes, a shorter one over a succession of lofty, thickly-wooded mountains, and an easier one over the lower ground. This last was the royal road: the other, at all times difficult, and in winter hardly passable. Both were terminated by the Persian Gates, a pass still more arduous than the last, and occupied by a much more formidable enemy; for here Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Persia—faithful to his master, or ambitious of independence—had intrenched himself with an army of 40,000 foot and 700 horse, on the heights which enclose the defile, and behind a wall which he had built across it. Alexander sent Parmenio with the baggage, the Thessalian cavalry, the mercenaries, and allied troops,\* by the lower road, while he himself, with the Macedonian infantry, the cavalry of the guard, and a part of the light troops, crossed the mountains, and encamped near the foot of the pass. The next day he made an attempt to penetrate it, but found the enemy's position too strong to be forced, and was obliged to retire to his camp, not without loss from their missiles, and from the stones which were rolled down on the heads of the assailants. His perplexity was relieved by some of his prisoners, or, according to another account, by a shepherd, a Lycian by birth, who offered to point out a way over the mountains, by which he might descend on the enemy's rear. He now left Craterus, with two brigades of the infantry, and a small body of cavalry and bowmen, in the camp, ordering him to keep up a great number of fires to deceive the Persians.

\* Curtius, v., 2.  
† Arrian, iii., 16. Whatever may have been the nature of these regulations, they seem to have been the same as those which are mentioned by Diodorus, xvii., 64, and Curtius, v., 2, though, according to these writers, they were made during a halt in Sitacene (Satrapene of Curtius), Amyntas having rejoined the army at Babylon.

\* Arrian here (iii., 18) expresses himself with unusual indistinctness. He says that Parmenio was sent with the troops mentioned in the text, and with all the other heavy-armed (*ὅσοι τὸν τοῦ ἐπὶ τῇ περσικῇ βασιλείᾳ ἐπὶ τῇ περσικῇ βασιλείᾳ*), and yet adds, that Alexander took with him all the Macedonian infantry—that is, the phalanx, the part of the army which was more heavily-armed than any other. So Droysen makes Parmenio set out with the heavy-armed and the baggage train, and neither explains nor notices the seeming inconsistency.

and as soon as he should hear the signal of the trumpets, which were to announce the king's arrival at the opposite end of the pass, to make an attempt to storm the wall. He himself, with four brigades of the infantry and the remainder of the cavalry and light troops, followed his guides over the mountains, where, in many places, the snow had been drifted to a great depth. At the end of about eight miles he divided his forces, and sent three brigades, under Amyntas, Philotas, and Cœnus, into the plain, to throw a bridge over a river which crossed the road to Persepolis.\* He himself, with the brigade of Perdiccas, the hypaspists, some squadrons of horse, and the lightest of the bowmen, turned to the right, along a still more rugged path, which led to the defile. Before day-break he had reached the Persian outposts. At the first he put all the men to the sword. From the second a few escaped, and still more from the third; but all were so panic-struck, that they fled into the mountains, and none apprized Ariobarzanes of the enemy's approach. With the first dawn of day, having left Ptolemy with 3000 men on one of the heights above the Persian camp, he appeared before it below. The blast of the trumpets first gave notice of his presence both to the astonished enemy and to Craterus, who, when he heard the expected signal, immediately led his men to attack the wall. The Persians, thus threatened on three sides, lost all self-possession, abandoned their fortifications to Craterus and Ptolemy, and thought only of flight. The greater part were cut to pieces, or perished among the precipices. Ariobarzanes, with a few horsemen, made his escape into the mountains.

After a short rest, Alexander advanced into the plain to rejoin his generals, who had by this time completed the bridge, and, having crossed the river, proceeded by forced marches towards Persepolis. His speed was quickened by a letter which he received on the road from Tiridates, the governor of the city, offering to surrender the treasures, but expressing his fears that he should not be able long to preserve it from plunder. As he approached the capital, he is said to have been met by a multitude of Greeks, who had been transported, it seems, from Asia Minor†—for what offence is not recorded—and had been barbarously mutilated. The fact itself, though omitted by Arrian, and used by other writers as a topic for a rhetorical exercise, is consistent enough with Persian usages to be perfectly credible, and perhaps had some connexion with the events that followed; for Alexander, though he met with no resistance, and found the treasure untouched, permitted his soldiers to plunder the city,‡ which seems

to have surpassed both Babylon and Susa, as well in the opulence of its inhabitants as in the hoards of the crown. This had been the principal reservoir—perhaps because the province was deemed the most secure from invasion—into which the tribute of the East had flowed from the beginning of the monarchy. The amount of the royal treasure is estimated at 120,000 talents—a sum which the authors, who felt themselves constrained to report it, could not help acknowledging to be almost incredible; and yet we have no reason to suspect that it has been very much exaggerated. It seems to have been one of the state maxims of the Persian kings to draw as little as possible from this pile of wealth; and it was probably their pride to be continually augmenting it. The expenses of the court and army, as they were chiefly defrayed by a system of purveyance, did not require any great outlay of money;\* and we have seen that, on some occasions, the most important preparations were allowed to remain long suspended, because the means of prosecuting them could not be obtained from the court;† while tribute was rigidly exacted from the satraps, even for parts of their provinces which were but nominally subject to them, and which yielded no revenue.‡

The sight of the mutilated Greeks, which must have excited feelings of vehement resentment in the army, may have contributed to inspire Alexander with the thought that it became him to appear, in this ancient seat of the Achæmenids, as the avenger of the injuries which, in the days of their prosperity, they had inflicted on Greece, and more especially on Athens, and thus to discharge the commission which he had received from the congress at Corinth. Yet there may have been some ground for the story, which appears to have been more commonly received, that he was not in full possession of his judgment when, in spite of Parmenio's remonstrances—who begged him to consider that he was about to spoil his own property, and that it would seem as if he did not mean to retain his conquests, and had only come to rife and ravage the lands through which he passed—he set fire with his own hands to the royal palace. Many of his admirers, no doubt, thought his memory dishonoured by the tale that, at a banquet given by one of his generals, when the guests were heated with wine, an Athenian courtesan suggested the thought of this—as she might naturally deem it—glorious revenge, and that the king, starting up in a half-sportive, half-passionate mood, led the way, and hurled the first torch into that magnificent and venerable pile. But Arrian seems to have perceived that such a sally, in a convivial moment, would have betrayed less weakness than the deliberate purpose of an act so barbarous and useless. And if, as Plutarch asserts, it was admitted on all hands that he soon repented of the deed, and ordered the conflagration to be stopped—that he afterward regretted it, Arrian himself observes§—we should be at a loss to reconcile such levity with the character which he displayed whenever it was not disguised by intemperance.

\* Not, of course, the Araxes (Bendémir), which flows close by Persepolis. It may have been, as Droysen thinks, the Arsis, but perhaps, more probably, is a stream which appears to flow from the same mountains farther eastward in a direction nearly parallel to the Araxes, and to lose itself in the plain.

† One of them, according to Curtius, was a native of Cumæ; another, indeed, was an Athenian. Flathe, i., p. 287, thinks that they were partisans of democracy in the cities on the western coast.

‡ This fact, however it may be explained, seems sufficiently attested by Diodorus and Curtius, notwithstanding Arrian's silence. Flathe, i., p. 334, supposes that Alexander and his troops were exasperated by the resistance of the inhabitants. But this would hardly have been passed over in silence by our authors. Diodorus does not say, as Flathe

represents, that the city was burned down as well as the palace.

\* See Heeren, *Ideen*, i., 1, p. 404, foll.

† Vol. i., p. 568, n. 1. ‡ Vol. i., p. 493. § Vol. vi., p. 30.



This violence, if it was the result of sober reflection, would also have been somewhat strangely contrasted with the reverence which he showed for the tomb of Cyrus, which he visited at Pasargadæ, a city not far to the south-east of Persepolis, built, it is said, by the founder of the monarchy, as a monument of his victory over Astyages.\* There, in the midst of the park, was a small tower, containing his golden coffin resting on a bier, a table covered with drinking vessels, tapestry, and carpets, and dresses of Babylonian workmanship, and jewelled ornaments, and arms. On the outside was an inscription in Persian characters, which declared to whom the sepulchre belonged, and claimed respect for the remains of the King of Asia. Within the same enclosure was the dwelling of a Magian family, which, ever since the reign of Cambyzes, had been charged with the care of the tomb. Alexander, when he came to Pasargadæ, ordered Aristobulus to enter the sepulchral chamber, to inspect its condition, and repair any injury which its ornaments might have suffered in the course of time. The palace of Pasargadæ also contained a treasure of 6000 talents, which he carried away.

Arrian gives no hint that Alexander designed to punish the people of Persis for the acts of its ancient kings otherwise than by the conflagration of the palace; and it is very doubtful that the plundering of the capital was premeditated; the disposition which had been shown to seize the treasure might sufficiently account for it. He seems to have respected national feelings, when he appointed Phrasaortes, son of Rheomithres, satrap of the province, though he left Tridates in the office which he had before held,† and intrusted the citadel of Persepolis to a Greek.

Thus, in about three years and a half after he had crossed the Hellespont, Alexander had broken the military force of the Persian Empire, had made himself master of its richest provinces, had seated himself on the throne of Darius. His conquest, indeed, was not yet complete; his rival not yet in his power. But he might fairly assume the title of King of Asia, as it had been borne by Cyrus and his successors. What remained to be done was, not so much to assert his claim to it with the sword, as to take possession of the rest of his dominions.

## CHAPTER LI.

### FROM THE TAKING OF PERSEPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF DARIUS.

AFTER the battle of Gaugamela, Darius had taken the road to Ecbatana. This ancient capital of Media contained a considerable treasure, and here he thought he might wait in safety for the turn of events: not without a hope that

some accident might happen to arrest Alexander's progress. He calculated, perhaps, on the resistance which might be made by the satrap of Persis, or by the wild tribes on its north-west border; partly, too, it may be, on the movements which were beginning to threaten Macedonia in Greece. For even after his last defeat he had received an embassy from Sparta, which was accompanied by an Athenian named Dropidas; and he had learned that the nation at large was not so blinded by names as to share the sentiment of the Corinthian Demaratus, who, when he saw Alexander seated on the throne of the great king, is said to have shed tears of joy, and to have observed, that the Greeks who had died before they witnessed that sight had lost a great pleasure;\* as if it was a happiness for Greece to have the great king reigning at Pella as well as at Susa. But it seems that he trusted entirely to fortune, or to the exertions of others. It is very doubtful whether he ever entertained the design of collecting a fresh army and meeting Alexander again in the field; though Arrian's silence may not prove anything against the assertions of the other historians on this point, which are in some degree confirmed by the rumour which he himself mentions about the preparations of Darius. But his final resolution was to retreat before Alexander, if he should advance into Media, towards the northeast, laying waste the country through which he passed, and to seek refuge on the other side of the Oxus, where he might hope that the conqueror would be content to leave him unmolested. He sent his baggage and his harem to the Caspian Gates, one of the passes of Mount Elburz. The force which he had gathered at Ecbatana is said by Diodorus and Curtius to have amounted to more than 30,000 infantry, including 4000 Greeks, and 3000 cavalry. Arrian mentions only 6000 foot and 3000 horse as accompanying his march. It is possible that a part was sent forward with the baggage, and that when he began to retreat, numbers left his standard. Bessus, however, in whose satrapy he meant to seek shelter, Barsaentes, the satrap of Arachosia and Drangiana, Nabarzanes, who had commanded the cavalry in the right wing at the battle of Issus, and the aged Artabazus, loyal as ever to the royal house, still adhered to him.

Alexander suffered four months to elapse before he again set out in pursuit of Darius. Plutarch says that he wished to rest his army. Yet, in the course of this time, with a body of cavalry and light troops, he made an expedition, which lasted thirty days, against the fierce tribes in the highlands of Persis, and notwithstanding the obstacles opposed by the rigour of the season, penetrated into their secluded valleys, and reduced them to submission. If the site of Ecbatana is occupied by Isfahan,† it seems a little surprising that he should have remained so long within a distance which he could have traversed, perhaps, in about twelve days, without any of the difficulties which he encountered in his expedition against the Persian mountaineers. On the other hand, if Darius was as far off as Hamadan, it is very easy

\* Heeren supposes Pasargadæ (or, according to Tychsen, Pasargada—abode of Persians) to have been the name of the district which included both cities. Zonga believed Pasargadæ to have been the more ancient: Persepolis to have been founded by Darius.

† Curtius, v., 6, 11. As the treasure was to be removed, it would seem that Tridates must have been appointed to receive the tribute of Persis, though Flashes infer, from Arrian's silence on this point, that the province continued to enjoy its ancient immunity.

\* Plutarch, Al., 37, 56. Elsewhere, Ages., 15, he himself expresses a different feeling.

† This question will be considered in the Appendix.

to understand why Alexander should have let the winter pass before he resumed his march with his whole army towards the northern mountains of Irak. On his road to Ecbatana, he turned aside to subdue the Parætaceniens,\* one of the tribes to the north of Persis, who, relying on their highland strongholds, subsisted chiefly on plunder, and committed the government of the province to Oxathres, son of Abulites, late satrap of Susa. When he resumed his march, he received information that Darius, having been re-enforced by auxiliaries from Scythia, and from the independent Cadusians, was about to meet him and to offer battle. There seems to be reason to suspect that this report may have been a stratagem by which Darius intended to gain time. Alexander was induced by it to leave his baggage behind, and to advance with his army prepared for action. But when he had reached the borders of Media, he discovered that the report he had heard was unfounded, and that Darius was bent on flight. This intelligence quickened his movements, and within three days' march of Ecbatana he was met by Bisthanes, a son of Ochus, who informed him that Darius had set out five days before from the Median capital with his little army, carrying off the treasure, which amounted to about 7000 talents.

During his stay in Persis, Alexander had collected a vast number of mules and camels to transport the treasures of Persepolis, where, after the disposition that had been manifested by the inhabitants, he did not think they could be left in safety, to Ecbatana. Even if it was in his power to have reached the Caspian Gates by a shorter road, it would not be surprising that he should have given up the chance of overtaking the fugitive on that side of the pass, that he might first enter Ecbatana, and make arrangements for the reception of so important a deposit. At Ecbatana he permitted the Thessalian cavalry, and as many of the other allied troops as desired it, to return to their homes. The object of his expedition had been so far attained, that he had no longer any colour for detaining them without their consent. But he invited those who were willing to continue in his service to enter their names in a roll, and many preferred to remain with him. The rest received 2000 talents in addition to the pay which was due to them. Epocillus was appointed to escort them with a body of cavalry—for the Thessalians sold their horses—as far as the coast, where Menes was directed to provide for their passage to Eubœa. Parmenio, who had been left with the baggage, was ordered to lodge the treasure in the citadel of Ecbatana, and to commit it to the care of Harpalus, under the guard of 6000 Macedonians, some cavalry, and light troops. The Macedonians were afterwards to be brought up to rejoin the army by Cleitus, the commander of the royal squadron of the guard, who had been detained by illness at Susa. Parmenio, with a division composed of the Greek mercenaries,

Thracians, and a part of the cavalry, was afterwards to make a circuit through the territory of the Cardusians, who inhabited the mountainous region now called Dilem, and then to proceed along the shores of the Caspian into Hyrcania.

He himself, with the main body of the army, advanced by forced marches in pursuit of Darius. Many of the men and horses sank under the fatigue; but he abated nothing of his speed until, having traversed a space of about 300 miles in eleven days, he reached Rhagæ, at the distance of fifty miles from the Gates. There, having ascertained that Darius had passed through, he gave up immediate pursuit as hopeless, and allowed five days' rest to his troops. Rapid as had been his progress through Media, he considered it as conquered, and committed the satrapy to a Persian named Oxodates, whom he had found imprisoned in the citadel of Susa by order of Darius. This appeared a sufficient guarantee of his fidelity to his new master. He then advanced in the track of the fugitives. After he had passed the Gates, he laid in a stock of provisions, which he learned it would be difficult to procure in the desert country that lay before him, and had sent out Cœnus with a foraging party, when two of the followers of Darius, a Babylonian named Bagistanes, and Antibelus, the son of Mæzus, arrived at the camp, with tidings that Darius had been thrown into chains by Bessus, Barsantes, and Nabarzanès.

Bessus and his accomplices had, it seems, soon after their master's fortunes became desperate, formed the plan of seizing his person, with the intention either to deliver him up to Alexander or to despatch him, as might best serve their interest. Their object was to secure themselves in the independent possession of their satrapies; and they hoped either to receive them as the reward of their treachery from Alexander, or to be able, after the death of Darius, to retain them by force. Bessus was in some way connected with the royal family, and thus saw a prospect of mounting the vacant throne with the appearance of a legitimate title. The Bactrian troops, which formed the strength of his little army, were devoted to him; but Patron, the commander of the Greek mercenaries, was the more steadfast in his fidelity to Darius, as he feared, above all things, to fall into Alexander's hands; and the loyalty of Artabazus was known to be incorruptible. The traitors, therefore, thought it necessary to proceed with caution. In a council which was held after their departure from Ecbatana,\* Nabarzanès ventured to propose that the king should, for the time, resign his authority to Bessus, whose birth, rank, and influence in the provinces where they might expect to rally their forces, pointed him out as the man best qualified to restore the falling empire. Darius was so indignant at this suggestion, that he drew his cimeter, and was with difficulty restrained from rushing upon the speaker. But after Bessus and Nabarzanès had withdrawn, he was induced to stifle his resentment by the counsels of Artabazus, who

\* Mr. Williams, for the interest of his theory about the site of Ecbatana, takes it for granted (*Life of Alex.* p. 177, and *Geogr. Memoir of Ecbatana*, p. 26) that the expedition against the Parætaces, mentioned by Arrian, iii. 19, is the same as that described by Curtius, v. 6, 12. But this assumption is utterly groundless, and inconsistent with Arrian's language.

\* According to Curtius, v. 8, Darius in this council proposed to wait for Alexander, and give battle: a design so inconsistent with his character, especially if he had but 9000 men with him, that I am surprised Droysen should think the rhetoric of Curtius sufficient to prove it.

represented the danger of discord in the camp at a juncture when Alexander was so close behind : and the conspirators, when they next appeared in the royal presence, feigned repentance and submission, and were again seemingly received into favour. But, in the mean while, they endeavoured to gain over the rest of the troops, and their designs became known to Patron and Artabazus. The Greek obtained an audience of Darius, disclosed his suspicions, and pressed the king to take refuge in the Greek camp. Darius, it is said, declared that he would rather die among his own people than owe his safety to the protection of foreigners ; nor could the persuasions of Artabazus induce him to change his resolution. He was soon after deserted by his attendants : his tent was surrounded by the Bactrians, and no resistance was offered by the other troops, when, by the command of Beesus, he was chained and placed in a covered chariot. All submitted to the rebel's authority except the Greeks, and Artabazus and his sons, who withdrew from the camp, and turned aside out of the high road into the mountains of the Tapurians (Taberistan).

Alexander, when he heard these tidings, immediately prepared for still more active pursuit ; he did not even wait for the return of Cœnus, but, leaving Craterus to follow with the army by gentle marches, set forward the same evening with a part of the cavalry, including the guard, and a select body of foot, whom he ordered to take nothing with them but two days' provisions. They marched the whole night, and did not halt until the next day at noon ; and after a short repose again set out, continued their march through the night, and arrived at daybreak at the place where the fugitives had encamped, when they were deserted by Bagistanes. Here he was informed of the course that had been taken by the Greeks and Artabazus. His men and horses were now nearly spent with toil, yet he pressed forward without intermission for another night, and on the following noon reached a village where the barbarians had encamped the day before. Here he learned that they had determined to pursue their march during the night ; and it seemed hopeless, with troops so fatigued, to overtake them on the same road. By inquiry, however, among the country people, he discovered that there was a cross-road leading over a desert, arid tract, by which he might gain upon them ; but his infantry were unable to follow him with the speed required for this last effort ; he therefore mounted 600 of the officers and best soldiers of the infantry in their ordinary armour, and ordering Nicanor and Attalus to proceed along the high road, with the hypaspists and Agrianians lightly equipped, himself, with his little band, took the shorter route. After another laborious night he came up, by daybreak, with the enemy, whom he found in all the disorder of a hasty retreat. The numbers which he had brought with him were not known, and his unexpected presence spread general consternation. Scarcely any attempt was made at resistance : the conspirators, when they found that he was approaching, pressed Darius to mount a horse, and fly with them. The unhappy king now preferred falling into the hands of a generous enemy. On his refusal, they left

him mortally wounded in the chariot, and took to flight, accompanied by 600 horse. He expired before Alexander saw him. The conqueror threw his own cloak over the corpse.

One of the many kings who would have been happier and more honoured if they had never mounted the throne ; yet, if he had reigned in peaceful times, he would probably have been esteemed, at least, as well able to fill it as most of his predecessors ; and it is very doubtful whether any of them, had they been in his case, would have defended it more successfully. None, however, could have lost it more ingloriously ; and, perhaps, he has only gained the credit of mildness and moderation, because, as Arrian observes, he had no opportunity of showing his real character in this respect in a reign which was one series of troubles and disasters. As, after his accession to the throne, he lost the reputation for personal courage which he had previously earned, so it was his fate, after death, to recover the honours of which he had been stripped during his life.\* Alexander ordered his body to be buried in the sepulchre of his ancestors with royal magnificence, took charge of the education of his children, and married his daughter.

Alexander had encamped near the Parthian city, which, being a point where many roads met, bore the sounding Greek name of Hecatompylus (the hundred-gated), probably not far from Damaghan ; and here he suffered his troops to rest until they were rejoined by the main body, which he had left under the command of Craterus. If we might believe Curtius and Diodorus, a very general wish now manifested itself in the army to be released from farther service, and it was only by an eloquent appeal to their sense of honour that Alexander induced his Macedonian troops to remain with him. It is certain that he now dismissed the greater part of his Greek auxiliaries, but with praise and munificent rewards. Besides their pay, reckoned to the time of their arrival in Greece, the horsemen received each a talent, and each foot soldier a tenth part of that sum ; but those who were willing to stay were rewarded with a donative of three talents a man—that is, probably for the cavalry, and for the infantry in proportion. A letter from Alexander to Parmenio, quoted by Plutarch, proves that he thought it expedient to proclaim that the Macedonians also were at liberty to depart, if there were any who chose to abandon their king in the midst of his victorious career. His offer was received with general acclamations : they would follow him into whatever part of the world he might lead them. Their zeal was recompensed with the treasure found among the baggage of Darius. Yet, when the auxiliaries had left him, he found his army reduced to 20,000 foot and 3000 horse : to be re-enforced, indeed, within no long time by the two brigades of the phalanx which were waiting for the arrival of Cleitus at Ecbatana. The satrapy of Parthia and—though he had not yet entered it—of Hyrcania was bestowed on a Parthian, Amminapes, who had contributed, with Mazaces, to open Egypt to the Macedonians ; but with him, as usual, was associated

\* The remark may appear sentimental ; but it is Arrian's.

a Macedonian named Tlepolemus, as inspector, or military governor of the province.\*

He then divided his forces into three columns, for the invasion of Hyrcania. With the lightest he himself took the shortest, but most difficult road over the mountains on his left. The second division he gave to Craterus, with orders to march westward into the territory of the Taurians, and both to reduce the barbarians to submission, and, if possible, to make himself master of Artabazus and the Greeks. Eriguius, with the third division and the baggage, was to follow the easier and more circuitous road which led northward to Zadracarta—probably the site of Sari, the modern capital of Mazanderan. This mountainous region, which separates the great plains of Khorasan from the fertile valleys which open on the south coast of the Caspian Sea, was inhabited by a fierce race of independent barbarians. Alexander, by the rapidity of his movements—advancing with a few light troops before the main body of his division—secured the passes, yet the troops which followed him did not effect their passage without some difficulty and loss. In his camp on the river which Curtius calls the Ziobaris, Diodorus the Stibœtes, where he rested four days, he received a letter from Nabarzanes, who had already abandoned Bessus, and now offered to surrender himself, if he might be assured of his personal safety. Alexander gave the royal pledge which he required, considering him, perhaps, as the tool of Bessus, and, therefore, as beneath his vengeance. As he pursued his march, he was met by Phrataphernes, the satrap of Hyrcania, and by several of the principal Persians who had followed Darius, and had made their escape after his death. They had been faithful to their prince, and found a gracious reception from the conqueror. He then proceeded towards Zadracarta; but, it seems, before he reached it he was rejoined by Craterus and Eriguius.† Craterus had overpowered all resistance wherever he passed through the land of the Taurians, but he had not fallen in with Artabazus or the Greeks. Soon after, however, Artabazus himself came to the camp with three of his sons, accompanied by Autophradates, the satrap of the Taurians, and by deputies from the Greek soldiers. To reward the submission of Autophradates, Alexander permitted him to retain his satrapy; and he honoured the loyalty of the venerable Artabazus, whom he kept near his own person, with the most delicate marks of attention. He himself usually accompanied the march of the army on foot; but, when attended by Artabazus, he mounted on horseback, that the old man, who was now in his ninety-fifth year, might not be ashamed to ride by his side. To the Greek deputies, who wished to capitulate with him, he gave a stern answer; he would make no stipulation with men who had so violated the duty which they owed to their country, and had disobeyed the decrees of the national congress. They must throw themselves unconditionally on his mercy, or must provide for their safety as they could. They

then consented to surrender at discretion, and at their request Alexander sent Andronicus and Artabazus to conduct the troops to his camp.

Another fierce tribe remained to be subdued on the western side of Hyrcania, the Mardians, whose seats appear to have occupied the confines of Ghilan and Mazanderan; a race of robbers, who thought themselves secure in the midst of the thick forests which clothed the sides of their mountains, and had, therefore, neglected to propitiate the conqueror. He had, indeed, advanced so far eastward as to lead them to suppose that he did not intend to attack their territory, which had not, for a long time, been violated by the foot of an invader. His sudden appearance, therefore, struck them with the greater terror, and when his perseverance had surmounted the natural obstacles of the land, he had but little resistance to encounter from its inhabitants. In the course of this expedition Bucephalus fell into the enemy's hands. Alexander made it known that unless his horse was restored to him, he would not leave the country until he had exterminated the whole population. The threat answered its purpose; the noble animal was brought back to its master, and soon after an embassy came to announce the entire submission of the tribe. Alexander committed the government of it to Autophradates, whom he had already intrusted with the adjacent satrapy of Tapuria. He then returned to his encampment on the road to Zadracarta, where he found the Greek soldiers, who had come to await his pleasure, with the envoys who had accompanied Darius in his flight, and had afterward followed their countrymen into the Taurian mountains. Besides those of Sparta and Athens, there were some from Sinope and Chalcedon. They met with various treatment, according to the difference of their cases. The Spartans and the Athenians were placed in confinement; the envoys of Sinope, which lay within the territories of the great king, and had no share in the national deliberations of the Greeks, were allowed to depart; and the same indulgence was extended to Heracleides, the envoy of Chalcedon, though not entitled to the same plea. The soldiers, too, who had been in the service of Persia, before the states to which they belonged had entered into alliance with Macedonia, were set at liberty. The rest were incorporated with the army on the same terms on which they had served Darius, and were placed under the command of Andronicus, who had interceded in their behalf. Alexander then made his entry into Zadracarta, where he remained fifteen days, and solemnized his triumph with sacrifices and games. It was an interval of repose needed to refresh his troops after the fatigues which they had lately undergone, and to prepare them for the toils and hardships of the expedition on which he was now about to lead them into the eastern provinces of the empire.

The farther Alexander advanced into the heart of Asia, the more clearly must he have perceived the disproportion between the forces with which he had achieved his conquests, and the extent of the territory which he had subjected to his sway. For the purpose, indeed, of victory, his army seemed sufficiently strong; and he had reason to believe that into whatever new re-

\* Arr., iii., 23, ἐκστρέφει δὲ τὴν Παρθωλίαν καὶ τὴν Ὑρκανίαν.

† This depends on the question whether the Zadracarta mentioned by Arrian, iii., 23, is the same place with the Zadracarta which he mentions iii., 25, or, as Droysen thinks, a different one.

gions he might penetrate, he should meet with no obstacles in nature which he could not surmount, and no enemy that he could not overpower. But his object was not merely to gain battles, and to traverse vast countries, but to found a durable empire in the East; and for this end it was necessary that his authority should be cheerfully acknowledged by the inhabitants of his new dominions; that they should be led, as soon as possible, to forget that they had been reduced under the yoke of a foreigner; that his government should appear to them a continuation of that to which they had been accustomed under their native princes. It was henceforth not as the conqueror, but as the successor, of the great king, that he wished to be regarded by his Eastern subjects. The death of Darius—brought about, as it had been, so as to leave him without reproach—was an event of inestimable importance in this point of view. The vacancy of the throne did not, indeed, establish his title to the succession; but too many revolutions had happened in Persia, especially of late years, for much offence to be taken at a change of dynasty, if, in other respects, national prejudices were spared. The voluntary submission of Artabazus, while it might have great weight as an example, showed that Persians, the most devoted to the royal house, might now acknowledge Alexander as their legitimate sovereign. The Persian kings themselves, though in the course of two centuries their authority had spread its roots far and wide in the habits and feelings of the people, derived their power—except in the small province which was the cradle of their dynasty—from conquest, and in many parts of their dominions had been always looked upon as foreign masters. Alexander, therefore, might well step into the place of Darius.

The title under which he ascended the throne was of much less importance than the manner in which he filled it. The policy dictated by his situation required that he should keep two objects constantly in view: the one to conciliate his subjects, the other to impress them with reverence for their new ruler. The first end was attained with little difficulty, and without any extraordinary sacrifices. It was only necessary that all who submitted to him should find as much security for their persons and property as had been afforded by the preceding government; and, with a little vigilance and activity, it was easy to give more. The tribute was left on its ancient footing; all branches of the administration were conducted in the same manner as before; but tyranny and arbitrary exactions were likely to be repressed in a greater degree, both by the character of the sovereign and by the system of mutual control which he established for his own security. The provinces which bordered on the predatory tribes, which had so long been permitted to retain their independence in the heart of the empire, must have had reason to rejoice in the revolution which had transferred the sceptre to a hand that could wield the sword. It was probably, at least, as much with a view to conciliate the people, as to gain the support of the great families—though it would be difficult nicely to distinguish between the two ends—that, as he left Greece at a greater distance

behind him, he more and more frequently filled the vacant governments with Persians, or allowed those who submitted to retain their satrapies; so that this became at last a rule from which he seldom deviated. It operated certainly as a strong lure to incline those who were still wavering to his side. But this can scarcely have been his principal motive; for, after the death of Darius, he had less and less reason to apprehend resistance to his arms, but might well grow more and more anxious about the means of securing his conquests; and he might think, with good ground, that the sight of Macedonians filling the highest stations, even if they did not abuse their power, was likely to excite general discontent.

It was, however, still more necessary for an Asiatic ruler that he should be feared and revered than that he should be loved. It may be thought that Alexander's wonderful fortune, and extraordinary endowments of body and mind, could not fail to strike the conquered nations with admiration, and that no artifices could be necessary to exalt him in their eyes. But Alexander must have soon discovered that it was not by such means Eastern royalty ever attracted the veneration of its subjects. No intrinsic merit could, in their estimation, supply the place of the pomp and splendour which they always associated with the idea of greatness. The great king, though the feeblest and worst of men, was viewed as a superior being so long as the luxuries and ceremonies of a court were interposed between him and the rest of mankind; but no measure of wisdom and virtue could have obtained the same reverence for him if, in his dress and manner of living, he had descended to a level with other men. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary, for the security of Alexander's throne, that he should adopt the principle, at least, of the outward distinctions, which had been always deemed essential to the majesty of his Persian predecessors; that he should assume the Eastern garb, in which alone some of these distinctions could appear; that he should be surrounded by a numerous train of state attendants, and that the simple forms of the Macedonian court should be exchanged for the strict rules of Persian etiquette. The great king wore his tiara erect; he sat on a raised seat, on which it was a capital crime in a subject to place himself; he was to be served with certain ceremonies; and he was to be approached only with peculiar observances, which resembled a religious adoration, and were, perhaps, derived from a persuasion which they strongly tended to confirm, of a kind of divinity that resided in the royal person.\*

\* Yet it would not be safe to attribute to the Persians any very distinct conceptions on this point. Flathé observes that the modern Persians revere their kings as divinities; which, whatever travellers may say, it is clear no Mohammedans can do. He adds, that Chardin relates that the modern Persians ascribe powers of healing to their kings. Kings of England, too, who were not looked upon either as gods or heroes, touched for the evil. The state of the case may be illustrated by a passage in the life of Timur. After having mentioned some instances of the veneration with which the Tartar conqueror was regarded by his emirs, Chereffeddin proceeds to observe (tom. ii., p. 373), "Toutes ces démonstrations de respect et d'amour des officiers de Timur, sont non seulement des preuves de son grand mérite; mais elles marquent entre cela quelque chose de divin, qui lui avoit été accordé d'en haut par dessus les autres hommes."

Alexander was not of a character that would have permitted him to become the slave of such forms; but he was too prudent to discard them, even if they had been, as, perhaps, they were at first, repugnant to his feelings. It was his object, as far as possible, to relieve and temper them with Grecian taste and freedom. In the camp he never allowed them to fetter his movements; but, on state occasions, it was his wish to observe all the leading points of the Persian ceremonial. But there was a great difficulty in the way. Was it to be expected that his Macedonian nobles, the partners of his toils, who had been used to terms of familiar intercourse with their princes, should submit to a foreign custom which placed so wide a distance between him and them? or, on the other hand, was it consistent with his dignity to dispense in their case with the marks of respect which he exacted from his Persian subjects?

It was a question turning, indeed, upon a mere form, but involving the most important consequences. The compliance of the Macedonians would reduce them, outwardly at least, to a level with the conquered people, from whom it was, no doubt, their wish to be distinguished as a superior race. It is probable that they viewed all the favours conferred on the Persians with jealousy, as rights withheld from themselves, and, at the utmost, reluctantly admitted the expediency of such concessions. Still, the honours bestowed on others could not lower them. But if they submitted to the ceremony now required from them, the distinction on which they prided themselves was effaced; nor would they be able to retain any of their national privileges but at the king's pleasure; every trace of freedom might soon be lost.

There can be little doubt that it was the very same reason which led Alexander to attach so much value to the ceremony. It was his intention to reduce all his subjects to the same level beneath himself; to recognise no distinction between Europeans and Asiatics, Greeks and barbarians; to admit no claims founded on any other title than personal merit, and this to be measured by the zeal shown in his service, and subject to his own judgment. In him this was, perhaps, not the simple effect of ordinary ambition; it was a natural result of the view which he took of the relation in which he stood to his own people. The distance which might seem to separate him from them was so great, that any advantage they might possess over the conquered nations was, in comparison, too trifling to be regarded. The Macedonians were a semi-barbarian race, which had only been raised to the station it now occupied among nations by the efforts of its kings. He, according to the traditions of his family, which he firmly believed, was not only sprung from the purest Hellenic blood, but from a heroic lineage, and on both sides traced his origin to the father of the gods; and he felt himself to be worthy of this illustrious descent. The victories which enabled the Macedonians to look down upon other nations as their inferiors had been his

triumphs. It was he who still sustained the monarchy he had founded. The Macedonians had as much reason as the Persians to regard him as a being of a higher order.

Still, as these thoughts had been nourished and unfolded in himself by the recent change in his fortunes, it was not to be expected that the Macedonians could be easily brought to adopt these views. Yet it was only so far as they were impressed with them, that they could willingly submit to a ceremony, which was both degrading in itself, and mortifying to their national self-complacency. It seems to have been for the purpose of overcoming their aversion, that Alexander, about the same time that he assumed the tiara, and some other distinguishing ornaments of the royal attire,\* and ordered his court after the Persian model, encouraged the diffusion of a report, which, in fact, only expressed his own consciousness of his extraordinary genius in a mythical form, that his birth, as well as his origin, was divine, like that of Hercules and Æacus:† the secret, which had been long kept to protect Olympias from dishonour, had been revealed to the king himself by the oracle of Ammon.‡ It was, indeed, not likely that such a story should be believed, except, perhaps, in the ardour of military enthusi-

\* Plutarch, indeed (Al., 45), asserts that Alexander did not adopt the tiara, or the vest called the *adornos*, or the loose trousers (*δραυπίδες*) which belonged to the Median garb. But it seems hardly credible that he should have assumed the Eastern dress, and yet have forbore to use those parts of it which in the eyes of the people were inseparably associated with the royal majesty. We may, therefore, confidently prefer the positive testimony of Diodorus (xvii., 77), *τὸ Περσικὸν δίσκος περιέθετο* (or, as Curtius more distinctly describes it, vi., 6, *purpureum diadema distinctum albo*, quale Darius habuerat), *καὶ τὸν διάλεκτον ἐνεδέσαστο χιτῶνα, καὶ τὸν Περσικὸν ζώνην, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πλεὴν τὴν δραυπίδων καὶ τοῦ ἀδιδνός*. The royal dress seems to have been distinguished not so much by its fashion, except in the tiara, as by its colours, which Alexander adopted. Wesseling (on Diodorus, u. s.) suggests, what is not improbable, that he, by degrees, assumed other parts of the Medo-Persian attire.

† Plutarch, Al., 37, reports a remarkable conversation which Alexander had in Egypt with a philosopher called Phasmon (Pe-Ammon?), who taught that all men are governed by God; for the ruling principle in each is divine: but Alexander was of opinion that the deity (*τὸν θεόν*) is indeed the common father of all men, but adopts the best as peculiarly his own, *θεὸς κοινὸν πατέρα τοῖς ἀρίστοις*.

‡ Mr. Williams (Alex., p. 217) has a singular remark on this subject, which deserves notice, as many readers may have been misled by it. He says, "When it was proposed to pay the same outward respect to Alexander (as to the Persian king), it could only be done by asserting that he was as much entitled to divine honour as Dionysus, Hercules, and the Dioscuri, Castor and Pollux. As far as I can trace, Alexander never attempted to claim any other homage as a divinity; nor do I find, from any respectable authority, that he ever asserted himself to be the son of Ammon." But if it is admitted that Alexander claimed homage as a divinity, it seems to be moving a superfluous question of pagan theology to inquire what kind of divinity he claimed. Mr. Williams's remark would lead the uninformed reader to suppose that Dionysus, Hercules, and the Dioscuri were not worshipped as gods. And again, if it was necessary to assert that Alexander was as much entitled to divine honour as these personages, it would seem to have been necessary, for the proof of this assertion, to show that he, like them, was a son of a god; though still it did not follow that he should receive divine honours in his lifetime. Mr. Williams, while he rejects the story, unconsciously produces the strongest arguments in its favour. Arrian's language (iv., 9), *προσκυνῶνται ὁλοκλήρῃ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ λόγος κατέχευε, βροτῶν μὴ ἀνθρ καὶ τῆς ἀφ' ἧς τοῦ Ἀμυμονος πατρὸς, μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν Φιλίππου δόξαν*, seems to imply that he had found, from authority which seemed to him respectable, that Alexander not only asserted, but fancied himself to be a son of Ammon. Flatch (ii., 347) conceives that the relation to Ammon was claimed to impose upon the Asiatics. But it is not at all clear that anything more than the title and ensigns of royalty were needed to obtain their profoundest homage.

We see that the propensity of mankind to idolize power and greatness is common to all ages and countries, and may be indulged even where it is utterly inconsistent with the letter of a received creed.

asm, by the most ignorant of the private soldiers. But still it might serve as a colour for his claims, which might render them less revolting to the feelings of Macedonians and Greeks, than if they had rested merely on his power of enforcing them. The bitter consequences which flowed from this unhappy state of things will appear in the sequel.

Nearly about the same time that Alexander was engaged in the pursuit of Darius, the affairs of Greece took a turn which relieved him from all anxiety about the safety of Macedonia. His progress had been anxiously watched by the Greeks, who regarded it not merely as a succession of dazzling achievements, but as it affected the interests of their own country; and they had never ceased to hope that it might be arrested by some disaster, which would be the signal for a general insurrection against Macedonian ascendancy. Before the battle of Issus the language of the Persian courtiers was echoed by the orators in the Greek assemblies; and Demosthenes, mistaking his wishes for grounds of belief, assured the Athenians that they would soon hear that the Macedonian army had been trampled down by the Persian cavalry. Even after the second defeat of Darius, his cause did not appear desperate in Greece, and an embassy had been sent, as we have seen, by Sparta, to solicit his aid for the preparations she was then making against Antipater. It was, of course, subsidies only that they expected from him; but these, in a contest which was to be decided chiefly by mercenary troops, were of great importance. In the mean while she had formed a confederacy which embraced the greater part of the Peloponnesian states: Elis and Achaia, except Pellene, and the whole of Arcadia, except Megalopolis, entered into this league; Argos seems to have kept aloof, and Messenia was undoubtedly hostile. Even beyond the Isthmus some states promised assistance: probably those of the West, as the Ætolians had either already incurred Alexander's vehement displeasure by the reduction of Cnidaæ, or were meditating the blow which they afterward struck.\* Athens, however, did not venture to stir, though Demosthenes, according to his rival, claimed the merit of having been the principal author of the movements in Peloponnesus;† Alexander's flattering presents may have concurred with the garrison of the Cadmea, to restrain her from a step which would have exposed her to the fate of Thebes.

The news of Alexander's progress in the East rather encouraged than disheartened the Peloponnesians. The farther he advanced, the less probable it became that he would ever return to Greece; the longer was the interval allowed for some decisive stroke, while Macedonia was abandoned to its own resources, which were almost exhausted by the incessant demand of levies for the army in the East. They waited only for a favourable opportunity; and this was at length afforded by events which took place in the countries north of Macedonia, which were subject to Alexander. Zopyrion, who had been appointed governor of the maritime region between the Balkan and the Danube, had engaged in a rash expedition against

the Scythians, had been defeated and slain; and the greater part of his army, 30,000 men, had shared his fate.\* It was, perhaps, this disaster that encouraged Memnon, the governor of Thrace, to throw off his allegiance to Alexander, and to excite the Thracians, who were themselves sufficiently impatient of the yoke, to support him in his revolt.† While Antipater marched to suppress this rebellion, the Peloponnesian confederates, thinking that they now saw a juncture highly propitious to their designs, assembled their forces, and declared open war against Macedonia. The Spartans first took the field under their king Agis, with the entire levies of Laconia, and a body of mercenaries, and gained a decisive victory over an army which was brought against them by Corragus, of whom we do not know whether he was a Macedonian or an Arcadian leader.‡ But he probably commanded the troops of Megalopolis. After his defeat, Agis was joined by the other forces of the league, which, including 10,000 mercenaries, amounted to 20,000 foot and 2000 horse, and laid siege to Megalopolis. He pressed it so closely, that its fall was daily expected, when the news came that Antipater was advancing to its relief. When he heard of the movements in Peloponnesus, he brought the war in Thrace, where he had probably already gained some decisive advantage over the enemy, to a speedy termination; and then hastened southward, on his march collecting the forces of all the states which still adhered to Macedonia, so that when he arrived in Peloponnesus he was at the head of 40,000 men. Agis, though so much inferior in numbers, did not decline a battle, and it seems that he skillfully endeavoured to compensate for the difference by the strength of his position, and that it was not until he was drawn from it in pursuit of the enemy, that the fortune of the day turned in favour of the Macedonians.§ He himself, early in the action, was severely wounded, and carried out of the field; but, finding that his pursuers were on the point of overtaking him, ordered himself to be set down, and, resting on one knee, defended himself to the last with a spirit worthy of Sparta. The allies lost between 5000 and 6000 men; Antipater, according to the more credible account, more than 3000.

After this defeat, nothing remained for the vanquished but to throw themselves on the conqueror's mercy. Antipater, however, would not undertake to decide on the conditions of peace. To relieve himself from responsibility, or rather, perhaps, in imitation of the policy which Philip and Alexander had adopted on similar occasions, he assembled a congress at Corinth, and referred the case of the rebellious states to its judgment. The Achæans and Ætolians were condemned to pay a fine of 120 talents to Megalopolis. But the congress itself did not venture to pass sentence on Sparta. She was ordered to place fifty of her principal citizens as hostages in the hands of Antipater, and to

\* Justin, xii., 1.

† Diodorus, xvii., 62.

‡ Freinshem (Supplement ad Curt., vi.) has, *juxta Corragum Macedonia castellum*; apparently neither understanding the words of Æchines (Ctes., § 165) nor perceiving the moral impossibility that the battle should have been fought in Macedonia. Corragus, however, does not sound like a Greek name. We find a Macedonian so called in Diodorus, xvii., 100.

§ Curtius, vii., 1, 2.

send an embassy to Alexander to learn his pleasure.\*

This blow riveted the chains forged at Chæroneia, which, however, were still destined to be burst by more than one gallant struggle, though never to be finally shaken off. Alexander, when he heard of Antipater's success, is said to have spoken contemptuously of the battle of *micæ*,† which his lieutenant had been fighting, while he had been slaughtering myriads, and overrunning kingdoms; and while the event continued unknown, it did not in the slightest degree interfere with his operations. Yet Antipater's victory was, perhaps, not much less hardly won than either of his own over Darius. But from the distance at which he now stood, Greece and Macedonia began to appear very diminutive objects. His little kingdom was now chiefly valuable to him as a nursery of soldiers; and the most important advantage which he reaped from the establishment of his power in Greece was, that it ensured a constant succession of recruits for his army. But he had resolved not to be much longer dependant on his European dominions for such supplies. The barbarians, he believed, only wanted training to become as good troops as the Macedonians; and he gave orders that boys should be selected from the hardest races to be instructed in the Greek language, and in the use of Macedonian arms. This was the first step towards an interfusion of European and Asiatic blood, manners, and feelings, which he appears to have contemplated as the firmest support of his throne.

## CHAPTER LII

### ALEXANDER'S CAMPAIGNS IN BACTRIA AND SOGDIANA.

ALEXANDER's next object, after the subjection of Hyrcania had secured a communication between the shores of the Caspian and the interior provinces on the south side of the chain of Elburz, was to crush the resistance which he had to expect from Bessus and his remaining confederates, and to take possession of the eastern satrapies as far as the borders of India, where a boundless field lay open to his ambition. The power of Bessus was the most formidable, as well on account of the extent and resources of the fertile and populous countries which he governed, as because the adjacent steppes of Tartary, and the high table-land to the east of his province, both afforded a ready refuge from pursuit, and might again supply him with numerous auxiliaries. It was, therefore, to this quarter that Alexander's attention

was mainly directed. From the Hyrcanian capital he marched into the territory of the Parthians, or *Parthians*—the people who were destined to what so large a portion of his empire from his successors—which lay at the southern foot of the Elburz.\* It must not, however, be supposed that he retraced his steps. He, no doubt, advanced along the southeast corner of the Caspian, through Korkan, and then crossed the lower ridges which connect the Elburz with the Indian Caucasus. He thus came within the borders of Aria to a city called Susia, most probably Tous, ruins of which are still found near Meshed, the modern capital of Persian Khorasan.† Here he was met by Satibarzanes, the satrap of the province, to whom he restored his satrapy as the reward of his submission. An important ally was thus detached from Bessus; and Aria, acknowledging Alexander's authority, parted Bactria from the southern provinces, two of which, Drangiana and Arachosia, were governed by Barsantes, one of the murderers of Darius. As Alexander expected re-enforcements from Media, he ordered Anaxippus to accompany Satibarzanes with forty horse-dartmen, to prevent any hostilities which might arise through mistake between the natives and the troops which were on their march from the west.

At Susia he received intelligence that Bessus had assumed the tiara, the name of Artaxerxes, and the title of King of Asia; that he had been joined by a great number of Persians, had collected a powerful Bactrian army, and expected to be re-enforced by some of the Scythian tribes. Bessus was evidently aware of the advantage which he might derive from the ensigns of royalty; and this was a hint which must have confirmed Alexander in his resolution not to neglect them. He was here joined by a part of the troops from Ecbatana, including the Thessalian volunteers and other mercenaries, horse and foot, under Philippos and Andromachus, and was rapidly advancing towards the Oxus—in the direction, it seems, of Meru-Shah Jehan—when tidings reached him that Satibarzanes had put Anaxippus and his party to death, and was collecting all the forces of Aria in the city of Artacoana, with the intention of joining Bessus. He had not supposed that Alexander would have turned aside from his route to disturb his preparations. But Alexander instantly halted, and, having ordered Craterus to follow with the main body of the phalanx, pushed forward with two brigades, the light troops and the cavalry of the guard, by forced marches towards Artacoana. At the unexpected news of his approach, Satibarzanes took to flight, and was deserted by most of his troops. Artacoana, which stood on a high rock, precipitous on one side, and well supplied with water, did not immediately open its gates; and Craterus was ordered to besiege

\* Droysen's admiration is entirely reserved for his hero, whose conquests he chooses to consider as the cause of Greece: the Greeks who take up arms against Macedonia are a discontented, faithless, mercenary faction: he even goes the length of charging the Spartans (who, at least, were not a faction) with treason to the cause of Greece, because they refused to take part in the congress of Corinth, and afterward made war with Alexander. It has been the fate of every struggle for freedom, and one of the hardest trials of those who engage in one, that, if it proves unsuccessful, it is condemned as an enterprise of madmen and traitors. Yet such language ill becomes a historian, whose country so lately shook off a foreign yoke, by an effort which has been applauded more than that of Agis, only because it was more successful.

† Plutarch, Ages., c. 15, *ὑποπαξία τίς*.

\* Strabo, xi., 9. Von Hammer (Wiener Jahrbucher, vii., p. 253) observes that Parthysæ—which he considers as equivalent to Farachwad, or the land of the plain and of the mountains—originally comprehended Ghilan, Dilem, Mazanderan, Dabistan, Taberistan, and Kamis. He refers to a dissertation in his *Fundgruben des Orients*, iii., p. 310. Strabo (n. s.) distinguishes only two provinces, Comisene and Chorene, in Parthysæ or Parthysæ, which he makes to extend westward as far as Rhagæ. He does not mark its eastern limits.

† "About seventeen miles N.N.W. of Meshed, upon the eastern bank of a small stream that forms a principal branch of the Mushed River."—Fraser, *Khorasan*, p. 517.



it, while the king himself pursued the fugitives into the heart of their mountains. Those who remained in the villages were spared; of the rest, few escaped death or slavery. On his return to the camp, Artacoana surrendered, and Arsamēs, a Persian, was appointed satrap of Aria. Not very far from Artacoana, yet probably not so nearly on the same site as has been commonly supposed, Alexander's eye was struck by the central position and extraordinary fertility of a plain on the banks of the Arius (the Heri-rood), which induced him to found a city there for a Macedonian colony, to be called by his name (Alexandria Ariorum): under that of Herat, it still preserves his memory, and continues to be the great inland port of the East,\* an emporium of commerce between India, Persia, and Tartary. The army then continued its march southward to Prophthasia (probably Furrāh, in Seistan), the capital of Drangiana. Barsaentes was still less prepared for resistance than Sati-barzanes, and he fled across the mountains into the territory of one of the Indian tribes, on the borders of his eastern satrapy, Arachosia. But it seems that the fame and the terror of Alexander's arms had gone before him, for he was seized by the Indians, and sent to Alexander, who put him to death.

The army's stay at Prophthasia was rendered, unhappily, memorable by one of the dark passages in Alexander's history: the first cloud that casts a shadow over his heroic character; the first calamity that imbittered his hitherto uninterrupted prosperity. He discovered grounds for suspecting that a conspiracy had been formed against his life, with the privy, at least, of several of his principal nobles, of some who held the highest offices near his person, and had been distinguished by the most signal marks of his favour and confidence; among the rest, by Parmenio's son Philotas. Philotas was at this time the only survivor of three brothers who had accompanied the expedition. Hector, the youngest, had been drowned in the Nile, as Alexander was descending the river, on his return to Syria. He had been always much beloved by the king, who was nearly of the same age, and was interred, by his orders, with great magnificence. Nicanor, the commander of the hypaspists, died of a sudden illness, while the army was in full march against Beesus; at this loss, also, Alexander expressed much grief; but, as his own movements admitted of no delay, he left Philotas, with a body of the cavalry which he commanded, to pay the last rites to his brother's remains. Philotas himself, as the commander of the horse-guard, stood nearer to the king's person than any man in the army except, perhaps, Craterus and Hephæstion. None had enjoyed a larger share of the royal bounty; nor, indeed, would his temper, which was inclined to boundless profusion, and to ostentatious magnificence, have been satisfied with any ordinary supplies. Nevertheless, it was long since he had really possessed Alexander's confidence. During his stay in Egypt, Alexander had received secret information of language used by Philotas in private conversation with a person to whom he thought he might safely unbosom himself, highly offensive to his sovereign. It was a Greek

girl, one of the captives taken at Damascus,\* in whose company, while he boasted of his own exploits, he affected to speak slightly of Alexander, as a stripling who owed all that he had acquired to himself and his father.† Some of these expressions had reached the ears of Craterus, who, if not an enemy, was a rival both of the father and the son for Alexander's good graces, and he brought the girl secretly to the palace, to tell her story to the king. It is painful to believe that Alexander could have listened to such contemptible information; but Ptolemy and Aristobulus agreed as to the fact that it was in Egypt he conceived the first suspicions of Philotas,‡ which appear to have had no other ground. Yet he continued, as we have seen, to employ his services in the same high station, and outwardly to honour him as much as ever with his favour and confidence, while, from time to time, he received fresh motives for suspicion and resentment, through the same impure channel. Still, it is scarcely credible that he had hitherto entertained any serious doubts about his loyalty. He could not, in that case, have allowed him to retain a post which gave constant access to his person; nor would he have chosen Parmenio to superintend the transport of the treasures which were accumulated at Ecbatana, and to command the forces by which they were guarded. But even his respect for Parmenio appears to have been much abated, especially since the battle of Gaugamela, where the old general, whose cautious counsels had never suited his temper or plans, was thought to have betrayed some want of energy and firmness. From Philotas he had been long, at heart, completely estranged, and was open to still more unfavourable impressions concerning him. The offence which Philotas had given by the indiscretion of his language had been much aggravated since Alexander had begun to assume the Persian state, and since a question had arisen as to the honours which he was to receive from the Macedonians. Philotas, as was to be expected from his character, which was frank and generous, but arrogant and harsh, appears to have declared himself strongly both against the compliance required from them and the reasons alleged for it. Both in public and in private, he ridiculed the story which was becoming current, of the oracle which had revealed Alexander's supernatural birth. If we may believe Curtius, he had even ventured to write, in a letter to the king, that he congratulated him on his admission into the number of the gods, but that he pitied those who were doomed to live under one who was not content with the limits of human nature. It was, therefore, clear that he might be expected vehemently to oppose the changes which Alexander wished to introduce.

Such was the state of Alexander's feelings towards Philotas, when Dimnus, a Macedonian officer, was charged, by a youth named Nicomachus, with whom he was on terms of the closest intimacy, with a plot against the king's life. Nicomachus had informed his brother Ceb-

\* She was a native of Pella or Pydna, and had been taken by Autophrades on her passage to Samothrace. Ptolemy, De Alex. Fort., ii. 7. Al., 48.

† Plutarch, u. s., and Al., 48. Al., 48.

\* Christie in Pottinger's Travels, p. 415.

alinus that Dimnus had pressed him to take part in the conspiracy, and, as an inducement, had named several officers of high rank as his accomplices. Cebalinus, who feared to excite suspicion if he applied for an audience of the king, happened to meet with Philotas at the palace gate, and disclosed the danger to him. Philotas entered the palace, and had a long interview with Alexander, but did not mention the information he had received, and, in answer to the inquiries of Cebalinus, alleged that the king had not been at leisure to attend to him. Another day passed; the same opportunity offered itself; and again no use was made of it. The third day was that on which the attempt was to be made against the king's life. Cebalinus, finding that Philotas had not spoken to the king on the subject, addressed himself to Metron, one of the royal household, who immediately carried the message to Alexander, though he happened to be then in the bath. Cebalinus was brought into his presence, and, while he was examined, orders were given to arrest Dimnus. Dimnus, however, either killed himself, or struggled so violently against the officers that he received a mortal wound from them.

Thus, while his guilt seemed to be proved, no evidence remained as to the particulars of the conspiracy, but such as might be given by Nicomachus, a person whose character did not entitle him to full credit.\* But Alexander now discovered that the information had been received two days before by Philotas, and called upon him to account for his silence. Philotas pleaded, in excuse, that the author of the story appeared to him so contemptible, that he did not think it fit to be mentioned to the king; he appealed to the whole tenour of his past life in proof of his innocence, and begged the king, however reprehensible his silence might have been, not to interpret it as treason. Alexander appeared to be satisfied with his apology, and offered his hand in token of forgiveness. But he forthwith held a council, at which Nicomachus was introduced, and repeated his story. Philotas was absent; and Craterus seized the occasion to revive the king's suspicions against him. He was supported by Hephæstion, Cœnus, Eriguius, Perdicas, and Leonnatus; and Alexander was persuaded that it was necessary to arrest Philotas, and to wring the truth from him. That evening Philotas supped at the royal table; but in the night his house was surrounded by armed men, who led him a prisoner to the palace. Guards were stationed at the city gates, to prevent the news from being carried to Parmenio. The next day the Macedonian troops were assembled, according to the forms used when they were to constitute a tribunal for the trial of a capital cause, as the representative of the Macedonian people. The corpse of Dimnus was exhibited; the witnesses, Nicomachus, Cebalinus, and Metron, were produced; and, when they had given their evidence, Alexander himself came forward as the accuser of Philotas. The speech which Curtius puts into his mouth, though perhaps the rhetor-

ical ornaments belong to the Roman writer, may be considered as faithfully representing the substance of that which he delivered. We know, from the concurring testimony of Ptolemy and Aristobulus, that the strongest argument on which the charge of treason was grounded was drawn from the prisoner's silence as to the information he had received from Cebalinus; we may, therefore, easily believe that Alexander endeavoured to supply the deficiency of this evidence by all the other indications he could collect of treasonable designs. When Philotas was arrested, it seems that his papers were seized, and that among them was found a letter from his father, written before Nicanor's death, in which he gave some advice to both his sons, which, if it had been ascertained that they were engaged in a conspiracy, might have been interpreted as a cautious allusion to it. He bade them take care first of themselves, then of their friends; so, he added, we shall accomplish our purposes. As to the nature of these purposes, it contained no farther hint. Yet it seems that Alexander produced this letter as a proof by which he himself was convinced that both Nicanor and Parmenio shared the treasonable designs of Philotas. As to Philotas himself, the assembly was reminded that he had been the intimate friend of the pretender Amyntas, and had been strongly suspected of having abetted his attempt to ascend the throne after Philip's death; and that Attalus, the implacable enemy of all the children of Olympias, had married his sister. The insolent, if not treasonable language in which he had been long used to speak of his sovereign and benefactor, the audacious letter in which he had sneered at the oracle, were now for the first time made public. Alexander himself could no longer doubt that his life was in danger; it only remained to be seen whether his faithful soldiers, on whose loyalty he cast himself, would shield their king from the daggers of traitors.

Against such an accuser, a hero who was the idol of his army, a sovereign on whose favour every man present depended for wealth and promotion, whose life was so precious that it could not be too dearly secured by any sacrifice, and that his simple affirmation of his own apprehensions might seem sufficient proof of his danger, it must have gone hard with any defendant. But Philotas was not even popular with the army; his character was not amiable: he had made himself generally obnoxious by his overbearing manners, by his invidious display of his enormous wealth, by the luxury in which he indulged at the expense of the soldier's comfort: often, when the men were seeking their quarters, had they found the way blocked up by a train of carriages laden with the general's treasures; often had they been turned out of their lodgings to make room for his attendants, and even forced to take a circuitous path, that their noise might not disturb his slumbers. But it seems that he had still more deeply wounded the feelings of the Macedonians by another kind of indiscretion: he did not disguise his contempt for the national dialect and manners; he professed to know no language but Greek, and to need an interpreter to converse with the soldiers who only spoke their mother tongue;

\* Droysen (p. 292) describes him as one of the royal pages (*einem Jüngling aus der Edelschaar des Königs*), and does not give the slightest hint of the character implied in the expressions of Curtius, *scortum*, *croletus*, which are important for a just estimate of the transaction.

he affected to treat the Macedonians as no better than barbarians, perhaps claiming a pure Hellenic origin, like Alexander's, for his own family; and, as if borrowing the tone of Demosthenes, insulted them with the names of Phrygians and Paphlagonians.\* Such a person, charged with an atrocious crime by one who was as much admired and beloved as he was hated and envied, could not be viewed with impartial eyes; though many may have been moved with a feeling of pity at the reverse of fortune by which the man, whose pride scarcely acknowledged his king as his superior, was brought before them as a criminal to await his doom from them. If there were any who hesitated, and who watched the effect which the accusation produced on others, their doubts must have been removed when Cœnus, the prisoner's brother-in-law, calling him parricide and traitor, was seen to take up a stone, to set the example of the punishment which, according to ancient usage, a Macedonian assembly, combining the functions of judge and executioner, inflicted, in such cases, with its own hands.

But this summary proceeding would not have satisfied either Alexander or the private enemies of Philotas; and it was suspected that this burst of loyal indignation was only a feint by which Cœnus endeavoured to save his kinsman from the farther ignominy and torture which awaited him. The king interposed, and declared that the culprit should be heard in his own defence;† and, that he might have the full benefit of it, himself, in the mean while, withdrew from the assembly.

It would be of little importance, if we were able to ascertain how far the speech of Philotas has been faithfully reported by Curtius: the arguments attributed to him are equally strong, whether he used them or not.‡ It was not pretended that Dimnus, though he was said to have enumerated his principal accomplices for the very purpose of attracting Nicomachus into the plot, had ever mentioned his name, which would have had more weight than any of the others. He admitted the fact of his silence, which alone gave a colour of probability to the charge; but the king himself had, at first, professed to be satisfied with the explanation he had given of it; and the utmost it could prove, was some degree of imprudence and remissness. He owned that he had not thought a story which came to him through such a channel as the worthless stripling Nicomachus, fit for the king's ears; it seemed likely to agitate him with causeless apprehensions, and to lead to the sacrifice of many innocent lives. Alexander himself had taught his friends to be cautious in such matters when he neglected Parmenio's information about the physician Philip-

pus; but, if he had been an accomplice of Dimnus, was it credible that he should have waited passively until the plot was revealed to others? that he should not have stopped the mouth of Cebalinus, or have taken advantage of the free access which he had to the king's person, to forestall the disclosure by the execution of his design? Could he have foreseen the death of Dimnus, or have believed himself safe while he lived? Had he much to gain, or, rather, not everything to lose, by the crime which he was said to have meditated? He possessed, indeed, considerable power and influence through the station which he occupied near the king. But was his popularity with the army such that he could have expected to rise higher when Alexander should be removed?

From an impartial tribunal, which adopted the principle, that a defendant is to be accounted innocent until he has been proved to be guilty, there is little doubt that such arguments would have obtained an acquittal, though they might not dispel all the suspicions raised by the conduct of Philotas. But, before he had concluded his defence, he was interrupted by clamours, which too clearly showed the disposition of his judges; and, at the end, they were ready to have torn him to pieces. But Alexander returned, and adjourned the assembly to the next day, and the prisoner was led back to the palace. It seems to have been felt that such proofs, though sufficient—as they would have been had they been still lighter—to procure the condemnation of Philotas, scarcely afforded a decent ground for a charge against the venerable Parmenio; nor, we may hope, would Alexander himself have consented, without some better evidence, to sacrifice his father's old friend, the general to whose assistance Philip accounted himself most indebted for his conquests,\* who had been the guide of his own youth, the companion of his victories, who, though he seldom saw his advice followed, was never weary of suggesting what appeared to him the best. It is reasonable to suppose that he, at least, desired to ascertain the truth on this point, even though he might not have had fortitude enough to act upon it according to the dictates of justice. According to the prejudices of that age, those which then prevailed in the most civilized nation of the earth, and which have been but slowly and partially dissipated by the light which we enjoy, no evidence was so trustworthy as that which was extracted by torture. Philotas was reserved for this trial. Hephæstion, Craterus, and Cœnus were appointed to preside at the question, while Alexander waited for the result in another apartment, not too distant, it is said, to hear the prisoner's shrieks. Philotas appears to have given way to the force of pain and terror sooner than had been expected, and he at last made a confession as ample and minute as his tormentors desired; yet it was a story so improbable, that, even without any knowledge of the previous facts, we should be led to conclude that, since his enemies refused to dictate it, he framed it to suit their wishes. The main thing required was,

\* Curtius, vi., 11.

† Curtius adds that he bade Philotas address the Macedonians in their own language; but this, if he himself had spoken in Greek, is hardly credible: it would, indeed, have been but a slight aggravation of the injustice of the whole proceeding, but would, perhaps, have betrayed Alexander's passion too glaringly.

‡ The manner in which Droysen has slurred them over, omitting the greater part and the strongest, and putting the weakest forward, as if there were no others, is, perhaps, as gross a breach of good faith as a historian ever committed; and yet he ventures to speak (p. 396) of the uncanonised use which Sante-Croix has made of his authorities in his account of this transaction.

\* Philip once said, the Athenians were lucky to be able to find ten generals every year: he, in the course of many years, had only found one, Parmenio. Plutarch, R. at I., Philipp., 3.

that it should involve his father, as well as admit his own guilt. He confessed that Parmenio had been induced to form a design against the king's life before the death of Darius, by the instigation of his friend Hegelochus, who had since fallen in battle, whose indignation had been excited by Alexander's claim to divine honours. While Darius lived, Parmenio had not thought it prudent to remove the king: he himself—for the admission of the general purpose was not deemed sufficient, unless he also acknowledged his participation in the plot of Dimnus—had hastened his measures through fear lest his father, who was now seventy years old, might be snatched away by death from the command which placed the royal treasure at his disposal.

The next day this confession was read before the military assembly, in the presence of Philotas, and of the persons named by Nicomachus, who were all despatched on the spot. The next most pressing care was to get rid of Parmenio before he heard of his son's death. He was at the distance of between thirty and forty days' march; as soon as the news reached him, he might be expected to revolt, and, with such a treasure in his hands, had means of doing much harm, if not of endangering Alexander's throne. Polydamas, one of Parmenio's intimate friends, was chosen to carry an order to Cleander, who was next in command at Ecbatana, to put him to death. He went, leaving his brothers as hostages, accompanied by two guides. Mounted on dromedaries, they crossed the desert, and arrived at Ecbatana in eleven days. Polydamas, entering the city by night, delivered the king's letters to Cleander, and the next morning repaired, with him and his principal officers, to Parmenio's residence, where, while the old man was reading a letter which had been forged for the purpose in his son's name, they fell upon him, and slew him. His head was carried to Alexander.

Such is the account given by Curtius of this transaction: in its leading outlines it bears the stamp of truth, and is perfectly consistent with the little that Arrian has reported from Ptolemy and Aristobulus; though the Greek writer passes over it so hastily, that we do not even know whether his authors mentioned the torture. They, too, probably related the affair as briefly as possible. But their narrative cannot have been more favourable to Alexander's character. For Arrian—so low, at the bottom, was his estimation of his hero's virtue—declares himself in doubt whether he believed in Parmenio's guilt, or only felt that his own safety required his death. And, in spite of the confession wrung from Philotas, both he and his father appear to have been the victims much more of resentment and of policy than of suspicion.\* Yet,

\* Mr. Williams, apprehending, it seems, that his readers might feel some misgivings as to his hero's treatment of Parmenio, has been at the pains to find out another charge which might justify the execution, if that of treason should seem to fail. He observes (p. 192) "One fact is certain—Parmenio had refused to obey orders. Alexander had commanded him to advance from Media through Cadusia into Hyrcania, and the king's western march into the territories of the Mardi was apparently undertaken for the sake of meeting him. But neither Parmenio nor his troops seem to have quitted the walls of Ecbatana." (Just before the author had said, "It is not unlikely that Parmenio also paid the last honours to his gallant son"—Nicanor, who died in Parthia). What Mr. W. asserts to be a certain fact is no-

barbarous as is the iniquity of the whole transaction, which hideously combines some of the worst features of Greek democracy and of Eastern despotism, we have seen enough of the unhappy position in which Alexander was placed, to render him an object of pity rather than of blame; and we need not suppose that his generous nature had already been corrupted by power and prosperity. The persons whose conduct throughout the affair strikes us as most revolting are the Macedonian nobles, especially Craterus. Certainly it was not pure zeal of loyalty that led him to open Alexander's ears to the wretched information which first kindled his resentment against Philotas, and afterward to direct the tortures by which the suspicions he had instilled into his master's mind were to be confirmed; any more than this was the cause of his frequent quarrels with Hephæstion. Of Hephæstion, as Alexander's personal and dearest friend, we might think more favourably; but it is a suspicious circumstance, that he was rewarded with a share of the high command which had become vacant by the death of Philotas. Alexander did not now deem it safe to commit the whole to one person; not even to his beloved Hephæstion. He divided the horse guards into two regiments, one of which he gave to Hephæstion, the other to a person little less dear to him, Cleitus, son of Dropidas.

This division strongly indicates how deeply distrust, even of the followers whom he admitted to his closest intimacy, had taken possession of his mind. It was the heavy price which he had to pay for his conquests: the penalty, perhaps we may add, of suspicions too lightly indulged, which, again, were but the natural result of the artificial and uneasy position in which he had placed himself between his old and his new subjects; the necessity of alienating some to gain others, or of attempting to reconcile all at the expense of truth. It would have been wiser, as well as more magnanimous, if he had refused to listen to the officious information of Craterus, or, with the same generous confidence which he had shown to his physician, had communicated it to Philotas.

But the blood which had been shed called for more. After one traitor had been punished, it was not fit that others equally criminal should be spared. And now Alexander the Lyncestian, whose trial had been hitherto deferred through regard for Antipater, whose daughter he had married, was brought out of his prison, after three years' confinement, to answer the charge on which he had been arrested. The hesitation which he betrayed, when thus suddenly called upon for his defence, was interpreted by the soldiers as a proof of conscious guilt, and he fell beneath their spears. But Philotas had many friends of high rank in the army, who, it was natural to suppose, must have been acquainted with his designs, which could scarcely have been accomplished without their concur-

thing more than an utterly groundless and most improbable guess. We might more fairly assume it to be certain, that if Parmenio had committed such an act of disobedience, Mr. W. would not have been the first person to make it known. The time when Parmenio was to begin his march to rejoin the army is nowhere mentioned—perhaps was never fixed, but was to depend on circumstances, as the arrival of Cleitus. Droysen (p. 268) assumes—also without authority, but with much more probability—that Parmenio was ordered to set out in the following spring.

rence. Among these were the sons of Andromenes, Amyntas, Polemo, Attalus, and Simmias, who all filled important commands. And the suspicion suggested by their intimacy with Philotas was confirmed by the behaviour of Polemo, the youngest, who left the camp as soon as he heard of his friend's arrest or torture. His brothers; therefore, were brought to trial, in the same assembly, according to Curtius, which had just before executed its judgment on Alexander the Lyncestian. The king himself appeared in person as their prosecutor; but as in this case his feelings had not been strongly excited, the tone of his accusation was probably much milder than in that of Philotas. The grounds of the charge, if calmly considered, were manifestly frivolous, unless it was necessary to put every friend of Philotas to death; and Amyntas, who was first called upon for his defence, pleaded their cause so ably, that they were acquitted. He immediately requested that he might be allowed to go in search of Polemo, and undertook to bring him back to the camp. His request was granted, and he returned the same day with his brother, who, it seems, had been unable to support the thought of tortures, from which innocence afforded no security. Alexander himself was now satisfied as to Amyntas, who soon after died in his service.

Alexander's conduct in this last prosecution might seem worthier of a Tiberius, if a better light had not been thrown on it by some facts, for the knowledge of which we are indebted to Curtius, and which are interesting in other points of view. Amyntas, when he was sent to bring new levies from Macedonia, had been ordered by the king to execute his commission without any regard to the protection which might be given by Olympias to those who were unwilling to serve. It seems that Alexander had been informed by Antipater that his mother had abused her authority in this manner; it was probably one of the many complaints which the regent was obliged to make against her interference in affairs of state, from which her son's directions expressly excluded her. Much as he loved her, he knew enough of her temper to be sure that she would not rest satisfied with a share of power, and, therefore, thought it best to withhold it from her altogether. Still, her restless and haughty spirit gave rise to frequent collision between her and Antipater, whose complaints once drew a remark from Alexander, that Antipater did not know how soon ten thousand letters were blotted out by a single tear of a mother. Among the conscripts brought by Amyntas were some who had taken shelter in the palace, and whom, in obedience to the king's orders, he had compelled Olympias to give up. Hence he became an object of her resentment, and she endeavoured to prejudice her son against him and his brothers. It was not the only case in which she strove to instil suspicion and jealousy—perhaps equally groundless—into Alexander's mind. Her advice, indeed, not to be so lavish of his favours as to raise his friends to a level with princes,\* may seem to have been dictated by pure maternal affection; yet it admitted of an application to Antipater, which renders the motive questionable.

It does not seem inconsistent with what has

been related that Alexander's distrust should have been extended to his soldiers, or, at least, that he should have wished to discover whether any of them had been tampered with by their officers. Arrian's silence is no reason for rejecting the statement of other writers, that he adopted the expedient, so familiar to the police of modern governments, of opening their letters. Nor, perhaps, ought we to reject the farther account—that he collected the men whose correspondence gave proofs of discontent in a separate corps—as a groundless fiction. This may have been the notorious fact; the opening of the letters a conjecture to explain it. The story, at least, deserves notice, as indicating a report which seems to have been current in the army.

It was probably late in the autumn of 330 when Alexander resumed his march. His object was now, instead of returning into the road to Meru, to make himself master of the passes of Paropamisus, the high chain of mountains which separates Bactria from the valleys that open to the southeast on the basin of the Indus. First, however, he advanced southward into the fertile plains on the banks of the Etymander (the Helmund), which were then inhabited by a peaceful and industrious tribe, the Ariaspans, who, for the services they had rendered to Cyrus, when, on his expedition to Scythia, they supplied his famishing army with provisions, had been honoured by the great king with the title of his benefactors.\* Such beneficence might some day prove equally as viceable to a Macedonian army; and it was therefore politic to encourage it. Alexander rewarded the hospitable race with a grant of additional territory, and with some political privileges, which are described under the vague name of freedom; but he did not fail to place them under the government of a satrap. Here, it is said, he made a sojourn of sixty days, which, however, he can hardly have devoted to the regulation of this little province. But if, as Curtius relates, he was joined shortly after by the brigades of the phalanx from Ecbatana, it may be supposed that he waited for their arrival. During this interval we find that he was still haunted by the fear of treason. Demetrius, a somatophylax, was arrested as an accomplice of Philotas, and his dignity was bestowed on Ptolemy, the son of Lagos, for whom it laid the foundation of his after greatness.

It must have been near midwinter when he again set out on his expedition against Bessus. He seems to have ascended the valley of the Etymander, and so to have penetrated into Arachosia, the eastern satrapy of Barsaentes, where he marked the site of another Alexandria, which still flourishes under the altered name of Kandahar. The snow lay deep on the mountains, and as he advanced northward the soldiers suffered extreme hardship from the severity of the cold and the scarcity of provisions. On his

\* The whole of this transaction is remarkably illustrated by one which is mentioned by Pottinger, *Travels*, p. 106. The Belooches said "that, though they lived in a desert and were a poor set, they had once entertained Nussur Khan—who had been to Mushed in Khoraan to assist the King of Kabool against the Persians, and came home through Seistan and the desert—and his army for five days so profusely that he ever afterward called them the Dil Koochas, or open-hearted, that is, generous." This was at Nookhy, not 200 miles from the country of the Ariaspans.

\* Plat., *Al.*, 89, *ἰσοδουλίτας*.

road he heard that the Arians had been again roused to insurrection by Satibarzanes, who had entered the province with 2000 horse which he had received from Bessus. He immediately sent Eriguius, Calamus, and Artabazus—who was, perhaps, supposed to possess some influence over the insurgents—to quell the revolt; and the Parthian satrap Phrataphernes was ordered to co-operate with them. In the mean while he arrived at the foot of the highest pass by which he was to cross the Paropamisus, called Caucasus by the Greeks (the Hindoo Kuh), into the basin of the Oxus. And here, perhaps about fifty miles northwest of Cabul, he founded another Alexandria (ad Caucasum), where he planted a colony of Macedonian veterans. The province of the Paropamisus was committed to Proexes, a Persian; the garrison of the city to Niloxenus, one of the officers of his guard.

The time which he spent in these quarters is not distinctly marked by the historians. Strabo says that he wintered there, but Arrian's language would lead us to suppose that he stayed there no longer than was necessary for the foundation of the new city; and, as prudence forbade him to wait for the season when new dangers and difficulties would have arisen from the melting of the snows, it may be presumed that he did not let himself be deterred by the severity of the winter. It appears to have been by the pass which leads through the ancient city of Bamian that he crossed the Hindoo Kuh, though our authors do not mention any city which he found in the heart of the mountains. During the first part of its march the army suffered only from cold and fatigue; but, as the highlands began to sink towards the vale of the Oxus, and its progress was less impeded by the depth of the snow, it began to experience scarcity of food. Bessus had not yet assembled forces sufficient to withstand the expected invasion, and he placed his whole confidence on the natural obstacles which might retard it. He did not, however, trust entirely even to the mountain barrier which separated him from his restless enemy, but, still farther to check his progress, had ordered the whole country which the Macedonians were to traverse, between the lower valleys of the northern side and the left bank of the Oxus, to be laid completely waste; so that Alexander, as he descended, found himself in an artificial wilderness, where he had expected an abundant supply. The provisions of the camp were at length entirely spent, and it was found necessary to sacrifice a part of the beasts of burden to preserve the lives of the men. Even this coarse fare they found no wood to dress, and it was only rendered tolerable by the sulphur, which grows in great abundance in these valleys, and is still a favourite article of food among the natives. Yet it seems that Alexander founded another Alexandria at the northern foot of the mountains, to secure both extremities of the pass. The hardships of the march were a little relieved at the Bactrian town of Drapsaca or Adrapsa, where he allowed his troops some days of repose.

Drapsaca itself seems to have been situate among the highlands; for he is said to have advanced, after his halt there, to Aornus, which was not only a large town, but, as its name im-

ports, a fortress built on a commanding height; so strong, that Alexander thought fit to leave a garrison in it, though he had taken it, as well as Drapsaca, at the first assault. He then proceeded to Bactra, probably the modern Balk, which we might conclude to have been then, as now, the chief city of Bactria, if we were certain that Bactra was, as Strabo supposed, the same place as Zariaspa, which Arrian seems to distinguish from it. In the mean while Bessus had crossed the Oxus, had burned the boats which carried his troops over, and then, bending his course towards the northwest, had halted at Nautaca, probably near the modern Karshi or Nackshab. His Bactrian horse had quitted his standard when they found that he did not mean to await the enemy's approach, but he was still accompanied by some powerful chiefs, who were followed by a body of Sogdian cavalry, and by the Dahæ, one of the Scythian tribes. Intelligence of his movements had been brought to Alexander by one of his courtiers, a Magian named Cobares, who thus at the same time showed how little reliance could be placed on the loyalty of the rest. At Bactra he was rejoined by Eriguius, who had quelled the revolt of the Arians, and had slain Satibarzanes himself with his own hands. But it seems that the report which he brought of the conduct of Arsames raised Alexander's suspicions of his fidelity; and he sent Stasanor to arrest him, and to succeed him in his satrapy. That of Bactria he committed to Artabazus, but summoned the Bactrian chiefs to a general assembly, or review of their forces, to be held at Zariaspa on his return. As he was now about to cross the Oxus, he dismissed some of his Macedonian troops, whom their age and infirmities rendered unfit for the laborious service which awaited the army in the Scythian deserts, and the Thessalian volunteers, whose spirit had sunk under the hardships of the march across the mountains, in which many of their horses had perished.

Bessus had probably passed the Oxus at Kilif, where caravans proceeding from Balk to Karshi are still commonly ferried over.\* The road along which Alexander followed his traces crossed a strip of the great desert which stretches from the Caspian towards the skirts of the high table-land which contains the sources of the Oxus and the Jaxartes. That in this march his army was much distressed by want of water may be easily believed, though Arrian's silence might lead us to suspect that Curtius has exaggerated its sufferings. It was, however, one of the many occasions in which Alexander displayed that passive fortitude which endeared him to his soldiers no less than his contempt of danger. On the last day's march, as they approached the river, he would not quench his own thirst until their wants had been supplied. The Oxus was here not much less than 800 yards wide,† and there were neither boats to be procured nor materials for building any. There was, however, no enemy at hand to offer interruption, and Alexander transported his troops safely over on the skins of the tents stuffed with straw. The passage

\* Burnes, ii., p. 312.

† Burnes (ii., p. 214) estimated its breadth at upward of 800 yards a little lower down, at Khoju Sala.

occupied six days. He then pushed across the desert north of the river, towards Nautaca, but on his way was met by envoys from two of the chief followers of Bessus, named Spitamenes and Dataphernes. From them he learned that the usurper had already experienced treachery like that which he had practised towards Darius. He had been seized by Spitamenes and Dataphernes, who now expressed their readiness to deliver him up to Alexander if he would send one of his officers to them with a detachment of his army. He appointed Ptolemy to this service, with a select body of cavalry and light troops, and ordered him to set forward with the utmost speed in pursuit of the fugitives. Ptolemy executed his orders so zealously, that he performed a march of ten ordinary stages in four days, and on the fourth reached the place where Spitamenes had encamped the day before. Here, it is said, he discovered that the two chiefs were wavering in their purpose as to the surrender of Bessus. This was, perhaps, a conclusion which he drew from their proceedings; for he may have expected that, as he was coming at their request, they would have waited for him. But it seems that though Bessus was so little esteemed that no hand was raised in his behalf, they could not depend on the willingness of their troops to submit to the Macedonians. Ptolemy, therefore, left his infantry behind, and hastened forward with his cavalry to overtake them. In the course of the day he came to a village, or small town, surrounded by a slight fortification, where he found that Bessus had been left in the custody of a few soldiers. Yet it is not quite clear whether they considered themselves as his jailers or his guards, for Ptolemy thought it necessary to encircle the village with his cavalry and to negotiate with the inhabitants.\* When they were assured that no harm should befall them if they gave up Bessus, they admitted him within their walls, and he took possession of the wretched man who had so dearly purchased the brief enjoyment of a shadow of royalty.

Spitamenes and Dataphernes had withdrawn to a short distance, ashamed, it is said, to appear in person on such an occasion. That Aristobolus was misinformed when he reported that they themselves brought Bessus to Ptolemy is unquestionable, since the authority of Ptolemy, here a part of the events which he related, is above all suspicion. But it seems probable that they wished it to be believed among their countrymen that they had reluctantly submitted to the conqueror when they found that resistance would be unavailing, while from Alexander they claimed the whole merit of the surrender. They appear, however, to have accompanied Ptolemy when he returned with his captive to the army. He had sent despatches to announce his success, and at the same time to inquire in what manner Bessus should be brought into the king's presence. Alexander ordered him to be stripped naked, and to be stationed, with a clog round his neck, on the right of the road by which the

army was to pass. When he himself came up to the place in his chariot, he halted, and, after having upbraided the prisoner with the treachery and ingratitude he had shown to his king and benefactor, ordered him to be scourged, while a herald proclaimed the crimes for which he suffered. He did not, however, immediately put him to death, but committed him to the custody of Oxathres, the brother of Darius, and sent him to Zariaspas, the capital where he had lately appeared in royal state, to be reserved for a still more painful and ignominious punishment.

Alexander had now reached the delightful country irrigated by the waters of the Kohik\*—Zerafshan, the gold-showering—which is extolled in the descriptions of Eastern writers, whose praises are confirmed by the testimony of European travellers as one of the paradises of the world. Its exuberant fertility and beauty have, no doubt, always made the deeper impression from the contrast they present to the dreary sterility of the adjacent desert, in which the river, by the Greeks called Polytimetus—a term nearly equivalent to its modern epithet—is lost, before it reaches the Oxus, in the salt lake of Dengiz. With the horses which he found in its pastures he supplied the losses which his cavalry had sustained in its march across the mountains, and through the desert on both sides of the Oxus, and then advanced to Maracanda, the capital of Sogdiana, which, through a singular coincidence, has retained the greater part of its ancient name in that of Samarqand, which it, nevertheless, derived from a totally distinct tradition.† He placed a Macedonian garrison in the citadel; but, it seems, left Spitamenes—though not with the title of satrap—in possession of great authority, probably as governor of the district which he had held under Bessus. He then advanced towards the northeast, through the hill country of Ura-tippa, or Oerushnah, and, having crossed the chain which branches westward from the Ak-Tagh, or in which the Asferah mountains sink into the desert, arrived at the left bank of the Jaxartes, probably not very far below Khojend; not, however, without molestation from the natives, who, suddenly descending from the mountains, fell upon the Macedonians, while dispersed in quest of forage, and carried off a number of prisoners. Alexander pursued them into their fastnesses, and did not leave their country until he had reduced them to submission, but himself received a wound from an arrow, which for some time confined him to a litter.

It was, according to Curtius, in the course of his march through Mawerahnahar, though whether north or south of Maracanda his description does not indicate, that he came to a small town where Xerxes, on his return from Europe, had planted the priests and people of Branchidæ, who had betrayed the treasures of their sanctuary into his hands. That the Milesian troops who served in the Macedonian army should have been eager to take vengeance for

\* So called from a Kohik, or hillock, which rises between the river and Samarqand (Baber, p. 49). Its ancient name was Soghd (Introduct. to Baber, p. xxxvii.).

† Samarqand means the city of Semar. Droysen, however, suspects that this etymology has been fabricated to account for the modern name.

\* Arrian's language (iii., 36) is ambiguous. It is not clear whether Ptolemy treated with the villagers or the soldiers. The condition, that they should be allowed to depart, seems more applicable to the soldiers.

the sacrilege on the descendants of the criminals, may be easily conceived; but that Alexander should have allowed them not only to plunder and destroy the town, but to massacre the inhabitants, sounds hardly credible, though the story cannot safely be rejected as a groundless fiction.

North of Uratippa, on the skirts of the desert which intervenes between the hills and the Jaxartes, stood a chain of fortresses, seven in number, which had been built within a short distance of each other, apparently for the purpose of protecting Sogdiana against the incursions of the Scythian tribes; the principal among them bore a name which the Greeks translated into Cyropolis, and which seems to indicate that they all owed their origin to the founder of the Persian monarchy. Alexander left a small garrison in each before he advanced to the left bank of the Jaxartes. He had now reached the borders of a vast region, the nature and extent of which were very imperfectly known to the best informed among the Greeks. The only facts which the Macedonians were able to ascertain as to their position were, that the country beyond the Jaxartes was inhabited by a race of barbarians who resembled the Scythians of Europe, and that the river discharged its waters into a great lake or inland sea. Possibly they also heard the name of Tanais among those by which it was known to the tribes of various origin which were seated on its banks. But, perhaps, even without this suggestion, they might easily entertain the fancy that this was the stream which divided Europe from Asia, and, after a long course through the heart of the Scythian wilderness, entered the Lake Mæotis. It was a persuasion which must have been very agreeable to their pride to believe that they had traversed the whole of Asia in this direction, and it must have soothed their better feelings to think that they were again on the confines of Europe. Alexander could not have wished to dispel this allusion, even if he did not take pains to encourage it; but it is difficult to believe that he shared the ignorance out of which it arose, and that he had not a generally correct conception of the distinction between the Caspian and the Mæotis, which had been long understood in Greece. He did not intend, for the present at least, to push his conquests beyond the Jaxartes. There was nothing to attract him into the Scythian deserts while India lay behind him unexplored; and even if he had not reached the northern limits of Asia, he might well be content that his empire should be bounded on this side, as that of Cyrus had been. But he wished both to erect a durable monument of his expedition, and to provide for the security of this frontier more effectually than had been done by the seven fortresses: he therefore selected a site on the Jaxartes for a new Alexandria. No place seems to correspond to this object so well as the ancient city of Khojend, which lies on the left bank, at the point where the river issues from the highlands of Ferghana, and changes its course from southwest to northwest; though it does not appear to have been ever very flourishing—a consequence, perhaps, of its unwholesome air\*—and the tradition of its Greek origin

has been lost, transferred, perhaps, to Samarcand, which still boasts of Alexander as its founder\*.

While he was thus employed, he received two embassies, one from the Scythians beyond the river—the Europeans, as they were called by the Macedonians—and another from a race in which he recognised those Abians whom Homer had celebrated as the justest of mankind. It is not clear whether their name contributed to suggest the thought of this identity, or whether it was merely an inference from the contrast between their peaceful habits and those of the predatory hordes which belonged to the same family. Still less can we hope to ascertain their exact situation; though it is most probable that they were seated in the upper valleys of the Jaxartes, where, secured by their mountain barriers, they maintained a quiet independence. If their embassy struck Alexander's imagination, that of the northern Scythians excited a much deeper interest; for it was from them that he had most to fear. He sent some of his officers back with their envoys, under the pretext of cultivating their friendship, but with the purpose of gaining information as to their country and military strength, which might be useful to him in some future expedition.

In the mean while an insurrection broke out in his rear, which spread rapidly over the newly-conquered provinces. It began among the mountaineers of Uratippa, who made a sudden attack on the seven fortresses, and, having killed the Macedonian garrisons, proceeded to strengthen their fortifications, and to prepare for a siege. But they obtained succours from the inhabitants of the Sogdian valleys, where Spitamenes and his associates possessed the chief influence; and, though they had not yet declared themselves by any open act, Alexander had reason to believe that the revolt was caused by their instigation. Spitamenes was a bold, ambitious, restless man, and, though he appears to have met with a gracious reception from Alexander, had, perhaps, expected a more liberal reward for his treachery to Bessus, and may have been disappointed because he had not been promoted to the vacant satrapy. He had not only excited the Sogdians to rebellion, but had drawn many of the Bactrian chiefs over to his side by insinuations that the assembly to which they had been summoned was meant as a snare for their lives or liberties.

Alexander's first care was to reduce the seven fortresses. He immediately ordered a number of scaling ladders to be provided, and sent Craterus, with a detachment, to invest Cyropolis, while he himself marched against Gaza—a name which seems to survive in the Desert of Ghaz, which stretches westward of Uratippa to the Sea of Aral—the fortress which lay nearest to the camp. It was defended by a mud wall of no great height, which was soon cleared by the missiles of the besiegers, and rapidly scaled. Alexander ordered all the men to be put to death; the women and children formed part of the plunder; the town was reduced to ashes. He then marched without delay against the next, which was stormed the same day, and underwent like treatment. The

\* Baber, p. 5.

\* Baber, p. 48.



following morning he advanced upon a third, and, while he assailed it, sent the cavalry forward to prevent the inhabitants of the two next from making their escape. The unhappy barbarians, when they learned the fate of the neighbouring towns, first from the smoke of the conflagration, and then from the fugitives, quit- ted their own to seek refuge in the mountains, and, falling into the hands of the Macedonian cavalry, were almost all cut to pieces. Thus, in two days, Alexander had made himself master of five out of the seven. Cyropolis, which was now the next in his line of march, was both the most strongly fortified, and held by the most numerous and warlike garrison; consisting of 15,000 men, who had thrown themselves into it as the place where they might hope to make the most persevering resistance. Alexander here brought up his engines to play upon the walls on one side, and led the enemy to believe that his sole object was to open a breach there. But he had observed that, on another side, the bed of a torrent which passed through the town, and was now dried up,\* left a large entrance that had neither been filled up nor guarded. While the attention of the besieged was engrossed by the attacks of the engines, he himself, with a small body of light troops, made a circuit, and, sheltered by the high banks of the empty channel, crept into the town unobserved. He immediately hastened to break open the nearest gates. The barbarians, however, were not dismayed by the sight of the enemy within their walls, but boldly advanced to repel him; and a warm engagement ensued, in which Alexander was stunned by a heavy stone, which fell on the nape of his neck, and not only disabled him for the moment, but for some days almost deprived him of sight.† The barbarians were, nevertheless, forced to give way, and were soon completely overpowered by a multitude of fresh troops, who poured in through the gates and over the deserted wall. Eight thousand fell in the carnage which followed; the rest took shelter in the citadel; but, as it was not supplied with water, they, too, were fain to surrender the next day. Their lives, it seems, were spared, as, according to Ptolemy, were those of the seventh garrison, which threw itself on the conqueror's mercy; but all the prisoners were kept in close confinement, to be transported out of the country.

Short as this contest had been, it showed a spirit in the barbarians which must have led Alexander to anticipate a still fiercer and more obstinate struggle with the other insurgents; and it was scarcely at an end before he found himself threatened by a new enemy; for, on his return to his camp on the Jaxartes, he saw its right bank lined by a host of Scythians, whom Arrian distinguishes from those to whom the embassy had been sent, as the Asiatic. They probably occupied the country to the northeast of the river, and differed in blood and language from those who ranged over the steppes westward, and to the north of the Sea of Aral and the Caspian. They might think their independence endangered by the rising city; but it seems

that they had also been urged by the agents of Spitamenes to make their appearance while the invader was occupied with the insurrection in the south. At the same juncture news arrived that Spitamenes had taken up arms, and was besieging the Macedonian garrison in the citadel of Maracanda. Alexander sent a detachment to its relief, consisting of 1500 foot and 800 horse, all mercenaries, with sixty of his cavalry guard, under the command of Andromachus, Menedemus, and Caranus. But he appointed his interpreter, a Lycian, named Pharnuches, to the command of the whole division, deeming him qualified, by his knowledge of the language, and by the dexterity which he displayed in his intercourse with the barbarians, to conduct an expedition in which more, it seems, was to be accomplished by address than by force. The new city—though it was only twenty days since the foundations had been laid—was by this time surrounded with a wall high enough to sustain an attack; and he now planted a colony in it, composed chiefly of Greek mercenaries, but with a mixture of natives\* and of Macedonian invalids. Having then consecrated it with sacrifices and games, he prepared to chastise the Scythians.

They were confident in their prowess, and at first attributed the inaction of the Macedonians to the fear which it inspired. As they shot their arrows across the river, which was here not very broad, they defied Alexander with barbarian insolence, and threatened that, if he attempted to attack them, he should learn the difference between the Scythians and the effeminate races which he had hitherto subdued. Alexander ordered pontoons or rafts to be made, and the skins of the tents to be prepared like those with which he had transported his troops across the Oxus. In the mean while Aristander sacrificed to consult the gods on the issue of the enterprise. The victims were found to forebode some disaster; and the king, it is said, notwithstanding his impatience, did not, at first, venture to neglect the omen. But when, on a second trial, they still presented a threatening aspect, he declared that he would brave any danger rather than bear the insults of the Scythians any longer. Aristander calmly replied, that he could not make a report contrary to the intimations given by the gods, to suit Alexander's pleasure. One might suspect some collusion between the king and his soothsayer, if we believed, what Curtius relates, that the sacrifices suddenly proved propitious. Arrian, however, seems to have read that they continued unfavourable to the last, and that Alexander embarked in spite of them. It seems more probable, therefore, that Aristander, who, no doubt, understood the practical use of his science as well as Xenophon, wished to divert his master from an undertaking which, even without any adverse omens, he might have judged to be very dangerous; especially as Alexander had not yet quite recovered from the effects of the blow he had received at Cyropolis. And Curtius gives strong warrant for the conjecture that he was acting in concert with Hephæstion, Craterus,

\* This, as Droysen observes, proves that Cyropolis was not Khojend, and did not lie on the Jaxartes.

† So Ptolemy (De Al. Fort., ii., 9), though he makes Hyrcania the scene of the occurrence.

\* According to Arrian (iv., 3), voluntary settlers from the neighbourhood. Curtius says (vii., 6, 37) that they were prisoners whom Alexander ransomed; but it seems not very likely that he would have intrusted them with such a post.

and Eriginius, who all endeavoured to dissuade the king from his purpose.

When the pontons were prepared, he ordered the engines to be planted by the water's edge, while the troops were drawn up along the bank ready to embark. The Scythians were riding up and down on the opposite side with their usual gestures of defiance. At an appointed signal, a discharge of missiles began, with an effect which seems to have amazed and terrified the barbarians nearly as much as the firearms of the Spaniards did the natives of the New World. Several of them were wounded, and one of their bravest warriors fell from his horse, pierced through both buckler and corselet. At this sight the rest retreated out of the reach of the engines; and Alexander seized the opportunity to begin the passage. He himself led the way. The bowmen and slingers were landed first, and were ordered to ply the enemy with their missiles, that they might not be able to fall upon the infantry until the whole of the cavalry had crossed over. As soon as the whole army had come to land, he sent a small detachment of cavalry to charge the enemy. But the Scythians waited for their approach, and then, suddenly wheeling round, assailed their flanks with a shower of arrows, while, by the rapidity of their movements, they eluded every attack. Alexander, seeing his troops engaged in an unequal contest, advanced with the main body of his horse, interspersed with the bowmen and the rest of the light infantry; and when he came up to the scene of action, sent some squadrons forward to charge, while he followed at the head of a column flanked with the light troops.\* The Scythians, threatened by this second division, did not venture to repeat the evolution on which they usually relied, but which would now have exposed their flank to the enemy. As little were they able to sustain the charge with which they were assailed in front. They did not long keep their ground, but sought safety in flight. Alexander, however, was not to be satisfied with a decided victory. He was bent on pursuing them until the last man was slain or taken. He pressed forward, in spite of the scorching heat, with unabated speed, and only paused for a few moments at a well to slake his burning thirst. But the water proved brackish, or otherwise noxious, and he soon began to experience the effects of the draught, which compelled him to relinquish the pursuit, and to permit himself to be carried back, in a state of extreme danger, to the camp. So, Arrian observes, Aristander's prediction was fulfilled; and he believed that it was only Alexander's illness that saved the Scythians from extermination. About a thousand of them were left on the field, and 150 taken. The defeat struck the rest of the people with awe, and Alexander soon after received an embassy from their king, or, as he was, perhaps, then called, the khakhan, offering excuses for the hostile proceedings of his countrymen, which he represented as the acts of a single tribe, not authorized by the general consent of the nation, and professing himself willing to

submit to Alexander's pleasure. Alexander graciously accepted the apology, which he could not becomingly have rejected, unless he had followed up the war in Scythia, for which he had now no inclination or leisure. He even restored the prisoners without a ransom. The fame of such clemency and liberality, coupled with that of his victory over a people which had hitherto been deemed by its neighbours invincible, attracted the homage of the Saccæ, who seem to have ranged over the highlands to the west of the chain of Belur Tagh, and behind their mountain barriers might have thought themselves secure from his arms. He sent one of his officers with their envoys, when they returned, under the same pretext, and with the same view, as in the case of the Scythian embassy.

But his attention was now drawn to another quarter by the tidings he received of the corps which he had sent under the orders of Pharnuches. Before it arrived at Maracanda, the garrison had successfully repelled the assaults of Spitamenes, and when he heard that another Macedonian force was approaching, he raised the siege and retreated towards a city, which Arrian does not name, but which he describes as the capital of Sogdiana, a title which he had before given to Maracanda. This second capital, as it undoubtedly stood lower down in the vale of the Sogd, may be now represented by Bokhara. Pharnuches and his colleagues hastened to overtake him, and continued to pursue him even after he had taken refuge in the desert of Khiva. Here, however, he was joined by a body of 600 horse, which the Scythian tribes of this region sent to his aid when they found that their country had been invaded; and thus reinforced, he ventured to wait for his pursuers. They came up with him in a plain on the skirts of the desert, which afforded ample room for the evolutions in which the Scythian cavalry excelled, and which, as we have seen, had called for Alexander's military skill, as well as a superior force, to baffle them. Spitamenes now employed them with complete success. His Scythian allies, eluding the charge of the Macedonian cavalry, whose horses were enfeebled by a laborious march and the scarcity of food, and, wheeling round the phalanx, galled its flanks with their arrows, and, as often as they were put to flight, returned, after a short interval, to the attack. It soon became evident that the only hope of safety for the Macedonians lay in a speedy retreat to some place of shelter, and the generals resolved to fall back upon the Polytimetus, which offered a refuge in the woods that lined its banks. They formed their division in a hollow square, and reached the river, though pursued by the barbarians, without much loss. But it seems that their movements were not well concerted, and that Pharnuches, whose talents were probably not equal to such an emergency, did not possess sufficient authority over his colleagues. Caranus, who commanded the cavalry, no sooner saw the river before him, than, without orders, and before the rest were aware of his intention, he pushed forward to gain the opposite bank. When this movement was observed by the infantry, who were still more eager to escape from the continual molestation which they were utterly unable to

\* Mr. Williams takes a different view of Alexander's tactics, which is, no doubt, equally consistent with Arrian's description. But Droysen also supposes the column to have attacked the flank of the Scythians.

repel, they did not wait for a command, but followed in disorderly haste, and plunged into the water. The Scythians perceived the advantage which was offered to them by the enemy's mistake, and, instantly dashing into the river, attacked the fugitives on all sides. A few only had landed, and these were, for the most part, overtaken and cut down. The rest were repulsed from the bank, which was high and steep, and exposed, without defence, to the enemy's arrows. At length they all made for a small island, which, indeed, afforded them firm footing and the use of their shields, but seems to have been open on all sides to the missiles of their assailants. Here almost all perished: the few prisoners who fell into the hands of the barbarians were put to death in cold blood. According to Aristobulus, who, however, gave a different account of the operations which led to this result, not more than 40 horse, and about 300 foot, made their escape to bear the mournful tidings to Alexander.

It was the first disaster that had befallen his arms, and he hastened to wipe off the stain. Spitamenes had been encouraged by his success to advance again on Maracanda, and renew the siege of the citadel. Alexander, by one of his extraordinary marches, appeared there on the fourth day after he had moved from the bank of the Jaxartes; but, on the news of his approach, Spitamenes again took to flight, and retraced his steps towards the desert. Alexander pursued him with ardent speed, until he reached the scene of the recent carnage, where he halted to pay the last honours to the remains of the slain. But he still did not give up the hope of overtaking Spitamenes before he came to the edge of the boundless desert, into which it would have been madness to follow him. He therefore returned into the vale of the Polytimetus, and ravaged it, as he marched up the river, in its whole length and breadth, reducing the fortresses into which the unfortunate inhabitants fled for shelter, and putting to death all whom he found there as accomplices in the revolt of Spitamenes. This is certainly one of the acts of Alexander's life for which it is most difficult to find an excuse. There seems to be no ground even for the wretched plea of necessity or policy which has been urged in his behalf. Both Curtius\* and Arrian† afford reasons for believing that the mass of the Sogdian population was peaceably disposed, and had been urged into insurrection against its will by the influence and arts of Spitamenes. The real motive of the desolation with which the conqueror visited this lovely region can hardly be mistaken. It was manifestly resentment for the dishonour of his arms, the loss of his troops, and the escape of Spitamenes. He wreaked his vengeance on the innocent, because he was not able to reach the guilty. But if anger is to be admitted as an extenuation of such cruelty, the most horrible atrocities of a Jenghiz, a Timur, or a Nadir, must be accounted venial offences. It ought rather to be acknowledged that humanity was not one of the qualities that

adorned Alexander's character, and that the clemency for which he has been often praised did not rest on this foundation, but was the result of less amiable feelings, even where it was not the effect of a mere calculating policy. He could not, perhaps, have filled the part which he acted in the history of the world, if he had been capable of letting an emotion of pity restrain him in the career of his ambition. In the narrative of his conquests there is hardly room for a moral reflection on the misery they caused, because it would be equally appropriate everywhere. But he is answerable as a man, even to posterity, for all the evil he wrought which did not essentially belong to his vocation as a conqueror.\*

The year 329 was now drawing to a close, and as tranquillity, or the solitude which conquerors call peace, had been established in Sogdiana, Alexander, leaving Peucolaus with 9000 men as satrap of the province, proceeded to take up his winter-quarters in Zariaspa. Here he was joined by the satraps Phrataphernes and Stasanor, who brought Arsames, the suspected satrap of Aria, and Barzanes, who had been appointed to the government of Parthæa by Bessus, with them in chains. About the same time he received re-enforcements of Greek mercenaries brought by Asander and Nearchus, and of Asiatic troops, which had been levied by Asclepiodorus, the satrap of Syria. The generals who had escorted Menes and the treasure to the coast, also met him at Zariaspa. And now he held a solemn council, which was probably attended not only by his own officers, but by the Bactrian chiefs, to decide finally on the fate of the traitor Bessus. He was condemned to be mutilated, according to Persian usage, in his nose and ears, and then to be conveyed to Ecabatana, to suffer death in the presence of an assembly of Medes and Persians, which was to be called together to witness his punishment. There can be little doubt that Alexander's motive for this rigorous treatment of Bessus was not so much indignation at his crime, as a politic regard for the majesty of the throne, which had been outraged in the person of Darius. Arrian justly censures his compliance with the barbarous practice of superadding torture to death. It seems, however, to have been designed to gratify Oxathres and the other kinsmen of Darius, to whom, according to Curtius and Diodorus, the execution was committed.† They

\* vii., 6, 24, speaking, indeed, only of the population of Maracanda.

† iv., 3, and 6, in his statement of the purpose for which Phrataphernes was appointed to conduct the expedition: ἐπὶ τῷ καθολικῷ τοῖς βαρβάροις πᾶσιν ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐν ταῖς μέγαις ῥηγίσι.

\* Droysen's attempt to palliate the barbarity of Alexander's proceedings in this case is the more revolting, because he gives entire credit to the statement of Curtius as to the reluctance with which the Sogdians engaged in the insurrection, and believes that the modern Tadjiks of Bokhara represent the original peaceful and industrious race of subjects which inhabited the country at the time of the Macedonian invasion. Yet we are called upon not merely to excuse the ruthless destroyer, but to admire "the clearness and rigour with which he adjusted his plans to his resources." A merit which cannot be denied to Robespierre. It is much to be regretted that so excellent a work as this of Droysen's should be disfigured by an idolatry which sacrifices everything to its hero. The language of Anaxarchus is as unbecoming in the mouth of a historian as of a philosopher. Mr. Williams, too, whose humanity bursts out in a blaze of indignation at the bare thought of Julian's devastations in Assyria (Essay on the Geography of the Anabasis, p. 211), is not at all moved by the "vengeance" which Alexander exercised in Sogdiana. (Life of A.L., p. 216.) Indeed, the expression that "he overran the whole country" hardly leads the reader to suspect anything more than the suppression of the rebellion.

† Droysen (p. 327) observes that Alexander's treatment of Bessus is a remarkable proof how much he respected

are said to have put him to a cruel death,\* and even extended their vengeance to his lifeless remains, which they carefully guarded, that they might not be torn by bird or beast, an essential condition, according to the Magian religion, of an honourable interment.†

During his stay at Zariaspas his ambassadors returned from the country of the European Scythians, accompanied by Scythian envoys, sent by a new king, the brother of the last, who had succeeded to the throne in the interval after the first embassy. They brought presents and a message from their prince of even more friendly import than that which Alexander had received from his predecessor. He professed the most unreserved submission to Alexander's pleasure, and offered his daughter's hand as a pledge of the close alliance which he wished to contract with his powerful neighbour. If Alexander should not think fit to accept this proposal, he suggested that the object might be accomplished by a union between the great men of the Macedonian court and the daughters of the principal Scythian chiefs. Alexander received the envoys most graciously, and assured them that there was no need of such a connexion to cement the friendship that subsisted between him and their king.

About the same time he received a still more gratifying proof of the impression made by the fame of his victories, and of his personal character, on the neighbouring barbarians, in the arrival of a powerful chief named Pharasmanes, who is described as king of the Chorasmians, and whose territories, which long preserved the name of Khauresm, lay on the lower Oxus and the south coast of the Sea of Aral, probably comprehending the whole of the modern khanate of Khiva, and extending, perhaps, farther northward, between the Aral and the Caspian. He came attended by a body of 1500 horse, not merely with general offers of submission and service, but, it is said, with a distinct tender of his aid for a particular object which he himself suggested. He described his own dominions, we are informed, as bordering on the land of the Colchians and the Amazons, and was ready, if Alexander was inclined to make an expedition against those celebrated races, both to accompany him as his guide and to supply his

army with provisions. It is difficult here to distinguish between truth and fiction. The mention of the Amazons seems clearly to prove that the proposals of Pharasmanes have not been correctly reported. This supposed nation of female warriors was an object of strong curiosity to Alexander's soldiers, who had been familiar with the story from their childhood, and, as they advanced towards the northeast, appear to have been continually expecting to fall in with them. Hence a report became current, and found a place in the works of the greater part of Alexander's historians, that, on the banks of the Jaxartes, he had received a visit from a queen of the Amazons; but the Chorsasmian king, if he was acquainted with the name, must have heard it first from the Greeks themselves. Nor is it easy to explain how he could have been led to describe himself as a neighbour of the Colchians, from whom he knew himself to be separated by a great distance, whether of land or sea. Alexander, also, must have been perfectly aware that, when he moved eastward from the shores of the Caspian, he was leaving the seats of the Colchians farther and farther behind him. Still, it is credible enough that Pharasmanes may have proposed to conduct him round the northern shores of the Caspian, for the purpose of subduing the tribes which were seated between it and the Euxine. He himself, perhaps, had but a vague notion of the distance; and Alexander must have greatly underrated it if he really made the answer which Arrian attributes to him, that he must first march into India, and so complete the conquest of Asia: he would then return to Greece, and make an expedition with his whole force, naval as well as military, into the countries on the Euxine; and he desired Pharasmanes to keep himself in readiness then to assist him; in the mean while to maintain a good understanding with Artabazus and the other satraps of the provinces which lay nearest to his territories. The plan itself, however, which this answer indicates is such as we may very well believe Alexander to have entertained.

The accounts remaining of his next two campaigns are very confused. Neither Curtius nor Arrian enable us distinctly to follow his movements. Arrian gives but a brief outline, dwelling only on a few incidents, and evidently not strictly adhering to the order of time; and Curtius mentions some facts which raise a suspicion that the Greek author has either omitted or totally misrepresented some very important operations. According to his account, when Alexander moved from Bactra or Zariaspas, in the spring of 328, he crossed the River Oxus, and came to a city called Margina, in the vicinity of which he founded six towns, at a short distance from one another, on lofty hills, that they might the more easily combine their forces for mutual aid to bridle the disaffected province. If the Oxus was, as is commonly believed, one of the streams which flow towards the Caspian from the mountains which form the barrier that separates the tableland of Khorasan from the low countries south of the Oxus, there could be little doubt that the name Margina is connected with those of Margiana and of the River Margus, or Murghab, from which the province was so called: and it

Eastern prejudices. Mr. Williams, on the contrary, is of opinion that "Alexander deeply erred in ordering Bessus to be scourged publicly for his crimes;" and that "the feelings of the Persians were as much outraged by the degrading punishment of Bessus, as those of the English nobility would be, were they to see a Duke of Norfolk or Northumberland flogged by the hands of the common hangman through the streets of London." The propriety of this illustration may be partly estimated from the nature of the punishments which the Persian kings were used to inflict on any of their subjects who incurred their displeasure. As to the question itself, it may be sufficient to observe, that Arrian blames Alexander for adopting a barbarian usage in the punishment of Bessus; that, according to Diodorus and Curtius, Bessus was tortured by the Persians themselves; that Alexander could not have intended to outrage the feelings of the Persians by the punishment he inflicted on the murderer of their king; and that his meaner of judging on this subject were at least as good as the best scholar enjoys at this day. He, too, had read his Xenophon.

\* Diodorus (xvii., 83; Plutarch, Al., 43), who imputes the atrocity to Alexander himself. According to this account, he was torn limb from limb, between two trees, which were first bent, and then suddenly allowed to spring back. But Curtius only represents him as fastened to a cross, after having been mutilated, and there pierced with arrows.

† Curtius, vii., 5, 40. Compare Herodotus, i., 140.

might be supposed that Alexander, before he crossed the Oxus, had made an expedition southward to quell some disturbances which had taken place in Margiana, and to secure the communication between Bactria and Asia by the lower road, which he had himself designed to take before he was diverted from his purpose by the insurrection of Satibarzanes. But it is certainly easier to believe that Curtius was altogether mistaken in this statement than that Arrian either wholly omitted to mention these transactions or described them in a manner which, but for this hint of the Roman writer, would have rendered it impossible to recognise their real nature. It is, besides, clear that, during the winter sojourn at Zariaspa, Alexander's attention was fully engaged by the affairs of Bactria and Sogdiana.

Some of the Bactrian chiefs still held out against him; and, though the greater part were kept quiet by his presence, he saw enough to convince him that he could not depend on their submission any longer than they were overawed by a superior force, at least while Spitamenes was at hand to excite them to revolt; and he learned that, notwithstanding his desolating ravages, the Sogdians were not reconciled to his yoke, but, intrenching themselves in their fastnesses among the hills, defied the authority of Peucolauus. He therefore left a strong corps in Bactria, under four generals, Polysperchon, Attalus, Gorgias, and Meleager, who, however, were, it seems, all placed under the command of Craterus,\* to reduce the remaining insurgents, and to restrain the rest of the population from new attempts, and himself proceeded to cross the Oxus. While he was encamped on its bank, its water being so loaded with clay as to be scarcely drinkable,† wells were dug for a better supply, and from one, which was opened close to Alexander's tent, there gushed up a spring of naphtha, or, as the Greeks called it, oil.‡ Aristander was consulted on the prodigy, and foretold a very laborious, but successful campaign.

Having passed the river, he divided his forces into five columns, one of which he placed under the command of Hephæstion, another under Ptolemy, a third under Perdicas, and the fourth under Cœnus and Artabazus. They were directed to traverse the country in various directions, and to meet him and the fifth division at Maracanda. The chief object was to reduce the strongholds in which the insurgents had taken refuge; and there can be little doubt that, as usual, he reserved the most arduous of these enterprises for himself. We may, therefore, here adopt the order of Curtius, who relates that he now marched against a fortress which was deemed the strongest in the country, so as to be distinguished from the rest by the simple appellation of the Rock.§ It

was held by a chief named Arimazes, who had collected a great number, according to Curtius, 30,000, of his countrymen in it; and the general belief that it was impregnable, had induced the Bactrian Oxyartes, who had been a follower of Bessus, and had either never submitted to Alexander—as he did not, it seems, concur in the treachery of Spitamenes against Bessus—or had again revolted, to send his wife and daughters to take shelter within its walls. This was an additional motive to quicken Alexander's eagerness for the possession of the place. It was, like the hill fortresses of India, an insulated rock, precipitous on all sides, and only accessible by a single narrow path. Provisions had been laid in sufficient, it was thought, even if the siege should last two years. Alexander himself, when he saw it, was almost inclined to despair; but he sent Cophas, the son of Artabazus, to summon Arimazes to surrender. The chief received the message with derision, and asked whether the Macedonians had wings. In no other way did it seem possible for an enemy to reach the summit. The taunt roused Alexander to a resolution which he would allow no obstacle to foil. He proclaimed a reward of ten talents for the man who should first mount to the top, and a sum proportionately less for each of the nine who should follow. The lowest prize was to amount to 300 darics. The most agile and expert climbers in the army soon came forward as competitors for wealth and honour, to be earned by a risk which they were used to despise. They provided themselves with cords, and with a number of the iron pegs with which the tents were secured, and set out in the middle of the night towards the most precipitous, and, consequently, the most neglected, side of the rock. The attempt would, perhaps, have been utterly desperate if the ascent had not been rendered easier by the snow which lay on the ground, and which had become so solidly frozen, that the pegs, when driven into it, could support the weight of the body. Still, more than thirty of the adventurers lost their footing, and were buried so deep in the snow at the foot of the hill, that their bodies could not afterward be found. Their more fortunate companions, who gained the summit in safety, announced their success to their friends below by the waving of flags, the signal which Alexander had appointed; as soon as he saw it, he again sent Cophas to summon Arimazes, and to point out to him that the Macedonians had found wings. The sight of the enemy above his head, whose strength he did not know, seems to have deprived him of his presence of mind, and he hastily surrendered the fortress.

Alexander thus became master of the daughters of Oxyartes; one of them, named Roxana, was surpassingly beautiful, and made such an impression on the conqueror, that he resolved to share his throne with her. Arrian praises him for the generosity he showed to his fair captive, over whom he might have exercised the rights of a victorious enemy. But Plutarch

\* This may be safely inferred from iv., 17, though Arrian, through negligence, which seems to show that he, like Alexander, was impatient to reach India, has omitted to mention the name of Craterus with those of the four generals.

† Curtius, vii., 10, 13; and so it is described by Burnes, vol. ii., p. 214, second ed.

‡ Naphtha occurs in considerable springs on the shores of the Caspian Sea. It is used instead of oil.—*Ure's Dictionary of Chemistry*, art. NAPHTHA.

§ Droysen supposes it to have been situate near the Pass of Kolugha or Derbend, so often mentioned in the history

of Timur's early expeditions; and he would select the place called Kohistan, which is laid down in the map to Baber's Memoirs as an insulated hill, as the precise spot. It seems clear that if it was in Sogdiana, it must be looked for in this quarter. Mr. Williams's hypothesis on the subject will be noticed in the Appendix.

seems to take a more probable view of the case when he conjectures that his resolution was dictated not less by policy than by inclination. His marriage with Roxana was likely to conciliate her countrymen, whose resistance was the most obstinate he had yet encountered; and it accorded with the general system which he had adopted in his treatment of his new subjects. It was immediately attended with one important advantage. Oxyartes, as soon as he heard of the honour which the king was about to confer on his family, repaired to the Macedonian camp, and henceforth zealously exerted all his influence in Alexander's service.\*

Curtius relates that Arimazes, his kinsman, and the principal refugees taken in the fortress, were put to death by the conqueror; but it is very improbable that he should have displayed such severity on an occasion which naturally suggested extraordinary clemency. Curtius, indeed, refers the capture of Roxana to a different place, and therefore his account of the treatment of the vanquished may belong to another occasion. Though the Rock was the strongest fortress in Sogdiana, there were others in the high valleys of the upper Oxus, which appear still to have afforded shelter to some of the Bactrian and Sogdian insurgents. But Alexander was not at leisure to advance farther in this direction. His presence was required at Maracanda for the settlement of the province, and to secure it against the inroads of Spitamenes. This gallant chief, when forced to take refuge in the desert, accompanied by a small body of Sogdian fugitives, had only waited for a fresh opportunity of renewing hostilities against the invaders. As soon as Alexander had crossed the Oxus into Sogdiana, having collected about 600 of the Massagetæ, one of the Scythian tribes who ranged over the Chorasman desert, he made an irruption into Bactria, and surprised and cut to pieces a party of 800 Macedonian cavalry who were stationed near the frontier, and took Attinas, their commander, prisoner. Flushed with this success, he ventured to advance into the neighbourhood of Zariaspa; and though he was not strong enough to attack the city, he collected a large booty from the surrounding district. Craterus was at this time engaged, we do not know how, elsewhere. Zariaspa had been considered so secure, that several invalids of the horse-guard were left there, with Peithon, the governor of the royal household, and a cithar-player named Aristonicus, protected only by a very small body of mercenary cavalry. They had, however, now recovered so as to be able to bear arms. Peithon collected all the forces he could muster, including some of the royal pages, and, sallying out upon the enemy, surprised them as they were retreating with their spoil, wrested the whole from them, and slew a great number. But as he marched back in triumph to Zariaspa, he suffered himself to be surprised in his

turn. Spitamenes made a circuit, and laid an ambush for him on his road, into which he fell; his little band made a brave resistance, but the greater part were killed: among them Aristonicus, fighting more manfully, says Arrian, than could have been expected from his profession. Peithon himself was wounded and taken prisoner.

Craterus, when he heard of these events, set out in pursuit of the Scythians, and chased them back into the desert, where they were joined by a thousand more of their countrymen, and, as he still advanced, waited to give him battle; they were, however, routed, and left 150 of their number on the field; but Craterus did not venture to pursue them any farther: and this check scarcely counterbalanced the advantages they had gained. It was to be expected that Spitamenes would renew his attack in some other quarter; for, among the tribes of the desert, more especially the Massagetæ, who were always ready to make war where they saw a prospect of plunder, he could never be in want of troops. To take precautions against this danger was one of the main objects that called Alexander to Maracanda; here, after he had been rejoined by his five generals, he proceeded to regulate the internal affairs of the country. To heal the wounds which his vengeance had inflicted the year before, and to provide for the permanent security of the province against hostile inroads and internal disaffection, he directed a number of new cities to be founded: according to one statement, no fewer than twelve. They were planted with colonies, in which Macedonians or Greeks were mixed with barbarians; but, it seems, in such proportion, and on such terms, as to give a decided predominance to the European population. Hephæstion was ordered to superintend the establishment of the new settlers: a business which required much judgment and caution. In the mean while, the king made a progress through the country to reduce the places which still remained in the hands of the insurgents. In the course of this expedition he came to a royal park, in a district which Curtius calls Bazaria, where the game had remained untouched for more than a century. The army, according to the custom of an Eastern chase, formed a circle within the enclosure, and drove the wild beasts towards the centre, where the king and his nobles despatched them. Alexander himself was attacked by a lion of extraordinary size, and, rejecting the aid of Lysimachus, who would have interposed in his defence, killed it with his own hand. The incident, as Curtius suspects, through some strange perversion of the facts, gave rise to a story which became widely current, that Lysimachus, by the king's orders, had been exposed to a lion. Alexander's achievement earned the applause of a Spartan envoy who was present, and exclaimed, "A brave struggle, Alexander, with the royal beast for the mastery." But the Macedonian spectators, who had shuddered at the danger, deemed their king's life too precious to be risked in such a contest, and a military assembly was held on the subject, which, exercising a democratical privilege that had probably been long dormant, decreed that the king should not in future hunt on foot, or without some of his

\* Mr. Williams (p. 237) seems to suppose that what Plutarch says (Al., 47) about the difference between Hephæstion and Craterus, relates to Alexander's marriage with Roxana. But it clearly applies only to the general subject which led Plutarch to mention the marriage: Alexander's adoption of Asiatic usages. The marriage, however, might be very repugnant to the feelings of the Macedonians—as an indication of the policy which they thought injurious to them—though they did not think a *Bactrian bride*, as such, at all *degrading*.

chief officers by his side. Four thousand head of game were destroyed in this memorable chase; and Alexander's combat with the lion was afterward commemorated by a group of figures in bronze which Craterus dedicated at Delphi.

On the return of the army to Maracanda, Arbazus begged leave to resign his satrapy of Bactria, a post too laborious for his advanced age. He was dismissed into an honourable retirement, and Cleitus was appointed to succeed him. The new satrap had been ordered to prepare for his departure, and Alexander himself was on the point of setting out on a fresh expedition towards the western frontier of Sogdiana, to reduce a mountainous district which was still occupied by a band of Bactrian exiles. The eve of their parting was a day which the Macedonians were used to solemnize as a festival of Dionysus. But on this occasion, for some unknown reason, Alexander substituted sacrifice in honour of the Dioscuri. The religious ceremony was closed, as usual, by a banquet, at which Cleitus was present, and which was immoderately prolonged, according to a custom which Alexander certainly found already prevailing in his father's court, and had no need to learn, as Arrian intimates, from the barbarians. Among the guests were some Greek literary parasites, poets, rhetoricians, and sophists, persons of little reputation at home, who made up for the slenderness of their abilities by the grossness of their flattery, with which, unhappily, Alexander was not disgusted, for he did not encourage it as subservient to his political ends. Three of these adventurers, Ictis, an epic versifier of Argos, Cleon, a Siceliot, and Anaxarchus of Abdera, who professed the flexible philosophy of his countryman Democritus, have escaped oblivion through the preminence of their baseness. The conversation, when it was growing late, fell on the Twin heroes, whom, as Euripides expressed it, their father Zeus had made gods.\* The courtly tongues readily seized this occasion to dwell on the praises of the more illustrious hero then present, who, but for the envy which always attends living worth, would have been universally acknowledged as far greater than the Dioscuri, greater than Hercules himself. Cleitus, whom wine had released from ordinary reserve, checked this profane flattery, perhaps the more readily because he perceived its sycophantic tendency to favour the establishment of the ceremonies which he had always strongly opposed. He observed, too, that it was at his expense of the Macedonians, who had contributed their share to all the great achievements which were ascribed solely to their king, that his merits were thus magnified. And he quoted some verses of Euripides which denounced the injustice of the custom by which he honour of every victory was commonly assigned to the general alone. The remark must have been offensive to the king, not merely from its personal application, but as inculcating a sentiment directly adverse to the admission of which he wished to introduce. But when his own actions were made the subject of a more particular discussion in comparison with his father's, and, in reply to the flatterers who depre-

ciated Philip's exploits, Cleitus extolled them far above his son's, and as he rudely reminded him of the battle of the Granicus, stretched out his right hand, exclaiming, This hand, Alexander, then saved your life, the king could no longer contain his passion. He sprang up to rush upon Cleitus, but was held back by some of his friends, while he called out for his guards to come and rescue him from the traitors who were confining him, as Bessus had Darius. In the mean while, Cleitus, who did not still desist from his provoking language, was hurried out of the banquet chamber. Alexander was then released; but as his fury was only inflamed by the short restraint it had undergone, he immediately snatched a spear from the hands of a sentinel, and hastened towards the door. Unhappily, Cleitus had also recovered his liberty, and, no less frantic than the king, was returning to the palace, and met Alexander, who was calling out for the object of his vengeance, and, as soon as he perceived him, thrust the spear through his body.

When he saw the brother of his nurse Lanice, the companion of his boyhood, the preserver of his life, stretched dead at his feet, the double intoxication of wine and rage was instantly overpowered by a thrill of remorse. He retired to his chamber in an agony of grief, and throwing himself on his bed, continued to repeat the names of Cleitus and Lanice, whom, after her two sons had been slain in his service, he had deprived of her only brother. The murderer of his friends, as he loudly called himself—perhaps the assassination of Parmenio had begun to appear to him in its true light—he was not fit to live. For three days he rejected food, and abandoned himself wholly to his anguish. Then, as its violence began to subside, with the abatement of his bodily strength, his friends attempted, with more success, to soothe, console, and rouse him from his dejection. The soothsayers bade him submit to the just wrath of Dionysus, who had visited him with a temporary phrensy, to manifest his displeasure at the neglect of his festival, which the king must celebrate in due form if he wished to propitiate the god. The army adopted a less innocent artifice for the same purpose; they passed a resolution that Cleitus had been justly put to death, and forbade the interment of his remains until the king interfered, and ordered him to be buried. The motive of this servility may be admitted as a palliation for its baseness. There is nothing else to distinguish it from the adulation of Anaxarchus, who expressed the same sentiment in a more philosophical form. The poets, he suggested to Alexander, had placed Dike, the goddess of justice, at the right hand of Zeus, to signify that whatever he decreed was right: in like manner, whatever was done by a great king ought to be deemed just, first by himself, and, when so approved, by all other men.\* Alexander's understanding was too sound to be deceived by the obsequiousness of his soldiers, or by the sophist's theological and ethical fallacies: he more readily listened to the soothsayers, and found some comfort in

\* Anaxarchus had the merit, at least, of frankly professing the principle. How many adopt and act upon it, both in religion and politics, who have not the candour to avow it!

the thought that his fatal burst of passion was the working of the offended god; and, before he left Maracanda, atoned for his past neglect by the celebration of the Dionysiac festival. But the most efficacious remedy for his grief was supplied by the cares of public business, and the toils of war. Hephæstion was sent with a detachment into Bactria, to provide for the subsistence of the army in its winter-quarters. Amyntas was appointed to the vacant satrapy of Artabazus. Alexander himself set out on the expedition which he had before meditated towards the western frontier. The region which he was about to invade, which the Greeks, perhaps with a slight corruption of its proper name, called *Xenippa*,\* lay, it seems, on the skirts of a range of hills, which rise about ten miles north of Bokhara, running from east to west, and still bear the name, by which they were then known, of the Nura Mountains. It was a district abounding in villages, as its soil was singularly fertile. The natives, fearing that it might become the theatre of war, and might suffer, as the vale of the Sogd the year before, from Alexander's resentment, when they heard of his approach, compelled the Bactrian exiles to withdraw. Amyntas was sent to intercept them; but as their numbers amounted to more than 2000, all mounted, they ventured to attack him, and, having taken him by surprise, long maintained a hard combat. They were at last put to flight, and left 400 on the field of battle, and 300 in the enemy's hands; but the Macedonians purchased their victory with the loss of eighty slain, and between three and four hundred were wounded. Curtius seems to say that the fugitives soon afterward submitted, and obtained pardon from the conqueror; but perhaps this ought to be understood of the inhabitants of *Xenippa*, who had still reason to dread his displeasure on account of the shelter which they had afforded to the refugees. He then advanced towards the highlands of Nura, or, as Curtius writes it, Naura, where the principal defile was occupied by a chieftain named *Sysimithres*, who was in possession of a strong fortress at its entrance. According to Curtius, he surrendered at the first summons; but as Curtius has manifestly confounded the capture of this fortress with that of another, to be mentioned hereafter, we cannot be sure that he has not wholly misrepresented the manner in which it fell into Alexander's hands. It is only certain that the reduction of this place was not attended with the immediate submission of the whole canton. Alexander afterward, taking the cavalry only with him, made one of his extraordinary marches in pursuit of the remaining insurgents. Philip, a younger brother of *Lysimachus*, to show his devotion to the king, accompanied him the whole way on foot; and, when they overtook the fugitives, fought gallantly by his side; but as soon as the enemy was routed, sank exhausted by the effort, and expired in his master's arms. On his return to the camp, after he had completely dispersed the barbarians, Alexander had to lament another loss, the death of his brave general *Eri-*

*gius*, which had just taken place: perhaps an effect of wounds received in the attack of the fortress. His obsequies, and those of the young soldier, were celebrated together.

When this district had been pacified, there remained no enemy on foot in *Sogdiana*, though, as long as *Spitamenes* lived at large, it could never be secure from invasion. Alexander now proceeded with the main body of his army to *Nautaca*, where he meant to spend the winter, leaving *Cœnus*, with a division of horse and foot, in the vale of *Sogd*, to preserve the tranquillity of the country, and, if possible, to draw *Spitamenes* by some stratagem into his power. *Spitamenes*, as Alexander had expected, did not long remain quiet; but, as the strongholds of *Sogdiana* were now all in the hands of the *Macedonians*, he saw no hope left but in an attack on *Cœnus* and his division. Having come to *Bage*, a strong place on the northwest frontier, he again collected a body of cavalry, about 3000, from the *Massagetæ*, and marched against *Cœnus*. A hard-fought battle ensued; but the *Macedonian* tactics and discipline gained a decided victory. The barbarians fled, leaving 800 slain; the victors, according to their own statement, lost less than forty. *Spitamenes*, indeed, escaped, but his *Sogdian* and *Bactrian* adherents now began to view his cause as desperate, and a great number of them deserted him in his flight, and surrendered themselves to *Cœnus*. The *Scythians*, to console themselves for their disaster, plundered the baggage of their allies. *Spitamenes*, who still accompanied them, was left wholly in their power; they had little to hope for from him, and probably viewed him with an evil eye as the author of their calamities. A report soon reached them, spread, perhaps, for the purpose by *Cœnus*, that Alexander himself was on the point of making an expedition against them. To avert this danger, they cut off the head of *Spitamenes*, and sent it to Alexander.† So fell the boldest, most active, and persevering enemy that Alexander had yet encountered in Asia; one of the few men who had displayed a love of independence, which could neither be seduced nor overawed. His death relieved Alexander from his chief anxiety about the countries where he had now been detained nearly two years; though in the upper valleys of the *Oxus* there were still some refractory chiefs, among them *Catanes*, who had been an associate of *Spitamenes* in his treachery to *Bessus*, *Austanes*, and *Chorienes*, who still relied on the security afforded by that mountainous region. *Dataparnes*, who had taken refuge among the *Dahe*, neighbours of the *Massagetæ*, was sent by them in chains to Alexander, as soon as they heard of the death of *Spitamenes*.‡

\* According to another story, which Curtius relates at great length (viii., 3), it was brought by the wife of *Spitamenes*, who had entreated him to surrender himself to Alexander, and then murdered him to revenge herself for the ill usage she had received from him on account of her advice.

† So Curtius, viii., 3, 16. Droysen, I do not know on what authority, describes him as surrendering himself, p. 341. The order in which the events of the campaign of 328 are related in the text, is only the result of an attempt to combine the accounts of Arrian and Curtius together, in what seemed to me the most probable manner. It differs from Droysen's arrangement in two points. According to his view, Alexander first marched from the *Oxus* to *Maracanda*, there gave his orders to Hephæstion about the new *Sogdian* colonies, then took the *Sogdian* Rock, returned to

\* The great number of names ending in *tippe* in the modern maps of *Mawer-al-nahr* seems to indicate that it is only the first part of the name *Xenippe* that was turned by the Greeks according to the analogy of their own language.



It was Alexander's purpose, as soon as the season permitted in the spring of 327, to make an expedition against the chiefs who still held out in the eastern highlands, and then immediately to begin his march towards India. In his winter-quarters at Nautaca, where he was joined by Cœnus as soon as he had discharged the most important part of his commission, he made various regulations concerning the administration of the western provinces, which he was soon to leave at a still greater distance behind him, while he penetrated into the unknown regions of India. Already he had experienced the difficulty of maintaining his authority during a long absence over the remote parts of his dominions. Autophradates, the satrap of Tapuria, had been repeatedly sent for, and had not obeyed the summons. Phrataphernes was now despatched to arrest him, and bring him to court. Oxodates, the satrap of Media, had betrayed a want either of zeal or of loyalty, and Atropates was sent to take his place; Stamenes to succeed to the satrapy of Babylon, which had become vacant by the decease of Mazæus. Sopolis, Epocillus, and Menidas, were sent to bring fresh recruits from Macedonia.

With the first gleams of spring Alexander left Nautaca, and moved through an Alpine road, in which his troops suffered extreme hardships from tempestuous weather, cold, fatigue, and hunger, towards a country which Arrian calls Parætacene, and which has, therefore, been commonly supposed to lie to the south of Bactria. A part of Khorasan was undoubtedly called by that name, as well as the district which Alexander conquered on his way from Persepolis to Ecbatana. But it is impossible that either of these should be here meant by Arrian, not only because Alexander could not have taken either of them in his way from Nautaca to Bactra, but because this Parætacene appears, from Curtius,\* to have been situated in the vicinity of the Sacæ, whose seats unquestionably lay to the east of Bactria and Sogdiana. The place of greatest strength in this Parætacene was a fortress belonging to Choriènes.† It stood on

Marcanda, and after the death of Cleitus made the expedition against Xenippa and Naura, leaving Cœnus to protect Sogdiana. During his absence on this expedition, Spitamenes made his unsuccessful attempt, and his death took place before Alexander went into winter-quarters at Nautaca. It seemed to me necessary to place the capture of the Sogdian Rock earlier in the campaign of 328, on account of the snow which Arrian describes as lying so deep at the time; and I infer, from Arrian's language (iv., 17, 18) about Cœnus, that the death of Spitamenes took place after Alexander had left the vale of the Sogd for Nautaca. In iv., 17, we read that he left Cœnus commander-in-chief in Sogdiana, and ordered him to winter there, both to protect the country, and to draw Spitamenes into an ambush, if he found an opportunity, in the course of the winter. These expressions seem to prove that Alexander was at this time on the point of going into winter-quarters. Nor can it be considered as an important objection, that Arrian and Curtius both say he was meditating an expedition against the Massagete or Dahæ, among whom Spitamenes had taken refuge, when the chief's head was brought to him. It does not follow that he was then near their frontier. Arrian (iv., 18) seems evidently to allude to the commission which he had mentioned in the preceding chapter, when he says that Cœnus came to Nautaca, as well as Craterus, Phrataphernes, and Stasanor, having accomplished all that had been assigned to them by Alexander to do. The *iv. τοῦτο* can only refer to the interval between the defeat and the death of Spitamenes. As to Phrataphernes and Stasanor, I can hardly help suspecting that they have been mentioned here through some mistake arising from iv., 7.

\* viii., 4, 20.

† In the description which Curtius gives of the fortress of Sysimithres, which in general belongs to this of Chori-

a high insulated rock, precipitous on all sides, and completely surrounded by a deep ravine, which served as a natural trench to guard the approach. The ground at the top appears to have been level, and capable of holding a numerous garrison. The only path which led up to it was one which had been cut in the rock, so as to be of difficult ascent, even when not defended, and to allow room in its breadth for no more than one man.\* It was necessary to fill up a part of the ravine before the first step could be taken towards the storming of the fortress; and this was a work which, to a common eye, would have appeared utterly impracticable; so great was its depth, so precipitous its sides. But Alexander had resolved to become master of the place, and obstacles apparently as great had already yielded to such a resolution. The sides of the neighbouring hills were clothed with fir, which supplied abundant materials. By means of ladders the besiegers descended to the foot of the precipice, where they drove in piles, which they overlaid with hurdles, and then heaped up a pile of earth. The work advanced, indeed, but slowly, though the whole army was employed on it, one half during the day, under the eye of Alexander himself, the rest by night in three divisions, which relieved each other, under Perdiccas, Leonatus, and Ptolemy. Yet, at length, it rose to such a height that the arrows of the assailants reached the top of the walls. Choriènes, seeing so much that he had supposed impossible already effected, began to tremble lest his remaining defences might prove equally unavailing. He sent a herald to Alexander to request a conference with Oxyartes; and the persuasions and example of Oxyartes induced him to commit himself to Alexander's generosity. He came down with a few of his intimate friends to the camp, was graciously received, and, while he himself remained there, sent some of his companions back with orders to the garrison to surrender the fortress. When these orders had been obeyed, the king himself went up with 500 of the hypaspists to view the place. Its strength, and the large stock of provisions which had been laid in, proved either the confidence that had been reposed in him, or the awe he had inspired; and he did not scruple to restore the fortress to Choriènes, and to invest him with the government of the surrounding district. Choriènes required this generosity with a munificent present of provisions, sufficient to supply the army for two months; and he admitted that this was not a tenth part of the store which he had collected for the siege.

After the fall of this place, which was the key of the province, there remained no object in this quarter that demanded Alexander's presence. He himself proceeded to Bactra, to make his final preparations for his Indian expedition, and left Craterus, with the divisions of Pysperchon, Attalus, and Alcetas, and 600 of the horse-guard, to complete the reduction of Pafenes, the river or torrent at the bottom of the ravine is a conspicuous feature. But Arrian does not mention it. This, therefore, cannot help to identify the rock of Choriènes with the Hissar Shadman, which Droyen takes for it, though the conjecture, for aught that appears to the contrary, is probable enough.

\* One might suspect from Curtius (viii., 2, 21) that it was a gallery cut through the rock, and issuing at the top: *perpetuus cuniculus iter præbens in campos*.

metacene, and to crush the remains of the independent party in their last retreats. Craterus brought the two chiefs who still held out to an engagement, in which Catanes fell and Austanes was taken prisoner. Curtius seems to speak of a distinct expedition made by Polyperchon, in which he overran a region called Bubacene.\* This has been interpreted as the country now called Badakshan, which stretches eastward to the foot of the mountains (the Belur Tâgh) that contain the sources of the Oxus. But it seems doubtful whether Alexander gave any commission to his lieutenants beyond that which Arrian mentions, of subduing the Bactrian insurgents, and whether they would have ventured on such operations, when they knew that he was waiting for their arrival to set out on his march to India. They had certainly not much time for such conquests, since before the beginning of the summer they had already rejoined the grand army at Bactra.

During their absence, events had taken place there which illustrate the condition of Alexander's court, and the footing on which he stood with his Macedonian nobles. He had detected another conspiracy against his life, more certainly attested than that of Philotas, and formed by persons whom he could still less have suspected of such a design. The parties were some of the royal pages, youths selected, as has been already mentioned, from the noblest Macedonian families, to be trained in all the arts of war and peace, which might fit them for the highest commands, in the course of their attendance on the king's person. It was among their duties to keep guard at the entrance of the royal apartments, to receive the king's horse from the grooms, and wait on him when he was ready to mount, and to attend him to the chase. They were treated in other respects with the distinction befitting their birth and prospects, and enjoyed the privilege of sitting—like the Roman boys—at table before the king. It had happened that, at a hunting-party, perhaps on the road to Bactra, one of these youths, named Hermolaus, heedlessly or officiously had hurled his dart at a wild boar which the king was preparing to strike. Alexander, vexed and offended, ordered the youth to be punished with stripes, in the presence of the other pages, and to be deprived of his horse. The chastisement may have been merited and not excessive, and it was of a kind to which, according to custom, the pages were held to be liable at the king's pleasure. Yet this power may have been scarcely exercised that the infliction was accounted a grievous disgrace, and Hermolaus may not have viewed his own conduct in the light in which it appeared to the king. It is certain that he felt as one who had suffered an atrocious injury. He disclosed his feelings to one of his young comrades, Sostratus, son of Amyn-

tas, and declared that life would be insupportable to him without revenge. Sostratus was easily led to share the resentment, or, at least, the danger, of one whom he loved; and a plot was soon formed between them to murder the king. So far there is nothing to surprise us in the narrative. But what follows is hardly to be explained as the effect of boyish passion or sympathy. It must have been through other motives that the two friends induced four other youths of their own class, Antipater, the son of Asclepiodorus, who had been satrap of Syria, Epimenes, son of Arseas, Anticles, son of Theocritus, and Philotas, son of Carsis, who is described as a Thracian, to become their accomplices. It seems incredible that they should have taken part in such a plot without some previous ground of discontent and ill-will towards the king. There is no reason to suppose that he had personally offended them; and we are therefore inclined to suspect that their youthful indignation had been kindled by the complaints, which they might often have heard from their elders, of Alexander's attempts to degrade his nobles to a level with the conquered people, his adoption of Persian usages, his tyrannical proceedings in the case of Philotas and Parmenio. There could, indeed, be no doubt that this was the case, if we could rely on the report, that Hermolaus afterward pleaded these motives in justification of his conduct; and even if this was a rhetorical invention, it may truly express the feelings of the greater part of his associates.

The conspirators determined to take advantage of the opportunity offered by their attendance on the king to effect their purpose. According to one account, they waited until, in the course of rotation, they should be all on duty together at night, and a month elapsed before this combination took place; a remarkable proof, undoubtedly, if this was the fact, of the tenacity with which they clung to their design. Arrian, however, simply relates, that they agreed, when the night watch fell to Antipater's turn, to kill the king in his sleep. Antipater, it may be supposed, was to admit them into the bedchamber. It happened, however, that on this evening Alexander remained at table longer than usual, and, after he had retired from the banquet-room, was induced to return to it, and to continue there the greater part of the night. There was a story, which was adopted by Aristobulus, that a Syrian woman, who followed the camp, and was believed—apparently because she had lost her senses—to possess the gift of divination, and had access at all hours to the royal apartments, met him as he was withdrawing, and, by her entreaties, prevailed on him to rejoin the company he had left. Whatever the cause may have been, it is certain that he did not go to rest until the guard had been relieved. The next day Epimenes, moved, perhaps, by the king's marvellous escape, which might seem to indicate a divine interposition, revealed the plot to his bosom friend Charicles, who immediately disclosed it to Eurylochus, another son of Arseas: Eurylochus carried the information to Ptolemy, who reported it to the king. The conspirators were arrested, and all but Epimenes—whose life was spared—put to the torture. It seems that they

\* Droysen, in his paper *On Alexander's Marches through Turan* (Rhein. Mus., 1833, p. 100), incorrectly represents Curtius as saying that Catanes and Austanes were conquered by Craterus in *Bubacene*. If so, there could have been no doubt that Bubacene and Paratacene were the same district. But Curtius (viii., 5, 2), after he has mentioned the defeat of the two insurgent chiefs, adds, *Polyperchon quoque regionem que Bubacene appellatur in ditionem redegit*.  
† *Ætius*, Ann., xiii., 15. Curtius (viii., 6, 5) has, *sedentibus secum cum rege*, but perhaps this was as according to the Roman usage, *propria et parciore mensa*. Compare Servius on *Æn.*, vii., 176.

did not deny their guilt : Hermolaus is said to have gloried in the deed which he had meditated, and to have inveighed against Alexander's tyranny in the Macedonian assembly. They were stoned, according to the more probable account,\* by the army : according to another, their punishment was committed to their comrades, who, to prove their own loyalty, put them to a cruel death.

But in the confessions which had been extorted from them some other names had been mentioned, and among them that of the Olynthian Callisthenes, a person who, through the misfortune in which he was thus involved, probably acquired greater celebrity than he would have earned by all the works and actions of his life. Callisthenes was one of the men of letters who followed the court ; but he stood on a secular footing with the king. He was Aristotle's kinsman, had been educated by him, and, during his residence in Macedonia, had probably seen the companion of Alexander's studies ;† and it seems to have been through Aristotle's recommendation that he was permitted to attach himself to the expedition. The philosopher, perhaps, hoped that in the camp and the court he would acquire that practical sense in which he knew him to be very deficient, notwithstanding the success with which he cultivated several branches of literature, and his real rhetorical talent. But a more extensive intercourse with men did not render him fitter for society, but only exposed the defects of his character, and at length rendered them fatal to himself. He still continued to be a mere man of letters, but with an extravagant conceit of the importance of his own pursuits, and of the eminence he had attained in them. Philosophy was, it seems, the study which he professed as the basis of all his literary accomplishments ; and he probably adopted Aristotle's doctrines as far as he was able to comprehend them. But his faculty was not that of an inquirer, but of an expounder. His philosophy only furnished him with subjects for rhetorical exercises. It was probably in the same spirit, and with no higher ambition, that he undertook to record his great events which were passing under his eyes ; and, as one who was more conversant with words than with things, he conceived a very high opinion of the merit and value of his own work. It seems that he was even silly enough to boast that Alexander's fame depended on his pen, and that he had not come to seek reputation from Alexander, but to spread his renown over the world. We might other-

wise have put a better sense on another speech which is attributed to him : that Alexander's divinity would rest, not on the stories which had been forged to prove it, but on his own history of his actions.\*

It may have been with a better feeling, though not without a mixture of vanity, that he professed that the chief motive which had brought him to the court was the hope that he might prevail on the king to rebuild Olynthus, and restore the remains of its sacred population. It was a boon like that which Aristotle had obtained from Philip ; and to have become the second founder of his native city—a place so much more famous than Stagira—would no doubt have flattered his pride, as well as have gratified his patriotism. There are other indications that he was keenly conscious of his relation to a city which had once been mistress of a great part of Macedonia, and had been destroyed by Philip. Alexander, it is said, once requested him at a banquet, where a great number of his nobles were present, to entertain the company with a panegyric on the Macedonians. Callisthenes complied, and declaimed with his usual fluency. When he had perorated, amid the applause of his audience, the king, quoting a verse of Euripides, observed that on a fine theme it was no hard task to speak well, and challenged him to prove his ingenuity by an accusation of the Macedonians, which might point out the failings they had to correct. Alexander was, probably, quite in earnest, and would have been well pleased to have heard the defects of the national character, and those of his great men, faithfully, though delicately exposed. It was a step towards the removal of prejudices which interfered with his plans. But Callisthenes took up this subject in a very different spirit and tone from that in which he had handled the last. His panegyric had been a rhetorical exercise ; his second speech was a serious invective. He traced the origin of Philip's power to the internal dissensions which had wasted the strength of Greece, and quoted a verse which contained the remark that, *where discord prevails, is a road for the vilest to honour*. And he proceeded to give vent, no doubt, to his real sentiments, in a strain which surprised and deeply offended those who had before applauded him, and which induced the king to observe that he had exhibited to the Macedonians a specimen, not of his ability, but of his ill will.

It is evident that the arts of a courtier were those which Callisthenes had studied least, or which were least congenial either to his character or his national prejudices ; and Arrian justly remarks that, since he had chosen to live in a court, he ought to have conformed to its manners as far as it was possible to do so without personal degradation. Still, the bluntness of his deportment, and the freedom of his language, though they provoked enmity, also inspired a certain degree of respect. His company was especially sought by the young Macedonians who had any taste for philosophy or eloquence, and Hermolaus, in particular, was one of those who most frequently listened to his

\* Which would be unquestionably the true one, if the story of Alexander to Antipater, quoted by Plutarch (Al., 55), was certainly genuine. But the manner in which the fact is mentioned by Arrian (iv., 14) throws some suspicion on the letter : and its contents are, to say the least, very strange. It seems hardly credible that he should have thrown out such violent threats before even an inquiry had been made as to the ground of his suspicions against Aristotle.

† Stahr (*Aristotelis*, p. 106) says that this is expressly mentioned by Plutarch and Arrian. But neither Plutarch nor Arrian state that Callisthenes was Alexander's fellow-student. They only relate that Callisthenes was brought up by Aristotle. The other assertion is no more than a probable inference from this fact. Stahr is equally inaccurate when he asserts (p. 126), referring to Arrian (iv., 10), that Callisthenes bitterly blamed the murder of Cleitus. Arrian's *ὅτι φησὶν* (which does not imply any bitterness) rather, clearly relates, not to the death of Cleitus, but to the innovations which he had just mentioned.

\* It ought, however, to be observed, in justice to Callisthenes, that the language in which Arrian speaks of his own performance (i., 12) might, with very slight exaggeration, be represented as a proof of similar self-conceit.

discourse. Alexander himself seems to have thought that his co-operation, and even his acquiescence, might be of great use for the purpose of reconciling the Macedonians to the innovations which he wished to introduce. The other men of letters, sophists, poets, and rhetoricians, particularly Anaxarchus, readily entered into the king's views, and offered their services to promote them. It was concerted among them that, at a banquet in the palace, they should bring the subject under discussion, and should exert all their powers of reasoning and persuasion to overcome the reluctance of the Macedonians with respect to the ceremony of adoration; and it seems to have been arranged, through the mediation of Hephæstion, that the king should withdraw for a short time from his guests, on a plea of business, and that during his absence Anaxarchus and the rest should propose to salute him after the Persian custom on his return. When the time came, and Alexander had left the table, Anaxarchus turned the conversation on his great qualities and achievements, and endeavoured to convince his hearers that it was much more fitting for the Macedonians to pay divine honours to such a hero, who was their own king, than to strangers, like Dionysus and Hercules, whose exploits were much less admirable; and that as it was certain that, whenever he should be taken from them, they would honour him as a god, it was far more reasonable to treat him with the same reverence during his life than after his death, when it would be of no use to him.

The sophist's arguments were received with silence by the persons to whom they were addressed; but Callisthenes undertook to refute them, and showed that, according to the established doctrines and practice of the Greek religion, divine honours could only be bestowed on a mortal by the decree of a god delivered through an oracle, and that they had never been conferred on any one except, as in the case of Hercules, after his death. If we might depend on this passage in Arrian's report of the speech of Callisthenes, we should infer that the story about the oracle of Ammon had not yet been officially sanctioned. But such details are the less to be relied on, as there were two accounts of the conduct of Callisthenes, seemingly both belonging to the same occasion, and quite distinct, though not absolutely inconsistent with each other. That which Arrian gives as the less trustworthy is, nevertheless, confirmed by authority quite as good in such matters as that of Ptolemy or Aristobolus; by Chares of Mitylene, who filled the high office of Eisangelus at Alexander's court, when it began to be modelled after the Persian usage. It seems that, according to the arrangement which had been previously made with the Greek courtiers and the Persians who were present, the king sent his golden goblet round among his guests. The first who received it, after he had drunk, performed the Persian ceremony of adoration, and was then permitted to kiss the king. This example was followed by all who were in the secret, and it had been expected, we do not know precisely on what grounds, that Callisthenes was prepared to conform with it. When it came to his turn, however, he drank, but made no obeisance, and immediately advanced to kiss

the king. Alexander, who happened to be conversing with Hephæstion, did not perceive the omission;\* but when it was mentioned to him by one of his attendants, he turned away from Callisthenes when he approached. Callisthenes was heard to say as he retired, I am going away the poorer by a kiss.

Alexander was the more indignant at this language and behaviour, because he was assured by Hephæstion that Callisthenes had previously promised to perform the ceremony. The man's character renders it extremely improbable that he had ever made such a promise,† for which, if he did not mean to keep it, no satisfactory reason can be assigned; though it would not follow that Hephæstion told a wilful falsehood, as Plutarch supposes, for the purpose of exasperating Alexander's resentment. He may only have drawn a hasty inference from the silence of Callisthenes, or from ambiguous expressions which he used when the affair was discussed. Callisthenes, however, must have had many enemies, who were eager to widen the breach between him and the king, and who were not scrupulous about the means. To many of the Macedonian generals the whole tribe of literary idlers who hung about the court must have been odious, as in the time of Perdiccas, even when there was nothing repulsive in their manners; and Alexander now lent a willing ear to the insinuations which were addressed to him from various quarters, and which were probably corroborated by Hephæstion, who was personally hurt by the breach of faith which he imputed to Callisthenes; that he was setting a pernicious example by his affectation of independence, and was instilling dangerous maxims into the minds of the youths who flocked to his lessons, and were captivated by his eloquence.

Such was the position in which Callisthenes was standing when the conspiracy of the pages was discovered. Suspicion might naturally have been awakened against him by his familiarity with Hermolaus. But it had been forestalled, as we have just seen, by the suggestions of his enemies; and Alexander was disposed to believe everything that could be laid to his charge. A strict inquiry was instituted into the language which he had used in his conversations with the young delinquents; and we cannot be surprised that many expressions should have come to light which appeared conclusive evidence of his guilt to one who was already convinced of it. Those which are reported remind us of the attempts which were made by the accusers of Socrates to convict him of treason against the Athenian commonwealth. Their import could only be determined by the occasion and context of the discourse, as to which we know nothing. Taken by themselves, they are entitled to no weight, except on the supposition that he was acquainted with the plot. As to this point, there is a seeming contradiction in the accounts we have remaining from the best authorities, which, however, it may not be impossible to clear up. The princi-

\* Droysen (p. 352), to show his hero's magnanimity, takes the liberty of representing him as perceiving, but taking no notice of the omission. The statement in the text is that of Arrian and Plutarch, or, rather, of Chares.

† It is clear, from Arrian (iv., 10), that Callisthenes had from the first openly avowed his disapprobation of Alexander's proceedings.

nal object with which the youths were put to he torture appears to have been to obtain some information against Callisthenes, who had been arrested as soon as the plot was discovered; and it might have been expected that Hephæstion, who had managed that engine so successfully in the case of Philotas, would have been able to draw any confession that he wished from these striplings. Yet we learn from the very este authority—a letter written by Alexander at the time, and addressed to Craterus and his colleagues\*—that they continued to the last to deny that any person was privy to their design. On the other hand, Arrian mentions that, according to the concurrent testimony of Aristotolus and Ptolemy, they confessed that Callisthenes had instigated them to the deed. On a point so much affecting Alexander's reputation, we might reasonably question the authority of these two writers, and we should not scruple to reject their assertion, if it really contradicted both Alexander's own declaration, and the united evidence of all his other historians. But it seems not at all improbable that the instigation of which they spoke consisted only in sentiments which might have been very innocently uttered by Callisthenes, though they had the effect of encouraging the conspirators to persevere in their design, and might be construed by his enemies as intended to suggest it.

We have one decisive proof how incapable Alexander himself was, at this time, of forming right judgment on the case. It would have been scarcely credible, if it was not so well attested, that his prejudice against Callisthenes was so strong as to induce him to harbour a suspicion that Aristotle had some share in his insman's treason. Plutarch quotes a letter of the king's to Antipater, in which he expressed is resolution to *punish the sophist, and those who ent him out*. Even if the letter should be thought spurious, the fact to which it alludes is not less certain. The fate of Callisthenes furnished a subject for a variety of conflicting anecdotes. Arrian cannot suppress his surprise at Ptolemy and Aristobolus should differ from each other as to the mode of his death, notorious as it must have been. Ptolemy related that he was put to the torture, and afterward crucified. Aristobolus, that he was carried about in chains, and at last died of disease. This last account is placed beyond dispute by the testimony of Chares, who adds that the purpose for which he was kept in confinement was that he might be finally tried in Aristotle's presence, and that he died seven months after in India, of a loathsome disease, produced, it seems, by imprisonment in his corpulent frame.

His character is not one which can excite much interest in his behalf, but it is entitled to justice. There appears to be no reason for rejecting the almost unanimous judgment of antiquity, that he was innocent of the offence with which he was charged, and fell a victim to Alexander's preconceived resentment. Some of Alexander's modern apologists have assumed that the ancients were prejudiced in favour of Callisthenes by his profession of philosopher;\*

as if this had been sufficient to shield Plato or Aristotle from obloquy, and had not rather exposed them to innumerable calumnies; or as if Anaxarchus, sophist as he was, had not been branded with merited infamy. The transaction is memorable, as it exhibits the conqueror of Asia calling in the aid of Greeks to overcome the independent spirit of his own people.

## CHAPTER LIII.

### ALEXANDER'S CAMPAIGNS IN INDIA TO HIS RETREAT FROM THE HYPHASIS.

AFTER the conquest of the Bactrian satrapy, there remained only one province of the Persian Empire into which Alexander had not yet carried his arms: it was that which tempted his curiosity, as well as his ambition, perhaps more than any other. Already, indeed, before he crossed the Paropamisus, he had made himself master of a great part of the country which the Persians called India, and perhaps had very nearly reached the utmost limits within which the authority of the great king was acknowledged in the latter years of the monarchy. But the power of the first Darius had certainly been extended much farther eastward. It seems probable that a part of his Indian tribute was collected in the Pendjab, and there is some reason to believe that it was on the Hydaspes Scylax began his voyage of discovery.\* After the death of Darius, the attention of the Persian kings was so much turned towards the west, or distracted by wars with their revolted subjects, that they would scarcely have had leisure for fresh conquests in India, even if the spirit of Cyrus had lived in his successors: and it is very uncertain whether their territories reached so far as the Indus. The greater part of the peninsula was, as we see from the accounts of Herodotus and Ctesias, utterly unknown to the Persians. The India of Herodotus is bounded on the east by a sandy desert, which, it seems, he believed to be terminated by the ocean which girded his earth, and was inhabited chiefly by pastoral and savage, even, it was said, cannibal tribes.† Nor had Ctesias, during his long residence at the Persian court, heard of the Ganges, or of the countries on its banks. He had, indeed, collected many marvellous reports, which must, for the most part, have seemed incredible to all intelligent Greeks, about the productions of India; but he betrays a total ignorance of the peculiar features of Indian society. Both he, however, and Herodotus represent the country, so far as it was known to them, as exceedingly rich and populous. The Indians, Herodotus observes, are

hero's honour is concerned, that he makes no mention of the letter to Craterus: a document, the genuineness of which seems to be placed beyond a doubt by its direction, which could hardly have occurred to a forger. Mr. Williams is equally guarded on this point, and asks, *But why should we doubt the united testimony of Ptolemy and Aristobolus? &c.* almost as if he knew that the greater part of his readers would not be able to answer the question.

\* So Ritter, *Asien*, iv., l. p. 445. Van Bohlen (*Indien*, i., p. 64), who likewise considers Capatary as Cashmere, takes the river mentioned by Herodotus, iv., 44, for the Cabul River. But in the same page he expresses a doubt whether the voyage described by Herodotus was ever made.

† These are generally supposed to be the aboriginal negro population from which the Pariahs are believed to descend.

\* Plut., *Al.*, 55.

† So both Droysen (p. 357) and Mr. Williams (p. 251). It is characteristic of the partiality which Droysen betrays in his account of this transaction, and wherever else his

by far the most numerous race of men we know: and the tribute of the Indian satrapy amounted to a third of the whole that Darius received; all, according to him, arising from the gold found in the northern mountains. But many other costly and useful productions of India, as cotton, spices, ivory, and precious stones, were very early known in the west, chiefly, it appears, through the commercial activity of the Phœnicians. At the battle of Arbela the Greeks for the first time saw elephants, which they heard had been brought from the banks of the Indus. To Alexander and his companions India appeared from a distance as a new world, of indefinite extent, and abounding in wonders and riches. Even without any other inducement, he must eagerly have desired to explore and subdue it.

During the campaigns of the last two years, he had met with opportunities of gaining better information about India than was to be found in Herodotus or Ctesias. Among the followers of Bessus was an Indian chief, or leader of mercenaries, named Siyocottus, who, when Bessus fell into Alexander's hands, submitted to the conqueror, and became firmly attached to him. The accounts which he gave of the countries beyond the Indus might afterward have been confirmed by an embassy which Alexander received in Sogdiana, from a prince whose name is written by the Greeks Omphis, or Mophis, and who reigned over the rich tract which intervenes between the Upper Indus and the Hydaspes (Behut or Jhelum), the westernmost of the five great tributaries from which the whole eastern basin of the Indus, down to their confluence with it, takes the name of the Pendjab. His capital Taxila, from which he is more commonly entitled Taxiles, stood at some distance from either stream, and appears to have been a large and splendid city, though its site has, perhaps, not yet been discovered.\* The King of Taxila had offered his alliance to Alexander, and sought aid from him against a powerful neighbour; and thus Alexander ascertained that the state of things in this part of India was highly favourable to his projected invasion. The distribution of power in the Pendjab appears to have fluctuated as much in the earliest times to which we can ascend in its history, as it has in those nearest to our own days. Ctesias spoke of the king of the Indians,† as if all India, so far as it was known to him, was comprised under a single monarchy. This king was an ally of Artaxerxes, to whom he sent presents,‡ but not, it appears, as tokens of inferiority. Hence we may collect that, when Ctesias wrote, a great part of the country on the Persian frontier was united under one powerful ruler. But in its ordinary condition it seems to have been subdivided into a number of small states, which were not under kingly government, and its inhabitants were on this account branded, by the eastern Indians, whose kings reigned by divine right, as a lawless race.§

Through some revolutions, no record of which has been preserved, a great part of it had, in Alexander's time, fallen under the dominion of three princes, the Taxiles already mentioned, and two who were kinsmen, and bore the name of Porus. The most powerful of these was the immediate neighbour of Taxiles; his territories lay to the east of the Hydaspes. It was against him that the King of Taxila sought to strengthen himself by an alliance with the Macedonian conqueror.

The accounts which Alexander received of the population and resources of the country he was about to enter, together with the consideration of the great length of time that would be requisite for re-enforcements to reach him there, convinced him of the necessity of extraordinary preparations for his Indian expedition. But the European force which he had at his disposal for this purpose can hardly have amounted to a greater number than he at first brought over into Asia; for, besides the manifold losses this part of his army had suffered in the last two years, and the garrisons and colonies which had been drawn from it, he thought it necessary to leave a corps of 10,000 infantry and 3500 horse in Bactria, under the command of the satrap Amyntas. Yet he marched into India at the head of 120,000 foot and 15,000 horse.\* Of these we must suppose that at least 70,000 were Asiatic troops. A considerable part of these auxiliaries were drawn from Bactria and Sogdiana, and from the neighbouring Scythian hordes; and they answered the double purpose of strengthening his army and of securing the tranquillity of the conquered lands from which they were withdrawn. With the same object, a large proportion of the boys who were taken from their homes to receive Greek training, were undoubtedly collected in the northeast provinces. According to Curtius, it was just before he set out for India that Alexander ordered a levy of 30,000 youths, to serve at once as hostages and soldiers.

The summer of 327 had scarcely begun, when he crossed the mountains by a shorter route than he had taken in the winter of 329,† which brought him in ten days to Alexandria. Here he found reason to remove the governor whom he had left there, and, having appointed Nicanor in his room, descended the valley of the Cabul River to Nicæa. This, according to the most probable conjecture, was the new name which he gave to the city otherwise called Ortospa-na, or Cabura, the site of the modern Cabul, where he made a sacrifice to Athene, perhaps to place it under her protection. He then advanced to the banks of the Cophen, the river formed by the confluence of the Cabul River with the Pendjshir, a larger stream, which meets it from the northwest. Here, in conformity to his summons, he was met by Taxiles, and by several chiefs from the country west of the Indus, bringing presents, such as were accounted the most honourable; and, as he expressed a wish for elephants, they promised all they possessed, which, however, amounted to no more than five-and-twenty. The satrapy of

\* The claims of the *Topo* of Manikiana (Elphinstone, p. 79) to such antiquity are very doubtful.

† *Ibid.*, xi, 27, 28.

‡ *Ibid.*, 32.

§ Ritter, *Asien*, iv., p. 459. Lassen, de *Pentapotamia Indica*, p. 22. *Ἀπέρριος* (Arrian, *Periplus*, p. 27, ed. Hude.), *Ἀρξήστρα*, x *Αναξίας*, kingless. The nickname seems to have been applied to the whole population of the Pendjab, though it happened that in Alexander's time the part west

of the Acesines was under kingly government. Lassen, u. s., speaks of this as if it had been a permanent distinction.

\* *Plut.*, Al., 66. Arrian, *Ind.*, 19, who does not mention the cavalry.

the Paropamisadæ, west of the Cophen, or Pendjshir, was committed to Tyriaspes. Alexander now divided his forces. He sent Hephestion and Perdikkas, with a strong division, accompanied by the Indian chiefs, down the vale of the Cophen to the Indus, to prepare a bridge for the passage of the army, while he himself directed his march into the mountains north of the Cophen, and included between it and the Indus.\* Here lay the territories of three warlike tribes, the Aspasians or Hippasians, Guræans, and Assacenians. The operations of this campaign, which occupied the rest of the year, do not require to be related here with all the military details which belonged to Arrian's subject. It seems that Alexander was induced to take the upper road, not so much because he desired to reduce the mountaineers as because he had learned that it led through a country which was both better supplied with provisions, and, on the whole, presented fewer obstacles (since the streams would be more easily crossed near their sources, while the climate was more temperate) than he was likely to meet with if he kept closer to the left bank of the Cophen.†

He first ascended the rugged vale of the Choes, which seems also to have been called Choespes and Evaspla by the Greeks; a tributary of the Cophen, apparently the modern Kamah, or Kashgar, which falls into it at the eastern foot of the great mountain pile called the Khoond, in which the Caucasus projects southward towards the Khyber range. This vale led into the territory of the Aspasians, where, having taken two of the smaller towns, leaving Craterus to subdue the rest of the southern district, he himself marched northward against the capital, Gorydala, which stood on the eastern bank of the Choes. On his approach, the natives set fire to their city, and fled into the heart of their mountains; but they were overtaken by the invader, and their chief fell by the hand of Ptolemy. He then crossed over to the city of Arigæum, on the eastern side of the Aspasian territory. This he also found reduced to ashes, and deserted by its inhabitants; and

as it commanded an important pass between the vale of the Choes and that of the Guræus, another tributary of the Cophen (probably the Penjkore), he ordered Craterus, who had here rejoined the great army, to rebuild it, while he himself advanced into the interior in pursuit of the fugitives. He defeated their collected forces, and gathered a vast booty, including 40,000 captives, and between three and four hundred thousand head of cattle, from which he selected some of the finest to be sent into Macedonia. He then, with some difficulty, effected the passage of the deep and rapid Guræus, and entered the territory of the Assacenians. They did not venture to keep the field, but trusted to the strength of their towns. In Massaga, their capital, their chief had prepared to defend himself with the aid of 7000 mercenaries from the Pendjab. But when, after a short siege, he was killed by a dart from an engine, the garrison capitulated, and Alexander accepted the surrender of the place, on the condition that the mercenaries should join his army. But they discovered a degree of patriotism which he had not looked for. They were so averse from the thought of turning their arms against their countrymen, that, having marched out and encamped on a hill by themselves, they meditated making their escape in the night. Alexander was apprized of their design, and, though they had not begun to execute it—with less generosity than might have been expected from him, even if mercy was out of the question—surrounded the hill with his troops, and cut them all to pieces. Then, holding the capitulation to have been broken, he stormed the defenceless city, where the chief's mother and daughter fell into his hands.

Two strongholds, named Ora and Bazira, remained to be reduced in the district between the Guræus and the Indus; and the inhabitants of Ora, which probably lay farthest eastward, had received promises of support from a neighbouring prince named Abisares, who, according to this and the other indications afforded by his proceedings, must have reigned over Cashmere, a part of which is said to bear a name of very similar sound. Alexander, however, anticipated the arrival of these succours by the capture of Ora, where he found some elephants; and the inhabitants of Bazira, now despairing of their own safety, fled to another place of refuge, which was deemed impregnable, and soon became crowded with fugitives from all parts of the country. This was a hill fort on the right bank of the Indus, not far above its junction with the Cophen. Its Indian name seems to have been slightly distorted by the Greeks, according to their usual practice, into that of Aornus, which answered to its extraordinary height, as above the flight of a bird. It was precipitous on all sides, and accessible only by a single path cut in the rock, though in one direction it was connected with a range of hills; but its summit was an extensive plain of fruitful soil, partly clothed with wood, and containing copious springs. The traditions of the country concerning its insurmountable strength seem to have given occasion to the fable which spread through the Macedonian camp, that Hercules himself had assailed it without success. Alexander did not need this inducement to ex-

\* An opinion of such a man as Schlosser must always deserve notice, and, therefore, the reader ought to be informed that Schlosser (i., 3, p. 133) takes an entirely different view of Alexander's march from Bactria to the Cophen. He says, "Alexander must probably have found the nearest road to Cabul by Bamian too difficult, for he took the other, which leads from the southern part of the province of Balkh (from Ghorat) to Kandahar, and accomplished this march in ten days. Thence he marched up the River Urgundab by Ghizni, which his Greeks called Nyssa, to Cabul or Arigæum, and then down the River Cabul, which the ancients named Kophes, to its confluence with the Indus at Attock, the ancient Taxila." But Strabo (xv., p. 267, Tauchn.), on the contrary, says expressly that Alexander, on his return, crossed the Paropamisus by a shorter route than he had taken on his road to Bactria, and then directed his march straight towards India. This seems clearly to prove that he did not pass through Candahar or Ghizni. As he had before crossed the mountains in the winter, the shortest route was probably then impracticable. Schlosser assigns no reason for fixing Nyssa at or near Ghizni. Nissa lay (Arx., v., 1) in the country between the Cophen and the Indus, the same highlands in which lay the towns which Schlosser himself (p. 137) describes as situate in the mountains of Hindukuh.

† Strabo, xv., p. 266, Tauchn. It seems necessary to interpret the passage thus, on account of the concluding sentence, which assigns the reason why Alexander crossed the Cophen, and subdued the mountain region eastward. Otherwise it would seem that the description of the drought and the heat was meant for the south of India, and not for the valley of Cabul.

cite him to the undertaking. The opinion of the natives, which had led so many to take shelter there, was a sufficient motive. It had been a principle, to which he owed most of his conquests, to show that he was not to be deterred by any natural difficulties; and he resolved to make Aornus his own. On his road southward, along the right bank of the Indus, he passed through the district of Peucelaotis, so called after its chief city, Peucela, which lay west of the Indus, though it has given its name to the modern Puckhelee on the opposite side of the river.\* Its ruler, Astes, whose territory stretched southward beyond the Cophen, had maintained his independence against Hephæstion and Perdiccas, in a city which they besieged for thirty days, on their march eastward. But he had fallen in the siege, and the place having been stormed, was committed to the care of Sanguæus, one of his subjects who had revolted from him. Peucela surrendered to Alexander on his passage, and he occupied it with a Macedonian garrison. He then advanced to a city called Ecbolima, which lay very near to the foot of Aornus, and here he left Craterus, with orders to lay in a great stock of provisions; for the reports he had heard of Aornus, though they did not shake his resolution, made him doubt whether he might not be forced to turn the siege into a blockade.

The sight of the place itself, when he encamped before it, probably suggested no better hopes. But he had not long arrived at it, before he received information of a rugged and difficult track that led up to the top of a hill, separated by a hollow of no great depth, though of considerable width, from the rock. By this path he sent Ptolemy, with a body of light troops, who reached the summit before he was noticed by the garrison, and immediately, as he had been ordered, threw up an intrenchment, and by a fire-signal announced his success to the camp below. The Indians attempted in vain to dislodge him from his position; and the next day Alexander, by a hard struggle, notwithstanding their vigorous resistance, joined him there with the rest of the army. He now availed himself of his superior numbers, and began to carry a mound across the hollow. He took part in the work with his own hands, and the whole army, animated by his example and exhortations, prosecuted it with restless assiduity. It advanced at the rate of a furlong a day; and on the fourth day a small detachment of Macedonians took possession of a little peak, which was on a level with the rock, where, it seems, they were protected by the missiles with which the besieged were now continually assailed; and the army redoubled its efforts to connect the mound with this point. But the Indians, astonished at the intrepidity with which a handful of men had seized this vantage-ground, and alarmed by the progress of the work, began to despair of resistance, and to meditate flight. They sent envoys to treat of terms of capitulation; but their intention was only to amuse Alexander until nightfall, and then to make their escape. He, however, was apprized of their design, and permitted them partly to execute it. But while they were stealing out of the place, he scaled the deserted wall with a

part of his guard, entered the fortress, and chased the fugitives, with great slaughter, into the plains below. The capture of the rock, which had baffled the assaults of Hercules, was celebrated with solemn sacrifices, and supplied a fresh theme for the eloquence of Agis and Anaxarchus.

The government of this important fortress was committed to Sisycottus; and the satrapy of the newly-conquered districts between the Cophen and the Indus to Nicanor.\* But the spirit of the mountaineers was not yet subdued. Alexander had scarcely left the Assacanian territory before it was roused to revolt by a brother of the chief who had fallen at Massaga; and as soon as he had taken Aornus, the conqueror retraced his steps into the mountains, to suppress this insurrection.† He was the more anxious to reduce the rebel, because he was in possession of a number of elephants. But when he arrived at the town of Dyrta, in the insurgent district, he found it deserted by its inhabitants, and could not even obtain any information as to the movements of the fugitives. He therefore despatched Nearchus and Antiochus to scour the country towards the northwest, while he himself opened a road, which no army had ever before trodden, to the banks of the Indus. On his way he took some of the natives, who informed him that the main body of their countrymen had fled into the dominions of Abisares, but that they had left their elephants in the thickets, on the west bank of the river.‡ With the aid of native hunters Alexander captured the beasts, and then built a fleet, in which he dropped down the stream to the bridge which had been prepared for him by Hephæstion and Perdiccas, where he arrived, it appears, towards the end of the year 327.

It was in the course of the campaign in the highlands between the Cophen and the Indus, and, it seems, in the territory of the Gureans, that the Macedonians were struck with some appearances in the productions of the soil, and the manners of the natives, and probably, also, by the sound of some names, which reminded them of the legends of Dionysus, whose fabulous conquests were now so often mentioned by Alexander's flatterers, for the purpose of exalting the living hero, whom they proposed to deify, above the god. Euripides, a bold innovator in many things, had, in one of his finest tragedies, described the expedition of Dionysus to the remote east, and had carried him as far as Bactria, a greater distance, it seems, than he had been made to reach by any preceding poet. But as there was no reason why the victorious and beneficent career of the wine-giving son of Zeus should have stopped there, it could

\* So, perhaps, Arrian's statement, iv., 28, in which Droysen, p. 376, suspects an error, may be reconciled with that which follows, v., 8. The satrapy of Philippos may have begun south of the Cophen.

† It is amusingly characteristic to find Droysen, p. 390, talking of Alexander's *just anger* against the insurgents: as if a robber had a right to be angry when a man whom he has knocked down gets up again, and tries to recover his property.

‡ Ariane's narrative can hardly be reconciled with that of Curtius (viii., 12), if his Eryx, the Aphracis of Diodorus (xviii., 86), is the same person with the Assacanian chief; for, according to Curtius and Diodorus, his head was brought to Alexander by his own soldiers. The scene of the elephant chase is supposed to have lain near Mullai, about the confluence of the Indus and the Abhasen.

\* Rennell, *Memoir of a Map of Hindostan*, p. 147.



not be surprising if traces of his presence were discovered farther eastward. And so we read, that Alexander came to a city called Nysa, which boasted of Dionysus as its founder, and, as evidence of the fact, showed the ivy and laurel which he had planted: \* a sight new to the Macedonians since they had left their native land. And near the city was the mountain which he had named Meros, or Meru, in memory of his marvellous birth. The Macedonians, it is said, made a pilgrimage to the mountain, wove themselves chaplets of the ivy that grew in the thickets on its sides, and joyfully hymned the heart-cheering Power. Alexander sacrificed to his divine predecessor, and permitted his colony, which is described as an aristocratic republic, under a chief named Acuphis, to retain its liberty and laws.

We have too many instances of the readiness with which the natives of India have humoured the fancy of Europeans about their mythology, to be much surprised that the Gurmans should have adopted the fable of Dionysus, which they may have learned from the questions of the invaders, and have dexterously turned to their own profit.† Alexander, Arrian observes, was gratified by their story, and wished it to be believed that he was then treading in the steps of Dionysus: for he hoped that the Macedonians, roused by emulation, would be the more willing to bear the fatigues of the expedition, in which he purposed to pass the utmost distance that had been reached by the divine conqueror. If we may depend on this observation, it would prove that he had not yet thought of any limit to his own progress within the farthest bounds of the Eastern world.

Aristobulus related, that the spring (326) had only just begun when Alexander ended his campaign in the mountains; and, according to Arrian's chronology—which, however, as will be seen, there is some reason to question—it can-

\* The name of Nysa, which was so celebrated in the legends of Dionysus that it accompanied him in all his wanderings, was probably invented for this story by the writers who put it into the form in which it is related by Arrian. But if, as Van Bohlen conjectures (Indien, i., p. 143), the name of Paropamisus was properly *Paropamisas* (above Nisa), Alexander's soldiers must have heard some name in this district of similar sound. It is, however, remarkable, that in the Indian mythology (Van Bohlen, p. 141), the sun has the name of *Surendras*, the wine-god, and is born of *Nis*, night. Ritter, who a few years ago (Asien, iv., i., p. 449) seemed inclined to adopt Van Bohlen's derivation *para Nisa*, in his late essay on the Topos, p. 37, decides in favour of another, *Para Yag*—the mountain city, taking Nysa for the place which thus gave its name to the whole range. The country of the Gurmans, it has been conjectured, answers to that of the remarkable people called by the Mohammedans of India Caffre (Unbelievers), of whom an interesting account is given in the Appendix (C) of Elphinstone's *Cabul*. Their valleys, it is said (p. 618), produce large quantities of grapes, wild and cultivated. It is rather surprising that Arrian does not mention the vines of Nysa. They are, however, included in the description given by Curtius of Mount Meros, viii., 10, 13. The Caffre (Elphinstone, p. 626) of both sexes drink wine to great excess. Persons of both sexes and of all ages dance with great vehemence, using many gesticulations, and beating the ground with great force, to a music which is generally quick, but varied and wild. Such usages would certainly have struck the Macedonians as Bacchanalian.

† Acuphis, we are told by Arrian (v., 1), came at the head of an embassy, to implore the conqueror's clemency for the colony of Dionysus. They find him sitting in his tent, still covered with dust from the day's march, and in full armour, leaning on his spear. They prostrate themselves before him for a time in silent awe. Acuphis then makes a speech, such as might have been put into his mouth by Anaxarchus.

not have been later than March when he crossed the Indus, probably a little above its junction with the Cophen. He celebrated his arrival on the eastern bank by a solemn sacrifice, and soon after met Taxiles, who had come out, with his army and his elephants, to greet him, and conduct him to his capital, with professions of the most entire submission and devotion. It is possible, and, indeed, it must be supposed, if we follow Aristobulus, that he made a stay of considerable length at Taxila: \* for here, according to this author, he experienced the beginning of the summer rains,† which are not known to fall, in the Pendjab, before June or July.‡ It is certain that he there received an embassy from Abisares, which was brought by the prince's own brother, and by some of his principal nobles, as well as from another Indian chief, named Doxares. It appears, also, notwithstanding Arrian's silence on the subject, that he sent an envoy to Porus to demand tribute, and to say that he expected to be met by him on his western frontier. The answer of Porus breathed defiance; he would meet the invader at the entrance of his kingdom, but in arms. But about the same time he received an embassy, of a different tenour, from the other prince of that name. This Porus, who was jealous of his kinsman's power, and hoped to profit by his fall, sent offers of submission to the stranger. He was, perhaps, attracted by the example and the good fortune of Taxiles, whose hospitality Alexander requited with munificent presents, and an enlargement of his territory, to which he probably annexed some of the newly-conquered districts west of the Indus. But Taxiles purchased this advantage at the price of his independence; for Philippos was appointed satrap of this part of India, and a Macedonian garrison was stationed in his capital.

It seems to have been during his stay at Taxila that Alexander was first enabled to gratify his curiosity concerning the doctrines and practices of the Indian ascetics. He had already witnessed something similar at Corinth, where he found Diogenes living in habits of simplicity not unworthy of the Eastern gymnosophists, as the Greeks called the sages who exposed themselves, almost naked, to the inclemency of the Indian sky. He is reported to have said that, had he not been Alexander, he would have been Diogenes. The independence of a man who had nothing to ask of his royal visiter but that he would not stand between him and the sun, struck him as only less desirable than the conquest of the world; and he conceived a like admiration for the Indian quietists, who manifested a kindred spirit. Yet their principles were widely different from those of the Greek philosopher. Diogenes thought he had attained the summit of happiness when he had contracted his animal enjoyments within the narrowest compass, so that fortune might have the smallest possible hold on him. The Indian anchor-

\* As might perhaps be inferred from Diodorus, xvii., 87, *ἐν τῇ Ταίλου χώρα προσαναλίσσων τὴν δόραμιν*.

† Strabo, xv., p. 259, Tauchn.

‡ "The western monsoon commences in the south of India about the beginning of June, but it gets later as we advance towards the north." (Elphinstone, p. 126.) About Delhi it does not begin till the end of June, p. 130. It may, however, deserve to be noticed, that Baber (Memoirs, p. 257) mentions a great flood caused by a fall of rain in the Deab of the Indus, and the Jhelum, on the 25th of February.

ites appear to have viewed their mortal existence as a period of training for a final release from the body, which was the highest object of their desires, and to have believed that the waste and abuse of life was the best preparation for death. Alexander, to whom such spectacles were new, did not, perhaps, sufficiently reflect that to throw away life—whether in frivolous amusements, or useless austerities, or indolent rumination—requires much less vigour of mind and energy of character than to spend it in enterprises even less arduous and noble than his own. He was desirous of carrying away with him some of the Indian sophists as companions of Anaxarchus.\* Fifteen of them were pursuing their contemplative exercises in a grove near Taxila, and Onesicritus was sent to them with the king's invitation.† It was rejected with disdain by Dandamis, the eldest and head of the cœnobites; but one of them—by the Greeks nicknamed Calanus‡—was induced, it is said, by the persuasions of Taxiles, to accept it, and accompanied Alexander to the end of his expedition; a sacrifice of his independence by which he incurred the contempt of his fellow-recluses.

After solemn sacrifices and games, Alexander resumed his march. He was informed that Porus had collected his forces on the left bank of the Hydaspes, to defend the passage; and he therefore sent Cœnus back to the Indus, with orders to have the vessels in which the army had crossed sawed each into two or three pieces, and transported to the Hydaspes. He left all his invalids at Taxila, and strengthened his army with 5000 Indians, who were commanded by Taxiles in person. On his march he found a defile, through which his road lay, occupied by a nephew of Porus, named Spittacus, or Spitaces, with a body of troops.§ These he soon dispersed, and having arrived, without farther opposition, on the right bank of the Hydaspes, beheld the whole army of Porus, with between 200 and 300 elephants, drawn up on the other side, separated from him by a deep and rapid stream, which, at the time he reached it, was perhaps little less than a mile broad.||

\* Perhaps, too, as Arrian suggests (Ind., c. 15), for the benefit of their medical skill.

† Strabo, xv., p. 296, Tauehn. It has been disputed whether Calanus and his companions were Brahmins or Buddhists. The language of the Greeks, Alexander's contemporaries, who scarcely suspected the difference between the two religions, is of little weight on this question. But it seems most probable that they were Brahmins. This supposition appears to agree best with the attachment they discover to the soil of India, and with the boast attributed to Dandamis, that he, no less than Alexander, was a son of the supreme God. (Arrian, vii., 2.) On the other hand, there is no trace of any Buddhist peculiarity among them. The distinction between the Brahmins, the Samanai, or Buddhists, and the Sermani, or Brahmin anchorites, has been clearly and convincingly explained by Lassen, *De hominibus quibus a veteribus appellatur Indorum philosophi*. Welckers's *Rhen. Mus.*, vol. i., where he observes, p. 175, that the title of Gymnosophists, which was applied indiscriminately to ascetics of both religions, does not occur in any Greek author before Plutarch.

‡ His proper name was Spines, Plut., Al., 65. Calanus was, it seems, a corruption of the Indian salutation *Calanya*, which is said to be equivalent to *dear friend*.

§ Polyenus, iv., c. 31, who gives, indeed, no hint as to the scene of the action. But as there can be little doubt that his Pittacus is the Spitaces mentioned by Arrian, v., 18, I have not hesitated to place it here, with Droyen. Whether the government of Spittacus, who is described by Arrian as *νεπαρχὸς τῶν βαρβάρων*, extended west of the Hydaspes, is another question.

|| The exact points at which Alexander encamped on the

Porus had stationed posts at various points up and down the river to watch the enemy's motions, and Alexander spent some time reconnoitering the country on the right bank. To distract the attention of Porus, he divided his army into several columns, with which he made frequent excursions in various directions, as if uncertain where he should attempt a passage. He then gave out that he had resolved to wait for the more favourable season, when the streams should have shrunk within their ordinary beds, and ordered magazines of provisions to be formed, as for a long sojourn. It seems, indeed, surprising that he did not defer his expedition until the end of the monsoon, the nature and duration of which he must now have learned from the natives. He may, it is true, have suspected their accounts of exaggeration; but perhaps, also, he was encouraged by the persuasion that his own troops were able to sustain the inclemency of the weather better than any others, and by the thought that the greater the difficulty of keeping the field, the more likely that he might gain a passage by surprise. He had very soon satisfied himself that it would be utterly impracticable to cross

Hydaspes, and crossed it, seem to be not clearly ascertained. The prevailing opinion seems to be, that the encampment was either near Jhelum and Rotas, or near Jhelapore, about sixteen miles lower down. Mr. Elphinstone and his suite, who crossed at the latter place (Cabul, p. 80), were struck by the precise correspondence between this part of the Hydaspes and Curtius's description of the scene of Porus's battle, chiefly, it appears, on account of the islands, which are there formed by the stream. On the other hand, Burnes, ii., p. 49 (who also confounds the place either of the encampment or the passage with the field of battle, as well as the 150 stades of Alexander's march along the river with the distance of the Macedonian camp from its banks), observes, that the sunken rocks mentioned by Curtius (in the description of the encampment, viii., 13, 9) seem to point higher up the river near Jhelum, where is the more frequented ford and the ordinary road from the Indus (see Rennell's *Memoir*, p. 123, but comparing Vincent, i., p. 110), and where the river also forms several islands. About fifteen miles lower down, near Daralpor, he saw extensive ruins (Oudeennggur, Huria Badshapoor), which he takes for those of Nicæa and Bucephalia (describing them as nearly opposite to each other). He seems not to have observed that, according to Curtius, Alexander marched up the river to the place where he crossed. Ritter (Asien, iv., i., p. 452), though he mentions these conjectures of Burnes with approbation, fixes on Daralpor as the place of crossing, and supposes the camp to have been more than twelve miles lower down, therefore below Jhelapore, where, he says, the road from Taxila crosses the river. Mr. Williams (Al-ex., p. 267) observes, "We may be almost certain that the advance of the army was along the main road leading from Attock to Jellicok-pore" (perhaps a misprint for Mullick-pore or Jilla-pore, two names which are close together in Arrowsmith's map). Vincent would place the encampment much lower down; for he thinks it evident that the woody island, where Alexander crossed, is no other than that of Jamad, which was defended by Chehabeddin against Timur (Cheref., iii., c. 10), about twenty-eight miles, according to him, below Rotas; and he meets the objection which might be drawn from the modern direction of the high road from the Indus by the conjecture that the road has been diverted to Rotas only because the island afforded a strong post, which in India is always a source of taxation. And he thinks that, from the resistance of Chehabeddin, it may be presumed that the island has the advantage of high ground and woods, as described by Arrian. Droyen, adopting Vincent's hypothesis, and building upon the last-mentioned conjecture, does not hesitate to describe Jamad as a high and woody island (p. 389). But the coincidence, though certainly specious, is uncertain (Plutarch, from Alexander's letters, calls the island *ἡ νῆσος*, Al., 60); and, according to Vincent's reasoning, Alexander should have encamped nearer to the island. Droyen thinks that we recognise the line of Alexander's march in Baber's description of his own. But to do so, we must first ascertain the position of the pass of Hamâtû, and that of Bheroh on the Hydaspes. (Baber, p. 355.) Six years later (1525), we find Baber (p. 305) passing the river Behat below Jilam by the ford.

in the face of the enemy, because the very sight of the elephants would have thrown his cavalry into confusion. It only remained, therefore, to steal a passage at some other point. His movements were probably hastened by the intelligence that Abisares, notwithstanding the recent embassy, was on his way, with his army, to join Porus.

At the distance of a day's march above the camp, at a bend of the river towards the west, where the projecting right bank was covered with wood, an island, also thickly wooded, parted the stream. This was the spot which Alexander fixed upon for his attempt. He ordered the vessels brought in pieces from the Indus to be carried to it: the shelter of the wood enabled the workmen to put them together again unobserved. Skins were also provided to be stuffed with straw. In the mean while he endeavoured to lull the enemy's vigilance by a series of false alarms. Night after night he sallied forth with his cavalry, as noisily as possible, and pushed up or down the river, as if to attempt a passage. Porus at first drew out his elephants, and moved towards the quarter from which the clamour proceeded; but when the feint had been often repeated he ceased to attend to it, and did not stir his elephants for any noise that he might hear on the other side. Still farther to cover his plan, Alexander lined the right bank, down to the destined point of embarkation, with a series of posts, within hearing of each other, who were ordered to keep up an incessant shouting. He then left Craterus, with a strong division, in the camp, with orders to remain there as long as he saw the elephants on the opposite bank, but, whenever they should be withdrawn, to attempt the passage without loss of time. Meleager, Attalus, and Gorgias were posted, with the mercenaries, horse and foot, lower down the river, and were ordered to cross over as soon as they should see the Indians engaged with the king. Alexander himself set out with the flower of his Macedonian cavalry, and the Bactrian, Sogdian, and Scythian auxiliaries, in all about 5000, and a select division of heavy and light infantry, which included the hypaspists and the brigades of Cleitus and Cœnus. He directed his march at a sufficient distance from the river to be concealed from the enemy's view, and about sunset arrived over against the island. During the night a violent fall of rain, accompanied by a terrible thunder-storm, a little impeded the labours of the men; but the noise also served to drown the clatter of the axes and hammers, and all the din of preparation, which might otherwise have reached the post on the opposite bank.

With the return of light, the rain had ceased and the storm was hushed, and the troops were immediately embarked. The king himself, with Ptolemy,\* Perdicas, Lysimachus, and Seleucus, the founder of the Syrian dynasty, went

on board a small galley, with a part of the hypaspists. The woody island concealed their movements until, having passed it, they were within a short distance of the left bank. Then first they were perceived by the Indians stationed there, who immediately rode off at full speed to carry the tidings to their camp. In the mean while Alexander proceeded to form the cavalry, which was first landed, and, putting himself at their head, began to advance from the bank. But he soon discovered that he had not yet reached the main land—that he was on another island, separated from it by a channel of no great width, but which the rain just fallen had swollen into a formidable stream. A ford, however, barely passable, was at length discovered, and the whole division was finally drawn up in order of battle. Arrian seems to say that the infantry amounted to no more than 6000 men; but perhaps he meant to speak only of the two brigades of the phalanx;† the whole of the foot, including the hypaspists and the light troops, may have been nearer 20,000. Alexander pushed forward with his cavalry and a corps of bowmen, confident that, by his superiority in this arm, he should be enabled either to rout the whole host of Porus, or, at least, to keep it engaged until the infantry came up to support him; and it seems he was not without hope that the tidings of his unexpected passage might strike the enemy with such consternation that they would not wait for his coming, and that he should have nothing to do but to overtake and destroy the fugitives.

This hope, however, was not fulfilled. Porus was not of a spirit to be so easily overpowered. His first thought, when he received the intelligence, was that there might still be time to come up with the enemy before they had completed their landing, and he immediately sent one of his sons,† with 2000 cavalry and 120 chariots, towards the place. Alexander, when he first saw this body, believed that Porus was approaching with his whole army, and sent the horse-bowmen forward to reconnoiter; but, as soon as he had ascertained the real state of the case, he charged with all his cavalry. The Indians scarcely waited for the shock of this greatly superior force. Four hundred of them were slain, and among them the prince himself. The chariots, which made their way with great difficulty over ground which the rain had turned into a swamp, all fell into the hands of the conquerors.

Even this disaster did not bow the courage of Porus; but he was perplexed by the necessity of at once meeting Alexander's attack, and defending the passage of the river against Craterus. He did not, however, hesitate long; but, leaving a part of his elephants to check Craterus, advanced to the decisive conflict with 200 of them, the whole of his cavalry (about 4000), 300 chariots, and the bulk of his infan-

\* So Arrian. And even Curtius mentions Ptolemy as present at the battle (viii., 14, 15), though before (viii., 13, 37) he had mentioned him as if he had been left on the right bank opposite to Porus; probably confounding him with Craterus. Droysen, however, seemingly on no other ground, states that Ptolemy was left in command of the three divisions, Meleager, Attalus, and Gorgias. We require some better evidence to prove that Ptolemy was not an eyewitness of the battle, which Arrian has described on his authority.

† Droysen, on the contrary, imagines that they were left behind on the right bank to cover the road from Cashmire. One should have thought that Alexander could have found a better use for them against Porus, and it is not at all clear that he believed Abisares to be so near at hand. Arrian is silent as to the report mentioned by Diodorus (xvii., 87), that Abisares was on his march to join Porus, and was only 400 stades off. He merely speaks of an intention (*ἔμελλεν*, v., 30) which, it appears, had not been so far indicated by any overt act as to render an apology necessary.

† According to Curtius, his brother, named Hages.

try, which amounted to about 30,000 men. Beyond the swampy ground near the river, he found a tract of sandy soil, which now presented a firm footing, and here he drew up his forces to await Alexander's approach. He relied chiefly on his elephants, which he placed in front of his line, at intervals of a hundred feet, which were filled up with infantry: one half of the cavalry was posted at each flank, and the chariots in front of them.

Alexander, when he came in sight of the enemy, made his cavalry halt, to allow time for the infantry to come up, and recover breath, after their long and quick march, while he himself, observing the disposition of the hostile army, decided on his plan of attack. It was his object to make such use of his cavalry, in which his own strength lay, as to deprive Porus of all the advantage he expected from his elephants, and from the superior numbers of his foot. He posted himself, as usual, in the right wing, with the main body of the cavalry; but stationed Cœnus, with two squadrons, on the left. With his wonted sagacity, he anticipated that an attack on the enemy's left wing would draw out the cavalry on the right to protect it; and he ordered Cœnus, in this case, to fall on their rear. His own phalanx was not to be brought up until the enemy's line should have been thrown into confusion by the charge of the cavalry. The event answered his expectations in every point. The horse-bowmen were first ordered to advance, and threw the enemy into some disorder by a shower of arrows. Alexander then led up the rest of his cavalry to the charge. The Indian cavalry of the right wing was brought up to the relief of their left, and was at the same time taken in the rear by Cœnus, and charged by Alexander in front. The whole body, in disorder, sought shelter in the line of the elephants, and the Macedonian phalanx then advanced to take advantage of the confusion, and to support their cavalry. Yet the shock of the huge animals, as long as they were under control, made havoc even in the ranks of the phalanx, and afforded time for the Indian cavalry to rally. But when they were driven in by a second charge of the Macedonian horse, and the engagement was crowded within a narrower space, the elephants, pressed on all sides, began to grow unmanageable; many lost their drivers, and, maddened by wounds, turned their fury indiscriminately against friend and foe. The phalanx then opened a large space for them and eluded their onset, while the light troops plied them with their missiles, or mutilated their trunks, and drove them back upon their own ranks, where, as long as their strength lasted, they spread havoc and confusion.\* At length, when many of them were killed, and the rest, spent with wounds and toil, ceased to be formidable, Alexander ordered another general charge of horse and foot; and the Indians, routed at all points, betook themselves to flight. By this time Craterus, and the divisions on the right bank, had effected their passage; and, engaging in the pursuit with all the vigour of fresh troops, made dreadful slaughter among the fugitives.

The number of the slain on the side of the Indians amounted, according to the more mod-

erate account in Diodorus, to about 12,000. Among them were two other sons of Porus, and the greater part of his principal officers. Nine thousand prisoners were taken, and eighty elephants. The chariots had been all destroyed, though Arrian does not mention the part which they took in the battle. The loss of the Macedonians is estimated, as usual, at only a few hundreds.\*

Porus himself, mounted on an elephant, had both directed the movements of his forces, and gallantly taken part in the action. He had received a wound in his shoulder—his body was protected by a corslet of curious workmanship, which was proof against all missiles—yet, unlike Darius, as long as any of his troops kept their ground, he would not retire from the field. When, however, he saw all dispersed, he, too, turned his elephant for flight. He was a conspicuous object, and easily overtaken; and Alexander, who had observed and admired the courage he had shown in the battle, desirous of saving his life, sent Taxiles to summon him to surrender. But the sight of his old enemy only roused his indignation; Taxiles could not gain a hearing for his message, and narrowly escaped a wound. Alexander, nevertheless, continued to send messengers after him; and at length, hopeless of escape, and worn with fatigue and thirst, he yielded to the persuasions of Meroes, an Indian, one of his favourites, alighted from his elephant, and, after having slaked his thirst, permitted himself to be led into the conqueror's presence.† All he would ask of Alexander was to be treated as a king; and when Alexander observed that this was no more than a king must do for his own sake, and bade him make some request for himself, his reply was still, that all was included in this.

His expectations could scarcely have equalled the conqueror's munificence. He was not only reinstated in his royal dignity, but received a large addition of territory. Yet it was certainly not pure magnanimity, or admiration for his character, that determined Alexander to this proceeding. He was conscious that his forces were not sufficient to enable him to displace the native princes east of the Indus, and to annex their territories, in the form of a satrapy, to his empire. Hence the generosity he had shown to Taxiles. But Taxiles himself might have become formidable without a rival; and the only way to secure the Macedonian ascendancy in the Pendjab was to trim the balance of power.‡

\* This battle, according to Arrian, was fought in the month Munechion of the archon Hegemon (April and May, 326). Mr. Clinton adopts an emendation, by which the date would be changed to August, 327. The oversight by which he has omitted to notice that no time would thus be left for the campaign in the mountains between the Cophen and the Indus, is clearly pointed out by Droysen. But it is at least equally strange that Droysen himself should adopt Arrian's date, as if it were free from all difficulty: though, unless the nature of India has changed since the time of Alexander, it is impossible that the rainy season, which had set in before the battle, could have begun in Munechion.

† Diodorus and Curtius tell a different story. According to them, Porus, holding out to the last, sank senseless from loss of blood, and in this state was carried into Alexander's presence.

‡ Droysen, p. 401, conceives that Alexander could not have wished to make a people so highly civilized as the Indians subjects of his empire, but only to open a way for the influence of Hellenistic forms of society, by which, in pro-

Alexander, after he had buried his slain, and solemnized his victory with his usual magnificence, allowed the main body of his army a month's rest, perhaps in the capital of Porus. The continuance of the rains was probably the chief motive for this delay. But before he quitted the scene of his triumph, he founded two cities near the Hydaspes, one, which he named Nicæa, near the field of battle, the other near the place where he had crossed the river; this he named Bucephala, after his gallant steed, which had sunk, either under fatigue or wounds, in the hour of victory. Craterus was left to superintend the building of these cities; while Alexander himself, with a select division of horse and foot, invaded the territory of the Glaucæ, or Glausanicæ, who occupied the rich valleys on the north of the dominions of Porus. It was a highly flourishing and populous region, but offered little resistance to Alexander, who is said to have taken thirty-seven cities, none containing less than 5000 inhabitants. All this country he annexed to the kingdom of Porus. He, at the same time, reconciled him, in appearance at least, with Taxiles, who was then permitted to return to his own capital. On his return from his expedition against the Glaucæ, Alexander received another embassy from Abisares, which was again brought by his brother, in which he renewed his offers of submission, and, as a pledge of his sincerity, among other presents sent forty elephants. But Alexander, who was aware of his crooked and time-serving policy, replied only by a threatening message, requiring him, if he wished to avoid an invasion, to present himself in person at the Macedonian camp. Envoys came, likewise, from the younger Porus, who, up to this time, had believed that he was deeply interested in Alexander's success, and from the independent states east of the Hydraotes. Here, too, he received a re-enforcement, brought by Phrataphernes, of the Thracians who had been left with him. On the other hand, he was informed by a despatch from Sisycottus that a fresh revolt had broken out among the Assaceniens, who had killed the governor set over them. Philippos and Tyriaspes were sent with a division to reduce them to obedience.

Before he resumed his march eastward, Alexander ordered a great quantity of ship timber to be felled in the forests on the upper course of the Hydaspes, which abound in fir and cedar, and floated down the stream to his new cities, and a fleet to be built for the navigation of the Indus. He then advanced to the next great river of the Pendjab, the Chenab, which, it seems, he named Acesines, to avoid the sinister omen contained in its Indian name,\* which might attract attention from the injury which was done to the boats by its rocky bed. He now dismissed Porus to collect Indian troops and elephants for his service, and leaving Cænus, with his brigade, on the right bank to guard the passage for the convoys which he

expected, set forward with his lightest troops to overtake the younger Porus, who, hastily concluding that the favour shown to his kinsman portended his own ruin, did not venture to trust himself in the hands of the conqueror, and had fled beyond the Hydraotes (or Araotes, the Ravee), which separated his territories from those of the independent tribes. Alexander sent Hephæstion with a strong division to take possession of the fugitive's vacant dominions, as well as of any independent territory that he might find west of the Hydraotes; and ordered that they should be subjected to the rule of Porus. On the right bank of the Hydraotes he found himself not far from the confines of one of the most warlike of the independent tribes, who, according to the Greek form of their Indian name, were called Cathæans.\* Their chief city, Sangala, seems to have occupied nearly the same site as the modern capital of the Seik monarchy, Lahore, on a branch of the Ravee, near the edge of a small lake.† Alexander, on his march up the river, received or extorted the submission of some other smaller tribes. As he approached Sangala, he found the Cathæans strongly intrenched on an insulated hill near the city, behind a triple barrier of wagons. Such an obstacle could not long detain the Macedonians. After Alexander, dismounting from his horse, had put himself at the head of the phalanx, the three lines were soon forced, and the barbarians took refuge within their walls. He then invested the city on three sides, and, expecting that the enemy would attempt to escape in the night across the lake, lined its margin with his cavalry. The attempt was made, but, through this precaution, without effect, and he then proceeded to open a trench between the city and the lake. The barbarians still made another attempt to escape in the night, before the trench was completed; but their design was betrayed, and they were again driven back within their ramparts. Engines had now been constructed for an assault; but before they were brought up, the walls, which were made of brick, were partly undermined, and the place was carried by storm. A bloody carnage ensued; for the besieged had made a vigorous resistance, and more than 1200 of the besiegers, including several general officers, and the somatophylax Lysimachus, were wounded. In revenge, 17,000 of the barbarians were massacred; 70,000 were made prisoners. Alexander then sent his secretary, Eumenes of Cardia, to announce his conquest to two neighbouring cities which had been in alliance with the Cathæans, and to invite them to earn his clemency by a timely submission; but the fate of Sangala had struck them with such consternation, that the whole population took to flight. Alexander tried to overtake them, and came up with a few of the hindmost, who were cut to pieces; but he was at length obliged to give up the pursuit. On his return to Sangala, he razed it to the ground, and distributed its territory among the tribes which had submitted without resistance. Porus, who had arrived

cess of time, they might be united (under one government?) with the rest of Asia. But a conjecture so arbitrary does not belong to history, especially where it is not needed for the explanation of any facts.

\* Chandrabāgha—the moon's gift—would have been pronounced by the Greeks so as to sound like Sandrophagus (i. e., Ἀνδροφάγος or Ἀλκυονοφάγος). Ritter, *Asien*, iv., p. 456.

\* The name is considered by Sanscrit scholars as a corruption of Kshatra, or Xatres, which is said to signify a mixed race, sprung from females of the warrior tribe and men of an inferior caste.

† Burnes, i., 156.

during the siege with about 5000 Indians, was sent to place garrisons in their towns. He himself continued his march towards the south-east, and received the submission of two chiefs, who are named by the Greeks Sopeithes and Phegeus, and then arrived on the banks of the Hyphasis, or, rather, of the stream formed by the junction of the Hyphasis (Beiah) with the Hesudrus (Setledge).

That he came upon it considerably below the confluence seems clear, from the mention of the desert which lay between it and the Ganges. And here he had, at length, reached the fated term of his progress towards the east. The causes which arrested his career on the western bank of the Hyphasis are too uniformly stated by the ancient historians, notwithstanding the rhetorical exaggerations for which the event furnished such an ample theme, to permit us to believe that they have been totally misrepresented. Alexander had, no doubt, long been undeceived as to the narrow limits which, according to the geography of his day, he had at first assigned to India, and to the eastern side of the earth. The ocean, which he had once imagined to be separated by no very vast tract from the banks of the Indus, had receded, as he advanced, to an immeasurable distance. He had discovered that, beyond the Hyphasis, a desert more extensive than any he had yet crossed parted the plains of the Five Streams from the region watered by the tributaries of the Ganges, a river mightier than the Indus; that the country east of the Ganges was the seat of a great monarchy, far more powerful than that of Porus, the land of the Gangarides and Prasians, whose king could bring into the field 200,000 foot, 20,000 horse, and several thousands of elephants. That this information rather served to inflame Alexander's curiosity and ambition than to deter him could scarcely be doubted by any one who has fully entered into his character, even if it had not been expressly stated by the ancients. The only plausible reason that has been alleged for questioning whether he himself wished and designed to prosecute his expedition in the same direction is that, by the orders he had given for the building of a fleet on the Hydaspes, he had already manifested his intention of sailing down the Indus. That he had, indeed, resolved to explore the course of this river to its mouth, and to make it, if possible, a channel of communication between India and his western dominions, seems sufficiently clear. But he might still have left the time when he should execute this part of his plan to depend upon circumstances. As to the probable result of the expedition, if he had advanced towards the Ganges, it seems a little hardy to speak with confidence. It is by no means certain that he would have encountered any much greater obstacles than he had already overcome. The king of the eastern tribes is represented as an upstart and usurper,\* and Alexander might have been aided, as he had been in the conquest of the Pendjab, by divisions among the natives.

But the accounts which kindled his ardour plunged the Macedonians into sullen dejection, which at length broke out into open murmurs.

It is possible that, if they had seen any distinct and certain goal before them, they would not have shrunk from the dangers and difficulties of a last enterprise, however arduous. But to set out from a region which had once appeared to them as the verge of the habitable world on a new series of conquests, to which they could foresee no termination, was enough to appal the most adventurous spirits. Their thoughts began to revert with uncontrollable force to their homes in the distant West, as they had reason to fear that they were on the point of being torn from them forever; for, even of those who might escape the manifold dangers of a fresh campaign, how many might be doomed to sit down as colonists, and to spend the rest of their lives in that strange land! India was a still more hopeless place of exile than Bactria and Sogdiana, where the Greeks, who had been planted by violence, were only detained by terror. These seem to have been the motives which weighed most with the army; but their force was undoubtedly much aggravated by the extraordinary hardships it had suffered, since it had crossed the Indus, during the rainy season. It appears that a great many horses had perished, and it may be concluded that much sickness had been caused among the men by their continual encampments on damp, if not flooded, ground: though, after the battle of the Hydaspes, a part, at least, may have found shelter for some weeks within the walls of a town. It does not seem that they had experienced any scarcity of provisions; but their clothes and armour had been, in general, almost worn out, and many had been obliged to exchange the Greek dress for such articles of clothing as they could find in the country. The wish to return became universal, and was soon transformed into a firm resolution not to proceed.

It is difficult to guess how far the arguments by which Alexander endeavoured to overcome the repugnance of his troops, and to animate them with his own spirit, resembled any of those which are attributed to him by Arrian and Curtius. But it is hardly probable that he tried to persuade them that the ocean lay but a short distance beyond the Ganges, and that he declared his intention to circumnavigate first India, and then Africa; or that he expected them to believe that his recent conquests would be insecure, unless he enlarged his empire with the countries which lay to the east. The threat which Curtius puts into his mouth, that, if the Macedonians would not follow him, he would throw himself on his Bactrian and Scythian auxiliaries, and make the expedition with them alone, most likely misrepresents the tone which he assumed. But it may easily be supposed that he expressed his wishes and urged the army to compliance with passionate eloquence. Not only, however, the feelings of the troops, but the judgment of his officers was adverse to the proposed enterprise; and Cœnus, in a speech which has either been better written or more faithfully reported than the king's, exhorted him to abandon his design. Alexander retired to his tent in displeasure. The next day he again assembled the army, and made another attempt to overpower their reluctance. As a last experiment, he declared that he would

\* Curtius, ix., 2. Diodorus, xvii., 93.

force no Macedonian to accompany him; he was sure that there would be volunteers enough among them for his purpose; the rest might return home and say that they had left their king in the midst of his enemies. But even this appeal produced no effect. For three days he kept within his tent, where not even his chief officers were admitted to his presence, waiting for a change in the disposition of the men. But the stillness which prevailed in the camp convinced him, more strongly than words could have done, that their determination was fixed. He then felt that it was time to yield; not, perhaps, without some pride in the reflection, that there was not a man in the army who was capable of his own contempt for difficulties and dangers. He had, however, gone too far, it seems, to recede without some other pretext. The sacrifices easily supplied one. When they were found unpropitious to the passage of the river, he called his council, and declared his resolution to retreat.

It was received with tears of joy and grateful shouts by the army. Before he quitted the Hyphasis, he ordered twelve colossal altars to be built on its banks, and dedicated to the gods who had led him thus far victorious; then, after a solemn sacrifice and games, he began to retrace his steps. The country not yet disposed of, as far as the Hyphasis, was committed to Porus. On the Acesines he found the city, which Hephæstion had been ordered to build, ready to receive a colony; and there he left the disabled mercenaries, and as many natives of the neighbouring districts as were willing to settle there. While he was engaged in preparation for his voyage to the sea, he received another embassy from Abisares, pleading illness as an excuse for his absence, which was confirmed by the Macedonians who had been sent to his court. The embassy was accompanied by thirty elephants and costly presents. Arsaces, a chief whose territories lay on the confines of Abisares, came, at the same time, to offer his submission, and was placed under the authority of his more powerful neighbour, whom Alexander, though he had reason to distrust his professions, thought it prudent to conciliate.

The fleet on the Hydaspes was now nearly ready, but the two new cities had suffered so much from the rains, that the army was for some time employed in restoring them. In the mean while, Alexander made his final arrangement of the affairs of the northern Pendsjab, by which Porus gained a fresh addition of territory, so that his dominions included, it is said, seven nations and above 2000 cities, with, it seems, a title which established his superiority over all the chiefs east of the Indus.\* During the preparations for the voyage Cœnus died; more regretted, probably, by the army, whose cause he had pleaded, than by the king. Alexander, however, honoured him with a magnificent funeral; but, it is said, could not forbear to remark, that it was to little purpose Cœnus had made that long speech, and shown so much anxiety to return to Macedonia.†

## CHAPTER LIV.

### ALEXANDER'S PASSAGE DOWN THE INDUS AND RETURN TO SUSA.

HOWEVER reluctantly Alexander may have abandoned the immediate prospect of farther conquests and discoveries in the East, there was still enough to fill his mind, and to gratify his passion for heroic adventures, in the enterprise which he was next to begin. So vague had been, almost down to this time, his notions as to the geography of the regions which he was to traverse on his return to Persia, that, when he found crocodiles in the Indus, he conceived a fancy that this river was a branch of the Nile; and this conjecture seemed to him strongly confirmed when he met with the lotus, such as he had seen in Egypt, on the banks of the Acesines. He even mentioned, in a letter to his mother, that he believed he had discovered the land which contained the springs of the Nile; he thought that, in its course from India to Ethiopia, it might flow through some vast desert, in which it lost its original name. A little inquiry among the natives must have sufficed to correct this error—which seems to prove that he was not well read in Herodotus, and that the expedition of Scylax had excited but little attention in Greece—and that he remained so long ignorant of the truth, shows how singly his views were, at first, bent towards the East.

The fleet, which was probably, for the most part, collected from the natives, numbered, according to Ptolemy, nearly 2000 vessels of various kinds, including eighty galleys of war. Arrian gives a list of thirty-three, which were nominally under the command of the principal officers of the army, most of whom, nevertheless, continued to serve on shore.\* As we

of Alexander's vexation. Whether it was, as it has been called, *brutal*, cannot be determined by its present appearance on paper.

\* Mr. Williams (*Life of Al.*, p. 293) has thought proper to transcribe this list for sundry weighty reasons; first, as useful to show how the master-spirits were who worked the great revolution in the Eastern world. His readers might otherwise have imagined that there was but one master-spirit, Alexander, seconded by several able and active officers, whom he and his father had formed. Another purpose is, to show that the list does not contain the name of a single citizen of any of the southern republics, and particularly no Athenian. So we are led to an important consequence. "The Republicans of Greece had no part or portion in the glory of the war. Hence arose that jealousy of the Macedonian fame, that bitter hostility to Alexander, who had so dimmed and obscured their exploits by the splendour of his renown, and, as the literature of Greece was in their hands, that systematic attempt to depress his fame and blacken his character." This last remark will probably appear not the least notable to those readers who are aware that perhaps no history was ever so much disfigured by gross exaggeration and extravagant flattery as Alexander's; who remember Strabo's complaints about the constant tendency of his historians to magnify their hero's exploits (xv., 258, *αυμνόντες*—253, *πλάσματα τῶν κολακιστῶν* 'Αλεξανδρῶν—269, *πάντες οἱ περὶ Ἀλεξανδρῶν τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἀπὲρ τῶν ὁσίων, ἀπὸ τῶντο ποῦ μάλλον*), and Plutarch's treatise. The truth is, that the Greeks were proud of Alexander, as they well might be and had a right to be; for he belonged to them, both by blood and by education; in this last respect, more particularly to Athens. His conquests were one of their sources of consolation under the Roman yoke. Greece, indeed, produced few men comparable to him; but the same thing may be said of all the rest of the world, including even China, with its *admirable Constitution*. But as to the other master-spirits, from Hephæstion down to the eunuch Bagros, there was certainly no Greek state, however inconsiderable, that had any reason to be jealous of their glory. We know what the most illustrious among them were, and did. Notwithstanding the consciousness

\* Arrian, vi., 2.

† Curtius, ix., 3. Propter paucos dies longam orationem cum exortum, tantquam solus Macedoniam virtus esset. The last part of the remark may not have been correctly reported, but altogether the sneer was a natural expression.

learn from another author, that Alexander's finances were at one time, before he left India, in so low a state that he was obliged to solicit contributions from his friends, it seems very probable that these officers fitted out the vessels at their own charge.\* The crews of the larger vessels—the natives, no doubt, manned their own small craft—were composed partly of Phœnicians and Egyptians, and partly of Greeks, from the islands and coasts of the *Ægean*. The command of the whole fleet was intrusted to Nearchus. Alexander divided his forces into four corps. The main body, with about 200 elephants, was to advance along the eastern bank under the command of Hephæstion. Craterus was to lead a smaller division of infantry and cavalry on the opposite side of the river. Philippos, with the troops of his satrapy, was ordered to take a circuitous route towards the point where the two other generals were to wait for the fleet, in which the king himself was to embark with the hypaspists, the bowmen, and a division of his horse-guard, in all 8000 men. On the morning of the embarkation, Alexander himself, under the direction of his soothsayers, offered the libations and prayers which were deemed fittest to propitiate the powers of the Indian streams, Hydaspes and the impetuous Acesines, which was soon to join it, and the mighty Indus, which was afterward to receive their united waters. Among the gods of the West, Hercules and Ammon were invoked with especial devotion; then, at the sound of the trumpet, the fleet began to drop down the river. The most judicious arrangements had been made to prevent confusion, and to keep its main divisions, the galleys of war, the horse transports, and the vessels loaded with the baggage, at a convenient and invariable distance from each other. It was a spectacle such as the bosom of the Hydaspes had never before witnessed, nor has it since. Its high banks were crowded with the natives, who flocked from all quarters with eager curiosity to gaze, and accompanied the armament in its progress to some distance before they could be satiated with the sight of the stately galleys, the horses, the men, the mighty mass of vessels gliding down in unbroken order; and as the adjacent woods rang with the signals of the boatswains, the measured shouts of the rowers, and the plash of numberless oars, keeping time with perfect exactness, the Indians, too, testified their delight in strains of their national music.

On the third day Alexander found Hephæstion and Craterus encamped at the place appointed, and, having waited there two days, was joined by Philippos. He immediately sent Philippos across to the Acesines, with orders to pursue his march along its banks, while Hephæstion and Craterus moved forward in ad-

vance of the fleet on opposite sides of the Hydaspes. He himself, as he proceeded, landed his troops wherever he found a display of force necessary to extort submission from the neighbouring tribes, though it was with reluctance that he spent any time in these incursions; he was anxious, as soon as possible, to reach the frontiers of the Malli, a warlike race, from whom he expected a vigorous resistance, and whom he therefore wished to surprise before they had completed their preparations, and had been joined by their allies, particularly their southern neighbours, the Oxydracæ or Sudracæ. In five days he arrived at the second place of rendezvous, the confluence of the Hydaspes and the Acesines. His Indian pilots had warned him of the danger which the fleet would have to encounter at this point; yet it did not escape. The united rivers were at that time pent into a narrow space, where their conflicting waters roared and chafed in eddies and waves, which, seventeen centuries later, still presented the appearance of an agitated sea.\* The principal obstructions appear now to have been worn away, and the passage is no longer formidable. But Alexander's sailors were so much alarmed or astonished at the sounds which they heard, even before they reached the confluence, that, by an involuntary impulse, they at once rested on their oars; and when they had entered it, the novelty of the spectacle seems to have deprived them of their self-command, and to have prevented them from executing the orders they received with the precision necessary to carry them through in safety. The broad vessels, however, which were probably built after the Indian fashion, suffered no damage, though they were whirled round by the eddies. But several of the long galleys lost a great part of their oars, and were much shattered: two were dashed against each other, and entirely wrecked, and many of the crews perished. According to some accounts, Alexander himself at one time thought his own galley so much in danger, that he was on the point of jumping overboard. As the stream widened and spent its violence, a headland on the right bank afforded shelter to the fleet.

While it was undergoing the necessary repairs, Alexander made an expedition inland against the Sibas, or Sivaites, so called, undoubtedly, from the Indian deity, who was the chief object of their worship. As they were armed with clubs, and marked their cattle with this symbol of their god, the fancy of the Macedonians transformed them into descendants of the followers of Hercules.† They themselves, of course, did not, on this account, submit the more readily to the invader, as Diodorus represents;‡ but they appear to have been easily overawed, or disabled from sending any succour to their countrymen on the other side of the river; and this was the purpose for which Alexander entered their territory. On his return to the fleet, he was rejoined by his three generals, and immediately made his dispositions for the subjugation of the Malli.§

theatre on which fortune placed them. they permit us to assert that, out of the royal Greek family, Macedonia never gave birth to a great man. But such an effusion of purblind and impotent ill-will towards the people which has conferred greater benefits than any other on the world, would scarcely have deserved notice, except as a specimen of that systematic attempt to which I have adverted elsewhere.—Vol. i. p. 214, col. 1, note ll.

\* Plutarch. *Eum.* 2. Νέαρχον ἐκτείνων μετὰ νεῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἑὴν θαλάσσαν, ὅτε χρῆματα τοῦ φλόου· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἦν ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ. A passage not adopted by Schmiedel, who first proposed the opinion adopted in the text in his note on Arrian, *Ind.* 18.

\* Cherefeddin, iv., c. 10.

† Strabo, xv., p. 253, Taucha. Compare p. 55, col. 2, n. t. ‡ xviii., 96.

§ Arrian (vii., 5) has made his narrative rather obscure and perplexed by a premature mention of the orders given to Nearchus, which he afterward repeats, as if they relate



There can be little doubt that the name of this people has been preserved in that of the modern city of Multan, though it lies far below the junction of the Chenab and the Ravee, while the territory of the Malli seems to have been situate almost wholly to the north of that point, and most of it to have been included between the two rivers. Hence the greatest geographer of our day conjectures that they formerly met a great way to the south of their present confluence.\* The united forces of the Malli and the Sudracæ are estimated in the accounts of Diodorus and Curtius, on the most moderate calculation, at 80,000 foot, 10,000 horse, and 700 chariots; and, from the manner in which they are coupled together, we are led to presume that, in this respect, there was no great inequality between them. But the two races were composed of widely different elements; for the name of one appears to have been derived from that of the Sudra caste; and it is certain that the Brahmins were predominant in the other. We can easily understand why they did not intermarry, and were seldom at peace with each other, and that their mutual hostility was only suspended by the common danger which now threatened their independence. Yet it appears that even this was not sufficient to overcome the jealousy that prevailed between them, and that their forces were not combined, because they could not agree in the choice of a leader. But the Malli themselves seem to have relied chiefly on the strength of their fortified towns, and on the natural barriers of their peninsula, which was protected towards the north by a desert of considerable extent; they delayed, at least, to collect their forces before it was too late.

As it was on the side of the desert that they might be expected to feel most secure, Alexander resolved to strike across it himself, with one division of his army, into the heart of their country, while two other corps traversed it in other directions, to intercept the retreat of those whom he might drive before him. One of these was intrusted to the command of Hephæstion, who was sent forward five days before the king was to begin his march; the other to Ptolemy, who was ordered to wait three days after the king's departure, that he might meet the fugitives who should attempt to escape towards the north, on the side of the Acesines. To prevent the enemy from receiving any succours from the west, and from seeking refuge in that quarter, Philippos and his troops, together with Polysperchon's brigade, the horse-bowmen and the elephants, were transferred to the right bank of the Hydaspes, and placed under the command of Craterus, who was ordered to march down towards the confluence, and meet Nearchus, who was sent forward three days before with the fleet.

The division which Alexander retained under his own orders was composed of the light troops best adapted to the rapid movements which he meditated. With this, having marched day and night with a very short intermission, he appeared, early on the second morning,

before one of the strongholds, in which, as likely to be last attacked, many of the natives had taken refuge. A great number of them were surprised by the Macedonian cavalry outside the walls, and unarmed; many were put to the sword; the rest fled into the town, which Alexander immediately surrounded with his horse, while he waited for the arrival of the infantry. When it came up, he despatched Perdicas, at the head of his own squadron, and that of Cleitus, with the Agrianians, to invest another of the nearest towns, with orders to abstain from assault, but to take care that none of the inhabitants escaped to spread the news of Alexander's approach. He himself proceeded to reduce the first. The besieged—whose number can never have been great—found themselves so much weakened by the slaughter made in the fields, that they soon abandoned the walls, and retired into the citadel; but, notwithstanding their gallant defence, this, too, was speedily stormed, and they were all put to the sword. As the number of those who were slain here was but 2000, the vanquished seem to have earned quite as much glory, in a better cause, as the conquerors. Perdicas soon returned to the camp. He had found the town which he was to blockade entirely deserted; but, hearing that the inhabitants had not quitted it long, he pursued them at full speed, and overtook and cut down many; the rest sought shelter in a morass, where he did not venture to follow them.

Alexander allowed his men a short rest, and then, by a forced night march, reached the Hydrates at daybreak. Here he learned that many of the natives had already crossed the ford, but he came up in time to make considerable slaughter among the hindmost, and instantly plunging into the stream, pursued the fugitives on the other side. The greater part sought refuge in an adjacent fortress, which, however, soon yielded to Peithon, who was sent to attack it, while Alexander marched against another town, which the Greeks describe as if it was inhabited by Brahmins only: and these are mentioned as a different race from the Malli who fled to them for shelter. We cannot rely on the accuracy of these statements; but it is certain that, in this western border-land of India, the distinction of castes has never been rigidly observed, and it is possible that, here and elsewhere, a whole community of Brahmins may have preserved the purity of their blood, while they engaged in all the necessary occupations which, in theory, properly belonged to the lower castes. Yet the name may only designate a mixed colony of purer Indian blood than the great body of the Malli, and their neighbours, the Sudracæ, among whom it is probable there was also some disparity of birth. These Brahmins were stout warriors, and offered the most determined resistance that Alexander had hitherto encountered in this campaign. When they could no longer defend their walls against the superior skill of the besiegers, they retreated to the citadel; and when this, too, was stormed, set fire to the houses, and almost all, to the number of 5000, died, either fighting or in the flames.

After a day's repose, he advanced into the interior, but found the towns abandoned, and

to two distinct epochs, though it is clear from the context that Nearchus did not move before Alexander had returned from his expedition against the Sivates.

\* Ritter, *Asien*, iv., i., p. 468.

learned that their inhabitants had fled to the desert. So, after another day's pause, he sent Peithon with his brigade, accompanied by a squadron of horse under Demetrius, and some light troops, back to the Hydrætes, with orders to march along the river side and intercept the fugitives, who might have betaken themselves to the woods that lined its banks, while he himself proceeded to the capital of the Malli, which, we thus perceive, lay east of the Hydrætes. The reports he had heard led him to expect that he should find it crowded with those who had escaped from the other cities, and, perhaps, that he might here nearly finish the campaign at one blow; but it also was deserted by the Indians on the tidings of his approach, and he ascertained that they had crossed the Hydrætes, and were collecting their forces on the right bank. Instantly he pushed forward towards their position with his cavalry, leaving the foot to follow. The banks of the river, where he saw the hostile army, it is said 50,000 strong, drawn up to receive him, were indeed high and steep, so that the Malli had thought them a stronger defence than their walls. But Alexander scorned such obstacles: he waited not for the infantry, but at once dashed into the stream with his horse; and before he had reached the other side, the enemy, who, however, were not fully aware of his weakness, began to retreat. When he had overtaken them, and they perceived the smallness of the force by which they were pursued, they made a stand; nor did Alexander attempt more than to detain them by slight charges, until the infantry should have come up. So long only their courage held out; at the appearance of the phalanx the whole mass took to flight, mostly towards the strongest town in the neighbourhood. Thither Alexander pursued them, cutting down many of the fugitives, and immediately encircled the place with his cavalry, but, as the day was far spent, deferred the assault to the morrow, to give his wearied troops and jaded horses a short interval of refreshment.

The next morning he began the attack of the town on two sides, having given the command of the second division of his army to Perdikkas. It was probably a mere embellishment of the story, suggested by the event, that he was warned by a soothsayer of danger to his life, and urged to postpone the assault, but rejected the advice with a sneer at auspices and superstition. It is certain that, even if he believed in such things less than he appears to have done, he was too prudent to disclose his incredulity, and so throw away an instrument which a Greek general might so often find useful. The besieged did not attempt to defend the town, but retreated within the walls of the citadel, which must have been capable of containing a great multitude. The king and his troops entered first through a postern, which they opened with the hatchet. Perdikkas was later, though his men were only delayed by the difficulty of climbing over the town wall; but, as it was supposed that all resistance was over, the scaling-ladders were mostly left behind. Alexander, at the foot of the citadel, eagerly called for them. Two or three were brought; and, seizing the first, he himself fixed it against

the wall, and mounted foremost, covered by his shield. At the top, he soon killed or thrust away the Indians who opposed him, and took his stand on the wall, which, it seems, was narrow, and without battlements. He was followed by Peucestes, bearing the shield taken from the temple at Ilion, and by Leonnatus, who both made good their ascent; as did, on another ladder, Abreas, a veteran of the class called *dimoirites*, from the double pay with which their services were rewarded, and which thus became also a title of honour. But in the mean while Alexander stood as a mark for the enemy's missiles, both from the nearest towers, and from the adjacent parts of the citadel; and the Macedonians, especially those of his guard, alarmed for his safety, crowded to the ladders. Before a fifth man had reached the top, both the ladders were broken by the weight, and Alexander was thus cut off from all prospect of immediate aid, while the enemy, animated by the hope of an easy victory, worth more than the destruction of an army, redoubled their efforts.

He felt that he could not remain long where he was, and that he was exposing his life, with little honour, and to no useful purpose. There were two ways of changing his position, between which he had to choose. He might throw himself down, with comparative safety, among his friends, or he might descend into the midst of the enemy, where he would at least, if not instantly overpowered, have an opportunity of using his arms. With little hesitation, he decided on the last alternative, and, by a dexterously-balanced leap, alighted unhurt on his feet, so that he could immediately put himself into a posture of defence.

No action of his life seems to have contributed so much as this adventure to lower the general estimation of his prudence and good sense, and to subject him, even in the opinion of his warmest admirers, to the charge of blind, ungovernable, almost frantic rashness. Yet to himself it may have seemed so natural and fit as to be, in a manner, necessary; and it may have been as little the effect of a sudden, thoughtless impulse, as the unreflecting self-devotion of a martyr, who feels that, to shrink from the last trial, would be to undo all his past labours and sufferings. Alexander's principle, to which he owed his conquests, had been, never to recede before anything less than an insurmountable obstacle—as to which he was used to judge differently from other men—least of all, before personal danger. He now but acted on the same principle, in a new and very hazardous attempt, without any particular necessity, indeed, except that of preserving his own character. But, for Alexander, could there be any more pressing! It may serve, perhaps, according to the reader's point of view, somewhat to extenuate either his imprudence or his heroism, to notice that a similar exploit is related of a princely German warrior of the fifteenth century.\*

The Indians rushed on, a host against a man, as having nothing to do but to despatch the prey that had fallen into their hands. But Alexander, who was now partly sheltered by

\* Ranke, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation*, i., p. 70.

the wall, and also, it seems, by the trunk and spreading boughs of an old tree that grew near it, kept his assailants at bay with his wonted vigour. Their chief, and another who ventured within reach of his sword, paid for their rashness with their lives. Two more, before they came quite so near, he disabled, after the manner of a Homeric combat, with stones. The rest, deterred by these examples, kept at a safe distance, and only plied him with missiles, which, if we believe Curtius, were mostly intercepted by the branches under which he stood, leaning either against the trunk or the wall. By this time, however, he was joined by Peucestes, Leonnatus, and Abreas, who, it may be supposed, had not been left unmolested before they leaped down to defend him. Abreas very soon received a mortal wound, from an arrow, in the face; and he had scarcely fallen, when another arrow pierced Alexander's corselet and lodged itself deep in the right breast. Yet he did not immediately cease to defend himself, but, after a short struggle, fainting through loss of blood, sank upon his shield. Peucestes and Leonnatus now stood over him, and intercepted the blows aimed at him by the enemy. Both were wounded, but not so as to prevent them from keeping their post. So unequal a contest, however, could not probably have lasted much longer. It was the most critical moment of Alexander's life.

But in the mean while the Macedonians outside the wall, not less anxious because they could not witness his danger, had not remained inactive. Though ladders were not at hand, their ingenuity, sharpened by the emergency, soon found substitutes. Some drove pegs into the wall, which was of clay, and so climbed to the top. Others were raised on the shoulders of their comrades. All, as fast as they effected their ascent, leaped down, and rushed, with cries of grief and rage, towards the place where they saw their king stretched, seemingly lifeless, on the ground. The combat soon ceased to be merely defensive on the part of the Macedonians. A gate was forced open by some who had entered, and numbers poured in, sufficient to overwhelm all resistance. The only work now remaining for them was that of revenge; and this they executed so diligently, by a general massacre of the besieged, that not even a woman or a child was spared.

Alexander, as soon as he was rescued, had been conveyed to his tent; and the arrow was at length extracted, whether by the physician Critodemus, or, as some accounts went, by Perdiccas, who, it was said, by the king's command, widened the wound with his sword, to make a passage for the barbed steel. But the extraction was followed by so great a loss of blood, that the patient again fainted; and when he recovered his senses, it was for some time doubtful whether he could survive. The first tidings of the disaster carried to the camp, near the confluence of the Hydraotes and Acesines, represented him as already dead; and the grief and alarm they excited in every breast were a tribute of affection and confidence which might well soothe the resentful feelings that had been awakened in him by the abrupt termination of his campaign on the Hyphasis. The grief of the Macedonians, indeed, which broke out in

a wailing that spread with the news through the camp, was probably in great part selfish, but, even so, highly honoured its object; for it attested what they were not slow to declare in words, that, in their judgment, he was the only man in the army capable of leading them back safely through the countries which he had traversed as a conqueror. It was their despondency about their own seemingly forlorn condition that rendered them backward to believe the more favourable reports which followed, that the king was still living, and that there was ground to hope for his recovery. Even when a letter from himself announced that he should soon be among them, there were many who suspected that it was a mere artifice of the generals to lull their fears.

When he had regained sufficient strength to bear the gentlest motion, he embarked on the Hydraotes, and dropped down towards the confluence, not more, perhaps, to quiet the apprehensions of his troops, than, as Curtius suggests, to crush the hopes which might have been conceived from the same cause by the enemy. As he approached the camp, he ordered the awning, under which he lay at the stern of the galley, to be removed, and, when close to the bank, stretched out his hand towards the crowd who were there waiting for him, still half doubting what they so eagerly wished. This sign of life was answered by a general shout of joy, and every hand was raised, not without tears, in gratitude to Heaven, or in greeting to the king. A litter was brought for him to the landing-place, but he called for his horse; when he mounted it, the banks and adjacent woods rang with a fresh peal of applause. At a short distance from his tent he alighted, that he might be seen to walk; and all pressed round him to touch, if they could, his hands, or knees, or clothes; or, at least, if less fortunate, to see and salute him, and to strew his path with filets and flowers. The congratulations of his officers in the tent were mingled with remonstrances, as severe as might be ventured, on his imprudence. To these he listened but impatiently: as Arrian thought, because he knew that they were just; perhaps, rather, because he felt that they were misapplied, and that he was misunderstood. He was better pleased with an old Bœotian, who cheered him with the remark, that men must be proved by their deeds; adding a line of Æschylus, rather strangely distorted from its original meaning,\* to the effect, that whoever would do, must expect to suffer.

While he waited here to complete his recovery, he received an embassy from the Malli, who still remained in arms, and the Sudracæ. The envoys, a hundred or more of their chief men, persons of stately form and mien, all riding in chariots, and clad in linen robes embroidered with purple and gold, came with magnificent presents, to offer their entire submission to the conqueror. They spoke of their past resistance not without dignity, adding some mention of Dionysus, the only invader

\* *Ἀποδοῦναι γὰρ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδοῦναι*, quoted, among other poetical apophthegms on Divine Retribution, by Stobæus, *Ecl. Ph.*, l. 4, 24. It is the *πρὸς τὸν θεόν* of the Choeph., 302, which Klausen suspects may have been the passage Stobæus had before him: the more probably, as *τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδοῦναι* occurs there also a few lines before.

who had ever before subdued them, which they knew would be acceptable to his successor. They declared themselves ready to give hostages, pay tribute, and receive a satrap at Alexander's pleasure. He annexed their countries to the satrapy of Philippos, and, according to Curtius, imposed a tribute on them of the same amount as they had paid to the Arachosians: a statement hardly consistent either with their boasts of independence or with their recorded actions. For security, he demanded a thousand of their best warriors, either as hostages, or, if they were willing, to serve in his army. Curtius also describes a magnificent banquet at which they were entertained, and which gave rise to a single combat—not without its significance, if it really occurred—between Dioxippus, an Athenian, and a Macedonian named Corragus, in which the Athenian, who was practised in the games of Greece, armed only with a club, overcame his antagonist in the panoply of the phalanx, to the great displeasure of the Macedonians, and of Alexander himself. The ambassadors soon returned with a band of a thousand men, the flower of their nation: they also brought, as a free gift, 500 chariots, with some of the produce of their industry, and, among other rarities, several tamed lions and tigers. Alexander, convinced, it seems, of their sincerity, accepted the chariots, and dismissed the hostages.

During this detention he had ordered more vessels to be built for the transport of his troops, and when he felt himself strong enough to prosecute his expedition, embarked with a larger force of horse and foot, and sailed down to the confluence of the Acesines with the Indus, the southern extremity of the Pendjab. At this important point he waited some days for Perdikkas, who, with a part of the land force, had been engaged in the subjugation of an independent tribe, the Abastani, or Avasthanas. In the interval he received the voluntary submission of another free commonwealth, the Ossadians, and fresh additions to his fleet from the banks of the Acesines. This point of the Pendjab he assigned as the southern limit of the satrapy of Philippos, whom he ordered to build a new city there. It was to be well provided with arsenals; and he expected, from the peculiar advantages of the site, that it would become a flourishing seat of commerce. The small town of Mittun may, perhaps, stand nearly in its place, but no vestige remains of Alexander's foundation. During his stay here he was overtaken by his father-in-law, Oxyartes, who probably came to inform him of a revolt which had broken out among the Greek colonists in Bactria,\* and to complain of the misconduct of Tyriaspes, the satrap of Paropamisus. Tyriaspes was deprived of his government, and Oxyartes received it in addition to his own. We must, therefore, suspect an error in Arrian's statement or text, where it is related that Oxyartes was appointed, with Peithon, satrap of the territories to be conquered in the

lower course of the Indus to the sea. A body of troops, including all the Thracians, was left with Philippos. Craterus, with the bulk of the army and the elephants, was landed on the left bank of the Indus, where the country opposed the fewest obstructions to his march; and yet his presence was needed to overawe the natives. Alexander himself sailed down to the chief city of a people whose name is variously written: Arrian calls them Sogdians. He transformed their capital into a Greek colony, which he named Alexandria, and probably designed for the residence of his satrap. Here, too, he built an arsenal, in which he refitted a part of his fleet.

Not very far to the south lay the territories of a powerful prince, whom the Greek writers name Musicanus, from whom, as he had hitherto made no overtures, Alexander had reason to expect active resistance. He therefore urged the progress of his fleet, and reached the frontier before Musicanus was aware that he had quitted the Sogdian capital. Dismayed by the suddenness of his appearance, he went forth to meet the invader, with royal presents, all his elephants, and submissive acknowledgments of his fault, which were still more graciously received, and placed himself and his people at the conqueror's disposal. Alexander was struck with admiration by the fertility and opulence of the country—which probably far surpassed all the regions he had been traversing from the north in the luxuriance of its vegetation—and by the capital, traces of which may, perhaps, still be visible near Bukkur.\* He permitted Musicanus to retain his kingdom, but ordered a fortress to be built in the city, under the superintendence of Craterus, and to be occupied by a Macedonian garrison, as a post peculiarly well fitted to command the surrounding country.

Westward of the territory of Musicanus lay that of a chief similarly named Oxycanus, or Porticanus,† who likewise had kept suspiciously aloof. Alexander, with only a body of light troops and cavalry, marched against him with his usual rapidity, and stormed two of his cities, in one of which Oxycanus himself was taken or slain. After this, all the other towns submitted without resistance. In the adjacent highlands, a chief named Sambus, who, it seems, had courted the conqueror's favour through jealousy of Musicanus, as Taxiles through fear of Porus, and had been invested with the title of satrap, when he heard that his enemy was pardoned, and re-established in his dominions, had

\* As Burnes thinks (i., 66), in the ruins of Alore, four miles distant, "said to have been once the capital of a mighty kingdom," ruled by a Brahmin, who was defeated and slain by the Moehans in the seventh century.

† These names are an etymological puzzle, tempting from the seeming readiness of solution. Mr. Williams (p. 313) thinks that they "point to the names of the territories governed by these princes, because the word *khan* is constantly found, even to this day, on the lower Indus; so that Musicanus might be properly described as the *raja* of Moosh, and Oxycanus as the *raja* of Ouche." I am surprised to find that Ritter, at least some years ago, entertained a similar opinion (Asien, xi., 2, p. 1095). Do we not require some better evidence than the Turkish title *khan* (Mirchond in Wilken, *Chrestomathia Persica*, p. 120, observes *Gordachestanenses principem suum Schar appellanti, quemadmodum Turca Chan, et Indi Rai dicunt*) was in use before the time of Alexander on the lower Indus? The names of the district *Sehwan*, and the city *Larkhanu*, have suggested other not much more satisfactory conjectures. According to Curtius, the people of the northern chief were called Musicani.

\* Arrian (vi., 15) does not mention this revolt, the details of which are given by Curtius (ix., 7), and assigns no motive for the coming of Oxyartes. Curtius places the arrival of Oxyartes later, which, indeed, would be absolutely necessary, if Diodorus is to be believed when he states (xvii., 90) that the revolt was occasioned by the report of Alexander's death.

become alarmed for his own safety, and had withdrawn from his capital, Sindomana. Alexander, therefore, advanced against it, but was received, according to Arrian, with every token of subjection by the friends of the absent chief, who explained the motive of his flight, and surrendered his elephants and his treasure. Other authors had spoken of a laborious siege, and immense slaughter of the barbarians. Arrian only mentions the capture of a town which had revolted through the instigation of the Brahmins, and that they were put to death.

The influence of the Brahmins was also very powerful in the kingdom of Musicanus, and at his court. It seems to have been always directed against the invader, who had touched the hallowed soil with impure feet, with all the energy of patriotism inflamed by religious zeal. During Alexander's absence, Musicanus was induced by his priestly counsellors to revolt, in an evil hour for him and them, and for the ill-fated land. Alexander sent Peithon, the satrap, with a sufficient force against the king, who had probably no time to collect an army, while he himself overran the country, and made himself master of the towns, which he either razed to the ground, or curbed with citadels and garrisons. Peithon brought Musicanus a prisoner, with his principal Brahmins; and Alexander, calculating, as we are apt to think, rather too coolly on the effect of the spectacle, ordered them to be crucified in the most conspicuous manner.\* We are here unpleasantly reminded of Cortes and Pizarro.

The conquest of the Indus was now nearly complete; for the chief of Pattala, named or entitled Moeria,† whose rule extended over the Delta of the Indus, came in person to surrender himself and his dominions to the conqueror. He was directed immediately to return to his capital, and make preparations for the reception of the armament. As no farther resistance was to be apprehended down to the river's mouth, Alexander here divided his forces, and ordered Craterus, with three brigades of the heavy infantry, some light troops, and the elephants, accompanied by the disabled Macedonians who had received permission to return to their native land, to take the road to Carmania, through Arachosia and Drangiana, no doubt by the pass of Bolan. He thus gained the advantage of confirming his authority in a part of the empire hitherto but imperfectly subdued, while he lessened the difficulties of his own march through an inhospitable region, and spared the veterans who might have sunk under its hardships. The rest of the land force, in two divisions, he placed under the command of Hephæstion and Peithon, who were ordered to march down to Pattala on the opposite side of the river; and Peithon was charged with the task of settling colonies in the fortified towns, and pacifying the country on the way. He himself proceeded with the fleet; but before he had reached the city of Pattala, which stood like Tata, if not precisely on the same site, at the northern point of the Delta, he was informed that the chief, in a fit of distrust, had taken to

flight with the greater part of the inhabitants. In fact, Alexander, on his arrival, found the city and its neighbourhood almost utterly deserted. He instantly sent a detachment of his lightest troops in pursuit of the fugitives, and when some were brought in prisoners, bade them return to their countrymen, and invite them, with every assurance of safety, to come back to their fields and dwellings. After a while the greater part of the population resumed their peaceful labours.

Alexander's first care was to fortify a citadel in the town, to form a harbour, and build docks sufficient for a large fleet. The superintendence of these works was committed to Hephæstion, who had already arrived. Parties were sent into the neighbouring districts, where there was a great scarcity of water, to dig wells, and otherwise make provision for the passage of troops or travellers.\* They were attacked by the natives, and it was found necessary to send a stronger force to protect them. Nor, it seems, could Alexander procure a pilot at Pattala for the voyage which he now meditated to the sea down the western branch of the river.† He, however, embarked as soon as the works had made some progress, in a squadron of his fastest-sailing galleys, while Leonnatus, with a corps of 8000 foot and 1000 horse, began his march along the same side of the Delta. On the second day his voyage was interrupted by a gale, which, meeting the rapid current of the Indus, caused a swell, in which the galleys became unmanageable. Most of them were severely damaged, many went to pieces, either afloat, or after they had been run aground. While the shipwrights were repairing this disaster, Alexander sent a few light troops up the country in search of natives who might serve as pilots. A few were taken, well acquainted with the navigation of the river; and, under

\* Arrian, indeed (vi., 18), says something more than this; but, on the other hand, very much less than has been inferred from his words, particularly by Droysen, p. 457. Arrian says that Alexander sent men into the waterless part of the adjacent country (*τῶν ἀνυδατῶν τῆς ἐκείνου γῆς*) to sink wells, and to make the land habitable (*ἐκτίθεσθαι*). The number sent, as appears from the narrative, was not large. Droysen, however, describes Alexander's object to have been nothing less than "to facilitate the communication between Pattala and the east of India, and to open it for caravans from the countries on the Ganges and from the Deccan." But it seems very difficult to believe either that Alexander had acquired sufficient information as to the geography of India to form such a plan, or that he had the means of executing it. The operation described by Arrian could have been manifestly but a very slight and ineffectual beginning of such an undertaking. But as little can I believe that Alexander's main object was to promote the cultivation of the country round Pattala. His views seem to have been confined, for the time at least, to two points: the survey of the mouths of the Indus and of the Delta, and the establishment of a commercial intercourse with the West. I therefore suspect that Arrian's arid tract must be referred to the Delta or to the adjacent shores, and that the wells were designed, in the first instance, for the service of the expedition.

† A strange fact, not clearly explained by Arrian, or by those who comment on him. The only reason Arrian assigns is, that the natives had fled. But it seems very improbable that Alexander set out before most of them had returned to their homes, and even less likely that in the whole population no pilot could be found, "because the people of Pattala, and the Indians in general, did not practice navigation." This remark, which is Droysen's, at least cannot be applicable to the rivers. The Indus surely was at all times actively navigated by the natives down to its mouth. How else are we to account for the canal mentioned by Arrian shortly after? Perhaps too little attention has been paid to Curtius, who says that the pilots whom Alexander took with him from Pattala made their escape.

\* Mr. Williams, however, informs his readers (p. 314) that probably the insurrection had been characterised by atrocious deeds. *Vix victis!*

† Van Bohlen (Ind., i., p. 91) seems to suspect that it is a corruption of the Indian title Maha-rajah.

their guidance, he continued his voyage to the sea. Near the mouth, it still blew so hard from the sea, that he was fain to take shelter in a canal pointed out by the Indians. And here the Macedonians were first astonished by the ebb of the tide, when they saw their vessels suddenly stranded. They were still more amazed and terrified by the fury of the reflux—the peculiar terror of the Indian coasts at the mouths of the great rivers, but so familiar to the natives, that it seems they gave the strangers no warning of it—which shattered the galleys which were not firmly imbedded in the mud. After it had been refitted, the fleet was moored at an island lower down, named Cilluta, where water was found, while Alexander, with the best sailers, proceeded to explore the mouth, and soon came in sight of another island, which lay beyond in the ocean; the term, in this direction, of his conquests and discoveries. That day he returned to Cilluta, and made solemn sacrifice, as he gave out, according to directions which he had received from Ammon.\* On the morrow he touched at the distant island, where he celebrated fresh sacrifices, with different rites, to other deities. Finally, he put out to the open sea, that he might satisfy himself no land lay within view to the south. Here he again sacrificed to the sea-god, whose proper realm he had now entered, as well in thankfulness for the prosperous termination of one expedition, as to propitiate his favour for that which was to be next undertaken. The victims, and the golden vessels with which he made the libations, were thrown into the sea. He then returned up the same arm of the Indus to Pattala, where he found the fortifications of the citadel completed, and Peithon arrived with a very satisfactory report of his operations.

The works connected with the harbour were not yet finished, and while they proceeded, under the care of Hephæstion, he again embarked to explore the eastern side of the Delta. He found that the river, before it reached the sea, expanded into a broad gulf. Here he left the greater part of the troops, and all the smaller vessels, with Leonnatus, and then, again entering the ocean, which, on this side, opposed fewer obstacles to his passage, landed on the south coast of the Delta with a body of horse, and surveyed it to the distance of three days' march westward, sinking wells at convenient intervals. He then returned to his ships, and sailed up to Pattala, while a detachment, which was ordered, likewise, to dig for water at every halting-place, marched round in the same direction. The gulf he had seen appeared to him so important as a naval station, that he once more visited it, ordered docks to be built there, and magazines, where he laid in four months' provisions for the army, and left a garrison to protect them.

The immediate object of all these preparations and precautions was to provide, as far as was practicable, for the successful commencement of the voyage of discovery, on which he had resolved to send a squadron from the Indus to the Persian Gulf. That there was an open

sea between the two coasts he could now scarcely doubt, though the passage might be difficult and dangerous; and this was the first step towards the communication which he wished to establish between India and his western dominions. If, however, we believe an account which Arrian gives, on the authority of Nearchus himself, it would seem that, when Alexander first appointed Nearchus admiral of the fleet, he had either not yet matured his plan, or did not think fit to disclose it. Afterward, we are informed, he consulted Nearchus on the choice of an officer to conduct the voyage of discovery. Nearchus, as, we should think, must have been expected, offered to undertake the command himself; and it appears that there was no other man in the army whom the king would willingly have intrusted with it. We cannot, therefore, but suspect the sincerity of the reluctance which he is said to have expressed, to permit so valued a friend to embark on so perilous an adventure. But he desired that the offer should be freely made by Nearchus, for the sake of the confidence with which it would inspire those who were to be placed under his orders.

He himself was about to undertake a march along the same coast, little less dangerous: one on which, according to tradition, the armies of Semiramis and Cyrus had perished almost to a man; and Nearchus believed that he was partly stimulated to the enterprise by the hope of outdoing these celebrated conquerors.\* We must, however, doubt whether he could have heard of these legends in India, even if they are genuine, and did not rather spring out of his own expedition. It seems clear that he had no distinct conception of the difficulties he was about to encounter; and, particularly, that he had not foreseen the length of time he was to spend on the road, which was far greater than a calculation, founded on the most exact measurement of the distance, would have led him to expect. But, at least, he was not impelled by any childish emulation. He had two important objects in view: to provide, as far as possible, for the safety of the fleet, and to explore and subdue a side of the empire which was hitherto, at most, but nominally subject to him.

The navigation of the rivers had employed about seven months, and nearly four appear to have been spent in and near Pattala. It was towards the end of August, 325, when the preparations were completed for the departure of both armaments. We are unable to estimate the force of either, otherwise than by an uncertain approximation. If, however, Alexander invaded India with 120,000 men, since he received some re-enforcements there, we can hardly believe, after every allowance for the numbers lost or left behind in garrisons and colonies, and for the division under Craterus, that he retained fewer than 50,000 under his own command. As to the armament under Nearchus, we have no other guide than the list

\* A proof, in Mr. Williams's judgment (p. 317), that, as early as his Egyptian voyage, he had contemplated his visit to the shores of the Eastern Ocean. One would think the fact might be more simply explained.

\* Arr., vi., 24. Schlosser (i., 3, p. 146) has strangely mistaken Arrian's meaning, and attributes the opinion that Alexander was not aware of the difficulties of the enterprise to Nearchus; whereas it is clear, both from Arrian and Strabo (xv., p. 250, Tauchen.), that it was Nearchus alone who ascribed to him the motive of emulation with Semiramis and Cyrus, adding, indeed, oddly enough, that of his rational anxiety for the safety of the fleet.

f the galleys equipped on the Hydaspes. But, probably, it did not include so many of that class.\* It is not likely that any larger force could be employed on this service than might appear necessary to overpower resistance on the coast; for it was not undertaken without reluctance by the men, though their spirits were raised by the appointment of Nearchus, by the careful and even splendid equipment of the vessels, and still more, perhaps, by the excursions which the king himself had made into the ocean. But Alexander was now aware of a natural obstacle, the prevalence of the southwest monsoon, which rendered it necessary to postpone the departure of Nearchus. Some weeks were still to come before the trade-winds would set in from the northeast, when they would be perfectly favourable for the voyage. It was not, however, necessary that the army should wait so long, but, perhaps, rather more expedient that it should precede the fleet. Nearchus, therefore, was left at Pattala, while Alexander set out on his return to the West.

The chain of mountains which descends, west of the Indus, from the Paropamisus to the sea, was first to be crossed; he then entered the province of Lus, which is surrounded on three sides by lofty ranges. He found it divided between two independent tribes, the Aratites and the Orites, who were separated from each other by a river called the Arabius (the coralree, or River of Sonmeany); names which probably preserve a trace of an early settlement formed on this coast by Arabians or Phœnicians. At the approach of the invader, the Arabites, incapable of resistance, yet disdaining submission, fled to the adjacent desert; and Alexander did not pursue them, for he wished to surprise their western neighbours, the Orites, so seem to have been the more powerful race. In the Arabius, in which he found but little water, he left the bulk of his army under the command of Hephæstion, and pushed forward, with a select body of troops, towards the coast, where he designed to sink wells for the use of the fleet. The coast of the Oritis was described by Nearchus as a barren tract, inhabited by a race of hairy, half-naked savages. But in the interior, after a forced night march across a desert, Alexander found a more civilized people, and a well-cultivated region, which he traversed with his cavalry, not, however, without formidable resistance; for the natives fought with poisoned arrows, and Ptolemy received a wound which had nearly proved mortal; but an antidote—revealed, it was said, to the king in a dream—was discovered in time. It is not certain whether there was a capital of the country named Ora, or the people lived wholly in villages. But the largest of these, called Rambada, appeared to Alexander so happily situated, that he resolved to plant a colony there, and Hephæstion was appointed to superintend the progress of the new Alexandria. In the meanwhile the king himself, with a small body of cavalry and the lighter troops, rapidly advanced

towards a difficult pass in the western mountains, which, he learned, was held by an army of Orites and Gedrosians; but the mere tidings of his approach threw the enemy into such consternation, that the chiefs of the Orites came to the camp and submitted. They were directed to exert their influence to restore tranquillity, and recall the fugitives to their dwellings. He did not, however, think it safe to rely on their professions. He placed Apollonides over them as satrap, and left Leonnatus, with a body of troops, to wait for the arrival of Nearchus, and, in the interval, to protect the rising city, and secure the obedience of the natives.

It was, perhaps, the beginning of October when he penetrated through the pass from which he had driven the enemy into Gedrosia, the southern Mekran. This wild, fearful region has since been but little explored by European travellers; but a few of its general features appear to be well ascertained. It is intersected with ranges of mountains, some very lofty, running parallel to the coast, but commonly not approaching it within ten or twelve miles. The ridges themselves are rocky and bare; the intervening plains, for the most part, barren wastes, here and there furrowed by deep water-courses, which, except in the rainy season, are almost dry. Still, the interior is, in general, less arid and desolate than the low ground on the coast.\* Alexander, when he entered Gedrosia, sent Thoas, with a party of horse, to the seaside, and received an alarming report from him of the maritime district which he visited. He had found there only a few wretched fishermen, living in stifling cabins built of sea-shells and the bones of whales, or other large fishes, which served for rafters and door-posts. Fish, with a small mixture of meal, was their common food; and even the few sheep they possessed had no other. Water they could only procure in small quantities, and brackish, as they dug for it under the beach. Hence the whole coast of Mekran, as far as Cape Jaak, is called by the Greeks the land of the Ichthyophages, or Fish-eaters. It must not, however, be supposed that the foregoing description is applicable to the whole tract, which contains some cultivated districts, as it did, no doubt, in Alexander's time. Still, the information he received induced him to abandon his original intention, which was to follow the windings of the coast, and he

\* The report of Captain Grant, who traversed the western part of Mekran in various directions (Kinneir's Memoir, p. 203, foll., and 447), does not convey any such idea of desolation as the ancients appear to have associated with the name of Gedrosia. "It appears that the middle parts are entirely mountainous, diversified with valleys and plains, some of which are exceedingly fertile, and others arid." Again: "The level plain between the sea and the hills produces abundance of pasturage." Captain Grant seldom, even in the most unfrequented route of Mekran, made a march without meeting one or two flocks of goats and sheep, amounting to from one to two hundred each. In the low country he frequently encountered droves of two or three hundred camels, and saw individuals possessed of a thousand head." "Between Kej, the capital, and the post of Chobar, the country is hilly, and, comparatively speaking, well inhabited." It seems, however, that farther eastward the coast is more generally barren. So, in the report of General Malcolm's native agent, who travelled along the coast from Sonmeany to Chobar (Kinneir, p. 200 and 442), we hear more of arid, sandy tracts, and from Kej to Urbuo, a small seaport, distant about seven days' journey in an E.S.E. direction, the country is said to be destitute of vegetation and good water.

\* Droyen (p. 409) has totally mistaken Vincent, who takes the number, not of the vessels, but of the men in the thirty-three galleys, amount to 2000, exclusive, as he says, (Nearch., i., p. 212), of those on board the transports. And it seems nearer the truth than Droyen's conjecture, which he himself believes to be more moderate, of 100 vessels and 5000 men.

took a more inland route. Yet it seems that his line of march was seldom more than two or three days' journey from the sea, and oftener within sight of it.

The heats in this country prevail from March to November; when Alexander traversed it, they were still excessive, though beginning to subside. To avoid this evil, the army generally moved during the night; but it frequently happened that, at daybreak, it was still far from the next watering-place, and was compelled to prolong its march under the burning sun, tormented by increasing thirst. The sandy wastes, indeed, were not always utterly cheerless. Their sterility was often relieved, especially, it seems, on the eastern side of Gedrosia, by a profusion of aromatic plants\*—myrrh-trees, from which the Phœnician followers of the camp loaded their beasts with the precious gum, and spikenard, which, when trodden under foot, filled the air with its fragrance. The wild vigour of nature was also indicated by venomous reptiles, poisonous plants, and thorns of uncommon strength, from which the hares could not extricate themselves, and which were found annoying even by the cavalry. But far greater hardships were to be endured when the army came to wide plains, where the sand was fine and soft as freshly-fallen snow, in the daytime so hot as to blister the feet, and driven by the wind into long ridges.† On the top of these downs grew a kind of grass, which was a favourite lurking-place for serpents, from which they darted forth on the unwary passenger. Here numbers of the beasts sank, under the continued toil of wading through the sandy waves. The carriages were, for the most part, broken up, as they could not be dragged through; so that, at last, no means were left of conveying the sick, or those whose strength could not support them to the halting-place. Wretched and hopeless was the condition of those who, overcome with fatigue, lay down to sleep, and, when they woke, found themselves far in the rear; and the men, occupied each with his own misery and danger, grew careless of one another's sufferings and wants.

The descriptions of Arrian and Strabo might lead one to imagine that a great part of the march was made over such ground. Nevertheless, it seems certain that Alexander never crossed any part of the Great Sandy Desert, which is bounded by the mountains of southern Mekran, unless possibly for a short distance near the confines of Gedrosia and Carmania (Kerman). There may, however, have been some tracts nearer to the coast, answering to this description, though hardly of any considerable extent, so as not to be avoided by a moderate circuit. But one or two scenes of this kind would leave so deep an impression, that they could not fail to become the prominent feature in every narrative.

The scarcity of water was the great and

constantly recurring cause of distress. Numbers, both of men and beasts, perished through thirst: and at the outset many disasters arose from the impatience with which, when they came in sight of water, the foremost crowded to it, several ceasing not to drink till they expired. A still greater calamity was occasioned by the rising of a small stream, on which the army encamped for a night, which was suddenly swollen, by a fall of rain in the distant mountains, into a mighty flood,\* and, it is said, drowned most of the women and children, and all the remaining beasts of burden, and carried away the whole of the royal baggage, and the arms of many of the soldiers. After this occurrence the camp was always pitched at a distance from the watering-place. But food was, at times, equally scarce. The country yields but little grain: sheep, it seems, are not rare: but the flocks would often be driven out of reach. It is, however, interspersed with groves of date-trees, which abound particularly in the beds of the rivers, and, according to Strabo's strong expression, their fruit was the salvation of the army. Still, the men were sometimes forced by hunger to slaughter the beasts of burden, pretending that they had perished of thirst on the road; and Alexander was obliged to wink at this license, which indeed, in the confusion of the night marches, could seldom be detected.

It may easily be supposed that he bore his full share in the labours and hardships of the expedition. He accompanied his men during their longest marches on foot; and it was perhaps on one of these occasions that he gave an example of self-command, which served to animate their courage, while it raised him in their esteem. After an unusually long and hot march, some of the light troops, who had been sent in search of water, having discovered a little remaining in the bed of a torrent, brought some in a helmet, as the most precious of all presents, to the king. Alexander, who knew how many longing eyes were fixed on him, though he was himself parched and faint with thirst, poured the delicious draught on the ground.† Another time, when all the marks of the road had been covered by the sand-drifts, the sea was no longer in sight, and the guides owned that they had lost their way, he set out, with a few horsemen, to seek the coast. Five only remained with him when he reached it. But having discovered that there was here plenty of fresh water to be found in the beach, he led the army to the place, and for seven days after marched close to the shore. The barrenness of the coast inspired him with no less anxiety about the safety of the fleet than he felt for the troops under his own command, and his exertions to provide for its wants were no less unremitting. From the first district in Gedrosia, where he found provisions unusually abundant, he ordered all that could be spared to be transported to the seaside, in packages sealed with his own signet. But the escort

\* Nothing of this kind is noticed in the reports of modern travellers, though the plains are said to be frequently overgrown with jungle.

† Arrian's description of the sandhills (vi., 24) answers so well to that which Pottinger gives of the high waves of soft fine sand which he had to cross for a distance of about seventy miles (see his *Travels*, or *Kinneir's Memoirs*), as to be strongly confirmed by it. Yet it is strange that no obstacle of this kind is mentioned as occurring in Mettrac, south of the Great Sandy Desert.

\* It still remains to be explained how this could have happened so late in the year.

† Arrian expresses a doubt whether the occurrence belonged to the march through Gedrosia, or to the occasion mentioned *ante*, p. 279. It seems possible that it may have happened, under different circumstances, more than once. Plutarch (*Al.*, 42) refers it to the pursuit of Darius.



intrusted with this convoy were themselves so pressed by hunger on the way, that they were compelled to break the royal seal, and to consume the whole stock. Another supply was afterward transmitted under the care of Cretheus; and, again, Telephus was sent with a small quantity of meal. Parties were also detached up the country for the same purpose; and the natives were directed to bring down all that could be procured of corn, dates, and sheep.

Two months were spent in the march from Ora to Pura, the capital of Gedrosia.\* The time seems great, compared with the direct distance, especially as the army was often forced to make very long marches from one station to another, and we hear of none but the ordinary halts. It is probable, however, that, though the road was only once lost, it was generally very winding, since both the difficulty of the ground, and the scarcity of provisions, often rendered a circuit necessary. Even at Pura, the position of which is unknown, Alexander seems to have allowed his troops but a short repose before he advanced into Carmania. He had several motives to urge his progress: to meet Craterus, to gain tidings of Nearchus, and perhaps, also, to prevent the disturbances which were likely to arise from reports of his own danger, and to ascertain the state of affairs in the provinces from which he had been so long absent. For he had already reason to suspect that some of his officers in distant governments had abused his confidence: as at Pura he was induced to remove Apollophanes for neglect of duty;† though it seems that, before the satrap learned his disgrace, he had atoned for his fault by death on a field of battle. On the road to Carmania, Alexander received despatches from Taxiles and Porus, announcing the death of Abisares, and of Philippos, who had been murdered by some of his own mercenaries. His Macedonian guards, however, had remained faithful, and punished the assassins. Alexander directed Taxiles, and Eudemus, the commander of the Thracians left with Philippos, to take charge of the province until a new satrap should have been appointed. The son of Abisares was permitted to succeed his father.

In Carmania the army found a delightful change in the face of nature, and a striking contrast to the Gedrosian wilderness: a country which the ancients describe as uncommonly fertile, abounding in fruit, especially grapes of extraordinary size,‡ and watered by copious

streams. This description is still applicable to some districts of Kerman, though they are separated from each other by many desert tracts. Craterus arrived soon after, safe and victorious, having quelled an insurrection in Arachosia, and brought two of the chiefs of the rebels, Ordanes and Zariaspes, with him in chains. It is a little surprising and suspicious that we hear nothing of the hardships and dangers that beset his march: though, as his road, unless he made an enormous circuit, lay across a part of the Great Sandy Desert, it might have been supposed that, with the elephants and the heavy baggage, he must have had more to encounter than Alexander. The plenty that now prevailed in the camp was increased by the arrival of a large convoy, brought by Stasanor, satrap of Ariana, and Pharismanes, son of the Parthian satrap Phratharnes, who, either in compliance with the king's orders, or of their own accord, hearing of the dangerous route he had taken,\* came to meet him with a long train of camels, and other beasts, laden with provisions. Alexander distributed all among his troops. Their losses were thus partly repaired, their wants abundantly supplied; their sufferings might be considered as at an end. We cannot wonder that, in the enjoyment of pleasures from which they had been so long debarred, they abandoned themselves to some excesses, perhaps only following the example of their chiefs and of Alexander himself: and this was probably the main ground of fact for the exaggeration of later writers, who described his march through Carmania as a continued revel, in which he imitated the festive procession with which his divine predecessor had returned from his Indian conquests. He was now also joined by three generals, Cleander, Sitalces, and Heraco,† who commanded the forces left in Media with Parmenio, and had brought with them the greater part of their troops. They too, perhaps, wished to make a display of loyal zeal, but they were called upon to answer charges of gross misconduct; and Cleander and Sitalces were immediately convicted and put to death. It appeared that they had plundered temples, ransacked ancient tombs, and sacrificed the honour of noble families to their lust. If we may believe Curtius, Alexander also put to death no less than 600 of the soldiers, who had been their instruments in these acts of violence. Heraco was afterward condemned on another similar charge.

There can be no doubt that in these cases the punishment was deserved. But another execution is said by Curtius to have taken place in Carmania, for which he charges Alexander with cruelty. Aspastes, the satrap of the province, though he came to meet the king on his arrival, and was at first graciously received,

\* It has been commonly assumed that this is Pures, "now a miserable village."—Kinnair, p. 207. But the name does not seem sufficient evidence. Bampur, situate in a district which "produces grain in such abundance as to supply the neighbouring country," might seem to have a better claim; and a small town, named Pahura, lies sixteen miles from it to the N.E.—*ib.*, p. 218.

† The conjecture that this Apollophanes was a different person from the satrap who had been left in Oritia may be allowed to sink into oblivion, with the hundreds of others as confidently and groundlessly thrown out in the work where it occurs. On the other hand, we are not informed what the points were as to which Apollophanes had neglected his duty. The instructions mentioned by Arrian (vi. 2) relate only to the fleet and to the administration of Oritia: nor is it easy to understand how it was in the power of Apollophanes to provide for the subsistence of the army during its march through Gedrosia. It does not appear how any army he might have sent could have overtaken Alexander.

‡ Strabo's description (xv., p. 315) reminds us of the

grapes of Canaan. The clusters, he says, were three feet long. A convivial usage of the Carmanians is mentioned by Posidonius (Athen., ii., 24.)

\* Arrian represents their coming as a spontaneous movement. But, according to Curtius (ix., 10, 17) and Diodorus (xvii., 105), they were only obeying orders which Alexander had sent when he began to be distressed by the scarcity of provisions in Gedrosia. This would confirm the opinion that he was before ignorant of the nature of the country. But he may have sent the orders sooner.

† Curtius adds Agatho to the number; but we do not hear what became of him.

was put to death on a suspicion of treasonable designs formed in Alexander's absence.\* This, according to the view entertained by Curtius, and by several other writers, both ancient and modern, would be the first indication of an unhappy change which was beginning to show itself in Alexander's character: an effect, either of his uninterrupted prosperity, or, as others have conceived, of the partial failure and disappointment which he had experienced in India. We need not stop to inquire which of these causes is the more probable, since the alleged effect seems to be extremely doubtful. We shall, indeed, meet with other instances, in which there is ground to suspect that he was not exempt from passion, which hurried him into hasty decisions in the administration of justice; but we cannot infer that any change had taken place in his character. He appears to have been always quick in resentment, and rather generous than either merciful or scrupulously just. He was now, no doubt, highly provoked by the audacity with which his officers had violated their duty in his absence, as if certain that he would never return, and was hence inclined to lend a favouring ear to such accusations; and his indignation was probably heightened by the conviction, which must have been forced on him by these occurrences, that, from the moment of his death, had it happened, his vast empire would at once have fallen in pieces. Still, cruelty, in the most odious sense of the word, wanton injustice, was always foreign to his nature: nor have we any proof that his temper had become in other respects harsher, or less even, than before his Indian expedition.†

In the mean while he was in painful uncertainty, and was giving way more and more to gloomy thoughts as to the fate of Nearchus and the fleet. They were at length dispelled by tidings that Nearchus had landed on the coast of Carmania, within a few days' march of the camp. The bearer of the news was the governor of the maritime district in which the event had occurred. Some of the men belonging to the fleet, in an excursion up the country, had fallen in with one of Alexander's soldiers, and learned from him that the king was encamped only five days' march from the sea: by him Nearchus was brought to the governor, who hastened to the camp with the joyful tidings. Alexander sent party after party, with means of conveyance, for Nearchus. Some of his messengers proceeded but a short distance, and returned without intelligence. Others went farther, but lost the road. He began to suspect that he had been deceived, and ordered the governor to be arrested. Meanwhile, Nearchus had hauled up his vessels on shore, and had fortified a naval camp, where he left the great-

er part of his men, and set out with Archias, his second in command, and five or six companions, to seek the king. On their way they met one of the parties which had been sent with horses and carriages in search of them; but so great was the change made in their appearance by the hardships of the voyage, that, even when they inquired the road to the camp, they were not recognised by their countrymen, until, on the suggestion of Archias, they made themselves known. Some now hastened to inform Alexander of their approach. When he heard of the smallness of their number, he concluded that the fleet was lost, and that they were the only survivors. But their arrival cleared up all mistakes, and diffused universal joy.

The details of the voyage would be foreign to our purpose. Nearchus had been forced to begin it before the winds had become favourable, by the hostility of the Indians at Pattala; and, though he waited four-and-twenty days on the Arabite coast, he afterward lost three of his vessels in the adverse monsoon. On the coast of Oritis he met Leonnatus, who, after Alexander's departure, had been obliged to defend himself against the combined forces of the natives and their allies. He had gained a great victory, with the loss of few men: the satrap Apolophanes was among the slain. From Leonnatus, according to the king's orders, Nearchus received a supply of corn sufficient for ten days, and exchanged some of his least active sailors for better men from the camp: but it does not appear that he lighted upon many of the magazines destined by Alexander for his use. After manifold hardships and perils, from the monsters of the deep, the barrenness of the coast, the hostility of the barbarians, and from the timidity and despondency of his own crews, he at length, with the aid of a Gedrosian pilot, reached the mouth of the Persian Gulf. When they came in sight of Arabia, Onesicritus—with what view is not perfectly clear—urged the admiral to strike across, and steer to the south. Nearchus, however, prudently refused to deviate from the king's instructions, and finally landed near the mouth of the River Anamis (Ibrahim), not far to the east of the Isle of Ormuz.

Alexander now celebrated these happy events with a solemn festival, which, as usual, was enlivened by gymnastic and musical contests; and, perhaps, the poets, who vied with one another on this occasion, as well as the spectacle itself, may have contributed to the origin of the fables about his Bacchanalian pomp. In the triumphal procession, Nearchus was the foremost object of congratulation and applause. The king then consulted with him as to the remainder of the voyage. Alexander may now have been in earnest when he begged him not to expose himself to farther danger and hardship with the fleet, which some other officer might conduct to the mouth of the Tigris; but he gladly and thankfully complied with the admiral's request, that he might be allowed to complete the glorious undertaking, which he had already brought to a point where it became comparatively safe and easy. He was accordingly dismissed with a small escort. The state of the country was still so unsettled, that he

\* The fact might seem doubtful if it rested on no authority better than Curtius. But Arrian, though he does not mention it in his history, seems clearly to allude to it in his *Indica*, 36, where he says that the satrap of Carmania *ῥητέρευκε κατὰ πρόβητιν Ἀλεξάνδρου*. Schmieder, indeed, interprets this expression to mean, *had gone out of office*, and refers it to the removal of Siburtius; but he supports his opinion only by most irrelevant quotations.

† Droysen's picture (p. 486) of the state of Alexander's mind: "the period of effort and struggle had gone by, the enthusiasm of youth and hope was cooled," &c., seems to be drawn purely from imagination, and to be inconsistent with the vast enterprises in which we find him engaged to the end of his life.

was attacked on his way to the sea by the Carmanians, who were in open revolt, and had seized all the strongholds. According to Arrian, this insurrection was excited by the changes that had been made in the government of the province; for Siburtius, who succeeded Aspastes, had just been removed to the satrapy of Gedrosia, and Tlepolemus appointed in his room. In his history, Arrian does not mention this rebellion, and perhaps Alexander did not think it important enough to require that he should suppress it in person.\* He now divided his forces. The main body he committed to Hephæstion, who, as it was winter, was ordered to move along the shore of the Persian Gulf, where the climate, at this season, is mild, and provisions plentiful, and to join him at Susa. He himself, with a small division of light troops and cavalry, took the upper road through Pasargadæ and Persepolis.

In Persis, too, he found that affairs had gone but ill in his absence. The satrap Phraortes was dead, and a noble Persian, named Orxines, according to Curtius, a descendant of Cyrus, and a man of large hereditary possessions, had ventured to assume the government, professing, however, none but loyal intentions, perhaps being the only person to whom the province would quietly have submitted; and he came to meet the king with a magnificent display of costly presents. Alexander seems to have betrayed no displeasure at his usurpation, but was exceedingly incensed by the discovery that the sepulchre of Cyrus, at Pasargadæ, had been defaced and pillaged: the offender was not immediately named. The Magians who had the care of the sacred enclosure were examined and put to the torture, but revealed nothing. It was not until the army reached Persepolis that Orxines was charged with this and other acts of sacrilege, and with arbitrary executions; and being convicted, according to Arrian, on clear evidence, was condemned to death. Curtius, however, asserts that he was innocent, and fell a victim to calumny and court intrigues; and it must be owned that, if we believe what is said of his birth and his wealth, the charge of sacrilege seems scarcely credible, especially as the tomb of Cyrus, at least, appears to have been rifled by a Macedonian named Polymachus. Alexander had before resolved to confer the satrapy of Persis on Peucestes, whom he had already, in Carmania, raised to the dignity of somatophylax, as a reward for his great service in India. Peucestes had also distinguished himself in another way, not quite so honourable to him, by the readiness with which he adopted the barbarian usages; and when he was appointed satrap, he assumed the Median dress, began to study the Persian language, and in all points formed his court on the native model. By these proceedings, he both won the hearts of the people and rose in favour with his master. A more jealous prince might, perhaps, have suspected him of ambitious projects; but Alexander was too well pleased with his obsequiousness or dex-

terity, and hoped that his example might be followed by others among his Macedonian nobles.

From Persepolis, where he could not now view the ruins of the palace without regret and self-reproach—a sign that his better feelings had not lost their strength—he proceeded, without farther delay, to meet Hephæstion and Nearchus at Susa, which he designed for the scene of several important transactions.

## CHAPTER LV.

FROM ALEXANDER'S RETURN TO SUSATO HIS DEATH.

ALEXANDER might now be said to have returned into the heart of his dominions; since the Indus, the Tazartes, and the Nile had become Macedonian rivers. It was a question, at that time, of great importance to the whole civilized world, what were the plans now floating in the imagination of the youthful conqueror, if not yet reduced to a settled purpose. His character and past achievements naturally excited an expectation of enterprises still more extraordinary. None, perhaps, not absolutely impracticable, could be thought too great for his ambition, or too arduous for his adventurous spirit; some of those attributed to him, however, could only have been deemed probable by persons who were incapable of duly estimating the sagacity and prudence which guided even his boldest undertakings. It was believed by many that he designed to circumnavigate Arabia to the head of the Red Sea, and afterward Africa; then, entering the Mediterranean by the Pillars of Hercules, to spread the terror of his arms along its western shores, and finally to explore the northern extremity of the Lake Mæotis, and, if possible, discover a passage into the Caspian Sea. These reports were not altogether without a visible foundation; they seem to have arisen out of the simple fact that Alexander, on his return from India, prepared to equip a fleet on the Euphrates, and sent orders to Phœnicia for vessels to be built there and transported to Thapsacus; thence to fall down the river to Babylon, where a harbour was to be formed capable of containing 1000 galleys of war. That a great armament, therefore, was to be collected for some operations which were to begin in the Persian Gulf, was sufficiently certain; and Alexander also gave proofs that his views were directed toward Arabia, for he sent three expeditions to survey its coasts: first, a vessel under the command of Archias, the companion of Nearchus, who, however, did not even venture to cross over to the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf, but stopped short at one of the islands. Androsthenes, who was afterward sent out with another vessel, did a little more—he sailed for a short distance along the coast. The boldest of the adventurers was a Cilician named Hiero, who advanced much farther in the same direction; but his courage and perseverance were at length overcome by the vast range of the coast, which exceeded all his expectations; and, on his return, he reported that Arabia was nearly as large as India. Yet it would seem, from Arrian's account, that even he had not doubled the cape seen by Nearchus.

\* In the speech which Arrian puts into his mouth at the mutiny, he says of himself, *Κυριακὸν σπασκόμενον*, which, but for the reason given in a preceding note, might seem to imply that it had never before been subject to him. But the expression may relate to the rebellion, whether it was quelled by Alexander himself or by Tlepolemus.

It can hardly be supposed that Alexander had resolved to attempt the conquest of Arabia while he was conscious that he knew so little about the nature and extent of the country, especially as the information which he might obtain as to the interior cannot have been encouraging. But it is not the less probable that discovery and conquest in this quarter were the objects which henceforth, to his death, chiefly occupied his thoughts; for the spirit of discovery was here stimulated by a clear prospect of great advantages to be derived from a maritime communication between Egypt and India. To ascertain whether it was possible to open one, and to secure it, if not by conquests, at least by colonies planted on the Arabian coast, was, a design certainly suited to Alexander's genius, and worthy of his ambition; and this appears to have been the first destination of the new armament. That another expedition to India had presented itself to his mind is implied in this supposition, but that it was the immediate object of his preparations we find no reason to believe. On any other projects which he may have entertained, it would be still more idle to speculate.

For some time after his return, his attention was engrossed by different cares. From every side he continued to receive fresh complaints of the excesses committed by his satraps and other officers during his absence, and fresh proofs that many of them aimed at establishing an independent authority. The indignation of the people was especially provoked by the spoliation of the sacred buildings. It is probable, that in almost every case, such outrages on the national feelings proceeded from the reckless cupidity of the Macedonians, though the native governors may have abused their powers as grossly in other matters. Not unfrequently, perhaps, they had connived at the misconduct of the Macedonian officers under their command, as we may suspect to have been the case with Orxines and the above-mentioned Polymachus, who is described as a man of high rank. So Abulites, the satrap of Susa, and his son Oxathres, were put to death, it is said, for neglect of duty; it would seem too hastily, for Alexander ran Oxathres through the body with his own sarissa: but it was the Macedonian Heraco who had plundered the temple at Susa. Such proceedings may have been the main cause of an insurrection which had broken out in Media, but was suppressed by the satrap Atropates, who brought its author, a Median named Baryaxes, and several of his partisans, to Pargadæ, where they suffered death. Baryaxes had assumed the erect cidaris, and the title of King of the Medes and Persians, a step to which he was probably encouraged by the popular discontent which had been excited by the extortion and insolence of the strangers. Alexander was still more deeply wounded by another example of disloyalty, which was aggravated by foul ingratitude, and led to important consequences.

We have seen, that before he came to the throne, some of his friends had been banished from Macedonia because they had taken his side in his quarrel with his father.\* Among them was Harpalus. All were afterward re-

warded with high promotion; Harpalus, whose frame was not sufficiently robust for military service, was intrusted with the office of treasurer. Yet, a little before the battle of Issus, he had fled to Greece, having, no doubt, been guilty of embezzlement. But even this offence did not deprive him of the king's favour. Alexander not only induced him to return by a promise of pardon, but afterward restored him to the trust which he had so flagrantly abused, and, on the death of Mazæus, raised him to one of the most important posts in the empire, the Babylonian satrapy. The man, probably, beside the doubtful merit of his early services, possessed some pleasing talents which won his master's partiality; and Alexander committed no greater mistake in this choice than in the appointment of the Egyptian satrap Cleomenes. Harpalus was not more greedy than lavish of money; and, as the king's return from the far East grew more and more hopeless, he threw off all restraints, treated the revenues of his rich province and all he could exact from it as his own, and squandered them in a luxury which seems to have rivalled that of the Persian kings. We read of fish brought from the Persian Gulf for his table,\* and of his struggles with nature to fill his gardens at Babylon with exotic plants.† These, however, were his most innocent pleasures. The Babylonians were forced to surrender their wives and children to his boundless lust, which he, moreover, indulged with a peculiar kind of capricious ostentation. He sent for Pythionice, the most celebrated of the Athenian courtesans, and caused her to be received at Babylon with royal honours, and, after her death, erected two monuments to her memory, one at Babylon, the other in Attica, at a cost of 200 talents;—the Babylonian monument in the form of a temple, where he ordered her to be honoured, under the title of her patron goddess, with sacred rites. Her successor, Glycera, a native of Athens, he treated with no less extravagant homage, lodged her in the royal palace at Tarsus, dedicated a bronze statue to her in Syria by the side of his own, and in a place where he was about to erect one of Alexander himself, and forced the people to salute her as a queen. For her sake, and probably, likewise, with an eye to the need he might have of Athenian protection in a reverse of fortune, he sent a large present of corn to the Athenians, who requited it with their franchise. An account of these proceedings was sent to Alexander by the historian Theopompus, in a letter of which some fragments have been preserved;‡ but Alexander had probably received earlier information of them from other quarters. When Harpalus heard of the king's safe return, and of the severity with which he had punished similar offences, he despaired of forgiveness, seized all the treasure he could collect, which amounted to 5000 talents, took 6000 mercenaries into his pay, and, flying to the western coast, sailed

\* Diodor., xvii., 108.

† Plat., Al., 35.

‡ Theopompus in Athen., xiii., 67. Plutarch, however (Phoc., 22), says that the one in Attica cost but thirty talents, and that it did not look as if so much had been laid out on it.

§ Athen., xiii., 67. 'Ἐν ἑτῇ πρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρον ἐπιστολῇ. In what relation this letter stood to a work of Theopompus quoted by Athenæus, xiii., 50, under the title 'Ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς Χίας ἐπιστολῇς, it is difficult to conjecture.

\* Ante, p. 154.

over to Athens. He was forced, indeed, after a time, as we shall see, to quit the city; but he stayed there long enough, and was sufficiently well received, to excite bitter resentment in Alexander's mind against the Athenians. The king's confidence in Harpalus was so strong to the last, that he imprisoned Ephialtes and Cissus, who brought the news of his flight, as guilty of calumny.\*

It was necessary not only to soothe the people by the punishment of such offences, but, if possible, to prevent their recurrence. It seems to have been for this end that Alexander sent orders to all his Asiatic satraps to dismiss the Greek mercenaries whom they had taken into their service, in whom they probably found their most willing instruments for every act of violence, as well as encouragement to hope for impunity. That Alexander really issued this order, cannot be doubted, as we shall have occasion hereafter to observe some effects which resulted from it. It cannot, however, have been his intention to allow these adventurers to roam at large over Asia, where they might be expected not only to commit numberless disorders, but, likewise, to lend their aid to every attempt that might be made against his government, and to hold out a constant temptation to the disaffected. We have, therefore, in the case itself, confirmation of a statement, otherwise not resting on very high authority, that he designed to plant colonies in Persia with these disbanded troops.† The plan, indeed, if it was formed, seems to have failed, at least as to the greater number. The Greek soldiers, so long as they could find employment, were, perhaps, seldom inclined to exchange their military habits for peaceful occupations, and, at least, were generally averse from the thought of a settlement so far from their native land; as had been already proved by the example of those who had been left in Bactria, who, not long after, rose against the satrap, seized the citadel of Bactria, drew a part of the natives into their revolt, and set out in a body for Europe. This, however, only shows that there was a difficulty to be overcome. The project attributed by Pausanias to Alexander is not the less in perfect harmony with his general policy, and appears, in fact, as we shall see, to have been partly carried into effect.

But such precautions as these were barely sufficient to maintain tranquillity for the present; much more was needed for the future. All that he had observed since his return appears to have strengthened his previous conviction, that his empire, to be permanent, must be established on a new basis. And at Susa he began a series of measures, tending, in their remote consequences, to unite the conquerors with the conquered, so as to form a new people out of both, and, in their immediate effects, to raise a new force, independent alike of Macedonian and of Persian prejudices, and entirely subservient to his ends. The first of these measures was a great festival, in which he, at the same time, celebrated his own nuptials with Statira, the eldest daughter of Darius (who now, it seems, took the name of Arsinoë), and those

of his principal officers with Persian and Median ladies of the noblest families. We find an intimation that some address was needed before the preliminaries could be arranged;‡ and this, from the known temper and views of the Macedonian generals, we can easily believe. The king's example had, no doubt, the greatest weight in overcoming the aversion which they must have felt to such an alliance. The liberality with which he portioned their brides out of his treasure also had its effect; and their pride was flattered by the condescension with which he placed them on a level with himself in the ceremony. Hephæstion received the hand of Drypetis, Statira's sister: it was Alexander's express wish that his friend's children should be related to his own. Craterus was wedded to Amastris, a niece of Darius; Perdiccas to a daughter of the satrap Atropates; Ptolemy and Eumenes to two daughters of Artabazus. For Nearchus Alexander chose the daughter of Mentor by Barsine, a mark of distinguished favour, since he himself had admitted the mother to his bed, and already had a son by her, on whom he had bestowed the name of Hercules, and who afterward became a competitor for the throne. To Seleucus he gave a daughter of the Bactrian chief Spitamenes. These are the only names recorded by Arrian, but the whole number of the officers who followed the king's example amounted to nearly a hundred. It was not less important for his object that above 10,000 of the private Macedonians had either already formed a connexion, or were now induced to enter into one, with Asiatic women. To render it solemn and binding, a list was taken of their names, and a marriage portion was granted to each.

The wealth of Asia and the arts of Greece were combined to adorn the spectacle with a splendour and beauty worthy of the occasion. A gorgeous pavilion was erected, probably on a plain near the city, capable of containing not only the bridal party, but the guests whom the king had invited to the banquet.† It was supported by pillars sixty feet high, glittering with gold, silver, and precious stones, and was hung and spread with the richest tissues. Ninety-two chambers, magnificently furnished, were annexed to the building; and an outer court appears to have been enclosed by a partition, likewise hung with costly tapestry, for the re-

explain the variations in the name which we find in Arrian, vii., 4 (compared with Photius, p. 686, 687), and other authors. Aristobolus related that Alexander also married Parysatis, daughter of Ochus. There was probably some foundation for this statement; but we hear nothing more of Parysatis, and Alexander certainly never placed her on a level with Statira.

\* Diodorus, xvii., 107, *fraus*. Compare Arrian, vii., 6.

† That the tent described by Chares (Athenæus, xii., 54, *Ælian*, V. H., viii., 7) as erected for the marriage-feast is the same with that described as the king's ordinary tent for solemn audiences by Phylarchus (Athenæus, xii., 55; *Ælian*, V. H., ix., 3), may be considered as nearly certain. Droysen (p. 496) concludes that the royal tent was fitted up for the wedding-feast. It seems more probable that one was built for that occasion. Chares distinguishes the *αἶμα*, or inner tent, in which the tables were laid for the bridegrooms and the king's guests, from the *αὐλή*, in which, according to him, the whole army, with the crowd of strangers, was entertained. But that an enclosure were made to contain so vast a multitude seems highly improbable. The *αὐλή* appears to have been destined for the Macedonian bridegrooms of lower rank. Droysen takes no notice of the outer court, but supposes that tables were laid in the tent for 9000 persons, all of distinguished rank.

\* Plut., Al., 41.

† Paus., i., 25, 5. *Ἀναισικαὶ σφᾶς ἐς τὴν Παρπίδα Δελφῶναι*; *Ἀκτινῶρον*.

\* This is Droysen's conjecture, which seems happily to

ception of the 10,000 newly-married soldiers, each of whom received a golden vessel for his libation, and of the strangers who had been drawn by business or curiosity to the court. In the foreground without, tables were spread for the rest of the immense multitude. The nuptials were solemnized according to Persian usage. A separate seat was assigned to each pair: all were ranged in a semicircle to the right and left of the royal throne. When the last libation had been announced by a flourish of trumpets to the multitude without, the brides entered the banquet-hall and took their places. The king first gave his hand to Statira, and saluted her as his consort; and his example was followed by the rest. This, it seems, completed the nuptial ceremony. The festivities lasted five days, which were filled up with a variety of entertainments; among the rest, musical and dramatic performances of Greek artists, and feats of Indian jugglers.\* Alexander's subjects from all parts of the empire vied with each other in the magnificence of their offerings to the king; and the value of the crowns which he received on this occasion is said to have amounted to 15,000 talents.

We may here mention another spectacle which was exhibited at Susa, probably soon after the king's arrival, not less to the astonishment of the natives than of the Greeks. The Indian philosopher Calanus had accompanied the army thus far.† He had become a favourite with Alexander, and with several of his officers; was frequently a guest at the royal table, and sometimes even offered political advice to the king.‡ On the road to Susa, he was visited for the first time, at the age of seventy-three, with symptoms of disease. He disdained, as perhaps Plato would have done, to submit to the use of medicine and change of diet for the sake of a few more years of sickly life; and resolved, while his mind was still clear and his spirit unbroken, to drop his mortal load, and ascend to a higher sphere. He wished to solemnize this his last act according to the custom of his country, and requested the king to direct a funeral pile to be prepared for him. Alexander endeavoured in vain to divert him from his purpose, and at last ordered Ptolemy to make the necessary arrangements. When all was ready, a military procession, accompanied by the elephants, led the way. Vessels of gold and silver, royal vestments, and precious spices—Alexander's presents to his departing friend—were carried before him to be laid on the pile, which was itself constructed of all manner of odoriferous woods.§ A horse of the Nysæan breed had

also been brought for him; but, according to some accounts, he was unable to mount it, and was borne in a litter, crowned with a chaplet, and singing his Indian hymns. When he reached the place, he distributed the king's presents among the persons to whom he had been most attached, giving the horse to Lysimachus, who had been used to take pleasure in his conversation, took leave of his friends, and requested them to devote the rest of the day to convivial mirth. He then mounted the pile, and gravely laid himself down in the sight of the whole army, which was drawn up in a circle round it. Alexander alone would not be tempted by curiosity to witness such an end of one whom he loved. As soon as the torches were applied to the pile, the trumpets sounded, the men raised the battle-yell, and the elephants were made to join their sharp screech. Every eye was fixed on Calanus, but he was never seen to stir again. The funeral was followed, according to ancient Greek usage, by a horserace, and by gymnastic and musical contests. But his last request was fulfilled in a manner which he could scarcely have wished, and which does not convey a favourable idea of Alexander's court. At the banquet which closed the day the king proposed a prize for the stoutest drinker. It need not be supposed that he himself engaged in the contest; but it proved almost immediately fatal to no less than forty-one of the competitors, and Promachus, the conqueror, did not survive his triumph more than three days. It must be confessed that such a tribute to the memory of Calanus was not more humane than a combat of gladiators; and, after this well-attested fact, the Macedonians could not justly complain that any wrong was done to their character by the legend of their drunken march through Carmania.\*

The nuptial festival was a concession gained from the Macedonians in favour of the ancient masters of Asia. It had not been yielded without reluctance; and, notwithstanding the king's liberality and condescension, murmurs were excited, both in the mass of the army, and among some of the newly-married officers, by the preference which had been given to the Persian ceremonial. Alexander, who meditated innovations which were likely to give still greater offence to the Macedonians, now endeavoured to conciliate them by another act of royal munificence, and by the distribution of rewards to those who had distinguished themselves in the late expeditions. He declared his intention to pay the debts of every Macedonian in the army; and directed that all who wished to share his bounty should give in their names to be registered. The offer was at first very coldly received, and awakened a suspicion which indicated an unsound state of feeling, though it arose in part from a reproving conscience, and might also be considered as occasioned by the incredible amount of the proffer-

\* *Geopædonol.* Athen., xii., 54.

† Strabo (xv., 300, Teuch.) says that he fell ill at Pasargada, and put an end to his life, which seems to imply that this was the scene of his death: and Arrian (vii., 3) appears likewise to fix it in Persia. But, as Droysen observes, his mention of Nearchus and the elephants as present at the funeral clearly proves that it cannot have taken place before the reunion of the forces at Susa. And so we find Diodorus, in this instance, apparently rather more accurate than Strabo or Arrian; for, according to him, it was about the time that Alexander reached the frontiers of Susia that Calanus burned himself, xvii., 107.

‡ To illustrate the danger of Alexander's expeditions into remote regions, Calanus, it is said, laid a dry hide on the ground, and showed that when any corner was pressed, the other parts were raised, but when the pressure was applied to the centre, the whole was kept at rest. Plut., Al., 65.

§ *Æli.* V. II., v., 6.

\* *Ælian's* authority (V. H., ii., 41) does not seem sufficient to prove that such drinking matches were customary in India, and that Alexander proposed this to gratify the Indians who were then at his court. There is no reason to suppose that so great a change has taken place in Indian manners as this would imply. *Ælian* may have inferred the custom from the request of Calanus and the manner in which it was fulfilled.

ed donative. It was generally believed that the king's object was chiefly to gain information as to the state of their private affairs, and, from the debts which they had contracted, to form a judgment which could not fail to be often unfavourable on the habits and character of each. Few, therefore, presented themselves to enter their names. Alexander, as soon as he discovered the cause of this general backwardness, reproved them for their unworthy distrust, with the remark, that it was no more fit that subjects should suspect their king of falsehood than that he should practise it; and immediately ordered tables to be set in the camp, with heaps of gold, where each might receive the amount of his debts without registering his name. This generous confidence removed all doubts: men of all ranks flocked in with their claims; and the secrecy was felt as a greater favour than the relief. We hear but of one case in which the temptation held out by it to fraud was abused. A veteran named Antigenes, who had lost an eye at the siege of Perinthus, came to one of the counters with a man whom he had induced to act the part of a creditor. The pretended debt was paid; but the collusion was soon after detected, and Alexander indignantly banished Antigenes from court, and deprived him of his command. The shame was more than the offender could bear; and it became evident that he would not long survive it. To prevent a fatal issue, which would have damped the joy of the army, Alexander restored the old officer to his rank, and permitted him to keep all he had received.

The sum expended on this largess is said to have been no less than 20,000 talents. Alexander, at the same time, bestowed crowns of gold on several of his principal officers, among whom are mentioned Peucestes, Leonnatus, Nearchus, Onesicritus, and Hephæstion. Other rewards were conferred on a great number of persons, in proportion to their rank and services. But the popularity which the king gained by these measures was soon to be subjected to a hard trial; for it was not long after that the satraps who had the charge of the Asiatic youth selected some years before to be taught the Greek language, and to be trained to war according to the Macedonian system, came to Susa with a body of 30,000 young soldiers formed in these schools, equipped and armed in the Macedonian fashion. Alexander himself was delighted with their fine persons and martial bearing, and with the manner in which they executed their manœuvres, and immediately proceeded to incorporate them with his army. The infantry, it seems, was, for the present, kept distinct from the Macedonian troops; but the cavalry, which was drawn from Bactria and Sogdiana, and other eastern provinces, was admitted into the same ranks with the flower of the Macedonian nobility. A fifth division of horse was formed to receive them; and, at the same time, several of the young Asiatic nobles were enrolled in the escort, a body hitherto selected from the first families of Macedonia. These changes roused the jealousy and resentment of the old troops in a much higher degree than any of the king's previous acts. His adoption of the dress and usages of the conquered

people had displeased them, because it indicated a purpose which they disliked: the late alliances created, perhaps, still greater discontent, because they still more clearly and directly tended to the same point. But the new organization of the army was more than a tendency; it was not a mere indication, but the first step in the execution of the purpose which had alarmed them; it was a beginning of destruction to all the privileges they most valued. Alexander, it was plain, wished to be considered only as their sovereign, no longer as their countryman.

The murmurs of the camp probably did not escape his notice, and may have induced him to set out the earlier from Susa, on a march which, by the new occupation it afforded, would, perhaps, make the army forget its supposed grievances. He therefore ordered Hephæstion to lead the main body down to the coast, while he himself, with the hypaspists, and a few squadrons of horse, embarked on board the fleet which Nearchus had brought up the Eulæus to Susa. Having fallen down the river as far as the cut by which it is connected in the upper part of its course with the Tigris, he left the vessels which had suffered most from the sea, to enter the Tigris by this canal, while with the rest he sailed down to the mouth, and surveyed the coast of the Delta. Then, again entering the Tigris by another arm, he sailed up towards the place of rendezvous which he had concerted with Hephæstion, and, when the whole armament was once more united, proceeded, by slow marches, to Opis. His attention on the way was entirely devoted to the state of the stream and the adjacent districts; and he employed his troops to remove the dikes or bunds by which the ancient kings of Persia or Assyria had obstructed the navigation; whether, as he wished to be believed, for the security of their dominions against inroads from the sea, or, as seems more probable, for other purposes, which appeared to him no longer to require them.

On his arrival at Opis, he assembled the Macedonians, and addressing them from a lofty stand, where he was surrounded by his principal officers, informed them that he had determined to release from service those who, by age or wounds, had become unfit for the field, and that they were at liberty to return to their homes: that it should be his care to make such a provision for their old age as should render their condition happy and honoured, and should induce others of their countrymen to encounter like hardships and dangers for the sake of like rewards. The offer may have been made in a spirit of real kindness and generosity, but it was interpreted by the Macedonians according to the impression which had been left on them by the recent innovations. They viewed it as a pretext by which the king sought to rid himself of veterans whom, toilworn as they were, he would have been glad to retain in his service if he had not wished to fill their places with barbarian recruits. This thought was as a torch applied to their pile of grievances, and kindled their long-smouldering resentment into a blaze. A cry spread through the ranks, and was raised by several who stood immediately before the king, "That he might dismiss them all, and go to war with the aid of the god, his father." It was evident that, though the out-

break was sudden, the movement had been long prepared: that the disposition of the multitude was ripe for violence, and that this tumult, unless immediately suppressed, might, in a few moments, burst every barrier, and cause irreparable calamities. Alexander met this danger with as much presence of mind as all others to which he was ever exposed. He was probably a little stung by their taunts, and, perhaps, his indignation was roused by what he may have considered an ungrateful return for his kindness. Arrian thinks that, before he became accustomed to the servility of the barbarians, he would have treated his Macedonians in such a case more leniently. Of this we can hardly judge, as the occasion would not have arisen; but, in his actual situation, the course which he took was probably the only one by which he could have averted the danger, without the sacrifice of his will and the loss of his authority. He instantly leaped down from the tribune, followed by his officers, and pointing to the men whom he had observed most active in the disturbance, ordered his men to seize them. Thirteen were arrested, and led away, at his command, to immediate execution.

At once the uproar sank into deep silence; the spirit of the multitude quailed before a stronger resolution: the mutiny was already crushed. It only remained to follow up the blow and secure the victory. Alexander resumed his station, and again addressed the awestruck crowd. The speech which Arrian has put into his mouth for this occasion may not improbably represent the substance of that which he really delivered. It has been much admired, and certainly its merit, as a piece of rhetoric, is not the less because it confines itself to topics on which he could dwell with a clear advantage, avoids all notice of the point which was the sole ground of complaint, and gives a turn to the language of the mutineers quite foreign to their well-known sentiments. He reminded them of the benefits which his father and himself had conferred on Macedonia, and the terms in which he describes the state from which Philip raised it involve a complete vindication of the policy of the Athenian party which resisted the growth of his power, and of the contempt with which they regarded his people. He then spoke of his own conquests, of the scanty means with which he began his expedition, and of the immense change it had made in the fortunes of his followers; for all he had won was theirs: he had conquered, not to enrich himself, but them: for himself he reserved nothing but the purple and the diadem. So the speech dexterously, and not less boldly, asserts, as if they had been expected to believe that his treasury had been drained by his munificence. He could more truly claim the merit of greater personal risks and sufferings than any of them were able to allege, which, if they, and not he, had been the gainers by his victories, would doubtless have been an argument of some weight. He, however, reminded them more particularly of the splendid rewards they had received for their services, and, finally, he bade them go and make it known at home that, after a series of triumphs such as no conqueror had before achieved, they had abandoned their king, and had consigned him to the guard of the

barbarians whom he subdued. "This conduct," he concludes, with emphatic irony, "may, perhaps, be honourable in the judgment of men, and pious in the eyes of the gods. Away!" So saying, he hastily quitted the stand, attended by his great officers and his guard, and shut himself up in the palace,\* where he neglected his ordinary refreshments, and, for two days, refused to admit even his most intimate friends to his presence.

The Macedonians might, perhaps, have found an answer to the speech, though so much of it was indisputably true. They might have pointed out that it did not at all affect the justice of their complaints, which rested on the change that had been made in their relation to the conquered races; and that, far from wishing to leave their king in the hands of the barbarians, they only felt themselves aggrieved because he had honoured and trusted the barbarians too much. But, for whatever might have been said in their behalf, they had neither spokesman nor hearer; and, what rendered their condition still more desperate, they had no leader. They remained for some time where the king had left them, in silent consternation and deep perplexity. They were a body without a head, unable either to act or to deliberate. The spirit of resistance had, it appears, been entirely broken; they were ready to submit, and only waited to learn Alexander's intentions. He had resolved to try their obedience, and to vindicate his own majesty to the utmost. On the third day he sent for the principal Persian officers, and declared to them his purpose to be hereafter served by Asiatic troops in the room of the Macedonians; he assigned to them their commands in the army, which was to be organized on the Macedonian model, and with Macedonian names. Even the royal escorts of infantry and cavalry were to be composed wholly of Persians. and he selected some Persian nobles to receive the title of his kinsmen and the privilege of kissing him.† When these orders were published, they carried the feelings which already prevailed in the Macedonian camp, to the last extremity of anguish and dismay. It seemed as if the king was in earnest, and would take them at their word; their own rashness had brought down upon them the evil which they dreaded. No hope was left but in the royal clemency. There needed no consultation, and scarcely a voice to express the universal sentiment. With one consent they rushed to the palace, and threw down their arms as ensigns of supplication before the gates, entreating for admission, offering to surrender their evil counsellors and those who had first uttered the seditious cries for punishment, and declaring that they would not quit the threshold, day or night, until Alexander took compassion on them.

\* Mr. Williams (*Geography of Ancient Asia*, p. 32) asserts that "at Opis there could have been no royal palace," but neglects to offer any proof of his assertion. Whether there was a treasury there is a question perfectly immaterial. On this very bold but no less unfortunate attempt to extort testimony from Arrian in favour of the opinion that the mutiny took place, not at Opis, where Arrian expressly lays the scene, but at Susa, see *ante*, p.

† Droysen (p. 515) infers from Polyenus (iv., 3, 7) that Alexander sent a challenge to the Macedonians to choose a leader and give him battle. This is not more probable than the scene which Polyenus describes, perhaps with no other groundwork than a distorted account of Alexander's language on this occasion.



He had now brought them to the degree of submission which he desired, and it became safe and seasonable to relent. We may be sure that nothing was farther from his thoughts than to lose such a body of troops, and to endanger the peace of Macedonia by an appearance of complete alienation; and perhaps the experiment would have been imprudent if it had exposed him to such hazard. But he might easily foresee the result; and, indeed, the success of his first step showed that it rested with himself to receive them again into his service, whenever he would, upon his own terms. His prudence was no less conspicuous in the manner of the reconciliation than his firmness had been throughout the struggle. It appears that he did not let them remain long in the attitude of supplicants, but came out to them, as eager to forgive, when he could no longer doubt the sincerity of their repentance. Their downcast looks and pitiful lamentations drew tears—which a Greek easily shed—from his own eyes. He prepared to speak; but the sound of wailing and entreaty did not cease. At length a veteran officer of the cavalry, named Callines, ventured to remark, that the thing which most hurt the Macedonians was, that the king had honoured Persians with the title of kinsmen, and the privilege of the kiss, which no Macedonian had ever enjoyed. Alexander, as if affected by their loyal jealousy, declared that he should henceforth look upon all of them as his kinsmen, and grant them the privilege they so much coveted. Accordingly, Callines and several others were permitted to kiss him; and the whole body, taking up their arms, returned with shouts of joy and pæans to the camp. To seal the reconciliation, Alexander celebrated a thanksgiving-sacrifice, which was followed by a banquet, at which he entertained 9000 of his troops, selected for their personal rank and merits from the rival nations. The Macedonians took the precedence, and were placed immediately round the king; the Persians were seated next; and then, it seems, without distinction, the representatives of the other races. The religious rites were directed by Greek soothsayers and Magians; the king and those around him drew their libations from one bowl; and he accompanied them with a prayer for concord and community of empire between the Macedonians and the Persians.

The discharged veterans, 10,000 in number, were then dismissed with every token of respect and affection. Each received a talent over and above his pay, calculated to the time of his arrival in Macedonia. The children born to them of Asiatic women,\* Alexander took under his own charge—to prevent, as he said, discord in their families—promising to train them for soldiers, and, when they had grown up, to lead them to Macedonia himself. And he bade them consider it as the strongest proof he could give of his regard for them, that he appointed Craterus, the friend who was dear to him as his own life, to conduct them home. With Craterus he had joined Polysperchon as second in command, that no embarrassment might arise if Craterus, who was in ill health, should be detained on the road. It was not, however, sim-

ply for the sake of the veterans that Craterus was intrusted with this commission. He had received other instructions of at least equal importance. He was to supersede Antipater in the government of Macedonia, and Antipater was to conduct the fresh levies to the king. Though Arrian cautions his readers not to rely on writers who affect to disclose the most secret counsels of princes, it can hardly be doubted that by this time Alexander's confidence in Antipater had begun to give way to his mother's continued accusations, and to the complaints which he received from other persons against the regent. If we may judge from the scanty accounts remaining of Antipater's private habits and sentiments, there was reason to think that he disapproved of many of the king's proceedings. He is reported to have remarked, when he heard of Parmenio's death: "If Parmenio conspired against Alexander, who is to be trusted? If not, what is to be done?"† And he might be supposed to be no better satisfied with the execution of his own son-in-law, Alexander the Lyncestian. He retained the old Macedonian simplicity in his dress and manner of living, to a degree which attracted notice, by its contrast with the habits of the age, and which must have appeared still more singular when compared with the splendour of Alexander's court.‡ The looms of Ionia were kept in constant activity to supply purple robes for the courtiers; while Antipater still wore a garment adorned only with a plain white border. And Alexander is said to have observed, when this was mentioned to him, that, though Antipater's outside was so homely, he was all purple within.§ That there was a real foundation for the prevailing opinion that the regent had sunk in the king's favour, seems clear from the fact that he sent his son Cassander to court to defend his conduct; and it appears that he had also entered into a secret treaty with the Ætolians.||

Alexander's attention had also been drawn, of late, towards the state of Greece, and particularly towards Athens. Nothing had occurred there that could fairly be interpreted as a sign of defiance or hostility; but it seems that this resentment, kindled by the flight of Harpalus, turned itself against the people among whom the fugitive had sought shelter, and that he meditated a signal revenge. It may easily be conceived that he was still more impatient of every appearance of opposition from the Greeks than from his Macedonians, and he had adopted two measures, which left no doubt as to the footing on which the Greeks were henceforth to consider themselves as standing with respect to him, and were calculated to put an end to all resistance to his authority. It will be more convenient to reserve an account of the reception which these measures met with in Greece for a subsequent chapter; but they must be mentioned here, as they throw light on Alexander's character and views. One was a decree, published at the Olympic games (B.C. 324), by which he enjoined that all the exiles who had been forced to quit their

\* The Epigoni, properly so called; for the name was sometimes incorrectly applied to the young barbarian recruits.

\* Plut., R. et I., Ap., Antip., 1. † Athen., xii., 71.

‡ Athen., xii., p. 539, F.

§ Plut., R. et I., Ap., Alex., 17. || *Ἐκδοὺς Λακεδαιμόνων, τὰ δὲ ἑνὸς ἀποσπέρματος.* Plut., Al., 49.

homes for any other offence than sacrilege and murder should be permitted to return. This measure was manifestly designed for the benefit of that numerous class of persons who had been defeated in the struggles of the Greek parties, and banished by their adversaries. Their return would have established the predominance of the Macedonian interest in every Greek city almost as effectually as a Macedonian garrison. It was a stroke of policy; the policy of an enemy, who wished to divide, that he might rule. But the other measure looks more like the act of a despot, who would degrade a conquered people that he might trample upon them. It was a requisition, sent round to the principal states of Greece, demanding divine honours for Alexander. It is true that such things were no longer looked at by the Greeks so seriously as they had once been: there had also been instances in which honours of this kind had been paid to persons much inferior to Alexander in dignity and power, as to Lysander; it was, indeed, no more than Harpalus had exacted, though not from Greeks, for his deceased mistress. Possibly, too, Alexander's envoys may have ventured to allege the example of the Macedonians; and very probably he expected that the reluctance of the Macedonians might be softened by the acquiescence of the Greeks. This last supposition, though it could not alter the character of the measure in the eyes of those to whom it was dictated, would certainly present it in a less odious light to us.\*

After the departure of Craterus, Alexander set out for Ecbatana. The state of the treasure and the country, which had been so long in such hands as those of Cleander and Sitalces, demanded his attention. It was also a point where he might collect information, and concert measures, with regard to the regions which bounded his dominions on the north along the coasts of the Caspian Sea, concerning which his knowledge was hitherto very imperfect. But no doubt one of his main objects was to gratify the Medians by a residence of some months in their splendid capital, one of the proudest cities of the ancient world, where his Persian predecessors had been used to hold their court during a part of the year. Their sojourn had been a burdensome honour to their subjects; for the host which they brought with them was to be supported at the expense of the country.† Alexander's presence was ev-

erywhere felt as a blessing. In his progress through Media he viewed the pastures, celebrated, it seems, under the name of the Nysean plain, for the number and excellence of the horses bred in them. The number had amounted to 150,000; but, through a series of depredations, which mark the disordered state of the province, it had been reduced by nearly two thirds. Here he was met by Atropates, the satrap of the northwest part of Media, who, it seems, entertained him with a masquerade of a hundred women, mounted, and equipped with hatchets and short bucklers, according to the popular notion of the Amazons. Such is Arrian's conjecture. The fact, whatever it may have been, gave rise to a story that Alexander here received an embassy from the queen of the Amazons, and promised to pay her a visit. There were several other objects on this road to attract his attention in a leisurely march: a Boeotian colony planted by Xerxes, which still retained a partial use of the Greek language, and the garden and monuments of Baghistane, which tradition ascribed to Semiramis.

At Ecbatana, after he had despatched the most important business which awaited him there, he solemnized the autumnal festival of Dionysus with extraordinary magnificence. The city was crowded with strangers who came to witness the spectacle; and 3000 artists are said to have been assembled from Greece to bear a part in it. The satrap Atropates feasted the whole army; and the Macedonian officers seem to have vied with each other in courtly arts. They put proclamations into the mouths of the heralds, breathing, it is said, a strain of flattery, such as had scarcely been heard by the Persian kings.\* One of these, which was preserved as a specimen of insolent servility,† but is more remarkable as an indication of Alexander's sentiments, was made by Gorgus, the master of the armory, who presented him with a crown worth 3000 gold pieces, and undertook to furnish 10,000 complete suits of armour, and as many missiles of every sort proper for the attack of a town, whenever he should lay siege to Athens.

Among the theatrical exhibitions there was one which, through the singularity of the subject, has been, in part, preserved from the oblivion, in which the rest, with numberless better things, have been lost. It was a little drama of the satirical class, entitled *Agon*, the work, as was generally believed, of one Python, possibly the Byzantian, Philip's secretary;‡ but there was also a singular report, that it was written by Alexander himself. If he did not even suggest the subject, or any of the scenes, the passages which have been preserved were certainly designed to gratify his feelings.§

\* Droysen (Al., p. 594) elaborately vindicates the policy of the measure, which, according to him, was absolutely necessary for the stability of Alexander's throne; adding the very questionable assertion, that all monarchical governments rest on the belief that the sovereign is a being of a higher nature. But his argument with regard to Alexander depends on the no less precarious assumption that the effort of the order on the Greeks was likely to be that of awakening their veneration for his majesty. It appears that the feelings which it really excited partook much more of either indignation or contempt.

† A tolerably correct notion of the weight of the burden may be formed from the list, given by Polyænus (iv., 3, 32), of the provisions daily consumed by the great king's household. The list processes to have been copied from a brazen column which Alexander found in a royal palace. As a specimen, we may notice that it included 400 sheep, 300 lambs, 100 oxen, 30 horses, 30 deer, 400 fat geese, 300 pigeons, 600 small birds of various kind. Alexander ordered the column to be taken down. He limited the daily expense of his own table to 10,000 drachmas, which possibly was as much as the Persian kings spent for the same purpose.

\* *Κηρύγματα υπερήφανα καὶ τῆς Περσικῆς υπερβολῆς ἀνθεόστομα*. Athen., xii., 53.

† *Ὑπερκεκαυκὸς πᾶσαν κολακεῖαν*.

‡ Athenæus calls him first (xiii., 50) *ῥ Καρυναῖος*, and afterward (c. 68) *ῥ Κ. ἢ ῥ Βυζαντίος*. One might be inclined to suspect some confusion between *Καρυναῖος* and *Αἰνίος*.

§ According to Athenæus (xiii., 68), the *Agon* was exhibited during the Dionysia celebrated on the banks of the Hydaspes. But as it is certain that the flight of Harpalus did not take place before Alexander's return from India, there must be some error in the name Hydaspes. Droysen would read *Χοάσπης* for *Υἱάσπης*, and supposes the *Agon* to have been performed at Susa. Specious as this conjecture

They allude to the flight of Harpalus, who is mentioned both by his own name, and by a nickname significant of his most notorious vice;\* to the monument which he had erected at Babylon in honour of Pythonice, and to the largess of corn by which he had obtained the Athenian franchise. The wretched state of Athens, as if it needed such benefactions, is described in a tone of bitter sarcasm, which passes into that of earnest hostility, when one of the speakers observes that the corn was Glycera's, but might perhaps prove a fatal pledge of friendship to those who had received it.† There can be no doubt that in these words the poet meant to speak Alexander's mind. But the festival was interrupted by an event which Alexander felt as the greatest calamity of his life. Hephæstion had been attacked, some days before, by a fever, which at first did not show any alarming symptoms. Trusting to his youth, and his strong constitution, he had, it appears, neglected the directions of his physician, and by his imprudence so inflamed the disease that it carried him suddenly off. It was a day which was to have been devoted to the gymnastic exercises of the boys. Alexander was witnessing a footrace, when a message was brought to him that Hephæstion was worse. He instantly hurried to his friend's bedside, but before he arrived Hephæstion had expired. Alexander's grief, though not imbibed by self-reproach, was passionate and violent as that which he showed at the death of Clitus. There is no evidence that Hephæstion possessed any qualities that deserved the preference with which Alexander distinguished him; and, indeed, there are intimations that, even in Alexander's judgment, his chief merit was the devotion and obsequiousness with which he requited his master's partiality.‡ Perhaps, if the attachment had been more considerably formed, the loss would have been less keenly felt. After the first transports of anguish had subsided, Alexander sought consolation in the extravagant honours which he paid to his departed favourite, and in the vain semblance of grief, which he forced all persons and things around him to put on. We may refuse, with Arrian, to believe that he was so barbarous and frantic as to put the innocent physician to death, and to pull down the temple of Esculapius, if there was one, at Ecbatana. But there is no reason why we should question Plutarch's statement, that he ordered the horses and mules to be shorn, and the town-walls to be dismantled of their battlements.¶ These were probably

among the customary signs of a general mourning on the death of the Persian kings; and it is certain that he directed one to be observed throughout his Asiatic dominions. He also commanded that, as was usual on the same occasions, the sacred fire should be quenched in all the Persian sanctuaries until the funeral was over. For this preparations were made on a scale of more than royal magnificence. He ordered Perdicas to convey the corpse to Babylon, where a pile was to be built at the expense of 10,000 talents, and funeral games, gymnastic and musical, were to be celebrated with a splendour never before witnessed; for which purpose all the artists assembled at Ecbatana were to repair to the capital. The courtiers, especially those who might be suspected to entertain very different feelings, endeavoured to prove their sympathy with the king by extraordinary tokens of veneration for the departed favourite. Eumenes, who had lately had a violent quarrel with him, which was only composed by the royal authority, dexterously set the example, and dedicated himself and his arms to the deceased; perhaps anticipating Alexander's wish that Hephæstion should receive sacred honours. He was anxious that this should be done under the sanction of religious authority, and therefore sent to consult the oracle of Ammon on the question, whether Hephæstion should be worshipped as a hero or a god. In the mean while, it is said, he ordered the sound of music to cease in the camp. The division of the cavalry which had been commanded by Hephæstion was to retain his name, and the officer to whom it was committed was to be regarded only as his lieutenant.\*

These fantastic cares, however, served but to cherish his melancholy, and his officers endeavoured to divert him by some fitter occupation, which might draw him from Ecbatana, where he was constantly reminded of his bereavement. He at length began to rouse himself, and complied with their wishes. An object opportunely presented itself, which called him again into action, and in the manner most suited to the present temper of his soul. The Cossæans, who inhabited the highlands on the confines of Media and Persia, were still unsubdued; and, relying on their mountain strongholds, continued, from time to time, to make predatory inroads on their neighbours. Though it was now the depth of winter, Alexander set out to punish and quell them. He divided his forces into two columns, and gave the command of one to Ptolemy. The obstacles opposed by the country and the season were such as he was used to overcome; the barbarians could do little to bar his progress. They were hunted, like wild beasts, into their lairs, and every man taken capable of bearing arms was put to the sword. It was a sacrifice to the shade of Hephæstion, in which Alexander might see another resemblance to Achilles.

is, two reasons induce me to reject it. The Dionysia celebrated by Alexander at Ecbatana were very famous (Athen., xiii., p. 538, A.), but we do not hear of any at Susa. This, indeed, of itself, would be a slight objection. But another which seems decisive is, that at Susa Alexander could not have heard of the fugitive's reception at Athens, and there was therefore no provocation for the threat. To suppose that Alexander encouraged such language on a bare surmise—as Droysen seems to intimate (Al., p. 632)—would both be violently improbable, and reflect little honour on his temper or his judgment. \* Παλλήνη.

† *Ἐρῶν δ' ἰαυὸς Ἀβροσίαν δῖλθρον, κοῦχ τραίπας ἀρπάσων.*  
‡ Plut., Al., 47. Hephæstion's merits are summed up in the epithet φίλος Ἀλεξάνδρῳ (Friend to Alexander); it seems that Alexander himself could not help respecting Craterus more. When the favourite quarrelled with Craterus in India, Alexander sharply rebuked Hephæstion, saying he must be mad if he was not aware that without Alexander he would be nothing.

¶ Droysen rejects these reports with the utmost contempt,

perhaps forgetting what Herodotus (ix., 24) relates of the mourning for Manisius, in which the Persians shaved themselves, and the horses, and the beasts of burden; a precedent which at least proves that there is nothing absurd or incredible in Plutarch's account, if it does not render it certain that the same marks of grief were a necessary part of the general mourning ordered by Alexander.

\* Arrian, vii., 14.

He then crossed the mountains, and, coming down upon the Tigris, took the direct road to Babylon.

At the distance of some days' march from the city, he was met by presages of impending calamity. A deputation of the Chaldean priests came to the camp, and requested a private audience, in which they informed him that their god Belus had revealed to them that some danger threatened him if he should at that time enter Babylon. Alexander is said to have replied with a verse of Euripides, expressing disbelief in divination. But it is certain that the warning sank deep into his mind. The state of his feelings was apt for gloomy forebodings; and there was a strange harmony between the words of the Chaldeans, and an intimation which he had lately received from a Greek soothsayer named Peithagoras. Peithagoras had been requested by his brother Apollodorus—who had commanded the troops left at Babylon with Mazæus, and though he had accompanied the king to Ecbatana, did not feel secure of his favour—to discover, if he could, through his art, whether the general had anything to fear either from Alexander or Hephæstion. An answer came from Babylon that, as to Hephæstion, he was safe; the victims showed that the favourite would soon be out of their way; and the next day Hephæstion died. Shortly after, a like prediction came with regard to Alexander himself; and Apollodorus was loyal or prudent enough to disclose it to the king, who commended him for his openness. A still more marvellous story afterward found credit; that Calanus, just before his death, had declined to take leave of Alexander, saying that he should soon meet him at Babylon. Still, the priests found that they could not induce the king to give up his intention of visiting the capital of his empire, where many important affairs were to be transacted, and embassies from remote parts of the world were awaiting his arrival. They then urged him at least not to enter the city in the direction in which he was then marching, by the eastern gate, so as to have his face turned towards the dark west; but to make a circuit, and enter from the opposite quarter. This mysterious advice struck Alexander's fancy; he wished to comply with it, and for that purpose altered the course of his march, and proceeded some distance along the bank of the Euphrates. But he then found that the lakes and morasses formed by the inundations of the river to the west of Babylon would prove an insurmountable obstacle. He was still reluctant to neglect the warning of the Chaldeans, but yet not now indisposed to listen to Anaxarchus, and the other philosophical Greeks about him, who treated the occult science, and especially its Babylonian professors, with contempt. There was, however, another motive for distrust, which weighed still more with him. He had begun to conceive a suspicion that his priestly counsellors were less concerned about his safety than their own. It appeared that they and their order had reason to dread the account to which they would probably be called on his arrival. Alexander, before he left Babylon, had ordered the great temple, which Xerxes had demolished, to be rebuilt; the work was placed

under the superintendence of the priests, who might have been expected to show the greatest zeal for its accomplishment. Yet Alexander had complained of the remissness with which it was carried on, and he had since discovered the cause. The revenues which had been assigned by the Assyrian kings for the maintenance of the temple-worship were also managed by the priests, and, while the temple lay in ruins, had been applied by them to their own use. They knew that Alexander's presence would soon put an end to such abuses; and he might, therefore, well doubt that the oracle, with which they attempted to delay his coming, had been given by the god. We do not hear that he suspected any collusion between them and other persons at Babylon; yet the example of Apollodorus seems to show that such a suspicion would not have been unreasonable.

Thus, then, he at length entered Babylon, not without a secret misgiving, by the ominous quarter.\* The great city had, probably, never before witnessed so stirring a scene as was exhibited by the crowds now assembled for various purposes within its walls. Nearchus had brought in the fleet from Opis; the vessels transported over land from Phenicia had come down from Thapsacus; the harbour was in progress, and other ships were on the stocks in the arsenals of Babylon itself, for which Alexander had ordered the cypress-trees, the only ship-timber its territory yielded, to be felled. Another crowd of workmen and artists were busied with Hephæstion's funeral pile, and with the preparations for his obsequies; and never before had Alexander's imperial greatness been so conspicuously displayed as in the embassies from foreign states, which were now in attendance at his court. It seems, indeed, that there was a disposition among some of his historians to exaggerate the number and variety of those embassies. We must, perhaps, pass over, as doubtful, those which are said to have come—surprising the Macedonians and Greeks by the novelty and strangeness of their names and garb—from the European Scythians, from Celtic and Iberian tribes, from Ethiopia, and from Carthage, though reasons may be assigned why the Carthaginians, at least, should have thought it expedient to propitiate the master of Asia and of Egypt. Yet it seems to have been better ascertained that among the envoys there were some from Libya—probably the part between

\* That Alexander's return to Babylon took place early in 323, may now be considered as sufficiently certain. Vincent's remark, "I cannot discover in any of the historians two winters after Alexander's return to Susa," so clearly expresses the inference which any unprejudiced reader must draw from the narratives remaining to us, that Mr. Clinton would certainly never have disputed it (*F. H.*, p. 231), if, through his oversight in the previous chronology—having brought Alexander to Taxila a year too soon—he had not found a year on his hands, which he could only dispose of at Babylon. He has thus been induced to admit as a sufficient answer to Vincent's objections, a series of fictions and fallacies, resting chiefly on the groundless supposition that the works mentioned were all begun after Alexander's arrival. The contrary is plainly implied in Arrian's statement from Aristobolus, *viii.*, 19: and the conjecture that Alexander made two voyages from Babylon is utterly inconsistent with Arrian's narrative. It is not the only instance in which the writer whose opinion Mr. Clinton adopts has misled his readers, not merely through ignorance, but by an unreasonable display of the kind of knowledge which he really possessed.

Egypt and Cyrene—who came to present him with crowns, and to congratulate him on the conquest of Asia, and from at least three of the Italian nations, the Bruttians, Lucanians, and Tyrrhenians. The object of the Italian embassies is not mentioned; those of the Bruttians and Lucanians may be easily accounted for, since, only six or seven years before, the conqueror's kinsman and namesake, Alexander of Epirus, had perished in war with them. If this was their motive, and, indeed, whatever may have been the interests for the sake of which they undertook so long a journey, we might have expected that their most powerful neighbour would not have been unconcerned about the issue of their negotiations; and hence we are prepared to accept the testimony of the authors who related that they were met at Babylon by envoys from Rome, though it was not confirmed by Ptolemy or Aristobulus, and though the scene may appear to us so memorable as to have afforded temptation for fiction; for the fact was recorded before the greatness of the Roman name could have suggested the thought. Strabo mentions an occasion which might have led to this embassy.\* Alexander—we know not precisely when—had sent remonstrances to the Romans on account of injuries which his subjects had suffered from the pirates of Antium, which was subject to Rome; and the same fact, as Niebuhr observes, throws light on the embassy of the Tyrrhenians, the maritime inhabitants of Etruria. Most readers, perhaps, will be inclined to adopt the opinion of that great historian on another question, which has been variously viewed from Livy's days down to our own. He thinks that Alexander would probably have been satisfied with such a supremacy in Italy as he had acquired in Greece; that no general confederacy would have been formed against him by the Italian states; and that Rome, single-handed, could not long have withstood such an army as he could have brought against her, backed by the forces and treasure of Greece, Asia, and Africa.

Among the embassies were several from Greek cities, sent, some to offer presents, some to seek the king's aid or intervention in public and private affairs, and some to remonstrate against the decree for the restoration of the exiles. To those who came on this last business he gave audience after the rest, probably to mark his displeasure at the application, for he cannot have listened to it favourably, though he strove to send all away satisfied. To the others he gave precedence according to the dignity of their temples. So Elis took the lead, and was followed by Delphi and Corinth; but the shrine of Ammon was recognised as second to Olympia. The Epidaurians received an offering for their god, though Alexander added the remark, that Esculapius might have treated him better than to suffer him to lose his dearest friend.

The honours designed for Hephæstion con-

tinued to share his earnest attention with graver business. The funeral pile was at length completed, and was a marvel of splendour such as the gorgeous East had never beheld. A part of the wall of Babylon, to the length of about a mile, was thrown down to furnish materials for the basement and the shell of the building. It was a square tower, and each side, at least at the foot, measured a stade in breadth: the height was about 200 feet, divided into thirty stories, roofed with the trunks of palm-trees. The whole of the outside was covered with groups of colossal figures and other ornaments, all of gold, ivory, and other precious materials, and it was surmounted by statues of sirens, so contrived as to emit a plaintive melody. All who courted the king's favour contributed their offerings to the work or to the obsequies. As to the magnificence of the concluding ceremony of the funeral games and banquet, nothing more need be said than that it corresponded to the richness of this astonishing work of art, which was raised at an expense about ten times exceeding that of the Parthenon,\* merely to be devoured by the flames.

Alexander was not of a character to continue long brooding over melancholy thoughts.† He appears now to have resumed his great plans with his wonted energy. It was about this time that he sent out the three expeditions already mentioned to explore the coast of Arabia. He was also intent on discoveries in another quarter. He was impressed with the belief that the Caspian Sea was connected by some outlet at its northern extremity with the ocean which girded the earth, and, perhaps, hoped that a passage might be found through this channel to the coast of India. With this view he sent Heraclides, with a party of shipwrights, to the shores of the Caspian to build a fleet which might survey its coasts and ascertain its limits. In the mean while, he undertook an excursion from Babylon on the Euphrates, to inspect the canal called the Pallacopas, which branched from it to the southwest, both for the purpose of effecting any improvement which might appear practicable in the distribution of its waters for the benefit of the surrounding country, and to ascertain the nature of the obstacles which barred the communication with Arabia on this side.‡ The Pallacopas had been formed to discharge the superfluous waters of the Euphrates when they rose to their greatest height after the melting of the snows; and it was then necessary to close its mouth, that it

\* See Leake, Athens, p. 419. The alteration in the value of money is to be taken into account.

† Here, again, Droysen's picture of Alexander's dejection (p. 567)—"With Hephæstion his youth had sunk into the grave, and, though scarcely beyond the threshold of manhood, he began fast to grow old"—seems violently overcharged.

‡ Mr. Williams (Geogr. of Anc. As., p. 174) labours hard to prove in the teeth of Arrian—who happens expressly to mention that Alexander, as he sailed back from the lakes, had Babylon on his left—that the Pallacopas was above Babylon. With more than the usual ill-fortune which seems to attend his remarks on the text of the ancient authors, he thinks that every scholar will see that ἔγγω (he resolved) in Arrian, vii., 21, should be changed to ἀπέγγω (he despaired). The question is one with which scholarship has very little to do. Who can believe that Alexander despaired of forming an efficient barrier at the entrance of the canal, when the Babylonian satrap formed one every year, which lasted until it became necessary to open it again? and if he had despaired, what was the use of the new out?

\* v., p. 232 (376, Tauchn.). It is remarkable that both Droysen (Al., p. 564), and, it seems, Niebuhr himself (iii., p. 195), have confounded what Strabo says of Alexander with what he adds of Demetrius, that he sent back the pirates whom he took. Of Alexander he only relates that he made complaints in a letter (ἐγκύλιον ἐπέγραψε). The fact of the embassy was recorded by Clitarchus, who wrote not long after Alexander's death. Plin., N. H., iii., 9.

might not drain the main stream; but, on account of the softness of its bed, this was an extremely difficult operation, which commonly required the incessant labour of 10,000 men for three months. Alexander turned his thoughts to devise a remedy for this inconvenience, and, having found that about three miles beyond the mouth of the canal the ground on the right bank became firm and rocky, he determined permanently to stop up the ancient entrance, and to make a new cut, which might be more easily closed at the proper season. He then sailed down the Pallacopas into the lakes which received its waters, and examined the channels by which they were connected with each other; on a part of the shore his eye was struck by a point which seemed to him well adapted for the site of a city, and he ordered one to be built there, which he afterward peopled with a colony of Greek mercenaries. The circuit was large, and the passages so intricate, that he was once separated for some time from the main body of the squadron. On his return through this maze of waters, an accident occurred, trifling in itself, but sufficiently ominous, it seems, to revive the uneasy feelings with which he had entered Babylon, and which had subsided when he saw himself once more out of it, and the predictions of the Chaldeans apparently belied. On the reedy margin of the lake stood here and there some monuments, tombs, it was said, of ancient Assyrian kings. As the royal galley, which Alexander steered himself, passed near one of them, a sudden gust of wind carried away his casia into the water, and lodged the light diadem which circled it on one of the reeds that grew out of the tomb. One of the sailors immediately swam off to recover it, and, to keep it dry, placed it on his own head. Alexander rewarded him with a talent, but, at the same time, ordered him to be flogged for the thoughtlessness with which he had assumed the ensign of royalty. The diviners, it is said, took the matter more seriously, and advised the king to avert the omen by the infliction of death on the offender. In later times, his offence, for the sake of the omen, was ascribed to Seleucus.

On his return he found all the preparations for his intended expedition nearly complete; the fleet was equipped, and he exercised it frequently in manœuvres and rowing-matches on the Euphrates. Fresh troops had arrived from the western provinces, and Peucestes had brought an army of 20,000 Persians and a body of mountaineers from the Cossean and Tapyrian highlands. The Persians Alexander incorporated with his Macedonian infantry; so as in every file of sixteen to combine twelve Persians armed with bows or javelins, with four heavy-armed Macedonians selected from those who had been rewarded for their services, and taking the places of honour, the first three and the last in the file. And now the envoys whom he had sent to the oracle of Ammon returned, with the answer that Hephæstion was to be worshipped as a hero; this was probably as much as Alexander had desired; he immediately proceeded to give effect to the injunction, and sent orders to his satrap Cleomenes to erect two temples to the new hero, one in Alexandria, the other on the isle of Pharos; and he was weak enough to add—if the letter which

Arrian quotes was genuine—that, if Cleomenes did but show himself diligent in this business, and in the care of the Egyptian sanctuaries, all else that had been, or should be faulty in his administration, should be overlooked: an extraordinary license, indeed, unless Alexander thought it prudent to temporize with a man conscious of many flagrant offences, who had so important a province in his hands.

Fresh envoys had also arrived from Greece—from what states we are not informed—to render him the divine honours which he had demanded;\* they came crowned, according to the custom of persons sent on a sacred mission to a temple, offered golden crowns to him, and saluted him with the title of a god. But Arrian observes, with emphatic simplicity, he was now not far from his end; it seemed to be announced by another sinister omen: the king had been busied with the enrolment of the newly-arrived troops, in council with his officers, who were seated on each side of the throne; feeling thirst, he withdrew to refresh himself; the council rose for a time, and none were left in the hall but the attendant eunuchs: before he returned, a man entered the apartment, mounted the steps of the throne, and seated himself on it; the slaves had probably been kept motionless by amazement when they should have prevented him; but, when the deed was done, the etiquette of the Persian court forbade them to lay their hands on one who occupied the seat of royalty, and they rent their clothes and beat their breasts in helpless consternation. The man was examined and put to the torture by Alexander's orders, who suspected a treasonable design. According to some accounts, he was a Messenian, named Dionysius, who had been a long time in prison, and had just made his escape. We may infer that he was out of his senses. He could give no explanation of his act, but that it had come into his mind; hence it seemed the more manifest to the soothsayers that it must be viewed as a sign of impending evil. Alexander himself probably so considered it, and it was the more alarming, as it followed so many others; for, on his arrival at Babylon, he had inquired of Peithagoras as to the nature of the tokens which he had seen in the victims when he was consulted by his brother; and when he heard that the same part of the liver was wanting in that which was inspected for a revelation of his own destiny, as in that which had suggested the prediction already fulfilled by the death of Hephæstion, it is said that he did not dissemble the impression which the omen made on his mind. That he was haunted by his gloomy forebodings and superstitious fancies to the degree which Plutarch describes, is hardly credible, unless he was already unconsciously affected by the disorder which proved fatal to him; as, on the other hand, it seems probable that its secret germs may have been cherished by the dejected state of his spirits. The same causes may have led him to indulge more freely than usual in the pleasures of the table, while even slight

\* Mr. Williams, not knowing, it seems, that these honours had been required by Alexander, speaks, with the indignation befitting a professed admirer of the Chinese Constitution, of the servile Republicans who hailed him with divine honours.

excesses were peculiarly dangerous. From the presence of the disease, before its symptoms had become manifest, we may, perhaps, best explain the behaviour which Plutarch attributes to him in the interview which he had with Antipater's son, Cassander, shortly before his death: a scene which appears to have been attended with very important consequences. Alexander confronted Cassander with Antipater's accusers; and when Cassander treated their charges as groundless calumnies, sternly interrupted him, and asked whether men who had suffered no wrong would have travelled so far to prefer a calumnious charge? Cassander pleaded that the greater the distance from the scene of the alleged injury, the safer was the calumny. But the king indignantly replied, that Cassander showed how well he had studied Aristotle's sophistry, by which every argument might be turned two opposite ways, but that it should avail nothing if the complaints proved to be in any degree well founded. So far, indeed, we only see a proof that Alexander retained the full vigour of his mind and character. Plutarch, however, adds, what is more difficult to believe, that because Cassander, at his first audience, could not keep his countenance at the sight of the Persian ceremonial, which was entirely new to him, Alexander seized him by the hair and dashed his head against the wall. This may be a gross exaggeration; but that Cassander's reception was so harsh and violent as to leave an indelible impression of fear and hatred on his soul, is confirmed, as strongly as such a fact can be, by his subsequent conduct.

The preparations for the projected campaign were now so far advanced, that Alexander celebrated a solemn sacrifice for its success. On this occasion he distributed victims and wine among the troops by companies, that the Macedonians and Persians, who had been so lately brought together, might be disposed, by his liberality, and by the season of convivial enjoyment, to more cordial union. He, at the same time, entertained his principal officers at a banquet, and continued drinking with them to a late hour of the evening. As he was retiring to rest, he was invited by Medius—who, it seems, had of late been admitted to an intimacy with him something like Hephæstion's—to a revel, which was to be followed by a fresh drinking-bout. He complied, and the greater part of the night seems to have been thus spent. The next evening he again banqueted at the house of Medius, and again the carousal was prolonged to a very late hour. It was at the close of this banquet, after he had refreshed himself with a bath, that he felt the symptoms of fever so strongly as to be induced to sleep there. The grasp of death was on him, though his robust frame yielded only after a hard struggle to the gradual prevalence of the malady.

We have a minute and seemingly complete account of his last illness, in an official diary which Arrian transcribed. Nevertheless, various reports, which it does not sanction, were current in ancient times, and one of them, which ascribed his death to gross intemperance, has always been very generally believed. Another, which has been as generally rejected, attributed it to a dose of poison, contrived by Aristotle, conveyed by Cassander, and admin-

istered by Iollas, another of Antipater's sons, who filled the office of cup-bearer to the king. As this report was undoubtedly invented by Cassander's enemies, so the other may have been first circulated by him and his partisans. It represents Alexander as having drained an enormous cup, a bowl of Hercules, as it was called, and as having instantly sunk as from a sudden blow. This incident certainly would not have appeared on the face of the journal; but neither does it seem quite consistent with Alexander's habits, who, according to Aristobolus, drank chiefly for the sake of prolonging conversation, nor with other details which have been preserved concerning the banquet.\* If he had been in his usual state of health, the debauch described in the journal would probably have produced no effect on him. It may, however, both have hastened the outbreak of the fever, and have rendered it fatal. Aristobolus related another fact which the journal passed over in silence; that in a paroxysm of the fever, the patient quenched his thirst with a large draught of wine.

It seems that, for three or four days, though the disease was making steady progress, he was not sensible of his danger. On the morrow of the first attack he fixed the time of departure, both for the army and the fleet. The land force was to move on the fourth day, and he himself to embark the day after. He then crossed over to the royal park on the other side of the river, and spent the next day chiefly in the company of Medius, but appointed to give audience to his generals the next morning. During the night the fever raged without intermission, yet he gave his orders to Nearchus, and the other generals, as if he should be ready to embark on the day after the morrow. And so, from day to day, as his strength declined, he continued to admit them into his presence, and to make fresh arrangements for the commencement of the expedition. But on the sixth day it was with difficulty that he could bear the exertion necessary for his customary morning sacrifice. Still, he retained hope, or, at least, would not part with the show of it, but conferred with his officers on the subject of the voyage. The next day, however, he seems to have felt that he was dying, and ordered himself to be conveyed back from the park to the state palace; and here, when the generals were admitted into his chamber, they found him still sensible, but speechless.

All around him now began to despair: a report ran through the army that he was already dead; and the men, partly to ascertain the fact, partly that they might once more see him alive, insisted on entering the palace. They were permitted to pass in succession through the room where he lay. Though unable to speak, he still recognised them, and had strength enough, though with difficulty, to make signs to them with his hands and his head, and with expressive glances. It was felt that no human aid could be of any avail. Four of the generals, Pithon, Attalus, Demophon, and Peucestes,

\* Nicobulé (Athen., xii., 53) related that Alexander, on this occasion, recited a passage out of the *Andromeda* of Euripides from memory. It is added, indeed, that he drank freely, and urged others to follow his example. But this description conveys the impression that the entertainment still preserved its intellectual character.

passed a night in the temple of Serapis,\* seeking an oracular vision, which might suggest a remedy. The god, it seems, was silent. Seleucus and two others then inquired at his shrine, whether it would be better for Alexander to be brought into the temple as a suppliant for relief. And now a voice was heard from the innermost recess, enjoining that he should not be brought, but should stay where he was : so it would be best for him. Soon after he had received this answer he expired.

But if for himself this was the happiest end of all earthly cares, there was still a question of deep importance to those who survived him : how he wished to dispose of his empire. On this subject, however, nothing was recorded in the official diary, or by Ptolemy or Aristobolus. It seems that he himself had never mentioned it, while he was still able to express his will, and that no one else had ventured to touch on it. There were reports that, in his last moments, he was asked who should succeed him, and that he replied, the worthiest : adding, that he foresaw a great contest at his funeral. But if this had been his mind, he could not have uttered it. There was only one act credibly attested by the sequel, which might be interpreted as an intimation of his wishes on this point. Just before he breathed his last, he drew his ring from his finger and gave it to Perdiccas.

So passed from the earth one of the greatest of her sons : great above most, for what he was in himself, and not as many who have borne the title, for what was given to him to effect. Great, not merely in the vast compass and the persevering ardour of his ambition, nor in the qualities by which he was enabled to gratify it, and to crowd so many memorable actions within so short a period, but in the course which his ambition took, in the collateral aims which ennobled and purified it, so that it almost grew into one with the highest of which man is capable, the desire of knowledge and the love of good. In a word, great as one of the benefactors of his kind. This praise, however, would be empty, unless it be limited as truth requires, and his claim to it must depend on the opinion we form of his designs.

It is not to be supposed that, in any of his undertakings, he was animated by speculative curiosity, or by abstract philanthropy. If he sought to discover as well as to conquer, it was because the limits of the known world were too narrow for his ambition. His main object, undoubtedly, was to found a solid and flourishing empire ; but the means which he adopted for this end were such as the highest wisdom and benevolence might have suggested to him in his situation, without any selfish motive. And,

\* Mr. Williams (Al., p. 395) has taken occasion, from this mention of Serapis, to make a very unjust attack on Tacitus, whom he ventures to stigmatise as a gross perverter of the truth, on account of the story which he reports on the authority of the Egyptian priests, Hist., iv., 83, fol. The existence of the temple at Babylon does not even prove that Serapis was an Assyrian god ; and Tacitus does not profess to give an account of the introduction of the worship of Serapis into Egypt. On the contrary, he mentions that Ptolemy built the Serapion on ground where there was *sacellum, Serapidis atque Iridis antiquius sacra-tum*. It is not Tacitus who has in this instance perverted the truth : he has only had the misfortune not to be understood ; which he shares, as we have seen, with other ancient authors. On the story itself, the reader may find some remarks in the Philological Museum, ii., p. 180.

as his merit is not the less because so many of his works were swept away by the inroads of savage and fanatical hordes, so it must be remembered that his untimely death left all that he had begun unfinished, and probably most of what he meditated unknown : that he could hardly be said to have completed the subjugation of all the lands comprised within the limits of the Persian Empire. Still, it cannot be denied that the immediate operation of his conquests was highly beneficial to the conquered people. This would be true, even if the benefit had been confined to those advantages which may seem purely material ; for none were really so. The mere circulation of the immense treasures accumulated by the ancient rulers, which Alexander scattered with such unexampled profusion, was doubtless attended by innumerable happy results ; by a great immediate increase of the general well being, by a salutary excitement of industry and commercial activity. The spirit of commerce, however, was still more directly roused and cherished, by the foundation of new cities in situations peculiarly adapted to its ends ; by the opening of new channels of communication between opposite extremities of the empire, and the removal of obstructions—arising from the feebleness and wantonness of the ancient government—which before impeded it ; by the confidence inspired by the new order of things, the growing consciousness of safety, and expectation of protection and encouragement. Let any one contemplate the contrast between the state of Asia under Alexander and the time when Egypt was either in revolt against Persia, or visited by her irritated conquerors with the punishment of repeated insurrection, when almost every part of the great mountain-chain which traverses the length of Asia, from the Mediterranean to the borders of India, was inhabited by fierce, independent, predatory tribes ; when the Persian kings themselves were forced to pay tribute before they were allowed to pass from one of their capitals to another. Let any one endeavour to enter into the feelings with which a Phœnician merchant must have viewed the change that took place in the face of the earth, when the Egyptian Alexandria had begun to receive and pour out an inexhaustible tide of wealth ; when Babylon had become a great port ; when a passage was opened both by sea and land between the Euphrates and the Indus ; when the forests on the shores of the Caspian had begun to resound with the axe and the hammer. It will then appear that this part of the benefits which flowed from Alexander's conquest cannot be easily exaggerated.

And yet this was, perhaps, the smallest part of his glory : it was much, indeed, so to cultivate, enrich, and beautify this fairest portion of the earth ; it was something more to elevate the intellectual and moral character of the people ; and this was, in a great degree, the effect, in a still greater degree the tendency, of Alexander's measures and institutions. It may be truly asserted that his was the first of the great monarchies founded in Asia that opened a prospect of progressive improvement, and not of continual degradation, to its subjects ; it was the first that contained any element of moral and intellectual progress. That it did so



is certain ; but it has been disputed how far this entered into Alexander's intention. We cannot regard him as entitled to much honour on this account, unless we admit that the great thought of his life was to unite his new subjects with the old, so as to form one nation ; and that, for this purpose, he wished to raise the Asiatics to a level with the Europeans, and, according to the modern expression, to Hellenize Asia. It has been contended that such a project of amalgamation was too chimerical to have been adopted by a prince of Alexander's sagacity and judgment ; that he must have been too well aware of the obstacles which must always have rendered it impossible for the new element to penetrate and assimilate so vast and heterogeneous a mass as the population of his Asiatic dominions ; and that we must, therefore, consider those of his measures which seem most clearly to indicate such a design as merely temporary expedients of a conciliating policy, forced upon him by his relative weakness. It seems, however, a sufficient reply to this objection to observe, that we can hardly now determine what Alexander would have found practicable in the course of a long reign ; that if there were limits, in extent and degree, beyond which he himself could not have hoped to realize such an idea, it was still an object worthy of all his efforts ; and that, when we see him adopting a series of measures clearly tending to this end, it is reasonable to infer that he had the end in view. It may be said that he planted Greek cities in Asia, merely as either commercial or military posts, to fill his treasury or secure his possessions ; that he educated the barbarian youth in Greek schools, merely to recruit his army ; that he promoted intermarriages between the Europeans and Asiatics, merely to soothe the conquered nations. But he cannot have been blind or indifferent to the ultimate tendency of all these steps ; he must have foreseen that from each of his new colonies the language, arts, and manners, the whole genius of Greece would radiate through the adjacent regions, and would gradually enlighten, civilize, and transform their population ; he must have known, that by the domestic ties which he formed, and by the education of the young, he was raising up a generation which would be more open to receive this influence. The extent to which the interfusion actually took place, and the Asiatics became Greeks in everything but blood, was by no means small ; if Alexander had lived to become the founder of a peaceful dynasty, which might have prosecuted his plans, the changes wrought would have been incalculably greater.

It is another question, whether this change of nationality was, in all respects, an unmixt good ; whether, in the old frame of society, in the literature, the arts, the manners, and even, perhaps, in the speculative systems of the conquered races, much was not lost and destroyed through it that was worth preserving ; whether the new forms were not, in most cases, destitute of life and reality, an empty varnish, or spiritless imitation. Still less should we venture to maintain that the infinitely diversified combination and confusion which ensued between the religions and mythologies of Greece

and Asia was anything in itself desirable ; or that the new rites and creeds, which were the progeny of this unnatural mixture, were not often as odious and baneful as they were wild and fantastic. They, at least, did not enter into Alexander's plans, who merely extended his politic protection alike to all modes of worship and belief ; and it would be as unjust to charge him with their mischievous consequences, as it seems false to represent him, on this account, as the Precursor of a better Light, which, on the contrary, they contributed, more than any other cause, to refract and obscure. But it became Alexander, as a Greek, to believe that the change was, on the whole, highly beneficial ; and we, who owe so much of what is best among us to the same culture, can hardly charge him with blind partiality. We must rather admire the greatness of mind by which he rose above the prejudices of his Macedonians, who, themselves foreigners, indebted for all that made them worthy, or even capable, of their fortune, to their Greek education, were loth to share it with others whom they wished to trample on as barbarians.

Still, there is one side on which Alexander's administration appears in a much less favourable light. We must speak with caution on this subject, because we are very imperfectly acquainted with his measures, and he had scarcely time to unfold his views. Yet it must be owned that we cannot perceive even the first lines, that we catch no hint of any political institutions framed to secure the future welfare of his subjects. We do not find that in any case he had begun to assume the character of a lawgiver ; though Arrian thought him as well entitled to divine honours as Minos or Theseus. It is probable, indeed, that he intended his new colonies, at least, should enjoy all the municipal freedom consistent with the maintenance of an absolute government. But we do not know what security he had provided for their privileges ; and he seems to have left the mass of the people, in this respect, nearly as it had been under its former masters. The only improvement which he appears to have introduced into the old system, was to restore, perhaps to multiply, the checks by which, according to the earlier policy of the Persian kings themselves, their great officers in every province were enabled to control one another. These checks, as he discovered on his return from India, proved utterly ineffectual for the protection of life and property ; and though he punished the offenders with the utmost rigour, we hear of no other precautions that he took against the recurrence of such abuses. When he seated himself on the throne of Darius, he assumed, as perhaps was necessary, the fulness of despotic sovereignty that had been exercised by his Persian predecessors ; and he, too, was represented by his satellites. Though he might be able to restrain them, it was to be expected that a successor of inferior energy would be forced to connive at their license : from the highest station to the lowest, there was no permanent safeguard against misrule. The condition of the people was bettered ; but it remained precarious. It must even be admitted that, if he raised the Asiatics, he brought down the Macedonians

and the Greeks, to meet them on the same level.

What has been said relates only to the effect which his conquests produced in Asia : it is another question, how far they were beneficial to Greece. Some advantages she, no doubt, derived from them. A boundless field, with brilliant prospects, was thrown open for Greek adventurers. A part of the new commerce of the East found its way into Greek ports. But we should seek in vain for any benefits of a higher order which resulted to Greece from Alexander's expedition ; while, in many respects much more important, her condition was changed for the worse. She was treated no longer as an humble and useful ally of Macedonia, but as a province of the Persian Empire, and made to feel her subjection by despotic, and apparently wanton and arrogant commands. And yet she had scarcely begun to taste the bitter fruits which she was to reap from the fulfilment of those splendid visions with which Isocrates would have consoled her for the loss of freedom.

## CHAPTER LVI.

FROM THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER TO THE END OF THE LAMIAN WAR.

Our attention will now, again, be chiefly occupied with the affairs of Greece. The connexion, indeed, between the events which took place there, and the contests carried on by Alexander's successors in Asia, becomes henceforward so close, that it will be necessary to keep both constantly in view ; the latter, however, as subordinate to the proper subject of our history. Before we turn to it, we must proceed as far as the first settlement that was made of the great interests which were left in so much confusion and uncertainty by the sudden vacancy of the Macedonian throne.

It may easily be believed that Alexander's death was sincerely deplored by all around him whose immediate interest was not too deeply affected by it to allow room for grief. When the royal pages, unable to contain their excitement, rushed out of the palace with loud wailings, and made the event generally known, the whole city soon resounded with the voice of lamentation. The Macedonians mourned for their hero,\* the Persians for their king. Many and various were the honours afterward paid to Alexander's memory, by word and work, in monuments and spectacles, in smooth verse and well-turned periods ; but the most honourable tribute was offered by Sisymbria, the mother of Darius. She, who had survived the massacre of her eighty brothers, who had been put to death in one day by Ochus, the loss of all her children, and the entire downfall of her race, now, on the decease of the enemy and conqueror of her house, seated herself on the ground, covered her head with a veil, and, notwithstanding the entreaties of her grandchild-

ren, refused nourishment until, on the fifth day after, she expired.

But even the genuine regret of the common people gave way almost immediately to anxiety about their own safety, and to mutual suspicions. The Macedonians passed the night after the king's death under arms ; as if feeling themselves surrounded by enemies. The peaceable inhabitants of Babylon, perhaps with better reason, dreaded lest their wealthy city should become the scene of military tumult and license. They hardly ventured to creep out of their houses to gather news ; lighted no lamps in the evening, but watched for the morning in darkness and silence, eagerly listening, and trembling at every sound they caught. The great officers, on whom the care of the state chiefly devolved, probably spent the same interval, together or apart, in no less anxious deliberation. By Hephæstion's death the number of those who bore the title of somatophylax was reduced to seven : Leonnatus, Lysimachus, Aristonous, Perdicas, Ptolemy—the reputed son of Lagos, but, according to a report rather widely spread, one of Philip's bastards, his mother having been the king's mistress†—Pithon, and Peucestes. When Alexander died, they were all in Babylon. The next day they summoned a council of the other Macedonian officers, some of whom were but little inferior to them in rank and influence, to confer on the great question of the succession. The soldiers wished to take part in it also ; and, though forbidden, forced their way into the palace, and filled the avenues of the council-hall, so that many witnessed the proceedings. There a mournful object met their eyes, and revived the consciousness of their loss : the vacant throne, on which had been laid the diadem, with the royal robes and armour. The sight called forth a fresh burst of lamentation, which, however, was hushed into deep silence when Perdicas came forth to address the assembly. First, he placed the ring, which he had received from Alexander in his last moments, on the throne. "The ring," he said, "was the royal signet, which Alexander had used for the most important state business : it had been committed to him by the dying king ; but he placed it at their disposal. It was, however, absolutely necessary for their own safety, that they should forthwith elect a chief capable of guarding them against the dangers to which they would be exposed without a head in a hostile land. It was to be hoped that in a few months Roxana would give them an heir to the throne. In the mean while, it was for them to choose by whom they would be governed." He had probably hoped that the wish which he so modestly dissembled would have been anticipated by general acclamation. But the meeting waited for advice. Nearchus had a different plan to propose. He, as we have seen, had married a daughter of Mentor's widow, Barsinè ; and Barsinè was also the mother of a son by Alex-

\* Pausan., i., 6, 2, and the commentators on Curtius, ix., 8, 23. † So Curtius, x., 6, 4.

\* Curtius (x., 5, 11) goes so far towards one extreme as to say that they reproached themselves for having refused him divine honours : Justin (xiii., 1) still farther on the opposite side ; for he would have us believe that they rejoiced as if delivered from an enemy, so much were they disgusted with his severity and endless adventures.

† Curtius, x., 6, 9. *Sextus mensis est.* But Justin (xiii., 2, 5) has *exactly mensis octavo*. The *tyrôp*, with which Photius, in his epitome of Arrian (p. 69, b. 16), introduces the birth of the child immediately after the partition of the satrapies, can hardly be said to favour one of these statements more than the other.

under. He therefore pointed out to the Macedonians, "that there was no need to wait for the uncertain issue of Roxana's pregnancy: there was an heir to the throne already born: Hercules, the son of Barsine: to him the diadem belonged." But Nearchus was the only man present who had any interest in this choice. The soldiers clashed their spears and shields together a token of vehement dissent; and Ptolemy gave tolerance to their feelings on this point. "Neither Barsine nor Roxana could be mother of a prince whom the Macedonians would acknowledge as their sovereign. Was it to be borne, that the conquerors of Asia should become subject to the son of a barbarian captive? It was either that the throne should remain vacant, or that the persons who had formed Alexander's council of state should continue to have the supreme management of affairs, deciding all questions by a majority of votes." This notion, however, gained few partisans: its effect would have been permanently to exclude the royal family from the succession: a step for which few were prepared. Thus, most minds were turned towards the advice of Perdiccas; for there was a clear distinction between Barsine and Roxana, Alexander's beloved wife, who was then in the palace, while Perdiccas's widow had been left with her son at Pergamum. It was now the right time for some friend of Perdiccas to come forward in his behalf, and Aristonous, perhaps according to previous concert, undertook the task. He observed "that Alexander himself had already decided who was worthiest to command, when, having cast his eyes round all his friends who were at his bedside, he gave his royal signet to Perdiccas. They had only to ratify Alexander's choice." Still, the assembly was not inclined to invest Perdiccas alone, under any title, with supreme power. The result of the whole deliberation was a sort of compromise between the proposals of Ptolemy and Aristonous. It seems to have been decided, but without clamorous opposition, that, if Roxana should bear a son, he should succeed to the throne; and that, in the mean while, four guardians should be appointed for the future prince, to exercise the royal authority in his name. Perdiccas and Leonnatus were to be agents in Asia. Antipater and Craterus in Europe.

The cavalry—the aristocratical portion of the army—acquiesced in the resolution of their chiefs; but it was very ill received by the whole body of the infantry. No motive appears for their dissatisfaction, except that they had not been consulted on the question, and that they wished to dispose of the crown. Still, it is not clear whether they acted quite of their own accord, or were excited to resistance by Meleager, who seems to have been impelled, partly by ambition, and partly by personal enmity to Perdiccas. The accounts remaining of his conduct are contradictory as to details, but agree in representing him as the leader and soul of the opposition. According to some authors, he quitted the council of the officers, after bitter invectives against Perdiccas, declaring that the people was the true heir of the monarchy, and alone could rightfully dispose of it, and hastened to instigate the soldiery to insurrection and

plunder.\* According to others, he was deputed to appease their discontent, but took the opportunity to inflame it, and placed himself at their head.† We are left equally in doubt whether it was he who first proposed another competitor for the throne, whose name was soon mentioned in the popular assembly.‡ This was Arrideus, a son of Philip by Philinna, a Thessalian woman, who is commonly described as of low condition. Arrideus was either naturally deficient in understanding, or had never recovered from the effects of a potion said to have been administered to him by Olympias, whom jealousy rendered capable of every crime.§ It seems that Alexander, either through prudence or compassion, had removed him from Macedonia, though he had not thought him fit to be trusted with any command: and he was now in Babylon. Most probably Meleager, perceiving that whoever should raise such a prince to the throne would reign under his name, was the foremost to recommend him as the sole legitimate heir. To the army Arrideus must have been personally indifferent; but he was Philip's son, without any mixture of barbarian blood, and, which probably weighed more with them, he would be purely their creature. The proposal, therefore, was agreeable to their pride and their prejudices, which were stronger than their regard for Alexander now, as they had been in his lifetime. After a short pause, perhaps, of surprise that a name so seldom heard should have been put forward on such an occasion, all, as if some happy discovery had been made, broke out into loud acclamations in favour of Arrideus; and Piton, who, it seems—having apparently been sent by the council to soothe them—endeavoured to show the folly of their choice, only incurred their resentment.¶ Meleager was

\* Curtius, x. 6.

† Diodor., xviii., 9.

‡ Justin (xiii., 2, 8) represents Meleager as proposing Arrideus in the council of the officers, but only by way of an alternative, advising them to choose between him and Hercules. Meleager's subsequent conduct, from which it is evident that he relied entirely on the soldiery, renders the account which Curtius gives of his language and behaviour at the council far more probable. Droysen, however (*Geschichte der Nachfolger Alexanders*, i., p. 23), has partly adopted Justin's statement, making Meleager simply propose Arrideus; but he then endeavours to combine this statement with that of Curtius, and supposes that, while Arrideus was proposed in the council by Meleager, his name was accidentally mentioned in the assembly of the troops, and that, before they were joined by Meleager, they had determined to proclaim him king. Such a coincidence is in the highest degree improbable; and Curtius and Justin alike lead us to suppose that the soldiers took no step before they heard of the decision of the council. I must here make a remark, which has been forced upon me by a number of similar instances, that Droysen, in his excellent work, has apparently adopted the principle of combining all the accounts relating to his subject, which are not palpably inconsistent with one another. He has certainly often shown great ingenuity in the manner in which he has placed his materials together; but the principle is one which, if uniformly applied to such writers as those from whom we have to collect the history of this period, must often lead into error, and the present case is one of many in which it seems to me to have been unfortunately applied. Droysen has here carried it so far, that he first makes Meleager propose Arrideus, and then, in a second speech (suggested by that in Curtius), protest against the authority of the council.

¶ Plut., Al., ad fin.

¶ Piton's presence in the assembly, which is only mentioned by Curtius, seems to remove an objection raised by Droysen against the statement of Diodorus, that Meleager was deputed by the council. Droysen objects that the council would have sent some more trustworthy person. Whether they had any reason at the time to distrust him does not appear; but if Piton was joined with him in the embassy, they might, at least, well have thought themselves safe.

deputed to bring the prince into the assembly; and, when he came, they saluted him as king, under the new name of Philip.

He immediately proceeded to the palace, accompanied by Meleager, and escorted by the troops. The officers, it seems, were still in council there, and when Arrideus appeared, some attempt was made to terminate the affair by discussion; but as the chiefs refused to sanction the choice of the infantry, they soon found themselves threatened with violence, and obliged to retire. Arrideus mounted the throne, and was invested with the royal robes. Perdiccas had ordered the door of the room in which Alexander's body lay to be locked, and prepared to guard it with 600 chosen men, and he was joined by Ptolemy at the head of the royal pages. They were, however, soon overpowered by superior numbers. The soldiers of the adverse party broke into the chamber; blows were interchanged; Perdiccas himself was attacked with missiles, and blood was beginning to flow, when some of the elder among the assailants interposed, and, taking off their helmets, entreated Perdiccas and his followers to desist from their useless resistance. Their mediation put an end to this prelude of the long contest which was to take place for Alexander's remains. But the greater part of the generals, and the whole body of the cavalry, quitted the city, and encamped outside the walls. Perdiccas did not yet accompany them: he hoped, it seems, that some change might happen in the disposition of the multitude, which he might more easily turn to his own advantage if he stayed. But Meleager, probably apprehending the same thing, and eager to satisfy his hatred, urged the king to give an order for the execution of Perdiccas. This he could not obtain: Arrideus was, perhaps, too timid to strike so great a blow. Meleager, therefore, was forced to interpret the silence of his royal puppet as consent, and sent an armed band to the house of Perdiccas, with directions to bring him to the palace, or to kill him if he should resist. Perdiccas had only about sixteen of the royal pages with him when his door was beset. He, however, appeared on the threshold with a firm countenance, and overawed those who came to arrest him by the severe dignity of his looks and his words. They probably did not think Meleager's authority a sufficient warrant for the murder of a man of such high rank. When they had withdrawn, he and his attendants mounted their horses, and hastened to the camp of their friends.

One eminent person of their party, however, remained in the city: Eumenes the Cardian, who had already decided on the course which his own interests required, and, on this occasion, gave proof of the sagacity and dexterity which afterward carried him through so many dangers, and even brought him so near to the highest fortune. Eumenes, in his boyhood, had attracted Philip's notice by his promising talents;\* he was brought up at the Macedonian court, and was employed by Alexander both as his principal secretary and keeper of the records,

It is remarkable that Droysen takes no notice of Pithon's part in this transaction.

\* Various accounts are given of his original station by Plutarch (Eum., init.), Elian (V. H., xii., 43), and Nepos, who describes him as *domesticus summo genere*.

and in military commands. He had risen so high in favour with the king, that he could even venture, on more than one occasion, to quarrel with Hephæstion; but, after the favourite's death, he laboured, by ingenious contrivances and profuse expense in honour of his memory, to remove all suspicion that he viewed the event with pleasure. In this liberality he showed the greater self-command, as he was habitually parsimonious. Plutarch relates that when the leading officers contributed to the equipment of the fleet in India, Eumenes, whose share was rated at 300 talents, produced only a hundred, pretending that it was with great difficulty he had been able to scrape this sum together. Alexander made no reply, but soon after ordered his slaves secretly to set fire to the secretary's tent. It was then discovered that Eumenes had amassed more than a thousand talents. Alexander, however, forgave him, as he did Antigènes, and allowed him to keep all; though he had himself to regret the loss of many valuable papers, which perished in the flames.

Such a man was formed for the times which followed Alexander's death. Eumenes felt that he could only be safe in the strife of parties as long as he could guard against the jealousy to which a foreigner in high station was exposed among the Macedonians. He remained, as we have observed, in Babylon after the flight of Perdiccas, under the pretext that he had no right to take a part in disputes concerning the succession; secretly, however, purposing to promote the interests of Perdiccas as far as he could; for he probably foresaw that this side would finally prevail. He assumed the character of a peacemaker; and his seeming neutrality gave great weight to his mediation. It was seconded by vigorous measures on the part of the seceders. They began to stop the supply of provisions, and to threaten the Great City with famine. Meleager found his condition growing every day more embarrassing. He had been called to account by his own troops for the attempt he had made against the life of Perdiccas, and could only shelter himself under the royal authority. At length the soldiers came in a body to the palace, and demanded that an embassy should be sent to the cavalry with overtures of peace. Three envoys were, accordingly, despatched; and it is remarkable that one of them was a Thessalian, another an Arcadian of Megalopolis; so that probably the third, Perilaus, whose country is not mentioned, was not a Macedonian. The negotiations which followed are reported too obscurely to be described. It is said that the party of Perdiccas refused to treat until the authors of the quarrel had been given up to them; and that this demand excited a violent tumult in the city, which was only calmed when Arrideus, displaying more vigour than he had been believed to possess, offered to resign the crown. Yet it does not appear that this condition was granted. The terms on which the treaty was concluded were, according to the most authentic account, that Arrideus should share the empire with Roxana's child, if it should be a boy;\* that Antipater should

\* Arrian in Phot., 92, init.: διαλαβάνει . . . τὴν ἀνδρὶ ἄρριδου . . . ἢ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρου ὃν ἐμῆλθεν ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου τέκνῃ Γούλμῃ, συμβασιλεύειν αὐτῷ; ὃ καὶ γέγονεν, εἰς

command the forces in Europe; that Craterus should be at the head of affairs in the dominions of Arridæus; but that Perdicas should be invested with the command of the horse-guards, the chiliarchy, before held by Hephæstion, in which Alexander would permit no one to succeed him. This, it seems, was a post which, at the Persian court, had been equivalent to that of prime minister, or grand vizier of the whole empire.\* It was, however, stipulated that Meleager should be associated with Perdicas in the regency, though with a subordinate rank. Of Leonnatus we hear no more as a member of the government. The compact was ratified by a solemn reconciliation between the contending parties. The cavalry returned to the city; the phalanx marched out to meet them; Perdicas and Meleager advanced between the lines to salute each other as friends. The troops on each side followed their example, and were once more united in one body.

It was, however, impossible, after what had happened, that Perdicas and Meleager should ever trust each other. Meleager probably relied on the infantry for protection. But Perdicas had now taken possession of the imbecile king, who was as passive in his hands as he had been in his rival's, and had resolved to strike the first blow. Before he directly attacked his enemy, he thought it necessary to deprive him of the support which he might find in the army; and he seems to have devised a very subtle plan for this end. He suborned emissaries to complain among the foot soldiers that, by the recent arrangements, Meleager had been elevated to an equality with himself; not apparently for the purpose of exciting discontent, or of gaining a party among these troops, but to lead Meleager himself blindfold into a snare. Meleager was soon informed of the language that had been used against him in the camp, and indignantly complained of it to Perdicas, whom he probably suspected to be its secret author. But Perdicas was so great a master of dissimulation, that he completely lulled his suspicions. He affected to sympathize deeply with his resentment, and proposed to arrest the agitators. It was agreed between them,† the more safely and surely to effect their object, that the whole army should be drawn out in the adjacent plain, under the pretext of a solemn lustration, to be celebrated with the old Macedonian rites, to purify it from the blood shed in the late quarrel. The usage, on such occasions, was to kill a dog, and to carry its entrails, divided into two parts, to opposite extremities of the field, so that the army might be drawn up between them, the phalanx on one side, the cavalry on the other.‡ Such, at least, was the order now adopted by

the two chiefs. On the appointed day Perdicas, with the king at his side, placed himself at the head of the cavalry and the elephants, facing the infantry, which was commanded by Meleager. After a short pause, he ordered them to advance. Meleager's troops were alarmed at the sight of this movement, for they now observed that the ground was favourable for the operations of the cavalry, and that, if they were attacked, they should not be able to make good their retreat without great loss. But, as they received no orders from their chief, and were quite uncertain as to the design of Perdicas, they remained motionless until a very narrow interval was left between the two lines. The king then rode up with a single squadron, and, having been previously instructed by the regent, demanded that the authors of the late dissensions should be given up to punishment; threatening, if they refused, to charge with the whole force of the cavalry and the elephants. The men were dismayed by the suddenness of the proceeding; and Meleager, who now perceived his own danger, had not sufficient presence of mind to make any attempt at self-defence. Perdicas took advantage of their consternation to select about 300 of those who had most distinguished themselves as his adversary's partisans, and immediately caused them to be trampled to death by the elephants in the sight of the whole army, and with the apparent consent of the king whose cause they had maintained. After this execution, Meleager could have no hope of safety but in flight. He was not arrested on the field, but soon after took refuge in a temple at Babylon, where he was despatched by order of Perdicas.

By this blow the regent's authority was firmly established, as far as related to the king and the army. A more difficult task remained. He was still surrounded by rivals as ambitious as Meleager, and more formidable from their ability and influence. His next care was to satisfy their pretensions so as least to weaken himself. A new distribution of the satrapies was settled by general consent, but, probably, in most points under his direction; in some, at least, we clearly trace his hand. It was not necessary for any purpose to make a total change; and the general principle adopted seems to have been, to retain as many as possible of the satraps appointed by Alexander in their governments. The provinces which lay near the eastern and northeast frontier of the empire were, probably, the least coveted, and in these scarcely any alteration was made. There were others, from which, as they were more desirable, it might have been more difficult to displace their actual occupants. Thus, not only was Taxiles permitted to rule in India, Oxyartes in the Paropamisus, Philippos in Bactria and Sogdiana, Phrataphernes in Parthia and Hyrcania, Strasanor in Aria and Drangiana, Siburtius in Arachosia and Gedrosia, Tlepolemus in Carmania, but Peucestes was left in possession of Persis, and Atropates of Northern Media, while the southern portion of that country was committed to Pithon, Babylonia to Archon, Mesopotamia to Archelaus. The most important part of the new arrangement was that which related to the governments west of the Euphrates. Ptolemy, who was not only honoured on ao-

αὐτῶν; τοῦ τῶν αὐτῶν. I have quoted the words, because Droyen, it seems through an oversight, observes that Arrian, at least Photius, had not mentioned this clause, and adopts it only on the authority of Justin.

\* Some remarks on this subject may be found in the Philological Museum, i., 380.

† It seems, at all events, more probable that Perdicas obtained Meleager's consent, than that, as Justin says, he gave his orders for the lustration *repente ignaro collegâ*.

‡ Droyen attempts to connect this scene with that described by Livy, xi., 6, where it is said that the lustration was usually closed with a sham-fight. But Livy does not say that the fight was between the cavalry and the infantry, which, indeed, would be scarcely credible: nor does Curtius hint that a sham-fight was to form part of the ceremony at Babylon.

count of his reputed connexion with the royal family, but also much beloved for his personal qualities by the army, had fixed his eyes on Egypt, and obtained it, with the adjacent regions of Arabia and Libya. Cleomenes was not removed, but placed under his orders. Laomedon remained in Syria, Philotas in Cilicia, Asander\* in Caria, Menander in Lydia, and Antigonus in the great province which included Phrygia Proper, Lycia, and Pamphylia. But, since Lycia and Pamphylia are also said to have been given to Nearchus, we may infer that he held these provinces with a subordinate rank : a suspicion which is confirmed by his subsequent relations with Antigonus. The Hellespontine Phrygia was assigned to Leonnatus, perhaps as a compensation for his share in the regency, or for the sake of removing him from court ; and Eumenes, whom Perdiccas regarded as his steady adherent, was rewarded with the title of satrap over Paphlagonia and Cappadocia. But these countries, which Alexander had never subdued, were still to be won by the sword from their native ruler, Ariarathes, who had held them as a hereditary vassal of Persia. In Europe, the government of Macedonia and Greece, together with that of the western countries on the coast of the Adriatic, which might afterward be annexed to the empire, was to be divided between Antipater and Craterus, a partition in which Perdiccas may have seen a prospect of collision between them likely to promote his ascendancy. Thrace, or the whole maritime region to the northeast of Macedonia, a province which had never been reduced to tranquil submission, and where the Odrysians had lately been roused to revolt by their chief, Seuthes, was committed to Lysimachus, a warrior of iron frame and unfinishing hardihood. There are two other names which might have been looked for in this list. Aristonous might have been expected to occupy a prominent place in it, since he had shown himself a decided partisan of Perdiccas ; yet we hear of no provision made for him. Hence it has been conjectured that Perdiccas retained him near his person as one of his staunchest friends. It was, perhaps, for a like reason that he intrusted Seleucus—who was destined to act so great a part in the history of the ensuing period—with the chiliarchy which had been assigned to himself : a highly honourable and important post, indeed, but one which he might safely part with, as it could add little or nothing to the power he possessed as regent.

There still remained a question on which he felt it necessary to consult the army, that he might relieve himself from a dangerous responsibility. Papers had been found in Alexander's cabinet, containing the outlines of some vast projects. It would seem that they might easily have been suppressed ; but it was known that they corresponded in part with the instructions which had been given to Craterus, and, therefore, they could not safely be neglected without the general consent. Some related to the equipment of a great armament—a thousand galleys, it is said, of the largest size—destined for the conquest of Carthage, and of the whole coast

of Africa on the Mediterranean as far as the Straits, and those of Spain and the adjacent maritime regions, as far as Sicily ; for which end a road was to be made along the African shore. Others were plans for new colonies, to be planted in Asia with Europeans, and in Europe with Asiatics. There were also directions for six new temples to be built in Europe—at Delos, Delphi, Dodona, Dium, Amphipolis, and Cyrrhus—each at the cost of 1500 talents, besides one of extraordinary magnificence to the goddess of Ilium, and for a monument to his father in Macedonia, which was to equal the largest of the Egyptian pyramids in its dimensions. It must be owned that there are some points in these schemes which look suspicious, and which, even if they had crossed Alexander's mind, we should not have expected he would have committed to writing. But the part relating to the temples can scarcely have been fabricated, and was probably contained in the instructions given to Craterus. The plan for an interchange of population between Europe and Asia is also quite conformable to the views which Alexander disclosed in his lifetime. This, however, and that of the expedition to Africa, could not any longer have entered into any one's thoughts, and might have been silently dropped. But, perhaps, Perdiccas apprehended that the sums destined for the other objects might be demanded from him by his colleagues, and, therefore, deemed it advisable formally to annul the whole by the highest authority. That he forged the project of the expedition, to render the real contents of the papers the less acceptable to the Macedonians, seems a very improbable conjecture.\* All were laid before a military assembly, and rejected as impracticable or useless.

During the tumultuous scenes which followed Alexander's death, his body had lain in the palace unburied. There are various reports as to the place selected for its interment. According to one, it was to have been transported to the sanctuary of Ammon;† but the more probable is, that it was determined it should be deposited in the sepulchre of his ancestors at *Ægæ*‡ and Aristander the soothsayer is said to have declared that it had been revealed to him, the land where it rested was destined to be ever prosperous and secure from invasion,§ which, however, was no more than an ancient Greek superstition as to the virtue of a hero's relics. Orders were now given to construct a funeral car worthy of these precious remains, and the general Arrideus was appointed to escort them towards the western coast.

While such honours were paid to the conqueror's corpse, two of the living objects of his affection fell victims to the revenge of Roxana and the ambition of Perdiccas. Roxana, with the regent's concurrence, invited Statira and her sister Drypetis to Babylon by a friendly letter, and when they came, caused them to be assassinated and secretly buried.|| In the course of time she was delivered of a boy, who was acknowledged as partner of Arrideus Phil-

\* Flathé, i., p. 441.

† Diodorus, xviii., 3. Curtius (x., 5, 4) mentions a report, manifestly false, that Alexander himself had so ordered at the same time that he gave his ring to Perdiccas.

‡ Pausanias, i., 6, 3.

§ *Ælian*, V. H., xii., 64.

|| Plutarch, *Al.*, ult.

\* This seems to be the true name, and, at least, serves to distinguish him from Cassander, with whom he is often confounded in the manuscripts.

ip in the empire, and bore the name of Alexander (*Ægus*).

Such was the state of the empire in Asia, and the attitude in which the principal persons who might pretend to a share in it had been placed towards one another, when Greece became the scene of a conflict which led to a fresh series of momentous changes.

Unless the nature of the Greeks could have been changed, or their judgment blinded by the success of the Macedonian arms, it would have been impossible that they could generally have viewed the progress of Alexander's conquests with complacency. Even if it had been acknowledged that the supremacy acquired by Philip might in itself—at least as it was exercised by him and his son—be a wholesome restraint on the spirit of discord which had caused so many calamities to Greece, it did not follow that any Greek patriot could look forward without alarm to the period when this supremacy should belong to a king of Macedonia who was also master of Asia. It was at such a time not infatuation, but dishonest artifice, to treat the Persian king as the enemy of Greece,\* and to blame Demosthenes for the secret negotiations into which he entered with the Persian court. The change which had taken place in the relations between Greece and Persia after the battle of Salamis was as great as that which Europe has experienced in its relation to the Turks since the battle of Lepanto. The power of Persia had become one of the chief securities of Greek liberty. Already, under a government which professed to derive its authority from the Amphictyonic council, and the assembled representatives of the nation, and to be the guardian of the national institutions, the people had been made to feel the value of the political independence it had lost. The bondage of Thebes, when it was placed at the mercy of a lawless garrison, the destruction which followed its attempt to release itself; the demand for the surrender of the Athenian orators, and other acts which will be mentioned hereafter, were warnings, which showed what might be expected from the future if the power which had been thus exercised should become absolutely irresistible; if it should fall into the hands of princes strangers to Greece, and educated in the maxims of Oriental despotism. It was not through a paltry jealousy, but from a well-grounded anxiety, that the Athenians willingly listened to Demosthenes, when he encouraged them to believe that the invader would be overwhelmed by the collected forces of the Persian empire. They may, notwithstanding, have regarded Alexander's exploits with admiration, not the less sincere because it was reluctantly yielded and seldom openly expressed. The marks of favour they received from the conqueror were more likely to bias their judgment, but, still, never induced them for a moment to consider his cause as having anything in common with their interests. Her citizens enter-

ed into the service of his enemy with the feeling that they were engaging in the defence of their country.

It is rather surprising that when Agis, encouraged by the great distance which separated Alexander from Europe, by, perhaps, exaggerated rumours of the dangers that threatened him in Asia, and by the disasters which had befallen the Macedonian arms at home, ventured on his ill-fated struggle, Athens remained neutral. It was afterward made a ground of accusation against Demosthenes, that he had taken no advantage of this occasion to display the hostility which he always professed towards Alexander. The event proves that he took the most prudent course; but his motives must remain doubtful. He was, perhaps, restrained, not by his opinion of the hopelessness of the attempt, but by the disposition to peace which he found prevailing at home, whether the effect of fear, or of jealousy, or of any other cause.\* Had the people been ready to embark in the contest, an orator, probably, would not have been wanting to animate them to it. But Demosthenes may still have given secret encouragement and assistance to the Peloponnesian confederates, and may have alluded to this when, according to his adversary's report, he boasted that the league was his work.† The issue of that struggle, and the news which arrived soon after of the great victory by which Alexander had decided the fate of the Persian monarchy at Gaugamela, must have crushed all hope at Athens except one, which might have been suggested by domestic experience, that the conqueror's boundless ambition might still lead him into some enterprise beyond his strength.

There was, however, a party there which did not dissemble the interest it felt in the success of the Macedonian arms. Before the battle of Issus, when Alexander was commonly believed to be in great danger, and Demosthenes was assured by his correspondents that he could not escape destruction, Æschines says that he was himself continually taunted by his rival, who exultingly displayed the letters that conveyed the joyful tidings, with the dejection he betrayed at the prospect of the disaster which threatened his friends. Æschines was the active leader of the Macedonizing party: all his hopes of a final triumph over his political adversaries were grounded on the Macedonian ascendancy. But Phocion, though his motives were very different, added all the weight of his influence to the same side. His sentiments were so well known, that Alexander himself treated him as a highly-honoured friend; addressed letters to him from Asia, with a salutation which he used to no one else except Antipater, and repeatedly pressed him to accept magnificent presents. Phocion, indeed, constantly rejected them; and when Alexander wrote that their friendship must cease if he persisted to decline all his offers,\* was only moved to intercede in behalf of some prisoners, whose liberty he immediately obtained. Even among the instructions which Craterus

\* As we find Æschines (c. Ctes., § 132) dexterously confounding the past with the present. The Persian king, δ τὸν ἄθρον διαρπάζας, δ τὸν ἱ. ἀλλοτρίων ζεύγας, δ γῆν καὶ πόλιν τοῖς ἱ. ἁπλῶς αἰρῶν—and so on—ὅν οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ κύριου τρέψαν εἶναι διαγινώσκοντες. ἀλλ' ὅσα περὶ τῆς τοῦ σῶματος ευρυπίας. As if Xerxes and the last Darius had been one person.

\* If Plutarch's anecdote about Demades (Reip. Gr. Fr., c. 25) had contained the real cause, it at least required extraordinary impudence in Æschines and Diarchus (Ctes., § 165. c. Demosth., § 36) to lay the blame on Demosthenes. † Æsch., Ctes., § 167. § Plut., Al., 39. Phoc., 18.

took with him, one is said to have been to put Phocion in possession of an Asiatic city, which he should select from four that were to be offered to him. All this may be considered as a pure tribute of disinterested reverence for extraordinary virtue, but it was not the less likely to produce a powerful effect on minds not formed to prize virtue as its own reward, or to believe that it could be so esteemed by others.

The disaster of Chæronea had held out a signal to the enemies of Demosthenes at Athens to unite their forces against him. He had been assailed, in the period following that event until Philip's death, by every kind of legal engine that could be brought to bear upon him—by prosecutions of the most various form and colour. All these experiments had failed; the people had honoured him with more signal proofs of its confidence than he had ever before received; he had never taken a more active part, or exercised a more powerful sway in public affairs. Yet it seems that after the Macedonian arms had completely triumphed, both in Asia and in Greece, Æschines thought the opportunity so favourable for another attempt of the same nature, that he resolved to collect all the force of his eloquence, and all the strength of his party, for a last attack on his great rival. He endeavoured, indeed, to shield himself from this reproach, and from the charge which he was conscious might be brought against him, that his main object was to display his zeal in Alexander's services, under the flimsy pretext that the indictment had been laid before Philip's death. This was true; but it was no less evident that the cause had been dropped for seven or eight years, and that the state of political affairs alone had now induced him to revive it. This trial, the most celebrated of ancient pleadings, the most memorable event in the history of eloquence throughout all past ages, deserves mention here, chiefly for the light it throws on the character and temper of the Athenian tribunals, at a time when the people is supposed to have been verging towards utter degeneracy, so as to be hardly any longer an object of historical interest; a time, it must be remembered, when the rest of Greece was quailing beneath the yoke of the stranger, and his will, dictated to the so-called national congress at Corinth, was sovereign and irresistible.

The occasion of this prosecution arose out of two offices with which Demosthenes had been intrusted, in the year, it seems, after that of the battle of Chæronea (B.C. 337). He had been appointed by his tribe to superintend the repairs which, according to a decree proposed by himself, the city walls were to undergo, the work being equally distributed among the ten tribes.\* At the same time, he filled another post, which, if not among the highest in the state, was one of the most important in the eyes of the people, the treasurership of the

theoric fund, which, as Æschines takes great pains to prove, involved a large share in the general control and direction of the finances. In both offices he had made a liberal contribution out of his own property to the service of the state. On this ground, but more especially as a mark of approbation for his public conduct on all occasions, a decree was passed, on the motion of his friend Ctesiphon, that he should be presented with a golden crown, and that the honour conferred on him should be proclaimed in the theatre, at the great Dionysiac festival, the time when Athens was full of strangers, who came to attend the spectacle. For this decree Æschines had indicted Ctesiphon as having broken the law in three points: first, because it was illegal to crown a magistrate before he had rendered an account of his office; next, because it was forbidden to proclaim such an honour, when bestowed by the people, in any other place than the assembly-ground in the Pnyx, but particularly to proclaim it as Ctesiphon had proposed; and, lastly, because the reason assigned in the decree, so far as related to the public conduct of Demosthenes, was false, inasmuch as he had not deserved any reward. Among these points, there was one on which it seems clear that the charge of illegality was well grounded. Though the superintendence of the repairs was, probably, not a magistracy in the eye of the law, which, indeed, forbade any one to hold two at once, the treasurership of the theoric fund certainly was one, and one to which the law, which forbade the crowning of a magistrate still accountable, applied with peculiar force. As to the mode of the proclamation, it seems doubtful whether the law on which the prosecution rested had not been modified by another, which declared that proclamation might be made, as Ctesiphon proposed, if the people should so decree; though Æschines speciously contended that this exception was only meant to relate to crowns bestowed on citizens, not by the people, but by foreign states. But the third point, the truth or falsehood of the reason alleged in the decree, was that on which, according to the manifest sense of both the parties, of the court, and of all present at the trial, the case really turned. The question at issue was, in substance, whether Demosthenes had been a good or a bad citizen. It was on this account that the court was thronged by an extraordinary conflux of spectators, both citizens and strangers. Hence the prosecutor, after a short discussion of the dry legal arguments, enters, as on his main subject, into a full review of the public and private life of Demosthenes; and Demosthenes, whose interest it was to divert attention from the points of law, which were not his strong ground, can scarcely find room for them in his defence of his own policy and proceedings, which, with bitter attacks on his adversary, occupies almost the whole of his speech.

The preceding history will, perhaps, enable the reader, even if he should not have read that speech, to form a general conception of the principles on which the orator vindicated his public conduct. Suffice it here to observe, that his boast is, that throughout his political career he had kept one object steadily in view—to strengthen Athens within and without, and to

\* This decree must be distinguished from that mentioned *ante*, p. 151, where I would now omit the statement of the sums. Droysen, in an elaborate examination of the records inserted in the oration for the Crown (in the *Zeitschrift für die Alterthumswissenschaft*, 1839), has shown that the hasty reparation of the walls which took place immediately after the battle of Chæronea must be distinguished from that to which Demosthenes contributed three talents, and which gave occasion to Ctesiphon's decree.



preserve her independence, particularly against the power and the arts of Philip. He owned that he had failed; but it was after he had done all that one man in his situation—a citizen of a commonwealth—could do. He had failed in a cause in which defeat was more glorious than victory in any other—in a struggle not less worthy of Athens than those in which her heroic citizens, in past ages, had earned their fame. In a word, the whole oration breathes the spirit of that high philosophy which, whether learned in the schools or from life, has consoled the noblest of our kind in prisons, and on scaffolds, and under every persecution of adverse fortune, but in the tone necessary to impress a mixed multitude with a like feeling, and to elevate it for a while into a sphere above its own. The effect it produced on that most susceptible audience can be but faintly conceived by the finest critics in their closets. Yet there have certainly been few readers—perhaps none but those whose judgment has been perverted by prejudices—in whom it has not left a strong conviction of the speaker's patriotism, if not of his general integrity and political virtue. The result was, that the prosecutor not only lost his cause, but did not even obtain a fifth part of the votes, and consequently, according to law, incurred a small penalty.\* But he seems to have felt it insupportable to remain at the scene of his defeat, where he must have lived silent and obscure. He quitted Athens, and crossed over to Asia with the view, it is said, of seeking protection from Alexander,† through whose aid alone he could now hope to triumph over his adversaries. When this prospect vanished, he retired to Rhodes, where he opened a school of oratory, which produced a long series of valuable sophists, and is considered as the origin of a new style of eloquence, technically called the Asiatic, which stood in a relation to the Attic not unlike that of the composite capital to the Ionic volute, and was destined to prevail in the East wherever the Greek language was spoken, down to the fall of the Roman Empire. He died at Samos, about nine years after Alexander, having survived both his great antagonist and his friend Phocion, and probably was preserved, by his exile, from a similar fate.

The spirit displayed by the tribunal which decided in favour of Demosthenes on such grounds as he alleged is, at least, as noble as that of the Roman senate and people when they went out

to meet and thank the consul on his return from Cannæ. But the case may seem to exhibit the Athenian administration of justice in a much less favourable light. On one point, at least, it is clear that Ctesiphon's decree was contrary to law. The attempt made by Demosthenes to prove that the law, which forbade an accountable magistrate to be crowned, did not apply to his case, only shows the extreme looseness of legal reasoning which was tolerated in Athenian courts. It seems, indeed, to have been admitted that there had been numerous precedents for whatever was illegal in the decree, as to the circumstances of time and place. But this only proves the laxity which prevailed in the observance of the laws. It appears that, according to that theory of the Constitution which had been universally approved and acted on in the purest times, immediately after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants, the court which tried the author of a decree denounced as illegal was bound to compare it with the letter of the law, and to give judgment on the simple question of their strict agreement. But it is evident that the courts had afterward assumed greater freedom; and it is not at all certain that this was repugnant either to the spirit of the institution or to the practice of preceding ages, with the single exception of the short period in which the restoration of the democracy awakened extraordinary jealousy for the maintenance of the laws. The will of the people, declared in a decree, had been subjected to the revision of a tribunal which might be expected to possess superior means of information, to secure the people itself against the pernicious consequences of temporary measures into which it might be surprised. This seems to have been the general object, to which all others were subordinate; and for this purpose it might be necessary that, in such cases, the courts should be invested with an ample discretion, and should not be required to adhere to the letter of the laws, so as themselves to commit wrong, or to injure the commonwealth. The form of the proceedings was such, that a verdict against Ctesiphon must have been interpreted as a condemnation of Demosthenes; and it was the deliberate will, and the highest interest of the people, to show that it still honoured the man who had not despaired of the commonwealth. It would have been better that the prosecutor should not have been able so to embroil the question; but, where he did so, it was desirable that the court should have the power to decide on what it deemed the most important point.

In the course of the same year was tried another cause, which is interesting in the same point of view. The occasion has been already mentioned. In the eighth year after the battle of Chæronea, the fugitive Leocrates returned to Athens, which he had deserted in her hour of danger, and resumed the functions of a citizen. He was impeached by Lycurgus, under the law which had been passed immediately after the battle, forbidding emigration under pain of death. He pleaded that he had set out in the course of his business as a merchant, without any intention of changing his abode; but his subsequent conduct belied his professions. He was convicted, and probably suffered the penalty of his offence.

\* Plut., Dem., 24. X. Or. Vit., 540, C., p. 540, A. The absurd skepticism with which this fact has been questioned, on the pretence that "Æschines would hardly have ventured to prosecute his accusation without assurance of support from the party which looked to Phocion as its head," might surprise us, if it did not occur in a work which, though cast in an historical form, was intended to convey, not historical information, but, first of all, opinions, and then such facts as could be made to square with them. It is well matched with the exquisite learning which describes "the numbers composing the Athenian courts," as "all standing" during a trial. It would be almost affronting the reader to refute so ridiculous a fiction by evidence, as, e.g., the proclamation in the *Vesp.*, 752, *τὸ δὲ δίκασμα*; *ἀντιτάξις*. It is the proper penalty of wilful ignorance so to expose itself.

† X. Or. Vit., p. 540, D. The story of the sympathy which Demosthenes showed to Æschines after his defeat (Vit. X. Or., p. 543, E.) is in strange contrast with all we know of the public life of the two rivals. Yet, from the other version, in which Demosthenes is represented as the object of similar generosity (Plutarch, Demosth., 26), we may hope that it had some foundation. It seems too improbable to be a mere fiction.

Lycurgus, the prosecutor, was one of the few men then living at Athens who could undertake such a task with dignity, as conscious of a life irreproachably spent in the service of his country. There are few Athenian statesmen of any age who can bear a comparison with him; Phocion equalled him in honesty and disinterestedness; but in his general character, and in his political conduct, seems to fall far below him. It is pleasing and instructive to contemplate the image of such a man; and it is a peculiar happiness that his biography is less meager than that of most of his celebrated contemporaries; the principal features of his character stand out before us with sufficient distinctness.

Demosthenes was often reproached with a mixture of barbarian blood in his veins. Lycurgus was a genuine Athenian, and his family was one of the oldest and most illustrious in Athens. He traced the origin of his house, which was distinguished by the honourable appellation of the Erechbutads,\* to the royal hero Erechtheus, and thus to a divine stock. By virtue of his descent, his family possessed an hereditary priesthood of Poseidon, whose worship, as probably his nature, was intimately connected with that of Erechtheus. In the Erechtheum, the temple dedicated in common to the hero and the god, the portraits of the ancestors of Lycurgus who had held that office were painted on the walls. He could also boast of some, more truly noble, whose memory was endeared to the people by real services. Lycophron, his grandfather, had been put to death by the Thirty, and both he and Lycomedes, another of the orator's progenitors, had been honoured with a public funeral. Lycurgus had studied in the schools both of Plato and Isocrates; but had not learned from the one to withdraw from active life into a visionary world, nor from the other to cultivate empty rhetoric at the expense of truth and of his country. His manly eloquence breathes a deep love and reverence for what was truly venerable in antiquity—his speech against Leocrates, which is still extant, shows that he dwelt with a fondness becoming his birth and station on the stirring legends of elder times; but his admiration for them had not made him indifferent or unjust towards those in which he lived. He possessed an ample hereditary fortune; but he lived, like Phocion, with Spartan simplicity. In an age of growing luxury, he wore the same garments through summer and winter, and, like Socrates, was only seen with sandals on extraordinary occasions. Yet he had to struggle against the aristocratical habits and prejudices of his family. He was the author of a law to restrain the wealthier women from shaming their poorer neighbours by the costliness of their equipages in the festive procession to Eleusis; but his own wife was the first to break it.† His frugality, however, did not arise from parsimony, and was confined to his personal wants. He was reproached with the liberality which he

displayed towards the various masters of learning whom he employed, and declared that if he could find any that would make his sons better men, he would gladly pay them with half his fortune. He devoted himself to public life in a career of quiet, unostentatious but useful activity. He was a powerful, but not a ready speaker; like Pericles and Demosthenes, he never willingly mounted the bema without elaborate preparation; and his writing-instruments were constantly placed by the side of the simple couch on which he rested, and from which he frequently rose in the night to pursue his labours. But to shine in the popular assembly was not the object of his studies; he seems only to have appeared there on necessary or important occasions. His genius was peculiarly formed for the management of financial affairs; and the economy of the state was the business of a large portion of his public life. In the latter part of Philip's reign he was placed at the head of the treasury.\* The duties of his office embraced not only the collection, but the ordinary expenditure of the Athenian revenues, so far as they were not appropriated to particular purposes. On the administration of the person who filled it depended both the resources of the state, and the manner in which they were regularly applied. The office was tenable for four years: a law dictated by republican jealousy, and, it seems, proposed by Lycurgus himself, forbade it to remain longer in the same hands. Yet Lycurgus was permitted to exercise its functions during twelve successive years, selecting some of his friends for the last two terms to bear the title. In the course of this period nearly 19,000 talents passed through his hands.† He is said to have raised the ordinary revenue from 600 to 1200 talents.‡ We hear of no expedients but unwearied diligence by which he effected this increase. It is only as to the application that we are more fully informed. It seems that the amount and the nature of the domestic expenditure were committed, in a great degree, to his discretion. As the surplus not required for war fell into the theoric fund, which was devoted to the transient gratification of the people, it required all the influence of the treasurer to apply as large a sum as possible to objects permanently useful. The administration of Lycurgus was distinguished above every other since Pericles by the number of public buildings which he erected or completed. Among his monuments were an arsenal, an armory, a theatre, a gymnasium, a palestra, a stadium. After the example of Pericles, he laid up a considerable treasure in the citadel, in images, vessels, and ornaments of gold and silver, which, at

\* *ταμίας τῆς κοινῆς προόδου*. See Boeckh, ii., 6.

† So the decree of Strateias at the end of Vit. X. Or. According to another account in the Life of Lycurgus, 14,000 talents, which Boeckh considers as the result (in round numbers) of a calculation, being the amount of the revenue for twelve years. And this he supposes Pausanias to have had in view, i., 29, 16, where he says that Lycurgus brought into the treasury a greater sum by 6500 than Pericles, which would be the case according to the amount of the treasure mentioned by Isocrates, i. *ἴρ.*, § 152, *ἀνασκευάζει τάλαντα χωρίς τῶν ἐργῶν*, reduced by 100, which Boeckh thinks may have been the more accurate statement.

‡ In Vit. X. Or. it is said that they were before only sixty talents. Boeckh, i., p. 470, thinks that the bugbarron confounded the revenue with the tribute. But Sauppe (Z. f. die Alterthumswiss., iii., p. 430) makes it appear more probable that *ἐκκορρεῖν* should be altered to *ἐκκεῖναι*.

\* Importing, the genuine Batads or descendants of Butes: *τὸν δῆμον Βουτᾶδης, γένους τοῦ τῶν Βουτῶν ἀδελφῶν*. X. Or. Vit., § 41, B., where most of the materials of the following sketch will be found.

† According to Vit. X. Or., he paid a talent to the sycophants to avert a prosecution, and afterward defended himself on the plea that he had given, not taken. *Ælian*, however (V. H., xiii., 24), represents her as legally condemned.

the same time, served to heighten the splendour of the sacred festivals. It was in a different capacity, under a special commission, that he also built 400 galleys, and formed a great magazine of arms. He seems, likewise, to have taken Pericles for his model, so far as the difference between their times permitted, in a continual endeavour to raise the character and to refine the taste of the people. That he instituted a choral contest in honour of his family god Poseidon, may be ascribed to a personal motive. But we find his attention entirely directed to more important branches of art and literature. He was the author of a regulation—the precise nature of which is not sufficiently ascertained to be stated here—for the better management of the comic drama. But he conferred a more lasting benefit on his country, and on all posterity, by another measure, designed to honour and preserve the memory and the works of the three great tragic poets to whom Athens was indebted for so large a part of her literary fame. The dramas of Sophocles and Euripides, if not of *Æschylus*, were still frequently exhibited; they were acknowledged as the most perfect models of dramatic poetry; but this did not prevent them from undergoing a fate similar to that which has so often befallen the works of our early dramatists; they were frequently interpolated and mutilated by the actors. Before the invention of the press this was a serious evil, as it endangered the very existence of the original works. To remedy it, *Lycurgus* caused a new transcript or edition to be made of them by public authority, in many cases probably from the manuscripts of the authors, and to be deposited in the state archives.\* The value of this edition was proved by its fate. It was afterward borrowed by one of the *Ptolemies* to be copied for the Alexandrian library, and fifteen talents were left at Athens as a pledge for its restitution. The king, however, sent back the copy instead of the original, and forfeited his pledge. By the decree of *Lycurgus*, it was directed that the players should conform in their representations to this authentic edition. The bronze statues of the three poets, which he also caused to be erected, were less durable monuments, and had become a more trivial distinction.

All these works attest the influence of *Lycurgus*, while they show the spirit in which it was exerted. That influence was founded, not on his birth, or wealth, or eloquence, or ability, but simply on the confidence which a jealous people reposed in his integrity and probity. As the state intrusted him with its revenues, so private persons deposited their property in his custody. When a piece of ground was required for his new stadium, *Dinias*, its owner, made a present of it to the people, with the extraordinary declaration that he gave it for the sake of *Lycurgus*. His testimony was sought as the most efficacious aid in the courts of justice. He was once summoned by an adversary of *Demosthenes*. *Demosthenes* said he should only ask whether *Lycurgus* would consent to be thought like the man whom he befriended.\*

In his own judicial contests, whether he appeared as prosecutor or defendant, he always gained his cause. He could venture sharply to rebuke the assembled people, when he was interrupted in a speech by clamours of disapprobation. When the philosopher *Xenocrates* was seized in the street, as liable to the alien tax, by one of the farmers of the customs, *Lycurgus* struck the man with his staff, and committed him to prison; and his conduct on this occasion was universally praised. We hear but of one case in which he may seem to have courted popular favour by a deviation from his principles in the management of the public funds. He had convicted a wealthy man, named *Diphilus*\*, of a gross and very pernicious fraud on the state, in the working of the mines at *Laurium*. The offender was put to death, and his whole estate confiscated, and *Lycurgus* consented, at least, to distribute the sum which it brought into the treasury among the people, as the whole produce of the mines had been distributed before the time of *Themistocles*. The general tendency of his measures, and the impression produced by his character, were rather of an opposite kind. He inspired a feeling approaching to awe, by his antique, Spartan-like austerity, as he publicly avowed his admiration of the old Spartan manners. When he was appointed to superintend the police of the city,† the measures by which he cleared it of rogues and vagrants were deemed so rigorous as to be compared with the laws of *Draco*. On the other hand, one of his celebrated enactments was a provision against one of the grosser abuses of the slave-trade, by which it sometimes happened that free persons were sold under false pretexes in the Athenian market.

The account to which every Athenian magistrate was liable was, of course, most rigidly exacted from one who filled such an office as *Lycurgus* discharged for twelve years in succession. He rendered one at the end of each quadriennial period, either in his own name, or in that of the titular minister for whom he acted. No flaw was ever detected in his reckonings, and it appeared that he had, on various occasions, borrowed between 600 and 700 talents for the public service.§ Still, he himself was not satisfied with the ordinary inspection to which his accounts were liable; he justly considered them as one of his fairest titles to gratitude and esteem, and he therefore caused them to be inscribed on a monument which he erected in the palestra founded by himself; and it appears that a considerable part of this inscription

the affair of *Harpalus*. *Lycurgus* was dead when *Stratocles* prosecuted *Demosthenes* on that ground.

\* Perhaps the same person for whom *Demosthenes* had obtained the public honours mentioned by *Dinarchus*, *Demosth.*, § 44.

† *Ἐσχέ τοι δέσποτος τὴν φυλακὴν, καὶ τῶν κακοῦργων τὴν σάλληναιον*. *Sauppe* (u. s., p. 416) rejects this statement as having arisen from some mistake, because no mention of such an office occurs elsewhere. But his observation, "that the Athenian magistrates had the power of proceeding against offenders, each in his sphere, as the *Thesmothetae*, the *Areopagus*, and that *Lycurgus* was in general celebrated for his rigour," seems hardly to explain the anecdote.

‡ So *Boeckh* (ii., p. 132) interprets the words of the decree of *Stratocles*, which may, however (compared with the corresponding passage in the life of *Lycurgus*), be understood of a deposit which had been consigned to his care. *Sauppe* (u. s.) would correct the numbers in the decree by those in the life, which are 250.

\* See *Grynæ, De Græcorum Tragedia*, p. 7.

† *Rutilius Lupus*, ii., 4. *Ruhnken*'s conjecture that the nameless adversary of *Demosthenes* was *Stratocles*, is not improbable; but the occasion must have been previous to

tion has been preserved to our day.\* A short time before his death—which seems to have a little preceded Alexander's—he is said to have directed himself to be carried to the council-chamber, and to have challenged a fresh scrutiny of his whole administration.† The only person who came forward to lay anything to his charge was one Menesæchmus, whom he had prosecuted, and he now refuted all his cavils.

Crowns, statues, and a seat at the table of the Prytanes, had been bestowed on him in his life. After his death he was honoured with a public funeral, and with a bronze statue near the ten heroes of the tribes, and the distinction he had enjoyed as a guest of the state was made hereditary in his family. Yet his sons—who, it may be suspected from his language on the occasion already mentioned, were not worthy of him—were prosecuted for some offence by the same Menesæchmus, who succeeded him in his office, and it is said that they were released from prison through the intercession of Demosthenes; though this may have had no other foundation than the close political, and perhaps personal, friendship which united the great orator with Lycurgus.‡

The fragments here collected from the biography of a truly illustrious man, who has not generally attracted all the notice he deserves, will, perhaps, not be thought to occupy too much room, when it is considered that they are scattered over a period during which the history of Athens is almost a blank. They lead us to believe that the life of the people, at this period, cannot have been so worthless and insignificant as we often find it described; a people which, in the midst of a swarm of profligate political adventurers, sycophants, and parasites, bestowed its esteem, its confidence, its highest honours, on two such men, so widely at variance with each other, as Phocion and Lycurgus; a people, it may be added, which could even be misled by such a speech as that of Demosthenes in his defence,§ was not hopelessly corrupt, not dead to all right and noble feelings, nor ready to sink into ruin through its own internal feebleness and levity. Notwithstanding the vast extent of the Macedonian conquests, and the magnificence of the new dynasties which arose out of Alexander's empire, we need not be ashamed to regard the struggle which

this people made for liberty as not less interesting than the contests of some ambitious soldiers of fortune for their shares of that rich spoil.

During the whole of his administration, if, as appears most probable, he remained in office to his death, Lycurgus had to contend against the influence of Demades. This most reckless and shameless of all the candidates for power that had hitherto appeared at Athens, who, in condition and character, presented the most complete contrast to Lycurgus,\* had been appointed, it seems, immediately after Demosthenes, treasurer of the theoric fund, and he occupied that station during the twelve following years. The influence which he acquired rested on two grounds, besides his wit, fluency, and impudence; on his avowed connexion with Macedonia, from which some advantage had been derived in the negotiations with Philip and Alexander, and on the readiness with which he squandered the public money to gratify the lowest tastes of the Athenian populace. We even find it related that succours would have been sent to the Peloponnesians in their struggle with Alexander, if he had not warned the people that they must then forego the sum which he was about to distribute among them for an approaching festival.† The story in this form, indeed, is hardly credible, or consistent with the complaints which were made against Demosthenes on the same subject; but it does not the less truly mark the man's character, and the basis of his power. He had, indeed, as we have seen, been prosecuted with success by Lycurgus; but the result of the conviction was probably only a fine, which he could easily pay, and which did not interrupt his political activity. In reputation he had nothing to lose. At the end of the twelve years he was again impeached for his conduct in his administration. In his defence he had the front to claim the merit of the blessings which the people had enjoyed during the long period of peace. It was probably felt that he might still be useful; at least, that it was not the time to punish him; and he was acquitted.

In the course of the year preceding Alexander's death, the stillness and obscurity of Athenian history were broken, partly by the new measures adopted by the conqueror on his return from India with respect to Greece, and partly by the adventures of Harpalus. Alexander's claim of divine honours could not be viewed in Greece with the same feelings which it had excited among the victorious Macedonians. To the people, bowed down by irresistible necessity under a foreign yoke, it was not a point of great moment under what form or title the conqueror, in the plenitude of his power, chose to remind them of their subjection. They might consider the demand as a wanton insult, but it was in no other sense an injury. There might not be many base enough to recommend it, but there were, perhaps, still fewer so unwise as to think it a fit ground for resistance. It involved no surrender of reli-

\* Boeckh, *Stats.*, ii., p. 344.

† It is a question whether the twelve years are to be reckoned from Ol. 109, 3 (342), or from Ol. 110, 3 (338). The latter is Boeckh's opinion, according to which Lycurgus would not have completed the last term at the time of his death, and Sauppe's arguments on this side seem more convincing than Droysen's (*Z. f. d. Alterthumswiss.*, vi., p. 250) on the other. This opinion seems also to be confirmed by the statement in Vit. X. Or., p. 841, C., *ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔτι διετέλει*, for he appears to have exercised the superintendence here mentioned, like the rest, by virtue of his office as treasurer.

‡ In the life of Lycurgus the ground of the prosecution is not stated: we are only left to conjecture that it was connected with his administration, and that after his death Menesæchmus renewed his charge with greater success. And such is the state of things supposed in the third letter of Demosthenes, which, though certainly spurious, had probably some authority for this point, but seems to have been itself the only authority for the intercession of Demosthenes mentioned in the life of Lycurgus.

§ At the same time, I am aware how cautiously such arguments should be used, and into what grievous mistakes we are likely to fall when we attempt to infer the character of an age from the sentiments contained in its books.

\* He is generally described (Suidas; Quinctilian, ii., 17, 16) as having been originally a common soldier (*πυρρὸς ῥεμex*); by Proclus (in *Poeta Minores*, Gaif., iii., p. 5) as *ἡθοειδὴς*, of which the other account may have been an exaggeration. The fish-market at Athens was a school, not more of scurrility than of impudence and dishonesty.

† Plutarch, *Reip. Gr. Fr.*, 25.

gious faith, even in those who were firmly attached to the popular creed; and the ridicule for which it afforded so fair a mark was, with most, sufficient revenge for its insolence. The Spartan answer to the king's envoys was perhaps the best: "If Alexander will be a god, let him."\* At Athens there was something more of debate on the question; yet it hardly seems that opinions were seriously divided on it. The motion, as was most fitting, was made by Demades; and even in his proposal he did not go much farther than Epicrates, who had ventured to say that, instead of the nine archons, the people would do well to appoint as many ambassadors to Alexander.† It was opposed by a young orator named Pytheas, who seems to have fluctuated greatly in his political alliances,‡ but on one occasion, at least, expressed himself strongly on the notorious contrast between the private habits of Demades and Demosthenes.§ Pytheas, perhaps, took that view of the question in which it afforded the best subject for vehement declamation. It was observed by the more practical statesmen that he was not yet of an age to give advice on matters of such importance. He replied that he was older than Alexander, whom they proposed to make a god. Lysurgus appears to have spoken, with the severity suited to his character, of "the new god, from whose temple none could depart without need of purification."|| But it does not follow that he wished to see the demand rejected. At least, Demades and Demosthenes were agreed on the main point, and their language, as far as it is reported, seems to have been very similar. Demades warned the people not to lose earth while they contested the possession of heaven;¶ and Demosthenes advised them not to contend with Alexander about celestial honours. Yet it is said that, on a previous occasion, he had carried a motion forbidding innovations in the objects of public worship;\*\* whether with reference to rumours of Alexander's pretensions we do not know. The assembly acquiesced in the king's demand.

But the order relating to the return of the exiles awakened much stronger feelings, partly of fear and partly of indignation. It appears that Alexander, before he set out on his expedition, when it was his object to conciliate the Greeks, had engaged by solemn compact with the national congress at Corinth—perhaps only confirming one before made by Philip—not to interfere with the existing institutions of any Greek state, but to preserve them inviolate. At the time of this treaty, Messene, it seems, was governed by a tyrannical dynasty, the house of Philicides. The tyrants were afterwards expelled, but were restored by Alexander's intervention, under the pretext that the treaty required the governments then standing to be preserved. But this pretence could not be pleaded in another case, when the demo-

cratic party at Pellene in Achaia was expelled, their property confiscated and distributed among their slaves, and Chæron established as tyrant by the power of Macedonia.\* The tendency of Alexander's new measure was to effect a similar, though it might be a less violent revolution, wherever Macedonian influence was not yet completely predominant, throughout Greece. Nicanor, a Stagirite, had been sent down by Alexander to publish his decree during the games at Olympia. Demosthenes, on this occasion, proposed himself to fill an office which was commonly confined to unimportant ceremonies: to head the embassy by which Athens was publicly represented at the national festival, that he might there discuss the question, point out the injustice of the measure, and impress the assembled Greeks with his own sentiments. For this purpose he was sent, and at Olympia had a public debate with Nicanor, but without any immediate effect. Nicanor could only obey the king's orders; and there were some thousands of the exiles and their friends collected there, who listened to the proclamation with joy. It was in the form of a letter, addressed to them in a style of imperial brevity. "King Alexander to the exiles from the Greek cities. We were not the author of your exile, but we will restore you to your homes, all but those who are under a curse.† And we have written to Antipater on the subject, that he may compel those cities which are unwilling to receive you."

Great alarm ensued at Athens among those who had reason to dread the execution of the decree. The people would not comply with it, but still did not venture openly to reject it. A middle course was taken, by which time, at least, was gained. An embassy was sent to Alexander to deprecate his interference; and at Babylon the Athenian envoys met those of several other Greek states, who had come on the same business. How far they acted in concert with each other, and whether through the exhortations of Demosthenes, we are not informed. There seemed, indeed, to be a very faint hope that Alexander's purpose could be shaken by their arguments or entreaties; but yet the event, very unexpectedly indeed, showed that they had taken the most prudent counsel. In the mean while there prevailed at home not only great anxiety about the issue of the embassy, but fears for the immediate safety of the city. A strong body of Athenian exiles was collected at Megara, where they might keep up a communication with their friends in Athens, and would be furnished with such aid as Megara could afford; for, as was to be expected from the ancient enmity between the two cities, Megara had warmly embraced the interests of Macedonia, and had bestowed its franchise on Alexander, who smiled at the honour, but was assured that he was the first stranger who had ever received it since his ancestor Hercules.‡ Suspicions were entertained of clandestine meetings with

\* Elian, V. H., ii., 19. † Athenæus, vi., 58.  
‡ Demosthenes, Epist., iii., § 29, foll. Plutarch, Phoc., 31.

§ Athenæus, ii., 22. A passage not uninteresting, as it helps us to appreciate such reports of the private character of Demosthenes as we find in Athen., xiii., 63.

|| Athen., ii., 22. Demosthenes, Epist., iii., § 29. Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Pr., 6. An. Seni. Ger., 2.  
¶ Dictum sapiens it is called by Valerius Maximus, vii., 2, E, 10. \*\* Diarchus c. Dem., § 97.

\* Demosthenes, De Fud. Alex., § 8, 12.

† Πᾶν τὸν θάνατον. Explained by Diodorus himself (xvii., 10), to mean those who had been convicted of sacrilege or murder; as in Polysperchon's edict (xviii., 56) they are described more fully, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος ἐκ ἀμαρτίας κατὰ νόμον ἀποκρίναι.

‡ Plutarch, De Un. in Rep., Dom., 2.

the exiles at Megara; and the Areopagus was directed to investigate one, at least, of these cases. Another was brought forward by Demosthenes, who was, however, induced to drop it, probably by his own danger, as well as information which he had received of some designs against the arsenal.\*

Such was the state of affairs at Athens when the appearance of Harpalus gave rise to fresh perplexity and uneasiness. The precise time when he arrived on the coast of Attica is difficult to ascertain; but it seems most probable that it was after the return of Demosthenes from Olympia. Harpalus, as we have seen, carried away some 5000 talents, and had collected about 6000 mercenaries. He must, therefore, have crossed the Ægean with a little squadron; and it is probable that the rumour of his approach reached Athens at least some days before him. He had reason to hope for a favourable reception. He came with his Athenian mistress, for whose sake he had conferred a substantial benefit on her native city; and he had already gained at least one friend there, on whose influence he may have founded great expectations: Charicles, Phocion's son-in-law, who had descended so low as to undertake the erection of the monument in honour of Pythionice, and had received thirty talents by way of reimbursement. He might calculate still more confidently on the force of the temptation which his treasure and his troops held out to the people, if they were already disposed to risk an open quarrel with Alexander, and on the ample means of corruption he possessed. These hopes were disappointed, and, at first, he certainly met with a total repulse. It seems most probable—though our authors leave this doubtful—that his squadron was not permitted to enter Piræus. We know that a debate took place on his first arrival, that Demosthenes advised the people not to receive him, and that Philocles, the general in command at Munychia, was ordered to prevent his entrance. Philocles, indeed, appears afterward to have disobeyed this order;† but it is probable that he did not immediately allow Harpalus to land. The fullest account we have of the proceedings of Harpalus, on his first appearance in the roads of Munychia, is contained in the few words of Diodorus;‡ that, “finding no one to listen to him, he left his mercenaries at Tænarus, and, with a part of his treasure, came himself to implore the protection of the people.” All the other authors describe him as having arrived but once,§ and this is easily explained if, on his first coming, he was not allowed to land; but still it is possible that, even on that occasion, he found an opportunity of distributing a part of his gold among some of the leading men, and, perhaps, may have concerted with Philocles that he should be admitted when he returned with a

single vessel. The sum which he brought back with him was a little more than 750 talents: enough, certainly, to buy the greater part of the venal orators, and many yielded to the temptation.

That Demades—whose avowed maxim it was to take whatever was offered to him\*—was of this number, can only appear surprising, as inconsistent with his Macedonian politics; but it would only have been so in any other man. Phocion's son-in-law, too, did not desert the friend whom he had before so humbly served; and it is said that Harpalus ventured to solicit Phocion himself with offers which were, of course, rejected.† But the most interesting question connected with this transaction relates to the conduct of Demosthenes. Whether he was one of those who accepted a bribe from Harpalus, has been a disputed point from his own day to ours. It will appear from the following narrative that the evidence cannot be considered as quite conclusive on either side; all that can be proved in his favour is, that the more fully the facts of the case are stated, the more glaring are the absurdities and contradictions involved in the suppositions of his guilt, while the few facts which tend that way may be very easily reconciled with the supposition of his innocence.

The part which he took in the public debates on the affair is known from good authority; mostly from that of his contemporaries and accusers. It is universally admitted that he was one of those who, at the first, opposed the reception of Harpalus. After the return of Harpalus to Athens, when he had gained over several of the orators to his side, envoys came from several quarters, from Antipater, from Olympia, and, it seems, also from Philoxenus, a Macedonian, who filled a high office in Asia Minor,‡ to require that he should be given up. Demosthenes and Phocion both resisted this demand; and Demosthenes carried a decree, by which it was directed that the treasure should be lodged in the citadel, to be restored to Alexander, and he himself was empowered to receive it. Its amount was declared by Harpalus himself; but, out of the 750 talents, no more than 308 remained in his possession. It was clear that nearly 450 had found their way into other hands.§ Demosthenes now caused another decree to be passed, by which the Areopagus was directed to investigate the case; and he proposed that, instead of the ordinary penalty—tenfold the amount of the bribe—capital punishment should be inflicted on the offenders. A very rigid inquiry was instituted: the houses of all suspected persons—with the single exception of one who had been just married—were searched: the Areopagus made its report against several, and among them was Demosthenes himself. He was the first who was brought to trial,|| was found guilty,

\* Dinarch, Dem., § 107; *ὁμολογῶν λαμβάνειν καὶ ἀψεύθει*.

† Plutarch (Phoc., 21) makes him offer 700 talents, nearly all he had brought; and the rest would be comprised in *τῶλλα πέννα*.

‡ Pausan., ii., 33, 4. There seems to be no reason whatever for questioning this fact, unless we choose also to deny that Philoxenus took any part in the business. But the act is confirmed by Plutarch, De Vit. Pad., 5, a passage which seems to have been overlooked.

§ Photius, Bekk., p. 494, a.

|| Droysen (Al., p. 533) not only denies this fact, but thinks it an argument against the genuineness of the second letter attributed to Demosthenes, that the writer makes

\* Droysen (Alex., p. 534) assumes, on the authority of the adverse pleader (Dinarch., § 97), that Demosthenes fabricated these charges to shelter himself. He does not notice the case of Polyæctus Cydantides (Dinarch., Dem., § 86), which proves that such suspicions were not confined to him. And who can doubt, under the circumstances of the time, that there was reasonable ground for them?

† Dinarchus, Philocl., init. § xvii., 108.

‡ Boeside Plutarch, Phoc., Dem., X. Orat. Vit., Dinarchus (Dem., § 115) speaks just in the same way: *συνεργία περί τὸν Ἀργεῖον κατέχοντα καὶ τὴν ἀφέντα*.

and condemned to pay fifty talents. Being unable to raise this sum, he was thrown into prison, but soon after made his escape, and went into exile.

It must be owned that, if we knew no more than this about the case, it would require a stronger faith than is generally placed in the agacity and purity of the Athenian tribunals to be convinced that he was guilty. But it is either the report of the Areopagus, or the judgment of the popular tribunal, that has been the chief ground of suspicion against him. It has been a story told by Plutarch, and, apparently, confirmed by a great number of contemporary allusions. According to Plutarch,\* Demosthenes at first warned the people not to receive Harpalus, and so involve themselves in war with Alexander, on a ground neither necessary nor just. But a few days after, when an inventory was taken of the treasure, his eyes were struck by a golden goblet of very fine workmanship; and when night came, Harpalus, who had perceived his admiration and longing for it, sent it to his house, full of gold pieces to the amount of twenty talents. The next day he orator appeared in the assembly, which met to deliberate on the subject, with wrappings about his neck, and, when called upon to speak, made signs that he was disabled by a sore throat. But there were some present who already knew the secret, and the pretext was received with sarcastic allusions to the bribe which he had taken. It immediately became the subject of many bitter jests; and when he afterwards attempted to defend himself in the assembly, his voice was drowned in a tumult of popular indignation.

That Plutarch should have adopted so amusing a story without any misgiving, was to be expected.† But had it not affected the charac-

ter of Demosthenes, we might have been surprised to find it repeated by modern writers, far more learned and sagacious than Plutarch, with as much confidence as if there was nothing in it either improbable, or inconsistent with admitted facts.\* Some of the slighter difficulties which raise a doubt about its truth are, that Demosthenes should have accepted a bribe from Harpalus, after the decree had been passed by which the whole treasure was to be taken out of the hands of Harpalus, and committed, for a time, to his own keeping; that he should have selected a bribe which exposed him to the greatest danger of detection; that his accuser, Dinarchus, should not only have made no allusion to the goblet, but should mention twenty talents as the whole sum which Demosthenes had received. That part of the anecdote which relates to the orator's silence is referred by another author—who, in the same passage, appears to confound Demosthenes and Demades—to a totally different occasion;† and, at least, it seems impossible that, in any part of the proceedings concerning Harpalus, Demosthenes should have been driven to any pretext for silence, when he was expected to speak on the question. Even if he had not himself previously opposed the surrender of Harpalus, he might surely have done so without suspicion, when Phocion recommended the same course. After the decree had been passed to retain the treasure, this was all that Harpalus had to desire; and so far Demosthenes openly espoused his cause. There is, therefore, no motive that can easily be conceived for his silence. Still, the scene in the assembly may be rejected as an immaterial circumstance—as it is in itself, though it has had more weight than any other with most readers—and yet the general fact, that Demosthenes received a bribe from Harpalus, may be thought not the less credible. And

Demosthenes say he had been the first tried (p. 1470, τῷ πρώτῳ δικάσθαι), whereas Dinarchus (p. 170) testifies that several were tried before him. For want of the edition which Droysen refers to, I am unable to ascertain the passage of Dinarchus which he has in view, and can only conjecture that it may be one (p. 100, § 64), which might possibly, if it stood alone, seem to admit of such an inference, as it is to be explained by reference to p. 98, § 64, of an earlier transaction. But what is certain is, that Dinarchus testifies, in the most distinct and unequivocal terms, and more than once, that Demosthenes was the first of the persons found guilty by the Areopagus who was brought to trial (p. 103): τιμωρίας ἔνεκα τῆς κατὰ τῶν ἐνίκων ὁρῶν αἰς ἀποδοῦσαι Δημοσθένους δολογίας πρώτος; and a little lower down, ἀφῆκε τὸν πρώτον δολογηθῆντα πρὸς βῆμα. If course the accuracy of the writer of the letter on this point neither establishes its genuineness, nor the force of the argument there grounded on the fact. I hardly understand another objection which Droysen makes to the same passage in the letter, in which the writer asks, What plea, if those which saved the persons who were tried after me, did I omit? Droysen affirms that Demades and Aristogeiton were both condemned after Demosthenes. I do not see how this contradicts the letter, if true. But with regard to Aristogeiton, I cannot find the passage of Dinarchus to which Droysen refers. In the third letter of Demosthenes (p. 1483) the contrary is asserted: ἐπὶ οἷς Ἀριστογείτονα ἐφίκαται, ἐπὶ τοῖς Δημοσθένει ἐκδοθέντες. I will now notice, that in the oration of Dinarchus against Philocrates, there is a passage which might seem to prove that Philocrates was the first tried (p. 110): ὑπαρκτός τὸν δῆμον ἅπαντα αὐτὸν τοῦτον γενομένην καὶ προκτεριζομένην πρῶτον τῶν ἄλλων ἐπὶ τῇ τιμωρίᾳ ἐν βῆμα δόσθαι. But whether this relates to the proceedings in the Areopagus, or merely to popular belief and rumour, it cannot be admitted to contradict the express assertion in the speech against Demosthenes. \* Demosth., 25.

† He must have taken an entirely different view of the case when he wrote the passage (Phoc., § 1) where he says that Harpalus saw the orators who had accepted his bribes changing sides and accusing him to avoid detection, while

Phocion, who had taken nothing, paid some regard to his safety as well as to the public interest.

\* Droysen (A.L., p. 531) relates the story, according to Plutarch, in its most glaringly absurd and incredible form, and then indulges in a sneer at Niebuhr for his belief in the integrity of Demosthenes: perverting, however, the sense of the expression to which he alludes (Nieb., XI. Schrift, p. 467, or Philolog. Museum, i., p. 487), by which Niebuhr only meant to describe the undeviating consistency of the orator's public conduct. The unfortunate phrase has also, it seems, been considered as profane.

† Aulus Gell., N. A., xi., 9. Droysen merely observes that Gellius erroneously refers the story to an earlier occasion, on which Demosthenes was bribed. Gellius reports it from Critolaus; and certainly the story he relates is not, like Plutarch's, a string of absurdities and contradictions. In that, a sufficient cause is assigned for the orator's vocal silence. But whether the story in this shape belonged to Demosthenes or not, is the more doubtful, as the sequel, at least, could only be attributed with any probability to Demades, who, we know, made no secret of his venality, even if it had not been related of him—as Gellius mentions in the next chapter—by C. Gracchus. That the comic poet Timocles (Athen., viii., p. 391) mentioned fifty talents as the bribe which Demosthenes received, does not, as Droysen truly observes, affect the main question. It only shows how little stress ought to be laid on any argument which might be drawn from the supposed notoriety of the fact. It would appear, from the same passage of Timocles, to have been equally notorious that Hyperides the prosecutor had also shared the gold of Harpalus. The jest of Corydus on the goblet (Athen., vi., 47), "The man who calls other people swillpots has drained the great bowl himself" (οὗτος τοὺς ἄλλους ἀρπαγομένους, καλῶν αὐτὸς τὴν μεγάλην βωτάνην), is not unimportant, as it shows how Demosthenes may have incurred the ill will of many besides his political opponents. Those who felt themselves wounded by his censure of their vices were of course delighted to propagate any scandal about him.

so, in another account of the transaction, which is, in some respects, fuller, we find it related that, though he at first opposed the admission of Harpalus, he was afterward induced, by a bribe of a thousand darics, to change sides, and, when the Athenians wished to give Harpalus up to Antipater, dissuaded them from this step, but proposed that the treasure should be lodged in the citadel.

One point is indisputably clear, that Demosthenes, whether bribed or not, did not change sides, unless Phocion did so too. His conduct, from the beginning to the end of the affair, is, at least, perfectly consistent with itself, and with the course which has appeared to most observers in later times, as it did to him and Phocion, at once the safest and the most honourable. So that, even if it were certain that he was justly condemned, he would still be entitled to the benefit of an excuse, similar to that which has been alleged in favour of some celebrated English patriots of the seventeenth century, who labour under a like imputation.\* But the reputation of Demosthenes has not been left in quite so precarious a state. A fact was brought to light—we know not precisely how long after—which, at least, counterbalances such a presumption as is raised against him by the judicial decision. Harpalus, notwithstanding the efforts of Demosthenes and Phocion in his behalf, was committed to prison, to await Alexander's pleasure. He, however, made his escape, returned to Tenarus, and thence crossed over with his troops, and the rest of his treasure, to Crete. Here he was assassinated by Thimbreon, one of his confidential officers. His steward fled to Rhodes, where he was seized by order of Philoxenus, and forced to disclose the names of those who had accepted bribes from his master. The list was sent to Athens, and the name of Demosthenes—though Philoxenus is said to have been his personal enemy—did not appear in it.†

As to the trial itself, it must be observed that the inquiry made by the Areopagus, though Demosthenes had offered to stake his life on the result, was but a preliminary proceeding, and that its judgment was nearly in the nature of a finding by a grand jury: it was afterward to be

confirmed or set aside by a court of 1500 common jurors. It may easily be imagined that, in such a case, unless the evidence offered had been utterly colourless, the Areopagus would not be inclined to take on itself the responsibility of an acquittal; yet, in the speech which Dinarchus wrote for one of the prosecutors, the whole stress of the argument is made to rest, not on the nature of the evidence which had been brought, but partly on the authority of that venerable tribunal, and partly on general invectives against the defendant. Dinarchus tacitly admits that the evidence was not quite conclusive, and that the truth might be more fully discovered if the slaves of Harpalus, who had been carried to Alexander, should be sent down to be examined at Athens. We have, indeed, ground to believe that the only apparent foundation of the charge was, that Demosthenes had neglected some of the precautions which it was thought incumbent on him to have taken to relieve himself from responsibility, and that it arose from the vexation which was generally felt at the escape of Harpalus.\* That extraordinary engines were set at work to procure his condemnation, appears from the list of his accusers, among whom, besides Himeræus, Patrocles, Menesæchmus, the persecutor of Lycurgus and Stratoles, who rivalled Demades in impudence and profligacy, we find the names of Pytheas and Hyperides, both previously his partisans. The speech of Dinarchus enables us, also, to perceive the nature of the influence which was exerted against Demosthenes. Dinarchus, indeed, insinuates that Demosthenes was at bottom in the Macedonian interest; he wishes to give a turn to the mission to Olympia, as if it proved the orator's credit with Alexander; he accuses him and his friend Polyæctus of a secret understanding with Demades. But it is not on this account that he represents the safety of the state as involved in the issue of the trial; he plainly intimates that a war with Alexander will be the consequence of an acquittal.† It was, apparently, to give greater force to this argument that the prosecutors brought Demosthenes to trial first. Few of those who were denounced by the Areopagus were acquitted; but we hear of one Aristogeiton who escaped, though his case strongly resembled that of Demosthenes. On the other hand, Demades was convicted, but either was very lightly fined, or neglected to pay the penalty; and he remained, without any diminution of his influence, at Athens. All these indications lead us to the conclusion that Demosthenes fell a victim to political intrigues, which derived their chief strength from the critical position in which Athens was placed by her resistance to Alexander's decree for the restoration of the exiles.

Another charge, of a very different kind, which seems not to have occurred to any of the ancients, has been brought against him for his

\* See Mackintosh, *View of the Reign of James II.*, p. 330. "In these circumstances, some of them (the English enemies of the court) are said by the French ambassador to have so far copied their prince as to have received French money, though they are not charged with being, like him, induced by it to adopt any measures at variance with their avowed principles. It was not pretended that the largesses were to influence the public conduct of the parties."

† Pausanias, ii., 33. Droysen labours with all his might to get rid of the inference which has been drawn from this fact. Pausanias, indeed, says that Philoxenus *πάντα ἐπέθετο, ὅτι τὸν Ἀρκελάου τὴν εὐχὴν ἐλάφους*. But this may be an error. The steward may have been left behind at Tenarus when his master went the second time to Athens (or he might not have known of the transaction with Demosthenes). Then, again, Pausanias mentions some circumstances which are not confirmed by other authority, as that Philoxenus demanded Harpalus from the Athenians. When, however, Droysen adds, among the circumstances which excite his suspicions, that one Pausanias is named by Pausanias as the murderer of Harpalus, this is a mere mistake. Pausanias only says that there were some who so related the story; and his knowledge of such a report surely cannot weaken the authority of his own evidence. But, even if he had adopted it himself, it would be a new rule of historical criticism to reject the substance of a narrative because it contains some improbable circumstances. In this case the doubtful circumstances can hardly be called improbable.

\* V. X. Or. *φύγιοντες Ἀρχάου ἐκ τοῦ δεσποτηρίου αἰλίαν εἶχον ὁ Δημοσθένης σωροδίκας, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ τὸν δολὸν τὸν ἀνακαταθέντων μεμνημένος μὴ τὴν τῶν φιλασσομένων ἀμφιλαν*. If this was so, there is an error of Plutarch's story. It appears that Demosthenes was never suspected before the flight of Harpalus. Droysen has taken no notice of this infinitely more natural and probable version of the story, except to mention that Demosthenes had given no account of the money committed to his custody.

† P. 98, *γράφει αὐτὸν Δημόσθενες πολέμῳ ἑστῆαι*;



conduct as a statesman in this affair. It has been alleged\* that, unless he was prepared for unqualified submission to Macedonia, he ought to have seized the opportunity presented by the arrival of Harpalus, and to have advised the people to receive him with open arms, and to make use of his treasure and his troops for a war with Alexander. It does not, however, seem necessary to conclude that the faculties of Demosthenes had been weakened by age because he did not see the need of either of these alternatives. It might be a sufficient answer to say, that a war, undertaken for Harpalus and his stolen treasure, would have exposed the Athenians to the charge of injustice and wanton aggression; it would have deprived them of all claim to the sympathy of the other Greeks in their quarrel with Alexander. Such, in fact, is the ground which Demosthenes himself is reported to have taken in his first advice on the question; and the event proved that there was no necessity for the sacrifice either of liberty or of honour. The Athenians did not pollute themselves by a connexion with Harpalus; and they suffered no detriment from the want either of his treasure or of his mercenaries in the war which soon after broke out. This, indeed, Demosthenes could not have foreseen; but still it seems hard to charge a statesman with incapacity because he did not perceive that it was impossible honesty could be the best policy in a case where the event proved it to be so.

And yet it appears that Demosthenes had not concealed from himself or from the people, that a war might arise which would demand extraordinary sacrifices. He had spoken of an occasion which might require that they should melt down the ornaments of the women, their plate, and even all the treasure of the temples.† This emergency can have been no other than that which might be looked for if Alexander should not be persuaded by their envoys to revoke or modify this edict for the return of the exiles. One effect which they had to apprehend from it was, that their colonists who had been last planted in Samos, would be forced to resign their possessions to the families of their former owners. But there was also reason to fear that it might lead to a state of things like the tyranny of the Thirty; disputes must have arisen, which would have afforded a pretext for the introduction of a Macedonian garrison into the city; there would have been no security either for public or private rights but the moderation of a powerful party, irritated by the remembrance of past sufferings, and resolved at any price to guard against them for the future. It may, at least, be presumed that when Demosthenes spoke of such sacrifices as have been just mentioned, his hearers must have felt that the occasion was worthy of them. That this was the prevailing impression at Athens, is both expressly asserted by Curtius,‡ and seems to be proved by the burst of popular feeling which took place there immediately on the news of Alexander's death; and we may easily believe, Justin's statement,§ that the publication of his edict in favour of the exiles led many other states openly to avow their resolution to maintain their

liberty by arms. Those in which this sentiment was strongest might still well try the effect of negotiation before they resorted to an attempt seemingly so desperate.

It is a different question, which the meager accounts that have been preserved of these times leave in great obscurity, whether any preparations for war had actually been made at Athens before Alexander's death. It can hardly be supposed that any such measures were taken until the envoys, who had been sent to remonstrate with him, returned from Babylon; and the interval between their return and the arrival of the news of his death cannot have been very long. Yet that in this interval, at least, something was done with a view to a war, which was believed to be impending, may be regarded as nearly certain.\* For it was at this time that a division of the mercenaries, who had been disbanded by the satraps in compliance with Alexander's orders, was brought over to Europe by the Athenian Leosthenes.† Leosthenes himself had been for a time in Alexander's service,‡ and though still young, had gained a high reputation; but it seems that he had quitted it in disgust,§ and had already returned to Athens, and that he went over to Asia to collect as many as he could of the disbanded troops, whom he landed at Cape Tænarus. It can hardly be supposed that he did this without some ulterior object; and his connexion with Hyperides—the chief of the Anti-Macedonian party, after Demosthenes had withdrawn—and his subsequent proceedings, scarcely leave room to doubt that the object was to have a force in readiness to resist Antipater if he should attempt to enforce Alexander's edict. When the news of Alexander's death reached Athens, Phocion and Demades professed to disbelieve the report. Demades bade the people not to listen to it; such a corpse would long before have filled the world with its odour. Phocion desired them to have patience; and, when many voices asseverated the truth of the report, replied, "If he is dead to-day, he will still be dead to-morrow, and the next day, so that we may deliberate at our leisure, and the more securely." But their remonstrances were disregarded. The council of Five Hundred held a meeting with closed doors; and Leosthenes was commissioned immediately to engage the troops at Tænarus,

\* Though Gruert (*Analekten*, p. 236) has certainly been led into an error on this point by an anachronism of Diodorus (xvii., 111) which must be corrected from xviii., 9, his view of the state of things at Athens seems in substance perfectly correct; and there is no weight in Droysen's argument (*Al.*, p. 537), that after the retirement of Demosthenes no one remained to animate the people to resistance. It does not appear that Hyperides had changed his politics; and it is clear, both from Pausanias and Diodorus, that Leosthenes was then at Athens.

† Pausanias, i., 25, 5; viii., 56, 5. In the last passage he erroneously represents Leosthenes as having brought over the whole, amounting to 50,000 men.

‡ Strabo, ix., p. 301, Tauchn. 'Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐταίρος. Gruert (*Analekten*, p. 233) suspects that Strabo may have confounded Leosthenes with Leonnatus. This, however, is highly improbable; but the expression may mean no more than is stated in the text.

§ Diodorus, xvii., 111, μάλιστα δυντακόμενον τοῖς Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πράγμασιν. He is described by Plutarch (*Phoc.*, 23) as μωρῶτικος. He had, however, been left a widower with children (*Paus.*, i., 1, 3), but was just on the point of marrying again, as appears from a story found by Gruert in Jerome adv. Jovin., i., p. 33.

\* By Droysen, *Al.*, p. 532.

† Dinarchus, p. 99.

‡ x., 2, 8.

§ xiii., 5, 5.

about 8000 men, but secretly, and in his own name, that Antipater might not suspect the purpose, and that the people might have the more time for other preparations. Confirmation of the fact was received shortly after from the mouth of eyewitnesses, who had been present at Babylon when it took place.

As soon as all doubt on this point was removed, there was an end of hesitation and secrecy. The popular feeling burst forth, like a flood long pent up. Phocion and the orators of the Macedonian party endeavoured in vain to stem it. Their influence was gone; as Demades, before long, experienced to his cost. None were listened to but those who recommended the most decided and vigorous measures. Hyperides and Polyæuctus, the early coadjutors of Demosthenes, were now among the foremost to propose such as, if he had been present, he would certainly have approved. It was resolved, without delay, to send a supply of arms and money to Leosthenes for his levies at Tænarus, with directions no longer to make a secret of the object for which they were destined. The remainder of the treasures of Harpalus, and the penalties which had been recovered, furnished the means. It was very important, now that a prospect was once more opened of a general confederacy among the Greeks for a national cause, that Athens should immediately make her determination known as widely as possible. By another decree, the people declared itself ready to assert the liberty of Greece, and to deliver the cities which were held by Macedonian garrisons; for this purpose, a fleet was to be equipped of forty trireme galleys, and 200 of the larger size, with four banks of oars. All the citizens under forty years of age were to arm; those of seven tribes to prepare for foreign service, the rest to remain at home for the defence of Attica. Lastly, envoys were appointed to the principal states of Greece, to announce that Athens was again, as in the days of her ancient glory, about to place herself in the front of the battle with the common enemy, and to set her last resources, men, money, and ships, on the venture; and to exhort all who wished for independence to follow her example.

The success of the Athenian negotiations appears not to have been so great in Peloponnesus as in the northern states, though these were exposed to the enemy's first attacks. Sparta, Arcadia, and Achaia, kept aloof from the struggle to the end; whether restrained by jealousy of Athens, or by the remembrance of the last unfortunate contest with Macedonia. Messene, Elis, Sicyon, Phlius, Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Argos, joined the confederacy; but even of these, several appear to have held back until they were encouraged by the first success of the other allies. In Northern Greece, Leosthenes himself was one of the most active and successful envoys. As soon as he had completed the equipment of his levies at Tænarus, leaving them, it seems, under the command of an inferior officer, he went over to Ætolia. He found the Ætolians, who had been alarmed and incensed by Alexander's threats about Cœniadæ, heartily inclined to the national cause, and obtained a

promise of 7000 men. He then proceeded to solicit aid from Locris, Phocis, and others of the neighbouring states. Almost everywhere, from the borders of Macedonia to Attica, a good spirit prevailed. The Thessalians, indeed, did not immediately declare themselves, but probably gave private assurances of their favourable disposition. Pelinna is mentioned as the only town in the north of Thessaly which did not, sooner or later, enter into the league; and Thebes in Phthiotis. In the vale of the Spercheius, the towns of Malea and Heraclea alone refused their aid. But the Dolopians, the mountaineers of Ceta, all the towns of Doris, Carystus in Eubœa, the Locrians and Phocians, many of the tribes in the western valleys of Pindus, as the Ænians, Alyzæans, and Athamantians, the Leucadians, and a part, at least, it seems, of the Acarnanians, sent their contingents. Even from beyond the borders of Greece, the allies received some auxiliaries: from the Molossian chief, Aryptæus, who, however, afterward deserted and betrayed them, and, in very small number, from Illyria and Thrace. But the policy by which Thebes had been destroyed, and its territory divided among the Bœotian towns, was now attended with an effect more disastrous to Greece than the conqueror could have foreseen. It was known that the success of the Greeks would be followed by the restoration of Thebes: the Theban exiles probably formed a strong body in the Greek army; and hence the Bœotians, though surrounded on all sides by the forces of the confederacy, zealously adhered to the Macedonian cause, which was that of their private interest, and their inveterate hatred to the fallen city.

The movements of Leosthenes, before the opening of the campaign, are very imperfectly reported by our extant authors. It might be supposed, from the manner in which they are described by Diodorus, that he never returned to Athens. This, however, is highly improbable in itself; and it seems to be indicated by Plutarch's anecdotes that he came back at the head of the troops he had collected, and that he had to encounter strenuous opposition from Phocion and others, who dreaded the sacrifices and risk of the war. The language attributed to Phocion may serve to exhibit the temper and views of his party, though we need not adopt the assertion of Diodorus, that this party included all the men of property in Athens. Phocion affected to sneer at the young general, who spoke in a high and confident strain of his performances and prospects. "Your speeches, young man," he said, "are like cypress-trees, stately and lofty, but bearing no fruit." And when Leosthenes was provoked to ask, what benefit Athens had reaped from Phocion's generalship during the many years that he had borne the title, "It has been no small one," he replied, "that our fellow-citizens have been buried in their own graves." Again, Hyperides asked him, When he would advise the Athenians to go to war? "Whenever," was the answer, "I shall see the young willing to keep their ranks, the rich to contribute their money, and the orators to abstain from that of the public." The armament collected by Leosthenes, which excited general admiration, produced no

such effect on Phocion; and when he was asked what he thought of the preparations now, he replied that they were well enough for a single heat, but that he feared for the end of the race, seeing that the city had no more money, or ships, or men, to carry on the contest with, if these should be lost.\*

Diodorus, apparently following the opinion of an author who considered Phocion as representing the wisdom and foresight of Greece, or who judged of the undertaking from the event, asserts that the most intelligent Greeks condemned the rashness of the Athenians, who had not even taken a lesson from the fate of Thebes, but, in their eagerness for glory, heedless of consequences, had rushed into a premature and unnecessary conflict with an irresistible power. If, however, it is once admitted that it was desirable for Greece to shake off the Macedonian yoke—and this, according to Diodorus, none of those intelligent Greeks was base enough to deny—it seems that something may be said to vindicate the Athenians from the charge of extreme imprudence. It may be admitted that, in this case, as in most others, they were guided rather by an instinctive love of freedom than by sober calculations of expedience, as the Rhodians, who, on the news of Alexander's death, immediately expelled the Macedonian garrison from their city; but Phocion himself could not point out any time when they might make the attempt with a fairer prospect of success. He could only taunt the people with their presumed unfitness for any great enterprise: a sneer which, so far as it contained any truth, would be always equally true, but which, as applied to the question, was triumphantly refuted by the event. But the deeper the admiration and the fear with which the Greeks had been impressed by Alexander's genius and fortune, the more excusable was it that they should believe his premature death would be immediately followed by the total dissolution of his huge empire. The news of his death must have been accompanied by some accounts, probably exaggerated, of the subsequent tumults and beginning of a civil war at Babylon; and even the composition, by which the throne was to be shared between an idiot and an infant yet unborn, did not hold out much promise of permanent tranquillity. The more was known of the character of Alexander's principal officers, the less likely must it have seemed that they would acquiesce in such an adjustment. It was to be expected that they would be too much occupied with their own contests for power to be able to afford aid to Antipater, even if there were not some who found it suited their interest to ally themselves with the Greeks. Macedonia itself—almost drained of its military population by Alexander's incessant demands—had never been weaker, never more threatened by its northern and western neighbours. It was not extravagant to hope that the war might be ended in one short campaign, which would raise Greece to the rank of an independent and formidable

power. The singular combination of circumstances through which this was frustrated proved that it had not been rashly conceived.

Antipater received the tidings of Alexander's death—to him no mournful event—nearly at the same time with those of the movements in Greece. His situation was one of great difficulty and danger; and it appears that he sent an embassy to soothe the Athenians, and to persuade them to peace; for it was probably on this occasion that, when his envoys extolled the mildness of his character, Hyperides answered, We do not want a mild master.\* Antipater can only have hoped to gain time by this step, and he greatly needed it. The whole force immediately at his disposal was small, and, if he marched against Greece, it would be necessary to leave a part of it for the protection of Macedonia. He had no clear prospect of aid but from one quarter, and that a distant one; for Craterus, with his army of veterans, had advanced no farther than Cilicia; and, however he might be induced to quicken his march, it would be long before he could reach the theatre of war. Nevertheless, Antipater determined not to wait for re-enforcements, nor to remain on the defensive, but to seek the enemy. The force which he was able to bring into the field amounted to no more than 13,000 foot and 600 horse. It might seem that he, rather than the Athenians, was acting rashly, when, with so small an army, he ventured to invade Greece; and perhaps he relied somewhat too confidently on the superiority of the Macedonian discipline and tactics, and on the recollection of his victory over Agis. It must, however, be observed that he calculated on the support of the Thessalians, and probably of some other northern states; and he might hope, by a rapid movement, to crush the confederacy before it had collected its forces, or, at least, to prevent it from receiving fresh accessions of strength. He had also ordered Sippas, whom he left to supply his place in Macedonia, to levy troops with the utmost diligence, and may have expected to be speedily re-enforced by these recruits.† His coffers were well filled, for he had received a large supply of treasure from Alexander; and the fleet which had brought it over, consisting of 110 galleys, remained with him, and was now ordered to attend the operations of the army.

Thermopylæ was the place appointed for the rendezvous of the allies—a position by which they were enabled to cover their own territory, and to prevent a junction between the enemy and the Boeotians. It is not clear whether it ought to be considered as an effect of the tardiness which Demosthenes so often complained of, that the contingents of the northern states were assembled before the Athenian troops had begun their march. Læsthenes had joined them with his mercenaries, and, perhaps, with all the Peloponnesian levies. He was elected commander-in-chief, not more in honour of Athens than on account of the confidence which was reposed in his abilities.‡ The Athenians

\* In Vit. X. Or., the same sentiment and image (contrast of *εὐδοκία* and *δολέχου*) are attributed to Demosthenes, on the occasion of Antipater's defeat; and Agnistratus is named as the friend to whom Demosthenes expressed his fears.

† Diodor., xviii., 12.

\* Vit. X. Or., Hyperides, p. 850, A., *ὅτι δαδύμα χήματος δεικνύου*.

† That they were not supposed to be needed, as Droysen represents, p. 67, for the defence of Macedonia, seems to follow from the expression of Diodorus, xviii., 12, *δοῦς ὅρπα τῶν τὰς τοῖς ἱκανοῦς*.

‡ Pausanias, i., 25, 6.

could spare no more than 5000 infantry and 500 cavalry, of Attic troops: to these they added 2000 mercenaries. But now the Bœotians, encouraged, perhaps, by the tidings of Antipater's approach, collected their forces to oppose the passage of this little army, and encamped near Plataea, no doubt in very superior numbers, to watch the passes of Cithæron. Leosthenes, apprized of their movement, hastened with a division of his troops to the relief of his countrymen, effected a junction with them, and gave battle to the enemy. He gained a complete victory, raised a trophy, and returned, with this happy omen of more important success, to his camp.

Antipater was joined on his march by a strong body of Thessalian cavalry, under Meno of Pharsalus, which gave him, in this arm, a decided advantage over the allies. He drew up his forces, it seems, in the vale of the Spercheius, and offered battle. Leosthenes did not wait to be attacked. It is possible that he may have had a secret understanding with the Thessalian general. But his army was 30,000 strong; and it may have been the sight of his superior force that fixed Meno's wavering inclination. The fortune of the day was decided by the Thessalian cavalry, which went over in the heat of the battle to the Greeks.\* We are not informed what loss Antipater suffered; but he did not think it safe to attempt to retreat through Thessaly. He looked about for the nearest place of refuge, and threw himself into the town of Lamia, which stood in a strong position on the south side of Mount Othrys, about three miles from the sea, began to repair the fortifications, and laid in a supply of arms and provisions, furnished perhaps by the fleet. His only remaining hope was, that he might be able to sustain a siege until succours should arrive. Leosthenes immediately proceeded to fortify a camp near the town, and, after having in vain challenged the enemy to a fresh engagement, made several attempts to take it by assault. But the place was too strong, the garrison too numerous; the assailants were repulsed with the loss of many lives; and at length he found himself obliged to turn the siege into a blockade.

Antipater had no reason to be much ashamed of his defeat, nor the Greeks to be very proud of their victory; but it everywhere produced a great effect on the public mind. It was the first advantage that had been gained for many years over the Macedonian arms, which were beginning, perhaps, to be thought invincible; and it had certainly reduced an enemy, late the master of Greece, to a state of extreme distress and danger. At Athens the news was received with boundless exultation; the streets were thronged with festal processions; the altars smoked with continued sacrifices of thanksgiving. The orators who had advocated the war loudly triumphed in the seeming fulfilment of their sanguine predictions. Phocion alone, perhaps, among those who wished well to their country, would take no part in the universal joy, and did not suppress his gloomy

forebodings. As the glad tidings flowed in, he bitterly asked, "When shall we have done conquering?" And when he was asked whether he could have desired better success for himself, replied, "No; but better counsels."† The confidence of the people was raised to its utmost height by an embassy from Antipater, by which he sued for peace. We are not informed what terms he proposed; but his overtures were probably treated as a sign of despair. The people looked upon him as already in their power, and demanded that he should surrender at discretion.‡ Yet they did not relax their efforts, but made use of the advantage they had gained to procure additional strength for the common cause. Polyæuctus was sent with other envoys into Peloponnesus, to rouse the states which had hitherto remained neutral to action. Here he was opposed by some of the traitors whom Athens had lately cast out from her bosom; but he was seconded by the voluntary exertions of his old colleague Demosthenes.

As soon as Alexander's death released the Athenians from the restraint which his power had imposed on them, the orators of the Macedonian party, deprived of the foreign stay on which they had hitherto leaned, sank under the contempt and indignation of the people, and several of them paid the penalty of their former insolence and baseness. Demades was, perhaps, most mildly treated in proportion to his offences. The remembrance of some good offices which he had rendered to his country in times of calamity might plead in his behalf; his very impudence rendered his servility less odious; since, at least, he could not be charged with treachery or dissimulation; and his extraordinary talents, in which he did not acknowledge even Demosthenes as his superior,§ had more than their due weight with such a people as the Athenians. Yet he was brought to trial on several indictments; among others, as the author of the decree which conferred divine honours on Alexander, for which he was condemned to a fine of ten talents; a very trifling sum for his means; especially if, as seems probable, the penalty which he had incurred for the bribe he took from Harpalus had been remitted. But the most important effect of the sentences passed on him appear to have been, that he was partially disfranchised, so as to be made incapable of taking part in public affairs. The bronze statues, also, with which he had been honoured, and the city disgraced,¶ were melted down, and applied to purposes the most expressive of contempt and loathing for the original.|| He, however, remained at Athens in the enjoyment of his ill-gotten wealth, waiting till the accomplishment of Phocion's denunciations should raise him once more out of his ignominious obscurity, and should compel the people to listen to his voice. The timeserving Pytheas, the prosecutor of Demosthenes, and the witty glutton Callimædon,‡ who had been accused by Demosthenes

\* Plut., Phoc., 23. Timol., 6. † Diodorus, xviii., 18.

‡ Plut., Demosth., 10, 11, explained by Præc. Reip. Ger., 7.

§ Dinarchus, Demosth., § 104.

¶ Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Fr., 27, τοὺς Ἀνδρόνους (ἀνδρόπικτας) κατέσχευον τὴν ἀύλην.

‡ Nicknamed ὁ Κἀπνός, from his favourite shellfish (Athenæus, iii., 57.) He belonged to the Sixty, a club of

\* Diodorus, xviii., 12, distinctly represents the desertion of the Thessalian cavalry as having caused the loss of the battle; and it is surprising that Droysen should have adopted the supposition more honourable to the Greeks, that the victory was the cause of the desertion.

if a reasonable correspondence with the exiles at Megara, were also convicted, we know not on what charges, and were obliged, either by sentence of banishment, or to escape worse evils, to quit Athens. They now threw aside the mask, openly entered into the service of Macedonia, and were employed by Antipater to counteract the influence of the Athenian envoys in Peloponnesus with all the power of their oratory.

Demosthenes had not resigned himself so contentedly as Æschines to perpetual exile. It was, perhaps, a weakness, but one which does not lower him in our esteem, that he met the thought of it with less courage than that of death. He lingered mournfully, we are told, and impatiently waiting for a change which he could scarcely have hoped to see, on the coast of Trœzen, or the cliffs of Ægina,\* where he could still gaze on Athens, and might distinguish many scenes which recalled the recollection of his most glorious days. Sometimes, it is said, he gave vent to his grief in bitter complaints, which would have been worthier of Homer; as when, fixing his eye on the Acropolis, he was heard to exclaim, "Goddess, what favourites hast thou chosen! the owl, the serpent, and the Athenian people." The young men who sought his society, he would warn to shun that public life which he had too late discovered to be beset with fear, and envy, and danger, worse than death itself. But when he heard of the successes of Leosthenes, when he learned that an Athenian embassy was making the circuit of Peloponnesus to advocate the cause of national independence, and that it was thwarted at every step by Antipater's intrigues, his despondency and resentment vanished; he quitted his retreat, joined the envoys, and accompanied them to the end of their mission. To him it owed its most important results. He repelled the calumnies of Pytheas, who was not ashamed to resort to general invectives against Athens for the service of his employer.† The Arcadian congress was the most celebrated scene of their contests; and we are informed that Demosthenes not only overcame Pytheas in debate, but prevailed on the Arcadians to abandon the Macedonian alliance.‡ It does not appear, however, that they sent any succours to their countrymen.§ But Icyon, Argos, and even Corinth are mentioned among the states which were brought over to the league by his eloquence.||

There may be an error as to some of these names; but that his activity and success have, on the whole, been exaggerated, is proved by the consequences which ensued to himself.

Ke-makers, about which Athenæus, xiv., 3, has some curious details.

\* Schlosser, i., 3, p. 384, observes: Demosthenes, it is all known, fled to Megara. So, indeed, says Justin, xiii.; but the place where the exiles of the Macedonian party were assembled was certainly not that which he would have chosen for his sojourn. Plutarch's authority is infinitely preferable.

† Phylarchus in Plut., Dem., 27. Pytheas compared an Athenian embassy to asses' milk, which never comes but to a sick house. Demosthenes retorted, 'Yes: as a remedy.' ‡ Vit. X. Or., p. 846, C.

§ Justin., xiii., 5, 10.

|| Pausanias, viii., 6, 2, expressly says that they remained neutral; and this account seems so much more conformable to the known bias of the Arcadian politics, that it is too easy to see why the other should be thought more accurate.

The people was touched with gratitude and admiration by the report of his zeal and his services.\* His kinsman, Demon, took advantage of the general feeling to propose a decree for his recall. It was passed, and not in the form of an act of grace, but of a respectful invitation. A vessel was sent, by public authority, to bring him over from the place of his sojourn. When it returned with him to Piræus, a solemn procession, headed by the magistrates and the priests, came down to greet him, and to escort him back to the city. He now again raised his hands—perhaps to the goddess whom he had unjustly reproached—and congratulated himself on a return so much happier than that of Alcibiades, as it was the effect of the free good will of his fellow-citizens, not extorted from their fears. It was, indeed, a day of glory so pure—not to be effaced by a thousand scandalous anecdotes—that he might gladly have consented to the price which he afterward paid for it. The penalty to which he had been condemned still remained to be discharged; and it was one of those obligations which, it seems, could not be legally cancelled. But Demon contrived an expedient to reconcile law and equity. He carried a decree by which fifty talents were assigned to Demosthenes from the treasury, nominally to defray the cost of an altar, which was annually adorned at the public expense for one of the festivals.

But these bright gleams of joy and hope were soon to be overcast. The Greeks had been victorious in the first stage of the race, but that which was to decide the contest still remained, and it was destined to be a series of reverses. Antipater's fortune had sunk to the lowest point; it was now to be gradually gaining the ascendant. The first disaster which befell the Greek cause was the death of Leosthenes. Antipater had directed a sally against the besiegers, who were employed in the work of circumvallation. A sharp combat took place; and Leosthenes, hastening up to the support of

\* So Justin, xiii., 5, 11, and Plutarch, Demosth., 27, Vit. X. Or., p. 846, C. Droysen rejects these testimonies, and places the return of Demosthenes after the death of Leosthenes, chiefly because in the sixth letter, which he believes to be genuine, Demosthenes is made to mention Antiphras as commander-in-chief. I can see nothing in that letter, except its brevity and dryness, that entitles it to such confidence. But if it was written by Demosthenes, it must have been still later than Droysen himself supposes; for the battle alluded to in it can hardly be any other than that of Crannon, or, at the earliest, that in which Leonnatus fell. The whole groundwork of the letter seems as absurd as any that was ever invented by a sophist. Whatever the battle was, could the Athenians need to be informed about it by an eyewitness sent to them out of Peloponnesus by Demosthenes? Droysen does not explain how it happened that the recall of Demosthenes was delayed so long as he supposes was the case. He tells us, indeed—though without any evidence—of suspicions entertained against Demosthenes by his own party, which, however, were removed by the zeal he showed on the occasion of the embassy to Peloponnesus. What, then, either delayed or finally procured his recall? Droysen intimates that his letters may have had a great deal to do with it. But, not to notice the arbitrariness of this assumption, it seems sufficient to observe that the enthusiastic reception the orator met with indicates the impression made on the people by recent services, rather than a favour obtained with difficulty by written assurances of his good will, and a state of public feeling in which joy and hope were predominant.

† The comparison in Pausanias (iii., 6, 1) with the battles of Leuctra and Delium is a little strange, but must probably be understood to refer, not to the importance of this trifling engagement, but to the subsequent disasters, which Pausanias elsewhere (i., 25, 5) attributes to the loss of Leosthenes.

his men, was struck on the head by a stone from an engine, fell senseless, and was carried back to the camp, where he died, the third day after. He was buried. Diodorus says, with heroic honours; but it does not appear that in this respect he was distinguished from the other citizens who had fallen in the war, and were afterward interred with the usual pomp in the same ground which contained the sepulchres of the ancient heroes. The funeral oration was delivered by Hyperides. Diodorus thought it incredible that this task should have been assigned to him, unless in the absence of Demosthenes. But Demosthenes had discharged it on a former occasion; the honour might seem more properly due to Hyperides, both as a principal mover of the war, and on account of his close intimacy with Leosthenes.\* Even in eloquence he was esteemed by his contemporaries little inferior to Demosthenes; and he seems to have been roused by the theme, and by the presence of the great master, whom he had heard in the same place, to an extraordinary display of his art. A fragment has been spared—one of the very few that remain of his works—which seems to have belonged to this speech, and is not unworthy of the admiration it excited. It offers consolation to the survivors in the deathless glory of their lost friends, which was sufficient to compensate for length of days, and for every blessing of life. It was difficult to say anything new on such a topic, but the concluding sentence is remarkable. "If death is as the state of those who have not been born, they are released from disease, and grief, and from all the accidents to which the life of man is liable; but if, as we suppose, there remain in the unseen world sense, and capacity of divine favour, none can have a better title to it than those who have vindicated the profaned majesty of the gods." If this was an allusion to Alexander's impiety, it can only be said that language, which would have appeared extravagant in a political discussion, might very well suit this kind of sacred oratory.

It remained to be considered who should take the place of Leosthenes. The choice, we find, was left without dispute to Athens. It seems almost incredible that any should have thought of Phocion; yet we are informed that there was a strong disposition to appoint him. His political opponents dreaded, with reason, to see such a trust committed to a man who avowed such sentiments. One of them ironically professed that, as an old friend, he could not consent to expose so precious a life to such a risk. Phocion disclaimed his acquaintance, but thanked him for his good offices. Antipater, a young man who had acquired high reputation for courage and military skill, received the command.

But, in the mean while, succours were approaching for the relief of Antipater. Leonnatus had come down to take possession of his satrapy, with instructions from Perdicas to aid Eumenes in the conquest of Cappadocia; for it was known that Ariarathes would not be easily overpowered; and Antigonus was directed to co-operate with them for that purpose. He, however, had higher aims, and paid no at-

tention to the regent's orders. The hopes of Eumenes, therefore, rested wholly on Leonnatus, who, when he came to the Hellespont, still professed his intention to undertake the expedition. But, if he was ever in earnest about this enterprise, he was soon diverted from it by other projects. He had entered into a secret correspondence with Olympias, who, being in open enmity with Antipater, and very much dissatisfied with the recent arrangements, desired to form an alliance, through her daughter Cleopatra, the widowed queen of Epirus, with some one powerful enough to protect her interests. The history of such negotiations is seldom accurately known; it only appears that Leonnatus received a letter from Cleopatra, in which she promised him her hand if he came to Pella; with a sufficient force, it must be supposed, to overpower Antipater, and to secure the throne of Macedonia for himself. He was a man of sanguine temper, as well as of towering ambition, and eagerly grasped at the offer. While he was occupied with this scheme, but was still believed to be preparing for the expedition against Ariarathes, he received a message from Antipater, now blocked up in Lamia, to implore his speediest succour. Antipater's envoy had probably been chosen on account of his personal enmity to Eumenes. It was Hecateus, the tyrant of Cardia, against whom Eumenes was known to have exerted all his influence with Alexander, though without effect; and he was empowered to offer the hand of one of Antipater's daughters† to Leonnatus. Eumenes endeavoured to dissuade Leonnatus from compliance with this request; and professed to consider his own life as in danger from the enmity of Antipater and Hecateus. Leonnatus therefore thought he might safely trust him with the

\* Plut., Eum., 2. If, as Droysen assumes (Nachf., i., p. 68), Memnon, in his History of Heracles (Photus, 224, a., 6), had really supposed that Cleopatra had taken up her residence at Sardis in her brother's lifetime, it would only seem to follow that he was mistaken. But since the place of Cleopatra's residence is not mentioned in the extract from Memnon, it appears unnecessary to suppose a contradiction between him and Plutarch.

† According to Diodorus (xviii., 19), Antipater, before he set out from Macedonia, sent to Philotas, who had received the satrapy of the Hellespontine Phrygia (πρὸς Φιλόταν τὴν ἐλλήσποντον φρυγίαν), to ask for succour, offering him the hand of one of his daughters. Wesseling naturally suspects that the name of Leonnatus, to whom alone such a description appears to be applicable, should be substituted for that of Philotas. But Droysen (Nachf., i., p. 68) objects to the alteration on three grounds: 1. At the time when Diodorus mentions the embassy, Leonnatus had not taken possession of his government. 2. The message brought by Hecateus after Antipater was blocked up in Lamia appears to have been the first which Leonnatus received from Antipater. 3. Leonnatus was a man of too high rank and too aspiring views to be tempted by the offer of a daughter of Antipater. None of these arguments seems to have the smallest weight. 1. Diodorus appears to have committed an anachronism exactly of the same kind as that which Droysen himself observes with regard to Leosthenes (xvii., 111, compared with xviii., 9). This would be far less surprising than that he should so have described Philotas, after having mentioned in c. 3 that the Hellespontine satrapy was given to Leonnatus; and Arrian in Photus (p. 694) says, that the satrapy given to Leonnatus had before been held first by Calas, and afterward by Demarchus. 2. Certainly the first embassy which Leonnatus received from Antipater appears to have been that brought by Hecateus; and Diodorus, when he relates it (xviii., 14), seems, by the use of the participle (καταγχομένου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔκκιτ' ἰσὺν προσεστού, καὶ δεόμενον βοηθείας), to refer to his previous statement, c. 12, λέγοντος . . . πρὸς Φιλόταν . . . δεόμενον βοηθείας. 3. Unless Leonnatus had been a higher or more ambitious personage than Perdicas, or Ptolemy, or Craterus, an alliance with Antipater might well have been thought a desirable object for him.

\* Which led Plutarch (De Frat. Am., 15) to couple them together, in a manner, however, which does not imply more than a political friendship.

secret, let him see Cleopatra's letters, and assured him that his intentions were nothing less than friendly to Antipater. But the project did not at all suit the views of Eumenes, who saw that he should probably forfeit his satrapy with the patronage of Perdiccas; and felt no confidence in the impetuous character of Leonnatus. He, therefore, made his escape by night, accompanied only by 300 horse and 200 armed slaves, with his treasure, which amounted to 5000 talents, and fled to Perdiccas, whose favour he secured by this proof of fidelity.

Leonnatus had now no choice left. It was in Macedonia alone that he could hope to establish himself. But it seems that he thought it necessary for his own sake first to quell the insurrection of the Greeks, and then to rid himself of Antipater. He therefore crossed over to Europe, and marched towards the theatre of war. In Macedonia he added a large body of troops to his army, which then numbered no less than 20,000 foot and 2500 horse. When Antiphilus heard of the approach of this formidable force, he immediately perceived that the siege must be raised; and he seems to have taken his measures with great judgment and energy. He fired his camp, sent the baggage and all his useless people to Melitæa, a town on the Enipeus, which lay near his road, and himself, crossing the chain of Othrys, advanced with his unencumbered troops to meet Leonnatus, before he could be joined by Antipater. Since the beginning of the siege of Lamia, the army of the allies had been much weakened through some of those causes which commonly paralyze the movements of such confederacies. Before the death of Leosthenes, the Ætolians had obtained leave from him to return home for a time, on some plea, which Diodorus only describes by the vague expression *national affairs*.<sup>\*</sup> We are left entirely to conjecture as to its nature and urgency; but the term seems equally to exclude the supposition of a festival,<sup>†</sup> and of a hostile inroad,<sup>‡</sup> which might otherwise have been probable motives; while it perfectly suits the occasion of an assembly held for the election of magistrates, and the transaction of other public business.<sup>§</sup> There is no reason to suspect the Ætolians either of lukewarmness or jealousy. Leosthenes himself may have believed that they might be spared for a time, as the blockade could be carried on without them. But he was also compelled to allow many of his other troops to withdraw. They too had, if not public business, private concerns to call them home, and they willingly believed that the end of the contest was already secured, and could not be endangered by their absence. Whether any others arrived from Peloponnesus to supply their place, does not appear; but the army which Antiphilus led into Thessaly was still superior, by 2000 foot and 1000 horse, to that of Leonnatus.

The part of Thessaly where the two armies

met is not mentioned; it is only described as a plain skirted by hills, and containing some marshy ground. It must have been that which is crossed by the high road from Macedonia, between the Peneus and the Enipeus. The strength of the Greeks lay in their cavalry, which included 2000 Thessalians, the finest troops of the kind then to be found. Leonnatus, however, whose gallantry is better attested than his judgment, did not hesitate to engage them with his Macedonian horse, which, in deed, was more numerous than the Thessalians alone, and may have been so much superior in his opinion to that of the other Greeks, as to render the inequality but trifling. He placed himself at its head, and charged with his wonted valour; but, after a sharp combat, his troops were broken and put to flight, and driven into the marsh, where he himself fell, pierced with many wounds. His body was rescued, and carried to the camp. The infantry on both sides appear to have taken no part in the action; but when the victory was decided, and Leonnatus had fallen, the commander of the phalanx judged it prudent to decline a battle, and drew off his troops to the higher ground, where they would be safe from the attacks of the cavalry. The Thessalians made some fruitless attempts to disturb them; but the Greeks remained masters of the field, and erected their trophy; the third which they had won since the beginning of the war.

To Antipater, however, the loss which he suffered through the defeat of Leonnatus was more than compensated by the advantage he gained from the death of a formidable rival,<sup>\*</sup> though he may not have known the whole extent of his danger. He had followed the march of the Greeks, and, it seems, was at no great distance when the battle took place; for the next day he effected a junction with the army of Leonnatus, which immediately acknowledged him as its chief. He now saw himself at the head of a force before which the allies, but for the superiority of their cavalry, would not have been able to stand. Still, such was the terror inspired by the Thessalian horse, that he did not venture to descend into the plain; and he had probably already received intelligence of the approach of Craterus. He therefore advanced along the higher ground on the skirts of the plain towards the borders of Macedonia.<sup>†</sup> Antiphilus and Meno could only watch his movements, and made no attempt to obstruct them, but remained in the central vale of Thessaly.

In the mean while the Athenians, who had undertaken the whole burden of the war on the sea, had been defeated on what they were used to consider as their own element. Diodorus has probably confounded several things in his brief account of this naval war. If we may trust him, the Macedonian fleet had been raised, by some re-enforcement of which he gives no account, to 240 sail; the precise number which was to have been equipped by the Athenians, according to their decree; while the fleet with which they finally put to sea consisted of no more than 170 galleys. The part of this

<sup>\*</sup> *Δὲν ῥίπας ὁὐκ ἔχοντες*, xviii., 13.

<sup>†</sup> As Grauert, *Analekten*, p. 258.

<sup>‡</sup> Lukas, *Ueber Polybios' Darstellung des Ætolischen Bundes*, p. 64, n., and Schorn, *Geschichte Griechenlands*, p. 3.

<sup>§</sup> This seems to have been first perceived by Droysen (*Nachfolg.*, i., p. 73). The time agrees perfectly with that at which, as we learn from Polybius (iv., 37), the Ætolians were used to hold their electoral assemblies: a little after the autumnal equinox.

<sup>\*</sup> So Justin, xiii., 5, 15. Antipater . . . morte Leonnati letatus est; quippe et emulum sublatum, et vires ejus accessisse sibi gratulabatur.

<sup>†</sup> Justin (xiii., 5, 16) says, in Macedonian concessit, which is probably a little beyond the truth.

statement which relates to the Macedonians is certainly very suspicious.\* But when we remember the strength of the naval armaments which had been sent out by the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war, the effort which they made on this occasion appears, even according to this account, very great. And yet the manner in which Diodorus expresses himself raises a suspicion that the decree may have been carried into full effect. The Macedonians, he says, being masters of the sea, the Athenians, in addition to the galleys which they had before, fitted out others, so that in all they amounted to 170. And he then relates that the Macedonian admiral, Clitus, with his 240 sail, gained two victories over the Athenians, who were commanded by Etion, and destroyed a great number of their ships. The scene of both these sea-fights is laid by Diodorus near the Echinades, that is, off the coast of Ætolia. But it is certain that one of them, at least, took place in the Ægean near Amorgus, one of the Cyclades.† It seems to have been on this occasion that Stratocles had the impudence to amuse the people with false tidings of a great victory, and to say, when the truth was ascertained, that they owed him two days of rejoicing.‡ Clitus, according to Plutarch, celebrated the battle of Amorgus with extravagant vanity; assuming the name of Poseidon, and the trident. The victory, therefore, cannot have been so trifling as Plutarch himself represents it:§ and we may suspect that it was now the Athenians, having, by fresh exertions, collected 170 galleys, again sought the enemy, and suffered a second defeat, probably still on the eastern side of Greece, which, in so critical a posture of affairs, the Macedonian admiral is not likely to have quitted for the coast of Ætolia.||

On every supposition the Athenians, in this part of the contest, displayed a degree of spirit and perseverance quite worthy of their best times; and the few glimpses which we catch of their proceedings at home show them, in a similar light. It had been with great difficulty that Phocion, as general, had restrained them from an incursion into Boeotia. He would not undertake it without a levy of all the men left under sixty. Soon after, when the Macedoni-

ans had become masters of the sea, a squadron was sent, with a strong body of troops, Macedonians as well as mercenaries, under the command of Micio, to invade Attica. He did not now refuse to second the general ardour, but led as strong a force as could be mustered to meet the enemy, who had landed on the eastern coast, not far from Marathon, and was overrunning the country. Plutarch has reported some pointed sayings of Phocion, as delivered on this occasion, which seem to show that there was more zeal than discipline among his troops. When advice was obtruded on him, he remarked, that there were many generals, but few soldiers. Leosthenes and Antiphrates were, perhaps, more fortunate in the men they commanded; for we do not find that they had any cause to complain, or they may have been less addicted to sarcastic speeches. But Phocion himself cannot have been very ill served; for the enemy was defeated, and driven back to his ships with great loss, and Micio was left among the slain. So that even this naval war, though it probably inflicted a severe injury on the Athenians, terminated in a manner which reminded them of better days.

Not long after, the aspect of affairs in Thessaly was again changed by the arrival of Craterus. He had brought, besides the veterans, 4000 heavy-armed, 1000 Persian bowmen and slingers, and 1500 cavalry. He probably entered Thessaly by one of the western passes, as this was the direction which Antipater had taken. When they had joined their forces, Craterus resigned the supreme command to his colleague. They then marched down into the plain, where the allies were posted, and encamped near the banks of the Peneus. The Macedonian army now amounted to between 40,000 and 50,000 heavy infantry, 3000 light troops, and 5000 cavalry. The Greeks were little more than half as numerous; for the Ætolians had not returned to the camp, and few re-enforcements had arrived to make up for the deficiency. They had fought the last time with 22,000 foot: they had now 25,000. The cavalry, though now inferior in number to that of the enemy, was still their main strength and their sole hope. Diodorus, very confusedly, mentions a spirit of insubordination which arose among them from the decrease of their numbers. We may easily believe that their commanders found it difficult to keep them together, after so many desertions, in the presence of so formidable an enemy. It must have seemed almost intolerably hard, that they were to fight at such fearful odds in behalf of those who had shamefully abandoned them. The situation of the generals became every day more embarrassing. When Antipater drew out his forces to offer battle, they declined it for some days, still hoping that they might be rejoined by those who had left them, or might receive fresh succours, which had, no doubt, been earnestly solicited. But the approach of Craterus had probably induced all who were lukewarm or wavering to regard the contest as hopeless. No re-enforcements arrived; and it became evident to Antiphrates and Meno that they must hazard a battle, or soon be deserted by the greater part of their troops. Meno still relied much, and not without reason, on his Thessa-

\* Droysen (Nachf., i., p. 81) has done strange injustice to Græner's remark (Analekten, p. 368) on the suspicious character of these numbers, which had also struck Wesseling: one might almost think, merely for the sake of a sneer at the Athenians. It would certainly not be surprising, as Græner himself observes, that they should not have been able to equip so vast an armament as they had decreed; and if they really fought with a force so much inferior to the enemy's, their spirit is the more admirable. But it is surprising that the force which they decreed, but failed to raise, should be exactly that which the Macedonians, who are not said to have received any addition to their numbers, brought against them. † Plut., De Fort. Alex., ii., 5.

‡ Plut., Demetr., 12, Præc. Reip. Ger., 3.

§ Τῶς δὲ νικητὰς Ἑλλήνων ἀνὰ τὴν θάλασσαν, Πτολεμαῖος ἀνυποκρίθη, καὶ ῥηρίαν ἐποίησε. Perhaps, however, the only foundation for this story was a statue or picture which so represented him.

|| Droysen (i., p. 83) makes a very bold, and, I think, improbable supposition to reconcile Diodorus with Plutarch. He imagines that Clitus, after his victory near Amorgus, sailed round to the western coast to observe the allies of Athens, and to prevent the Ætolians from marching into Thessaly; therefore, after the autumnal equinox; that the Athenians followed them with a new fleet, and were again defeated off the Echinades. This is really going to a great expense of ingenuity to save the credit of such a writer as Diodorus, who, after all, remains convicted of gross carelessness.



lian horse. They therefore resolved to accept Antipater's challenge. The engagement took place on the plain of Crannon, a little to the west of the road between Larissa and Pharsalus,\* not far from the foot of a range of low hills which stretch across from the Enipeus to the Peneus. It began, as before, with the cavalry. That of the Macedonians was probably commanded by Craterus, but it was still unable to cope with the Thessalians; and the event of the day might have been similar to that in which Leonnatus fell, if the Macedonians had not now had the advantage of two able and experienced generals. Antipater, who was at the head of the phalanx, when he saw his horse giving way, fell upon the enemy's infantry. They were quite unable to sustain the shock, but still were so ably commanded, that they retreated in good order to the adjacent high ground, and there took up a position from which the Macedonians vainly attempted to dislodge them: We seem to collect from this fact, that Alexander was still more fortunate in his enemies than in his officers. But Meno, perceiving the retreat of his infantry, did not venture to prolong the combat, in which he was on the point of gaining a decided victory: he drew off his troops, and the Macedonians remained everywhere masters of the field.

The Greeks had not lost more than 500 men;† but though the loss was trifling, it was the result of a defeat; and this, in such circumstances, was inevitably fatal to their cause. Antiphilus and Meno conferred together on the course now to be adopted; whether it was better to wait where they were, on the faint hope of a re-enforcement, which might enable them again to meet the enemy in the field, but with great danger of fresh desertions; or should make overtures to Antipater, while they were still at the head of a formidable army. Diodorus intimates that they reluctantly yielded to the emergency,‡ they thought themselves forced to negotiate. Unhappily, in this field the enemy they had to deal with was still more an overmatch for them than in the other. Antipater at once saw that an opportunity was presented to him of dissolving the confederacy without another blow. When the Greek heralds came to him with proposals of peace, he declared that he would enter into no treaty with the confederacy, but was willing to receive envoys from the allied states separately. He knew that this would be an irresistible temptation to each to renounce the common cause, that it might make the better terms for itself. But to hasten their resolution, he and Craterus laid siege to some of the Thessalian towns, among the rest to Pharsalus, which the allies were compelled to abandon to their fate. This proof of weakness, and the danger which extorted it, overpowered all reluctance in the inferior states of the confederacy. One after another sent its envoys to the Macedonian camp, and submitted to the terms dictated by Antipater, which were unexpectedly mild. Their lenity attracted those who

still hesitated, and in a short time all had laid down their arms.

The two states which had excited and guided the insurrection now remained exposed to the conqueror's vengeance, unable to afford any help to one another; unable, had their forces been united, to offer any resistance to him. Athens, as she had been first and last in the field, had reason to apprehend the first attack, and the most rigorous treatment. Antipater advanced from Thessaly into Bœotia, with the avowed object of laying siege to the city; \* and, as his fleet commanded the sea, there appeared no prospect of deliverance, or of relief from the miseries of a protracted blockade, except in timely submission. The only hope of any fate milder than death or slavery rested on Antipater's mercy; but from a man who had boasted of his clemency, who had just experienced such vicissitudes of fortune, this was not an unreasonable ground of confidence. Phocion now had the melancholy pleasure of exerting the influence he had gained by his long connexion with the enemies of his country in her behalf. For the readiness he showed on this occasion, we may well forgive his gentle reproach, that if she had followed his counsels, she would not have needed his aid; as, in truth, if she had followed those of Lycidas, in the Persian war,† she would not have become an object of envy and hatred, and would, perhaps, never have been subject to a Macedonian master. The honour of his mediation he shared with Demades, to whom the eyes of all were first turned in this emergency. While the storm of war was rolling towards the frontiers of Attica, Demades sat aloof, like Achilles, an unconcerned spectator, brooding over his dishonour, and could only be induced to interpose by entreaties and gifts. He was a disfranchised man, who had no right to offer his advice. But he was not inexorable; and when his franchise was restored to him, proposed a decree, which was immediately carried, to send envoys, Phocion and himself in the number, with full powers to Antipater. They found the Macedonian army encamped on the site of Thebes, and preparing to invade Attica. Phocion's first request was, that Antipater would not move forward, but would conclude the treaty where he was. Craterus thought that Phocion asked too much, when he desired that they should spare their enemies, and continue to burden their friends. But Antipater, taking him by the hand, gently insisted: We must grant this favour to Phocion. He would not, however, listen even to Phocion on any other point, and would be satisfied with nothing but absolute submission. The Athenians, he observed, had demanded no less from him when he sued for peace. With this answer the envoys returned.‡

\* Vit. X. Or., p. 846, E.

† See vol. i., p. 273.

‡ Here, again, Droyen seems to have been misled by his praiseworthy reluctance to part with a single grain of tradition which is not demonstrably false. In Vit. X. Or. it is said that Antipater, after he had taken Pharsalus, threatened to lay siege to Athens unless the Athenians should deliver up their orators. On this ground, Droyen not merely conjectures, but relates in his text, that the Athenians sent three embassies to Antipater suing for peace, the first while he was still in Thessaly, and that the answer they received was, that he would lay siege to Athens, unless they delivered up the orators. But, in the first place, no ancient author mentions more than two embassies; and Plutarch, who describes the whole course of the negotiations, in his Life of Phocion, 20, 27, could hardly

\* Leake, Northern Greece, iii., p. 365.

† Of these it appears that 200 were Athenians; for there can be little doubt that Pausanias, viii., 10, 5, means the battle of Crannon, the scene of which is also confounded with Lamia by Polybius, ix., 29, though Pausanias elsewhere (x., 3, 4) distinguishes between Lamia and Crannon.

‡ Τα πρῶτα κ' ἔπειτα συνέβη, xvi., 17.

The people could not recede; for they had no refuge. Another embassy was immediately despatched, with Phocion at its head, but including a new envoy, whose character, it was hoped, might make a favourable impression on Antipater: the philosopher Xenocrates, of whom Plutarch says, that there was no degree of insolence and cruelty which would not, it was supposed, give way before his presence. Antipater was neither insolent nor cruel; but he was not a man to give up a solid advantage for the sake of a philosopher; even if he had not a private dislike to Xenocrates, and did not wish to show his displeasure at the treatment of his friend Aristotle, who had been forced to withdraw from Athens soon after Alexander's death, on a charge of impiety, which was probably a pretext for those who hated and feared him on account of his intimacy and correspondence with Antipater; though it would not follow that there was any foundation for the story that Xenocrates was Aristotle's enemy. Antipater, however, is reported to have behaved to him with studied rudeness, to have withheld from him the ordinary salutation with which he received the other envoys, and to have interrupted him so often in his speech, as at last to compel him to desist.\* Xenocrates is said to have observed, that he considered it as an honour to be so treated by Antipater, when he was about to deal so harshly with Athens. The terms finally granted, on which the Athenians were to be admitted into amity and alliance with Macedonia, were, that they should deliver up a number of their obnoxious orators, including Demosthenes and Hyperides; that they should limit their franchise by a standard of property; that they should receive a garrison in Munychia, and pay a sum of money for the cost of the war. Xenocrates is said to have been the only person who murmured at these conditions, and to have remarked, that they were mild for slaves, oppressive for freemen. His colleagues professed to be delighted with their moderation; only with regard to the garrison, Phocion thought proper to intercede. But when Antipater asked him whether he would engage for the observance of the peace without it, he did not venture

ly have passed over the first. In the next place, it is quite inconceivable that, when the Athenians sent to ask on what terms Antipater would grant peace, he should either have mentioned no other condition than this, or have accompanied this demand with a threat. Still more difficult, if possible, is it to believe that, after he had made this demand to the first embassy, he should have required the Athenians, when they were represented by his friend Phocion, to submit generally to his discretion, as they had before required from him. Surely this answer could only have been returned at the beginning of the negotiations, not after he had already specified one condition. It might be known without an embassy that Antipater meant to besiege Athens, and that he threatened vengeance against the adverse orators; and this would have been sufficient foundation for the above-mentioned statement.

\* On the other hand, there are sundry anecdotes in the *Life of Xenocrates* in *Diogenes Laërtius*, which seem to indicate that the philosopher was on very friendly terms with Antipater. Antipater is said to have sent him a present of money, which, however, he would not accept; to have paid him a visit at Athens, when, however, Xenocrates would not interrupt the discourse he was holding to return his greeting. Even on the occasion of the very embassy to Thebes, *Diogenes* relates that Xenocrates, who had come to obtain the release of some Athenian prisoners, was invited by Antipater to his table, and replied in the words of *Ulysses* to *Circe*, which so pleased Antipater that he at once released the prisoners. Perhaps, from all this, we must infer that Antipater's sternness was confined to the audience on the terms of peace.

immediately to reply. While he paused, *Callimædon*, the exile, started up, and said, "And if he should talk so idly, will you, Antipater, trust him, and change your purpose?" All the articles were accepted by the plenipotentiaries and ratified by the people; and soon after the Macedonian garrison marched into Munychia, to settle the interpretation of those which had not been precisely defined.

It was remarked, as a contrast which aggravated the present misery and dejection, that the entrance of the foreign troops took place on the day of the mystic procession to Eleusis; the same on which, according to the Attic legend in the Persian war, when Attica was abandoned to the barbarians, the mystic shout, raised by unearthly voices, had announced the approaching destruction of the invader. The presence of the Macedonian garrison, however, was chiefly galling, as it constantly reminded the people of its servitude. There was no reason immediately to apprehend any of the outrages which Thebes had suffered, while it was occupied by Philip's troops; for the command at Munychia had been given to *Menyllus*, a man of humane disposition, and one of Phocion's friends, perhaps appointed at his request. The clause in the treaty relating to the change which was to be made in the Constitution, had probably been expressed, at first, in general terms, and its import, or Antipater's design, only fixed when the time came to carry it into execution. If we might lay stress on the language in which Plutarch reports it, we should be led to conclude that the Athenians had been induced to expect a revival of the ancient limited democracy, perhaps as it existed in the time of Solon, by which the poorest would, indeed, have been excluded from several offices but not from the privileges which they exercised in the assembly and the courts of justice. Hopeless as the condition of the people was, it seems doubtful whether they would have ratified the treaty if they had known beforehand how Antipater understood it on this point.\* The new regulation which he decreed sounded very moderate, if not necessary or just; but its practical effect was, that nearly two thirds of the citizens were disfranchised, and many transported out of Greece. It provided that a qualification of 2000 drachmas should be required from every citizen, and this has been commonly understood as the entire amount of property of every kind to be possessed by each. If this was the case, it remains an inexplicable mystery—one to which the great master of this subject resigns himself as in despair—that out of 21,000 persons then exercising the franchise,

\* *Droysen*, defending Antipater against *Grauert*, who describes the measure as a change from democracy to oligarchy, asks (i., p. 93) whether the government of 20,000 citizens over half a million of people was less oligarchical. It was, according to the definition of the ancients, who confined the term oligarchy to a government founded on distinctions of property. The question seems to imply that, because the Athenian Constitution limited the franchise one way, according to universally received Greek notions, it could be no hardship to limit it in another, totally different, and that this ought not to be regarded as an essential change. Least of all can our sympathy with the Athenians be destroyed by generalities and exaggerations, such as *Droysen's* remark that "one cannot form an adequate conception of the corruption of the Athenian state." It seems quite as possible to go beyond the truth on this subject as to fall short of it.

† *Boeckh*, *Staatsk.* iv., 3. Compare *iv.*, 9.

no more than 9000 could be found possessing that sum. It would follow that 12,000 were living nearly in the condition of Lazzaroni; for it appears that the interest of 2000 drachmas, at the highest ordinary rate, would have been scarcely sufficient to purchase the mere necessities of life for a man who had no family to support. We may, indeed, suppose, though no cause has been assigned for the fact, that the distribution of property had become very unequal at Athens, while its general amount had been much reduced. And yet, the accounts we have remaining of the administration of Lycurgus do not suggest the idea of general poverty, but rather of growing prosperity. Since that time to Alexander's death the state had enjoyed uninterrupted peace. The visions of Isocrates, who had represented the conquest of Persia as the beginning of a golden age for Greece, had, in this respect, been fully realized. A part of the treasures of the East had, in fact, crossed the Ægean, and it might have been supposed that Athens would have shared this benefit, and still more, that which flowed from the increased activity imparted to commerce by Alexander's conquests. It is true that such difficulties could not resist one well-attested fact. But the main fact on which the question here depends is not attested at all. We are not informed how the inquisition was made, nor what objects it included—whether, for instance, it took account of the profits derived from any occupation which needed only a very small capital—nor whether it related to the whole or only a part—that which was liable to taxation—of each citizen's property. It has been thought, by a high authority, a fatal objection to this last supposition that, in this case, the standard of property would have been too high.\* But, at least, it would not have been too high for Antipater's views; and that which he is commonly believed to have established would not even have answered the purpose which might have been thought the only reasonable ground for the innovation: to provide that every one who retained the franchise should possess some independent means of decent subsistence.†

To the disfranchised citizens Antipater offered a town and district in Thrace. We are not informed where it lay, but it may easily be supposed that it was not a maritime position, and therefore could not have been regarded as a desirable settlement. It does not appear that any were compelled to migrate; but the offer seems to show that Antipater wished to remove as many as he could without a display of force; and the prospect at home was gloomy enough to induce many to embrace this alternative. A great number of a higher class were formally banished.

It speaks well for the 9000 who remained in possession of the franchise, that Antipater still thought the garrison at Munychia a necessary precaution; but if his only object had been se-

curity, it might have been supposed that the presence of the troops would have been a sufficient protection for those who were disposed for peace. At least, after these measures there was left no plea of necessity to excuse his demand for the blood of the men who had guided the public counsels. Alexander, indeed, had called for such a sacrifice, but under very different circumstances; when it might have seemed requisite for his safety; it was the only one he asked; and still he had been induced to dispense with it. We can hardly acquit Antipater of the charge of a cowardly revenge. If policy required that resistance to Macedonia should be treated as a crime, exile, when return appeared so hopeless, might have seemed a sufficient punishment. And, from the manner in which the sentence was executed, it is but too clear that it was not merely a concession which he made to the rancour which his Athenian hirelings bore to the sufferers, though it is likely enough that Pytheas, and Callimædon, and Demades encouraged him, in this instance too, to adhere to his purpose. It would have been pleasing to find that Phocion had attempted to divert him from it; especially if he himself had, on former occasions, been protected by the eloquence of Demosthenes.\* In other cases he procured pardon for some who had been condemned to banishment by Antipater, or prevailed on him to remit the severest part of the penalty, and to let the exiles remain in Greece. It is plain, from these instances, though they were not needed to show it, what the real character of the new Constitution was; and we are the less tempted to speculate on the meaning of Diodorus, when he says that the 9000 were governed by the laws of Solon. It seems that the contribution which had been mentioned in the treaty was not immediately exacted; perhaps was purposely reserved as an additional security for their good behaviour. The question about Samos was referred to the king's council, and, by order of Perdikkas, the Athenian colonists were soon after expelled from their possessions. The republic, it appears, was also deprived of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyrus.

Demosthenes and his partners in misfortune had retired from the city before the Macedonian garrison arrived, yet hardly so soon as it was heard that Antipater was on his march against Athens;‡ for we are informed that when he demanded them, Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, made an effort, more honourable to his feelings than his judgment, to induce the people to resist, and, to animate the spectators, entered the assembly in armour. It is doubtful whether this was before the return of the second embassy; but then Demades proposed a decree, which was passed as a part of the treaty, condemning Antipater's victims to death. They had certainly escaped before they could be arrested under this decree;§ and their first place of

\* Boeckh, iv., 3.

† Diodorus (xviii., 18) says that they all migrated. If this had been the case, the *τοῖς βουλομένοις* would be only the official language. But it is clear from Plutarch, Phoc., 28, that a part actually remained at Athens. Yet, from the manner in which the *ἀριτοὶ* are mentioned by Plutarch, Phoc., 28, one might be inclined to suspect that they were not allowed to reside in the upper city.

\* So Nepos, Phocion, ii., 3. Yet this is rather hard to believe.

† As Plutarch represents, Phoc., 26, and Demosth., 22. This may seem to favour Droyen's conjecture, but cannot, I think, be admitted to outweigh the objections I have stated against it.

‡ It appears from Arrian in Photius (p. 69, b.) that they were already in Ægina when the decree was passed.

refuge was Ægina. Here Hyperides, a man, certainly, according to the accounts which have come down to us, not estimable in his private character, but one who had never descended to any political apostasy, and who had never been polluted by Macedonian gold, besought Demosthenes to forgive his temporary estrangement, thus apparently acknowledging the injustice of the charge he had brought against him, and took a last farewell of him. With them were Aristonicus, and Himeræus, also one of the accusers of Demosthenes, and brother of Demetrius the Phalerian, who was destined soon to rise to a bad eminence in the history of Athens.\* As the danger grew more pressing, the friends parted, seeking separate asylums. Aristonicus and Himeræus took shelter in the Eaceum. Hyperides, it seems, first sought refuge at the altar of Poseidon in the same island, but afterward passed over to Peloponnesus, and fled to the temple of Demeter at Hermione,† once deemed a shrine of awful sanctity. Demosthenes chose the sanctuary of Poseidon in the isle of Calauræa, near Trœzen. There remained no hope of safety for the fugitives but in the protection of the gods. But Antipater had taken his measures to render even this safeguard unavailing.

It was not in Athens alone that Antipater pursued the friends of liberty to death. To carry out his purpose, he had engaged the services of a band of men, who, from their infamous occupation, acquired the title of the *EXILE-HUNTERS*. The leader of this pack was an Italian Greek of Thurii, named Archias. He had been a player, and afterward, it seems, had studied, perhaps practised, rhetoric; but we find no trace that he was connected with any political party in Greece, where, indeed, as a foreigner, he could scarcely have been admitted into one. He served probably for nothing but his hire; yet he displayed as much zeal in his commission as if he had been instigated by private enmity. He was attended on his circuit by a guard of Thracians, and, with their assistance, dragged most of the Athenian exiles, whom, as the prey for which his master most longed, he had undertaken to seize himself, from the altars to which he found them clinging. Aristonicus, Himeræus, and Hyperides were conveyed to Antipater, who was then at Corinth or Cleonæ, and the first two, at least, were immediately put to death. Hyperides, according to the more authentic report,‡ was reserved to be executed in Macedonia. But all seem to have agreed that Antipater was not satisfied with his blood, but ordered his tongue to be first cut out, and his remains to be cast to the dogs. His bones, however, were secretly rescued by one of his kinsmen, and carried to Athens, where they were buried in the grave of his fathers.

Demosthenes calmly awaited the coming of Archias in the temple at Calauræa, well knowing that he should not be sheltered by the sanctity of the place, and prepared for his end.

\* Lucian (*Demosthenis Encom.* 31) adds the name of Eucrates, who, however, is not mentioned either by Plutarch or Arrian.

† So Suidas, seemingly better informed than either Plutarch (*Demosth.*, 28) or the author of *Vit. X. Or.*, p. 649, who says he was torn from the statue of the god.

‡ Of Hermippus, *Vit. X. Or.*, p. 649, B.

He had dreamed, it is said, the night before that he was contending with Archias in a tragic part; that the judgment of the spectators was in his favour, but that he lost the prize, because he had not been furnished with the outward requisites of the exhibition: an apt illustration, at least, of his failure in the real contest, which was the task of his life. When Archias came to the door of the temple with his satellites, he found Demosthenes seated. He, at first, addressed him in language of friendly persuasion, to inveigle him out of his retreat, and offered to intercede with Antipater in his behalf. Demosthenes listened for a time in silence to his bland professions, but at length replied: "Archias, you never won me by your acting, nor will you now by your promises." When the player found that he was detected, he flung away the mask, and threatened in earnest. "Now," said Demosthenes, "you speak from the Macedonian tripod; before you were only acting: wait a little, till I have written a letter to my friends at home." And he took a roll, as to write, and, as was his wont when he was engaged in composition, put the end of the reed to his mouth and bit it; he then covered his face with his robe, and bowed his head. According to another report, he was seen to take something out of a piece of linen, and put it into his mouth: the Thracians imagined that it was gold. In one way or other, he had swallowed a poison which he had kept for this use. When he had remained some time in this attitude, the barbarians, thinking that he was lingering through fear, began to taunt him with cowardice; and Archias, going up to him, urged him to rise, and repeated his offers of mediation. Demosthenes now felt the poison in his veins: he uncovered his face, rose, and, fixing his eyes on the dissembler, said, "It is time for you, Archias, to finish the part of Creon, and to cast my body to the dogs. I quit thy sanctuary, Poseidon, still breathing; though Antipater and the Macedonians have not spared even it from pollution." So saying, he moved with faltering step towards the door, but had scarcely passed the altar, when he fell with a groan, and breathed his last.

His end would undoubtedly have been more truly heroic, though not in the sight of his own generation, if he had braved the insults and torture which awaited him. But he must not be judged by a view of life which had never been presented to him: according to his own, it must have seemed base to submit to the enemy whom he had hitherto defied, for the sake of a few days more of ignominious wretchedness. And even on the principles of a higher philosophy, he might think that the gods, who were not able to protect him, had discharged him from their service, and permitted him to withdraw from a post which he could no longer defend. The ancients saw the finger of Heaven in the fate of the vile instruments of his destruction. That of Demades will be afterward related: Archias ended his days in extreme indigence, under the weight of universal contempt. It was later before Athens was permitted to do justice to the services of her great citizen, who, indeed, had never lost her esteem. The time at length came when his

nephew Demochares might safely propose a decree, by which the honours of the prytaneum, and of the foremost seat at public spectacles, were granted to his descendants, and a bronze statue was erected in the agora to himself. It bore an inscription, corresponding in its import to the dream which he was said to have had at Calauræa. *Had but the strength of thy arm, Demosthenes, equalled thy spirit, never would Greece have sunk under the foreigner's yoke.* The statue itself was believed, in Plutarch's time, to have confirmed the general persuasion of his innocence as to the only charge which ever threw a shade on the purity of his political character.\* The honours paid to his memory were not confined to Athens. A monument was erected to him in the sanctuary where he died; and both at Calauræa, and in other parts of Greece, he continued, down to the age of Hadrian, and probably as long as the memory of the past survived there, to receive marks of public reverence approaching to the worship of a hero.†

We are not informed how far Antipater advanced into Peloponnesus. At Corinth, it is not improbable that he may have assembled the mock congress, and again have used its name in the title of his despotic edicts. His presence was not needed to enforce submission to his pleasure. After he had sated his vengeance, and struck the disaffected with awe, he returned to Macedonia, accompanied by Craterus, whose friendship he secured, against the intrigues of Olympias and his other enemies, by the hand of his daughter, Phila, the most amiable and estimable person of his family. But very soon after the nuptials, as the year was now verging to a close, the two chiefs set out on an expedition against the Ætolians, the only state of the late confederacy which had not submitted to the conqueror. The army with which he invaded Ætolia consisted of 30,000 foot and 2500 horse: an irresistible force, since the utmost efforts of the Ætolians could only raise 10,000 men, at least of heavy infantry, for the defence of their hearths. But they were mountaineers, not wanting in self-confidence—there was, indeed, rather too much of a Biscayan vein in their character—and they relied still more, and with better reason, on the natural barriers and fastnesses by which their rugged country seemed to be formed for a home of liberty. They made no attempt to propitiate the invader, though wholly unable to withstand him in the field. In this sense of security we probably perceive the main cause which led them to abandon their allies in the latter part of the war. They now forsook all their towns in the open country, and transported their families and moveable property from all quarters to the impregnable strongholds which crowned the summits of their highest hills. The Macedonians made some attempts to storm these fortresses, but they had no Alexander at their head, and they were everywhere repulsed with great loss. But a more terrible danger threatened the Ætolians. They had expected that

the enemy would withdraw before winter, which in their highlands is often very rigorous, had set in. But the Macedonian generals, though not men of impetuous energy, were not to be diverted from their purposes by such difficulties, from which, in fact, the enemy had more to fear than they. Antipater, it seems, returned to Macedonia, where his presence might be necessary to watch the turn of affairs in Asia, and even to secure himself against the royal family; but Craterus remained, with the greater part of the army, in Ætolia, and ordered his men to prepare for a winter in the field. Amid frost and snow, he continued in his position at the foot of the hills on which the enemy had taken refuge. Cut off from all supplies, and even destitute of fuel, they soon began to experience the sharpest gripe of cold and hunger. A miserable death seemed their inevitable lot, unless they either descended from their heights and forced a passage, only to be won by a decided victory, through the Macedonian lines, or accepted such terms of peace as the viadictive and irritated foe might be willing to grant. Yet from this strait they were extricated—as the Athenians might, perhaps, have been, if they had stood a siege\*—by the turn which affairs were taking in Asia. The events to which they owed their deliverance will be related in the next chapter. Antipater found it necessary to withdraw his troops from Ætolia, that he might employ them against a more formidable enemy. The Ætolians were probably surprised at the moderation which he showed in the conditions of peace unexpectedly offered to them; and, perhaps, through ignorance of the cause, lost an opportunity of vengeance, which they might have inflicted on his retreating host. They were left, it seems, in complete independence. Antipater and Craterus were probably the more liberal in their offers, because they had secretly agreed, as soon as they should have the means, to transport the whole Ætolian nation into a remote region of Asia.† Such a measure would certainly have been in the spirit, it may even have been in the letter, of Alexander's posthumous commentaries.

## CHAPTER LVII.

FROM THE END OF THE LAMIAN WAR TO CAESAR'S OCCUPATION OF ATHENS.

WE must now resume the narrative which we dropped at the partition of the empire, and distribution of the provinces that immediately followed Alexander's death, and relate the events which led to the result mentioned at the close of the preceding chapter, and were pregnant with other more momentous consequences. One of the first occurrences which marked the administration of Perdiccas after he had established himself in the regency, was a wound which he inflicted on Greece in a distant corner of Asia: a triumph of the Macedonian arms, memorable rather because it prevented than because it produced an important change in the course of affairs, but which serves to illustrate his character, as well as the footing on which he

\* Plutarch (Demosth., 31) relates the story of the gold deposited in the hands of the statue as of recent occurrence. Yet it was also told of a statue at Thebes, Plin. N. H., xxiv., 10, 4. Athenæus, i., 34.

† Pausanias, ii., 33, 5.

\* As Pausanias thought, vii., 10, 4.

† Diodorus, xviii., 25.

stood. While the struggle which we have seen brought to such a disastrous issue was just beginning in Greece, and the states which took part in it could with difficulty raise a force sufficient to maintain it, a body of Greeks, who, if they had been present in their native land, would probably have thrown their whole weight into the same scale, and might have turned it decisively on the side of freedom, was suddenly swept from the earth. The Greek colonists whom Alexander had planted in the new cities which he founded in the eastern satrapies, had only been detained by fear during his life in what they considered as a miserable exile. None, probably, of the Greek adventurers who sought their fortune in Alexander's wars, had any other thought than to return as soon as they could, with their earnings and plunder, to settle in Greece. None, assuredly, could have been induced by anything but compulsion to fix their abode on the banks of the Iaxartes, or in the high valleys of the Paropamisus, or on the skirts of the Persian deserts. None could have consented to renounce their liberty for life, and to condemn themselves to perpetual banishment. Even before Alexander's death, some had betrayed the feelings which, as afterward appeared, animated them all. We have already noticed a revolt which broke out in Bactria, on the false rumour occasioned probably by the wound he received in Multan. It is from Curtius alone that we learn any of the details, and his narrative is not quite clear. He represents the insurrection as arising out of a sedition, for which he assigns no cause, but in which blood was shed, and which urged them, through fear of punishment, to open rebellion. But he also mentions that their leader, Athenodorus, though he assumed the title of king, had no other motive than the desire of returning to his country. The mutineers, if they ought to be so called—for their end seems to have been only to exercise an indisputable right—made themselves masters of the citadel at Bactria, and drew a part of the native population into the revolt. Athenodorus was murdered by one of his officers, who aspired to the command, and who, after some scenes of military tumult, led a body of 3000 out of Bactria, and marched towards Europe. Curtius says that he reached home with them; and it is possible that they were among the troops collected by Leosthenes. But, from the language of Diodorus,\* it seems more probable that they wandered about in the East, until Alexander's death became the signal for a general insurrection among their countrymen, who had been impatiently suffering a like confinement.

As the intelligence spread from one colony to another, a concert was formed among those who longed for freedom; they at length united their forces, and elected Philo, an Ænianian, for their leader. Their numbers amounted to more than 20,000 foot and 3000 horse: an army much larger than Antipater, as we have seen, was able to bring against the allies at the beginning of the Lamian war: all men inured to arms by long service in Alexander's campaigns. Perdiccas was justly alarmed at the tidings of this movement, and yet had no force which he could immediately dispose of suffi-

cient to suppress it. He could only spare 3000 foot and 800 horse, at least of his Macedonians, who were draughted by lot from his army: these, according to Diodorus, by their own choice, he placed under the command of Pithon, who eagerly coveted the commission which he saw might enable him to make himself independent of the regent. Perdiccas suspected his views, and met them with a sanguinary precaution; he ordered that no quarter should be given to the insurgents, and that the spoil should be abandoned to his troops. With Pithon he sent instructions to the satraps of the eastern provinces to furnish him with 10,000 foot and 8000 horse. With these forces Pithon marched against the insurgents; but, before an engagement took place, he found means to corrupt one of their chiefs, an Ænianian named Lipodorus, who commanded a division of 3000 men. During the action, at a critical moment, the traitor drew off his whole brigade to an adjacent height; his desertion created a panic among the rest, and the Macedonians remained masters of the field. Pithon now thought that the season had arrived for the accomplishment of his private design, which was to draw the Greeks by gentle treatment into his own service; he invited them to lay down their arms, under the most solemn assurances that they should be permitted to return in safety to their several settlements; but when, on the faith of his oath, they had placed themselves in his power, the Macedonians, encouraged by the order of Perdiccas, and greedy of the promised spoil, fell upon them by surprise and butchered them all. No acts of a brutal soldiery can excite surprise, hardly indignation: the whole guilt of this atrocious massacre rests with Perdiccas, who had contrived it in cold blood.\* Pithon returned to him, deeply disappointed, but dissembling his resentment. It was not very long before the hour of retribution came.

About the same time that Antipater was extricated from his dangerous position at Lamia by Leonnatus, Perdiccas, accompanied by the titular sovereign, set out on his march to Asia Minor. His first object was to establish Eumenes in his satrapy. Ariarathes had collected an army of natives and foreign auxiliaries, amounting in all to 30,000 foot and 15,000 horse. But one so composed could not withstand troops like those of Perdiccas. Ariarathes was defeated and taken prisoner, with his whole family. The ruthless conqueror ordered them all to be put to a cruel and ignominious death: it was indeed that which Alexander had inflicted on Musicanus; but in that case the barbarity was in some degree palliated by the revolt which provoked it, and by the policy of a terrible warning. Eumenes then received quiet possession of Cappadocia, but still continued to accompany his patron. Perdiccas next marched into Pisidia on another bloody business, for which, indeed, he had a fairer plea, but which still afforded fresh indications of his ferocious

\* Droysen (*Nachf.*, i., p. 37), as if to soften the horror of this tragedy, talks of the *guilt* of the unfortunate Greeks. Wherein it consisted he thinks it needless to explain. They were happy men if they had nothing worse on their conscience than compliance with one of the best and purest instincts of their nature. It is carrying the doctrine of passive obedience to an extraordinary length to represent an attempt to escape from captivity as a crime.

nature. Balacer, who had been appointed by Alexander general and satrap, to subdue and govern the province, had been killed by the natives: \* whether in the first struggle for freedom, or in a subsequent insurrection, does not appear. † A severe punishment might be necessary. Perdicas decreed that none should suffice but the utter destruction of two cities, Laranda and Isaura, which had the chief share in the resistance to Balacer. Laranda was stormed, all the men put to the sword, their families reduced to slavery, and the town razed to the ground. Isaura, a strong, large, and opulent city, made a more vigorous defence. For two days its hardy population, with a great sacrifice of life, repelled the assaults of the besiegers; but on the third day the Isaurians found their numbers so much reduced, that, seeing themselves unable to hold out much longer, and knowing what they had to expect from the mercy of Perdicas, they resolved on a deed which might have been called barbarous, if that epithet did not more properly belong to their enemy: they shut up their wives and children, set fire to their houses, and threw all the treasure they could collect into the flames. At the sight of the conflagration Perdicas renewed the assault, expecting little resistance, and was surprised to find the walls defended with the same spirit as before, while the city was burning. After they had once more forced the enemy to retire, the Isaurians threw themselves into the flames which had consumed all that was dear to them. The Macedonians entered the next day, and found only a mass of smoking ruins; but, when they had quenched the fire, were still able to rake out a rich booty of gold and silver.

From Pisidia Perdicas marched, it appears, into Cilicia, where he was at a nearly equal distance from the points on which his attention was now chiefly bent; while he remained here, he sent Eumenes, nominally to his own satrapy, but on a mission really concerning the bordering province of Armenia, where Neoptolemus, a man of high birth and rank, who was either satrap, or held a military command there, seemed to be endeavouring to make himself independent; he was not, however, prepared for resistance, and quietly submitted to Eumenes, who humoured his arrogance and vanity with great address. On this occasion, Eumenes began to discover that he could not safely rely on his Macedonian troops, who, proud and intractable towards their own generals, were peculiarly impatient of obedience to a foreign chief; he therefore determined to raise a body of cavalry in his own province, and in a short time, by the promise of extraordinary privileges, collected 6300 volunteers, and brought them, by sedulous training and the spur of emulation, into such condition as to extort the admiration of the Macedonians themselves. ‡

Perdicas having thus settled the more urgent affairs of the empire, was at full leisure to direct his undivided attention to his private interests. He could not feel himself secure, still less see his way open to the great end of his

ambition, while he was surrounded by so many powerful rivals. There were two who had already shown that they were not disposed to submit to him, even in his character of regent. Antigonus, as we have seen, had disregarded his orders in the case of Eumenes; and Ptolemy had given more than one indication of the light in which he viewed his satrapy, or, rather, had taken several steps to erect it into an independent and powerful kingdom. One of the first acts of his government was to put to death Cleomenes, who had, indeed, deserved this punishment for his rapacity and tyranny, but suffered it because Ptolemy considered him as a creature of Perdicas. \* The fruits of the extortion which Cleomenes had practised with extraordinary ingenuity for many years fell into Ptolemy's hands. They amounted to 8000 talents, † and enabled him to collect a strong army of mercenaries, as well as to gain many friends by his munificence. The current story of his illegitimate birth was confirmed by the royal liberality of his nature, which delighted in acts of bounty; and a saying is attributed to him, worthy of Alexander: that it was better to make rich than to be rich. ‡ He had not been long in possession of Egypt before an opportunity offered itself, which he readily seized, to make another most important acquisition. We have seen that Harpalus was assassinated in Crete by one of his officers named Thimbron, who thus became master of his treasure and his troops. With these he crossed over to Africa, embraced the cause of a party which had been exiled from Cyrene, and made war with the city. After many vicissitudes of fortune, he seemed at last to be on the point of attaining his object. He defeated the Cyrenæans in battle, cut off their communication with their port, and reduced them to great distress. The scarcity gave rise to a sedition, in which most of the wealthy citizens were expelled. They, perhaps, belonged to the party which Thimbron professed to befriend; for some sought his protection. Others, perhaps, distrusting the reckless adventurer, applied to Ptolemy for aid. Ptolemy sent them back, with a squadron of ships and a strong body of troops, under the command of Ophellias. On their arrival, the exiles in Thimbron's camp attempted to join them in the night, but were detected and cut to pieces; while the party in the city, to save themselves from their countrymen, entered into alliance with Thimbron. But he was defeated and taken prisoner by Ophellias, and given up to the vengeance of the inhabitants of Teucheira, whose town he had taken during the war. Most of the Cyrenæic cities now submitted to Ophellias; but fresh disturbances which ensued induced Ptolemy to make an expedition in person to Cyrene. His measures established perfect tranquillity, and he might now consider this rich country as a province of Egypt.

In another transaction of less moment he had come more directly into collision with Perdicas, and had still more plainly disclosed his aspiring pretensions. It had been resolved in the council of Babylon, as has been mentioned, to transport Alexander's remains to *Ægæ*; and

\* Diodorus, xviii., 22.

† Droysen adopts the former supposition, and yet coolly talks of the necessity of *sumbing* them.

‡ Plutarch, *Eum.*, 4.

\* Pausanias, i., 6, 3.

† *Ælian*, V. H., xiii., 12.

‡ Diodorus, xviii., 14.

Arridæus, the general, had been charged with the superintendence of the preparations and with the command of the escort. It may be suspected that this arrangement had been contrived by Ptolemy; for Arridæus was his friend, and it enabled him both to conceal his purpose as long as was needful, and then easily to effect it. The funeral car was a wonderful display of art and magnificence, glittering from the vaulted roof to the wheels with ornaments of massive gold, and of the most elaborate workmanship. It was drawn by eighty-four mules, and more than a year was occupied in the journey from Babylon to Syria. At Damascus, it appears that a contest arose between Arridæus and Polemo, an officer in the service of Perdiccas, about the place of destination. It was with great difficulty, and, according to some accounts, only by force of arms, that Arridæus was able to keep possession of his charge.\* He may have been aided by Ptolemy, who is said to have advanced as far as Syria with his army to meet the venerable relics.† They were first carried to Memphis, and then to Alexandria,‡ where they were finally deposited in a cemetery within the precincts of the palace, which was afterward the burial-place of Ptolemy's successors.

There could be no peace between Perdiccas and a man who showed himself so fit for a throne, and so determined and able to mount it. Both had long foreseen that their relative positions could only be determined by a war, and both had been endeavouring to fortify themselves by alliances, particularly with Antipater. Perdiccas, it is said, before he felt himself established in the regency, had solicited the hand of Antipater's daughter, Nicæa: the marriage treaty was concluded, and, when he came down into Asia Minor, Nicæa was sent to meet him.§ But, in the mean while, a change had taken place in his prospects: they reached to the throne of Macedonia, and to Alexander's whole empire, now shared between a simpleton and an infant, who might be easily removed. Antipater's alliance might rather obstruct than promote his designs, while a connexion with the royal house might give a colour of legitimacy to his usurpation. The alliance recently formed between Antipater and Craterus probably strengthened his resolution. He had made proposals for Cleopatra's hand to Olympias, who had been forced to retire into Epirus, but was eager to return and revenge herself on Antipater. She was no less willing to grant it to Perdiccas than to Leonnatus, and sent the princess over to Asia to accelerate the negotiation.|| Perdiccas now deliberated with his brother Alcetas and Eumenes which he should accept. Alcetas was fearful of a rupture with Antipater, and advised his brother to fulfil his engagement with Nicæa. Eumenes, who dreaded a coalition between Antipater and Perdiccas, to which he might himself be sacrificed, took the other side. Perdiccas, however, chose a middle course, best suited to his heartless and

faithless nature: he resolved to give his hand to Nicæa, but to keep up a correspondence with Cleopatra, and to discard her rival as soon as it was safe to drop the mask of friendship with Antipater. In the mean while he made another sacrifice not less grateful to her and to Olympias, who hated with all her soul every member of Philip's family, except her own children. Cynané, Philip's daughter, whom he had married to his nephew Amyntas, had refused, since his death, to accept the hand of another, and had lived in retirement, occupied with the education of her only child, Adea, or, as she was afterward called, Eurydice. She was herself a woman of masculine character and habits, delighting in camps and battle-fields, where she sometimes gave proof of her prowess. She had acquired this taste from her mother, the Illyrian princess Audata, who seems only to have followed the customs of her country, when she trained her daughter to martial exercises: and she educated Eurydice in like manner.\* Eurydice was now of marriageable age; and Cynané resolved to unite her to the young king. She entered into no previous negotiations—which, indeed, would have been impracticable, since the measure was equally opposed to the interests of Antipater and of Perdiccas—but, relying entirely on her personal influence, determined to pass over into Asia, collected a sufficient guard to force her way through a body of troops whom Antipater had sent to intercept her at the crossing of the Strymon, and arrived safely on the other side of the Hellespont. She was proceeding, it appears, towards the camp of Perdiccas, in the hope of gaining his army to her cause, when he sent Alcetas, with a division of his forces, to stop her, and put her to death.† She was taken prisoner, but not daunted by the sight of the armed host which surrounded her; and she boldly reproached Alcetas with his ingratitude. The Macedonians were moved with compassion and respect for Philip's daughter; but their fierce leader, insensible both to pity and shame, executed his brother's orders. Eurydice was spared; for it would not have been safe to destroy her: the sympathy of the Macedonians had been too strongly excited on behalf of her mother; and Perdiccas, to still their murmurs, and make her subservient to his ends, consented to marry her to the young king.

He had now, he believed, secured Antipater's acquiescence, and had only to rid himself of Antigonus, and to crush Ptolemy. Antigonus he hoped to ensnare, and gently complaining of his insubordination, summoned him to give an account of his conduct before an impartial tribunal. But Antigonus was aware of his designs against himself, and of his intrigues with Cleopatra. He met his artifices with politic dissimulation, and publicly professed himself ready to answer any charges that might be brought against him, while he secretly made preparations for flight. With his young son Demetrius, he embarked in some of the Attic ships which had been brought into one of the

\* Arrian in Photius, p. 70, b. *Ælian*, V. H., xii., 64.

† Diodorus, xviii., 26.

‡ By Philadelphus, according to Pausanias, i., 7, 1. The other writers, including Strabo (xvii., 437, Tauchn.) suppose the first Ptolemy to have executed his design.

§ Diodorus, xviii., 23.

|| Arrian in Photius, p. 70, a. Diodorus, xviii., 23.

\* Polyænus, viii., 60.

† I cannot find, either in Arrian or Polyænus (viii., 60) any trace of the alternative mentioned by Droysen, who says that Alcetas was ordered to bring her *alive or dead*. As a prisoner, she would have been very troublesome to Perdiccas.



Ionian ports, and crossed over to Europe to seek Antipater. From him Antipater learned the treachery of Perdiccas, and the danger with which he himself was threatened. This was the motive which induced him to make peace with the Ætolians, that he might direct his arms against the more formidable enemy in Asia. At the same time, he sent envoys to Ptolemy to renew their ancient friendship, and to contract a closer alliance against their common foe, which was to be cemented with the hand of Antipater's daughter Eurydice.

The flight of Antigonus convinced Perdiccas that he must prepare for immediate war with Antipater, and he now sent Eumenes to Sardis with presents for Cleopatra, and a message that he had resolved to send Nicaea back to her father, and to give his hand to the princess. Menander, the satrap of Lydia, who appears to have been secretly disaffected to Perdiccas, conveyed intelligence of this transaction to Antigonus. It confirmed the truth of his report, and added an impulse of personal resentment to Antipater's jealousy of his powerful rival. Perdiccas soon heard of his preparations, and found that he must now decide whether he must march in person against Antipater, or against Ptolemy, for it had become necessary to wage war with both at the same time. He held a council in Cilicia on this momentous question, in which the arguments on each side were maturely discussed. There was, on the one hand, the advantage which might be derived from the influence of Olympias and the royal name, if the war were carried into Macedonia; on the other, the fear that, in the mean while, Ptolemy might make himself master of Western Asia.\* Perdiccas determined to attack Ptolemy first, and to commit the defence of Asia to Eumenes. His motive for this choice may have been, that he considered Ptolemy as the more formidable enemy, and hoped that Antipater might be detained in Europe, or prevented from making much progress, until the war should be terminated in Egypt. But it may also be suspected, that he did not feel secure as to the disposition of his troops, and did not care to risk his own person against the reputation of Antipater and the popularity of Craterus, until the additional force which he might acquire by the conquest of Egypt should enable him to overpower all opposition. For the war with Antipater and Craterus, his colleagues in the regency, was likely to be viewed by the Macedonians in a very different light from one waged against a simple satrap, who had disobeyed the royal commands. It was a contest in which even the most complete success, the destruction of his rivals, would be attended with much odium and danger. This danger was, for the present at least, shifted on Eumenes, whose distrust of Antipater rendered him worthy of perfect confidence, and who had already displayed military talents not inferior to those of Perdiccas himself. Eumenes, therefore, was invested with a command which, it seems, extended over the whole of Asia Minor. Alcetas and Neoptolemus were joined with him, but in an inferior rank. His instructions as to military operations appear to

have left the management of the war entirely to his discretion, with the single limitation, that he was not to carry it over into Europe, but to resist, as he could, the threatened invasion.

The difficulties which Eumenes had to encounter, after the departure of Perdiccas, were even greater than the regent could easily have foreseen. It seemed as if he would hardly be able to retain any of his forces about him. He had sent a detachment to secure the passage of the Hellespont; but its commander was induced, by a message from Antipater and Craterus, to allow them to land their forces without any obstruction. Alcetas declared that, knowing what he did of the temper of the Macedonians, their respect for Antipater, and love for Craterus, he would not undertake to lead them against the enemy. Neoptolemus, who had always been jealous of Eumenes, and affected to consider him as a mere man of letters, not fit to command soldiers, entered into a secret correspondence with Antipater. Eumenes himself was, at the same time, solicited by Antipater's envoys to betray his trust; they urged him to be reconciled to Antipater, and not to draw the sword against his old friend Craterus; they promised that he should not only retain the provinces assigned to him by Perdiccas, but should receive an addition of territory, and be placed at the head of a larger army. He answered that he would not lay aside his ancient enmity to Antipater at a time when he saw Antipater breaking with his old friends; that for Craterus, he was ready to use his efforts to reconcile him, on equitable terms, with Perdiccas; but that he would resist their aggression, and would sacrifice his life rather than his honour. The treachery of Neoptolemus did not long escape his vigilance; and Neoptolemus, finding himself detected, threw off the mask and drew up his troops, who eagerly embraced his cause, to offer battle. An engagement took place, in which Eumenes gained the victory; but he owed it entirely to his Cappadocian cavalry, which turned the fortune of the day when it had been nearly lost by the infantry. He made himself master of their camp, and compelled the Macedonian phalanx to lay down their arms and enter into his service. Neoptolemus himself escaped, and joined Antipater with about 300 horse. His report, notwithstanding his defeat, was, on the whole, encouraging; for he declared his belief, that the mere sight of Craterus would induce the Macedonians to come over to him in a body. This confidence proved fatal both to Craterus and to himself. Antipater, who was impatient to overtake Perdiccas, or to unite his forces with Ptolemy, sent Craterus and Neoptolemus against Eumenes, while he himself pursued his march towards Cilicia.

Neoptolemus had not exaggerated the popularity of Craterus among the Macedonians. Eumenes himself was so well aware of it, that, when he heard of their approach, he did not venture to disclose the truth even to his officers, but gave out that Neoptolemus was coming, accompanied by a general named Pigres, at the head of some Cappadocian and Paphlagonian horse. On the morning of the day when

\* Justin, xiii., 6, 11.

he expected their appearance, he endeavoured to cheer his men with the description of a dream, by which he professed to have received a clear intimation of victory the night before: an artifice, it seems, to which he resorted on other occasions, and which is related so as to imply, that he was well informed of all that passed in the enemy's camp.\* Still, the great difficulty, which would have driven most other men to despair, was, how the presence of Craterus could be concealed from his army, when he should be actually in their sight. Even for this purpose, however, he devised an expedient, which was perfectly successful. He had learned beforehand in which wing Craterus commanded, and on this side he stationed two brigades of cavalry, composed of Thracians, Paphlagonians, and other barbarians, under the command of an Asiatic, named Pharnabazus, and Phoenix, a Greek of Tenedos, who probably did not know Craterus by sight. These he ordered to charge, as soon as the enemy should appear, with the utmost vigour, so as to allow him no time to wheel about, and not to listen to any parley if a herald should be sent towards them. His instructions were obeyed. From the brow of an eminence, which afforded the first view of the enemy, they poured down furiously to attack Craterus. He was astonished at the rapidity of the onset, began to believe that he had been deceived by Neoptolemus, yet bared his head, that he might be more easily recognised, while he advanced, with his wonted courage, to encounter their charge. In the combat which ensued, after many feats of prowess, he was pierced through the side by a Thracian, and sank from his horse. For some time he lay unheeded in a lingering agony; he was at length recognised by an officer of Eumenes, named Gorgias, who placed a guard round him to protect him. Meanwhile Eumenes, with a select escort of 300 horse, charged the enemy's right wing, where Neoptolemus had posted himself. As soon as they perceived each other, they engaged, both thirsting for revenge, in deadly conflict. When their horses met, they dropped the reins, seized each other's hands, and fell struggling to the ground. Eumenes rose first, and twice wounded his adversary; the second blow stretched him, seemingly lifeless, at his feet. The victor proceeded, according to the old savage custom, to tear off his armour; but, as he bent over the body, Neoptolemus, collecting his failing strength, pierced him in the groin; yet with a hand already unnerved, so that the wound did not prove fatal. Eumenes, though he had received three others in the struggle, was still able to mount his horse, and, after he had stripped his slain enemy, rode off towards the other wing, ignorant of the event which had there decided the fortune of the day in his favour. He now learned the fate of Craterus, was conducted to the place where he lay, and found him still breathing, and in possession of his senses. He dismounted from his horse, took his dying friend tenderly by the hand, and, with tears and bitter invectives against the treachery of Neoptolemus, bewail-

ed the hard destiny which had brought him into this fatal conflict with his old comrade.

Hitherto the cavalry alone had been engaged, and, after the death of the two chiefs, their broken squadrons took refuge behind the phalanx. Eumenes, faint from his wounds, and hoping to reap the fruits of victory without farther bloodshed, called off his troops from the pursuit by the sound of the trumpet, reared his trophy, and buried the slain. He then sent to propose a parley with the defeated enemy, invited all who would to join his army, but permitted those who might refuse to return whence they came. All accepted his offers, and, after the oaths had been interchanged, obtained leave to seek provisions in some of the adjacent villages before they entered his camp; but in the course of the following night they marched away by stealth to rejoin Antipater. Eumenes made an attempt to overtake them; but his bodily weakness and their excellent discipline compelled him to give up the pursuit, and they effected their junction with Antipater in safety. Eumenes had gained a brilliant victory, which raised his reputation for ingenuity and hardihood to the highest pitch; but he was doomed to pay dearly for it. Not only were the defeated troops inflamed with the fiercest resentment by the humiliation they had suffered, and the loss of their favourite leader, but even among his own the prevailing feeling was one of shame and indignation, which vented itself in deep murmurs against the upstart foreigner, who, by an impudent artifice, had employed the arms of the Macedonians themselves to destroy their most illustrious general. And, in the mean while, events had taken place in another quarter, which deprived him of the rewards he had reason to expect from Perdiccas.

Ptolemy, awaiting the approach of the invading army at Pelusium, had taken every precaution to strengthen the natural defences which render Egypt so difficult of access on this side. He had fortified every assailable point, and had laid in ample stores of ammunition. The regent, however, when he arrived, soon discovered that he had other difficulties to encounter besides those which the nature of the country and his enemy's preparations placed in his way. Already, on his march, a great number of his officers and men had deserted to Antipater;\* and he thought it advisable, when he reached Pelusium,† to begin with an appeal to the sense of the army on the justice of his cause. He called a general assembly, and, it seems, summoned Ptolemy to defend his conduct. We cannot believe that Ptolemy appeared there in person, though Arrian seems to have related so;‡ but it is not improbable that Ptolemy sent one of his friends to represent him. Perdiccas perceived that his accusation made a less favourable impression on the army than Ptolemy's vindication of himself, and that he had nothing to rely on but the success of his arms. Every accidental disaster which befell

\* Justin, xli., 8, 2, ad Antipatrum gregatim profectiebant. † Παρὰ τὴν ἑλπίδα καὶ ἀπὸ δαμασκῶ τοῦ Περδίκκα ἐκ τῆς Αἰγύπτου. Arrian (Phot., 71, a.). Droysen (i., 134) concludes from these words, combined with the following κατηγορίας δὲ Πτολεμαίου, that Perdiccas accused Ptolemy (by which he understands a formal trial) at Damascus. To me they seem inconsistent with that supposition.

‡ Κατηγορίας δὲ Πτολεμαίου, κενὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ πλοῦτος ἀπολυμένον τὰς αἰτίας.

\* Plut., Eum., 6. It was adapted to the enemy's watch-word.

him in his operations—as the bursting of a canal which he had begun to clear out—aggravated the discontent which prevailed among his troops, and desertions grew more and more frequent. He resolved, therefore, to make an attempt to cross the river at a point several miles above Pelusium; and, having set out in the evening, carefully concealing his object from his own officers, that the enemy might not be apprized of it, after a forced march, arrived the next morning at a ford of the Nile, over against a fortress named Camel's Wall. After a short interval of repose, he ordered the elephants to be led over, followed by a train with scaling-ladders, and by the light troops destined for the assault of the place, and a select body of cavalry to intercept any succours that might be sent to it. Ptolemy, however, had learned or suspected the aim of his movement, and was already within the fortress before the enemy had reached the foot of the walls. His arrival was announced by a flourish of trumpets, and by the shouts of the garrison, and he took his stand, surrounded by his officers, on the top of the battlements at the water's edge. Perdiccas, nevertheless, directed that the assault should proceed. It was carried on with great vigour the whole day long by successive divisions, which relieved one another; but all their efforts were defeated by the patient resolution of the besieged, who, though comparatively few in number, had the advantage of a strong position, and were animated by the example of Ptolemy, whom they saw exposing his own person in the place of greatest danger, and displaying extraordinary prowess.

In the evening Perdiccas recalled the assailants to the camp, convinced that the attempt was hopeless. He seems to have felt that his adversary's genius and spirit were superior to his own, and that he had no prospect of effecting his object unless he could elude Ptolemy's vigilance. In the following night he again broke up his camp, and marched towards Memphis, designing to transport his army to the great island there, formed by the Nile, before Ptolemy should be aware of his intention. Between the island and the east bank the river was fordable; but the water in the middle was up to the soldier's chin, and the current so strong that the men could scarcely keep their footing. There was, however, no enemy on the other side to oppose their passage; and, to render it easier, Perdiccas ordered the elephants to be ranged above the ford, so as to break the force of the stream, and the cavalry to cross below it, so that they might lend assistance to any who should be carried out of their depth. In this manner one division crossed over safely; but now arose an unforeseen impediment to the passage of the rest. The sand at the bottom, stirred up by the trampling of so many feet of beasts and men, was at length carried away by the stream, so that the ford was no longer practicable. As the cause was not immediately suspected, the change was attributed to a sudden rising of the river, and this persuasion heightened the general consternation. Those who had already crossed were not in sufficient numbers to defend themselves against Ptolemy, who might soon be expected to appear; and Perdiccas knew that they would not

be reluctant to lay down their arms. He therefore ordered all to return, as best they might. Some, who were unable to swim, or saw certain death in the attempt, or who gladly seized the opportunity of desertion, escaped to the enemy's camp. The strongest and most expert swimmers with great difficulty made good their passage; but the less robust and skilful either sank, exhausted by their efforts, or were carried down the stream, to meet a still more dreadful death. The scaly monsters of the Nile, attracted by the prey, flocked in shoals to the place. From the shore the spectators could see the water tinged with the blood of their comrades, could see their limbs crushed by those horrible jaws, could hear their shrieks, without the power of stirring for their relief.

When this scene was at an end, and there was leisure to calculate the loss, it was ascertained that 2000 were missing, and one half of the number was believed to have been devoured by the crocodiles. Among them were some officers of high rank. The thought which most deeply embittered the grief of the survivors was, that the sacrifice of life had been perfectly useless; that so many brave men had perished by a fate at once cruel and ignoble. From this kind of sympathy it was an easy transition which led the mourners to vehement indignation against the author of the calamity. Perdiccas had always been disliked, while he was feared; he began now to be despised as an incautious general, or detested as one reckless about the lives of his men. The contrast which, of late, they had so often been led to draw between their stern, imperious, inhuman chief, and his mild and affable competitor, was now renewed, more than ever to the disadvantage of Perdiccas; and Ptolemy heightened the impression already made in his favour, by an act of prudent generosity. He collected as many of the remains of those who had perished as could be recovered from the river, and, after he had burned them with the usual solemnity in his own camp, sent their bones to their friends. The sight irritated their rage against Perdiccas, and pleaded more powerfully than words in Ptolemy's behalf. Perdiccas, it seems, attempted to check the mutiny which he saw rising in his army by severity; but it was too late either to conciliate or overawe the discontented. A great number of his officers were estranged from him, and openly accused him: the phalanx testified its judgment by threatening clamours. Pithon, who had never forgotten the bloody stratagem by which he had been baffled and dishonoured, took the lead in the conspiracy, which was shared by about a hundred more, among whom were Antigenes and Seleucus. The cavalry adhered longest to the regent's side; but it was also partly won, and Pithon, with those whom he had gained, proceeded to the tent of Perdiccas. Antigenes struck the first blow; after a short struggle, he fell, pierced by their sarissas.\*

Thus was the world delivered from a man who, in the course of a short career, had

\* Diodorus (xviii. 36) names only Pithon among the conspirators: Nepos (Eumen., v. i.) only Antigenes and Seleucus. That Antigenes struck the first blow is mentioned by Arrian (Phot., 71, b.). Droysen, it seems to me erroneously, supposes that Pithon was not present.

shown himself capable of every crime to which ambition can instigate; had already shed torrents of innocent blood, and did not shrink from the basest murder more than from open massacre. That such a man did not succeed in his contest for power with such an adversary as Ptolemy, can hardly be considered otherwise than as a gain to humanity; though Perdiccas, if he had seated himself securely on a throne, might, perhaps, have reigned as mildly as his rival. His death immediately put an end to the civil war. Ptolemy, who, perhaps, was not a stranger to the plot, came the next day to the camp, and addressed the Macedonians in vindication of himself. The effect of his speech was enforced by a supply of provisions, which they greatly needed, and his influence was soon so firmly established in the royal army, that he was invited to assume the office which Perdiccas had left vacant. Ptolemy, however, had the prudence to be satisfied for the present with the possession of his rich province. He saw that the title of regent would contribute nothing to his independence, and might involve him in troublesome and dangerous quarrels. He therefore declined the offer, and turned the choice of the army on Pithon and the general Arrideus, who were both now his friends, and not likely ever to become dangerous rivals.

Only two days after the death of Perdiccas, the news arrived of the great victory which Eumenes had gained over Neoptolemus and Craterus, and of their death. Two days earlier this intelligence might have been useful to Perdiccas, though it could hardly have extricated him from his embarrassment, or have decided the contest in his favour. It now only inflamed the hatred of the Macedonians against him and his friends. They immediately put to death several of his adherents, and, in their fury, did not even spare his sister Atalante, the wife of his admiral, Attalus; and they condemned Eumenes and fifty of his principal officers, including Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas, to the same punishment. Attalus, when he heard of these proceedings, sailed away from Pelusium, and made for Tyre. Here, though it seems his brother's fate was already known, he was cordially received by the commander of the garrison, a Macedonian named Archelaus, who put him in possession of the city, and of the treasure, amounting to 800 talents, which had been deposited there by Perdiccas. At Tyre he remained for a time, to collect as many of his brother's friends as should be able to make their escape from Egypt, and to concert future operations in his own defence.

For the interests of Greece the fall of Perdiccas was, perhaps, to be regretted. As a master, indeed, he was as much to be dreaded as any of his rivals; but he might have proved a powerful and useful ally. Pausanias observes that, through the treachery of Demades and his party, the Athenians were terrified into a premature surrender of their freedom, which they might have preserved if they had been aware of the danger that threatened Antipater, which would soon have forced him to leave Greece unmolested.\* This remark is con-

firmed by the events which followed. Perdiccas had sent agents into Greece, who concluded an alliance between him and the Ætolians; and when Antipater had passed over into Asia, the Ætolians again collected their forces, 12,000 foot and 800 horse, who, under their general Alexander—the military chief of the nation—first invaded the territory of Amphissa, and, though they were not able to reduce the capital, took several of the towns, and then marched into Thessaly. They were met on their way by the Macedonian general Polycles; but, in a battle which ensued, he was defeated and slain, and the sale or ransom of the Macedonian prisoners appears to have yielded a considerable booty. In Thessaly, they were still warmly aided by Meno, through whose influence the greater part of the Thessalian towns were induced to engage in the new war; and the army of the confederates, including, it seems, some mercenaries, amounted to 25,000 horse and 1500 foot. Again, the power of Macedonia was unable to withstand even this small portion of the force which Greece, if united, might have brought into the field. Polysperchon, who had been left at the head of the government in Macedonia, was obliged to resort to negotiation and intrigues, to divide before he could conquer. The Acarnanians, the ancient enemies of their southern neighbours, were induced to make a diversion in Ætolia; and the Ætolians were obliged to withdraw their native troops from Thessaly, and to return to defend their homes. They, indeed, soon drove the Acarnanians out of their country; but while they were thus employed, Polysperchon marched into Thessaly, and gave battle to Meno. He was probably now greatly superior in numbers, gained a decisive victory, and Meno himself was among the slain. The whole of Thessaly submitted without farther resistance to the conqueror.

After the pacification of Memphis, Pithon and Arrideus returned with their royal charge into Syria, to join their forces with those of Antipater, on whom, after Ptolemy had declined the regency, the power of Perdiccas really devolved. They sent messengers to hasten his coming, and also to summon Antigonus from Cyprus, where he was, perhaps, raising a naval armament for the defence of Egypt. The two new regiments, on their march into Syria, found their situation growing every day more embarrassing. They had not to deal with an imbecile prince, who passively lent his name to every measure that was prescribed to him, but with an enterprising young queen, ambitious of power, who inherited her mother's hatred of Antipater, and who hoped, before he arrived, to make herself independent of his authority. She had quailed before the commanding energy of Perdiccas; but she entertained no such fear of Pithon and Arrideus; and claimed her share in all the deliberations of the council. They, indeed, repelled her pretensions, and declared that, until Antipater and Antigonus came, they would continue to exercise the supreme authority. But she did not cease to intrigue with the army, in which she had acquired great influence by her birth and character. She had also, it seems, entered into a negotiation with Attalus; and he was induced, by the prospect of a

counter-revolution, to quit Tyre, and to appear in the Macedonian camp. Such was the state of things which Antipater found when he joined the regents at the town of Paradisus, or Triparadisus, in Upper Syria.

It was to him that all demands were now to be addressed. The Macedonians of the royal army, who had served in the East, claimed the pay and rewards which had been promised to them by Alexander. Antipater did not venture to refuse, but professed that he must first inquire into the state of the royal treasury, and would then endeavour to satisfy them to the utmost of his power. This answer might, perhaps, have appeased them, if their discontent had not been fomented by the arts of Eurydice and Attalus;\* but the queen seized the pretext to excite the impatient soldiery against him. She harangued them in a speech which had been composed for her by Aesclepiodorus, who filled the office held, under Alexander, by Eumenes; Attalus seconded her with his eloquence; they were listened to with universal applause, and a tumultuous scene ensued, from which Antipater, who had ventured almost alone into the camp, escaped, with great risk of his life, through the mediation of Antigonus and Seleucus, to his own troops.† The intercessors themselves were violently threatened. The cavalry, however, declared itself in his favour; and its leading officers successfully exerted their influence to restore tranquillity. We know no more of the steps through which Antipater was invested by the army with the supreme power; but Attalus disappears—having returned, it seems, to Tyre—Eurydice is silenced; and Antipater is permitted to make such changes as he thought fit in the distribution of the provinces.

Among the particulars of this new arrangement, which is celebrated as the partition of Triparadisus, a few only need be here mentioned. Ptolemy not only retained Egypt, which was now looked upon as his own by right of conquest, but was also invested with all the territories which he had acquired, or might conquer, to the west of his province. Seleucus received the satrapy of Babylon; and Antigonus was rewarded with that of Susiana, for the share he had taken in the revolt against Perdiccas. About three thousand of the most turbulent of the Macedonians, who belonged to the class distinguished by the title of *Argyraspids*, from their silver shields, were placed under his orders, to serve as an escort for the treasure which he was directed to bring down from Susa. Arrideus was appointed to the Hellespontine Phrygia; Antigonus was reinstated in his old province, and was also promoted to the command of the army which had served under Perdiccas, and charged with the care of the royal personages, and with the pro-

secution of the war against Eumenes. The only precaution which Antipater took to prevent any abuse of this vast power with which he intrusted a man who, though deeply indebted to him, had not given him any clear proofs of attachment, was to place his son Cassander, with the title of chiliarch, at the head of the cavalry. He also conferred the rank of somatophylax on Autolyceus, Amyntas, a brother of Peucestes, Ptolemæus, and Alexander, the son of his friend Polysperchon. These he had, probably, reason to consider as persons devoted to himself. The approbation with which his measures were received is described as most lively and universal. They were, indeed, an appearance of moderation and disinterestedness worthy of his consummate prudence. He then set out with his own troops on his return to Macedonia, taking the road through Lydia to the Hellespont; while Antigonus, it seems, marched into his own satrapy, to make preparations for the war against Eumenes.

It was a great change that the revolution which had taken place in the government of the empire made in the position of Eumenes. He had been hitherto uniformly contending on the side of legitimate authority; if he was attached to Perdiccas, it was not as to his patron, but as to the lawful regent; if he was opposed to Antipater, it was not as to his private enemy, but as to one who had taken up arms against his sovereign. This was the only footing on which, as a foreigner, he could stand with safety in the midst of the civil wars of the Macedonians. Now the state of things on which he had grounded his hopes was completely reversed. All the titles behind which he had shielded himself were turned as weapons against him; the court was in the hands of his worst enemy; he was himself outlawed and proscribed in the name of his sovereign; every step he took in his own defence exposed him to the charge of treason and rebellion; he was left to depend entirely on the adherents he could preserve or gain by his personal influence; and this was much shaken by the connexion with Perdiccas, which had been his main support. On the other hand, he maintained his correspondence with the royal family of Macedonia, which gave some colour of legitimacy to his proceedings. He was still at the head of a strong and victorious army; and there were other adherents of Perdiccas, proscribed like himself, from whom he might expect powerful aid. Alcetas, though he had refused to lead his division against Craterus, seemed now to have no prospect of safety but in union with him; and Attalus, after his return from Triparadisus, had collected a body of 10,000 foot and 800 horse. The combination of all these forces with his own might have enabled him to defy an attack. But both Alcetas and Attalus, besides that they probably shared the common jealousy of him, and had always submitted impatiently to his command, had each his separate views; and the plans which they had formed for their own security and aggrandizement were quite independent of his concurrence. The aim of Attalus was, it seems, to establish himself with his fleet and army in some maritime settlement. Alcetas hoped to find a permanent refuge in Pisidia, and to become, in fact, master of the province. With this view, he had

\* Arrian ap. Phot., c. 92, p. 71, b., kal "Ατταλος δὲ Δρύωεν (Nachf., i., 145) observes that "this Attalus is of course not the brother-in-law of Perdiccas," and his appearance in the Macedonian camp is certainly surprising. Nevertheless, the Attalus mentioned in this part of the extract from Arrian seems to be afterward most clearly identified with the admiral, by the words (p. 72, a.) ὁ τῆς κατὰ Δρυινίδου στρατὸς ὀδόντες φέρων τὰ δέματα, of which Druryen takes no notice, but which I can only explain as an allusion to the sedition at Triparadisus.

† Arrian, Phot., p. 71, b. Polyænus has dressed up the story into a stratagem of Antigonus, iv., 6, 4.

taken great pains to efface the recollection of his brother's cruelty, and to conciliate the goodwill of the natives by liberality, marks of distinction, and affable demeanour. By these arts, he so won the affections of the mountaineers, that they were ready to lay down their lives for him. Still, it appears that he had opened a communication with Attalus, and that they had concerted a plan for mutual co-operation. Their project seems to have been, to make themselves masters of a part of the southern coast of Asia Minor, so as to provide a retreat for either in case of need, and to enable them readily to take advantage of any new turn of affairs, whether in Asia or Europe. It was towards Rhodes and the opposite coast of Caria that Attalus directed his first attempts; but he was repulsed by the Rhodians, and, it seems, defeated in a sea-fight. We hear no more of his naval armament; perhaps his loss in the battle had been so great, that he did not think himself able to keep the sea; and he certainly joined his land force with that of Alcetas.

It was about this time that Antipater arrived in Lydia. It may be concluded that the forces of Eumenes, Alcetas, and Attalus combined, might have obstructed his march, and have placed him in great peril, since Eumenes thought himself alone strong enough, on account of the superiority of his cavalry, to encounter him, and advanced as far as Sardis to offer battle in the adjacent plain. He was, however, induced to withdraw by the persuasions of Cleopatra, who was still at Sardis, and feared that the movements of Eumenes might be imputed to her instigation, and that she might fall the first victim of Antipater's vengeance. She had reason for such anxiety; Antipater, when he arrived at Sardis, reproached her with the countenance she had shown to Perdiccas and Eumenes. It seems that she was obliged to defend herself in public; and she met the accusation with counter-charges, and cleared herself so ably, that Antipater thought it prudent to let the matter drop, and a formal reconciliation took place between them. Though Eumenes was still at no great distance, Antipater did not feel confidence enough in the strength of his army to seek an engagement with him; and his attention was now drawn towards the movements of Alcetas and Attalus. We do not know either the precise object or scene of their operations; but Antipater ordered Asander, the satrap of Caria, to stop their progress. The result was an engagement, in which, though the fortune of the day inclined but little on either side, it finally rested with them. Still, Eumenes, though he invited them by an embassy, could not prevail on them to join him. They, perhaps, thought themselves safe in Pisidia, especially as Antigonus had now led the royal army into Phrygia.

Antipater did not proceed from Sardis directly on his march towards the Hellespont. He was induced, it seems, by letters which he received from Cassander and Antigonus, to deviate from his route in order to meet them in Phrygia. Antigonus complained of Cassander's insubordination; Cassander charged Antigonus with ambitious designs, and in his next interview with his father, strongly urged him

not to leave so great a trust in hands which might soon be turned against himself. Antipater, though he openly censured his son for his want of deference to the commander-in-chief, was not the less imbued with his suspicions. His confidence was, indeed, in some degree revived by the respectful address, and the seeming honour and probity of Antigonus; but still, before he resumed his march, he made some changes in his previous arrangements. He determined to carry the royal persons with him to Macedonia. This he seems to have regarded as a sufficient precaution against the rivalry of Antigonus. On the other hand, to ensure his success against Eumenes, he is said to have transferred to his command a large part of the forces which he had brought from Europe—between 8000 and 9000 Macedonians, and cavalry, or light troops, in equal number.\* But he retained seventy, being one half of the elephants, which had never yet been seen in Europe, for himself. One motive for the extraordinary liberality with which Antipater weakened his own army to strengthen that of Antigonus, may have been that he found himself unable to satisfy the demands of his men; whether for arrears of pay, or for a donative which he may have promised to keep them in good humour at Tripardisus. The supply of treasure which he had received from Alexander had been exhausted in the subsequent wars, and the Macedonians were again growing clamorous. It was with difficulty he could quiet them with an assurance that he would satisfy them when they reached Abydos. There he embarked clandestinely in the night with the princes, and, having crossed over to the Chersonesus, repaired to Lysimachus, who was in the neighbourhood. The army followed him across the Hellespont, but, overawed perhaps by Lysimachus, did not venture immediately to urge its claim; otherwise, the man who had just been disposing of the whole empire might have returned to his own province a defenceless fugitive.

It was late in the year 321 before he left Asia. Eumenes fixed his winter quarters at Celæne, and Antigonus in some other part of

\* Arrian, Phot., 73, b. Droysen conceives that it was only an exchange, and that Antipater took almost the whole of the royal army away with him to Europe. The only ground he assigns for this conjecture is, that it is afterward said of Antipater's troops, *στασιςμὲν πάντες ὁ στρατός αὐτῶν τὰ χρίματα*: words which certainly appear to refer to the previous demand of the royal army. Yet this is not so clear as it is that Photius, when he used the expressions *ἐνταυτοῖς—ἐνταυτοῖς—ὅς ἦσαν διατεταγμένοι τὸν πόλεμον*, did not understand Arrian's meaning to have been that Antipater showed the strongest mark of suspicion, and deprived Antigonus of the best troops he had to carry on the war with Eumenes. As to the argument which Droysen puts into Antipater's mouth, that it might be dangerous to employ such turbulent troops, who had been long in the service of Perdiccas, against Eumenes, it seems to have very little weight, since Perdiccas was abhorred by those who had served under him, and Eumenes was more hated by the old army on account of the death of Craterus, than he could be by the fresh troops who had served under Craterus but a very short time. The means of securing the fidelity of the army by the payment which it demanded were more readily to be found in Asia than in Europe. The words in Photius relating to the cavalry, *ἡντις τὴν ῥίππον* (al. *ῥιππον*) *ἰσχυρὰ*, are very obscure. Droysen thinks they mean as many as Antigonus had before. We find him immediately after opposed to Eumenes with 2000 horse. I have thought it possible that, in the abridgment of Arrian, *ἡντις* may include troops of other kinds.

Phrygia. In the following spring Antigonos opened the campaign. Eumenes was superior in cavalry, and did not fear to meet the enemy in open combat on even ground; but he was in continual danger from his own troops, and a series of stratagems and contrivances was necessary to provide them with pay, to secure their fidelity, and to baffle the attempts of the enemy, who was constantly tampering with them. A price of 100 talents was set on his head, and the reward was published in his own camp by written notices. But his Macedonians had sufficient sense of honour to resent this base temptation, and they decreed that a guard of a thousand select men should be appointed to protect him. Still, Antigonos continued to rest his hopes mainly on treachery, and this at length effected his object. He first induced a general, named Perdiccas, to desert with a division of 3000 foot and 500 horse; but, through the activity of Eumenes, the traitor was overtaken and punished, with his principal abettors, and the troops won by clemency to return to their duty. A second similar attempt proved more successful. Eumenes had encamped in one of the broad plains of southern Cappadocia, where there was ample space for the evolutions of his cavalry, and confidently expected the enemy's approach. But Antigonos had corrupted one of his officers, named Apollonides, who commanded a brigade of horse; he deserted in the midst of the battle, with the whole of his division, and his treachery decided the day in favour of Antigonos. Eumenes lost 8000 men and all his baggage. He, however, not only eluded the enemy's pursuit, but by a dexterous countermarch returned to the field of battle, where he encamped and paid the last honours to the slain, employing the timber of the dwellings in the adjacent villages for the funeral piles, and raised separate barrows over the remains of the officers and men—monuments of his hardihood and presence of mind, which excited the admiration of Antigonos himself when he again passed that way. The two armies were still sometimes so near each other that Eumenes once had an opportunity of making himself master of the whole of the enemy's baggage, which would have enriched his troops with an immense booty. He feared that the possession of such wealth would render them eager to quit his toilsome and perilous service, sent secret warning, under the pretext of private friendship, to Menander, the general who had been left in charge of the baggage, and enabled him to withdraw into an unassailable position. This seemingly generous action excited the gratitude of the Macedonians, whose wives and children it had saved from slavery and dishonour, till Antigonos pointed out to them that Eumenes had spared them only that he might not encumber himself.

At length, however, Eumenes himself, after an unsuccessful attempt to escape into Armenia, seeing his ranks thinned by frequent desertions, thought it best to put an end to this life of perpetual wandering, fatigue, and hair-breadth escapes, which could lead to no useful result, and he recommended to the greater part of his men to return to their homes and wait for better times. He reserved only 500 horse and 200 heavy-armed, with which he took ref-

uge in the impregnable fortress of Nora, on the confines of Lycaonia and Cappadocia.\* It was a rock, not more than about two stadia in circumference at the top, and precipitous on all sides, containing a copious spring of water, and a well-filled magazine of grain and salt, but no other kind of provisions. Seeing that many of his friends were dismayed by the prospect of the dreary imprisonment which awaited them during a long siege in such a place, he permitted them to depart, and dismissed them with expressions of the kindest regard. Antigonos soon surrounded the place with his army, and invested it with a double line of circumvallation. But, as he could scarcely suppose that Eumenes could intend to sustain a siege, he invited him to a parley. Eumenes would neither treat with him as his superior, nor consent to come down, until he had received his brother Ptolemæus as a hostage. He then repaired to his camp, and they embraced each other with the cordiality of old friends. But when they began to discuss conditions, Eumenes insisted on nothing less than the restitution of his satrapy, and of all the grants he had received from Perdiccas. The by-standers were astonished at such demands from a man whose situation seemed so hopeless; and Antigonos, desiring to leave an opening for future negotiation, promised to refer them to Antipater, and sent him back to the fortress. The Macedonians crowded about him, eager to gaze on the extraordinary person whose name, since the death of Craterus, was in every mouth. They were surprised to see, not the frame of a sturdy warrior, worn with toil and hardships, but a figure of the most delicate symmetry, seemingly in all the freshness of youth,† with a gentle and engaging aspect. The impatience of their curiosity alarmed Antigonos for his safety; he ordered them to keep at a distance, and at last, throwing his arm round the waist of Eumenes, conducted him, through a passage formed by his guards, to the foot of the fortress. He then left a force sufficient closely to blockade the place, and marched away to crush the remaining friends of Perdiccas.

His army was strengthened by a great part of the troops of Eumenes, so that it now amounted to 40,000 foot and 7000 horse. His only care now was to prevent the enemy's escape. By a forced march, he reached the borders of Pisidia in seven days, and, arriving thus unexpectedly, was enabled to occupy a pass which might have been easily secured. Alcetas and Attalus were encamped in the plain below. Their army numbered no less than 16,000 foot and 900 horse. Alcetas made a desperate

\* Kinneir (*Journey through Asia Minor*, p. 110), says, "On quitting Kara-hissar (Castabala, according to him) at daybreak, we followed a narrow path conducting us through the gorges of a chain of hills immediately to the west of the town. At the end of the third mile we passed under a high and perpendicular rock crowned with an ancient fortress, called by the natives Yengi Bar, or Nour, and well known in history by the name of Nora, where Eumenes stood a siege against Antigonos." He adds in a note, "The castle of Nora is stated to have been two stadia in circumference, and that of Yengi Bar exactly corresponds." He does not say how he ascertained this exact correspondence; but, altogether, these coincidences, with the position (which agrees with Droysen's conjecture), seem to leave little doubt as to the identity.

† Γλυφὸς καὶ νεοπρεπής. Plut., *Eum.*, 11. He was, however, at this time past forty.

attempt to dislodge the enemy from the heights, but was repulsed, and with difficulty effected his retreat through the hostile cavalry, with which Antigonus descended to cut him off from the main body. He had scarcely time to form his line of battle before the enemy poured down in an irresistible mass, with the advantage of higher ground. Terror and confusion spread through his ranks, and excluded every thought but that of flight. Attalus, with Polemo, Docimus, and several others of his chief officers, was taken prisoner. The bulk of the fugitives laid down their arms, and consented to enter the service of Antigonus. But Alcetas, with his guards, some slaves whom he had armed,\* and 6000 of his trusty Pisidians, made good his retreat to Termessus. Antigonus immediately proceeded to encamp near the place, which was so strong as to defy the assault of the most numerous host. He only desired to become master of the person of Alcetas, and sent to demand him. The elder Pisidians had no wish to endanger their city for the sake of a single stranger; but the young warriors who had served under Alcetas refused to surrender him, bade him rely on their devotion, and resolved to defend him to the last.† The old men now sent a private message to Antigonus, promising to deliver up Alcetas, alive or dead, if he would draw the younger citizens out of the town by a feigned attack. When this had been done, they fell upon Alcetas, who was left without any guard but his slaves. To avoid capture, he slew himself; and his body, placed on a couch, was carried out to Antigonus, who ordered it to be mutilated, and, at the end of three days, marched away. The young Pisidians, in the first transports of their indignation, resolved to fire the town, and, retiring to the mountains, to ravage the open country, which acknowledged the authority of Antigonus; and, though they were diverted from this design, they did not cease to infest this territory by marauding excursions. The body of Alcetas, which had been left unburied, they honoured with a splendid funeral.

By the result of this campaign, Antigonus was brought a great step nearer to the end of his ambition. His army was now raised to 60,000 foot and 10,000 horse; and there was no limit to the numbers by which he might augment it by means of the treasures which it placed at his disposal. He saw no power in Asia that could resist such a force, and might safely, whenever he would, lay aside the character of a subject, and profess the independence which he actually possessed, and which he was fully resolved to maintain. Yet a lingering feeling of gratitude and respect for Antipater might have induced him to dissemble his designs some time longer. But all his scruples were removed by intelligence, which he received before he had re-

passed the borders of Pisida, of Antipater's death, and especially of the state in which he had left the affairs of Macedonia. Antipater had been carried off by the combined effects of age and disease. His death gave occasion to very important revolutions both in Asia and in Greece.

After the peace, which the Athenians had purchased so dearly, the city remained as tranquil as Phocion himself could have desired. The business of the public assembly, and of the courts of justice, seldom interrupted the private affairs of the 9000 citizens: when they met, they were no longer agitated by the declamations of any brawling orators.\* The most simple expression of Phocion's opinion, or of the judgment of his good friend Menyllus, was sufficient to decide every question. Athens, in her more turbulent days, had witnessed many combinations between orators and generals for political purposes; but few in which there had been so complete an understanding between the parties, none so efficacious, as this. His own independence and dignity, however, Phocion maintained unimpaired. He would neither accept any presents, such as he had declined when offered by Alexander, from Menyllus, or Antipater, for himself, nor permit his son Phocus to receive any. So that it was remarked by Antipater that, of his two Athenian friends, he could neither prevail on Phocion to take, nor satiate Demades by giving. Phocion ventured even to resist Antipater's will, when he was required to become himself the instrument of some unseemly measure, and sternly observed, that Antipater could not have him at once for a friend and a flatterer. If there was anything to disturb the complacency with which Phocion contemplated this calm and orderly state of affairs, it was, perhaps, the petulance of Demades, who, like a satyr by the side of a heroic person, would be committing some extravagance, or making some roguish speech, which tended to destroy the illusion of his graver friend's administration. He not only took pleasure in an ostentatious display of his ill-gotten wealth, but was proud of the corruption from which it was derived. When he celebrated the marriage of his bastard Demas, he observed that the wedding-feast was furnished by kings and rulers. Another time he had undertaken to defray the expense of a chorus, and, as the law forbade the employing of foreign performers, under the penalty of a thousand drachmas for each, Demades produced a chorus consisting of a hundred foreigners, and exhibited the amount of the penalties—a sum sufficient to have preserved fifty citizens from transportation—with them in the orchestra. It was, perhaps, during this period, which seemed to realize Plato's ideal of a commonwealth governed by a philosopher, that Demades proposed to Phocion to introduce the Spartan discipline at Athens, and offered himself to draw up and recommend a decree for that purpose. "A fit advocate, indeed," Phocion observed, "for Spartan fare, and the institutions of Lycurgus, with that rich cloak, and that scent of perfumes."†

At bottom, however, Demades was not entire-

\* Πάδων, Diodor., xviii., 45. Pages, according to Droysen; yet they seem the same as the δολοί who are mentioned in the next chapter.

† This contest between the old and the young may, perhaps, remind some readers of one of Niebuhr's beautiful discoveries in Roman history (vol. i., p. 832). Here, however, we have only a natural result of the difference in age and circumstances. The young men are those of military age. No such explanation presents itself of the feud described by Polybius (iv., 53) between the *σπυδαῖοι* and *νεώτεροι* at Cortyæ. But so, in the siege of Florence in 1530, we find the *Giovani* and *Vecchi* taking opposite sides. (Varchi, *Storia Fiorentina*, l. xii., princ.)

\* Suidas, Διμάδος. Antipater, κατελθὼν δὲ δίκασθαι καὶ τοὺς ρητορικοὺς ἀγῶνας. † Plut., Phoc., 30.



ly satisfied with Phocion's ascendancy. Though he enjoyed all the license he could wish, his importance in the state, and, consequently, his opportunities of enriching himself, were not such as he could have desired. We may collect from the above-quoted saying of Antipater, that Demades was continually applying to him for money, and did not always obtain as much as he asked. Accordingly, when the movements and partial success of Perdiccas appeared to hold out a prospect of a revolution in Greece, Demades turned his eyes towards him as a patron, who might have greater need of his aid, and therefore would probably pay more liberally than Antipater. He resolved, at all events, to provide for his own safety, so as not to be involved in Antipater's fall; and sent a letter to Perdiccas, in which he urged him to appear and save Greece, *which was hanging by an old rotten thread*.\* The time was at hand when his policy and his wit were to cost him dear.

It might have been supposed that the government established by Phocion was, at least, perfectly conformable to the wishes of the citizens whose franchise had been spared. They were now plagued by no sycophants, taxed for no wars, had no entertainments to provide for a hungry multitude. Yet the garrison at Munychia, which secured the continuance of these blessings, was an eyesore to them. They desired to be rid of it, as eagerly as if they had been impatient of the government which it supported; and Phocion was repeatedly urged to exert his interest with Antipater for its removal, as he had induced him hitherto to postpone the exaction of the sum imposed on them at the peace. Phocion, however, declined to undertake an embassy in which he neither expected nor wished to succeed. A call was then made on Demades, as the person next in influence with Antipater: it was an opportunity for earning a bribe, and in an evil hour he accepted the commission, and set out for Macedonia, accompanied by his son Demeas. They found Antipater in the last stage of his disorder, but yet strong enough to give audience to the ambassador, and willing, perhaps, to enjoy his confusion in the scene which was prepared for him. Antipater was in possession of the letter—which had been found among the papers of Perdiccas—in which Demades had at once betrayed and ridiculed his benefactor. He was introduced into Antipater's presence, and permitted to unfold his business, and urged the petition of the Athenians with his wonted boldness. Antipater, it seems, did not deign to answer him; but an Athenian named Dinarchus, who, as a friend of Phocion, had, perhaps, been sent to oppose his application, became his accuser. The fatal letter was probably produced, and now, for the first time in his life, his impudence may have failed him. He and his son were led away by Antipater's guards to a dungeon. It is not quite clear whether Antipater himself had doomed them to death: it was, at least, Cassander who directed the execution.

He ordered Demades to be put to death first: he was pierced by the swords of the soldiers immediately under his father's eye, so that his blood sprinkled the old man's robe; and then Demades, having witnessed this end of one who was, perhaps, the only being he loved, after he had been loaded with reproaches by Cassander for his treachery and ingratitude, underwent a like fate: a termination which might have appeared almost too tragical for so contemptible a life, if he had not been the man who, to serve Antipater, proposed the decree which sentenced so many better men to death.

It may, probably, be collected from the share which Cassander is said to have taken in this scene, that he had already, during the latter part of his father's illness, begun to exercise some of the functions of the government, which, as he expected, was shortly to devolve on him. He was, at least, no less surprised than mortified when Antipater, on the point of death, declared his will to be, that Polysperchon should succeed to the regency, and that his son should continue in the subordinate station of chiliarch. Antipater's motive in this arrangement is, indeed, by no means evident. Polysperchon was no way related to him; and, though much respected by the Macedonians as one of the oldest generals of Alexander's wars, can never, as the sequel shows, have earned the reputation of eminent ability, while Cassander had already given sufficient proofs of his energy and talents. We can hardly conclude otherwise than that his father distrusted his character and temper, which were certainly far from amiable, and, perhaps, had already made him unpopular in Macedonia, and were likely to lead him to an immediate rupture with Antigonus, whom he had already provoked. Yet Cassander was not wanting in self-command. He dissembled his indignation, pretended to resign himself to his father's pleasure, and withdrew into the country, with a few intimate friends, under the pretext of the chase, in which he seemed to have forgotten the affairs of the state. But the time ostensibly devoted to his hunting-parties was really spent in earnest conference with his friends on the subject which engrossed his thoughts. He acquainted them with his resolution to recover what he considered as his patrimony, and engaged them, by large promises, to embrace his cause. At the same time, he sent secret agents to Ptolemy, who had, probably, already married his sister, to renew their friendship and implore succours, and particularly to request that he would send a naval force to the Hellespont from Phœnicia; for, not long after the transactions at Tripuradus, Ptolemy had sent Nicander, one of his generals, with an army, into Syria; the satrap Laomedon, who had rejected Ptolemy's offers,† had fallen into Nicanor's hands, and the whole province had submitted to him.‡ The part of Asia which contained all the elements of a maritime power in the greatest abundance was

\* Arrian, Phot., 70, a. Plutarch, Phot., 30. Diodorus, xlviii., 48.

† Appian, Syr., 52, who adds that Laomedon afterward escaped, and joined Alcotas in Caria.

‡ Droysen combines this expedition of Nicanor with the capture of Jerusalem on the Sabbath related by Agatharchides in Josephus, Ant., xii., 1, and in Apion, l. 23. But, according to Agatharchides, Ptolemy surprised Jerusalem in person.

\* Σάξαις τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀπὸ σακροῦ καὶ παλαιῶν στήμονος ἡγούμενους. (Arrian, Phot., p. 70, a. Plutarch, Demosth., 31; less accurately, Phot., 30.) But there seems to be no ground for Droysen's interpretation of the metaphor, as if it represented the Greek states as a bundle kept together by a thread.

thus annexed to Egypt; and the manner in which this invaluable acquisition was made proved, more clearly than ever, that to Ptolemy, at least, the imperial government, the titles and decrees of the regents, were mere empty sounds. Cassander, at the same time, endeavoured, by means of his agents, to interest other leading persons, and some foreign cities, in his behalf. Among the precautions which he took to secure his interests, one was to send a trusty adherent, named Nicanor, to succeed Menyllus in the command of Munychia. Nicanor arrived before the news of Antipater's death had been received at Athens, and took possession of Munychia without opposition. When the tidings were made public, loud murmurs arose against Phocion, as having connived at the deception; and the suspicion was confirmed by his intimacy with Nicanor, though he still exerted his influence with him in behalf of his fellow-citizens, and even induced him, among other popular acts, to accept the office of president at one of their public games. In Macedonia, Cassander saw no prospect of forming a party powerful enough to withstand Polysperchon, who was generally esteemed; and, therefore, while he continued to lull suspicion, made preparations for a clandestine flight. He received a favourable answer from Ptolemy; but it was from Antigonus that he determined first to seek protection, though he gave him no notice of his intention, well knowing that he would not suffer the remembrance of their quarrel to outweigh the grounds of policy which must induce him to espouse the cause of Polysperchon's enemy.

Antigonus no sooner heard of Antipater's death than he proceeded, with a steady hand, to grasp the prize which lay before him. His immediate object was to secure himself in the possession of Asia Minor before Polysperchon could collect his forces to interfere with him; and his first step for this end was to attempt to draw Eumenes over to his side. Eumenes, indeed, was apparently powerless, and in a condition more desperate than ever. He was still blockaded at Nora, without any prospect of relief. It was only by extraordinary expedients, suggested by his fruitful genius, that he had kept the bodies and spirits of his followers from sinking under the privations and hardships which they had been suffering during a year's siege. The ground afforded no room for the accustomed exercises of the men, still less for those of the horses. For the latter he contrived a substitute, which was among the most celebrated examples of his never-failing ingenuity. He caused the heads of the horses to be raised by ropes fastened to the roof of the stable, so that their fore feet barely touched the ground. In this uneasy position they were lashed from behind by the grooms, until the struggle, which strained every limb, had produced all the effects of a hard ride. For the men he set apart a room, one-and-twenty feet long, where he directed them to walk, gradually quickening their pace, so as to combine exercise with amusement. He received them all by turns at his own table, and though he had nothing but the common fare to set before them, he seasoned the plain, unvaried meal by his cheerful and lively conversation. At the end of the year

both horses and men were in as good health, and as ready for action, as when they entered the fortress.

Antigonus had formed a just estimate of the extraordinary abilities of Eumenes. He knew that, if he recovered his liberty, he might in a few days become a formidable adversary; and that the siege might be raised by succours from some quarter or other. He would, perhaps, before have granted the terms which Eumenes demanded, if he had not been restrained by regard to Antipater's enmity. He now sent Hieronymus of Cardia, a friend of Eumenes, who afterward wrote the history of his life, to solicit his alliance, and to propose an agreement, by which, on that condition alone, Eumenes was to recover his province, and all the other gifts which he had received from Perdiccas. The agreement was drawn up in writing: it mentioned the royal family, for form's sake, at the beginning; but the pledge of fidelity was to be given to Antigonus alone. Eumenes affected to consider this as an oversight: he inserted the names of Olympias and the princes, and made the treaty to run as a promise of allegiance to them, and to Antigonus only as acting in their behalf. The Macedonians unanimously approved of the alteration, and, not suspecting that it was contrary to their general's wishes, took the oath from Eumenes and allowed him to depart. In a short time he had collected a number of his old troops, who were still scattered over the country, and had a body of more than 2000 horse under his standard. In the mean while the agreement was sent back to be ratified by Antigonus, who, when it was too late, despatched his orders to continue the blockade, with a sharp rebuke to those who had accepted the amendment of his proposals.

He had not waited for the issue of this negotiation, but had already turned his arms against the satraps of the western coast. Arridaeus had afforded him a welcome pretext, by an unsuccessful attempt to make himself master of Cyzicus. Antigonus came, as to its relief, a little too late to seize it for himself, and then required Arridaeus to resign his satrapy. Arridaeus answered him with open defiance, threw garrisons into the principal towns of his province, and sent a body of troops to raise the siege of Nora. Antigonus detached a division of his army against him, and marched in person with the rest into Lydia, where Cleitus, Antipater's admiral, had been appointed in the room of Menander by the partition of Triparadisus. Cleitus likewise garrisoned his chief cities, and then sailed away with his fleet, which contained the captured Athenian vessels, to Macedonia, to warn Polysperchon. Antigonus, however, took Ephesus by assault, with some aid from within, just in time to seize four galleys which put into the harbour, having on board 600 talents, which they were conveying from Cilicia, where the treasure brought by Antigenes from Susa had been deposited in the fortress of Quinda, for the supply of the royal coffers. He calmly declared that he needed it for his own levies. While he was engaged in the reduction of the other Lydian towns, Cassander, having crossed the Hellespont, arrived at his camp, and besought his protection. An-

tigonus received him, as the son of his benefactor, with the warmest welcome, and readily promised to supply him with ships and men to vindicate his rights. No event could have been more seasonable than one which enabled him to keep Polysperchon fully employed in Europe, while he himself established his dominion in Asia.

Polysperchon was well aware of the storm which threatened him from the East. He saw his means reduced, through Antipater's imprudent confidence, to the possession of Macedonia, and a title which was every day losing more of its power over public opinion. It was a time when no aid was to be despised. There were three quarters to which he might look for support, and he addressed himself to each without delay. The name of Olympias had great weight in Macedonia, and wherever else Alexander's memory was revered. Polysperchon saw that she might be a useful ally to him, not only against Cassander, but against Eurydice, who, as she had submitted reluctantly to Antipater, would probably be no less eager to shake off the authority of his successor. He must have been aware that he had himself something to apprehend from the ambition of Olympias, but might think that, in the presence of so many common enemies, their joint interests would keep them closely united. He therefore wrote to invite her to leave Epirus, and to come and take charge of her infant grandson. Still more efficacious assistance was to be expected from Eumenes; and to him, also, he addressed a letter in the king's name, exhorting him to persevere in hostility to Antigonus, now in open revolt, and to adhere to the royal cause. It left him to choose whether he would join the regent in Macedonia, and share his office, or would prosecute the war with Antigonus in Asia. It confirmed all the grants that had been made to him by Perdiccas, and appointed him to the command of the king's forces in the East. He was also informed that orders had been sent to Antigonus and Teutamus to put him in possession of the treasure which they had brought from Susa, and to place themselves, with their troops, under his command; and he was empowered to take 500 talents for his own use, to indemnify him for his past losses. Polysperchon offered, if necessary, to go over to Asia in person with the royal family, and all the forces he could raise to support him. About the same time, Eumenes received a letter from Olympias, also entreating him, in the name of his ancient loyalty, to take Alexander's infant son under his protection; and she requested his advice on Polysperchon's proposals to herself. He did not need these pressing appeals to his honour to determine the course which he should take. He had seen it clearly from the beginning: nothing had occurred to change his views; the recent events confirmed them. We need not doubt that he was sincerely attached to the royal house, to which he owed his fortunes; that he was not indifferent to the reputation of gratitude and constancy, which he must have forfeited if he had acted a different part. But it happened that his personal interest, as he had the good sense to understand it, concurred with these motives. To

Antigonus he well knew that he could never appear in any other light than that of a tool, to be laid aside or broken when it had done its work. The greater his services, the deeper the jealousy they would awaken; the higher Antigonus might rise through them, the more unwilling he would be to own Eumenes as his benefactor. To the royal family he came as a friend in need: they might acknowledge and reward the merits of a faithful servant without humiliation; they would, probably, always require his support, and under the shadow of their name he might occupy a station which, as a foreigner, he could not safely aspire to on any other side. He answered Polysperchon with promises of zealous assistance. Olympias advised to wait for the present in Epirus, until she saw what turn the war took. If, however, she could not control her desire to return to Macedonia, he warned her to forget past injuries, and to use her power with the greatest lenity. It was, no doubt, because he knew how little command she had over her passions that he dissuaded her from the step to which he saw she was strongly inclined.

The third quarter towards which Polysperchon turned his eyes in this emergency was Greece. This was a sign of a new epoch in Grecian history. It was the opening of a prospect that Greece might still recover so much political importance as would, at least, ensure her independence. This was an advantage reasonably to be expected from the inevitable dissolution which awaited Alexander's colossal empire, and from the struggles which could not fail to ensue among his successors. It was not beyond hope or likelihood that Greece might become the arbiter of these contests. Her position, and the force which she was still able to raise, enabled her, if the scales should be nearly balanced, to throw in a weight which would make either preponderate. If, as was most probable, these contests should terminate in the permanent establishment of several rival states, she, though the least powerful, might rank among them on terms of perfect equality, and might be as effectually secured by their mutual jealousy as any sovereign in the European system; no member of which can be said to enjoy more than a like precarious independence, as none could resist a general coalition, and many have no other security against the encroachments of their neighbours. It is a great mistake to consider the political history of Greece as at an end when she was once compelled to submit to the Macedonian yoke. The events of the last half century alone ought to preclude such an error. If she did not recover the position in which she stood when Philip mounted the throne of Macedon, it was not because her strength was exhausted, nor because she was surrounded by too powerful neighbours; not even because events which might have proved favourable to her interests took an adverse turn; but chiefly because she wanted an eye to see her new position and relations, and a hand to collect, husband, and employ her remaining resources. It imparts a kind of tragic interest to the history of Greece, which is hardly to be found in that of any other fallen nation, to observe that she sank almost unconsciously while she still possessed the

means of deliverance, and that the insight and the effort came too late to be of any avail, even if they had been attended with immediate success.

It was a singular effect of Polysperchon's situation that, though he had succeeded to Antipater's authority, and had been placed in it by his choice, as a friend whom he valued and trusted more than his own son, he could only maintain himself by the closest union with his predecessor's bitterest enemies, and by the repeal of all his measures. The power which Antipater had acquired in Greece, though he had nominally recovered it in behalf of his sovereigns, was really reserved to himself and his family. He had committed the command of the garrisoned places to his personal adherents; and it was not to the regent, but to Antipater, that the Greek parties whom he favoured felt themselves indebted for their triumph over their adversaries. It was not, therefore, to Polysperchon, whose office gave him no claims on them, but to Cassander, their patron's son, that they transferred their good will. Polysperchon saw that the only way by which he could hope to wrest Greece out of Cassander's hands, and to turn its arms against him, was to reverse Antipater's policy, and to overthrow all that he had established there. The royal authority was still sufficiently strong to effect a revolution, which would place the government of the principal Greek cities in the hands of men who would be no less firmly attached to himself than their adversaries were by hereditary connexion to Cassander. He was encouraged in his design by the envoys of several states, or representatives of the exiled parties, who were then at the Macedonian court: some, perhaps, having come before Antipater's death to obtain a relaxation of their condition, such as the Athenians had requested; others may have been attracted by the prospect of a change which that event opened. All were graciously received by the regent, and obtained his promise that the democratical institutions should be every where restored; and he sent them back to Greece with a royal rescript to that effect. This edict ran in the name of the King Arridaeus Philip: it began with a declaration of the good will which, after the example of his predecessors, he bore to the Greeks, and asserted that he had no sooner mounted the throne than he sent directions to all the Greek cities for the restoration of peace, and the re-establishment of the constitutions by which they had been governed in the time of his father Philip. It then touched very delicately on the imprudence with which, while he was at a great distance, a part of the nation had engaged in war with Macedonia; it spoke in a tone of sympathy of the harsh treatment which they had suffered from the royal generals, to whom alone this severity was to be imputed. The king was now ready to heal the wounds they had inflicted, to restore harmony, and the political institutions which had subsisted in the reigns of his father and of Alexander; and he decreed that all the Greek citizens who had been transported or banished by his generals from the time of Alexander's passage to Asia—unless there were any of them condemned for homicide or sacrilege—should be permitted to return to their homes and to enjoy all their

property. A part of the Megalopolitan exiles, and all those of Amphissa, Tricca, Pharcadon, and Heraclea, were excepted from this amnesty; for the rest, a day was fixed as the term of their banishment. This part of the decree provided for the overthrow of all the oligarchical governments founded by Antipater. A following clause directed that if there were any forms of government which Philip or Alexander themselves had abolished as contrary to their interests, these cases also should now be laid before the king, that he might make such regulations as should seem expedient both for his own advantage and that of the cities concerned. The Athenians were to be replaced in the condition in which they stood under Philip and Alexander; even Samos, Philip's gift, was restored to them: only Oropus was to remain independent. In return for these favours, the king required that the Greeks should pass a decree in the national congress forbidding all hostility and adverse practices against himself, under penalty of banishment and confiscation on the offenders and their posterity. The direction of the whole business was committed to Polysperchon; and the edict concluded in the imperial strain: "Ye then, as we before wrote to you, obey him; for we shall permit none to neglect our commands."

Such was the language designed for the public ear; it could not be pleasing to any patriotic Greek: this was not the way in which, whatever might be his party, he could have wished to see Antipater's measures abolished. It was an exercise, and a formal assertion of the Macedonian sovereignty. Yet the effect might have been advantageous, if the Macedonian garrisons had been withdrawn, and things had been left in other respects to take their natural course. This, indeed, would probably not have been peaceable or bloodless, but would not have been attended with the evils which ensued through Polysperchon's intervention. His object was to loosen his hold on Greece as little as possible, and to excite a violent reaction against the partisans of Antipater. He therefore wrote to Argos and to other cities, directing that the persons who had held the chief station in the oligarchical governments should be punished with death, or exile and confiscation; and he announced, in a letter to the Athenians, that the king had restored the democracy, and exhorted them to return to their hereditary institutions. In the mean while, he prepared to march into Greece to give effect to his measures, and sent his son Alexander forward into Attica with a body of troops, to dislodge Nicanor from Munychia, and to make himself master of Athens. There his letter had roused an impatient desire in the people to rid themselves immediately of the foreign garrison; and they required Nicanor to withdraw. The force under his command was hardly strong enough to repel an attack, and he therefore amused them with evasive answers, while he secretly introduced fresh troops into Munychia, and collected others in Salamis. To gain time, he consented, on Phocion's undertaking for his safety, to attend a meeting of the council which was held in Piræus; but Dercyllus, who was in command there, had laid a plan to arrest him, and he was only apprized of it in time to effect his es-

cape. This breach of faith, it appears, was held to be justified by the information which had been received of his perfidious designs against the city; and Phocion was reproached because he had not concurred in it. He declared that he would rather suffer than do a wrong, but professed to disbelieve the reports which he heard of Nicanor's projects. These reports gained strength every day; the popular ferment increased; assemblies were repeatedly held on the subject; a decree was passed on the motion of Philomedes, that all the citizens should arm and be in immediate readiness to obey Phocion's orders. Phocion, however, continued to express entire confidence in Nicanor, and took no precautions against the attack which was generally expected. The event justified the suspicions which he disregarded. Nicanor brought over his troops from Salamis, and surprised Piræus in the night. Phocion, and two other friends of Nicanor, were sent to remonstrate with him; but he now bade the Athenians address themselves to Cassander, whose officer he was: he would take no steps without Cassander's commands.

A letter had already been sent to Polysperchon, urging him to hasten to the relief of the city; but, before either he or his son arrived, one was received from Olympias, in which she commanded Nicanor to restore Munychia and Piræus to the Athenians. It diffused universal joy among the people, who had heard that Olympias was about to return to Macedonia to resume her ancient authority, and to undertake the guardianship of her grandson: they hoped that it would awe Nicanor into compliance, and that they should quietly recover their liberty. Nicanor himself affected to treat it with respect, and promised to withdraw his troops, but continued to invent pretexts for delay. Affairs were in this state when Alexander appeared with his forces before the walls; he was accompanied by a great number of the Athenian exiles, but also by a mixed rabble of strangers and disfranchised citizens, who hoped to take advantage of the tumultuous reaction which might be expected: some to recover their lost privileges, others to assume a title which, at this juncture, was not likely to be disputed. Yet for a few days they remained tranquil, not doubting that Alexander was come to enforce the execution of the royal edict, and that Nicanor would shortly be compelled to retire. It appears, indeed, that they proceeded immediately to hold an assembly, in which Phocion was deposed from his office, but that no other measures were taken against him, and that he was left at liberty to have several interviews with Alexander; in these, it is said, he represented to him that he could not safely depend on the Athenians, unless he occupied Munychia and Piræus with his own troops. But there can be little doubt that this was Alexander's design from the first, and that he acted according to his father's instructions. The suspicions of the people were soon awakened by his conduct. He held repeated conferences with Nicanor, to which no Athenians were admitted. Their object was divined, and Phocion was denounced as the author of the plot. The vengeance which had been long gathering now burst upon him, and Agnonides charged him with treason. This

was the signal for the most notorious of Antipater's partisans to quit the city. Callimedes, and others of his stamp, did not think themselves safe within the reach of Polysperchon; but Phocion, and several of his friends, sought refuge in Alexander's camp; they were graciously received by him, and furnished with letters, by which he recommended them to his father's protection, as men on whose fidelity he might rely.

Polysperchon had entered Phocis with his army, accompanied by Philip. He was encamped at the village of Pharygæ,\* when he received his son's letters from Phocion and the partners of his misfortune, and, at the same time, an embassy from Athens, headed by Agnonides, which had been sent to accuse them and to claim relief from the presence of the garrison. A throne was set under a golden canopy for Philip, as the judge of the cause, and he took his seat, surrounded by his council, in which Polysperchon really presided. Dinarchus the Corinthian, Antipater's chief agent in Peloponnesus, who had left Athens with Phocion—it is said out of regard for him, but, perhaps, also hoping to find shelter by his side—and had been detained by illness for some days at Elatea, no sooner presented himself than Polysperchon ordered him to be led away to torture and execution; he then gave audience to the Athenians; their pleadings soon rose into a storm of clamorous invectives, in which all order was lost, until Agnonides stepped forward with the proposal, "Put us all into one cage,† and send us back to be tried at Athens." The king smiled at the image, which was ludicrously appropriate to the scene before him; but, in compliance with the wish of the Macedonians, who formed the outer circle, and who, though perfectly indifferent to the parties, found amusement in their contention, the ambassadors were ordered to proceed with their accusation in due form. Polysperchon listened to them with evident partiality; but when Phocion began his defence, interrupted him so often and so rudely, that at length he indignantly struck the ground with his staff and spoke no more. Hegemon, another of the accused, ventured to appeal to Polysperchon himself, as a witness of the good will he had always borne to the people, but Polysperchon angrily exclaimed, "Have done calumniating me to the king." And Philip started from his seat to strike at the audacious slanderer with his lance; Polysperchon, however, seized his arm, and, to prevent any farther indecency, broke up the council. The result of his deliberation was, to send Phocion and his friends as prisoners, ignominiously bound on wagons, to Athens, that they might receive their final judgment from the people.

The only probable motive which can be assigned for Polysperchon's conduct in this transaction, is one which involves a degree of baseness and cruelty not common even among the Macedonian generals of this age, but of which he afterward proved himself fully capable. It

\* Strabo, ix., 426. Plutarch (Phoc., 33) calls it a village of Phocis. It stood on the site of the ancient Tarphæ.

† Γαλεῖν, Plut., Phoc., 33. In Athenæus (xiv., 6) we read that Lydimachus ordered Telephorus ἐπὶ τῷ θύμῳ εἰς γαλεῖν, καὶ δέκναι Ἰνπίου περιφερέμενον καὶ τρεφόμενον . . . ἀποβαίνειν.

was impossible that he could entertain any personal resentment against Phocion for his adherence to Antipater, or that he could feel the slightest interest in the quarrel of the Athenian parties. He had, besides, been assured by his son that Phocion was willing to submit to his government, as he had done to Antipater's, and would probably serve him with equal zeal. It was, therefore, apparently without the slightest bias of passion, on the coolest calculation of policy, that he consigned Phocion to the fate which was prepared, according to his own express commands, for all the most eminent of Antipater's partisans. The point, however, which seems most strongly to mark the nature of his conduct is, that the gain which he could expect from Phocion's death was, at the utmost, very small, and, on the whole, doubtful. Diodorus, indeed, attempts to connect his sacrifice of Phocion with a resolution which he is said to have formed on the subject of the garrison in Piræus. He had now, Diodorus believes, abandoned his original purpose, which was to occupy it with his own troops, as too flagrantly inconsistent with his recent public professions. But no information which could have been preserved as to Polysperchon's intentions could convince us that, while he was every day expecting an attack from Cassander in this quarter, he meant to leave Piræus in the hands of the Athenians when he had wrested it from Nicanor. Nor, in that case, could there have been any need of another sacrifice to propitiate their good will. It is far more probable that because, on the contrary, he had determined to retain possession of the place, and thus to disappoint and irritate the Athenians, he resolved to soothe them with the blood of victims which cost him nothing. Yet it might have seemed that even Phocion's enemies, after their first resentment had subsided, must have honoured him more, if he had sheltered the man whose virtues had won the respect of Alexander and Antipater, and even of his political adversaries. But respect for virtue or for misfortune was a feeling to which Polysperchon was always a stranger; and in a Greek they probably excited the brutal soldier's especial contempt.

And yet it must be owned that our own sympathy with Phocion's fate is not a little weakened by the thought that such were the rulers under whose dominion he had himself contentedly bowed, and whom he had aided with all his influence to impose their yoke on his country; that he had offered his services for the same purpose to the very man who now, for the chance of a trifling advantage, exposed him to insult and doomed him to death. It was, indeed, an ungrateful requital of his faithful attachment to the Macedonian cause; but he had scarcely a right to complain of it. It was by his own consent that he had become subject to the foreigner's pleasure; he had steadfastly discouraged every attempt which others had made to deliver Greece from such dependence; he had acquiesced—it is to be feared approvingly—in the condemnation of Demosthenes and other enemies of Antipater. We can hardly consider it as other than a just retribution that he was himself now about to suffer for his adherence to Antipater, at the instigation of Antipater's bosom friend and successor.

Cleitus was ordered to escort the prisoners to Athens. Phocion was accompanied by four friends: Nicocles, the most intimate of all, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Pythocles. While the carriage in which they were chained slowly rolled through the suburb Ceramicus, exposing them to the gaze of some pitying, but of more threatening and exulting spectators, the theatre, which had been appointed as the place of an assembly summoned to decide their doom, was gradually filled. No care was taken to exclude those who had no right to sit in judgment there; and the seats were crowded with the mixed multitude which had followed Alexander to Athens; even women, it is said, were admitted.\* It was, no doubt, the object of Phocion's private enemies to render the approaching scene as disorderly and noisy as possible; and the intruders, who were safest in tumult, were likely to be the most clamorous. But, without any artificial excitement, most breasts already burned with indignation and the thirst of vengeance against Phocion and his associates. By the exiles Antipater's friend was regarded as the author of their calamity; by most of those who had remained under his administration he was suspected of a treasonable correspondence with Nicanor, which had defeated their hopes of deliverance from a galling chain. Such was the prevailing disposition of the assembly, when Cleitus entered the theatre with his charge. He first read a letter from the king, which declared that, in his judgment, the prisoners were guilty of treason; but as the Athenians were now free and independent, he committed the case to their decision. Cleitus remained as a simple spectator of the proceedings, though his presence, after such a letter, could not but affect them. A friend of Phocion's came forward to propose that, since so grave a business had been referred to them by the king, the strangers and slaves should withdraw. But this motion was lost in an outcry, raised, no doubt, chiefly by the persons whom it concerned, against the oligarchs, the enemies of the people. The accusers were then heard, in silence or with applause, while they traced all the evils which had befallen the city since the Lamian war—the banishment of so many citizens, the death of so many illustrious orators, the loss of their ancient institutions, the continued presence of the foreign garrison—to Phocion's intrigues. When the time came for the defence, Phocion made several fruitless attempts to obtain a hearing. His voice was drowned in a tumult of hostile sounds. At length, in one of the short intervals which broke the uproar, he was heard to say, that as to himself, he gave up his plea and resigned himself to death; he only desired to intercede for his innocent friends. He was as little listened to in their behalf as others who generously came forward to defend him. At length Agnonides mounted the bema, and renewing the foulest iniquity of the proceedings which followed the battle of Arginusæ, produced a decree which he had prepared, directing that the people should decide by show of hands whether the prisoners were guilty or not, and that, if the show of hands was against them, they should be put to death.

\* *Ἰδὲν αὖτὲν αὐτοῦ, Πλὴν, Φωκ., 34.*

The temper already manifested by the assembly was such that a man was found more impudent than Agnonides, who ventured to suggest as an amendment that Phocion should be put to death with torture. This was too much for Agnonides, especially as he saw that Cleitus was disgusted; he therefore rejected the proposal, observing that such a death would be fit for a wretch like Callimedon, if he should fall into their hands, but that as to Phocion, he would move nothing of the kind. "You do well," a voice exclaimed; "for if we should torture Phocion, what shall we do to you?" Very few, however, entertained, or, at least, ventured to express, such sentiments. The decree was carried, and at the show of hands the spectators rose as one man to give their verdict against the prisoners. Many even crowned themselves before the act, as for a joyful solemnity. Sentence of death was likewise passed against several absent persons; among them were Demetrius the Phalerian, Callimedon, and Charicles.

On his way to the prison, Phocion suffered some gross insults from the populace with meekness and dignity. Though the day was a holiday, and marked by an equestrian procession, the sentence was immediately executed. Phocion met his end with the playful composure and gentle equanimity of Socrates. He endeavoured to cheer his fellow-sufferers, and as the strongest proof of friendship, permitted Nicocles to drink the hemlock before him. When he was asked if he had any message for his son Phocus, "Only," he said, "not to bear a grudge against the Athenians." As the draught prepared proved not sufficient for all, and the jailer demanded to be paid for a fresh supply, he desired one of his friends to satisfy the man, observing, that Athens was a place where one could not even die for nothing.

His body, according to law in cases of treason, was carried to the waste ground on the confines between Megaris and Attica, where, as his friends did not venture to take part in the funeral, it received the last offices from the hands of hirelings and strangers. His bones were collected by a Megarian woman. When the angry passions of the people had subsided, the remembrance of his virtues revived. His bones were brought back to Athens and publicly interred, and a bronze statue was erected to his memory. Agnonides was condemned to death by a popular assembly, and two of his other accusers, having been found to quit the city, were overtaken by the vengeance of Phocus. These were effects of a change rather in the times than in the opinions of men. But the more the Athenians resigned themselves to the prospect of permanent subjection to foreign rule, the better they were disposed to revere the character of Phocion.

Had he lived in an earlier period, he might have served his country, like Nicias, with unsullied honour. In a later age, he might have passed his life in peaceful obscurity. His lot fell on dark and troubled times, when it was difficult to act with dignity, and the best patriot might be inclined to despair. But he despaired, and yet acted. He despaired, not merely of his country, which any one may innocently do, but also for her, which no man has a right to do.

He would have forced her to despair of herself. He resisted every attempt that was made by bolder and more sanguine patriots to restore her independence. He did not withdraw from public life; he acted as the tool of his country's enemies, as the servant of a foreign master; content to mitigate the pressure of the degrading yoke which he had helped to impose. Towards the close of his life he descended lower and lower, constant only in his opposition to whatever bore the aspect of freedom. The fellow who spat on him in his way to execution was, perhaps, a more estimable person than the man to whom he would have surrendered Athens as well as himself. He left a character politically worse than doubtful: one which his private worth alone redeems from the infamy that clings to the names of a Callimedon and a Demades: a warning to all who may be placed in like circumstances, to shun his example, whether they value their own peace, or the esteem of posterity.

While the Athenians were expecting help from Polysperchon, and Alexander was negotiating with Nicanor, Cassander appeared in the roads with a fleet of thirty-five galleys, having on board 4000 men, furnished by Antigonus. He was immediately admitted by Nicanor into the harbour, and suffered to take possession of Piræus. But Nicanor, who seems to have had some private views, continued to occupy Munychia with the troops which he had lately engaged in his service. On this intelligence Polysperchon advanced into Attica, and encamped close to Piræus. His army amounted to 24,000 foot, 20,000 of whom were Macedonians, a thousand horse, and sixty-five elephants. He made some attempts on Piræus, but found the fortifications too strong to permit any hope of immediate success, and the resources of Attica insufficient for the maintenance of so large a force. He therefore left a body of troops under the command of his son, and himself, with the bulk of his army, marched into Peloponnesus, to second the efforts of his partisans, and especially to reduce Megalopolis, which openly defied the royal authority, and embraced the cause of Cassander. At Corinth he convoked a congress of deputies, to receive the acknowledgment of subjection which was called alliance, and sent his envoys to the states which submitted to him to enforce the execution of his orders. Under their direction, the adherents of the oligarchical governments were, in most places, condemned to death or banishment. But the resistance of Megalopolis demanded his own presence, and military force to overpower it; and he pursued his march to lay siege to the city.

There, through an unhappy combination of ancient prejudices with party interests, Antipater's cause had become really popular. We have seen that Megalopolis refused to join the national confederacy in the Lamian war. It had always shown a strong attachment to Macedonia, for it was indebted to Philip for the humiliation of Sparta, the object of its inveterate, implacable enmity. Polybius\* very unjustly, though with a natural partiality, censures Demosthenes for the bitterness with which he reviled the leaders of the Macedonian party in

Megalopolis as traitors to the cause of Greece. The historian represents the orator as blinded by his Athenian patriotism; but certainly the views of the Macedonizing Arcadian statesmen were not larger or clearer, when, in their jealousy and hatred of their neighbours, they overlooked the danger which threatened Greece from a foreign power; though Philip, secure of their attachment to him, did not think it necessary to introduce his garrisons into their cities. These feelings continued to animate the Arcadians, after they had become more glaringly unreasonable and irreconcilable with the national interests. Their devotion was successively transferred from Philip to Alexander, from Alexander to Antipater, as the regent of Macedonia. Antipater had strengthened it by personal ties. Yet there can be little doubt that it would have descended to Polysperchon as his legitimate successor, if he had not deemed it expedient everywhere to introduce a violent change in the existing order of things. But the leading men, who saw their fortunes and lives threatened by his measures, as their government had hitherto been in accordance with the strongest popular feelings, might easily persuade the people that their safety against Sparta depended on their fidelity to Cassander. It was probably through these causes that Polysperchon, when he appeared before Megalopolis, found, not a city divided between two factions, but a whole population unanimously resolved to resist him to the last gasp.

They had made the most vigorous and judicious preparations for defence, had removed their property out of the country into the city, had enrolled the citizens, aliens, and slaves, capable of service, and found that they amounted to 15,000 men, who were distributed, according to their various qualifications, for the purposes of labour or military duty. The fortifications were repaired, and strengthened with a new ditch and rampart; arms and engines were fabricated with unremitting activity; an officer, named Damis, who had served under Alexander, was appointed to command. Polysperchon, having encamped before the city, proceeded to assail it with all the engines and contrivances known in his time. He brought up wooden towers, higher than the walls, which poured showers of missiles on the besieged. But the open attack seems to have been chiefly designed to divert their attention from a mine, which he, at the same time, began to carry under the walls. When it had advanced far enough, fire was set to the props which supported the roof, and it fell in with a tremendous crash. The breach thus effected included three of the largest towers, with the intervening parts of the wall. Even this disaster, however, did not shake the resolution of the citizens; a remedy was immediately devised and applied. Their forces were divided into two parts; and while the one body repelled the assailants who mounted the breach, the rest began to build a new wall behind it. The ruin, which, of itself, obstructed the advance of the Macedonians, was defended until the approach of night compelled Polysperchon to sound a retreat. During the night the new works were carried on with unwearied zeal. The next day Polysperchon proceeded to clear the ground of the ruins, to open

a passage for the elephants, whose strength would, he expected, bear down all resistance. Damis was aware of his design, and prepared to meet it with a stratagem suggested to him by his familiarity with the nature of the elephants. He caused doors set with spikes, the points upward, to be laid in the opening, covered with a thin layer of earth. The way was left clear in front, but a strong body of darters and bowmen were stationed in each flank, with engines for the discharge of more powerful missiles. The beasts were blindly driven into the snare. At the same time that their feet were entangled in the spikes, they were assailed from each side by the iron shower. Maddened by pain, and mostly losing their drivers, they spent their strength in attempts to escape, which only succeeded so far as to spread confusion and havoc in the ranks behind them. Several of the best were left dead; a still greater number was entirely disabled; and those which suffered less injury did the more to their friends.

This repulse, while it deprived Polysperchon of a valuable part of his force, discouraged him from the renewal of the assault. The possession of Megalopolis did not seem an object worth the delay which it was likely to cost if he remained there in person, while he had so many active enemies in his rear. The impression so signal a failure might make on the minds of the Greeks he appears not to have heeded. He, however, left a division of his army to blockade the place, and marched away with the main body to concert measures for the protection of Macedonia, which was threatened by Cassander and Antigonus. He had reason to apprehend that Antigonus might attempt to invade Macedonia from the north, and he therefore sent his fleet, under the command of Cleitus, to the coast of Thrace, with instructions to effect a junction with the satrap Arrideus, who had taken refuge, with a body of troops, in the Bithynian town of Cios. Cleitus sailed into the Propontis, reduced several places on the Asiatic coast, and was joined by Arrideus. But Cassander, hearing of this expedition, sent Nicanor against him with his squadron, which was increased to more than a hundred sail by the remaining ships of Antigonus. A battle took place near Byzantium, in which Cleitus gained a brilliant victory; seventeen of the enemy's vessels were sunk, and forty taken, with all their crews; the rest took refuge in the harbour of Chalcedon. But the confidence engendered by this triumph turned it into the occasion of a fatal disaster. Cleitus drew up his fleet on the European shore in fancied security. But Antigonus, on the tidings of the lost battle, came to Chalcedon, and surprised the victors by a stratagem something like Lysander's at *Ægæe-potami*. He procured transports from Byzantium, in which he sent over a body of troops in the night with orders to attack the camp of Cleitus a little before day-break, and directed Nicanor to sail across with the remnant of his fleet, so as to arrive at the same time off the coast. Both these operations were completely successful. The troops of Cleitus on shore were thrown into confusion by the sudden attack, and fled to their ships, leaving their baggage and prisoners in the enemy's hands. They had scarcely embarked before Nicanor's fleet was seen approaching. It



fell upon them while they were still in disorder, and totally routed them. All, except the admiral's galley, were captured with their crews. Cleitus himself escaped only for the time. When he reached a place of safety on the coast of Thrace, he quitted his vessel, to return to Macedonia over land. But on his way he fell in with some soldiers of Lysimachus, who slew him, either for the sake of plunder, or as their master's enemy.

In the mean while Polysperchon's affairs were not more prosperous in the south. His defeat at Megalopolis shook the confidence of his adherents in Greece, and in many cities led to a counter-revolution in favour of Cassander. This was the effect it produced at Athens. It had become clear that Polysperchon was less than ever able to deliver and protect the city, and that to remain in alliance with him, while Cassander was master of Piræus, would subject it to the evils of a lingering siege, to the ruin of its commerce, and to constant danger from surprise and treachery. To Cassander, on the other hand, it was important, for the sake of his influence in the rest of Greece, to make Athens entirely his own, by fair means. At length, one of his leading partisans ventured to propose that a negotiation should be opened with him. His motion gave rise to a violent debate; but the advantages of peace were so evident, that an embassy was decreed to treat with Cassander. The terms he offered might appear liberal when compared with those which his father had dictated. Yet the difference was rather in sound than in substance, so far as the freedom of the people was concerned. The Athenians, becoming friends and allies of Cassander, were to be restored to the possession of their city, their territory, their revenues, and ships; but Cassander was to continue to occupy Munychia with a garrison until he should have brought the war to an end. The Constitution was to be altered only in two points. A qualification of property was again required for the franchise; but it was reduced to the half of the amount fixed by Antipater. Another article stipulated that the people should receive a governor, under the title of guardian of the city,\* elected by Cassander. Phocion had, in fact, though not in name, exercised such authority under Antipater;† and, indeed, so long as the Macedonian garrison remained, this was a very slight additional encroachment on liberty. The person whom Cassander chose for this office was Demetrius, son of Phanostratus, the Phalerian; perhaps as one who was well suited, both by his character and his private relations, to act as mediator between the contending parties. His brother Himereus was one of the orators put to death by Antipater,‡ though he himself had been recently forced to fly the city, as one of Antipater's adherents. He had, besides, the reputation of a philosopher, simple in his habits, moderate in his desires, a lover of literature and the arts. In one point Cassander's forbearance was conspicuous, from its contrast with the conduct both of his father and of Poly-

sperchon. He demanded no sacrifices to policy or revenge; no decrees of death or banishment against his political or personal enemies.

This treaty with Cassander forms an epoch of some importance in the history of Athens; and it invites us to pause for a few moments, to reflect on the destinies and prospects of Greece. So far, indeed, as they depended on those of Athens, they were darker than ever. She was about to sink under a tyranny more degrading and corrupting than any she had hitherto experienced: one which tended to make her more and more familiar with the dominion of a foreign master, more willing to purchase tranquillity at the expense of liberty and honour. But for the nation the future was not without its bright side. It was, indeed, impossible for the most sagacious to have foreseen the work which Cassander was destined to accomplish: that he was about to revenge the ruin of her freedom in a manner from which her own humanity would have recoiled. But it was apparent that a separation was going forward between Macedonia and the Asiatic provinces of Alexander's empire: that Thrace was becoming a distinct, independent state, from which Greece had little to fear, and much to hope. There was ground to believe that the time might not be far distant when the ruler of Macedonia might find an equal alliance with Greece necessary to his safety, and when it might even be desirable for her that he should be a man of energy and talents like Cassander, rather than one so feeble and contemptible as Polysperchon. Even, apart from these calculations, the glorious resistance which Megalopolis alone had opposed to the whole power of Macedonia, might well have stirred every Greek bosom with joy and hope. It proved that the nation had not yet very deeply degenerated from her heroic ancestors; that she was still worthy of her bright inheritance of fame: it showed what her united strength might still effect if it was roused for a common cause, if a deliverer should step forth superior to the petty jealousy, to the narrow ambition, which had so long divided and wasted it, and capable of controlling and directing it to a worthy end. The event, however, depended on the issue of the struggle between Cassander and Polysperchon, and of that in which Antigonus was about to engage with his rivals in the East, and then on the position in which the conquerors might be placed towards one another.

## CHAPTER LVIII.

FROM CASSANDER'S OCCUPATION OF ATHENS TO THE TREATY BETWEEN ANTIGONUS AND PTOLMEY, CASSANDER AND LYSIMACHUS IN 311 B.C.

WHILE Antigonus was engaged, as we have seen, on the western coast of Asia, Eumenes had availed himself of the leisure thus afforded him to take possession of the authority with which he was invested by Polysperchon. It was a task of infinite difficulty and danger. He was soon forced to quit Cappadocia, by the arrival of Menander and a body of troops, sent in pursuit of him by Antigonus. By a forced march he crossed the Taurus, and in Cilicia met An-

\* *Ἐπιμελητὴς τῆς πόλεως*, Diodor., xviii., 74.

† Diodor., xviii., 64, *ὁ τὴν τῶν ἑλλαν ἀρχὴν ἰσχυρότερος*.

‡ In what sense we are to understand the Epiphania which he celebrated on the occasion of his brother's death (Athenæus, xii., 542, E.) remains very obscure, after all the explanations of the commentators.

tigenes and Teutamus. They submitted to the royal mandate, and received him with respect as commander-in-chief. The jealousy of the Macedonians was subdued by admiration of his genius, and by sympathy with the strange vicissitudes of his fortune. The guardians of the treasury at Quinda also surrendered it to his disposal. Still, he saw himself surrounded by officers of high spirit and ambitious views, who looked upon themselves as personally superior to the foreigner whom accident had placed above them, and by troops, proud of their services, spoiled by license and flattery, impatient of discipline and subordination. He perceived that their fidelity could only be secured by the most studied show of moderation and humility; that he must keep his personal pretensions as much as possible in the background, and put forward the legitimate authority, in the name of which he claimed their obedience. He therefore declared at once that he would not accept the 500 talents which had been assigned to him for the supply of his own wants. He had none which required so large a sum: he had no private aims: he was merely the servant of the royal family, and had reluctantly undertaken the difficult office with which he had been intrusted. The more effectually to suppress the spirit of rivalry and discord, he pretended to have been favoured with a dream, in which he had seen Alexander, as when alive, arrayed in the ensigns of royalty, seated in his tent, and despatching affairs of state; and he proposed that they should erect a magnificent tent, should place a golden throne in the centre, on which should be laid a diadem, sceptre, and royal apparel, and that there they should transact business as in the presence of the departed king. All were pleased with the thought; and in this form the councils were held. Each of the generals, when he entered the tent, burned incense on an altar in front of the throne, and adored Alexander as a god, and then took his place on one of the seats which were ranged on each side of the throne. The awe of an invisible presence was felt, in some measure, by those who thus met; and the multitude was prepared to revere orders which issued from a place where they might seem to be suggested by Alexander himself, while Eumenes, without prejudice to his authority and influence, could, on these occasions, preserve the appearance of perfect equality with his officers.

While he declined the royal bounty for himself, he made free use of the treasures at Quinda for the public service. He sent his friends to levy troops in the neighbouring provinces of Asia Minor, and in Syria, Phœnicia, and Cyprus, with offers of large pay, which drew many Greeks, as well as Asiatics, under his standard. In a short time he had collected 10,000 foot and 2000 horse; so that, with the Argyraspids and the troops which he brought with him, his army may have fallen not far short of 20,000 men.

Both Ptolemy and Antigonus were alarmed at the progress which he appeared to be making, and both, nearly at the same time, set similar engines at work against him. Ptolemy sailed in person with an armament to Cape Zephyrium, near the mouth of the Calycadnus, in Cilicia; and, while he stayed there, sent a message to the generals of the Argyraspids, urging them

not to obey a man who had been condemned to death by the unanimous votes of the Macedonian army; and another to the commanders at Quinda, protesting against their surrender of the treasure, and offering his protection to them if they would resist the demands of Eumenes. Ptolemy, however, inspired neither fear nor respect sufficient to counterbalance the royal authority, and no attention was paid to his messages. Antigonus sent a confidential agent, named Philotas, to the camp of Eumenes, with a letter addressed to the Argyraspids themselves, and to the other Macedonians in his service, accompanied by thirty Macedonians, selected for their volubility and address, with instructions to engage Antigones and Teutamus, and as many more as they could, by bribes and promises, in a conspiracy against their chief. Teutamus grasped at their offers, and tried to persuade his colleagues to concur with him. But Antigones had a clearer view of their common interest, and convinced Teutamus that it was not Eumenes, a foreigner, who would never venture to injure them, but Antigonus, whose ambition was ready to level all before it, that should be the object of their jealousy. The letter brought by Philotas was read to the soldiers in the absence of Eumenes, and, at first, produced a strong impression on their minds. It exhorted them immediately to arrest Eumenes, and put him to death, and threatened that otherwise Antigonus would march against them with all his forces, to punish their disobedience. But when Eumenes appeared and read the letter, he made a speech which dissipated their fears, confirmed their loyalty to the royal house, and strengthened their attachment to himself. The occurrence, however, admonished him to quicken his preparations for war. He soon after marched into Phœnicia to collect a fleet, which might secure the command of the sea for Polysperchon, and enable him to transport his forces into Asia, to meet Antigonus whenever he would. Another object of this movement was, it seems, to wrest Syria from Ptolemy. But before he had accomplished either, he found himself compelled to quit the coast and to retire into the upper provinces, by the approach of Antigonus himself. He had received a warning in the loss of a squadron of Phœnician vessels which was bringing treasure to him from Quinda. It was moored near Cape Rossus, when the fleet of Antigonus was seen sailing by, adorned with the trophies of the recent victory over Cleitus. Sosigenes, the commander of the squadron, was on shore waiting for a calmer sea. The Phœnician sailors plundered the treasure, and surrendered their ships to the enemy.\*

After his victory near Byzantium, Antigonus no longer entertained any fear of an attack from Polysperchon. It was not his interest immediately to decide the contest for the possession of Macedonia, but rather to let the two parties spend their strength and waste its resources; and since Cassander appeared now to be quite able to maintain his own cause, there was no farther need of his presence near the Hellespont. The preparations of Eumenes were assuming a threatening aspect; and after the fail-

\* Polynius, iv., 6, 9.

ure of the attempt made through Philotas, Antigonus selected 20,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry from the mass of his forces, and advanced with the utmost speed into Cilicia. He came, however, too late to overtake Eumenes, who had already set out on his march towards the Euphrates. Antigonus followed him into Mesopotamia, and there put his army into winter quarters. Eumenes took up his in Babylonia,\* and entered into negotiation with Seleucus and Pithon, who were both at Babylon, to persuade them to join in the defence of the royal authority against Antigonus. They professed themselves ready to serve the royal house, but declared that they would never submit to the orders of Eumenes, a condemned criminal; and they sent an envoy to Antigones and the Argyraspsids, calling on them to depose him from his command. But the fidelity of the Macedonians seemed now so secure, that such attempts only afforded a fresh opportunity for the display of their zeal in his behalf. When the season permitted, he resumed his march eastward. His first object was to gain Susa, and make himself master of the treasures remaining there. At the passage of the Tigris he encountered some resistance from Seleucus and Pithon, though their forces were not sufficient to meet him in open battle. But while he lay on the western side, they cut the bank of a canal and flooded his camp. He was reduced to great danger and distress until he discovered the bed of another, which he cleared out, and thus drew off the waters. Seleucus was now anxious to deliver his province from this formidable enemy, and consented to a truce, that he might cross the river without molestation: at the same time, he apprized Antigonus of the event, and urged him to advance without delay, before the satraps of the upper provinces should have brought their forces down into his territory.

This coalition of the eastern satraps, against which Seleucus sought the aid of Antigonus, had been caused by Pithon's indiscreet ambition. He had put to death Philippos, the satrap of Parthia, and had appointed his own brother, Eudamus, in his room. This violent proceeding, while it betrayed his aspiring views, alarmed all the satraps who had been placed under his authority by the partition of Triparadisus. They formed a league against him, defeated him in battle, and drove him out of Parthia. Even in his own province, Media, he did not feel secure, and had repaired to Babylon to engage Seleucus in his interest. It is not clear why Seleucus espoused his cause, and still less why Antigonus declared himself on the same side; since neither Pithon nor Seleucus was strong enough to oppose him, and, by a different course, he might have deprived Eumenes

of many powerful allies. Eumenes had transmitted the royal letters to the satraps, who willingly promised obedience, and, according to his directions, advanced to meet him in Susiana. The principal confederates were Peucestes, the satrap of Persia, Polemo of Carmania, Siburtius of Arachosia, Oxyartes of Paropamisus, who had sent his contingent under the command of Androbazus, Stasander of Aria and Drangiana, who also brought a body of Bactrian troops, and Eudamus, who, after Alexander's death, had assassinated Porus, and made himself master of 120 elephants. Eumenes thus found himself joined by an army of little less than 20,000 foot and 5000 horse, besides the elephants which Eudamus had brought with him. But in proportion to the magnitude of this reinforcement was the difficulty of preserving harmony and subordination among the leaders. Peucestes, who, as the highest in rank, and as governor of the province which furnished the largest amount of troops, had hitherto held the chief command, was not willing to resign it; and Antigones, as the leader of the veterans who had shared the glory of all Alexander's conquests, would not acknowledge a superior. Eumenes could not venture to urge his own pretensions, and had need of all his dexterity to prevent a fatal rupture between them. He resorted to his old expedient, and persuaded them not to elect any one commander-in-chief, but to deliberate together, with the ceremonies before adopted, as in Alexander's presence. There was, however, one important advantage which he reserved for himself. Xenophilus, the governor of the citadel at Susa, complied with the royal orders, which directed that Eumenes alone should dispose of the treasure. From this he drew six months' pay for the Macedonians, while the satraps maintained their own troops, and secured the attachment of Eudamus by a grant of 200 talents, nominally to defray the expense of the elephants, which were deemed an arm of peculiar importance.

The intelligence of their union induced Antigonus, who was on the point of setting out in pursuit of Eumenes, to wait some time longer in Mesopotamia, to strengthen himself with fresh levies. He then marched to Babylon, and having concluded an alliance with Pithon and Seleucus, and joined their troops to his army, crossed the Tigris, and advanced towards Susa. Eumenes, when he heard of his approach, prevailed on the confederates to retreat, and to take up a position behind the Pasitigris, extending their lines as far as the coast. To defend this long range of country, he induced Peucestes to send for an additional body of 10,000 bowmen from Persis, which is said to have been collected in a surprisingly short time by a chain of oral signals. On his arrival at Susa, Antigonus bestowed the satrapy on Seleucus, and, as Xenophilus refused to surrender the citadel, left him with a body of troops to besiege it, while he himself marched forward to the Coprates. The river was not fordable; and he could collect but few transports. In these he sent a division of his army across, but, before he could join it with the main body, it was attacked by Eumenes, and completely routed. The fugitives crowded into the boats, which sank under their weight: numbers perished in

\* So Diodorus, xix., 12. But he adds the name of the place, *ἐν τοῖς ἀποκαθιναῖς Καρπὸν κύμασι*. Wesseling remarks: Diceret propter Carrhas fuisse, mora Abrahami et Crassi clade nobilitatas, nisi ille (l. xix., 91) extra Babyloniam, uti erant, locarentur. Droysen has no such scruple, but he takes the place to have been the village mentioned by Diodorus (xvii., 110), which lay east of the Tigris. But I do not understand why Eumenes, whose object it was to reach Susa as soon as possible, should have recrossed the river, voluntarily exposing himself to the difficulty and danger which he experienced at the passage. Droysen says that it was to frighten Seleucus and Pithon. But after the failure of the negotiation, this seems hardly an object worth the risk and the delay.

the river: 4000 were forced to surrender. This disaster induced Antigonus to fall back on the Eulæus; and he lost so many of his men on the march, through the heat of the weather, that he resolved to change his route, and proceed to Ecbatana, with the hope, it seems, that the confederacy might be broken up by the danger which threatened the eastern provinces. To avoid the heat, he took the shortest road, which led through the Cossæan highlands, but suffered great loss, and narrowly escaped destruction, from the attacks of the still unconquered mountaineers. So many of the horses and other beasts had perished in this march, that he was obliged to send Pithon to collect a fresh supply from the Median pastures. His men had begun to murmur at the hardships they had undergone, but were soothed by his liberality, when Pithon returned, bringing not only a number of beasts sufficient to repair their losses, but 500 talents collected for the royal revenue.

His movement, as he had foreseen, created perplexity and discord among the allies. Antigonus, and Eumenes himself, with all who had followed them from the West, thought it most advisable to return and take advantage of his absence in the maritime provinces. But the satraps, who were alarmed for their own possessions, refused to leave them exposed to the enemy; and Eumenes, seeing that, unless he complied with their wishes, the confederacy would be dissolved, consented to march into Persia. On their arrival at Persepolis, the army was entertained by Peucestes with a sacrifice in honour of Philip and Alexander, to whom altars were erected by the side of those of the gods, and a magnificent banquet, which so won their hearts, that Eumenes, to preserve his own influence, forged a letter, which he pretended to have received from Orontes, satrap of Armenia, a friend of Peucestes, announcing that Olympias had returned to Macedonia with her grandson, that Cassander was slain, and that Polyperchon had crossed over into Asia with an army, and was already in Cappadocia. All eyes were now turned with respect and anxiety towards Eumenes, as the future dispenser of royal favours and punishments; and he made use of this impression to bring Siburcius, the most intimate friend of Peucestes, to trial, and forced him to fly for his life. Eumenes, however, won the good will of Peucestes by friendly words and liberal promises; and, to secure the attachment of the officers whom he most suspected, pretended to be in want of money, and borrowed large sums of them in the king's name.

In the midst of these festivities and rejoicings for imaginary success, the enemy was almost forgotten, when tidings came that Antigonus was on his march towards Persia. Eumenes carried a resolution to advance and give him battle. On the road, he was seized with illness, the effect, it is said, of unusual intemperance at a banquet which he gave, as if to vie with Peucestes: he was obliged to halt for some days, in great danger, and remained so weak that he let himself be carried in a litter in the rear, while Peucestes and Antigonus commanded in his stead. But when the enemy suddenly came in sight, the foremost ranks of the column halted, and, grounding their arms,

refused to proceed until Eumenes should put himself at their head. When he learned what had happened, he ordered himself to be transported with the utmost speed to the front, and as he approached, causing the curtains of his litter to be withdrawn on each side, waved his hand towards them. They, in return, greeted him with shouts and the clash of their arms, and loudly expressed their eagerness to meet the enemy, and he immediately began to form his line of battle. Antigonus, who had heard of his illness, and had quickened his march to take advantage of it, when he observed the dispositions that had been made to receive him, and saw the litter moving from one wing to the other, remarked to his friends, with the loud laugh with which he usually accompanied his good things, "The enemy's tactics seem to be in that litter;" but he immediately gave the signal for retreat,\* and took up a strong position behind a ravine intersected by a river. Eumenes encamped not far off on the other side. Neither general ventured to begin the attack, and they remained several days inactive.† During this interval Antigonus made another attempt to gain over the hostile Macedonians and their chiefs, by promises that the satraps should retain their provinces, and that the men should be sent back to their country with honour and large donatives, or should be taken into his own service. The Macedonians, however, still adhered firmly to Eumenes, who exposed the perfidy of his adversary's offers by the fable of the lion, who was persuaded to part with his teeth and claws.

Antigonus now found it necessary to decamp, as both armies were suffering from scarcity of provisions. Eumenes divined that his intention was to reach Gabiene, a district of Elymais, hitherto untouched, and capable of supplying all his wants. He himself had the same object, and gained the start of Antigonus by a stratagem, but afterward let himself be deceived in his turn, and was obliged to give battle. Their forces were pretty equally balanced: Antigonus was stronger in cavalry, Eumenes had a greater number of elephants. But after a day's hard fighting, in which Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, for the first time headed a brigade of horse, no decisive advantage had been gained on either side. The number of killed and wounded was, indeed, greater on that of Antigonus; and there prevailed in his army a general consciousness of defeat. Yet he was able to return first to the field and bury his dead, because Eumenes could not prevail on his men to encamp at a distance from their baggage, so that he found it necessary to apply to Antigonus, as conqueror, for leave to bury his slain. But the troops of Antigonus were so disheartened, that he resolved to resign possession of Gabiene to the enemy, and to take up his quarters in a distant part of Media, and he detained the herald of Eumenes until he had finished the preparations for his retreat.‡ Eumenes did not think it prudent to pursue him, as his own men needed refreshment and repose; and after a magnificent interment of his slain, in which the

\* Plutarch. Eum., 14, 15.

† Diodorus (xix., 25). He seems to know nothing of Plutarch's anecdote, which, however, appears to be fully entitled to credit.

‡ Diod., xix., 33. Polyæmus, iv., 6, 10.

widow of an Indian officer mounted the funeral pile, he marched into Gabiene, and put his army into cantonments for the winter.

The part of Media in which Antigonus wintered was within nine days' march of Gabiene by the most direct road; but this road led through an arid desert. Antigonus, however, resolved to attempt to surprise the enemy. He set out in the depth of winter, having spread the belief that Armenia was the object of his expedition, and having ordered the men to provide themselves with victuals for ten days, ready dressed. To ensure secrecy, he forbade them to kindle fires during the night. But the severity of the cold forced them to neglect this prohibition, and when they were within three or four days' march of their destination, the camp-fires betrayed their approach. The tidings were carried with the utmost speed, by couriers mounted on dromedaries, to the headquarters of the allied satraps, and plunged them into consternation. It seemed certain that Antigonus would fall upon them before they could collect their troops from the villages where they were cantoned, which were spread over a great extent of country. Peucestes proposed to retreat to the opposite extremity of the province, where they might, at least, reassemble a part of their force before the enemy came up. Eumenes alone preserved his presence of mind, and was ready with an expedient to meet the emergency. He saw that the movement proposed by Peucestes was likely to be attended with a total dissolution of the confederacy, and he undertook to stop the progress of Antigonus long enough to afford them time to bring all their troops together. The desert tract which Antigonus was crossing, in great part level, was bounded on the side of Gabiene by a ridge of high hills. On their summits Eumenes caused a number of fires to be lighted, so as to present the appearance of a great encampment. The blaze was seen far and wide; and Antigonus was warned that his approach had been discovered, and that the enemy appeared to be assembled in full force to receive him. As he did not venture to expose his wayward troops to the chance of an engagement, he turned aside out of the desert, and halted some days to refresh them. During this interval, Eumenes fortified his camp, laid in an abundant stock of provisions, and was rejoined by his whole force except the elephants, which, however, also reached the camp in safety, notwithstanding an attempt which Antigonus made to intercept them.

The two armies remained only a few days within a short distance of each other before they joined battle. Eumenes now had a great advantage in numbers. His infantry amounted to near 37,000 men; that of Antigonus to no more than 22,000. But the cavalry of Antigonus was nearly 10,000 strong; that of Eumenes scarcely exceeded 6000. The spirit of his army was excellent. But on the eve of the battle he discovered, through the information of Eudamus and another officer, who, as his creditors, felt an interest in his safety, that the principal satraps, at the instigation of Antigonus and Teutamus, inflamed with jealousy, stronger than ever, of his growing popularity, had resolved to get rid of him as soon as he should have won them a victory over Antigo-

nus. He had, it seems, a few friends whom he still trusted, and with them he is said to have deliberated whether he should not abandon his faithless associates—a herd of wild beasts, as he justly called them\*—and even to have made his will, and burned such of his papers as might involve the writers in danger after his death. But it seems that he at last determined to commit himself to the good will of the troops, who manifested extraordinary zeal. The Argyraspids, notwithstanding their age, believed, themselves, and were commonly believed to be almost invincible. Just before the signal was raised for the onset, Antigonus ordered a horseman to ride up within hearing of that part of the enemy's line where the Macedonians were stationed, and to admonish them that they were about to begin an unnatural combat with their fathers; the veterans to whom Philip and Alexander owed all their conquests, and who would still show themselves worthy of the renown they had earned in so many glorious fields. This address made some impression on the troops of Antigonus; murmurs were heard among them, which showed that they painfully felt its truth; while, on the other side, the men loudly demanded to be led against the enemy.

Antigonus had collected the main strength of his cavalry in the right wing, where he commanded in person with his son Demetrius. To meet this disposition, Eumenes strengthened his left with the best part of his cavalry and elephants, and the Argyraspids, and took his station there, together with most of the satraps. His right wing he placed under the command of Philippus, with orders to avoid an engagement, and to wait the issue of that which was to begin on his right. The event of the battle, however, was not determined either by the tactics of the generals, or by the valour of the men, but by the nature of the ground on which they fought. It was a plain, covered with fine, loose sand, partly covered with a salt crust; and the trampling of the horses and men soon raised a cloud of dust, through which no object could be discerned at more than a few yards distance. It is not quite clear whether it was to escape from this annoyance, and to gain a part of the field where he might see the enemy better, or from want of spirit, or with a treacherous purpose, that Peucestes did not wait to receive the charge of Antigonus, but wheeled off with his division of cavalry, which amounted to 1500 men. Eumenes, though so much weakened, maintained the unequal combat for a time, but at length was forced to retreat, and moved off in good order to the right, to re-enforce himself with the troops of Philippus, which were not yet engaged. But in the mean while Antigonus had obtained a more important advantage through the dust which darkened the air. He was enabled to send some select squadrons of horse round to the enemy's camp, as under cover of night. They reached it unobserved, routed the troops which had been left to guard it, and made themselves masters of all it contained, which included the wives and children of the Argyraspids, and all the earnings of their long services. The Ar-

\* *Ἰππὸς τοῖς φίλοις εἰπὼν ὅς τε καὶ κατήγετο Σπάρτης ἀναστρέφεται.* Plut., Eum., 14.

argyraspsids sustained their reputation in the battle; and, although Diodorus must be exaggerating their exploits when he says that they killed 5000 of the enemy, and yet did not lose a man, the success of the infantry of Eumenes was probably due chiefly to them. But when the combat of the cavalry was decided, Antigonus divided his into two bodies, and while, with one of them, he himself watched the movements of Eumenes, he sent Pithon with the rest to charge the Argyraspsids. They, however, gave proof of their wonted coolness and soldiership; though they had no horse to protect them, they formed themselves into a square, which Pithon found himself unable to force, and retired in safety from the field; and then discovered the irreparable loss they had suffered.

When night had parted the combatants, Eumenes and the satraps held a council of war. Eumenes wished to renew the battle the next day, observing that their infantry had been victorious, and even the cavalry had not been defeated. But the satraps, thinking this too great a risk, proposed to retreat into the upper provinces. Both parties adhered to their opinions, and the council broke up without any decision. There was, however, a third party, which they had not consulted, but which soon made its sentiments known. The Argyraspsids were furious at the discovery of their loss, indignant at the conduct of Peucestes, which seemed to have deprived them of the victory, when it was already in their hands, incapable of any thought but the immediate recovery of their families and property. When they learned the subject on which the council had been divided, they loudly declared that, while all that was dear to them was in the enemy's power, they would neither fight nor retreat: "What had they any longer either to hope or to fear!" All feelings of loyalty and honour were now extinguished; the only expedient that seemed to be left to them was to apply to Antigonus for the restitution of what they had lost. Teutamus, who had always been inclined to change sides, and now probably saw no other way to preserve his authority, himself opened a secret negotiation with Antigonus. Antigonus was willing not only to grant their request, but to confer other favours on them if they would enter into his service, and deliver Eumenes into his hands. These terms were accepted, and the Argyraspsids prepared to execute their treacherous purpose. A number of them entered the tent of Eumenes together, under various pretexts, wrested his dagger from him, overpowered him, and fastened his hands behind his back with his own belt.\* Antigonus was immediately apprized of the event, and sent an officer named Nicanor to take possession of the prisoner. He earnestly entreated, it is said, that he might be allowed to die, either by their hands or by his own, before he was surrendered to the enemy; on that condition, he was ready to acquit them of the guilt of treachery; but he could not obtain even this last favour. Antigonus, who had not dropped all hope of engaging him in his own service, ordered him to be committed to the closest cus-

tody until his fate should be determined. When the question was discussed in the council, two voices only pleaded for his life; his old friend Nearchus, and the young Demetrius, who was capable of admiration for a noble adversary. Nor, perhaps, was Antigonus himself, though, it is said, violently incensed against the prisoner, entirely callous to such feelings; but in him they were speedily overpowered by the remonstrances of his other generals, who, each regarding Eumenes as a rival, pressed for his execution, and even threatened, if he were spared, to quit the service of Antigonus. The army, too, or at least the wretches who had betrayed him, began to be clamorous for his life;\* and Antigonus was forced to give way. He was still so reluctant to shed the blood of the man who had once been his friend, that, with cruel superstition, he ordered his food to be withdrawn. But as the camp was broken up two or three days after, the prisoner was despatched, before he sank under the torments of hunger, either by command of Antigonus or to satisfy some more jealous or more merciful enemy. So perished, in the forty-fifth year of his age, the ablest and best of Alexander's surviving captains; if we ought not rather to say, the only one who united very eminent abilities with a character entitled to respect. His talents and zeal, with which he might have conferred important benefits on his country, were wasted in the service of foreigners, who could never forgive the superiority of a Greek. It not only interfered with the ambitious views of his rivals, but shocked the self-complacency—always strongest in the most barbarous and worthless races—with which a nation of military bores, intoxicated with the good fortune which had made them the instruments of great achievements, regarded itself as the first people on the earth.

No opposition, it seems, was offered by the rest of the army to the mutiny of the Argyraspsids; and the surrender of Eumenes was presently followed by the submission of almost all the allied satraps and their forces. Peucestes was among the first to fall in with the current, and joined Antigonus with his 10,000 Persians. The blame of their resistance was, of course, thrown upon Eumenes; and Antigonus received their excuses graciously; he excepted only a few, who had shown either personal attachment to Eumenes or hostility to himself. Antigones had excited his special resentment, as the man who had baffled his early attempts to corrupt the Argyraspsids. He was now, by order of Antigonus, cast into a pit, and burned alive. Eudamus, Celbanus, and some others, were likewise condemned to death. Thus was the league of the eastern satraps suppressed, and the royal house lost the only man who had ever shown a true devotion to its cause, and was able effectually to support it. Antigonus had now only to make use of the advantage he had gained, quietly to remove all the obstacles which still opposed the accomplishment of his ends.

He soon quitted Gabiene to take up his quarters for the rest of the winter near Ecbatana, and cantoned his army in the northern districts of Media, chiefly in the territory of

\* Justin (xiv., 3, 12) represents him as having taken to flight, and as having been seized and brought back.

\* Nepos, Eum., 12.

**Rhagæ.** While it remained here, he received information that Pithon was endeavouring, by a free distribution of money, to draw as many as he could of the scattered divisions into his own service, and was meditating a sudden attack upon him. He dissembled his purpose, affected to treat the reports he received with indignation, as fully assured of Pithon's fidelity, and publicly announced his intention to leave the satrap of Media in the station he had before occupied—the superintendence of the eastern provinces. When he had allowed sufficient time for his language to reach Pithon's ear, he wrote to advise him that he was on the point of returning to the West, and desired his immediate presence, to confer with him on affairs of the highest moment. Pithon fell blindly into the snare; he came, expecting, according to the information he had received from his friends, that he was to be invested with the government of the East. But Antigonus brought him to trial before his council, and caused him to be condemned and immediately put to death. The satrapy of Media he committed to Orontobates, a native of the country, and appointed Hippostratus to the military command with a body of 3500 Asiatic troops. He then collected his forces, and, proceeding to Ecbatana, took possession of the treasure remaining there, which amounted to 5000 talents, and set out on his march to Persepolis. While he was on the road, a feeble attempt was made by two generals, Meleager and Menætas, who had engaged in Pithon's plot, to excite an insurrection in Media, and they nearly surprised the camp of the new satrap and Hippostratus; but the revolt was soon suppressed, and the leaders punished with death.

In Persia, Antigonus was received with royal honours, and he held a council to deliberate on the distribution of the eastern provinces. Most of the more distant he thought it prudent to leave in the hands of the satraps who had hitherto held them, who could only have been removed by force; and he sent for Siburtius from Arachosia, as assured of his attachment by his enmity to Eumenes, confirmed him in the possession of his satrapy, and placed the most turbulent of the Argyraspids under his command, with secret instructions to employ them, by small parties at a time, in services which would ensure their destruction. This number included the men to whom he had been chiefly indebted for the surrender of Eumenes, who thus received the just recompense of their treachery. Persia was too important a province to be left in the hands of a man so popular among the natives, and so aspiring, as Peucestes. Antigonus removed him; and, when the people loudly expressed its discontent, and an officer named Thespius had the boldness to represent their wishes, he put Thespius to death, and appointed Asclepiodorus to the government, leaving a sufficient force under his command. Peucestes, whom he carried away with him, he soothed with hopes which were probably never fulfilled. We hear no more of his name, and can only conjecture his fate. On the banks of the Pasitigris he met Xenophilus, who had surrendered to Seleucus. Antigonus received him with a show of favour, not feeling secure of his

object until he had advanced to Susa, and had taken possession of the treasure. It still included the celebrated tree of pure gold, and other precious works of art, which were valued at 15,000 talents; and the crowns, and other presents, together with spoil which had been lodged there, amounted to 5000 more; so that, with what he had brought from Ecbatana, he found himself master of 25,000 talents. Carriages and camels were collected to convey the whole to the western coast, and Antigonus, leaving Aspisas, a native, satrap of Susiana, pursued his march with it to Babylon.

Seleucus, probably by his orders, had previously returned to Babylon, where, stifling the resentment and suspicion which he must have felt, he received the conqueror with magnificent presents, and entertained his whole army. He hoped to disarm his jealousy, but, perhaps, rather strengthened it, by his munificence; Antigonus resolved to rid himself of a man whose talents and spirit, together with the influence he had acquired by his mildness and liberality, rendered him a formidable rival. He called him to account for his administration of the revenues of his province. Seleucus, reflecting on Pithon's fate, argued that which was designed for himself. He publicly remonstrated against the requisition of Antigonus, alleging that he owed no account of a province which he had received, by the vote of the army, as a reward for his services under Alexander. The discussion lasted some days; but, as it grew warmer, he saw the danger increasing, and made his escape. Accompanied only by fifty horsemen, he took the road to Egypt, to throw himself on Ptolemy's protection. Antigonus at first rejoiced at his flight, which, while it left the satrapy vacant, spared him the necessity of violent measures against a man universally beloved. But his fears were soon awakened, it is said, by a prediction of the Chaldeans, who foretold that the fugitive, if he escaped, was destined to become master of Asia, and Antigonus to lose his life in battle with him. The prophecy, perhaps, was forged after the event; but Antigonus ordered him to be pursued when it was too late to overtake him, and dismissed Blitor from the command he held in Mesopotamia, because he had not exerted himself to arrest the fugitive;\* unless, indeed, this was a pretext for the removal of an officer whom he could not trust. Seleucus was reserved to accomplish his high destiny. Pithon, the son of Agenor, whom Alexander had left in India, was invested with the vacant satrapy.

While Antigonus was making such progress in the East as might encourage him to hope that, ere long, he should unite Alexander's whole empire under his rule, events had occurred in Europe which, though they raised up a new rival to resist his pretensions, also seemed to clear the way for his ambition. It appears that Polysperchon, when he returned to Macedonia, after his disastrous attempt on Megalopolis, with an army much reduced in numbers, and a still greater diminution of his military and political reputation, found himself no longer able, without assistance, to withstand the machinations of Eurydice. Her imbecile husband's

name afforded her a sufficient title to supreme authority, and she had begun to form a party in Macedonia which would enable her to exercise it, add to set Polysperchon wholly aside. It may be inferred, from the correspondence between Polysperchon and Olympias, and from the letter of Olympias to Eumenes, that the life of Roxana's child was believed to be in danger from Eurydice; and it is probable that, before Polysperchon made his expedition to Greece, he had sent both mother and son into Epirus, to seek protection from Olympias. Eurydice's proceedings now rendered a decisive step necessary. He had still, indeed, the army at his command, but he did not venture so far, to try its fidelity, as to make an attack on the young queen in his own name. It was only under that of Olympias that he could hope to overthrow her influence. Olympias, who had always been eager to return to Macedonia, and had only been restrained by her distrust of Polysperchon, could hesitate no longer when she saw her grandson expelled from his patrimony by one whom she hated as the granddaughter of one of her rivals. She accepted Polysperchon's proposals; and it was agreed that he should march into Epirus, and conduct her and the young prince to Macedonia. Her nephew, Æacides, king of Epirus, promised to join him with his forces. These preparations did not escape Eurydice's notice; but she resolved to meet force with force. She was already, it seems, in correspondence with Cassander, and she now urged him to come immediately to her aid. But Cassander was at this time in Peloponnesus, endeavouring to recover what Polysperchon had gained there, and was not able to leave it so soon as Eurydice's emergency required. She, however, had so far strengthened her party in Macedonia, that she was able to raise an army with which she could venture to encounter the united forces of Polysperchon and Æacides.

They found her encamped near the Macedonian town of Eira, and she did not decline a battle. The two armies were drawn up in battle array, and Eurydice was seen in front of her line, completely armed in the Macedonian fashion, forming and animating her troops. Yet it appears that no combat ensued. Before the signal was given, Olympias came forward, it is said, with an air of sacred phrensy, and accompanied with the instruments of Bacchanalian processions.\* It is not difficult to conceive that the Macedonians of her rival's army were so awestruck, as well by her unearthly aspect as by the recollection of her dignity, that they could not be brought to raise their hands against her. Philip was immediately taken, with all his retinue. Eurydice escaped from the field, accompanied by Polyces, the only one of her council that remained faithful to her, and fled towards Amphipolis, designing, no doubt, to proceed to the Hellespont; but she was arrested on the way, and delivered up to her rival. Olympias was not satisfied with a common revenge on her two prisoners; she determined to make them taste the bitterness of death in long-protracted tortures, and immured them both in a dungeon built for the purpose, with

only one narrow opening for the admission of food. In this state she kept them some days; but then, finding that the Macedonians were disgusted by this refinement of cruelty, she ordered the Thracians who guarded them to despatch Philip. For Eurydice she still reserved what she thought a bitter death. The young queen had not suffered her spirit to be bowed by her reverses. She spoke as boldly as ever, and asserted her right to the throne. While her husband's bleeding corpse lay at her feet, she received a message from Olympias, with a sword, a cord, and a cup of hemlock, bidding her choose which she would. She spoke only to pray that like presents might one day be brought to Olympias; then, having paid such offices as the circumstances permitted to her dead husband, she unclasped her own girdle, and with it put an end to her life. Olympias next gave loose to her vengeance against the family of Antipater. Nicanor, one of his sons, fell into her hands, and was put to death; and she now propagated the report that Alexander had been poisoned by Iolias, whose tomb she demolished. Even these victims did not satiate her; she selected a hundred of Cassander's friends, all men of high rank, and condemned them to death, it seems, without any form of trial. The advice of Eumenes was forgotten; and the effects which he foresaw soon attended this reckless indulgence of her ferocious passions.

Cassander was still in Peloponnesus, engaged in the siege of Tegea, when he received intelligence, perhaps at the same time, of the return and victory of Olympias, and of her bloody dealings with her royal prisoners, and with his own family and friends. His own appetite for revenge was as keen as hers. He had not forgotten the affronts he had suffered from Alexander; but this last injury forced him immediately to lay aside every other care but that of vengeance. Though Polysperchon's son, Alexander, was in Peloponnesus, ready to take advantage of his absence, and many cities, which had recently embraced his alliance, looked to him for protection, he raised the siege of Tegea, and set out for Macedonia. Polysperchon and Olympias expected his coming, and had taken precautions to secure Macedonia from invasion. They had engaged the Ætolians, who were led to espouse their cause, partly by the recollection of Antipater's enmity, and partly by the private influence of Polysperchon, to occupy the pass of Thermopylæ; and Polysperchon himself crossed the mountains of the southern frontier, and took up a position in Perrhæbia. Cassander did not waste his strength in an attempt to dislodge the Ætolians from Thermopylæ. He collected a number of small craft from Eubœa and Locria, and transported his army across the Maliac Gulf into Thessaly. There he divided it into two main bodies, one of which he sent, under the command of Callas, into Perrhæbia, with orders to keep Polysperchon employed, while, with the other, he himself pursued his march towards the nearest pass. This manœuvre entirely disconcerted the plans of Polysperchon and Olympias, who had believed that Macedonia was safe as long as Polysperchon retained his position in Thessaly. Olympias, when it was too late, sent

\* Βακχικόν μετὰ τυμπάνων. Athenæus, xii., 560, F.



some troops to seize the pass of Tempe, towards which Cassander was moving; it was already occupied by a detachment which he had pushed forward under the command of Deinias. She now saw herself in imminent danger; and, appointing Aristonous to meet Cassander with the forces which Polysperchon had left in Macedonia, she took refuge in Pydna, with a great number of royal and noble persons, among whom, besides Roxana and the young prince, were Thessalonice, one of Philip's daughters, and Deidamia, the daughter of *Æacides*. She was attended by a very small force, chiefly the household troops, and by the remainder of the elephants; nor was the town supplied with provisions for a long siege. She, however, resolved to remain there, not doubting that succours would soon be brought to her in abundance by sea, both from Macedonia and Greece.

Cassander, having crossed the mountains, moved directly upon Pydna. He drew a trench round the town from sea to sea, and sent for ships, engines, and ammunition, to besiege it both by land and sea. While he was thus engaged, he learned that *Æacides* was preparing to bring succours from Epirus. He therefore sent *Atarrhias*, with a division of his army, to occupy the passes between Epirus and Macedonia. The Epirotes felt no interest in the expedition, and broke out into open mutiny; so that *Æacides* was compelled to make a proclamation, by which all who desired it were allowed to return to their homes; and so many availed themselves of this permission that the king found himself unable, with his remaining forces, to make head against *Atarrhias*. Even the loyalty of his peaceful subjects was undermined by the seditious language of the men who had quitted his camp. A national assembly was held, in which, by a proceeding never before heard of in the history of Epirus, the king was declared to have forfeited his crown. It was transferred to the family of *Neoptolemus*, a remote branch of the royal line. *Pyrhus*, the infant son of *Æacides*, was with great difficulty and danger preserved from the pursuit of his enemies, and conveyed to the court of *Glaucias*, king of Illyria, who afforded him shelter. The authors of the revolution made a treaty with Cassander, who sent *Lyciscus* to act as regent in Epirus, which thus became devoted to his interest. The partisans of *Olympias* in Macedonia, who before wavered between hope and fear, were so disheartened by this event that they dropped the preparations which they were making to come to her assistance; and she was soon after deprived of her last remaining hope by the intelligence that the greater part of *Polysperchon's* troops had been seduced by *Callas* to abandon their chief, who was obliged to take shelter, with the few who adhered to him, in the Perrhæbian town of *Naxium*, where he was closely blockaded by the enemy. The aspiring woman, so lately absolute mistress of Macedonia, was left without a prospect of relief, exposed to the attack of her implacable foe.

The season, however, was so far advanced that Cassander found it impracticable to proceed by the way of assault, and contented himself with maintaining a strict blockade. In the course of the winter the scarcity of provisions

began to be severely felt by the besieged, and soon all the horrors of famine appeared in their most terrible form. The soldiers were reduced to a scanty ration; the elephants were fed on sawdust, and gradually pined away; the horses and beasts of burden were slaughtered for the sake of their flesh. The riders were not permitted to share the common allowance, and they, and at length more and more of the other soldiers, perished of hunger. The barbarians betook themselves to the bodies of the dead; the streets were encumbered with corpses, which the survivors scarcely retained strength or spirit either to bury or to throw over the walls. The hideous spectacle and the noisome stench diffused universal despondency. Desertions became frequent, and all who repaired to the camp of the besiegers were graciously received by Cassander, who sent them to their homes, where they spread the report of the desperate condition of *Olympias*, which extinguished every hope that might have animated her partisans to make an attempt for her deliverance. As the spring advanced, and the famine grew every day more pressing, the soldiers assembled round the palace, and called upon her, since she was no longer able to support them, to permit them to depart. She was obliged to comply with their demand, and at length saw herself so generally abandoned that she concerted measures for her own escape. A galley was prepared to carry her away with her friends; but, before they had embarked, Cassander was apprized of her design, sailed into the harbour, and took the vessel.\* She was now reduced to utter despair, and sent to negotiate with the conqueror. He, at first, insisted that she should surrender at discretion, but at length consented to promise that her life should be spared. He knew that when he had once made himself master of her person, this condition would not long stand in the way of his revenge.

After the fall of Pydna, all Macedonia submitted to him except Pella, which was held by *Monimus*, and *Amphipolis*, to which *Aristonous* had retired with a considerable body of troops. *Monimus*, however, surrendered at Cassander's first summons. *Aristonous* was inclined to hold out, for he had recently gained a victory over Cassander's general *Cratæus*, and, having besieged him in the Bisaltian town of *Bodys*, had compelled him to capitulate on condition that he should lay down his arms. He still hoped for succours either from *Eumeneæ*, of whose death, which happened in the preceding winter, he had not yet heard, or from

\* So *Diodorus*, xix., 50. *Polymnus* (iv., 11, §) tells a different and less probable story. According to him, the vessel was furnished by *Polysperchon*—who, one would think, was hardly in a situation to have done so—and intercepted by Cassander, who prevailed on the messenger to carry the letter in which *Polysperchon* exhorted the queen to make her escape, to *Olympias*, suppressing the fact of the capture. *Olympias* repaired by night to the water-side, but not finding the vessel there, concluded, without farther inquiry, that *Polysperchon* had deceived her, and abandoned herself to despair: a consequence that could hardly have been foreseen; and it is rather surprising that Cassander did not carry his stratagem a little farther, man the vessel with a crew of his own, suffer *Olympias* to embark, and then make himself master of it and her. There is a suspicious resemblance between this and the stratagem by which he soon after certainly attempted to draw her into his power.

Polysperchon or Alexander. Cassander, however, forced Olympias to send him an order to surrender, and with this he complied, on a stipulation for his personal safety; but Cassander, who was jealous of his rank and influence, eluded the fulfilment of the treaty, and instigated some of the family of Crateuas, who resented their kinsman's disgrace, to put him to death.

There were still some difficulties to overcome before he could wreak his vengeance on Olympias. He did not think it safe openly to violate the pledge which he had given: the pity of the Macedonians might be revived by her misfortunes. He thought it necessary, at least, to obtain the sanction of his army, and wished that she might herself furnish him with a pretext for her destruction. The first object he easily accomplished. The kinsmen of the numerous victims whom Olympias had sacrificed to her hatred of Cassander readily undertook to accuse her in a general assembly; and as she was absent, and had no one to plead for her, she was condemned to death. Still, this sentence did not release Cassander from his engagement, and he endeavoured to inveigle her into a step by which she would forfeit the benefit of it. He sent some of his friends to her with a private message, affected to be touched with compassion for her wretchedness, and to apprehend that he should not be able to protect her from the fury of the army, which had condemned her to death; he therefore offered to prepare a galley in which she might make her escape to Athens. His plan was, if she fell into the snare, to have her killed at sea, and thus, while he satisfied his hatred, to shift the imputation of breach of faith on her. Olympias, however, whether suspecting fraud, or confident in the influence which she believed herself still to retain over the Macedonians, declined the proposal. All that she asked for was a fair trial before a national assembly, in which she might be heard in her own defence. Cassander became alarmed lest he should be obliged by the voice of the people to grant this demand. He was resolved not to incur the danger which would arise from the public appearance of the aged queen as a prisoner and a suppliant before the multitude; he therefore sent a party of soldiers—200 men whom he selected as the most willing to render him any service—to surround the palace and despatch her. Olympias received warning that she must prepare for death. She put on her royal robes, and came forward, leaning on two of her women, to meet the soldiers. Even they were so overpowered by the majesty of her presence, and by the numberless great recollections attached to her name, that they could not bring themselves to execute Cassander's order. He was obliged to commit the deed of blood to the persons who had accused her, and who were eager enough for revenge to undertake it themselves. She submitted to her fate with unbending firmness, neither shrinking from their swords nor uttering a word unworthy of her birth and fortunes.\*

Cassander thus saw himself, in fact, master

of Macedonia: it remained for him to secure it against all other claimants in his own independent possession. It was, however, not more, perhaps, with this view, than to gratify his hatred of Alexander, that he resolved to rid himself of Roxana and her son. But this was a step which demanded great caution. The scenes which had lately taken place proved the veneration of the Macedonians for Alexander's memory. It was still uncertain how they might receive the tidings of the death of Olympias, and it would not have been safe immediately to follow up the murder of his mother with that of his widow and child. It seemed prudent, also, to wait for intelligence of the course which events were taking in the East before he ventured on this decisive measure. He therefore removed Roxana and the young prince to the citadel of Amphipolis, which he committed to a trusty officer named Glaucias. He, at the same time, dismissed the pages and officers who had before attended them, and ordered that they should be treated as private persons. This was a sufficient declaration of his intention to exclude Alexander's son from the throne; and his partisans probably repeated all the arguments that had ever been urged against the prince's title. But still, he required one more legitimate for himself, which could only be acquired by an alliance with the royal house. For this purpose he fixed his eyes on Philip's daughter Thessalonice, who, though her claims could not be considered equal to those of Cleopatra, might still serve to reconcile the nation to his rule. Their marriage was celebrated not long after the surrender of Pydna, and it was in honour of this princess, and probably in the course of the same spring, that Cassander founded the city which so long bore her name at the head of the Thermaic Gulf; as it was at this time that he founded one named after himself, Cassandrea, in the peninsula of Pallene, which he peopled with emigrants from Potidea and other neighbouring cities, and with a considerable number of families which had survived the ruin of Olynthus. He could have taken no measures more tending to multiply his personal adherents, and to accustom the people to view him as the successor of their ancient princes. Such was the character which he publicly assumed, and in this capacity he ordered the remains of Eurydice, Philip, and Cynane to be buried in the royal sepulchre at *Ægeæ*, and honoured their memory with funeral games.

He was now again at liberty to turn his attention towards Greece, where the state of affairs called for his presence. Alexander had taken advantage of his departure from Peloponnesus to draw several cities into his own alliance, and to seize several strong positions. Polysperchon himself, when he heard of the death of Olympias, and saw that his cause was irretrievably lost, for the present, in Macedonia, escaped from Naxium, and, joining *Æacides*, took refuge with him in *Ætolia*, where he possessed some personal influence, derived, it seems, from family connexions.\* It was highly desirable for Cassander to crush these rivals,

\* So Diodorus (xix., 81), and, more expressly, Justin (xiv., 6). Pausanias (ix., 7, 3) represents her as stoned to death.

\* Diodorus, xix., 52. Pausanias (v., 6, 1) calls him an *Ætolian*, which is explained by Tzetzes ad Lycoph. v., 802.

and to make himself master of Greece, before he should be assailed, as he might expect to be in any case, from another quarter. He, therefore, strengthened his army with new levies in Macedonia, and early in the summer of 316 set out on his march to Peloponnesus. He found Thermopylæ again guarded by the Ætolians, and was now obliged to force a passage. Though the settlement of Peloponnesus was his main object, there was another of great importance which detained him for some time in Bœotia. His position rendered it expedient for him everywhere, as much as possible, to gain the good will of those whom he wished to govern, and to signalize the beginning of his reign by acts of beneficence. It seems to have been his aim to invite a comparison between his own conduct and that of his predecessors on points in which he would turn in his favour; and it was probably, in part, this motive which induced him to resolve on the restoration of Thebes. The destruction of that ancient city had excited general sympathy in Greece, notwithstanding the violence with which it had abused its prosperity. To repair the injury which had been inflicted by the Macedonian arms was a work of humanity and generosity, likely to be generally approved and admired. But Cassander, probably, had some more special motives and ends. To rebuild what Alexander had destroyed, and to annul the decree by which he had doomed the site of Thebes to desolation, was, in itself, an undertaking that interested his personal feelings. In a purely political point of view, there was much to recommend it. The Bœotian towns, indeed, which had rejoiced in the fall of Thebes, and were still in possession of her territory, might feel themselves injured by it, and would no longer be so warmly attached to the Macedonian government as they had been. But, on the other hand, Thebes, which might again outweigh them all, would be entirely devoted, not merely to Macedonia, but to the house of her benefactor. She would help to secure the submission of Athens; and, above all, the Peloponnesian states, which retained their jealousy of Sparta, would hail the event with exultation.

On his arrival in Bœotia, Cassander assembled a congress of deputies from the Bœotian towns, informed them of his design, and condescended to request their consent. We do not know what arguments or motives he used, or whether he obtained more than a nominal consent, which could not prudently have been withheld. When this difficulty was removed, he directed that the work should be begun. The Theban exiles returned, to settle again on the hallowed ground; but they had only permission to occupy it; Cassander did not supply them with the means, and the undertaking was far beyond the reach of their broken fortunes. Succours, however, were brought to them from other quarters, with a zeal which, while it proves the policy of Cassander's plan, makes us regret that the spirit which displayed itself so nobly on this occasion had not prevailed more uniformly among the Greeks. The Athenians were foremost among those who contributed to the work; they built the greater part of the wall: a generous exertion, certainly, in behalf of a people whose ancestors had been

their bitterest enemies, and who had no claims upon them but such as arose out of their common origin, and the service which Thebes had rendered to the national cause in the struggle with Macedonia. Megalopolis and Messene also remembered that they owed their existence to Thebes, and testified their gratitude by pecuniary aid. Contributions were sent even from the Greek cities of Sicily and Italy. The Thebans were conscious of their altered position; they no longer aspired to dominion over their Bœotian neighbours, but solicited admission into the league, which was headed by their ancient enemies, the Platæans, and sent their sacrifice with the rest to the festival of the great Dædala, which was celebrated every sixty years, to commemorate the interval during which Platæa lay desolate.\*

From Bœotia Cassander advanced towards Peloponnesus. When he arrived at Athens, he found that Alexander had fortified the Isthmus, so as to render the approach extremely difficult on this side. He, nevertheless, proceeded as far as Megara, but there, having, perhaps, more accurately ascertained the strength of the enemy's position, he caused rafts to be prepared for the elephants, and transports for the troops, with which he crossed over to Epidaurus. He then marched to Argos, and induced it to renounce its alliance with Alexander. Hermione too submitted to him, either now, or a little later. One is surprised to hear that the chief resistance which he had to encounter was in Messenia. Before he could reduce Ithome, he found himself obliged to retire. Doubtless, intelligence which he had received from the East seemed to render it necessary for him to return with all speed, to secure his more important interests in Macedonia. Alexander remained in his position at the Isthmus, but could not prevent Cassander from passing his lines, and declined a battle. Cassander left Molycus, with 2000 men, to occupy the passes of Geranea, and pursued his march northward.

Antigonus, it appears, before he left Babylon, sent envoys to Ptolemy, Cassander, and Lysimachus, formally to acquaint them with his success, and to express his hopes that their alliance with him might continue uninterrupted. Towards the end of the autumn of 316 he arrived at Mallus in Cilicia, and distributed his army in winter quarters. The treasures at Quinda, still amounting to 10,000 talents, were delivered up to him; and he found that the ordinary revenues of the provinces already subject to him might be estimated at 11,000 talents. In the mean while Seleucus had reached Egypt, and was, perhaps, the first to apprise its ruler of the danger he had to apprehend from the enormous power and the grasping ambition of Antigonus. Ptolemy hastened to fortify himself by a closer alliance with the men whose safety was now inseparably connected with his own. Lysimachus had by this time firmly established himself in Thrace, though still exposed to formidable attacks from his northern neighbours, and was able to render important assistance. In the absence of Antigonus, a new power had sprung up in Asia Minor. Asander, the satrap of Caria, had extended his dominion far and wide, and had nearly made himself master of

**Cappadocia.** They and Cassander were easily induced to send their envoys to accompany those of Ptolemy and Seleucus on a common embassy to Antigonus. In the spring of 315, the ambassadors met Antigonus on his march into Upper Syria, and communicated to him the demands which they were instructed to make. Their masters claimed a share in the fruits of his success, to which they had all, in some measure, contributed. They proposed that the Hellespontine Phrygia should be annexed to the satrapy of Lysimachus, that Asander should be confirmed in the possession of Lycia and Cappadocia, Ptolemy in that of Syria, including Phœnicia, that Babylonia should be restored to Seleucus, and that the treasures which Antigonus had brought from the East should be equally shared among all. We hear of no demand on the part of Cassander; he was, no doubt, satisfied with the possession of Macedonia and Greece. Antigonus replied with a mixture of scorn and indignation,\* and particularly bade the Egyptian envoys inform Ptolemy that he would be ready to meet him. The allies probably did not wait for his answer to make the most active preparations for the contest, which they must have foreseen to be inevitable. Antigonus, after his declaration of war, immediately took measures to keep his less formidable rivals fully employed, while he himself bent his main force against Ptolemy. He sent an agent to Cyprus, and others to Rhodes, to secure the alliance of these islands, which was of great importance for the creation of the marine, which was one of his principal objects. He sent his nephew, Ptolemæus, with a strong body of troops, into Cappadocia to raise the siege of Amisus, which was defending itself against Asander, with instructions afterward to proceed to the Hellespont to guard the passage against Cassander and Lysimachus. He, at the same time, provided occupation for Cassander in Europe; he despatched Aristodemus with a thousand talents to Peloponnesus, to treat with Alexander and Polysperchon, and to levy troops, which might enable them to carry on the war against the common enemy; and he gave directions for the establishment of a chain of signals and post-stations, to maintain the readiest communication with the eastern provinces.

He then pursued his march to Phœnicia. The operation on which the success of his plans mainly depended was to make himself master of its ports, and to form a navy which should give him the command of the sea. He had little resistance to apprehend in the country; but Ptolemy had carried away all the ships and seamen he found there into Egypt. The sides of Libanus, however, yielded an inexhaustible supply of timber, and the population of Phœnicia furnished abundance of the best mariners. Tyre alone he found occupied by an Egyptian garrison; and having encamped over against it, while he made preparations for a siege, he sent for the Phœnician kings, and the officers who commanded in Syria, and gave his orders for the building of ships, and the collection of magazines of corn for a year's consumption. Three dockyards were speedily established in Phœnicia—at Tripolis, Byblus, and

Sidon—a fourth on the coast of Cilicia, to which the timber was brought down from Taurus, and another in Rhodes, where his envoy had obtained the people's consent. Eight thousand men were kept employed in the forests of Libanus alone, and a thousand team of cattle conveyed the timber to the coast. While these preparations were going on, as Antigonus lay encamped near Tyre, a fleet of a hundred sail, magnificently equipped, and executing its manœuvres with the greatest celerity, appeared in the road. It was commanded by Seleucus, who was on his way from Egypt to the Ægean, and took the opportunity to make this display of his naval power in the enemy's sight. It excited general uneasiness in the camp of Antigonus, especially among those of his allies who inhabited towns on the coast. What, they asked, would the greatest land force avail to protect them from ravages and annoyance while the enemy was master of the sea? Antigonus bade his friends keep up their spirits; before the summer was over he would put to sea with 500 sail. In Cyprus his ministers found Nicocreon, king of Salamis, and most of the other princes already gained by Ptolemy; four only, and those among the least powerful, entered into alliance with Antigonus. While his works were proceeding for the siege of Tyre, leaving Andronicus with 3000 men to superintend and protect them, he made an expedition southward, took Joppa and Gaza by storm, incorporated the garrisons with his army, and left troops of his own in their room.

In Asia Minor the success of his arms was more rapid. Ptolemæus compelled Asander's general, Asclepiodorus, to abandon the siege of Amisus, and to evacuate Cappadocia. He then marched into Bithynia, where the king Zibetes, either as an ally of the enemy, or for his private aggrandizement, had laid siege to Astacus and Chalcedon. He, too, was forced to yield, and to join the cities he had attacked in alliance with Antigonus. From Bithynia Ptolemæus was called, by pressing orders from his uncle, to hasten to protect Ionia and Lydia, which were threatened by Seleucus. He found Seleucus engaged in the siege of Erythræ; his arrival induced him not only to raise the siege, but to withdraw from the coast. He sailed away to Cyprus, where the state of affairs was sufficiently critical to render his presence desirable. No enemy now was left in Asia Minor but Asander, who was nearly reduced within the limits of his own province, where he might soon find himself attacked both by land and sea.

In Greece, Aristodemus executed his commission no less ably and successfully. He first sailed to Laconia, and at Sparta, where Cassander was viewed as a hereditary enemy, obtained the sanction of the government for his levies, which soon amounted to 8000 men. Polysperchon came over from Ætolia, it seems, to treat with him and his son. Alexander was persuaded to make a voyage to Phœnicia, for the purpose of a conference with Antigonus, while the old man remained at the head of the army. He was so deeply humbled by his reverse, that he consented to accept the title of general of Peloponnesus from Antigonus. On Alexander's arrival at the camp before Tyre, Antigonus, having concluded a treaty with him, called an

\* Appian, *Syr.*, 53, characteristically, *ἐπιχλευσάντες*.

assembly, to which not only the soldiers, but all the strangers in the camp were admitted. It was his wish to give the greatest possible notoriety to its proceedings, as they were designed to make an impression favourable to his cause on the public mind, both in Asia and Europe. He himself harangued the multitude, and recounted Cassander's misdeeds. Among them he enumerated not only the murder of Olympias, his treatment of Roxana and the young king, the violence with which he had obtained the hand of Thessalonice, and his assumption of sovereign power in Macedonia, but also his new settlements in Pallene and Boeotia. It was to dishonour the memory of Philip and Alexander, that he had invited the Olynthians, Macedonia's inveterate enemies, into the city which bore his own name, and had rebuilt Thebes. Having thus roused the indignation of his Macedonian hearers, he proposed a resolution, to be adopted by the army, by which Cassander was declared an enemy, unless he should release Roxana and the prince, should pull down his new cities, and, in all respects, pay due obedience to Antigonus, the lawful commander of the forces and regent of the empire. This latter title he seems never to have assumed before. It was to be regarded as a new dignity conferred on him by the vote of the army, to enable him to protect the royal family; and he would probably not have adopted it if the confederacy formed against him had been less formidable, and he had not thought it expedient to fix the stigma of rebellion and treason on his rivals, and to give an air of legitimacy to his own cause, without which he might have found it difficult to maintain his authority in the upper provinces. It was chiefly to them, and to the satraps who still revered the royal name, or considered it as their only safeguard against his ambition, that this part of the decree was addressed. Another part related to Greece. It declared that all the Greek states should be restored to liberty and independence: no Greek city any longer held by a foreign garrison. The object of this concession was clear enough. Polysperchon had tried to win Greece, by a democratical revolution: Cassander, by an oligarchical reaction. Antigonus would outbid them both, and attract Greeks of all parties to his side by the sound most pleasing to every Greek ear. The assembly passed the resolution, and Antigonus sent copies of it to all quarters where it was likely to promote his ends. He then dismissed Alexander with a present of 500 talents, and with hopes, which no one, it seems, knew better how to suggest without any distinct promise.

Ptolemy endeavoured to counteract the effect of the decree, so far as it related to Greece, by another, in which he held out a like promise. This imitation might help to destroy any illusion that had been created by the original, as it became doubly evident that each was only meant to serve a temporary purpose. But the prospect which the new turn of events opened for Greece was, as to the immediate future, gloomier than ever. The unhappy country seemed destined to be the theatre of endless wars, in which party rancour was combined with the hostility of foreigners to spread bloodshed and desolation over its whole surface.

The rivals were all alike strangers, in feeling and interests, to Greece; and their forces were so evenly balanced as to ensure many destructive alternations of success, while it was impossible to foresee the issue of the struggle. For a Greek, who had the good of his country at heart, there was no motive to prefer one side to another, except that a partition of Alexander's empire was a very desirable event, as it fostered hopes of national independence, which would be lost if the whole should be united in the hands of Antigonus. On the other hand, the power of Cassander might seem no less fatal to liberty. Yet it was difficult to remain neutral, and a state which took such a position was, perhaps, exposed to greater dangers than if it had actively engaged in the contest. To fight, or be trampled on, were the only alternatives. Two frightful examples of the calamities with which this period could not fail to abound occurred in the course of about a year after Cassander's last-mentioned return to Macedonia. He had left a man named Apollonides in command of the garrison at Argos. Apollonides had found an opportunity to surprise Stymphalus; but while he was absent on this expedition, the party in Argos adverse to Cassander invited Alexander to come and take possession of the city, which they promised to surrender to him. Relying on his support, they openly declared themselves, and, it seems, appointed 500 of their number as the new democratical council. Alexander, however, delayed, and Apollonides, having been apprized of the revolution, reached Argos before him. He found the council assembled in the Prytaneum, and having barred their egress, set fire to the building: the Five Hundred perished in the flames. The rest of the party were more mildly punished with death or banishment. The conduct of Apollonides seems to us inhuman; but there were few among the leading Macedonians of the period who had a right to reproach him with it, or who would not have approved of it; and it is only surprising that a man endowed with so much energy of will—in that age commonly admitted as a substitute for every good quality—should not have risen higher among his kindred spirits.

The other occurrence, which affords a melancholy illustration of the state of Greece, was one of the consequences which arose out of the measures taken by Cassander to counteract the operations of Aristodemus. Cassander, when he heard of his arrival in Peloponnesus, and of the success of his levies, hoped, at first, to be able to detach Polysperchon and Alexander from the cause of Antigonus. They, as we have seen, were gained over by Aristodemus; and Cassander found it necessary to make another expedition into Peloponnesus. In his passage through Boeotia, he halted for some time at Thebes to aid the Thebans in the completion of their fortifications, and having ravaged the Corinthian territory, and taken two forts which were occupied by Alexander's garrisons near the Isthmus, he advanced against the Arcadian Orchomenus. After some ineffectual attempts to take it by assault, he was admitted by his partisans: Alexander's friends sought shelter in the temple of Artemis. Their enemies obtained Cassander's leave to deal with them as

they would. All were torn from the sanctuary, and put to death.

Cassander moved forward into Messenia, where, it will be remembered, he had been obliged, the year before, to leave Ithome in the possession of Alexander's troops. He was still unable to reduce it. His presence, it seems, was again required in Macedonia. On his return through Arcadia, he appointed Damis governor of Megalopolis, and presided at the Nemean games in Argolis. But he had no sooner departed than Alexander and Aristodemus resumed their operations against the Peloponnesian cities which favoured his cause. He again had recourse to negotiation with Alexander, who, shut out from larger views, only desired an independent position in Greece. Cassander now sent Prepelaus to invite him to abandon Antigonus, with the offer of the same title which had been recently conferred on his father, and of a force sufficient to maintain his authority in Peloponnesus. Alexander accepted this proposal, and declared himself for Cassander. We are not expressly informed that Polysperchon acceded to the treaty; but it appears that he was now considered as Cassander's ally, and he continued to occupy Corinth with a strong body of troops.

Aristodemus, however, who had retired into Ætolia, prevailed on the Ætolians to espouse the cause of Antigonus, and, crossing the Corinthian Gulf with his mercenaries, renewed the war successfully in Elis and Achaia, where he was aided by the impression which the decree of Antigonus had produced on the towns occupied by Cassander's garrisons. Soon after, Alexander was assassinated at Sicyon; but his widow Cratesipolis, a woman of royal spirit, who had won the hearts of the soldiers by her liberality, kept the troops together, suppressed a revolt which broke out at Sicyon, and held the reins of government with a vigorous hand. Cassander, it seems, thought her and Polysperchon able to uphold his interests in Peloponnesus, and made an expedition into Ætolia and Acarnania, where he persuaded the Acarnanians, for the purpose of more effectual union against their southern neighbours, to concentrate their scattered population in three cities, and left Lyciscus with a body of troops to protect them. He then marched northward against the Illyrian king Glaucias, whom he had ineffectually tempted, by the bribe of 200 talents, to deliver up the infant Pyrrhus, defeated him in battle, and compelled him to enter into a treaty, by which he engaged not to molest Cassander's allies. Then, having first reduced and garrisoned Epidamnus, he returned to Macedonia.

Having secured his dominions by these barriers on the western side, he was at leisure to turn his attention towards Asia, and it was urgently claimed by the danger which now threatened him from that quarter. Antigonus, eager to complete the conquest of Phœnicia, and to be at liberty for other enterprises, as soon as he had collected a sufficient squadron, proceeded to blockade the harbours of Tyre. The garrison, however, held out fifteen months, and though, at last, compelled by famine to capitulate, obtained honourable terms, being allowed to depart with their baggage. While he was occupied with the siege, Ptolemy had been en-

deavouring to extend his influence in Cyprus, which, after the loss of Phœnicia, was doubly important to him. In the first year of the war (316), he sent 3000 auxiliaries to support his ally Nicocreon, and in the following spring fitted out a larger armament, destined partly for the same purpose. It consisted of 100 galleys, commanded by Polyclitus, and 10,000 mercenaries under an Athenian leader named Myrmidon; but the whole was placed under the orders of Ptolemy's brother Menelaus.

At Cyprus they found Seleucus with his fleet, and concerted the plan of the campaign with him. It was resolved to send Polyclitus with fifty galleys to Peloponnesus, where it was supposed that Alexander and Polysperchon were still acting on behalf of Antigonus; Myrmidon, with his troops, to Caria, to the relief of Asander, who was pressed by Ptolemæus; and that Seleucus and Menelaus should remain, with the rest of the fleet, at Cyprus, to carry on the war against the princes who had allied themselves with Antigonus. Two of them were forced to submit: Laphitus and Cerynia were taken by storm; but Citium made an obstinate resistance. Polyclitus sailed to Cenchrææ, and there, hearing of Alexander's alliance with Cassander, and seeing no employment for his squadron, set sail for the coast of Pamphylia, where he heard that a fleet, commanded by Theodotus, the admiral of Antigonus, was on its voyage from Patara eastward, protected by a body of troops under Perilaus, which moved along the shore. Polyclitus laid an ambuscade for the land force, and either killed or captured the whole, and took Perilaus himself prisoner. With his squadron, which he had concealed from view behind an adjacent promontory, he, at the same time, attacked the enemy, as they were about to land to succour their friends on shore, and took all their ships, with a great part of the crews, with which he returned triumphantly to Cyprus, and then to Egypt, where Ptolemy munificently rewarded his exploit. This occurrence led to a negotiation between Ptolemy and Antigonus, who sent to ransom Perilaus and some of the other prisoners, and, it seems, instructed his envoys to propose a personal interview with Ptolemy, who was then at Pelusium. It took place on the confines of Egypt and Syria, but we hear no more of it than that it was broken off, because Antigonus would not consent to Ptolemy's demands.

After the reduction of Tyre, Antigonus found himself in possession of a powerful navy, though it fell very far short of the numbers he had talked of. With re-enforcements from Rhodes and the Hellespont, and some which he found in the ports of Tyre, it amounted to 240 vessels of various sizes; among which were ninety of four banks of oars, ten of five, and as many of ten. The increase of dimensions in the ships employed in naval warfare corresponded to the enlarged scale of the contests carried on in this age, and to the growing attention paid to mathematics and to mechanical inventions. He reserved a squadron of fifty sail, which he designed to send to Peloponnesus. The rest he placed under the command of his nephew, Diocorides, and directed him to cruise about the coasts and islands where he might deem his presence most useful.

Cassander was aware that the preparations of Antigonos would before long be directed against himself; that as soon, at least, as he had subdued the resistance which was still opposed to him in Asia Minor, he would probably make an attack on Macedonia. He therefore, on his return from his expedition to Illyria, sent Prepeleus with a body of troops to Caria, to the aid of Asander, and required his two governors at Athens, Demetrius and Dionysius, to equip a squadron of twenty galleys for the recovery of Lemnos. They obeyed the order, and appointed Aristoteles to the command of the expedition. Seleucus deemed the object sufficiently important to call for his own presence. He joined Aristoteles with his fleet. Yet they could not prevail on the Lemnians to abandon the cause of Antigonos, which they probably regarded as that of their own independence; they preferred to see their territory ravaged, and their town invested. Seleucus then sailed away to Cos, leaving Aristoteles to conduct the siege. But Dioscorides, hearing of his departure, sailed to Lemnos. The superiority of his force must have rendered resistance hopeless. Aristoteles himself escaped, but most of the ships, with their crews, fell into the enemy's hands. It was late in the autumn before Prepeleus arrived in Caria and united his forces with those of Asander; and Ptolemæus, supposing that they would not commence operations before the spring, retired into winter-quarters; the earlier, it seems, because he had lately lost his father, and wished to celebrate his obsequies. They sent a division of 8000 foot and 2000 horse, under Eupolemus, to surprise him. He, however, was apprized by some deserters of the enemy's approach, collected nearly an equal force from the nearest cantonments, fell on the camp of Eupolemus at midnight, took him prisoner, and forced his troops to surrender themselves. With this occurrence the second year of the war ended.

Antigonos, on the whole, had hitherto been gaining ground and strength; for the successes of Ptolemy and Cassander were not to be compared in importance with his conquests in Syria and Asia Minor; and as his resources were almost inexhaustible, he might calculate on the continual growth both of his military and naval power. But his marine had not yet, it seems, answered his expectations. More time was requisite to enable him to wrest the command of the sea from Ptolemy. We have seen that Dioscorides, though it appears that he had with him the bulk of his uncle's navy, had not ventured to attack Seleucus, or to attempt to relieve Lemnos, before he heard that Seleucus had sailed away. Yet his numbers cannot have been inferior to the enemy's; and it must be supposed that his crews wanted the practice of the sailors whom Ptolemy had brought from Phœnicia. At all events, Antigonos saw that he was not yet in a condition to attack Ptolemy in his own dominions with any hope of success. He determined to turn his arms in person against Cassander and Lysimachus, to put an end to the war in Caria, and carry it over into Europe. When he had become master of Macedonia and Greece, it was probable that Ptolemy alone would not be able to resist him much longer.

With these views, it appears, he resolved, at the end of 314, to take up his winter-quarters in his old province, Phrygia. He left Demetrius in Phœnicia to watch Ptolemy's movements, with an army of about 12,000 foot and 5000 horse, and 40 elephants, but appointed four experienced officers—Nearchus, Pithon, the satrap of Babylon, who had recently come down to Phœnicia, Andronicus, and Philippus—to aid him with their counsels. In his first attempt to cross Mount Taurus, he lost a number of men, and was forced to retreat through a heavy fall of snow. But having waited for more favourable weather, he cleared the defiles and took up his quarters for the rest of the winter at Celænæ. In the spring he sent for his fleet from Phœnicia, and on its passage it fell in with a Macedonian squadron of thirty-six sail, which had, perhaps, been sent to the assistance of Asander, and captured the whole. The first operations of the campaign on the land were directed against Asander; but at the same time an opportunity seemed to present itself for an attack on Lysimachus, who was threatened by a formidable confederacy of the Greek cities in the western coast of the Euxine. It was begun by Callatia, which had expelled the Macedonian garrison. This example was followed by Istria, Odessus, and other adjacent towns, and they formed an alliance with several of their Thracian and Scythian neighbours. Lysimachus, however, crossed the Balkan, recovered Odessus and Istria, and, after having defeated an army of Thracians and Scythians, who were advancing to the relief of their allies, laid siege to Callatia. Antigonos sent a fleet under Lycon, and a land force commanded by Pausanias, to the aid of the besieged, and induced the Odrysian king, Seuthes, to revolt from Lysimachus, and to occupy the passes of the Balkan. Lysimachus, however, leaving a sufficient force at Callatia, marched rapidly with the main body towards the Bosphorus, where Pausanias had encamped. He dislodged the Thracians from the defiles, and soon after carried a strong position in which Pausanias had intrenched himself, killed the general, and forced all his troops to surrender. A part of them entered into his service.

After this check, Antigonos resumed his original plan for the overthrow of Cassander's power in Greece. He now sent Telephorus, with a squadron of fifty sail and a strong land force, to Peloponnesus, with instructions to expel all Alexander's garrisons, and to leave the cities in perfect liberty. The Greeks, whatever they may have thought as to the motives of this proceeding, seem to have been willing to take advantage of it. In a short time all the cities of Peloponnesus were free from foreign tyranny, except Sicyon and Corinth, where Cratesipolis and Polysperchon were strong enough to defy both assault and intrigue. In the mean while Asander was so vigorously pressed by Antigonos, that he submitted to a treaty, by which he consented to surrender all his troops, to restore all the Greek cities of his province to independence, and to accept Caria as a grant from Antigonos. He gave his brother as a hostage, but soon after repented of his concessions, recovered his brother out of custody, and sent to implore aid from Ptolemy and Seleucus. An-

tionous, indignant at this breach of faith, sent an armament, under Medius and Docimus, to dislodge all his garrisons from the cities on the coast; and while they reduced Miletus, he himself stormed Tralles, and laid siege to Caunus. Iasus, in the mean time, submitted to Ptolemæus. The whole province, it seems, was nearly in his hands, when his attention was diverted from it by the movements of Cassander. Before Caunus fell, though he had sent for the fleet under Medius to co-operate in the siege, he received an embassy from the Ætolians and Bœotians. The Ætolians were in great distress. Cassander's general, Philippus, had been directed to invade Ætolia; but while he was ravaging the country, hearing that Æacides had returned to Epirus, had remounted the throne, and assembled a strong army to succour the Ætolians, he advanced to meet him, defeated him with great slaughter, and took a number of his principal partisans, whom he sent to Cassander. Æacides, however, collected the wrecks of his army, joined the Ætolians, and again gave battle to Philippus, but was once more routed, and slain. The Ætolians abandoned their unfortified cities, and retired with their families to their fastnesses, and sent the embassy to Antigonus. The Bœotians, who had probably never forgiven Cassander for the restoration of Thebes, were encouraged, by the repeated declarations of Antigonus, to hope that they might now safely defy his power. Antigonus concluded a treaty with both. But we are surprised to hear that very shortly after he proceeded to the Hellespont, and had a conference with Cassander on terms of peace. Perhaps his motive will be best explained by the pacification which actually took place a year or two after. He could scarcely expect that Cassander would become his ally, unless he were allowed to retain possession of Greece, which Antigonus had engaged to make free. The negotiation must have been a feint to answer a temporary purpose; it was, however, soon broken off, and Cassander determined to secure his hold on Greece by a fresh expedition.

To have returned to Macedonia, collected an army, and invaded Greece by land, would, perhaps, have required too much time, or have left Macedonia too weak. His immediate object was to make himself master of Eubœa, which was especially important to him on account of its vicinity to Thessaly, Bœotia, and Attica; and for this he seems to have thought that the small force he had with him at the Hellespont would suffice. It was with a squadron of no more than thirty galleys that he sailed to lay siege to Oreus. Chalcis was already occupied by his troops. He commenced his operations so vigorously, that the place was on the point of falling into his hands, when Telesphorus arrived with twenty galleys and a thousand men from Peloponnesus, and soon after Medius, with a fleet of a hundred sail, from Asia. Cassander was now assailed in his turn. The enemy burned a part of his ships which were blockading the harbour, and all would have been lost if they had not been protected by succours which arrived from Attica. With these he was still able to make head against the enemy. But in the course of the summer, Antigonus sent Ptolemæus, with 5000 foot and 500 horse, and a re-

enforcement of fifty galleys, to Medius. They were accompanied by ten galleys, which the Rhodians had been induced to furnish for what they considered as the cause of freedom. Ptolemæus entered the Euripus, it seems, from the south, was joined by a body of Bœotian troops, drew away the fleet from Oreus, and threatened Chalcis; so that Cassander was forced to raise the siege of Oreus, and to move towards Chalcis. Antigonus, in the mean while, advanced towards the Hellespont, and sent for the fleet under Medius, to cross over into Europe and invade Macedonia. This danger compelled Cassander to return to his dominions. He left his brother Pleistarchus in command at Chalcis, and marched back over land to Macedonia. On his way he took Oropus by storm, engaged Thebes to abandon the Bœotian confederacy, and the Bœotian towns themselves to consent to a truce with him. Antigonus, however, was compelled to abandon his projected expedition, because the Byzantians, whom he had invited to join him, were induced, by the representations of Lysimachus, to remain neutral. The season, too, was now so far advanced, that he thought it prudent to retire into winter-quarters. After Cassander's retreat, Ptolemæus took Chalcis, where, to prove the sincerity of his uncle's professions, he left no garrison, but engaged the Eretrians and Carystians in alliance with him, and marched into Attica. The Athenians had already opened a secret negotiation with Antigonus; and when the forces of Ptolemæus approached the city, expressed their feelings in a manner which induced Demetrius the Phalerian to make a truce with him, and to send envoys to treat with Antigonus. Ptolemæus then marched northward, took the Cadmea, and left it in the hands of the Thebans, and then, in like manner, liberated the Phocian and Locrian towns from the foreign yoke.

While these events were taking place in Greece, Ptolemy, having suppressed an insurrection in Cyrene, made an expedition in person to Cyprus, punished Pygmalion, who had been treating with Antigonus, with death, made himself master of most of the cities which were still wavering, and left Nicocreon as his lieutenant in the government of the island. He then sailed along the coast of Syria and Cilicia, made incursions into the interior, took and plundered several of the towns in Upper Syria, and, lastly, having reduced Mallus and ravaged the adjacent country, retired with the booty to his ships, and sailed away to Cyprus. Demetrius was roused by this intelligence, left Pithon in Phœnicia with the elephants and heavy infantry, and made a forced march into Cilicia with his cavalry and light troops. He came too late to overtake Ptolemy, and lost most of his horses through the rapidity of his movements and the lateness of the season (313).

In the following spring Ptolemy, encouraged by his late success and urged by Seleucus, determined to undertake the conquest of Cœlo-Syria. He advanced to the neighbourhood of Gaza, with an army of 18,000 foot and 4000 horse, partly Macedonians, partly mercenaries, and with, it seems, a far greater number of Egyptian troops. Demetrius quickly collected his forces to meet him. His council advised him not to venture a battle, in his father's ab-



sence, against so formidable an enemy; but Demetrius, boiling with youthful impatience, disregarded their admonitions and inspired his troops with his own ardour. Thus the battle of Gaza was fought. His numbers appear to have been very inferior to those of the enemy; but, notwithstanding the valour he displayed at the head of his cavalry, his elephants, on which he had much relied, being entangled in the spikes of an iron palisade invented by Ptolemy for the occasion, became the principal cause of his total defeat. His loss amounted to 5000 slain, among whom were Pithon and other officers of high rank, and 8000 prisoners. Gaza, where he had left his baggage, while it opened its gates to his cavalry on his retreat, fell into the hands of the pursuing enemy. He himself escaped to Azotus, and sent a herald to ask permission to bury his dead. The conquerors not only granted this request, but restored all the baggage of his household and the most distinguished prisoners, without ransom; courteously adding, that it was not for the sake of these things they had quarrelled with Antigonus, but because he had refused to share his conquests with the allies who had borne their part in his wars with Perdicas and Eumenes, and had unjustly deprived Seleucus of his satrapy. Ptolemy proceeded to reduce the Phœnician cities, one after another, while Demetrius, having retired to Tripolis, called on his father to return, with the utmost speed, to his aid, and collected his troops from the more distant garrisons.

Antigonus affected to be little concerned by Ptolemy's victory, won, as he said, over a beardless boy; ere long he should have to contend with men; and he soon had the pleasure to hear that his son had surprised Ptolemy's general, Cillas, near Myus in Upper Syria, and had taken him prisoner, with 7000 men. Demetrius, not to be outdone in generosity, sent Cillas, and several of his friends, back to Ptolemy without ransom; almost the only examples of a chivalrous spirit which gleam through this dark scene of fierce and treacherous warfare; though Ptolemy also earned the praise of extraordinary magnanimity by his mild treatment of Andronicus, who, as governor of Tyre, had grossly insulted him, and afterward fell into his hands. But the victory of Gaza led to another event, which proved, in the end, fatal to Antigonus. Seleucus now thought that the time had arrived when he might recover his satrapy of Babylon. Ptolemy furnished him with no more than 800 foot and 200 horse for this enterprise; but he relied on his popularity at Babylon, and on the omens and prophecies which had announced his high fortune. He was ready, it is said, to have undertaken it alone. His confidence was brilliantly justified by the event. On his march through Mesopotamia, he strengthened his little band with a part of the Macedonian colonists at Carræ; and as he entered his old satrapy, the natives flocked to him from all quarters. The news of the battle of Gaza and of Pithon's death, no doubt, contributed much to his success. The force left in Babylon appears to have been small; and Polyarchus, one of the officers of Antigonus, went over to him with a thousand men. Those who remained faithful to Antigonus found resistance hopeless,

and took refuge in one of the two citadels, where Diphilus, the commander, held out for some time. Seleucus, however, took it by storm, and found in it many of his servants and friends who had been confined there after his flight. Before, however, he had time to assemble any great force, he heard that Nicanor, the military governor of Media, was on his march against him, with an army of 10,000 foot and 7000 horse, collected from Media and Persis. Seleucus, with as much boldness as he showed in the outset of his adventure, advanced to meet him with no more than 3000 foot and 400 horse. He trusted, it seems, partly to stratagem, and partly to the inclination of Nicanor's troops in his favour. In fact, having crossed the Tigris, and kept his little army concealed from view while the enemy approached, he surprised Nicanor's camp in the night; and when Evagrus, the satrap of Persis, had fallen in the tumult that ensued, the Persian troops, and a great number of the rest—partly, it is said, through fear, and partly through the offence which Antigonus had given them—passed over to his side. Nicanor, fearing lest he himself should be delivered up to Seleucus, fled with a few companions across the desert. That after this victory, Seleucus soon made himself master of Media, Susiana, and some adjacent provinces, which probably comprehended Persis, seems easy enough to understand; especially when we remember that the Persians had been deeply offended by Antigonus, and that Seleucus had been satrap of Susiana a sufficient time to endear himself to some of the inhabitants, and to render his winning character generally known.

Soon after he had received the news of his son's victory at Myus, Antigonus moved to join him in Syria. Ptolemy deliberated whether he should remain, and risk a battle, or retire into Egypt. His council decided for the safer course. He carried away all the treasure he could find, and on his retreat dismantled Acô (Acre), Joppa, Samaria, and Gaza. Thus, without a blow, Antigonus was again in possession of Syria; but under circumstances how altered from those in which he had left it! He was then master of the East; now it was doubtful whether his authority was acknowledged in a single province beyond the Euphrates. It was, however, some time after his return to Syria before he was informed of this change in the posture of his affairs. While he might, perhaps, have prevented it, he was employing his forces in an expedition against the Arabians of Petra. His object was, probably, to strike a blow at the commerce of Egypt, which received the spices of Arabia through the tribe which he attacked.\* But his design, whatever it may have been, was foiled by the patient valour of the children of the Desert. Demetrius, who conducted the expedition, was obliged to make an inglorious retreat, and precious time was irredeemably lost. Soon after his return letters arrived from Nicanor, and some of the other governors of the eastern provinces, announcing the events which had occurred there. The accounts they gave of the rapid progress of Seleucus must have surprised and perplexed Antigonus. It was probably with a twofold motive, to ascertain the real state of affairs, and to make a display of

\* See Hüllman, *Handels-geschichte der Griechen*, p. 232.

strength which might serve to keep up his reputation in the West, that, early in 311, he sent Demetrius with an army of nearly 20,000 men to recover Babylon, but with instructions to turn as soon as he should have reduced the province to obedience. Patrocles, who had been left by Seleucus governor of Babylon, with a very small force, was obliged to quit the capital on his approach. Demetrius, however, found both the citadels prepared to sustain a siege. He very shortly took one of them; but the other held out until he thought it necessary to return to Syria. He left Archelaus with 6000 men to prosecute the siege, and to maintain his father's authority in the province; but the license which he gave to his troops to enrich themselves with the spoil of the country, while it strengthened the interest of Seleucus, showed that he himself considered his possession as very uncertain.

While these important events were taking place in the East, the state of Greece remained unchanged. The only occurrence we find recorded in the interval is, that Telesphorus, jealous of the superior rank and authority of Ptolemæus, renounced the service of Antigonus. With somewhat capricious honesty, he sent back the squadron with which he had been intrusted, but kept all the troops he could persuade to share his fortunes, and commenced a predatory warfare on his own account. Before his treason was known he made himself master of Elis, in the name of Antigonus, and fortified the citadel and garrisoned the port, Cylene. He next proceeded to Olympia, plundered the temple, and levied fresh mercenaries. He had thus laid the foundation of a little principality. But Ptolemæus, as soon as he heard of his proceedings, marched into Peloponnesus, took and razed the new fortress at Elis—where, it seems, he found the spoil of Olympia, which he restored to the temple—and recovered Cylene. Here, again, he adhered to the principles which his uncle professed, and replaced the Eleans in the unrestricted enjoyment of their city, port, and territory.

Cassander had not been able to make any fresh attempt to regain the footing he had lost in Greece. He had been occupied by a war in Epirus, occasioned by the accession of Alcetas to the throne, and by an expedition against Apollonia, which, with the aid of the Corcyreans, had expelled his garrison, and formed an alliance with the Illyrian king, Glaucias. Epidamnus had also revolted; and the Apolloniates had collected an army, with which they ventured to give him battle when he appeared before their walls. They gained the day, though, it seems, not any very decided advantage; but it was sufficient, with the lateness of the season, to induce Cassander to return to Macedonia. After his departure, Leucas also called in aid from Corcyra, and freed herself from his garrison.

The state of affairs in 311 was such as might naturally incline the belligerents towards a cessation of hostilities. The principal of them had suffered checks and losses which rendered their prospects more than ever doubtful. It seems, however, to have been Cassander who made the first overtures of peace; and perhaps he now accepted the terms which he had rejected

in the negotiation at the Hellespont; at least, the conditions of the treaty were most unfavourable to him, and such as he could not have meant to fulfil. But after his reverses on the coast of the Adriatic, he might wish to gain time for fresh preparations, and to strengthen Macedonia before he resumed the struggle for Greece. The motives of Antigonus appear clearly enough from the treaty itself. It was agreed that Cassander should retain his authority in Europe, with the title of Strategus, until the young king Alexander came of age. Lysimachus was confirmed in the possession of Thrace, Ptolemy in that of Egypt and the adjacent regions eastward and westward. The government of all Asia was assigned to Antigonus, and the Greeks were declared independent. The great concession made to Antigonus, at a time when so large a part of Asia had actually slipped from his grasp, and the omission of the name of Seleucus, have been thought to cast suspicion on the report which Diodorus gives of the treaty. But we do not know in what sense the authority of Antigonus in Asia was acknowledged by the other parties; and they may have been the more willing to enlarge his title, the more they were led by the conquests of Seleucus to hope that he would never be able to enforce it. That Seleucus was not mentioned seems to show, that as Antigonus was probably unwilling to recognise any of his pretensions, so his allies might not like to limit them. It was, perhaps, chiefly the prospect of the aid which might, in the course of some time, be expected from him, that induced Ptolemy and Lysimachus to enter into the treaty. With Antigonus the principal motive may have been the article relating to Greece. If he could have prevailed on the other parties to execute it, and to withdraw their garrisons from Athens, Corinth, Sicyon, and whatever other towns they still held, he would have acquired a great increase of reputation, and would have been able to resume the war against Cassander with a considerable advantage.

Whether the views of the contracting parties were such or not, the treaty was concluded without any sincere intention on any side to execute it, and with dispositions which rendered it certain that the peace would be of no long duration.

## CHAPTER LIX.

FROM THE PEACE OF 311 TO THE BATTLE OF IPSUS.

THE treaty of 311 was almost immediately followed by a tragical event, which may be considered as the natural consequence of one of its conditions. From the beginning of the war the young king Alexander and his mother had been kept in close custody at Amphipolis, without the attendance befitting their rank. Cassander, by this treatment, had given sufficient evidence of his ultimate intentions with regard to them. He probably only waited until the Macedonians should have been reconciled to the spectacle of their degradation, and have forgotten them, to rid himself of them forever. The declaration, however, which Antigonus made in their fa-

your on his return from the East, may have revived the hopes of those who were still attached to the royal house; and the treaty, which solemnly recognised Alexander's title to the crown, must have excited still more sanguine expectations. The young prince was now about sixteen, the age at which his father had been intrusted with the government of the state and the command of armies. His partisans openly expressed their wish to see him immediately released from confinement and placed on the throne. That they were instigated to this injudicious display of their loyalty, which, without any benefit to its object, could not but alarm Cassander, and put him on his guard, by any secret machinations of Antigonus, seems a very needless conjecture;\* Antigonus might safely anticipate that the terms of the treaty would produce this effect, and he was probably able to divine its remoter consequences. Cassander hesitated no longer. He ordered Glaucias, with all possible secrecy, to murder Roxana and her son, and to conceal their bodies. The deed, however, could not remain long unknown. That it gave the highest pleasure to Cassander's rivals, who saw him loaded with all the infamy, while they reaped the fruits of his crime, might have been easily supposed, even if Diodorus had not expressly asserted it.† It is only remarkable that none of them appear to have made any show of regret or indignation, much less were induced to dissolve the treaty and take up arms against the murderer.

The occasion which led to the renewal of hostilities was of a very different kind. It was connected with a breach which took place between Antigonus and his nephew Ptolemæus. What grounds of complaint Ptolemæus had against his uncle has not been recorded; but it seems more probable that he had been disappointed in his private views, than that he took so deep an interest in the independence of the Greeks as to quarrel with Antigonus on their account.‡ Had that been the case, he would hardly have connected himself with Cassander, whose alliance he sought at the same time that he revolted from his uncle. He had it in his power to do great injury to Antigonus; for Phoenix, whom he had left in command at the Hellespont, was his devoted friend, and Ptolemæus now sent a body of troops to re-enforce him, and exhorted him to keep possession of the fortresses and cities of the Hellespontine satrapy, and to pay no regard to the orders of Antigonus. The rivals of Antigonus could not view this event with indifference; and Ptolemy considered it as a favourable opportunity for an attempt to deprive him of the cities on the coast of Asia, and of the islands which were subject to him, and thus at once to weaken his maritime power and to shut him out from Macedonia and Greece. The treaty afforded a fair pretext; it had declared that the Greek cities were to be restored to independence; yet a year had elapsed—it was now 310—and still Antigonus had not withdrawn any of his garrisons from the towns on the

coast of Asia or from the islands. Antigonus, perhaps, had scarcely thought of any others but those of Proper Greece. Ptolemy, however, now sent a squadron under Leonidas to the western coast of Cilicia, to dislodge the garrisons of Antigonus from the maritime towns, and at the same time, by means of his envoys, endeavoured to unite those which lay in the territories of Cassander and Lysimachus in the cause of freedom. Antigonus sent his younger son Philippos against Phoenix, and Demetrius to Cilicia, where he defeated Ptolemy's commanders, and recovered the places which had fallen into their hands.

The revolt of Ptolemæus and Phoenix, and Ptolemy's enterprise, would probably be sufficient to explain why Antigonus made no attempt to arrest the progress of Seleucus in the East, even if this had been one of the purposes for which he concluded the treaty. That he should have so far relied on it as immediately to set out on an expedition against Seleucus, as has been conjectured,\* is in itself highly improbable; even if it were possible that Diodorus should have passed over such an event in total silence, the murder of Alexander must have warned him that the peace was not likely to last long, and that he was in more danger than ever from Cassander. But it was apparently towards Macedonia that his attention was incessantly directed; and Alexander's death seems to have suggested a project by which he hoped to overthrow Cassander, and for which he had, perhaps, begun to make preparations soon after he heard of that event. The young prince Hercules was still living at Pergamus with his mother Barsine. During the lives of Arridæus Philip and Alexander Ægus, he had no pretensions to the throne that could render him an object of jealousy or notice. But he might now be considered as the rightful heir; he had claims, at least, which, in the eyes of all loyal Macedonians, must have appeared incomparably stronger than those of Cassander, and he might, therefore, be set up against him with the fairest prospect of success. This engine, however, was in the hands of Antigonus, and could scarcely have been employed by any one without his concurrence. Yet it is not Antigonus, but Polysperchon, hitherto Cassander's ally, who appears as the maintainer of the rights of Hercules. Polysperchon, we are informed, sent for him from Pergamus, and exerted his interest in Macedonia and Ætolia in his behalf so successfully, that he collected an army of 20,000 foot and 1000 horse. Even if the plan had been his own, he would probably have communicated it to Antigonus; and he was, perhaps, no more than his secret agent. This supposition is a little confirmed by the facility with which Polysperchon abandoned his enterprise. He had advanced with the prince to the town of Trampya, in the district of Stymphæa, on the southwest border of Macedonia, where his own patrimony lay,† when Cassander met him. The two armies were encamped not far from each other; and Cassander, alarmed at

\* Flathe, i., p. 198.

† xix., 103. Yet it seems to be going rather too far to assert, as Schlosser does (i., 2, p. 430), that the murder was a secret article of the treaty.

‡ As Schlosser assumes, i., 2, p. 432

\* Droysen (i., p. 399), who finds a confirmation of his conjecture in Arrian, *Ind.*, 42, and Polyæn., iv., 9, 1. But in the first of these passages Antigonus is not named, and the second may, perhaps, as will hereafter be shown, be referred to a different epoch.

† Tacit., ad Lycoph., 802.

the indications of popular feeling he perceived, which led him to fear that he should be deserted by his own troops, made secret overtures to Polysperchon; representing to him that, if he succeeded in his enterprise, he would sink into a private station as the young king's servant; and offering, if he would change sides, not only to restore all his private possessions in Macedonia, but to share his own authority with him, and to send him with an army to take the government of Peloponnesus. Polysperchon, whose conduct towards Phocion proved that he was a stranger to every feeling of honour, having calculated the profit of his treachery, consented to sacrifice his word, and caused him to be either poisoned\* or strangled† at a banquet. Cassander, it seems, rewarded him with a hundred talents, as an earnest of future favours, and furnished him with a small body of troops for the recovery of Peloponnesus; but he was not able to penetrate through Bœotia, and was forced to winter in Locria. We have the satisfaction to know that he never enjoyed any of the great rewards which had been promised for his crime. His baseness almost reconciles us with Cassander's energy, ruthless and reckless as it was. We have, indeed, no reason to think Cassander a worse man than any of his rivals; and his most atrocious deeds admit of more palliation, from the impulse of ambition and revenge, than they could have pleaded for some of theirs. When we find Seleucus and Ptolemy distinguished for their mildness and humanity, it must not be supposed that they, any more than Cassander, would have scrupled to commit any crime which their interest might seem to require. Of this, in Ptolemy's case, we have a proof in the transactions of the same year. About the same time that Polysperchon was marching against Cassander, he made an expedition to the coast of Lycia, to prosecute his efforts in the cause of Grecian independence. As he moved westward with his fleet, he took several towns, and at Cos sent for Ptolemæus, who was still at Chalcia, to join him, and at first received him very graciously; but as he endeavoured to ingratiate himself with the principal Egyptian officers by his conversation and presents, he soon roused the suspicions of his new ally, who, dreading his enterprising spirit, arrested and put him to death, and incorporated his troops with his own forces. With like vigour, having heard that Nicoteles was engaged in a private correspondence with Antigonus, he ordered him and his brothers to be put to death without farther inquiry. A tragic scene ensued. After the death of Nicoteles, his wife, Axiothea, killed her daughters, and then herself, having first persuaded her sisters-in-law to follow her example; and his brothers finally set fire to the palace, and died by their own hands.

Demetrius had been sent by his father to check Ptolemy's progress, and compelled him to raise the siege of Halicarnassus, when it was on the point of falling into his hands. Yet we find Ptolemy, in 308, again on the coast of Caria, at Myndus; and thence he sailed, without any opposition, to the Isthmus of Corinth.

On his passage he forced the troops of Antigonus to evacuate the Isle of Andros, and soon after his arrival induced Cratesipolis, we know not by what motives, to deliver up Corinth and Sicyon to him. It was only by a stratagem, practised on her own troops, that she was able to effect her purpose. They were ready to defend the Acrocorinthus, and, perhaps, would have refused to surrender it; but she pretended to send for reinforcements from Sicyon, and introduced Ptolemy's troops as the succours she expected. She herself retired to Patræ. Ptolemy, it seems, now hoped to unite the Peloponnesians in a voluntary alliance with himself, and prevailed on them to agree to a supply of provisions and money for the support of his troops. But the engagement was foreign to their habits, and perhaps they began to doubt whether they were not about to expend their resources less for their own defence than to fix them under the rule of a stranger; and when the time came they shrank from the fulfilment of their contract. Ptolemy saw that he could not rely on their good will, and entered into a new alliance with Cassander, on the condition that each should retain the places he possessed. He left garrisons in Corinth and Sicyon, and sailed back to Egypt. At the same time he was engaged in an intrigue, which indicated other designs, threatening, not only to Antigonus, but to Cassander. He had been negotiating for a union with Cleopatra, whose alliance, as she was almost the last surviving branch of the royal house, would have given him as good a title as any one now could claim to the throne of Macedonia. She was, probably, weary of her long confinement at Sardis, and accepted the offer of his hand as her sole remaining chance of liberty and power. She made no secret of her designs, but openly set out from Sardis to embark for Egypt. Antigonus was apprized of her movements, and ordered his governor of Sardis to arrest her. Soon after, fresh instructions arrived, in compliance with which the governor caused her to be assassinated by some of her women. Antigonus, to veil his own share in the infamous transaction, punished the wretched creatures with death, and honoured the remains of his unhappy victim with a royal funeral. We may judge of the sincerity of the indignation he had expressed at Cassander's proceedings. Yet Antigonus was confessedly one of the better and more noble-minded of Alexander's successors.

He now thought it time to make a more vigorous attempt to wrest Greece out of the hands of Ptolemy and Cassander, and thus to open another easier road into Macedonia. Demetrius was eager to undertake the enterprise. He was a youth of ardent spirit, of lively imagination, of inordinate passions: divided, throughout his life, between ambition and the love of pleasure, alike insatiable and ungovernable in each, the Alcibiades of his age. In the midst of his public and private occupations, he found leisure for severer studies, and, if he had not been a statesman and a soldier, he might have been renowned as the most expert mechanician of his time. He delighted in the invention of extraordinary engines, which exhibited at once the grandeur of his conceptions and the ingenuity and skill with which he could carry them

\* According to Tzetzes, and Pausanias, ix., 7, 2.

† Plotarch, De Vit. Pto., 4.

into effect. He was captivated by the thought of becoming the benefactor and patron, rather than the master of Greece. Athens especially attracted him by its name, and by the character of the people, in so many points congenial with his own. He aspired to the glory of accomplishing their deliverance, of winning their affection, of ruling over them with their free consent. Early in the summer of 307 he set sail from Ephesus, with an armament of 250 sail, a great store of ammunition, and a treasure of 5000 talents, and steered direct for Athens.

It was now more than ten years that Athens had remained under the government of Demetrius the Phalerian, who, under the modest title of guardian, with the Macedonian garrison, and the fear of Cassander to support him, in fact exercised unlimited authority. The accounts which remain of his administration would be perplexing from the appearance of contradiction they present, if the length of the period during which his rule lasted did not enable us to reconcile them. Demetrius was of very low, if not of servile origin;\* yet he was liberally educated, was a hearer of Aristotle's scholar, Theophrastus, and diligently cultivated rhetoric, criticism, historical learning, and political philosophy. He was an agreeable speaker, an elegant and voluminous writer. It was, perhaps, by his literary pursuits that he first recommended himself to the patronage of Cassander, who was so warm a lover of Homer that he copied out the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* with his own hand, and could repeat almost every verse; and one of the measures of Demetrius was to revive the public recitation of the Homeric poems in a new form.† For some time after his elevation to power, he appears to have wielded it moderately and wisely. It seems as if he aspired to emulate Solon and Pisistratus. He introduced, indeed, no fundamental changes into the Constitution, but preserved its forms, while he enacted many laws, of which Cicero and other impartial judges speak with great approbation. He adorned the city with useful, if not magnificent buildings;‡ he raised the public revenue to the same amount (1200 talents) as it had reached during the administration of Lycurgus. A very surprising proof of the general prosperity which Athens enjoyed under his sway is afforded by a census which he took of the population, probably in the year of his archonship, 309, from which it appeared that Attica contained 21,000 freemen, 10,000 resident aliens, and the prodigious number of 400,000 slaves. The 21,000 must have inclu-

ded all the citizens who were debarred from the exercise of their franchise by the want of the requisite qualification: their proportion to the rest is not stated; but, since 12,000 were excluded by Antipater's regulation, the number of slaves possessed by the remaining 9000 citizens, and by the aliens, must have been enormous: not much less, it would seem, than twenty to each. It is remarkable that sumptuary laws were among the acts of Demetrius, which we find mentioned. He limited the number of guests at feasts,\* and, to check the excessive magnificence which was displayed by the wealthy at funerals, ordered them to be celebrated before daylight. He himself appears to have retained the early simplicity of his habits and the philosophical frugality of his meals, even after he had risen to his high station, but, probably, not for any long time.

A very different picture is drawn of the man and his administration by other hands,† but apparently with equal fidelity. The time came when he began to devote but a small part of the public revenue, which all passed through his hands, to public purposes, and squandered the rest in extravagant luxury. In the costliness of his ordinary banquets he surpassed the Macedonian grandees; in their exquisite elegance, the effeminate princes of Cyprus and Phœnicia. It was remarked that even the floors of his rooms were adorned by skilful artists; that his guests were sprinkled with precious ointments; that the superfluity of his table enabled his cook—the most celebrated of his day—to purchase three large houses. He betrayed a ridiculous vanity by the attention which he paid to his personal appearance. The disciple of Theophrastus was not ashamed to colour his hair, to paint his cheeks, to wear an artificial smile; and, unhappily, this weakness was connected with sensual passions, which he indulged without reserve, at the expense, not only of his own dignity, but of the peace and honour of his subjects. He became, not only in the political, but in the moral sense, tyrant of Athens.

It is not difficult to account for the change. It was the natural effect of the sudden acquisition of power and wealth on a man of undecided character, who had, probably, fancied himself a philosopher while he seemed destined to an humble station, but found his desires swell with the growth of his fortune. There was, however, another cause which contributed to stifle his better dispositions, and to make him more and more indifferent to the esteem of the wise and good. The forbearance and discretion which he showed at the outset probably won the hearts of the Athenians, notwithstanding the prejudice they may have felt against him as Cassander's creature. They repaid him with extravagant tokens of admiration and gratitude. Honours of all kinds had become so common, that only very gross exaggeration could render them significant. Some parasite of the assembly desired a new distinction for the benefactor of Athens: he proposed to erect as many statues in honour of him as there were

\* To thirty. *Athenæus*, vi., 45. Officers called *γυναικόμετροι* had power to enter houses and count the guests; and the members of the *Areopagus* were associated with them in this grave function.

† *Duris* in *Athenæus*, xii., 60.

\* *Ælian*, V. H., xii., 43.

† *Athenæus*, xiv., 12. See *Bode*, *Geschichte der Hellenischen Dichtkunst*, i., p. 372.

‡ *Καὶ προσδοκῶν καὶ κατασκευαῖς ἤλθετο τὴν πόλιν*. *Diog. Laert.* in *Demetr.* We are informed, indeed, by Cicero, *De Off.* ii., 15, that Demetrius censured *Pericles* for having laid out so large a sum on the *Propylææ*. But *Schlosser*, ii., i., p. 118, and *Droysen*, who subscribes to his opinion, have pressed this passage too much: it is not clear that Demetrius condemned temples, porticoes, and theatres, or, in general, every kind of expenditure which was not to produce some immediate profit. That he was averse to theatrical exhibitions, Cicero does not in the remotest degree hint; and his institution of the Homeric recitations in a dramatic form need not be imputed to parsimony. His patronage of Menander also bears on this question.

§ Which was acknowledged even by his enemy Demochares. *Polybius*, xii., 13.

days in the year; and, in less than 300 days, 360 bronze statues, mostly equestrian, or representing him in a chariot, attested the popular enthusiasm. That it soon cooled, and in time was followed by opposite sentiments, may easily be conceived; as easily, that while this change was taking place, the voice of flattery grew louder than ever, and that his vanity and vices were humoured with more studied obsequiousness. So, in the year when he filled the office of archon—the ninth of his government—as he headed the Dionysiac procession, the poet who furnished the hymn of the chorus celebrated his illustrious birth and the dazzling radiance of his aspect. When this kind of intoxication was added to that of pleasure, it is no wonder that he forgot himself more and more, and wallowed in the foulest depths of sensuality. Yet, in one very important point, he continued to the last to deserve praise: his administration appears to have been quite free from the stain of cruelty; he continued, it seems, to exercise his authority mildly, even after he had become conscious that the people were weary of it.\* We have already seen that they eagerly listened to the promises of Antigonus, entered into a secret correspondence with him, and, when they were encouraged by the presence of his general, Ptolemæus, did not conceal their wish for his alliance, and forced the Phalerian, at least seemingly, to yield to it.

They were, therefore, quite ready to receive the son of Antigonus with the heartiest welcome; though his appearance was so little expected, that a squadron of twenty galleys, which he sent forward in advance of the main fleet, in the direction of Salamis, was taken for one of Ptolemy's, and he found the harbours all open.† He entered Piræus, and, when he was within hearing of the multitude that lined the shore, ordered the trumpet to sound a signal for silence and attention. The herald then proclaimed that his father had sent him to liberate Athens, to expel the foreign garrison, and to restore the laws and ancient Constitution. It may easily be imagined that this announcement was heard with the liveliest pleasure by the great mass of the Athenian spectators. The accounts of Diodorus and Plutarch seem hardly to be reconciled with each other as to the opposition which he had to encounter. According to Diodorus, the Phalerian made an attempt to defend Piræus, but was soon obliged to retire into the upper city. Plutarch says that his troops received his rival's proclamation with shouts of applause, lowered their shields, and invited him to land; and that the Phalerian forthwith sent envoys to treat with the conqueror. It is certain that he soon became anxious only for his own safety, surrendered the city, and departed under an escort of his rival's troops to Thebes, which he himself chose as the place of his retreat. This was the end of his political career. He afterward found shelter, patronage, and useful occupation at Alexandria, under the first Ptolemy, whom he did not long survive.

\* The fable (Phædrus, v. i.) is alleged by Græuert and Droyen as a proof of the contrary, but surely need not be construed so strictly: and Cassander's hatred of the Athenians, mentioned by Pausanias, i. 25, 7, appears to have been provoked by their expulsion of his governor.

† Polyanius, iv, 7, 6.

At Athens, after his departure, he was formally impeached and condemned to death. The sentence was executed on the 360 statues, which were destroyed with every mark of ignominy; yet one was preserved in the Acropolis, at the request of Demetrius,\* who did not share the popular resentment against his namesake. In imitation of the proceedings which followed the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants, the period of the late tyranny was designated as the Anomia (lawlessness). The reaction made itself felt in a very wide circle of the Phalerian's political friends. Even the comic poet Menander was involved in great danger by his patronage, and was only delivered through the intercession of Telesphorus, the nephew of Antigonus. It also extended to a class of persons who might have been supposed still more secure from the effects of a political revolution. A law was passed—proposed by one Sophocles, son of Amphicleides—prohibiting any philosopher, under pain of death, to open a school at Athens without the permission of the senate and people.† There can be little doubt that this measure was aimed chiefly at Theophrastus, the master of Demetrius, who had distinguished him with extraordinary marks of favour. The influence of Theophrastus, whose disciples are said to have amounted to the number of 2000 at one time, was not contemptible; and it is probable that the philosophers, who were mostly foreigners, were generally regarded—notwithstanding the noble example of Xenocrates—as devoted to the Macedonian ascendancy. It must have been on this ground that Demochares, who, in these evil times, showed himself not unworthy of his illustrious uncle, lent his support to the measure. The immediate effect was, that all the philosophers quitted Athens. Their absence was, no doubt, felt as a privation and a loss. It was like the suppression of a university. In the course of a year Sophocles was impeached as the author of an illegal proposition, and, though defended by Demochares, was convicted, and sentenced to a penalty of five talents. The law was consequently repealed, and the philosophers returned.

Dionysius was not so easily induced to surrender Munychia as the Phalerian had been to abandon Athens; he sustained a siege of some days, but the place was at length stormed, his troops laid down their arms, and he himself was taken prisoner. If we believe Plutarch, Demetrius refused to enter Athens until it should have been completely restored to liberty by the fall of Munychia, and during the interval occupied by the siege, made himself master of Megara, which, it seems, was only saved from plunder by the intercession of the Athenians. Possibly he may have invested Megara, and then have returned to reduce Munychia. He dismantled its fortifications, and then went up to the city and presented himself before the assembled people. He announced to them that henceforth their ancient Constitution was restored, and, in his father's name, promised them a present of 150,000 bushels of corn, and timber for 100 galleys. We cannot wonder at the transports with which his address was

\* Diog. Laert., Demetr. Phal.

† Diog. Theophrastus, Athenens, xiii., 92.

received ; especially as in the champion of freedom, the mighty chief, who had come with so formidable an armament to execute his generous purpose, they beheld a young hero of noble person, of princely carriage, and a countenance in which grace, dignity, and spirit were blended with a peculiar charm, which no painter of the age was able to portray. Unhappily, the gratitude and admiration of the people found sordid and mischievous interpreters, who vied with each other in new devices of abject and fulsome flattery, which degraded those who offered it, and threw ridicule on its object. It was little that Demetrius and his father were now saluted with the title of kings, which, though they had never claimed it, so properly belonged to them ; that two new tribes, the Demetrias and the Antigonias, were added to the ten which derived their names from the old Attic heroes, and that the council was correspondingly enlarged to the number of 600 ; that the name of the month Munychion was altered to Demetrium, one of the days called Demetrias ; and—as it was known that the young prince loved to trace a resemblance between his own person and character and those of the voluptuous conqueror Dionysus—the name of the Demetria substituted for that of the Dionysia. It was not much that the divine honours, which Alexander had so rudely exacted, were now freely conferred on Demetrius and Antigonus. It was something more that they were consecrated under the title of the Saviour Gods ; that it was decreed a priest should be appointed every year to minister at their altars, with a solemn procession, sacrifice, and games, and that his name should be inserted in all state records and private contracts to mark the date, instead of the archon's ; that their images should be woven in the peplos borne in the Panathenaic procession, together with those of the tutelary deities ; that the spot where Demetrius had first alighted from his chariot, when he entered the city, should be hallowed by an altar dedicated—with an epithet, before appropriated to the chief of the gods as Lord of the Thunderbolt—to the Descending Demetrius. Stratocles, who, on this occasion, tasked his ingenuity to exhibit the utmost extent of servile impudence, added the proposal, that all ambassadors sent to Demetrius and Antigonus should bear the same sacred title which had hitherto been given to the envoys who conducted the public sacrifices to the Olympic and Pythian games. This, indeed, was an honour which had already been bestowed on Alexander, and Stratocles was obliged to yield the palm of baseness to another orator, who moved that Demetrius, as often as he visited Athens, should be entertained with the sacred pomp ordained for the reception of Dionysus and Demeter, and that a reward should be assigned to the person who should celebrate the festival with the greatest magnificence. Still, the inventive genius of the time-serving parasites did not flag, and afterward suggested still deeper strains of adulation.

It could not be expected that any opposition should be offered to such proposals ; nor need it be doubted that they were, at first, carried with a certain degree of sincere enthusiasm. They were not the less pernicious in their ef-

fect on the character of the people and of Demetrius, and on the cause of freedom, which they brought into contempt. Demetrius, however, responded to them by fresh marks of honour and favour, and adhered to the principle which he professed at the beginning of his enterprise. He listened to the mediation of the Athenians—one which reflects some honour on their generosity—in behalf of Megara, protected it from the violence of his soldiers when they were about to plunder it, and left it without a garrison. From Megara he set out, accompanied only by a few light troops, on an expedition, which may be called romantic, after the Greek fashion, to pay a visit to Cratesipolis, attracted by the fame of her beauty. He ordered a tent to be pitched for the interview, which, it seems, she had granted at a distance from his camp, but was surprised by a detachment from Ptolemy's garrison at Sicyon or Corinth, and narrowly escaped. After his return to Athens, to the great delight of the Athenians, he solemnized his marriage with Eurydice, a descendant of Miltiades, and the widow of Ophellas, one of Ptolemy's officers who had fallen the year before in Africa. Nothing seems to have occurred to alienate the affections of the people from him while he remained at Athens ; but, in the course of a few months, he was called away from this scene of cheap and doubtful glory to a new field of harder contests, by orders from his father.

Antigonus had, in the mean while, been engaged in a peaceful attempt to perpetuate his name by the foundation of a new city on the Orontes, which he called Antigonía. Here he received the Athenian envoys, who came to lay the honours which had been decreed to him at his feet, and to solicit the fulfilment of the promises made by his son as to the corn and timber. He granted all their requests, and added a still more acceptable present, the isle of Imbros, the ancient possession of the commonwealth. But it seems that he was now alarmed by intelligence of Ptolemy's naval preparations, and by the firm hold which he had gained on Cyprus, and determined to make an effort to wrest the island from him. He therefore ordered Demetrius to arrange the affairs of Greece as well as he could in a congress, and then to sail away with all speed to the conquest of Cyprus. Demetrius was loth to abandon the career which he had just so brilliantly begun. But his affection and reverence for his father—the best feature in his character—always overpowered every other feeling. Before his departure he made an ineffectual attempt to bribe Cleonidas, Ptolemy's commander, to evacuate Corinth and Sicyon, and early in 306 sailed away with his armament to the coast of Caria. Here he invited the Rhodians to take a part in the war against Ptolemy ; but their commerce depended too much on their connexion with Egypt to render such a step advisable ; and they adhered to the neutrality which they had hitherto observed. Demetrius, dissembling his resentment, proceeded towards Cilicia, and having re-enforced his armament with fresh ships and men, sailed across to Cyprus. His army consisted of 15,000 foot and 400 horse ; his fleet, besides the transports, amounted to about 180 sail of ships of war : all, it appears, of a size

unknown in the ancient Greek warfare, and several capable of containing between 2000 and 3000 men. Demetrius delighted in the contrivance of methods by which these enormous machines might be moved with the greatest ease, so as to be equal in speed to the lighter vessels. Having drawn his fleet on shore near Carpasia, leaving a sufficient force to protect it, he marched towards Salamis, where Menelaus awaited him with a fleet of sixty sail, and all the forces he had been able to collect from his garrisons in the island. His numbers were not much inferior to those of Demetrius, and he ventured a battle, in which, however, he was defeated with great loss, and immediately began to prepare against a siege, while he sent for succours to Egypt.

Demetrius proceeded to invest Salamis by sea and land; but the place was vigorously defended, and after he had effected a breach in the wall, his machines were fired in the night by the enemy; and before he had repaired this loss, he heard that Ptolemy himself had come from Egypt with an armament of 140 galleys, and transports bearing not less than 10,000 troops. Ptolemy, on his arrival at Citium, about twenty miles from Salamis, sent overland to Menelaus, ordering him, if possible, to send out his galleys to join the fleet; but Demetrius anticipated this movement, and when he sailed to meet Ptolemy, left ten of his larger vessels under Antisthenes to block up the mouth of the harbour. Ptolemy had set sail by night, hoping to surprise the enemy; but at daybreak he saw them drawn up for action. The contending forces were so nearly equal to each other, that the two chiefs interchanged messages of scornful defiance: Ptolemy, bidding Demetrius sail away if he did not wish to be overwhelmed, and Demetrius offering to permit his rival to withdraw on condition that he would give up Corinth and Sicily. The battle which ensued was one of the most memorable in the history of ancient naval warfare, as well on account of the forces engaged, as for the skill and valour of the combatants. Demetrius gained a complete victory. Ptolemy himself escaped, it is said, with only eight galleys: all the rest of his fleet was either destroyed or taken. Almost all his transports and vessels of burden, with the troops, the arms, the engines, the treasure, and a multitude of persons who accompanied the expedition, fell into the enemy's hands. Menelaus had complied with Ptolemy's orders, and sent out his squadron under the command of Menætius, who, after a hard struggle, forced Antisthenes to retire and seek shelter from the land force. But he came too late to take a share in the battle; and we may suspect, did not escape quite unmolested, as Diodorus represents. According to another account, Menelaus himself fled with Ptolemy,\* but it seems to be better attested that he, not long after, capitulated, and surrendered Salamis, with all his ships and men, to Demetrius.

Demetrius, on this occasion, displayed the generosity which had hitherto tempered his hostility towards Ptolemy. He sent back his brother Menelaus, his son Leontiscus, and several other prisoners of rank, together with

his private baggage, and household servants\*—retaining, however, his mistress, Larnia, a celebrated courtesan, who soon acquired a pernicious and degrading influence over the conqueror—and honourably interred the enemy's slain. He also sent 1200 complete suits of armour, at once a trophy and a present, to the Athenians.† At the same time, he despatched Aristodemus the Milesian, to carry the tidings of this signal victory to his father, who, aware of Ptolemy's movements, was waiting with painful anxiety for the result. Aristodemus, when he neared the land, cast anchor, and put off in a skiff to the shore, and proceeded alone towards the palace of Antigonus, who, hearing of his arrival, sent some of his attendants to meet him and learn the news. But the wily Greek preserved an obstinate silence, and advanced slowly, with composed countenance, in the midst of the inquiring crowd, towards the palace gate, where Antigonus himself, no longer able to control his impatience, had come out to meet him. Aristodemus, when he drew near, addressed him in a loud voice, with the salutation: "Hail! King Antigonus: we have defeated Ptolemy in a sea-fight, and are masters of Cyprus, and have taken near 17,000 prisoners." Antigonus breathed lighter, and playfully threatened that the messenger, who had kept him so long on tenter-hooks, should, in his turn, wait for his reward. The title, however, with which Aristodemus had greeted him was not the least agreeable part of his speech.‡ He had long, as both Aristodemus and the Athenians knew, designed to assume it. It had, indeed, become almost necessary to place him on an equality with Seleucus, who had already received it from the barbarians, though he did not exact it from the Greeks. Antigonus thought his son's victory a fit occasion to unite the name with the substance of kingly power, and now solemnly assumed the diadem, and conferred the same dignity on Demetrius, whom he regarded as the partner of his throne. The intercourse between the father and the son, from first to last, presented the pleasing spectacle of tender affection, playful familiarity, without breach of filial respect, and unbounded mutual confidence. The example of Antigonus was immediately followed by Ptolemy—whose courtiers were eager to show that they were

\* *Privati instrumenti ministerio.* Justin, xv., 2, 7. Plut., Dem., 16, 17.

† One is inclined to suspect that the shields consecrated at Delphi, about which, by the decree of Dromocleides, Demetrius was to be consulted, were a part of this present, though Plutarch mentions them earlier.

‡ Droysen (i., 458) believes that the scene with Aristodemus was preconcerted for theatrical effect. He observes that Aristodemus was not, as he is represented by Plutarch and by modern writers, a vulgar parasite, but an officer of high rank and trust. Why he should not nevertheless have been an artful flatterer, does not appear. But Droysen wishes to connect this scene with a peculiar hypothesis which he has formed about the designs and pretensions of Antigonus. He conceives that, after the extinction of the royal family, Antigonus maintained the unity of the empire, with the view that he himself might be declared successor to the vacant throne, with the unanimous consent of the Macedonians, and therefore made war on Ptolemy and his other rivals, who insisted on retaining the shares each had acquired. But whatever may be the internal probability of this conjecture, it is impossible to adopt it without some better historical evidence. And it is difficult to perceive how the victory of Salamis, or the salutation of Aristodemus, or the acclamations of the multitude at Antipatria, or the decree of the Athenians, could add one jot to the legitimacy of the title which Antigonus assumed, if it was to have the meaning which Droysen supposes.

\* Polyænus (iv., 7, 7), whose stratagem Droysen himself cannot reconcile with the other authorities.



not disheartened by his defeat—and soon after by Lysimachus and Seleucus. Cassander, also, was saluted with the title by his subjects, but did not adopt it in his own letters. The title seems to have made no change in the habits of any of the new kings, at least in their intercourse with the Greeks.\* In fact, it only proclaimed what every one knew before, that they held their dominions in their own right, and acknowledged no superior. Cassander, Polyperchon, and Antigonus, had removed every pretender to a more legitimate royalty. The occurrence, however, visibly marks the new period which had succeeded to that in which Alexander's successors were struggling with each other in the flame of his empire and his house; and it was a little relief to the world that, if it was still to be tormented by their ambition, it was no longer to be insulted by their empty professions, and that they no longer affected to be anything more or less than was equal to their real strength.

Antigonus, elated by his son's victory, believed that the time had come, when he might crush Ptolemy, and resolved to invade Egypt without delay. He sent for Demetrius from Cyprus, and collected his forces at Antigonía. He himself took the command of the army, which was composed of 80,000 foot, 8000 horse, and 83 elephants: Demetrius was to conduct the fleet, 150 ships of war and 100 transports, loaded with ammunition, along the coast of Syria. It was the beginning of October before they set out, and the masters of the fleet warned Antigonus to expect a change of weather at the setting of the Pleiades, which was only eight days later. But he hoped, by the rapidity of his movements, to surprise Ptolemy, and, reproaching them with cowardice, gave orders to proceed. At Gaza he ordered his troops to provide themselves with food for ten days, and loaded a great number of camels, which had been collected for him by the neighbouring Arabs, with corn. From Gaza Demetrius pursued his course for a few days in a calm, the swifter galleys towing the transports. But the predictions which Antigonus had slighted were exactly fulfilled. The fleet was dispersed, and suffered great damage, by a gale from the north, in which many of the transports were lost; several of the war galleys were driven ashore on the swampy coast near the city of Raphia, and those which weathered the storm, and made their way as far as Mount Casius, not far from the mouth of the Nile, were obliged to remain at anchor there, as it was impossible to effect a landing through the surf. Nor would it otherwise have been safe on a hostile coast. Still, three of the larger were lost, with almost all their crews, and the rest were reduced to great distress and alarm, as their supply of water was spent, while it was uncertain how long they might be kept at sea. The wind abated in time, and soon after the army appeared to protect their landing, and to afford them needful refreshment.

But the difficulties of the enterprise were still to come. Ptolemy was as well prepared for defence as he had been against Perdicas. The rewards which he offered attracted many de-

serters from the enemy's camp. Antigonus was unable to cross the Nile, and Demetrius was repulsed in two attempts, which he made at different points, to enter it, and, after having suffered fresh loss and damage from another north gale, returned, with great difficulty, to the eastern coast to join his father. Antigonus had calculated on the effect of a sudden, well-combined attack; it had failed in all points, and he was not prepared for a longer stay in the enemy's country. His provisions both for men and beasts were nearly consumed; and it can have been only to save appearances that he affected to ask the opinion of his council, whether it would be better to remain, or to defer the conquest of Egypt to a more favourable season. They were unanimous in the recommendation to retreat with all possible speed, and he may have thought himself fortunate when the remains of the army and navy were brought back in safety to Syria. Ptolemy celebrated his second deliverance, which seemed to ensure him against a recurrence of this danger, by sacrifices and feasting, and wrote to communicate his success, which nearly counterbalanced the loss of Cyprus, to his allies, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and Cassander.

It was partly to console himself for this disaster, and partly to punish the Rhodians for their refusal to co-operate with Demetrius in the invasion of Cyprus, that Antigonus now resolved to reduce them to subjection. The changes which had taken place in the commerce of the world, in consequence of Alexander's conquests, especially through the foundation of Alexandria, had, it seems, been peculiarly favourable to the prosperity of Rhodes. It had now for many years enjoyed uninterrupted peace. After Alexander's death, the Macedonian garrison was expelled, and it seems that no attempt had afterward been made to compel the Rhodians to receive another. Their friendship was courted by all the rivals who contended for the empire. Their government was a polity highly extolled by the ancients for the wisdom of its institutions. The rulers, at least, had the prudence to conciliate the poorer class, which was not permitted to share their political privileges, by a liberal provision for its wants. This was not an expedient to serve a temporary purpose; it was a hereditary usage, by which the wealthy had always contributed, in a manner unknown to most other Greek cities, to the relief of the indigent. Thus exempt, partly through a happy combination of circumstances, partly through their own prudence and moderation, from the evils of war and civil discord, the Rhodians had actively cultivated all the resources of their fertile island and their geographical position. All the arts, both of peace and war, were carried to the highest point of perfection among them that they anywhere reached in this age. The magnificence of the public buildings which adorned the city was hardly equalled in any part of Greece. The masterpieces of sculpture and painting which they could boast of preserved and enlarged the ancient glory, celebrated by Pindar, of works that seemed to live and move. But it was more especially in those which belonged to the defence of the city and the extension of its maritime power that the government displayed its activity and fore-

\* As a specimen, see the anecdote about Lysimachus in Plutarch, Demetrius, 27.

thought. No other Greek city could exhibit arsenals, armories, magazines, and engines, comparable to those of Rhodes. The vigilant attention paid to the navy was indicated by a law forbidding the common people, under pain of death, to enter the dockyards.\* It had been continually gaining strength with the extension of trade; and the Rhodians had felt themselves able to undertake alone the task of suppressing the pirates who had long infested the Grecian waters, and who appear to have grown more numerous and insolent in the confusion which followed Alexander's death; and they had, in a great measure, cleared the sea of this pest.

In the contests of Alexander's successors it had been the object of their policy to preserve neutrality. They had, indeed, the greatest need of Ptolemy's friendship; for it was from Egypt they drew their chief supply of corn, and with Alexandria that they carried on their most profitable commerce; but they had, also, reason to fear the enmity of Antigonus, and had endeavoured, as we have seen, to conciliate him by ready compliance with all his demands for the furtherance of his naval preparations. After their refusal to aid Demetrius against Ptolemy, Antigonus sent a squadron to intercept all vessels sailing between Rhodes and Egypt; and when the Rhodians forced it to withdraw, interpreted this defensive measure as a declaration of war, and threatened them with his vengeance. In the spring of 305 he prepared to execute these threats, and collected an armament for the siege of the city. It was in vain that the Rhodians attempted to soothe him by flattering decrees, that they humbly besought him not to force them to break their treaty with Ptolemy, who had never injured them. Their envoys were dismissed with a stern reply, and brought back so alarming a description of the preparations of Demetrius, who was charged with the expedition, that, for a time, the firmness of the government gave way; they offered to submit, and to join Antigonus in his war against Ptolemy. When, however, Demetrius demanded a hundred of the principal citizens as hostages, and that his fleet should be admitted into the harbour, they saw that they must expect, not an ally, but a master, and prepared for the inevitable struggle. They sent embassies to Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander, for succour, and, in the mean while, called forth all their domestic resources. Besides their own citizens, they armed as many as they could of the resident aliens; and compelled those who were not able or willing to serve to quit the city. The number enlisted—6000 citizens and 1000 strangers—seems smaller than might have been expected. But it must be remembered that the poorer class was employed in the navy. On the other hand, arms were given, also, to the slaves—whose number is not reported—and it was decreed that those who distinguished themselves should be emancipated, and the price paid to their owners by the treasury; and the wise and beautiful Athenian law—by which those who fell in battle were honoured with a public funeral, their parents and children maintained at the expense of the state, their daughters portioned, and the orphan

youths, when they came to age, presented each with a suit of armour, and crowned at the Dionysiac festival—was adopted, as an extraordinary excitement, for this emergency. All ranks were animated with equal ardour, and vied with each other in voluntary contributions, of money, skill, or labour, to the common cause. Demetrius crossed over from the port of Loryma, on the coast of Caria, with an armament that almost covered the intervening channel: 200 ships of war, more than 170 transports, bearing nearly 40,000 infantry, besides a body of cavalry, and of the pirates lately conquered by the Rhodians, whom he had taken into his service, and an immense store of arms and engines; attended by about 1000 vessels laden with provisions. He encamped nearly within bowshot of the walls, felling the trees, and demolishing the buildings in the outskirts, to form a triple palisade round his camp, and constructed a new harbour close to the great port, sufficient to contain his huge fleet. One of his first operations was to send a detachment, consisting chiefly of the pirates, whose bitter enmity rendered them fittest for this service, to spread devastation over the island.

So began this siege of Rhodes, not less memorable than those of 1480 and 1523 for the energy displayed on both sides; perhaps more interesting as the successful struggle of a free people against a fearfully superior physical force. The details might have filled an entertaining volume. Demetrius first directed his attack on the side of the harbour, hoping to exclude the enemy from the sea. He made himself master of the point of the mole, where he landed 400 of his troops, and then proceeded to batter the walls with stones of enormous weight, hurled by his terrible floating engines. But though, after an assault which lasted eight days, he effected a breach, he was repulsed with so much loss and damage as to be forced to retire into his own harbour to repair his shattered vessels and machines. After an interval of seven days he renewed the attack. Again his floating batteries played upon the wall: others kept the ships of the besieged at a distance by a shower of fire, while a palisade, covered by plates of iron, mounted on a strong raft, ward off their missiles. The danger was pressing: the prytaues made a fresh appeal to the spirit of their countrymen, which was met with new enthusiasm. A band of volunteers manned three of the best ships, and put out, as on a forlorn hope, to attack the iron palisade, and the floating machines behind it. After a hard combat, their desperate valour forced its way through every obstacle, sank three of the engines, took one of his ships, and put the rest to flight. His admiral, Execestus, with some other officers, was wounded, and made prisoner. Demetrius caused another machine to be constructed, of thrice the height and breadth of the former. But it was sunk by a sudden gale as it was moving towards the mouth of the harbour, and the besieged took advantage of the confusion which ensued to make a sally, by which they recovered the point of the mole, and forced the 400 men left there to lay down their arms. Shortly after this victory, they were farther cheered by the arrival of a re-enforcement of 160 men from Crete, and 500 sent by

\* Strabo, xiv., p. 195, Taucha.

Ptolemy, partly citizens of their own, who had entered into his service.

These disasters—which probably could not have been repaired before the approach of winter would have rendered it impossible to renew the attempt on the harbour—determined Demetrius to change his plan of operations, and to assault the city on the land side, where he would be less subject to mischances, would have fewer obstacles to encounter, and might give free range to his boldest conceptions. Accordingly, his preparations for the second stage of the siege were on a scale far surpassing all that he had hitherto devised. With the assistance of an Athenian engineer, named Epimachus, he now built his celebrated machine, called, with a prognostic which happily failed, the *Helepolis* (city taker). It was a square wooden tower of 150 feet high, divided into nine stories, communicating by stairs with each other, and furnished with apertures in front for the discharge of missiles of every kind. The three exposed sides were sheathed with iron. The tower moved on eight wheels, so contrived as to admit of a change in its direction. When it was stored and manned for action, the labour of 3400 men—the strongest in the camp—was required to set it in motion. The *Helepolis* had two worthy companions in a pair of battering-rams, each 150 feet long, and requiring 1000 men to propel it, and armed with a beak like that of a ship of war. Thirty thousand workmen were employed in these preparations, which may easily be supposed to have occupied the greater part of the winter. In the mean while, the besieged were no less actively engaged in measures of precaution against the impending danger. They built a new inner wall, parallel to that which was threatened, and, having no other materials, pulled down their theatre and the adjacent houses, and even some of their temples, not without a solemn vow to restore them in better condition, if the city was preserved.

During this interval they sent out nine galleys to intercept the transports which were bringing provisions or ammunition for the besiegers. The squadron divided itself into three, which cruised in various directions; all did great damage to the enemy, and returned with valuable prizes. Among these was a galley containing a quantity of royal apparel, with other presents and letters from Phila to her husband. Menedemus, the captor, sent the precious cargo to Ptolemy; and Demetrius, it is said, complained that the letters, at least, had not been delivered to him; for, notwithstanding the terrible earnestness of the conflict, the feeling which prevailed between the parties was rather one of generous rivalry than of implacable animosity. Demetrius, as he made his approaches, had found, in one of the suburbs, a picture of Protegenes, painted by order of the state. It had occupied the artist seven years, and only wanted the finishing touches. The Rhodians sent an embassy, not to recover, but to intercede for the picture; and Demetrius answered, that he would rather destroy his father's statues. On the other hand, a proposal which was made in the Rhodian assembly, to pull down the statues of Demetrius and Antigonus, was, it is said, indignantly rejected; nor was

any change made in the honours paid to them before the war.

At length, in the spring of 304, the *Helepolis* and its gigantic escort were ready to take the field. A space of nearly half a mile wide was levelled for their approach; and, together, they faced a part of the wall which included seven towers. The Rhodians, it is said, had been persuaded by an engineer of Aradus, named Callias, that he would be able, by a contrivance which he exhibited to them in a model, to carry away any of the enemy's engines and hoist it over the wall into the city; and they were even induced to dismiss their state engineer, Diognetus, and to appoint Callias in his room. But he was now obliged to confess that to transport the *Helepolis* through the air was an undertaking beyond his means. Diognetus, we are informed, resumed his station, and contented himself with an attempt to convert the ground over which the ponderous machines were to pass into a swamp.\* But the delay thus caused appears, at least, not to have lasted long. Demetrius, however, did not rely solely on his battering engines: before they were brought up, he began a mine, which might have spared him farther trouble, if the besieged had not been apprized of it by a deserter, when it had been carried very nearly into the city. They immediately dug a trench parallel to the wall which was in danger, and opened a countermine, which arrested the enemy's progress. Demetrius attempted to bribe the Milesian, Athenagoras, who commanded in the countermine, to admit his troops into the city; but Athenagoras disclosed his overtures to the Rhodians, and enabled them to capture an officer of high rank who was sent to examine the passage. The main hope of Demetrius, therefore, still rested in the effect of his machines. They were beginning to shake the walls, when an embassy came from Cnidus to offer its mediation; and Demetrius consented to a suspension of hostilities. But the negotiation proved fruitless: the assault was renewed, and one of the strongest towers fell. At this crisis the public despondency was a little relieved by the arrival of a supply of corn from Ptolemy, Cassander, and Lysimachus. The besieged made an attempt in the night to fire the enemy's engines, which, though it failed, did great damage to them; and, while they were under repair, built a third inner wall in the form of a crescent, and opened a new trench to cover the part which had fallen in. During this interval their spirits were again raised by a naval victory, in which they captured several vessels of the pirates, and their chief, Timocles. But the assault was soon renewed, and the breach widened, so that Demetrius began to consider it practicable, though he had not been able to dislodge the besieged from a tower which remained standing in the midst of the ruins. At this juncture they received a fresh supply of corn, and a re-enforcement of 1500 men, from Ptolemy; and, nearly at the same time, an embassy came to the camp of Demetrius, of more than fifty envoys, sent by Athens and other Greek states, to induce him to make peace with the Rhodians. It would be unjust to suppose that the gallant efforts of the

Rhodians excited no sympathy in Greece, and suggested no reflections on the nature of that independence which was to be protected by the besieger of Rhodes. But the main motive, as well as the pretext, of the embassy, appears to have been the state of Greece, which, in the absence of its deliverer, was again threatened by Cassander. Possibly it was also known that their mediation would not be unacceptable to Demetrius. It is probable that he had already conceived strong misgivings as to the issue of his enterprise, and regretted that he had embarked in it, and would have been content to withdraw from it if he could have done so without dishonour. He therefore consented to a truce for the purpose of negotiation; but still his demands were higher than the Rhodians could grant, and the treaty was again broken off. Demetrius then prepared for what he probably foresaw would be his last attempt, to take the city by storm. He made it in the night, trusting rather to the effect of surprise than to force. His plan was to distract the attention of the besieged by a demonstration of a general attack on the side both of the land and the sea, while a select body of about 1500 troops, under Alcimus and Mantias, having approached under cover of the night, made their entrance through the breach. The plan succeeded so far, that Alcimus and Mantias penetrated into the city, and took up a position on the site of the demolished theatre, while cries of alarm crossed each other in all directions. We know not to whom in particular the honour belongs, that he remained calm in the midst of the tumult, perceived the enemy's design, and sent orders to all quarters to keep the men to their posts on the walls, while a select band, reserved for such emergencies, and now re-enforced by the Egyptian auxiliaries, engaged the division of Alcimus and Mantias. A hard combat ensued, which grew more and more unequal, as the Rhodians were continually strengthened by fresh succours, while none came to the enemy. The assailants were at length forced to retreat, and most of them were killed or taken. Their two leaders themselves were among the slain, though Alcimus, an Epirot of gigantic strength, wore a corselet of Cyprian steel, which was proof against a dart from a catapult. The Rhodians lost their prytanis Demoteles, perhaps the hero to whose presence of mind they were indebted for their victory.

Notwithstanding this repulse, Demetrius still professed his intention to continue the siege. But if he was not weary of it himself, his father perceived that it was interfering with more important objects, and might lead to disastrous consequences; and he directed his son to make peace on the best terms he could. Demetrius only waited for an opportunity, and one was soon after presented by the arrival of envoys from Ptolemy and the Ætolians, who came for the same purpose. Ptolemy—it seems with a friendly motive—counselled the Rhodians to accept any tolerable conditions from Antigonus. The Ætolians appear to have been impelled by their hostility to Cassander. Both the parties, perhaps, made some concessions which they had before refused. The Rhodians were allowed to retain their independence, the sole occasion of the long

struggle. They consented, indeed, to enter into alliance with Antigonus, but were neither to receive a garrison nor to be forced to join in any expedition against Ptolemy. On the other hand, they were to deliver a hundred hostages, whom Demetrius might select, except persons in office. This was not the demand which had roused their resistance. Demetrius retired from the siege in which he had now been engaged a whole year, after an immense loss of treasure and life, without any compensation but the equivocal title of Poliorcetes (the besieger); though it was more properly applied to him than the name of Helepolis to his baffled engine. To the Rhodians there remained the consciousness of heroic efforts in a noble cause, crowned with glorious success; and the pleasing duty to fulfil their vows to the gods and testify their gratitude to their benefactors. The theatre and temples rose again in more than their former beauty; statues were erected in honour of Cassander and Lysimachus. To Ptolemy something more was felt to be due. It is only surprising that the Athenian flattery of Demetrius did not divert them from the thought; but they obtained permission from the oracle of Ammon to confer divine honours on Ptolemy, and consecrated a piece of ground enclosed by a portico, under the name of the Ptolemaeum. Their concluding transaction with Demetrius was a singular exchange of courtesy. Before he sailed away, they requested, and, it seems, obtained some of his engines, as monuments of his power, and—though this may have been only in their thoughts—of their own gallantry.

While Demetrius was wasting his time and strength against Rhodes, Cassander had been making great progress in the conquest of northern Greece, and obtained possession of Corinth, which he consigned to the care of Prepeleas, and had laid siege to Athens; and Polysperchon had recovered the greater part of Achaia, Arcadia, and Argolis. Demetrius only waited to collect his forces, and, sailing direct to Eubœa, entered the Euripus with a fleet of 330 sail—including, perhaps, the transports—and a numerous army. He expelled the Boeotian garrison from Chalcis, and pursued Cassander, who, on the news of his approach, had raised the siege of Athens and retreated northward as far as the Spercheus. Near Thermopylae, it seems, an action took place between them, in which Cassander was defeated, Heraclea surrendered to the conqueror, and 6000 Macedonians deserted to him. On his return he received the submission of the Boeotian towns, and as he entered Attica, reduced Phylæ and Panactum, which were still held by Cassander's garrisons. These were the presents—perhaps not less acceptable than the corn and timber—with which he greeted the Athenians. If his presence did not awaken the same feelings as before, it was hailed with an appearance of even warmer enthusiasm. It was, indeed, difficult to invent new honours for him which could seem greater than those he had already received; but the flatterers imagined that he might be gratified with the profanation of what still remained most venerable in the eyes of the people; and it was decreed that the Opisthodomus, the hinder cell of the Par-

thenon, should be assigned as his lodging. But the charm of novelty was past; and he began to be sickened with the incense so prodigally offered. It might seem impossible to insult a people which had so far lost all respect for itself; and Demetrius, perhaps, did not think that he was giving offence when he made the freest use of its hospitality, and polluted the sacred dwelling by scenes of the coarsest debauchery. The most notorious courtesans of the day were the most decent, the least infamous of the inmates with whom he shared the temple of the virgin goddess, his elder sister, as he was used to call her; and it seemed as if the people did not shudder at this desecration of their Holy of Holies. On the contrary, the men who assumed to be its organs went still a step farther, and proposed temples, and libations, and pœans, for his favourite mistresses and his vilest parasites; a species of flattery, however, in which the Thebans, it seems, had already led the way.\* Demetrius himself was surprised rather than pleased at the excess of their servility. It hurt his self-complacency to find himself the champion and protector of so degenerate a race; and he was heard to complain that, in his day, there was no Athenian left who possessed any vigour or dignity of soul.

Yet indications were not wanting which might have convinced him that feelings still survived on which he was recklessly trampling, and which, though they might be stifled, did not cease to suffer; that there were men still worthy of the name of Athenians, who were painfully conscious of the public ignominy. A youth named Cleænetus, whose father had incurred a penalty of fifty talents, obtained a written order from Demetrius that it should be remitted. The order was obeyed; yet for a moment the spirit of the people seemed to revive, and a decree was passed that no citizen should present a letter from Demetrius. Soon, however, it became known that the king had expressed vehement indignation at this faint outbreak of the manly spirit which he affected to regret, and Stratocles flew to his post. He alarmed the people with a picture of the consequences that might follow from this rash step, and procured a decree, by which its authors were condemned to death or banishment, with a declaration which recognised the principle of Anaxarchus; that whatever King Demetrius should command was agreeable to piety and justice. There were still some bold enough to say that Stratocles must be out of his senses to propose such extravagant decrees. But Demochares—who knew that he was richly rewarded by Demetrius for his infamous services—remarked that he would not be in his senses if he were not out of them.† This sarcasm on a creature of Demetrius, touching, as it did, a secret of state policy, could not be forgiven; a pretext was soon found on which he himself was condemned to exile.

So the winter passed away; with the return of spring (303) Demetrius started with his usual alacrity from the lap of pleasure, and

again took the field. His first object was to recover Peloponnesus from Cassander, Poly-sperchon, and Ptolemy. The order of his operations is subject to much doubt; but it seems most probable that his first attempts were directed against Sicyon and Corinth. He had already, the year before, made himself master of Cenchree, and this seems to have suggested a stratagem by which he surprised Sicyon. It appears that he advanced to some distance beyond the Isthmus, and then retreated with the main army to Cenchree, where he seemed to abandon himself entirely to pleasure. But he had left a body of mercenaries under Diodorus, with orders to move suddenly on Sicyon from the side of Pellene; the fleet, or squadron, which lay in the Corinthian Gulf, was directed, at the same time, to appear before the harbour;‡ and he himself, after a proper interval, set out with the rest of his forces to support them. Diodorus, by a sudden night attack, had taken the lower city; but the garrison made good their retreat to the citadel. Notwithstanding its strength, the governor, Philippus, either terrified by the besieger's engines or won by his gold, surrendered to Demetrius on condition that the garrison should be allowed to return to Egypt. Demetrius then persuaded the inhabitants to abandon the lower town, and to transfer their dwellings to the table-mount on which the citadel stood, which, from the steepness of its sides, afforded the advantages of a natural stronghold, while the abundance of water, and the elevated position, rendered it a more agreeable residence. Demetrius razed the old town to the ground, and the new one was carried rapidly forward by the labour of his troops. It was for some time called after him Demetrias, and the inhabitants, delighted with the change in their situation, for which they willingly resigned the dangerous neighbourhood of the sea, honoured him with annual games and sacrifices as their founder. Their gratitude was the livelier, as he left no garrison behind him. He then turned his arms against Corinth. Here he had partisans within, one of whom admitted his troops by night through a postern into the city. The garrison continued to hold the two citadels, the Sisyphæum and the Acrocorinthus; but when he had stormed the Sisyphæum, Prepelaus, despairing, it is said, of resistance, or using this pretext to cover the bribe he accepted,§ surrendered the impregnable Acrocorinthus on the same terms which had been granted to the garrison at Sicyon. His conduct was on every supposition dishonourable; yet he appears to have retained his master's confidence. Corinth was a point of too much importance to be risked for the sake of a name; and Demetrius probably suggested the request of the Corinthians, which he most readily granted, that he would occupy it with his troops until he should have ended the war with Cassander. After the fall of these places, Poly-sperchon's garrisons were soon dislodged

\* Athenæus, vi., 62.

† Plutarch, Demetr., 24. *παύειτο μὲν' ἂν εἰ μὴ παύειτο.* Like the saying ascribed to Themistocles: *ἀπολέμεθ' ἂν εἰ μὴ ἀπολέμεθα.*

\* So Polyæmus, iv., 7, 3; and hence Droysen infers that the fleet had been ordered to sail round Peloponnesus. As we find no other object assigned for this long voyage, it seems rather improbable, and this feature may have been added to the stratagem by the narrator. Diodorus makes no mention of the fleet.

† According to Plutarch (Dem., 25), a hundred talents.

from the Achaian towns. At Ægium, Strombichus, the commander, and eighty of Polyperchon's partisans were put to a cruel death, for which Strombichus alone appears to have given provocation by an insulting defiance of the conqueror. His operations were equally successful in Arcadia, where Mantinea alone offered resistance, and in Argolis. At Argos he made a long stay, not only to celebrate the Heræan games, but to solemnize his marriage with the Princess Deidamia, whose brother Pyrrhus had been restored by Glaucias to the throne of Epirus, and, as Cassander's mortal enemy, was already closely allied in interest with Demetrius. Demetrius was now able to obey the directions which he had received from his father before he last quitted Greece; and he collected an assembly of deputies at Corinth, which, in its numbers, presented the appearance of a national congress. It invested him with the title which had been bestowed on Philip and Alexander at the same place, and voted a body of troops for his war with Cassander.

As the time spent in these transactions, and the order in which they succeeded each other, cannot be clearly ascertained,\* so the operations of Demetrius, immediately after the congress, which seems to have concluded his campaign in Peloponnesus, are involved in great obscurity. It would have seemed allowable to presume that he returned to Athens for the winter with Deidamia; but we find him elsewhere so early in the ensuing spring, and apparently on his return from a distant quarter, that it is difficult to believe he had been there only a month or two before. Yet it is nearly certain that, in the interval between the autumn of 303 and the spring of 302, he made an expedition to the west of Greece, which was in some way connected with the affairs of Leucas and Corcyra, and was in part directed against the Ætoli-ans, notwithstanding the alliance which he had so lately contracted with them.† We know, indeed, that Corcyra had lately fallen into the hands of the Spartan adventurer, Cleonymus, who had been sent by the parent state to aid Tarentum in her wars with the Lucanians and the Romans; and Demetrius may have been tempted by the opportunity of effecting its deliverance, and thus establishing his influence there. His rupture with the Ætoli-ans may have arisen out of his recent alliance with Epirus; and perhaps such an occasion would offer the best explanation of an expedition undertaken at such a season, and at a time when he was preparing to decide his contest with Cassander for the possession of Macedonia. However this may be, towards the end of March, 302, we find him again on his way to Athens, and announcing his approach in a letter to the people with an extraordinary demand, which shows that the impression which had been made on him during his second visit had not been weakened by his absence, and that he had learned to expect as the price of freedom, unlimited compliance with

his will. He had conceived a desire to be initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries, and to be admitted to their last stage; and he now requested that the whole might be despatched in the course of the next month, after which he designed to set out on his expedition to Macedonia. There were two difficulties in the way: the mysteries called the lesser, at which the initiations took place, were celebrated in the month Anthesterion, nearly answering to February; the greater, in Boëdromion, or September, when another step was taken by the candidate; but between this and the last, which introduced him to the *epopteia*—the full possession of all the secrets hidden in the recesses of the mystic sanctuary from profane curiosity—a year's probation was required by the law, which had hitherto been held sacred. But it had already been decreed that the will of Demetrius was the only measure of piety and justice; and Stratocles lighted on an expedient to reconcile it even with the letter of the law in most points. The next month was called Munychion; but a decree might change its name to Anthesterion, and when Demetrius had been initiated, it might, by the same power, be transformed into Boëdromion, and such a candidate might well be allowed to pass at once from the second degree to the last. This motion was carried, notwithstanding the opposition of the chief minister of the mysteries, the Torchbearer Pythodorus. Demetrius, on his entrance, was received with all the honours that could have been paid to a present deity; incense, garlands, libations, sacred hymns, and dances. One of the poems sung on this occasion by a chorus has happily been preserved; less remarkable, perhaps, for the profaneness of its flattery, in which it could not go beyond Stratocles, than for the boldness with which it avows an utter disbelief of the whole established system of religion. "The other gods are either far away, Or their ears are lacking, Or else they are not, or they heed not us. Thee we see before us: No form of wood or stone, but flesh and blood:" and it proceeds to pray, that he would grant peace to the world, and punish the rapacious Ætoli-ans, who had now begun to infest the distant coasts of Greece. If, after these honours, and the fruition of the mystic vision, Demetrius laid a tax of 250 talents on Athens, and, when it was collected, distributed it among his mistresses for their dressing-tables,\* or if he permitted them to extort money in his name, we cannot, perhaps, censure him as ungrateful; but we may reasonably be surprised that he should still have thought that he retained some claims on the gratitude of the Athenians.

In the mean while Cassander was aware of the danger that threatened him: he knew that Demetrius, having made himself master of Greece, meant to bring all his forces to bear on Macedonia, and he felt himself unable to resist the attack. Yet, before he prepared for defence, he resolved to try the effect of an appeal to the moderation or prudence of Antigonus, and sent to propose terms of peace. The answer was dictated by the consciousness of an overwhelming power: "Cassander must submit to the pleasure of Antigonus;" there could be no peace between them on any other terms. But Cas-

\* Diodorus (xx., 109, 103) only relates the operations on the coast of the Corinthian Gulf. Plutarch (Dem., 25) mentions the other points in a very confused manner. Droysen supposes that Sicily, Corinth, and Achaia were the last objects of attack: chiefly, it seems, on account of the expression *δυσχώρητοι* and the mention of the fleet in Polyænus.

† Athenæus, vi., 62, 63.

\* *Εἰς ἀμύματα*, Plut., Dem., 27.

sander had not sunk so low, and, perhaps, had only made the experiment, that he might have a better claim to the aid of his allies. He invited Lysimachus to a conference, and they sent a common embassy to Ptolemy and Seleucus, to represent the danger with which all alike were threatened by the arrogant ambition of Antigonus, who, once master of Macedonia, would be able to overpower every rival. But the enemy was too near to let them wait for foreign succours, and they concerted a plan for a diversion, which might paralyze the movements of Demetrius. It was agreed that Lysimachus should cross over into Asia, with a division of Cassander's forces, under Prepelaus, added to his own, to carry on an offensive war with Antigonus, while, with the rest, Cassander advanced to check the progress of Demetrius. In the spring of 302, Lysimachus executed his part of the treaty, and, having crossed the Hellespont, began a series of operations in Asia Minor, the result of which will be hereafter related. Cassander moved into Thessaly, and sent a detachment forward to occupy Thermopylae.

Demetrius had already assembled his land and sea forces at Chalcis, and now sailed into the Gulf of Pagasæ, and made himself master of Larissa Cremastæ, and several places in the south of Thessaly. Cassander strengthened the garrisons of Phæræ and the Pthiotic Thebes, and was still at the head of an army of nearly 30,000 foot and 3000 horse. That of Demetrius was nearly double this number. The contingents of the Grecian states formed its main strength, amounting to 25,000 men; the remainder was composed of 8000 Macedonians, 15,000 mercenaries, 8000 light troops, chiefly the pirates who had served him in the war with Rhodes, and 1500 horse. The two armies remained long encamped in face of each other. Cassander, from the sense of his weakness, must have wished to avoid an engagement: but Demetrius, with fatal and inexplicable remissness, did not attempt to force him from his position: both, we are told, waited for tidings from Asia, where, it was seen, the struggle must finally be decided.\* Demetrius was invi-

ted by a party at Phæræ to take possession of the town, and marching against it with a division of his forces, compelled Cassander's garrison to evacuate the citadel. This was the only use he made of his army in Thessaly. Lysimachus began his campaign with great success on the coast of the Propontis, and, having reduced several of the principal towns, sent Prepelaus to overrun Æolis and Ionia. He prepared to besiege Abydos, but a re-enforcement sent to its aid by Demetrius induced him to abandon this design, and he quitted the coast to complete the conquest of the Hellespontine Phrygia, and then marched against Synnada, which was held by Docimus, the general of Antigonus, and contained large magazines and a considerable treasure. He prevailed on Docimus to come over to his side, and thus became master of this important fortress. In the mean time Prepelaus had advanced to Ephesus, which surrendered without resistance. Here he found and released the Rhodian hostages, who had been left there by Demetrius. He did not impose a garrison in the city, but burned all the ships in the harbour, which were useless while the enemy commanded the sea. Teos and Colophon likewise yielded to him; but Erythræ and Clazomenæ received succours from Demetrius, which enabled them to repel his attacks, and, having ravaged their territories, he moved against Sardis. Here Phoenix imitated the example of Docimus, and surrendered the town; but its impregnable citadel was commanded by Philippus, who remained faithful to Antigonus.

Antigonus was still at his new capital on the Orontes, in profound security, and had made great preparations to celebrate the completion of his work with magnificent games, when he received the unexpected tidings that Lysimachus had crossed the Hellespont. He immediately broke up the festival, and, dismissing the competitors and the artists he had collected with royal presents, hastened to the defence of his dominions. He moved by forced marches into Cilicia, and at Tarsus gave three months' pay in advance to his troops, and drew 3000 talents from the treasury at Quinda. He then crossed the Taurus, and entered Cappadocia. The approach of Lysimachus had excited a general revolt in the Upper Phrygia and Lycaonia, but the presence of Antigonus reduced both provinces to obedience; and Lysimachus determined to wait for the arrival of Seleucus, to take up a strongly fortified position, and remain on the defensive. Antigonus came up, and having vainly endeavoured to draw him into an engagement, began to intercept his supplies. Lysimachus was forced to decamp, and by a forced march of some fifty miles reached the fruitful plain of Dorylæum, on the banks of the Thimbres and the Sangarius, where he again intrenched himself. But he was pursued by Antigonus, who, finding that he still declined a battle, proceeded to enclose his camp with lines of circumvallation. Lysimachus, failing in all his attempts to obstruct the progress of the enemy's works, and seeing himself threatened with famine, took advantage of an rulers, and became the object of such long and obstinate contests. We see that, in return for the political aims of freedom, the Greeks were able to furnish their benefactor with a force which, properly employed, would have made him master of Alexander's empire.

\* Droysen has some judicious remarks on the conduct of Demetrius and Antigonus on this occasion. He observes, apparently with good reason, that Demetrius flung away his advantages: that he might have crushed Cassander and Lysimachus, and have enabled his father to meet Seleucus with an irresistibly superior force. The superiority of Demetrius, however, was owing, it must be remembered, to the 25,000 men furnished by Greece. When, therefore, in a preceding page (179), Droysen represents the states of Greece as having lost almost all political importance, and observes that if the Macedonian chiefs still concerned themselves about what the Greeks said, it was merely their ancient renown and their intellectual culture that "from time to time gave these little states the chimerical importance of powers, while, in fact, they were of no weight, except as staples of the civilization which was to be carried over into Asia, as military posts in the struggle of parties, as objects of pity and magnanimity, on which it might be reputable for the possessors of power now and then to bestow the political aims of freedom;" this remark must be strictly confined to the individual states, and is only true to the extent that no one state was of itself any longer politically important. But though in this sense the remark is true, it is one of those half-truths, which are more likely to mislead than to benefit the reader, especially when expressed in such ambiguous language, which might easily tempt him to apply it to the whole of Greece. "What the Greeks said," so far as it indicated the side on which they would throw their weight, was still a matter of the greatest political importance. It was not for the sake of a name that the possession of Greece was so eagerly coveted by the Macedoni-

of a stormy night to withdraw unobserved, and crossed the mountains into Bithynia. Antigonus, when he discovered his escape, attempted to overtake him by a different route, which traversed the plains north of the Sangarius. But it was now late in the autumn: heavy rains broke up the roads, and subjected his troops to great hardships and losses; so that he found himself obliged to abandon the pursuit, and to retire into winter-quarters, doubtless in some part of Phrygia. He had hoped to strike a decisive blow before the arrival of Seleucus, who was so far on his way from the East that he might be expected to appear on the theatre of war very early in the following spring. He had now reason to fear that his forces would be unequal to the approaching contest, and he therefore sent a message to Demetrius, directing him to come over to Asia, with all his forces, without delay. Lysimachus took up his winter-quarters in the plain of Saloni, in the interior of Bithynia, which was famed for its rich pastures,\* and he entered into a connexion with Heraclea, which enabled him to draw abundant supplies from the coast of the Euxine. Heraclea was at this time governed by Amastris, whom Craterus, on his marriage with Phila, had transferred to its tyrant Dionysius.† Her character, no less than her position, rendered her alliance extremely desirable for Lysimachus; and he solicited and obtained her hand.

Demetrius, as soon as he received his father's orders, which probably arrived not long after he had taken Phœræ, entered into negotiation with Cassander, and concluded a treaty, which, however, was not to be valid unless it should be ratified by Antigonus. His object was to prevent Cassander from profiting by his absence; and one of the articles provided that all Greek cities, as well in Europe as in Asia, should remain independent. Cassander, who only wished to be delivered as soon as possible from the presence of his formidable enemy, assented to his proposals; and Demetrius, when he had collected a sufficient number of transports, embarked with all his troops for Asia. He directed his course to Ephesus, and, having encamped near the walls, soon compelled the town to submit, and the garrison to evacuate the citadel, which, in spite of the recent treaty, he occupied with his own troops. He then marched towards the Hellespont, and recovered most of the places which had fallen into the hands of Lysimachus; and proceeding to the mouth of the Euxine, left 3000 men in a fortified camp, with a squadron of thirty galleys, to secure the passage, and immediately afterward distributed the remainder of his army in winter-quarters among the Hellespontine cities. Cassander no sooner saw the field clear than he began to recover the places which he had lost in Thessaly: at the same time, he sent his brother Pleistarchus, with 12,000 foot and 500 horse, to the aid of Lysimachus. Pleistarchus marched to the Bosphorus, but, finding it guarded by the squadron left by Demetrius, he proceeded to Odessus, and collected transports to carry his troops over to Heraclea. But being unable to procure a sufficient number of vessels, he divided his

army into three bodies, which embarked in succession, himself accompanying the last. The first only arrived in safety; the second was intercepted by the squadron of the Bosphorus; and the third was overtaken near the coast of Asia by a storm, in which the greater part were lost. The galley in which Pleistarchus himself sailed was wrecked, and he narrowly escaped on a plank. After a short repose at Heraclea, he repaired to the winter-quarters of Lysimachus.

During these transactions Ptolemy had not been inactive; but though he had readily promised his aid to Cassander and Lysimachus, he showed little concern for their interests. He, indeed, made an expedition into Syria, when Antigonus had left it, but only that he might reduce it under his own dominion. He had made himself master of Cœlo-Syria, and was engaged in the siege of Sidon, when a report was spread that Lysimachus and Seleucus had been defeated by Antigonus, and had retreated to Heraclea, and that Antigonus was on his march towards Syria. One might be inclined to suspect that Ptolemy himself had forged this news, for the sake of a pretext under which he might decently return to Egypt. The season was probably so far advanced that he could not hope to make himself master of Sidon that year, and he clearly wished to keep aloof from the great struggle which was about to take place, and to reserve himself with undiminished forces for the conqueror. He therefore pretended to be deceived by the false alarm, hastily concluded an armistice for four months with the Sidonians, and, having left garrisons in the conquered cities, returned to his own kingdom.

The eyes of men were now bent most anxiously on the movements of Seleucus. During the interval which had elapsed since his return to Babylon, he had subjected to his rule all the provinces of Alexander's empire east of the Euphrates, and, it seems, had penetrated into India even beyond the limits which Alexander had reached. But this great expedition was destined to be known to us only from its results. Scarcely a single fact relating to it has been preserved from oblivion. We learn, however, that in India he was engaged in war with a powerful prince named Sandrocottus, who from an obscure condition had become the ruler of a mighty empire, but that he afterward contracted an alliance with him, as the price of which he received five hundred elephants. It is probable that he ceded all the conquests made either by Alexander or himself, east of the Indus, and even the territory lying between the upper Indus and the mountains, to his new ally, whose friendship was likely, at this period, to be more useful to him than the possession of those remote provinces. He foresaw that, on his return to the West, he should be forced to stake all he had acquired in a struggle with Antigonus; and the embassy of Cassander and Lysimachus can have done no more than quicken his movements. We do not know where it found him; but it was already winter, and perhaps the year 301, when he entered Cappadocia, where he halted to wait for the spring, having provided his troops with strong tents to winter in the field. He came

\* Strabo, xii., p. 565.

† Memnon ap. Phot., p. 224, a.



at the head of 20,000 foot, 12,000 horse, 480 elephants, and more than a hundred war-chariots.

Yet it appears that alone he would not have been able to withstand the united forces of Demetrius and Antigonus, and that it could not have been difficult for them to prevent his union with Lysimachus, on which the issue of the next campaign would mainly depend. The loss of the remaining books of Diodorus leaves us wholly uninformed as to the movements of the belligerents before the summer, when we find Lysimachus and Seleucus together, and offering battle to Antigonus and Demetrius. If we might venture to refer a stratagem of Seleucus, reported by Polyænus,\* which has been supposed to belong to an expedition of Antigonus, of which we find no trace in history, to this period, we might conjecture that, before Demetrius joined his father, Seleucus had gained some advantage over Antigonus, which, though of no moment in itself, opened a passage for Lysimachus to unite his forces with those of his ally. It was, however, near the little town of Ipsus, in Phrygia, that the decisive battle took place. The combined forces of Seleucus and Lysimachus included 14,000 foot, and not less, it seems, than 12,500 horse, besides the elephants and the war-chariots. Those of the rival kings numbered 10,000 foot, 10,000 horse, and 75 elephants. Demetrius was accompanied by the young king of Epirus, who had come as a fugitive to his camp, having been driven from his dominions by a revolt which broke out—kindled possibly by the intrigues of Cassander—while, believing his authority firmly established, he was on a visit at the court of Glaucias, to be present at a marriage of one of the royal family.

Antigonus was now eighty years old; yet in vigour, both of his body and his mind, was at little impaired. He had been wont to speak with contempt of the coalition formed against him; it was a flight of sparrows, which he would scatter with a single cast of a stone and the sound of his voice. He disdained to resort to the arts of negotiation, by which he might, perhaps, have separated them with a still slighter effort, if he would have condescended to hold out the lure of moderate concessions to each. But he could not bear to part with the thought which he had so long cherished, and once had so nearly realized, of a universal monarchy. Yet now, on the eve of the momentous conflict, he felt his haughty spirit weighed down by forebodings, which he betrayed by a marked change in his air and demeanour. Hitherto, in the presence of an enemy, his loud voice, his high language, his ready jests, had been used to inspire his troops with his own never-failing confidence. Now he was observed to be thoughtful, grave, seldom breaking silence. He even resented Demetrius to the army as his successor, and, for the first time in his life, admitted him to secret consultations in his tent—an indication that he, who had never before disclosed his plans until he gave his orders, now felt himself in want of advice. Demetrius, too, in the night before the battle, had an inauspicious dream. Alexander had appeared to him, armed for combat; had asked the watchword, and

then declared that he was going over to the enemy. On the morning of the eventful day, Antigonus, as he stepped out of his tent to see his line formed, stumbled and fell prostrate. When he had recovered himself, he lifted his hands to heaven, and implored the gods to give him victory, or death before he was conscious of defeat.

The battle seems to have been decided chiefly through the impetuosity of Demetrius and the mass of the enemy's elephants. He had routed the cavalry opposed to him, which was headed by Antiochus, the son of Seleucus. While he was engaged in the pursuit, the elephants moved forward, and interposed an impenetrable mass between him and the phalanx. Seleucus seized the opportunity to hover with the remainder of his horse on the flank, which was left exposed, never coming to a charge, but repeating his threatening demonstrations until he had thrown it into disorder. It would seem as if he must have had some secret intelligence, which led him to expect the result that ensued. One wing broke away from the rest, and came over to his side. This desertion spread terror and confusion among the ranks. Pyrrhus gave the first proofs of the impetuous valour which he afterward displayed in so many happier fields, and, for a time, thought himself victorious; but the day was irrecoverably lost. He was hurried along in the general flight. The prayer of Antigonus seemed to have been heard. He still kept his ground, after he had been deserted by all but a few of his officers. As the enemy came up, one of his attendants exclaimed, "It is against you, sir, they are making." "Why, who else," replied the old man, "should be the mark? But Demetrius will soon be here to the rescue." While he looked round him in vain for his son, a shower of darts fell, and many pierced him at once with mortal wounds. His followers fled, all but a Larissæan named Thorax, who remained by the corpse. It was interred by the victors with royal obsequies.

Demetrius made his escape from the field, accompanied by Pyrrhus, with 40,000 foot and 5000 horse, and directed his march with the utmost speed towards Ephesus. The Ephesians trembled, lest, at a time when he had such urgent need of money, he should be tempted by the treasures of their temple. But it seems that he did not feel himself yet driven to such an expedient, and was only anxious that the sacrilege should not be committed by his soldiers without benefit to himself; and, on this account, put them immediately on board the fleet, which lay in the harbour, and sailed away, leaving a garrison under the command of the Ephesian Diodorus.\* His first care was the discharge of a pious duty, which, however, happened to coincide with his interest. His mother, Stratonice, had been left by Antigonus at Tarsus; and there was also a treasure which might still be saved from the enemy's hands. He therefore made for Cilicia, took his mother and the treasure on board, and carried them over to Cyprus, where his wife Phila was residing. † He was of too sanguine

\* Probably the same person who is mentioned by Polyænus, vi., 49. Whether he was the officer whom Demetrius employed in the attack on Sicily, is doubtful.

† Diodorus, xxi., Eclog. i., p. 400.

a temper, and had too high an opinion of his own merit to be easily cast down by any reverse of fortune. He looked to Greece as still his own, and as ground where he might maintain an independent position until an opportunity should occur for new enterprises. He therefore bent his course to Athens; there he had left a part of his fleet, including a galley of thirteen banks of oars, the remains of his treasure, and his wife Deidamia; and its situation was the most opportune for any movements which his prospects might require. But, before he reached the coast of Caria, he received intelligence that Diodorus had agreed, for a bribe of fifty talents, to betray Ephesus to Lysimachus. He therefore steered, with a part of his fleet, towards Ephesus, and, leaving the rest at anchor behind the nearest headland, made for the mouth of the harbour with a single galley, in which a trusty officer, named Nicanor, appeared as commander, while he himself remained below. Nicanor invited Diodorus to a conference on the subject of the garrison, as if apprized of his design, and disposed to second it. Diodorus came to the ship's side in a boat; Demetrius then made his appearance, sank the boat, and took all the crew prisoners, and, landing, secured possession of the place.\* He now struck across the Ægean towards Attica; but, before he reached it, he was destined to a bitter disappointment. As he passed through the Cyclades, he was met by Athenian envoys, who begged him not to proceed towards Athens, since the people had decreed that none of the kings should be admitted within the city, and had escorted his wife Deidamia, with all the honours due to her high station, to Megara. This treatment, we are informed, wounded Demetrius more deeply than any of his late disasters; he had borne them with serenity and cheerfulness; but he was almost stunned by this unexpected blow, and could scarcely recover composure enough to send an answer suited to his altered circumstances, which did not permit him to resent it, gently complaining of their conduct, and requesting that they would restore his ships. This request was granted; and he proceeded to the Isthmus, where he found that the event of the battle had produced as unfavourable an effect on the state of his affairs in Peloponnesus as it had at Athens.

All that can surprise us in the transaction is the degree to which he must have been blinded by inordinate vanity, when he expected a different reception from the Athenians. It would seem as if he had forgotten everything that had occurred since the time when he first presented himself as the liberator of Athens and of Greece; or, as Plutarch suggests, that he remembered only the honours he had received, and not the manner in which he had requited them. If the Athenians had deserved to be treated as the vilest of his slaves; if they had offered their necks before he trampled on them; if the servility which disgraced them was properly to be attributed to the sentiments of the whole people, and not to the arts of a few of his own parasites, how could he believe that a people so utterly degraded should be capable of such generous constancy as to adhere to him in his fallen fortunes? If they still retained so much virtue,

and if the old Athenian spirit was not altogether extinct, it was certainly not a friendly welcome, but rather the language of indignation, scorn, and loathing, which he would have expected if he had ever viewed his own conduct in its true light. The behaviour of the Athenians was in every respect wise and becoming, and might have been called noble if it had been less prudent.

After the battle, it remained for the conquerors to divide the spoil. The dominions of Antigonus were actually in the hands of Seleucus and Lysimachus, and they alone had achieved the victory. It does not appear that they consulted either of their allies on the partition, though it seems that they obtained the assent of Cassander. They agreed to share all that Antigonus had possessed between themselves. It is not clear on what principle the line of demarcation was drawn, nor is it possible to trace it. But the greater part of Asia Minor was given to Lysimachus. The portion of Seleucus included not only the whole country between the coast of Syria and the Euphrates, but also, it seems, a part of Phrygia and of Cappadocia.\* Cilicia was assigned to Cassander's brother Pleistarchus. With regard to Syria, however, a difficulty remained. The greater part of it had, as we have seen, been conquered by Ptolemy: Tyre and Sidon alone were still occupied by the garrisons of Antigonus. Ptolemy had at least as good a right as his ally to all that he possessed; though we do not find sufficient ground to believe that Syria had been ceded to him by Seleucus, before the last campaign, as the price of his assistance, by formal treaty.† Seleucus, however, began to take possession of it, and when Ptolemy pressed his claims, returned an answer, mild in sound, but threatening in its import, to the effect that for the present, out of regard to their friendship, he would take no farther steps, but at a future time would consider how he should deal with his friends, whose views of aggrandizement interfered with his interests;‡ and it appears that Ptolemy was induced to withdraw his opposition.

There were, however, also some native princes, who had taken advantage of the contests between the Macedonian chiefs to establish their authority over extensive territories in the west of Asia. Ardoates was master of Armenia, with the title of king; so independent, that he not only gave shelter to Ariarathes, the son of the Cappadocian prince who was put to death by Perdiccas, but while the struggle between Antigonus and Seleucus was in suspense, enabled him to recover his hereditary dominions.§ At an earlier period, Mithridates, the son of Ario-

\* Appian, Syr., 55.

† As Droysen would infer from the argument of the Egyptian ambassadors reported by Polybius (v., 67), which does not require such an interpretation. It seems, indeed, hardly to be reconciled with the language of Seleucus in Diodorus (Malii, ii., p. 43): *δίαγων εἶναι τοὺς τῇ παραστάσει κρατήσαντας κυρίους ὑπάρχειν τῶν δορυκρίων*. This sounds very much as if there had been no such previous treaty.

‡ So I understand the words which immediately follow those quoted from Diodorus in the preceding note: *περὶ δὲ τῆς κοιλῆς Συρίας διὰ τὴν φίλιαν καὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀπὸν πολυπραγμονίαν* (so Droysen reads for *πολυπραγμοσύνη*): *βετερον δὲ βουλευόμεθα πῶς χρῆσθαι, κατὰ τὴν φίλιαν τοῦ βουλευόμενου κλεινεκτείν*. Droysen, however, interprets them, not as a threat, but a friendly promise; and supposes that it was the intention of Seleucus to give Cyprus to Ptolemy as a compensation for Phœnicia.

§ Diodorus, xxii., Eclg. iii., p. 517, sq.

\* Polybius, iv., 7, 4.

barzanes, who traced his descent from the royal house of Persia, had lived for a time under the protection of Antigonos, as the companion of his son. It appears that he betrayed aspiring views, which excited his patron's jealousy, and it is said that a dream, the natural effect of such suspicions, determined Antigonos, who, as we see from the history of Seleucus, was not free from superstition, to despatch him. But he disclosed his purpose to Demetrius, who was generous enough to give timely warning to his friend.\* Mithridates made his escape to Paphlagonia, on the Pontic Cappadocia, and became the founder of the dynasty which defied and shook the power of Rome. He afterward, it seems, submitted to Antigonos, and was permitted to possess some districts near the Propontis; and here the fate which he had avoided overtook him. When Lysimachus crossed over into Asia, Mithridates, as was to be expected, espoused his cause, and fell by the hands of assassins, employed either by Antigonos or Demetrius. His son succeeded to his dominions.† Both Lysimachus and Seleucus were too much engaged with other affairs to disturb any of these powerful neighbours.

So far as regards Asia, the battle of Ipsus must be considered as a disastrous event. Not because it transferred the power of Antigonos into different hands, nor because it would have been more desirable that he should have triumphed over Seleucus. But the new distribution of territory led to calamitous consequences, which might, perhaps, otherwise have been averted. If the empire of Seleucus had remained confined between the Indus and the Euphrates, it might have subsisted much longer, at least, as a barrier against the inroads of the barbarians, who at last obliterated all the traces of European civilization left there by Alexander and his successors. But shortly after his victory, Seleucus founded his new capital on the Orontes, called, after his father, Antiochia, peopling it with the inhabitants of Antigonis.‡ It became the residence of his dynasty, and grew, while their vast empire dwindled into the Syrian monarchy.

For the prospects of Greece, on the other hand, the fall of Antigonos must clearly be accounted an advantage, so far as the effect was to dismember his territory, and to distribute it so that the most powerful of his successors was at the greatest distance. It was a gain that Macedonia was left an independent kingdom within its ancient limits, and bounded on the north by a state of superior strength. It does not appear that any compact was made between Cassander and his allies as to the possession of Greece. It was probably understood that he should keep whatever he might acquire there. It may be doubted whether the forces of Greece, if they had been united and well directed, would not have been quite sufficient at this time to cope with those of Macedonia. Nor is it likely that any of Cassander's allies would have interfered to promote his aggrandizement. But the only man who could have united the Greeks, as a free people, in resistance to Macedonia, was Demetrius. If he had been worthy of the opportunity which now of-

fered itself, a new era might have opened for Greece. But he had forfeited the confidence of the nation: no Greek who loved his country could care much whether he or Cassander might prevail. All that was certain was, that Greece must shortly become the scene of a fresh contest, in which her strength would be wasted, without a chance of reward or even the illusion of hope.

## CHAPTER LX.

FROM THE BATTLE OF IPSUS TO THE DEATH OF PYRRHUS.

By the event of the battle of Ipsus the allies, who had been united by their common enmity to Antigonos, were transformed into jealous rivals. Their struggle with him was no sooner decided than the clashing interests of Ptolemy and Seleucus threatened an immediate rupture, which was averted, indeed, but so as to leave neither party secure, and one of them deeply offended. It was clear that the possession of Syria must be a subject of perpetual contest between the two states. On the other hand, Lysimachus had reason to be satisfied—if it was in the nature of ambition to be so—with the rich acquisition which had fallen to his share; but he could feel no confidence in the moderation of his powerful neighbour, and might well suspect that Seleucus would endeavour to resume so important a concession on the first opportunity. In the eyes both of Lysimachus and Ptolemy, Seleucus had stepped into the place of Antigonos; and they soon gave public proof of the jealousy with which they regarded him, by a new alliance which they contracted with one another. Lysimachus, although he had so lately married Amastris, and had children by a former wife, an Odrysian princess—among whom the eldest, Agathocles, was a youth of great promise—received the hand of Arsinoë, Ptolemy's daughter by Berénice. It seems that he would willingly have retained Amastris,\* whom he sincerely loved and esteemed, but she was too high-spirited to endure the presence of a rival, and retired to Heraclea, which she continued to govern, during the minority of her sons, with admirable ability. It was a sacrifice of the domestic affections to reasons of state, destined by a tragical retribution to prove fatal, not only to the happiness of Lysimachus, but to his throne and his life.

Seleucus, notwithstanding his superior power, could not be indifferent to this coalition, which was evidently formed against him. It was to be expected that he should endeavour to strengthen himself by a new alliance; but it must have excited general surprise that, for this purpose, his choice fell upon Demetrius, whose fortunes, as we see from the turn which his affairs had taken in Greece, most men considered as irretrievably ruined. Not so, however, Demetrius himself. He had already experienced and witnessed too many strange vicissitudes to be deeply dejected by his late reverse. He had seen his father a fugitive, seeking protection from Antipater, and, within

\* Plut., Demetr., 4. † Diodor., xx., 111.

‡ Strabo, xvi., p. 335, Tauchn.

\* Memnon ap. Phot., p. 224, b.

a year after, in condition to contend for the dominion of Asia. Seleucus had fallen as low before he rose to an equal height, and owed much less to others. Demetrius was not yet reduced to the situation of a suppliant; he still retained some fragments of his lost power, together with unabated confidence in himself, and seems to have been anxious to show that he had not given himself up to despair. Though he was too weak either to attempt to recover Athens, or to protect his interests in the Peloponnesus, he ventured to assume the offensive against one of his most powerful adversaries. In the spring of 300, leaving Pyrrhus at the Isthmus, he made an expedition with his fleet to the Thracian Chersonesus, and ravaged the coast, which Lysimachus was unable to defend. The immediate object of this movement may have been to enrich the troops with plunder, and to keep up their spirits; but Demetrius probably wished, at the same time, to draw attention on himself, to show that he still possessed means of annoying his enemies; and he must have been aware that an attack on Lysimachus would give no offence to Seleucus.

Still, it must have been with no less surprise than pleasure that he soon after received an embassy, by which Seleucus asked the hand of Stratonice, the daughter of Demetrius and Phila, for himself; though his heir-apparent, Antiochus, might have seemed a fitter consort for the blooming princess. Since it is evident that the object of the proposed alliance was to counteract that which had been formed between Ptolemy and Lysimachus, it might, perhaps, have been expected that he should rather have addressed himself to Cassander, whose power was far greater, and whose interest coincided with his own no less than that of Demetrius. But it is probable that Cassander was, too closely connected with Lysimachus, even if negotiations had not already been set on foot for the marriages which took place not many years later, between Antipater, Cassander's second son, and Eurydice, the daughter of Lysimachus, and between Alexander, the youngest of the Macedonian princes, and Ly-sandra, Ptolemy's daughter by Eurydice. But, moreover, Seleucus may have thought Demetrius better able to secure his object, on account of his fleet, and his possession of Cyprus and the Phœnician towns, which he still occupied with his garrisons; \* while a man in such circumstances was likely to prove a more obsequious ally than the King of Macedonia. Demetrius joyfully accepted the brilliant offer, and sailed with his whole fleet, accompanied by his daughter, towards Syria. On his passage, he landed—it is said merely to obtain the necessary supplies—at several places on the coast of Cilicia. But Pleistarchus, taking umbrage at this intrusion on his territory, retired to Macedonia, to complain to his brother of the league into which Seleucus was entering with the common enemy. Demetrius took advantage of his absence to make himself master of Quinda, where he found 1200 talents still remaining; and, having been joined by Phila, proceeded to Rhossus in Syria. There he was met by Seleucus, who first entertained him in his camp, and then, more fully to show them

perfect mutual confidence, went on board his father-in-law's galley as his guest.

These festivities were followed by many grave conferences on their common affairs; but their discussions and arrangements, of which it is probable very little was publicly known at the time, are now concealed from our curiosity by an impenetrable veil. The only point which we are able to discern with any degree of clearness is, that it was the object of Seleucus to avoid a rupture with the rival powers. For this purpose, while Phila was sent to pacify her brother, he brought about an alliance between Ptolemy and Demetrius, which was to be cemented by a match between Demetrius and Ptolemy's daughter, Ptolemæis; and Pyrrhus, whose sister Deidamia followed her husband to Syria, but died not long after, was sent to the court of Alexandria as a security for the execution of the treaty. But its terms—though they may have been more definite and important than Plutarch represents, are entirely unknown to us; and the modern conjectures on the subject are so uncertain as to be barely worth mentioning.\* The part of the transaction most difficult to comprehend is, that Seleucus should have promoted an alliance which manifestly tended to render Demetrius less dependant on him. But he may have thought that this danger was counterbalanced by the maintenance of peace, which he must have needed for the settlement of his new state, and by the prospect that the connexion into which Ptolemy now entered with Demetrius would weaken that in which he stood with Lysimachus. For Ptolemy it was a clear gain, that he could not only hope to detach Demetrius from the interests of Seleucus, but was put in possession of a hostage, whose title to the kingdom of Epirus might be used as an instrument for acquiring influence over the affairs of Macedonia and Greece. We are told that Pyrrhus took pains to ingratiate himself with Ptolemy, and for that purpose assiduously paid his court to Berenice. Perhaps it might have been said, with equal truth, that Ptolemy strove to win the young king's friendship by kindness, and singled him out to receive the hand of Antigone, Berenice's daughter by her former husband Philippus, not more on account of his merit than to serve his own political views.

For an interval of two or three years after this treaty, we are no better informed as to the proceedings of the parties than as to their com-

\* Droysen (Hellen., i., p. 550) believes that Ptolemy acknowledged Demetrius as king of Cyprus, Cilicia, and Phœnicia. But how is it possible to suppose that Seleucus was a party to a treaty containing such an article? Equally improbable does it appear that Demetrius joined in a general guarantee that Seleucus should indemnify Ptolemy for the loss of Syria, without knowing in what the indemnity was to consist; for, according to Droysen (p. 544), it was Cyprus that Seleucus intended to cede to Ptolemy. Flach's conjecture (ii., p. 18), that Demetrius was recognised as king of Greece, seems in substance very much more consistent with the interests and views—so far as they can be collected—both of Ptolemy and Seleucus: nor is it irreconcilable with the succours which Ptolemy sent to the Athenians after the change that took place in the relations between Demetrius and Seleucus. Raleigh (Hist. of the World, iv., 5) saw and expressed the state of the case very plainly: "Seleucus and Ptolemy could both of them have been contented better, that Demetrius, with help of their countenance, should seek his fortune somewhat farther off, than settle his estate under their noses."

\* Diodorus, xxi. Elog. i., p. 489. Plut., Dem., 32.

pacts or intentions.\* So long, it appears, they continued in the same relations to one another. Demetrius, who, immediately after the treaty, had occupied Cilicia, was permitted to retain undisturbed possession of it. Apparently, Ptolemy and Seleucus were engaged with their domestic affairs; and it seems to have been during this period that Cassander made an unsuccessful attempt to recover Coreyra, and was compelled to retire by the Syracusan tyrant, Agathocles, with the loss of almost all the ships he had employed in the expedition.† Seleucus may have thought it expedient to temporize until he saw what measures Cassander would adopt on the complaint of Pleistarchus; but he certainly never intended to have Demetrius for a permanent neighbour, or to leave either Cilicia or the Phœnician ports in his hands. Perhaps he expected that Demetrius, conscious of his inability to contend with the master of the East, would resign them at the first summons. But, if so, when at length they came to an explanation on the subject, he found that he had deceived himself. He first attempted to induce Demetrius to accept a sum of money as a compensation for Cilicia. Demetrius declined the bargain. He then, in an angry tone, demanded Tyre and Sidon, as appertaining to his own dominions. Demetrius denied his title, and strengthened the garrisons of the towns, declaring that, not if he had lost ten thousand fields like Ipsus, would he consent to pay at such a rate for his son-in-law. The conduct of Seleucus, it is said, was commonly regarded as ungenerous, and he did not deem it expedient immediately to enforce his claims by any warlike movements. But henceforth there was an open breach between him and his father-in-law.

Demetrius was not on this account the less ready to embark in a new enterprise, though it was one which drew him away from the only realm he possessed, while it was threatened by the ambition of at least one powerful neighbour. He still kept his eye fixed on Greece, and especially on Athens; and the state of affairs there seemed to him now to open a fairer prospect of retrieving his losses. Cassander, also, had been endeavouring to re-establish his authority there, but without success. After his failure in Coreyra, he had undertaken an expedition to Greece, had, it seems, made himself master of Phocis, at least of Elateæ, and had invaded Attica. The power of Athens was not sufficient to repel him without assistance; but she still possessed a man of considerable political and military talents, who was a zealous friend of liberty. Her general, Olympiodorus, sailed to Ætolia—the journey overland would, it seems, have been exposed to too many risks—and prevailed on the Ætolians to send succours to Athens. The arrival of these forces induced Cas-

sander to withdraw his army from Attica;‡ and not long after, it seems, Elateæ revolted from him, and was enabled, by the aid of Olympiodorus, to hold out against his attacks.† He did not, however, abandon his designs on Athens, but conceived a hope that he might attain his end by an easier, though, perhaps, slower course. Lachares, the popular leader of the day, was an ambitious, greedy, and unprincipled adventurer, and was persuaded by Cassander to aspire to the station which had been occupied by Demetrius the Phalerian.‡ He now became a secret adherent of the Macedonian interest, while he waited for an opportunity of espousing it more openly, and of rising through it to power. This juncture, when the Athenians were incensed against Cassander, and had still to apprehend a repetition of his attempt, seems to have been that which Demetrius considered so favourable to his hopes, that it encouraged him to make an expedition for the recovery of Athens.§

It was probably in the spring of 297 that he set sail with a formidable armament; but off the coast of Attica he was overtaken by a storm, in which the greater part of his ships were wrecked, and many lives were lost. After this disaster he no longer ventured to present himself at the mouth of the Piræus, but sent orders for the equipment of a new fleet in the eastern ports, and, in the mean while, having made some hostile demonstrations in Attica with little effect, marched into Peloponnesus, to reduce the towns which had revolted from him. The only place named among those which he threatened is Messene, where his assaults were repulsed, and he received a dangerous wound. He recovered, however, in time to attack some other towns more successfully; and these operations probably occupied the remainder of the year. In the course of the following winter an event took place which made an important change in the face of affairs. Cassander was carried off by a disease which popular tradition represented as a stroke of Divine vengeance for his atrocious crimes,|| but which is also described as an ordinary consumption.¶ He was succeeded by his eldest son Philip.

The return of Demetrius to Greece, and his hostilities in Attica, appear, as might be expected, to have changed the disposition of the Athenians with regard to Macedonia, and, perhaps, gave rise to new divisions among them. By a large party he was hated and feared more than Cassander. This party seems to have been headed by Demochares, who had probably returned from his exile, as soon as he heard of the battle of Ipsus. We find him displaying great activity in a war which was once, no doubt, well known under the name of the Four Years' War; but for which it is now somewhat difficult to assign a place in history. It is, how-

\* Pausanias, i., 26, 3.

† Ibid., x., 18, 7; i., 26, 3.

‡ Ibid., i., 26, 7.

§ Here our narrative cannot be reconciled with Plutarch, who clearly supposes (Dem., 33) that Demetrius was induced to undertake his expedition against Athens by the intelligence that Lachares had seized the tyranny. As Lachares, after he became tyrant, made himself very odious, this was a natural conjecture for one who did not minutely examine the chronology of the events he related.

|| Pausanias, ix., 7, 2, *ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἔσπευτο ἐλθεῖν εἰς αὐτόν*. Compare Acts, xii., 23.

¶ Dexippus in Synecellus, p. 504, ed. Bonn., *φθινούσας αἰσχυρίας*; and Porphyry, Euseb., Ann. i., p. 327.

\* This interval is only collected from the history of Demochares, as it appears on the face of the decree concerning him at the end of the Vit. X. Or. Plutarch (Demetr., 32, 33) gives no hint of such an interval; and Mr. Clinton (F. H., B.C. 299) follows him. But if the genuineness of the decree be admitted, which Mr. Clinton does not dispute, it seems an almost unavoidable inference—as will be afterwards seen—that his chronology is here erroneous.

† So Droysen (i., p. 559, n. 12) infers from the position of the fragment in Diodorus, xxi., relating to this expedition, which indicates that it was subsequent to the battle of Ipsus.

ever, nearly certain that it belongs to this period;\* and it may have included the contest with Cassander, as well as that which immediately followed with Demetrius, and thus have ended with the surrender of the city. We hear of no negotiations between the Athenians and Cassander after the re-appearance of Demetrius; but we learn that Demochares was sent on an embassy to Lysimachus, and obtained a subsidy of thirty talents from him; and that he carried a decree for an embassy to Ptolemy, who sent fifty talents,† and, it seems, promises of farther support. There is also some ground to believe that Demochares went on a like mission to Philip, Cassander's successor; though the behaviour imputed to him on this occasion is utterly incredible.‡ Philip's reign lasted only four months; but, as he died at Elatea,§ it may be inferred that he was engaged in the prosecution of his father's plans. He was succeeded by his younger brother, Antipater. It was perhaps about the same time, in the spring of 296, that Demetrius was preparing to lay siege to Athens. The city had been well provided with the means of defence under the direction of Demochares; the walls had been repaired, and the arsenal amply stored with ammunition; and he did not cease to seek aid from without. He concluded a treaty of peace and alliance with the Boeotians, and headed an embassy to the young king, Antipater, from whom he received a subsidy of twenty talents.|| But the subsistence of the Athenians still depended on continual supplies from abroad. Demetrius ravaged the country from Eleusis to Rhamnus, and proceeded to blockade the city by sea and land.

\* So much has, I think, been satisfactorily shown by Droysen in an article on this war in the *Zeitschrift f. d. Alterthumswissenschaft*, 1836. But it is difficult to conceive that the war can have received a designation by which it was known at Athens, as Droysen supposes (i., p. 563), with reference to its duration, so far as it concerned, not Athens, but Demetrius. It seems preferable to make it begin with Cassander's attempts upon Athens in 296.

† The Decree at the end of Vit. X. Or., p. 92, ed. Westermann.

‡ Seneca (*De Ira*, iii., 23), to illustrate Philip's patience under insults, relates that Demochares—*Parrhesiastes* or *nimium et procacem linguam appellatus* (compare Polybius, xii., 13)—having been sent on an embassy to him, when the king asked what he could do to oblige the Athenians, answered, *Hang yourself*. The by-standers were indignant. Philip, however, dismissed this *Thersites* unhurt, bidding his colleagues tell the Athenians that men who said such things were more arrogant than those who patiently listened to them. Seneca evidently supposed Alexander's father to have been the hero of his story, which, indeed, suits his character; but then Demochares, the nephew of Demochares, cannot have been the ambassador. The story, however, might originally have been told of Demochares with reference to an embassy to Philip, Cassander's son. As to the fact, in the form in which Seneca relates it, it requires a peculiar bias—from which Droysen has shown himself, on other occasions, not wholly exempt—to believe that any Athenian ambassador was ever guilty of such outrageous and brutal folly. In the case of Demochares, not only would it be inconsistent with the judgment of Polybius (u. s.) on his character, and with the impression which the extracts from his memoir preserved by Athenæus must make on an impartial reader, but it is utterly incredible that a man who had committed so gross a breach of decency in his embassy to Philip should have been sent, a few months after, in the same capacity to his successor, when the object was to implore succours. The silence of the Decree casts some suspicion on the fact of the embassy to Philip.

§ Dexippus, u. s.

|| The Decree (u. s.). Grauert (*An.* p. 349) suspects that this may be the younger Antipater, who reigned for about six weeks in 297. But one does not see why the Athenians should either have sought or received a subsidy from him. Mr. Clinton (p. 380) proposes to change the text.

He put to death the owner and master of a vessel laden with corn, which they attempted to bring into the harbour; and this severity deterred most private adventurers from such attempts. In the course of the summer an Egyptian fleet of 150 sail appeared in the Saronic Gulf, and excited hopes of more effectual relief.\* It was but a short gleam of sunshine. Soon after Demetrius received re-enforcements from Cyprus and Peloponnesus, which raised his fleet to 300 sail, and compelled the Egyptians to seek safety in flight.

Meanwhile the city was agitated by the strife of parties, whose views or pretexts are now only matter for conjecture. We know, however, that it afforded Lachares an opportunity of executing his long-cherished design, and that he became absolute master of Athens. Demochares, who was not a man to truckle to the tyrant, was driven into exile.† The usurper was probably supported by a body of mercenaries; but he was still exposed to constant danger both from within and from without. Polyænus relates‡ that Demetrius obtained arms for a thousand men from a party in Piræus, under the pretext that they were to be employed against Lachares. The story seems almost to imply that Piræus was in the hands of this party, and that they were expecting re-enforcements. The extraordinary cruelty imputed to Lachares§ may be attributed to his uneasy position in the midst of so many enemies. Yet he appears to have been more infamous for sacrilege than for bloodshed. He evidently saw that he could not retain his power long, and used it for the most sordid ends. He plundered the temples, and stripped the statue in the Parthenon of its precious ornaments. As the blockade continued, the price of the common necessities of life rose to a height which placed them out of the reach of all but the wealthy. As a specimen of the sufferings of the besieged, we read of a contest between a father and son for a dead mouse. Epicurus, who was at this time living at Athens, as the head of a philosophical society, shared a certain number of beans among the members for their daily meal.|| The patience with which the Athenians submitted to such privations may serve as a measure of the dread and aversion they felt for Demetrius. In fact, they had passed a decree making it a capital offence to propose a capitulation with him. The terror inspired by Lachares must, how-

\* Droysen (*Zeitschrift f. A. u. s. w.*, 1836, n. 20) conjectures that this was the same fleet which brought Pyrrhus back to Epirus.

† The Decree, u. s., *ἀπὸ τῶν ῥήτορων τῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ*, which can hardly be applied to Demetrius, who was the professed restorer of democracy. But it appears unnecessary to press the meaning of *ἀπὸ τῶν ῥήτορων* has done, referring it to the alliance with the Boeotians, and showing, with his usual ingenuity, how that treaty might have been made a ground of charge against Demochares by the Macedonian party. It may surely mean nothing more than that the patriotism of Demochares, of which he had given such signal proofs in his measures for the defence of the city, rendered him odious to the enemies of freedom, and was the cause of his banishment.

‡ iv., 7, 5. But Polyænus does not say, as Droysen (i., p. 567) seems to represent, that Demetrius became by these means master of Piræus, nor can this be safely inferred from *Plut.* i., 25, 8.

§ *Plut.*, *Dem.*, 34. It may seem, from the fragment of the comic poet Demetrius, in Athenæus, ix., p. 405, that Lachares himself had no better fare for his guests. Yet the expression *Λαχάρους τῖνος* is strange, if the noted tyrant was meant.

ever, be taken into account. There were, no doubt, many who were eager to be delivered, at any rate, from his tyranny. It seems that at length he himself found his position insupportable or untenable.\* He stole out in a rustic disguise through a postern, and then mounted a horse which was waiting for him at a short distance. He is said to have dropped gold pieces on his road, and thus to have detained a party of light horse who were sent in pursuit of him. He arrived safely at Thebes, where he found shelter, as in an allied city.† Perhaps a part of his sacrilegious plunder had been already lodged there.

After his departure the gates were immediately thrown open to Demetrius, and an embassy sent to propitiate him, though with little hope of a favourable hearing. The conqueror was not vindictive; and he resolved to astonish the people by a display of magnanimity, which was also likely to promote his interests in Greece. He ordered them to assemble in the theatre; the avenues were occupied, and the stage lined with his guards. While the audience sat in trembling suspense, Demetrius made his appearance at the entrance commonly assigned to the principal personage of a drama, and came forward to the front of the stage. It was to have been expected that a harangue full of bitter reproaches would introduce some tragic scene. But his first words dispelled these apprehensions. He complained of their conduct towards him, but in the mildest terms, and the gentlest tone, as if only to assure them of his forgiveness; and, as a seal of reconciliation, promised a donation of corn, and the re-establishment of their democratical institutions; and when one of his hearers corrected a grammatical error which he committed in his harangue, he expressed his gratitude for the lesson by a liberal addition to his present.† It may easily be conceived that the most practised orators could hardly find language strong enough to express the gratitude and admiration excited by this speech. But the transports of the spectators were probably a little cooled, when Dromoclides, who, at least, understood the mind of Demetrius, proposed that Piræus and Munychia should be placed in his hands. The motion was, of course, carried by acclamation; but Demetrius, as we shall see, did not long remain satisfied with this mark of confidence.

We have seen that, in his last campaign in Peloponnesus, he had been repulsed from Messene. It is therefore not surprising that, when he had made himself master of Athens, he should have returned to complete the conquest of the peninsula. But instead of Messene, we find that Sparta is now the object of his attack ; and no cause is assigned for the fact. Sparta was at this time so weak, and had kept so carefully aloof from all the contests which had disturbed Greece since Alexander's death, that it is improbable she should have offered any provocation to Demetrius. She had, however, shown her determination to preserve her independence ; and it seems that during Cassander's invasion

of Peloponnesus in 317, the Spartans had already, for the first time, begun to fortify some points of their city.\* Possibly Demetrius had demanded some tokens of submission which they refused.† They were, at least, aware of his design before he had advanced very far, and made such preparations as they could for defence. King Archidamus, a nephew of Agis, who fell in the battle with Antipater, was sent with an army, which must have been almost entirely composed of the subject classes, or mercenaries, to meet the invaders, and fell in with them near Mantinea.‡ The two armies were separated from one another by a woody hill, a spur of the Lycæan range. Demetrius set fire to the wood, and, while a north wind drove the flames against the enemy, made a charge which threw them into confusion.§ Archidamus retreated with the remainder of his forces to protect Laconia, and the Spartans, expecting an immediate invasion, hastily threw up some additional intrenchments round the capital. Still, they ventured on another action in the immediate neighbourhood of Sparta, but were again defeated with the loss of 200 slain and 500 prisoners; and the chief hope they had now left was in the strength of their newly-raised ramparts. Against the besieger such defences could not have availed them long. But at the moment when the success of Demetrius seemed almost certain, he was called away by intelligence which opened the prospect of a much more important conquest in another quarter.

After his departure for Greece, Ptolemy and Seleucus seem to have agreed to divide his eastern possessions between them. Ptolemy, at least, was permitted to conquer Cyprus; which was the easier, as Demetrius had drawn off all the naval forces he could raise there for the siege of Athens; and there can be little doubt that Seleucus, at the same time, made himself master of all he could wrest from his father-in-law on the main land. They perhaps invited Lysimachus—he, at least, took the opportunity—to reduce the towns which still belonged to Demetrius on the coast of Asia Minor. According to Plutarch, Demetrius heard of all these losses at the same time, just as Sparta was on the point of falling; and the news from Cyprus touched his personal feelings; for his mother and children were besieged by Ptolemy in Salamis, the only place in the island which still held out. Nevertheless, it is quite incredible that this intelligence had any effect on his movements. It was, no doubt, the change which had taken place in the state of affairs in Macedonia that induced him suddenly to break up his camp on the Eurotas.

Alexander, Antipater's younger brother, was the favourite of their mother, Thessalonice, and, perhaps, was encouraged by her to aspire to

\* Justin, xiv., 5, 5.

† Droyen believes that, without having been threatened or provoked, they were induced by Ptolemy's instigation to begin hostilities against Demetrius. This seems hardly consistent with the caution and the weakness of Sparta, and contradicts Plutarch's statement, *Dem.*, 35. It is more surprising that Demetrius should have left the Spartans unmolested so long, than that he should have attacked them now. If there were any ground for Fläthe's conjecture (*ii.*, p. 22) that he was jealous of the title of their kings, it would only increase this difficulty.

‡ Plut., Dem., 25.

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\* It is not quite clear what Pausanias (i., 25, 7) meant by his ἀλίσκομένου τοῦ τείχους. Polyenus (iii., 7, 1) also has ἀλίσκομενον τὸ τείχος.

† Polyneus, iii., 7, 1. Pausanias (i., 25, 7) thought that he was murdered on this journey.

‡ Plut., Reg. et Imp., ap. Δημητρίου, 2.

the throne, or, at least, to the possession of a princely appanage; for it seems that he had claims, and adherents to support them. Antipater, in a fit of rage, for no advantage could be hoped from such a crime, murdered his mother with his own hand. Yet it appears that the deed excited so little horror among his subjects, that he might have continued to reign, if Alexander, who saw himself unable to maintain his footing in Macedonia, had not called in foreign aid. He could expect none from Thrace, since Antipater had married the daughter of Lysimachus; and this rendered it the more necessary to seek it elsewhere. There were two other quarters which he might apply to. Pyrrhus had now regained the throne of Epirus. He had been furnished with troops and money by Ptolemy, about the same time that Demetrius was engaged in the siege of Athens, and had first compelled Neoptolemus to share the kingdom with him, and then got rid of his rival, who, as he gave out, had plotted against his life. To him, now master of an undivided realm, Alexander addressed himself in his need; but that he might have a double hope to lean on, he sent an embassy for the same purpose to Demetrius. Pyrrhus was the nearest at hand, and consented to march against Antipater, but on condition that Alexander should cede to him a large extent of territory, apparently including all the conquests that had been made by Cassander on the side of Ætolia, together with a portion of Macedonia itself.\* The young prince granted this high price through fear of Lysimachus, and because Demetrius was too much occupied by his affairs in Greece to comply immediately with his request. Antipater was unable to resist the invader, and, it appears, tried in vain to avert his hostility by an offer of 300 talents. Lysimachus was at this time engaged in a war with the Getae, which prevented him from interposing in behalf of his son-in-law, otherwise than by an ineffectual attempt to deceive Pyrrhus. He forged a letter to him in Ptolemy's name, recommending him to accept Antipater's offer. But Pyrrhus detected the fraud by the greeting of the letter, which, instead of the affectionate form always used by Ptolemy in their correspondence, "*The Father to his Son*," ran, in court style, "*King Ptolemy to King Pyrrhus*." Still, Lysimachus was anxious for peace, which Pyrrhus, having accomplished his immediate objects, was willing to grant. But the ratification was prevented, it is said, by a sinister omen. It appears, nevertheless, that Antipater was permitted to retain a part of Macedonia.† Nothing could better suit the interests of Pyrrhus than such a partition of the neighbouring

kingdom. Alexander remained in quiet possession of the rest.

This must have been the intelligence which called Demetrius so suddenly away from Sparta: not the first application which he received from Alexander, but the news that Pyrrhus had entered Macedonia. He had probably not been informed of the negotiation between Pyrrhus and Alexander, or he would have instantly broken off every affair that detained him in Greece, rather than resign such an opportunity of aggrandizement to the King of Epirus, whom, since the death of Deidamia, he could only consider as his rival, and the devoted ally of his enemy, Ptolemy. Feigning himself unconscious that his aid was no longer needed or desired, he advanced without delay, so as even to give his retreat from Sparta the appearance of a flight,\* to the frontiers of Macedonia. Alexander, alarmed and uncertain about his designs, marched with all his forces to meet him, and received him at Diium as an honoured guest, yet so as clearly enough to betray the uneasiness he felt at the unwelcome visit. Demetrius was privately informed that his royal host intended to assassinate him at a banquet. He provided for his own safety, but dissembled his suspicions, and the next day, pretending to have received news of some movements in Greece, which forced him to hasten his return, began to make preparations for his departure. Alexander, rejoicing at the unexpected deliverance, would accompany him as far as Larissa.† There, as his enemies gave out after his death, he hoped still to execute his murderous design; but, that he might not awaken suspicion by an appearance of distrust, suffered himself to be forestalled. It is certain that he accepted an invitation from Demetrius, and, as he was leaving the banqueting-room, was cut down by the guards whom Demetrius had posted there for the purpose, together with several of his friends. One of them is said to have acknowledged that Demetrius had gained the start of them only by a single day: but a fact so improbable cannot safely be admitted on such suspicious testimony.

It was night when the deed was perpetrated, and the news filled the Macedonian camp with alarm and tumult until the morning, when a message was brought from Demetrius, by which he expressed his desire to address the army, and to give an account of his conduct. He not only vindicated it to the satisfaction of the military assembly, but made so favourable an impression on his hearers,‡ that, preferring him

\* Plut., Pyrrh., 6. According to Niebuhr's emendation, *τῶν τῶν Συμπάτων, καὶ τῶν Παπῶν τῆς Μακεδονίας* (iii., p. 459, Engl. tr., where *Παπῶν* and *Παπῶν* should be transposed).

† This is distinctly stated by Justin, xvi., 1, 19; it perhaps suggested the notion of an antecedent *divisio regni*, mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, and is even clearly implied in Plutarch's narrative, Pyrrhus, 6, coupled with Demetr., 37. Nor would it be easy otherwise to explain the assertion of Pausanias (ix., 7, 8) that Antipater was dethroned by Demetrius. Droysen relies more on the expression *ἀντιπῶν τῇ βασιλείᾳ* in the fragment of Diodorus, xxi. He also believes that Antipater fled twice to the court of Lysimachus, once before Pyrrhus, and again before Demetrius. This supposition seems at least unnecessary, and no argument for it can be safely drawn from Dexipus.

\* Polyænus, iv., vii., 10. Here is an extremely striking and instructive example, to show how dangerous it is to ground an inference as to chronology on the seeming continuity of events in Plutarch's narratives. Mr. Clinton (F. H., under B.C. 299) places the siege of Athens by Demetrius about two years after the battle of Ipsus, because Plutarch enumerates the intermediate events without any indication of a longer interval. Yet Plutarch (Demetr., 36) connects the capture of Athens with the invasion of Sparta, which preceded the accession of Demetrius to the throne of Macedon (fixed by Mr. Clinton in 294) not many weeks, by the word *εὐθὺς*.

† So Plutarch, Dem., 36: and there is no reason for questioning that his joy was sincere, and not—as Droysen represents it, i., p. 580—assumed to mask his murderous intentions. There was no adequate motive for such a dangerous attempt after the departure of Demetrius.

‡ Plutarch observes (Dem., 37) that he had no need of long speeches: and indeed, with an army to second him,



to the parricide, and having no other competitor before them, they elected him to fill the vacant throne, and he returned to Macedonia at their head. The choice of the army was approved by the great mass of the people, who had never much affection for the bloodthirsty Cassander, or any of his family, and least of all would wish to be governed by Antipater. Whatever title his grandfather, their old governor, had to their regard, was inherited by the noble-minded Phila, and thus devolved upon her husband and their son Antigonus, surnamed Gonatas,\* who was now a youth capable of bearing arms, and had accompanied his father in this expedition. Antipater, probably finding himself generally abandoned, and having no hope of gaining anything from Demetrius, either by arms or negotiation, fled to the court of Lysimachus. But Lysimachus, who was now engaged more earnestly than ever with his preparations against his northern neighbours, was glad to make peace with Demetrius, and, it seems, compelled his son-in-law to renounce his claim to the part of Macedonia which had been assigned to him in the treaty with Pyrrhus.† Thus, seven years after the battle of Ipsus, and just at the time when he saw himself deprived of the last remnants of his patrimony in the East, Demetrius had acquired a new kingdom, in which he had never been able to set his foot while his father's power was at his command. At the same time, he heard that Ptolemy had been generous enough to let his mother and children depart with munificent presents, after they had fallen into his hands at Salamis. It might be considered as an additional favour of fortune that Seleucus had given up the beautiful Stratonice to his heir-apparent, Antiochus, whose life appeared to be in danger through the violence of his passion for his mother-in-law, and reserving the government of the provinces west of the Euphrates for himself, had committed the rest of his vast empire to his son.

It remained for Demetrius to complete the subjugation of Greece, and to unite it firmly with his new dominions. This was the more necessary, as he had a formidable rival in Pyrrhus, who would be ready to seize whatever he might leave unoccupied. Thessaly, it seems, as little more than a province of Macedonia, forthwith acknowledged his authority. But the Bœotians had not submitted to him, and we may collect that, after his retreat from Laconia, they had entered into treaty with Sparta, and had been encouraged by promises of Spartan succours to assert their independence. But Demetrius surprised them by the rapidity of his movements. He sent a herald before him with a declaration of war; but the day after the Bœotarchs received it at Orchomenus, he himself encamped at Cheronea.‡ In their con-

sternation they sued for peace, which he granted on moderate terms. Hoping, perhaps, that he had secured their fidelity by his generosity, he exacted no other pledge, and, it appears, returned immediately to Macedonia, where there was no doubt much to demand his presence, especially as the affairs of Lysimachus were in a critical position. But, shortly after his departure, the Bœotians were induced to revolt by the arrival of a Spartan army, commanded by Cleonymus, the uncle of the king Areus. The Spartan government probably hoped that the resistance of Bœotia might protect its own territory from a second invasion, which it had reason to apprehend as soon as Demetrius should be at leisure. A citizen of Thespizæ, named Pisis, who possessed the power without the name of a tyrant, also excited his countrymen to renew the struggle. But they soon found that they had misreckoned their means. Demetrius returned with a powerful army, forced Cleonymus to withdraw, and laid siege to Thebes. The retreat of the Spartans struck their allies with dismay, and they again submitted to the conqueror. Lachares, who had hitherto remained at Thebes, hid himself for some days when the city surrendered, and then made his escape to Delphi.\* Demetrius used his victory with great moderation, though he did not again trust the loyalty of the Bœotians. Only fourteen of the principal authors of the revolt suffered punishment;† but he exacted heavy contributions, and threw garrisons into their cities, and appointed Hieronymus of Cardia, the historian, governor-general of Bœotia. Pisis, who fell into his hands, he treated with unexpected lenity, leaving him in full possession of his former authority at Thespizæ, with the title of polemarch.‡

It was perhaps the Bœotian insurrection that led Demetrius to take a new precaution for the security of Athens, and it was probably now—at least not later—that he fortified an eminence called the Museum, within the walls of the city, and lodged a garrison there under the command of Heraclides. Polyænus relates a plot laid by the Athenian generals to introduce a body of Athenian troops into the city, to kill Heraclides and overpower the garrison. But it was defeated through the defection of a Carian leader of mercenaries, named Hierocles, who disclosed it to Heraclides, and enabled him to destroy all the conspirators.‡ It seems clear that this occurred after the Museum had been fortified, and the attempt was a natural result of the resentment which must have been awakened in the Athenians by the

\* Polyæn., iii., 7, 2.

† Diodor., xxi.

‡ Plat., Dem., 30.

‡ Paus., i., 25, 8, *ὁτις τὸν πόλεμον ἐκράτησε*.

‡ Polyæn., v., 17, 1. The scene of the interview between Hierocles and the Athenian generals, the Eleusinium on the Ilissus (Leake's Athens, p. 114), seems to connect this enterprise so closely with the Museum, that it must be supposed either that Pausanias (i., 29, 10) made a mistake, or that, notwithstanding the similarity of the circumstances, he is speaking of a different transaction. This can scarcely have been the victory which he alluded to in the passage quoted in the last note. The difficulty arising from the remark of Polyænus, *αὐτὸς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσπίδα*, remains the same on either supposition, and is not satisfactorily explained by Droyen's conjecture, that it was somehow or other occasioned by the name of the Macedonian river *Ἀσπίδα*. *Διοφάντας* should be *διὰ τὴν Ἀσπίδα*, as it is translated, *aperta quadam parte portarum*.

and so many circumstances in his favour, addressing troops without a leader, he might well dispense with eloquence.

\* According to Dexippus and Porphyry, from the Thessalian town of Gonni (compare Steph. Byz., s. 2). Where they suppose him to have been born or brought up. And this seems quite as probable as Niebuhr's conjecture (*Kleine Schriften*, p. 238), that the epithet was derived from a part of his armour, the *γομαρίς*, an iron piece which covered the knee; which, however, has the usual spelling in its favour.

† Justin., xvi., 1, *tradita ei altera parte Macedonia, quam Antipater genero ejus obtulerat, pacem cum eo fecit*.

‡ Polyæn., iv., 9, 12.

conduct of Demetrius. On the other hand, it is not improbable that the evidence which it gave of their spirit may have been the occasion which induced him to recall a number of Athenian exiles. As Dinarchus, the enemy of Demosthenes, was one of them, and they are said to have owed their restoration to the influence of Theophrastus,\* it may be concluded that they all belonged to the oligarchical party which had opposed Demetrius when he appeared as the champion of liberty, but in which he might expect to find his firmest supporters, as soon as he had proved his resolution to adopt the maxims of Cassander, and to govern Athens by military force.†

When he had completed the conquest of Bœotia, he returned to Macedonia. There can be little doubt that he would have pursued his march into Peloponnesus, to take revenge on Sparta for the recent provocation, and to accomplish what he had been obliged to leave unfinished, had not the state of affairs in the north more urgently demanded his attention. It was not long after that Lysimachus set out on an expedition, which Demetrius must have watched with great anxiety, as its issue could not but materially affect his own prospects. Its object was to decide the contest which had now been carried on for some years between the Greek kingdom of Thrace and the great Thracian tribe, called the Getes. This division of the race had, it seems, been driven eastward from its seat on the right of the Danube by an irruption of the Triballians, who were themselves making way for the Gauls.‡ The Getes then established themselves in the country on the northwest shore of the Euxine, which had once been occupied by the Scythians, whose great empire had been long dissolved into a number of feeble, disunited hordes. In their new territories they had become formidable neighbours to the Greek princes of the Tauric Chersonesus (Crimea); for the Thracian, Arpharnes, who supported Eumelus, one of these princes, with an army of 22,000 foot and 20,000 horse, in a war against his brothers for the succession, seems to have been king of the Getes.§ They were now governed by one named Dromichætēs, under whom their power appears to have reached its greatest height, and whose noble character would impress us with a favourable opinion of his subjects, if it was not evident that he was as much superior to his own people as he was to most of the contemporary kings. Lysimachus, we know not how long after the battle of Ipsus, had extended his dominions on the northeast frontier at the expense of the Getes; but his eldest son, Agathocles, had afterward fallen into the enemy's hands. Dromichætēs sent the young prince back with presents to his father, hoping that Lysimachus would meet this generosity by restitution and forbearance. But Lysimachus probably attributed conduct so foreign to his own character and to the maxims of the age, to the fear which the barbarian felt of his

power, and was only encouraged by it to prosecute his plans of conquest. He invaded the country of the Getes with an army, it is said, of 100,000 men, accompanied by Clearchus, the eldest son of Amastria,\* who, no doubt, brought a body of troops from Heraclea. But, trusting to the guidance of a Thracian who pretended to have deserted to him, he suffered himself to be drawn into a position where, to avoid starving, he was fain to surrender with all his forces.† Dromichætēs received his royal prisoner with more than chivalrous courtesy, saluted him with the name of father, and respectfully conducted him to the Gete city of Elis. There the barbarians were clamorous for vengeance on an enemy who had shown himself dead to all sense both of justice and gratitude. Still, Dromichætēs soothed them, and representing to them that they would gain nothing by the death of Lysimachus, whose dominions would probably be occupied by a more powerful successor, but that if they spared him they might recover all they had lost, he obtained their consent to treat him as he himself thought fit. He first made inquiries among the prisoners after the principal courtiers and attendants of Lysimachus, and restored them to their places about their master's person. Then, on occasion of a sacrifice, he invited Lysimachus and his nobles to a banquet, where he also entertained the persons of highest rank among the barbarians. But he had ordered preparations to be made so as to exhibit the Macedonian luxury and the Thracian simplicity in the most glaring contrast with each other. While on one side of the hall the prisoners, stretched on couches adorned with the rich furniture found among the spoil, were sumptuously regaled, and drank from gold and silver vessels, the conquerors lay over against them on coarse matting, partook of their usual homely fare, and drank out of horns or wooden cups. Towards the close of the feast, Dromichætēs asked his guest which style of entertainment he preferred, and took occasion to point out to him the folly of his aggression on an enemy who had so little to lose. Lysimachus might well think himself fortunate to receive no severer lesson. He gladly consented to cede all that he possessed east of the Danube, and offered the choice of his daughters to his generous monitor, who replaced the diadem on his brow, and dismissed him and his chief officers with presents.‡ Clearchus remained some time longer a captive, but he, too, was afterward released at the intercession of Lysimachus.§

The news of the defeat and capture of Lysimachus soon reached Macedonia, and Demetrius hastened to take advantage of it. He marched into Thrace, and, it appears, made himself master of Sestus. Lachares, who had taken refuge in the dominions of Lysimachus, happened to be in the town, and when it surrendered lay concealed for some days, and then made his escape in female disguise, under a black veil, as one of the mourners at a funeral, and fled to Lysimachia,|| the new capital founded by Lysimachus on the Isthmus near Cardia.

\* Plut., X. Orat., p. 850, D. Dionys., Dinarch., 2.

† This is Droyen's combination (i., p. 588), and in Zimmernann's Zeitschrift, 1836, p. 166.

‡ Niebuhr, Kl. Schr., p. 374, where he had in his mind a passage of Appian (Illyr., 3), which he has referred to elsewhere. (Hist. of Rome, ii., p. 512, Engl. tr.)

§ Diodor., xx., 22. Niebuhr, u. s., p. 381.

\* Memnon ep. Phot., p. 224, 4to, ed. Bekk.

† Polyenus, vii., 25.

‡ Diodor., xxi. Exc. Vat., p. 44. Strabo, vii., p. 302.

§ Memnon ep. Phot. Polyenus, vii., 3.

But Demetrius was suddenly arrested in his career of conquest by intelligence from two opposite quarters. He heard, it seems, nearly at the same time that Bœotia had again revolted from him, and that Lysimachus had recovered his liberty, and was on his way homeward.

The conquest of Thrace must have been an object of far greater moment to him than the reduction of the Bœotian towns, in which he could not have expected to find much difficulty, and which was the less pressing, as he had left Antigonus with a force sufficient, as the event proved, to quell the insurrection without him. It is therefore a little surprising that he should have suffered himself to be diverted from his enterprise. But perhaps he apprehended that if he persevered, he might have not only Lysimachus, but his new ally, the king of the Gêtes, upon his hands; and still more, that he might be attacked by Pyrrhus. This, and not his resentment against the Bœotians, was probably the motive that induced him to decamp from the Chersonesus, and to march with all speed southward. When he arrived in Bœotia, he found that the insurgents had already been defeated by Antigonus, and he immediately laid siege to Thebes. There can be little doubt that the Bœotians had been secretly stimulated by Pyrrhus to their attempt, which would otherwise have been desperately rash; and he now made a diversion in their favour. He invaded and overran Thessaly, and advanced as far as Thermopylæ. Demetrius, leaving his son to conduct the siege, hastened to meet him. His army must have been very strong; for he not only compelled Pyrrhus to retreat into Epirus, but was able to leave a corps of 10,000 foot and 1000 horse for the protection of Thessaly, and then returned to prosecute the siege. The Thebans, now despairing of forgiveness, made an obstinate resistance. Demetrius found it necessary to resort to the use of his huge Helepolis. In the mean while he ordered repeated assaults, in which he lost so many of his men, that Antigonus remonstrated with his father on the needless sacrifice of life. The answer was characteristic, "Why, my son, should that concern you? Have you to pay the dead?" He, however, exposed his own person to animate the assailants, and received a severe wound in his neck. The siege appears to have lasted the greater part of a year; in 290 the place surrendered at discretion. After so many provocations, the besieged had reason to expect the most rigorous treatment; yet the conqueror again contented himself with a very lenient vengeance. Some thirteen were put to death; a few banished, and an amnesty proclaimed for the rest.\*

It was the year of the Pythian games, and was rendered memorable by an innovation with respect to them, which illustrates the character, if not the policy of Demetrius. At the time when the games were to be celebrated at Delphi, the passes of the road from Athens to Delphi were occupied by the Ætolians, who, it seems, were in alliance with Pyrrhus; so that the sacred embassy, usually sent by the Athenians to attend the festival, could not safely undertake the journey. Demetrius could

probably have furnished it with a sufficient escort, both to have cleared the road of all obstacles, and to have guarded against interruption during the games; but he preferred to celebrate them at Athens, not on the ground of the temporary emergency, but declaring that the city where Apollo was worshipped, under a title which implied the antiquity of its devotion to the god, was the fittest of all places for his festival. Demetrius may have wished to gratify the vanity of the Athenians: it is clear that, in this proceeding, he assumed the functions of the Amphictyonic Council.\*

Nevertheless, the conduct of the Ætolians rendered it necessary, for the reputation of his arms, that he should chastise them; and it was also time to retaliate upon Pyrrhus for his late invasion of Thessaly, and to wrest from him the Macedonian provinces which he still retained. Demetrius had perhaps another motive, which will be presently mentioned, for an expedition to the West; and it was no longer a matter of choice with him whether he should bestir himself or remain quiet. He had placed himself in a situation which demanded a continual succession of fresh enterprises. From the time of his accession to the throne of Macedonia, it seems that it had been his constant object to increase his military and naval power to an extent adequate to the vast projects which that unexpected turn of fortune probably first suggested to him; for he now aspired to nothing less than the recovery of his father's empire—an attempt which he well knew must bring him into a conflict with the combined forces of Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus, even if Pyrrhus should have been previously subdued. He had raised an army quite out of proportion to the ordinary resources of his kingdom, and it was not only kept on foot, but continually growing. One consequence was, that his government became a pure military despotism, and that he was quite independent of the good will of the people, and depended entirely on the army; another was, that he was obliged to find employment for his troops, both to relieve his treasury, and to guard against the disorders arising from the leisure of the camp. In the spring, then, of 289, he invaded Ætolia, and after he had ravaged the country, left his general, Pantauchus, with a strong division to curb the Ætolians, while he himself marched into Epirus. In the mean while, Pyrrhus, foreseeing that his own territory would otherwise be the next seat of war, had moved to succour his allies. The two armies, however, happened to take different roads, so that nearly at the same time Demetrius arrived in Epirus, Pyrrhus in Ætolia. Pantauchus did not decline a battle; and, as he was distinguished above all the generals of Demetrius for strength and courage, seized the opportunity to display his personal prowess against a royal foe. Before the engagement began, he came forward and challenged Pyrrhus to a single combat. Pyrrhus, in person and in spirit no unworthy descendant of Achilles, disdained all scruples, whether of usage or prudence, and advanced to the encounter. He received a wound, but gave two, and would have slain his antagonist if he had not been rescued by his friends. The Epirots were animated by

\* Pint., *Dem.*, 40. According to Diodorus, xxi., *Eclog.*, l., p. 491, only ten suffered.

\* *Plut.*, *Dem.*, 40

the event of the combat; the enemy disheartened, as well by the absence of their commander as by its cause. In the end, Pyrrhus gained a complete victory, and took 5000 prisoners: the number of the slain is not mentioned, and perhaps he thought it prudent to spare the lives of the Macedonians as much as possible. But the advantage which he reaped from his success extended much farther. The Macedonians who had witnessed his exploits were struck with admiration, and perhaps found some solace for their defeat in the praises they bestowed on the conqueror. "He was, indeed, a soldier, worthy to command soldiers: the only king of the age in whom there could be traced any likeness to the great Alexander. Pyrrhus revived this image by the fire and vigour of his movements in the field of battle; the rest only mimicked the hero, whose title they assumed, in their demeanour, and in the trappings and state of royalty." It was a comparison peculiarly dangerous for their own sovereign, whose arrogance and love of ostentation had grown more inordinate than ever, since he sat on Alexander's throne.

Demetrius found no one to resist him in Epirus, and ravaged and plundered there at his pleasure. He made no attempt to seek Pyrrhus, most probably because he was occupied with another easier and more agreeable conquest. Pyrrhus had lost his queen Antigonæ, and after her death, according to the now prevailing usage of Greek princes, married three wives; all, it seems, for the sake of advantageous alliances. One was a Pæonian, another an Illyrian princess; and to these he added Lanassa, the daughter of Agathocles, with whom he received Corcyra as her portion. But the pride of the Greek princess was soon wounded by the attention which he continued to pay to his barbarian wives. She quitted him, and retired to Corcyra, where she looked out for an opportunity of revenge. She knew that she might reckon on the service of Demetrius, and invited him to take possession of her person and of the island. How welcome such an offer must have been to him may be gathered from the fact that, when the Spartan Cleonymus made himself master of Corcyra,\* both Demetrius and Cassander courted his alliance.† As Cleonymus was known to entertain hostile designs against Agathocles, it may be supposed that the relations which had hitherto subsisted between Demetrius and the Sicilian tyrant had been far from friendly. But about this time Agathocles sent his son, who bore the father's name, to Demetrius, to conclude an alliance with him. Demetrius received the young prince with the highest honours, invested him with a royal robe, and sent him back with splendid presents, accompanied by one of his own courtiers, named Oxythemis, who was publicly charged with the ratification of the treaty, but was secretly instructed to observe the state of Sicily, on which, it seems, Demetrius had cast his eye, as on a prize which might, perhaps, one day become his. How far this negotiation was connected with Lanassa's offer does not appear;

but it must have been on the occasion of his expedition to Epirus that Demetrius complied with her invitation, and made himself master of Corcyra.

In the following year Demetrius was attacked by a dangerous illness, and while he lay sick at Pella, Pyrrhus made an irruption into his kingdom, overran it almost entirely, and advanced as far as Edessa. Demetrius, however, recovered in time, and when he was able to take the field, soon expelled the invader. Still, the continuance of the war with Pyrrhus offered little prospect of advantage, and, as appeared from the events of the late campaign, might lead to disastrous consequences. It was only in Asia that he could hope to find a field worthy of his ambition, where he might rely on the constant attachment of his troops, so long as fortune favoured his enterprises. He therefore concluded a truce with Pyrrhus, that he might be able to devote his whole attention to the preparations which he was making for his expedition to the East. They were now very far advanced, and were on a scale proportioned to the magnitude of the object he had in view. To the fleet of 300 sail with which he had besieged Athens he had added 200 new ships, built under his personal superintendence at Athens, Corinth, Chalcis, and Pella: all large, and several of extraordinary dimensions, yet capable of easy and quick movements.‡ Besides the force necessary to man this fleet, he had collected an army of nearly 100,000 foot and 12,000 horse. It is difficult to imagine how he found means to equip this huge armament; and it has seemed an inevitable conclusion that he must have drained the resources of Macedonia and Greece, and have laid almost intolerable burdens on his subjects;† yet we do not find this mentioned among the causes of their discontent. Plutarch only speaks of his luxury and magnificence; particularly of the theatrical splendour with which he adorned his person,‡ and of the Asiatic seclusion in which he affected to keep himself concealed from public view, of the difficulty which suitors found in reaching the royal presence, and of the arrogance and harshness with which they were received. On this head the biographer relates an anecdote which indicates a disregard of public opinion bordering on infatuation: one day, as Demetrius came out of the palace, he was observed to be of easier access than usual; and a crowd of petitioners approached to present their memorials; he gathered them in his mantle and proceeded, followed by the anxious throng, to the bridge, and there threw them all over into the Axius. This conduct was the more offensive to the Macedonians, because they had

\* See ante, p. 344.

† Diodor., xx., 105. Schloesser (Univers. Uebersicht, i., 3, p. 437), through some oversight, describes the embassy as one to Agathocles.

\* Plutarch (Dem., 43) observes, that galleys of fifteen and sixteen banks of oars were never known before. He proceeds to remark, that in Ptolemy Philopator's state galley (more fully described by Callixenus in Athen., v., 37) there were forty, and these required 4000 rowers. But we find that the Heraclæot octareus (Memnon ap. Phot., p. 226, b., ed. Bekk.) was rowed by 1600 men. Hence a rough estimate may be formed of the numbers needed to man the fleet of Demetrius, which, however, was probably never completely equipped.

† Droysen, i., p. 603.

‡ On which compare Duri in Athenens, xii., 50, who, however, may be suspected of exaggeration; for while Plutarch (Dem., 41) describes a chlamys, on which the constellations of the zodiac and other stars were embroidered in gold, as only begun and never finished, Duri speaks as if Demetrius had many such in his wardrobe.

never been used to it in their rulers. Old men remembered the readiness and affability with which Philip had been wont to listen to all classes of his people; the simplicity with which he and Alexander maintained their dignity: more recently, Antipater had retained the habits of a frugal citizen, while he wielded a much greater power than Demetrius now possessed. The less was it to be endured, that this upstart, who was born a subject, should assume the pomp and state of a Persian despot.

It would, perhaps, be attributing too deep a policy to Demetrius to suppose that he meant to dazzle and awe the Macedonians; but it seems that he did not become aware, until it was too late, how deeply and widely his conduct had excited disgust and contempt. The army itself could not love or respect a prince of such a character, who kept his soldiers at such a distance, and whose ordinary habits were so remote from the freedom and plainness of the camp. If Demetrius had been conscious of his danger, he would have seen an additional motive to hasten his preparations for the enterprise in which he was about to venture his all on the struggle for universal empire. It had become the last expedient by which he could hope to secure what he already possessed. But the jealousy of his rivals was alarmed by his extraordinary exertions; and they determined not to wait until he should carry the war into their dominions. Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus renewed their league with one another against him, and sent ambassadors to remonstrate with Pyrrhus on the impolitic engagement he had contracted with the common enemy. They warned him of the danger to which he would be exposed if he suffered Demetrius quietly to execute his plans of conquest, and reminded him of the injury and dishonour he had lately sustained in the loss of Corcyra and Lanassa.\* He was easily induced to break his treaty with Demetrius, and to join the confederates. They fell upon him while he was still engaged in his preparations. In the spring of 287 Ptolemy appeared with a great armament off the coast of Greece, and invited the Greek cities to revolt. We do not know the nature of his operations, or with what degree of success they were immediately attended. It is most probable that the Greeks waited for the issue of the contest which had begun in Macedonia; for, nearly at the same time, Lysimachus invaded the upper provinces, and, it seems, made himself master of Amphipolis through the treachery of Andragathus, the officer who commanded there for Demetrius;† and while Demetrius was on the road to meet him, tidings came that Pyrrhus had penetrated into the heart of the lower country, and had made himself master of Berea, where he fixed his headquarters, and sent out detachments to reduce other places. The intelligence excited a tumult of grief and indignation in the Macedonian camp. The men were alarmed for the safety of their property and their families; they broke out into loud complaints and invectives

against their king, and threatened to quit his standard and return to their homes. But there were rumours, and perhaps voices, which apprized him that it was their intention to go over to Lysimachus. The name of Lysimachus, Alexander's old companion, was itself of powerful attraction to the Macedonians; and he had with him their exiled prince, his son-in-law, who was ready to renew his pretensions to the throne. Demetrius had reason to fear that, if he advanced farther, he might soon find himself deserted by his troops. He therefore resolved to retrace his steps, and to seek Pyrrhus, for he was not yet aware how completely he had lost the affections which he had disdained to conciliate: he did not suspect the feeling which prevailed in his army in favour of the Epirot, and believed that every bosom glowed with indignation against the foreign invader. But when he drew near to Berea, he was soon undeceived. The conqueror had treated his captives with kindness; he had won all hearts by his condescension; numbers of the Bereans flocked to the camp of Demetrius; and the report which they spread of the affability and generosity of Pyrrhus confirmed the impression which had been made during the campaign in Ætolia by his heroic valour and soldier-like bearing, and excited a general enthusiasm in his behalf. He himself employed secret emissaries, who, assuming the character of Macedonians, exhorted the soldiers to seize the favourable moment, and get rid of their vain, haughty, oppressive despot.\* The flame thus fanned, soon burst forth with uncontrollable violence. When Pyrrhus approached at the head of his army, his enemy's troops were prepared to receive him as their benefactor. All eyes were turned in search of the hero; for a time they could not find him, because he had taken off his helmet; but when he had put it on again, and enabled them to recognise him by the lofty crest and the horns at its sides, the Macedonians quitted their ranks, and came running up to ask him, as their chief, for the password. Many seeing that his attendants wore garlands of oak-leaves, crowned themselves in like manner. Demetrius quickly perceived that all was lost. Of those who were near him, some bade him begone, telling him that the Macedonians were tired of spending their strength to support his luxury; others assailed him still more rudely with threats and reproaches. It was clear that his only hope of safety lay in flight. He retired to his tent, exchanged his gorgeous robes for a dark mantle, laid aside his diadem, and stole out of the camp. His departure became the signal for general confusion, and a struggle took place for the plunder of the royal tent. But the tumult was suppressed by the arrival of Pyrrhus, and the Macedonian soldiers unanimously saluted him as their king. Lysimachus, however, had not taken up arms merely to aggrandize Pyrrhus; he claimed a share in the fruits of the victory for himself, and Pyrrhus was obliged to consent to a partition of Macedonia.† Antipater now thought that the time had come for urging his claims; but his father-in-law, who had protected the parricide, put the pretender to death,

\* Plutarch, Pyrrh., 10. Dem., 44.

† So Droysen (i., p. 612, 613) explains Polyæn. iv., 12, 2; and the mention of Amphipolis in Pausan. i., 10, 2, as the scene of an engagement between Demetrius and Lysimachus, in which Lysimachus was worsted, though in itself apparently erroneous, confirms this view.

\* Plut., Pyrrh., 11. Justin, xvi., 2, 3, exercitu ejus corrupto.

Digitized by t Plut., Pyrrh., 12.

and even confined Eurydice, because she had pleaded for her husband.\*

Thus, after a reign of seven years, Demetrius descended from the throne of Macedonia as suddenly as he had mounted it. He first took refuge in Cassandrea, where, it seems, Phila was residing. The generous woman could not bear to see him again reduced to the condition of a fugitive, and, despairing of better days, ended her life by poison. But Demetrius always found it easier to gain than to keep. He could not use or bear prosperity; but adversity braced his nerves, roused his energy, and brought all his talents into action; so that every fall was followed by a rebound. From Cassandrea he passed into Greece, where, when he marched against Lysimachus, he had left his son. But, it seems, before he was joined by Antigonus, he entered Thebes, with few attendants, and none of the ensigns of royalty; and he thought it expedient to conciliate the Thebans by the restitution of the political privileges which they had lost after their last revolt.† His garrisons, however, remained faithful to him; Antigonus, no doubt, had a body of troops under his command, and before long the royal adventurer saw himself again at the head of a little army. Not, however, in time to save Athens. As soon, probably, as the revolution in Macedonia was known there, a few brave men, with Olympiodorus at their head, resolved to make another struggle for liberty. The people answered to their call; young and old flocked to their standard. The garrison of the Museum came out to quell the insurrection, but was defeated, and driven into the fortress. It was immediately stormed. Leocritus made his name memorable as the first who mounted the wall and leaped into the place, where he fell in the combat. Piræus and Munychia were also recovered nearly at the same time.‡ The people celebrated its victory by the abolition of the priesthood instituted in honour of Antigonus and Demetrius, and the restoration of the ancient practice by which the chief of the Archons gave his name to the year.§ But the accounts which were soon after received of the growing strength of Demetrius began to inspire new fears; and, as Ptolemy had withdrawn from the coast of Greece, an embassy was decreed to obtain aid from Pyrrhus. In the mean while the spirits of the Athenians were raised by another victory, achieved under the command of Olympiodorus, over a division of the enemy,|| which had made an inroad into the plain of Eleusis.¶ With no other force than he could raise in Eleusis itself, he put the invaders to flight. Demetrius, however, soon after appeared with his army, and closely invested the city. We are informed that the Athenians sent an embassy to him, with the philosopher Crates at its head, who, by entreaty or argument, induced him to withdraw his forces.\*\* No eloquence or reasoning of all the philosophers in Greece could have produced such an effect on

Demetrius. He must have found it necessary to raise the siege; and it was most probably the approach of Pyrrhus that forced him to decamp. Pyrrhus, in fact, complied with the request of the Athenians, and came to Athens, where he went up to the Acropolis and sacrificed to the goddess. But it appears that it did not suit his plans at this juncture, when his footing in Macedonia was not quite secure, to entangle himself in the affairs of Greece. He thanked the Athenians for their confidence, but advised them not to admit any king again within their walls.\* Demetrius was equally unwilling to spend his time and strength in a contest with Pyrrhus, as he was still resolved to try his fortune on the other side of the Ægean. Both parties, therefore, were disposed to peace; and they concluded a treaty, the terms of which are not recorded; but it is probable that Demetrius resigned his pretensions to Macedonia, on condition that Pyrrhus should not interfere with his interests in Greece.

Demetrius now collected his fleet, and embarked with no more than 11,000 foot and a small body of cavalry, leaving Greece to the care of Antigonus, and steered for Miletus. His enterprise would have been desperately rash if he had relied on this slender force; but he seems to have had reason to hope that he might excite a general insurrection in his favour in the Asiatic dominions of Lysimachus, whose rapacity had, perhaps, rendered him odious to his subjects. On his arrival at Miletus, he found there Ptolemy's queen Eurydice, and her daughter Ptolemais, whose hand had been promised to him thirteen years before in the treaty concluded through the mediation of Seleucus. The marriage was now celebrated, and afforded some encouragement, if not support, to Demetrius in the campaign which he opened immediately after.† At the outset he made a rapid progress; several important places, among them Sardis itself, either yielded to his arms, or willingly submitted to him; some of the generals of Lysimachus went over to him with the troops and treasure intrusted to them. But the arrival of Agathocles, the son of Lysimachus, whom his father sent with an army to meet the invader, altered the state of affairs. Agathocles was so superior in numbers that Demetrius did not venture to give battle, and determined to seek another theatre of war. He conceived the seemingly extravagant project of penetrating into the eastern provinces of Seleucus. He believed that, if he could reach Armenia, he might bid defiance to all his enemies, and might next invade Media and rouse it to insurrection. So little of foresight and calculation appears in this plan, that it inclines us to suspect that Demetrius must have been attracted towards the East chiefly by the recollection of his father's conquests, and of the great revolution which Seleucus had so rapidly

\* Plut., Pyrrh., 12.

† Prideaux (Connection, P. 11, B. 1) supposes that Eurydice was sent with her daughter to Demetrius by Ptolemy himself. But besides that we hear nothing of a change in Ptolemy's relations to Demetrius, Plutarch's expression, *Εὐρυδικῆς ἐκδομένης*, seems sufficiently to show that it was the act of Eurydice, and that she had already quitted Ptolemy's court in disgust. This is Droysen's view of the transaction. Flaché (ii., p. 43) supposes a previous negotiation between Demetrius and Ptolemy, and that Demetrius sent Eurydice to Egypt to fetch Ptolemais. This, at all events, is utterly inconceivable.

\* Justin, xvi., 2, 4.

† Plut., Dem., 46. *Θηβαίους ἀπέλαβεν τὴν πολιτείαν.*

‡ Pausan., i., 36.

§ Plut., Dem., 46, where we should have expected some notice of the expulsion of the Macedonian garrisons.

|| Droysen (i., 615) conjectures that it was a detachment from the Macedonian garrison at Corinth.

¶ Paus., i., 36, 2.

\*\* Plut., Dem., 46.

effected there with even slenderer means than he himself now had at his command. He therefore took the road towards Phrygia, and, it seems, advanced far enough eastward to suggest a suspicion of his design to his army, which was not disposed to share his adventures in those remote regions. But he was closely followed by Agathocles, and, though he was commonly victorious when he could draw the enemy into a skirmish, they stopped his foraging parties, and reduced him to great distress. He also lost a great number of men in the passage of the Lycus, which he attempted at a point where the river was not fordable for infantry, relying on his heavy cavalry to break the force of the rapid current.\* In time the scarcity gave rise to a disease, which carried off some additional thousands, and compelled him to seek, not a new field of conquest, but shelter from the pursuit of Agathocles. He retraced his steps, and crossed the mountains into Cilicia, where he halted at Tarsus; and Agathocles did not pursue him beyond the frontier of his father's dominions, but contented himself with the precautions requisite to prevent him from repassing the defiles of Taurus.

Demetrius did not now wish to provoke Seleucus, and, urgently as his troops needed refreshment, abstained from the supplies which the country yielded until he had appealed to the king's generosity. He wrote a long and moving letter to Seleucus, who was, at first, touched with pity, and ordered his generals to afford royal entertainment to Demetrius, and abundant subsistence to his army. But the remonstrances of Patrocles, one of his most trusty counsellors, who represented to him the danger he would incur if he should harbour a man of such restless ambition in such desperate circumstances, induced him to change his views and measures. He himself marched, with a powerful army, into Cilicia, and withdrew the supplies which he had granted. Demetrius, in alarm, retreated to a strong position at the foot of Taurus, and again addressed Seleucus, requesting that he would either allow him to take possession of some territory now occupied by independent barbarians, or maintain his army in Cilicia during the winter. This proposal strengthened the suspicions which had been awakened in Seleucus; he offered to let Demetrius pass two months of the winter in Cataonia, but demanded his principal officers as hostages, and at the same time proceeded to secure the passages leading to Syria. Demetrius now no longer scrupled to treat him as an enemy, made marauding inroads into the country, and engaged him in several slight actions, with constant success. He soon obtained a more important advantage, having made himself master of a pass which gave him entrance into Syria. His troops were inspired with new confidence in their leader; he himself began to recall the dreams of conquest which had floated before him while he was still on the throne of Macedonia, and looked upon himself as engaged in a contest for no less a prize than the dominion of Asia. On the other hand, Seleucus, notwithstanding his great advantage of numerical strength, could not but secretly acknowledge the ascendancy of his rival's genius, and dread

some sudden turn of fortune in his favour. He began to regret that he had rejected the offers of assistance which he had received from Ly-simachus, and did not dare to run the risk of a battle single-handed. It is, indeed, still doubtful what the issue of the contest might have been, had not Demetrius been seized by a disorder which threatened his life, confined him for several weeks, and reduced him to a state of extreme weakness. During this interval of inaction his men deserted him in great numbers, either to return to their homes or to join the enemy; and when he was again able to take the field, he found only the wreck of an army remaining. With this it was no longer practicable to advance into Syria, and he set out in the opposite direction, as if it was his intention to return to Cilicia; but, suddenly turning eastward, by a night march he gained the pass of Amanus, and fell, plundering and ravaging, on the plains of Cyrrhestis.

Here he was soon overtaken by Seleucus. He made an attempt to surprise the enemy's camp in the night; and he might have succeeded if he had not been deterred by a stratagem of Seleucus, who, having been warned in time by some deserters, ordered the trumpets to sound, a fire to be kindled at every tent, and the men to raise a shout, as if prepared for defence.\* The next day the Syrian army came up to attack him. He directed a movement against one wing, and threw it into some disorder; but when Seleucus had pushed forward on the other side through a hollow way, with a select body of troops and eight elephants, and, baring his head, called upon the mercenaries, who formed the main strength of Demetrius, to abandon a famishing adventurer, and enter the service of a king who had treasure to satisfy all their desires, they with one accord laid down their arms, and saluted him as their master.† Demetrius fled, with a few attendants; but, after a few days' wandering in the forest at the foot of the mountains, and an ineffectual attempt to escape across them to the coast, he was induced by his friends to surrender himself to Seleucus. Seleucus was, at first, inclined to treat him rather as a friend than a prisoner; but when he saw his own courtiers, encouraged by this show of favour, flocking round the fallen prince, his jealousy revived, and he removed him to the Syrian Chersonesus, where he ordered him to be kept, under a strong guard, at one of the royal residences, with entertainment suited to his rank, but confined within the park annexed to the palace.

For some time the captive retained his wonted spirit, and perhaps his hopes. He sent directions to his son, and to the commanders of his garrisons in Greece, to pay no attention to any letters which they might receive in his name, nor even to his seal, but to maintain their posts as if he were dead, and his rights had passed to his successor. Antigonus, on this occasion, nobly displayed the filial affection which honourably distinguished his family above most of the princely houses of the age. He earnestly solicited his father's liberation, and induced several cities and sovereigns—their names are not recorded—to support his

\* Plut., Dem., 49. Polyæus, iv., 9, 2.

† Plut., Dem., 49. Polyæus, ix., 9, 2.

request. He even offered, in return, to deliver up all the places he still held, and to surrender his own person in his father's stead. The conduct of Lysimachus was as base as this was generous. After the departure of Demetrius from Europe, he had instigated Pyrrhus to break his treaty with him, to invade Thessaly, and to endeavour to wrest from him all he possessed in Greece. As soon as he heard that the subjects of Demetrius were irretrievably ruined,\* he suddenly turned his arms against Pyrrhus, surprised and defeated him near Edessa, and, having cut off his supplies, prevailed on the principal Macedonians to renounce their allegiance to a master whose ancestors had, of old, been the subjects of their kings. Pyrrhus, seeing the defection spread, thought it prudent to withdraw into Epirus,† and thus, after a reign of seven months, yielded his share of the kingdom to his rival. Still, Lysimachus did not think himself secure so long as Demetrius lived, and is reported to have tempted Seleucus, by an offer of 2000 talents, to put his prisoner to death.‡ Seleucus indignantly rejected the proposal, observing to the ambassadors that their master wished him not only to break his word, but to stain his hands with the blood of a kinsman. He even professed an intention to set Demetrius at liberty, and restore him to his kingdom,§ and that he only waited for the arrival of Antiochus and Stratonice from Babylon, that they might have the pleasure of executing this act of grace;|| but it is very doubtful whether he really entertained any such purpose. Demetrius lingered two years in confinement, and never saw his royal daughter again. At first he was able to find amusement in the chase, for which the park afforded ample room. But, by degrees, he grew weary of this pastime, and, shutting himself up in the palace, and neglecting all bodily exercise, sought refuge from thought, or a solace for the misery of hope deferred, in the pleasures of the table and in intemperance, to which he had not before been addicted. The operation of these combined causes brought his active and strangely-checked life to a premature and inglorious close, in the fifty-fifth year of his age (284). Seleucus ordered his ashes to be carried, in a golden urn, to Greece. Antigonus met the vessel which brought them as it crossed the Ægean, took the urn on board his own galley, the largest of the fleet, and returned with it to Corinth, where it was received with funeral pomp. It was finally transported to Demetrias, a city recently founded on the Gulf of Pagasæ, on the site of Iolcus, and peopled from the small towns on the coast.

After the death of Demetrius there remained but two competitors for power of Alexander's immediate successors; for the King of Egypt had already abdicated his throne in favour of

Ptolemy, afterward named Philadelphus, his son by Berenice. His motive for this step was not merely his passionate fondness for Berenice. It was, apparently, with good reason that he preferred her son to the legitimate heir, another Ptolemy, his son by Eurydice, who, from the reckless violence of his character which his subsequent conduct discloses, acquired, as Hamilcar and Bajazet, the epithet of Ceraunus (the Thunderbolt).\* The court of Egypt was no longer a safe place for the prince who had been excluded from the succession, and he fled with his younger brother, Meleager; but he sought shelter, not, as might have been expected, from Seleucus, but from Lysimachus. It seems that he thought he had less to dread from his rival's sister, Queen Arsinoë, than to hope from Lysandra, who, after Alexander's death, had married the Thracian heir-apparent, Agathocles. He was hospitably received, and gained the favour and confidence of Arsinoë herself, whose influence he found all-powerful with the old king. Still no breach followed on this account between Lysimachus and the Ptolemies: on the contrary, a new alliance was concluded between the royal families, through the marriage of the young King of Egypt with the princess Arsinoë, the sister of Agathocles. Ptolemy, the father, died within about two years after he had resigned the crown.

Seleucus and Lysimachus might also have remained at peace to the end of their lives, which were now drawing near to their natural term, if none but political causes of hostility had arisen between them. Lysimachus, indeed, had of late greatly extended his European dominions; for, about the same time that he drove Demetrius out of Macedonia, he treacherously made himself master of Pæonia, having entered it as the ally of Ariston, the lawful heir of the deceased King Autoleon.† In Asia, too, he had found an opportunity of enlarging his territory, and to him a no less interesting object—replenishing his coffers. Amastria had been put to death by her two sons, Clearchus and Oxathres, who were probably jealous of her influence. It is remarkable, that though Lysimachus, as he was sincerely attached to Amastria, desired to avenge her murder, he did not think it necessary to profess his abhorrence of the parricide, but contrived to gain admittance into Heraclea under the mask of friendship. He then put the murderers to death and took possession of their treasures, and permitted the people of Heraclea to revive their republican institutions. On his return, he spoke with warm admiration of the proofs which he

\* Memnon ap. Phot., p. 225, b., ἐπώνυμον δὲ τὴν ἐκείνην καὶ ἀπέδωκεν τὸν κεραυνὸν ἔχοντα. Paus., i. 8, 3, λέγουσιν ἀρχαῖος καὶ δι' αὐτῶν κεραυνὸς καλούμενος. Clearchus I. of Heraclea, who called himself a son of Zeus (Memnon ap. Phot., p. 225, b., Bekk.), gave the name of Ceraunus to his son, Justin, xvi., 5, ut deos non nunciant tantum verum etiam nominibus eludat.

† Polyæn., iv., 12, 3. But I should not venture with Droysen (i., 617), on the strength of the very uncertain reading *Σαρδίων*, to suppose that Ariston fled to Demetrius, and happened to find him at Sardis: ἀφικόμενος εἰς τὴν Σαρδίον would be a singular way of relating that fact; and we may add, not the way of Polyænus, who elsewhere describes the place simply as *Σάρδεις* or *αἱ Σάρδεις* (ii., i. 9; iv., 9, 4; vii., 6, 2, 13, 14). Indeed, I believe it would be difficult to produce any example in support of Droysen's conjecture.

\* Paus., i., 10, 2, γερμένους ἐπὶ Σελεύκῳ Δημητρίῳ. But this would extend the reign of Pyrrhus in Macedonia beyond the seven months assigned to it by Dexippus (Syn-cell., i., 508, Bonn.) and Porphyry (Euseb., Arm. i., 322, Ancher.).

† Droysen (i., 626) collects from Pausanias (i., 10, 2) that Antigonus united his forces with those of Pyrrhus, and that they were defeated by Lysimachus. But it seems very doubtful that this is what Pausanias meant.

‡ Diodorus, xii. Plat., Dem., 51.  
§ Diodorus, xxi. Κατάγειν ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν μεγαλοπρεπῶς. Plat., Dem., 51. Diodor. xxi.



had seen, in the cities ruled by Amastria, of the prosperity which they had enjoyed under her government; and Arsinoë took occasion to solicit that he would grant her the newly-conquered principality. He reluctantly complied with her request, and she sent one of her creatures as governor to Heraclea, which he oppressed and plundered.\* Still, these acquisitions were not of a nature to excite the jealousy of Seleucus: Lysimachus, in whom ambition seems to have become subordinate to avarice, and who was watched by two hostile neighbours in Greece and Epirus, could not have been a formidable rival to the master of the East. But a domestic tragedy, which shook the throne of Lysimachus, awakened hopes of conquest that had long slumbered in the bosom of Seleucus, and gave occasion to a war which proved fatal to both.

Arsinoë, when she obtained possession of Heraclea, probably designed chiefly to strengthen herself with a view to a farther and more important object. Her husband's advanced age filled her with anxiety for the prospects of her children, and she resolved, if she could, to put Agathocles out of the way before the throne became vacant. That she had conceived a criminal passion for him, and was disappointed through his scruples, is hardly credible. If there was any ground for this report, it may have been that she imputed such advances to him.† But it is certain that she induced Lysimachus to regard his eldest son as an enemy, and to consent to his death.‡ They feared, it seems, to use open violence, for the prince was generally beloved; but, after an ineffectual attempt to poison him, they threw him into prison, and it is said that Ptolemy Ceraunus despatched him there with his own hand.§ Lysandra fled with her children, accompanied by Alexander, the brother of Agathocles, to Seleucus, and implored his intervention.|| He learned that the deed had excited universal indignation among the subjects of Lysimachus, and that they were ripe for rebellion. He also received a message from Philetærus, governor of the fortress of Pergamus, where Lysimachus had deposited a treasure of 9000 talents, who, on the prince's death, being alarmed for his own safety, as Arsinoë was avowedly his enemy, and attempted to deprive him of his master's confidence,¶ offered, if Seleucus would invade the country, to put him in possession of the place, and of all the treasure it contained.\*\* Seleucus was tempted by the prospect thus opened to him, and not merely because it promised a great addition to his empire. He secretly yearned to see his native land again, and he could now only return to it as conqueror and king. He resolved to make war on Lysimachus. The King of Thrace was apprized of

the danger which threatened him. It is said that he crossed over into Asia to anticipate the attack which he expected, and that he began hostilities with Seleucus; but it is probable that he aimed at nothing more than to stop the progress of disaffection in his Asiatic dominions, and to put himself in a posture of defence. It was believed that he discovered, when it was too late, the falsehood of the charges which had been brought against his son.\* But he had alienated the most trustworthy of his family and his servants, and, if he had learned the truth, was obliged to dissemble his feelings. He left Arsinoë in possession of all her power: perhaps with the authority of regent. The important city of Cassandrea was entirely in her hands, having, apparently, been assigned to her as a place of refuge against a change of fortune. It seems, also, that Ptolemy Ceraunus accompanied Lysimachus on his expedition, and remained with him to its close. All the details of the struggle which ensued between the two rivals are lost; its termination only is known. A battle was fought (B.C. 281) at a place called the plain of Corus, in western Phrygia—a name which now conveys no information to us—in which Lysimachus was defeated, and slain by a man of Heraclea named Malacon.† According to some accounts, his corpse, which lay for many days neglected, and only guarded by his faithful dog from the wolves and vultures, was found and interred by Thorax, a Pharsalian. According to others, his son Alexander obtained permission, not without some opposition on the part of Lysandra, to convey it to the Thracian Chersonesus, where the inhabitants of Lysimachia received it with the honours due to the founder of their city, and deposited it in their principal temple, to which they gave the name of the Lysimacheum.‡

There had scarcely been a moment since Alexander's death when it appeared more likely that all the provinces of his empire might fall into a single hand than after this event. Seleucus might safely calculate that the whole kingdom of Lysimachus would submit to him without resistance, except such as might be made by private adventurers, at insulated points. So it seems to have been after the decisive battle that Theodotus, the governor of Sardis, refused to surrender the citadel, which contained a considerable treasure. But when Seleucus had set a price of 100 talents on his head, distrusting the fidelity of his troops, he opened the gates to the conqueror.|| Ceraunus likewise threw himself on the generosity of Seleucus, who not only received him with kindness, as the son of his old friend, but promised to restore him to the throne, his birthright, of which he had been deprived by his father's unjust partiality.¶ It was an opportunity for in-

\* Memnon, u. s., p. 225.

† Pausan., i., 10, 3, ὅτι δὲ ἔγραψαν, κ. τ. λ.

‡ Strabo (xiii., p. 693) says *ἡγαγέσθην τὸν υἱὸν ἀνελκίειν*; but Memnon (ap. Phot., p. 225, b.) represents him as inflamed with such violent hatred of his son (for which hardly any motive can be conceived but jealousy), that after the attempt to poison him had failed, he invented a charge of treason against him, as a pretext for putting him to death in prison. Justin, xvii., 1: Agathoclem non solum patrium, verum etiam humanum ultra morem, percosus, ministra Arsinoë nocere, veneno interfecit.

§ *Ἀπορύτοι*, Memnon, u. s.

¶ Strabo, xiii., p. 693.

|| Paus., i., 10, 4.

\*\* Paus., i., 10, 4.

\* Paus., i., 10, 3.

† Memnon, u. s.

‡ Apian, Syr., 64. Pausanias (i., 10, 5) describes the tomb as situate between Cardia and Paçya. The fidelity of the dog was celebrated enough to serve as an illustration to Plutarch, Reip. ger. præc., c. 28.

|| Polyæn., iv., 9, 4. Droysen believes that this occurred before the defeat of Lysimachus. But a strong presumption to the contrary seems to be raised by the presence of Arsinoë at Ephesus (Polyæn., viii., 37) at the time of her husband's death.

¶ Memnon, p. 226, b. Apian, Syr., 62.

terference which might kindle a civil war in Egypt, and make the ally of the successful claimant the real master of the kingdom. He so little anticipated any resistance in the European dominions of Lysimachus, that, without any apparent necessity, he suffered more than six months to elapse after the battle\* before he proceeded to take possession of them. It is said to have been his intention to resign all the Asiatic provinces to Antiochus,† and to end his days in Macedonia. But a different destiny awaited him.

If Ptolemy Ceraunus consented to murder Agathocles, it was not, as the event clearly proves, with a view to promote the interest of his sister and her children. It is probable that, before the death of Lysimachus, he had already conceived the ambitious project which he afterward executed, and that he looked upon Agathocles as the only formidable obstacle between himself and the throne. He would not, perhaps, have suffered the old king to stand much longer in his way. As he was utterly insensible to all restraints of piety, honour, and gratitude, the victory of Seleucus would not have changed his design, and might seem, in some respects, to open a fairer prospect of success, as it was now an invader, not the rightful sovereign, whom he had to supplant. The reckless daring, from which he derived his surname, was in him coupled with an equal measure of cunning and forethought; and, bold as the stroke was by which he hoped to win the crown, he seems to have taken all the precautions prudence could suggest to guard against miscarriage. He had, probably, a strong party of adherents in Thrace, with whom he concerted his measures, and, perhaps, had even gained some of the officers of Seleucus, among whom there might be several to whom the proposed change in the residence of the court was not acceptable.

Seleucus having transported his army across the Hellespont, marched towards Lysimachia. On the road, not far, it seems, from the city, was an ancient altar, erected, according to the traditions of the country, either by the Argonauts or by the heroes who besieged Troy, and, from whichever origin, named Argos. It was a name—as was at least afterward generally believed—of ill omen to Seleucus, who is said to have been warned by an oracle to beware of Argos. But the altar attracted his notice by its size and conspicuous position, and he stopped to examine it, and to learn its history. While he was listening to the tale of the antiquarians, he received a mortal wound in the back from Ptolemy Ceraunus;‡ who immediately mounted a horse, and rode to Lysimachia. Here he was welcomed as the avenger of Lysimachus, and immediately assumed the diadem as his successor, and returned with a brilliant escort to the camp.§ It does not appear that he had collected any military force; we rather find intimations that he needed no such protection. Yet it is certainly somewhat surprising that the man who had just basely assassinated a great and revered monarch at

the head of his victorious army should have ventured to present himself to the troops whom he had so deprived of their leader. The result, however, was that he was received, if not with favour, at least without any determined resistance, and was proclaimed king by the army of Seleucus. One account mentions that it yielded to necessity, the nature of which is not explained: \* another, that the acquiescence of the soldiers was purchased by the permission which they received to plunder the royal treasure.† Each seems to imply that the loyalty which was so easily overpowered was not very ardent. But if a considerable portion of the troops had originally belonged to the army of Lysimachus, and had been compelled to follow the conqueror, the transaction would be quite intelligible.

The assassin found himself in possession of a powerful army, a considerable number of elephants, and a fleet which included a squadron of vessels of extraordinary bulk from Heraclea. The European dominions of Lysimachus, north of Macedonia, submitted to him without an attempt at resistance; and the state of affairs in other quarters was singularly favourable to the measures which he took for the security of his throne. Antiochus would have been urged, both by his interests and his feelings, to avenge his father's murder; but he was fully occupied with the defence of his vast inheritance against a variety of other enemies.‡ The King of Egypt was easily persuaded to let his brother enjoy a distant kingdom, on the condition which he proposed of resigning his claims to the Egyptian crown. Pyrrhus would have been his most formidable rival. But, just at this juncture, his ambition was engrossed by the prospect of conquest in the West, and he was only anxious to obtain a re-enforcement for his Italian expedition, and to provide for the safety of his hereditary dominions during his absence. Ceraunus won him by the offer of both these advantages. He placed 5000 foot, 4000 horse, and 50 elephants at his disposal, nominally for the term of two years; and having induced him to accept his daughter's hand as a pledge of his good faith, took Epirus under his protection.§ And thus he was enabled to defy the hostility of a fourth rival, whom he could neither soothe nor bribe. Antigonus was no longer a potentate; but he was still master of some strong places in Greece, and of a fleet; and the lower the ebb of his fortune, the more eager he was to seize the opportunity, which seemed to be offered by the recent revolution, of recovering the throne of Macedonia. He was forced, indeed, to consign a part of his navy to Pyrrhus, as the price of his neutrality. But he felt himself strong enough, with the remainder, to venture on an expedition against Ceraunus, whom he hoped to find unprepared. The Thracian fleet, however, met him before he could effect a landing on the coast of Macedonia, and, chiefly through the overpowering size of the Heraclean vessels, or the skill of their seamen, gained a decisive victory, and compelled him to retire to Bœotia. During his

\* Justin, xvii., 2. Post menses admodum septem.

† Memnon ap. Phot., p. 226, a. Pausanias (i., 16, 2) describes the intention as executed.

‡ Appian, Syr., 63.

§ Μεγάλα κρητὸς δορυφορίας. Memnon, v. 226, b.

\* Memnon, u. s.

† Paus., i., 16, 2.

‡ Memnon, p. 227, u. Ἀντίοχος πολλοῖς πολεμοῖς, εἰ καὶ μάλιστα καὶ οὐδὲ πᾶσαν ὁμῆς ἀνασώσας αὐτὸν τὴν πατρίαν ἀρχήν.

§ Justin, xvii., 2.

absence events had occurred in Greece which rendered his position less secure and commanding than it had previously been there. Sparta had made an effort to engage all the principal states of Greece in a confederacy for the maintenance of their freedom. The undertaking was notoriously directed against the power of Antigonos; though its first avowed object was apparently but very remotely connected with its real aim. An expedition was sent, under the command of King Areus, against the Ætolians, who were in alliance with Antigonos, and were also in possession of the sacred land of Cirrha. Areus, however, was surprised, while he was ravaging their fields, by a small band of Ætolians, and put to flight with great loss. This defeat seems to have put an end to the Spartan project of a general union among the Greeks; but it did not prevent Sparta herself from prosecuting hostilities against Antigonos, whose garrison was, it seems, not long after dialogued from Troezen by a Spartan force under Cleonymus, the uncle of Areus. But the most important result of the movements which followed the death of Seleucus was the foundation of the Achæan League, to which we shall return in the next chapter.

Macedonia submitted without resistance to the conqueror as soon as he appeared there,\* and Antiochus no longer hesitated to conclude a treaty of peace with the successful usurper.† He was now near the summit of his fortune; only one stroke was wanting to fill up the measure of his prosperity and his crimes. So long as Arsinoë remained in possession of Cassandrea with her children, whose title to the crown was at least more legitimate than his own, he could not feel perfectly secure. Yet he did not venture on an open attack; for he was less anxious to make himself master of the place, important as it was, than of the persons it contained, who might have eluded his grasp if he had attempted to reduce it by force. He therefore resolved to compass his object by treachery; though, to gain the confidence of Arsinoë, whose accomplice he had been, who both knew him, and was herself a stranger to all scruples of conscience, honour, and humanity, was apparently as hopeless a project as he had ever yet formed. He was able, however, to interest her ambition, and, perhaps, her vanity, in opposition to her sober judgment and natural suspicions. He invited her to share his throne, and held out a prospect of a more remote succession for her children, to whom, in the mean while, he would be as a guardian; and he requested her to send one of her friends to receive such assurances as she might desire of his sincerity. It was, no doubt, with tormenting misgivings and forebodings that she consented to treat with him; but the fear of provoking him by the appearance of distrust, combined with her wishes and hopes, prevailed, and she commissioned a minister, named Chlodion, to witness the ratification of his offers and professions. To him Ptolemy eagerly exhibited whatever sanctions the most holy places, the most solemn rites, and the most awful forms of adjuration could be supposed by superstitious minds to enhance the obligation of an oath. Arsinoë could no longer decline an interview

with her brother; and her fears were so far quieted by his language and demeanour that, notwithstanding the warnings of her eldest son, Ptolemaus, she finally consented to the marriage. The nuptials were celebrated with royal magnificence; and when she had been crowned and saluted as queen, in the presence of the army, all her remaining doubts were silenced, and she seemed only anxious to atone for her past mistrust by proofs of unreserved confidence. She invited her husband to take possession of Cassandrea, and made preparations to receive him with every sign of festive welcome. Her two younger sons, Lysimachus and Philip, came out, with chaplets on their heads, to meet him. The eldest, after having ineffectually warned his mother, fled, it appears, to the king of the Dardanians. Ceraunus loaded the boys with caresses until his troops had entered the gate, and then gave orders to seize the citadel, and to put his two nephews, the elder of whom was but sixteen, to death. They were massacred in their mother's arms; and she was not even permitted to bury them. She herself—neglected rather than spared—was dragged, it is said, out of the city, but was suffered to retire, with two attendants, to Samothrace.\* She was yet destined to share the throne of Egypt with her younger brother, Philadelphus.†

Ceraunus did not enjoy the fruit of all these crimes much longer than a year and a half, during which he had to defend his dominions against the Dardanian king, who had given shelter to the son of Lysimachus.‡ He was then deprived at once of his kingdom and his life by a sudden calamity, which the ancients, with a right feeling, regarded as a stroke of Divine vengeance; the rather, as he seemed to have exposed himself to his fate with an infatuation which might well be considered as judicial, though it was a natural result of the success which had attended him in so many criminal enterprises. The irruption of the Gauls, which produced this and other momentous changes in the affairs both of Macedonia and of Greece, might, indeed, have been anticipated, without any uncommon reach of sagacity, by any one whose political horizon was not bounded by the limits of civilized society in the West; for it appears that Celtic tribes had been long in possession of the countries on the eastern side of the Adriatic, from which the invaders issued, and had been engaged in continual warfare with their neighbours, which kept them as averse as they had ever been from habits of peaceful industry, and as impatient of any fixed abode. Their presence in regions not very remote from Macedonia had been announced by the embassy which Alexander had received on the banks of the Danube; and their movements, though scarcely heard of beyond their immediate vicinity, were probably felt as far as the

\* *Protracta*, Justin, xxiv., 3. Memnon (l. c.), τῆς βασιλέως ἐκσφραγίς.

† Paus., i., 7, 1. As her son Lysimachus was sixteen when he was murdered by Ceraunus, she must have possessed, with her fiendish character, some singular fascination, independent of personal attractions. Droyson (ii., p. 241) imagines political motives—the claims of Arsinoë on the Asiatic cities which she had lost—which seem quite inadequate to the supposed effect.

‡ *Prolog. Trog. Pomp.*, xxiv. *Bellum quod Ptolemaus Ceraunus in Macedonia cum Momo (Monimio) Illyrio, et Ptolemao Lysimachi filio habuit.*

shores of the *Ægean*, through their influence on the Thracian wars of Lysimachus. But they were too far out of sight to attract notice in the Hellenic world; and the storm burst upon it not the less suddenly because it had been long gathering. The immediate occasion of this movement, or the causes which removed the hinderances that had hitherto prevented it, lie beyond the reach of history. Ceraunus himself first received warning of his danger from the king of the Dardanians,\* who, though he had been but a short time before at war with him, regarded it as so pressing, and so threatening to his own safety, that he at the same time offered him a body of 20,000 auxiliaries. In the blindness of ignorance, or the confidence of prosperous wickedness, Ceraunus disdainfully rejected this offer, treating it as degrading to the honour of his kingdom, to suppose that Macedonia could need the protection of the Dardanians against such an enemy.† It was not long before he received more direct intimation of the approach of the Celts, from an embassy which they sent to him with proposals for peace, if he was willing to purchase it by tribute. Their object, it appears, was not so much conquest as plunder; and they would have been content to drain the Macedonian treasury without a blow. Ceraunus attributed their overtures to fear, and replied by an arrogant message, bidding them, if they wished for peace, send him their chiefs as hostages, and lay down their arms. This language would have been not unworthy of a high-spirited prince, resolved to risk all for liberty and honour, if he had been better acquainted with the force which he defied, and had not so rashly neglected the means of defence which the friendship of the Dardanian king would have enabled him to command. As it was, it only served to quicken the steps of the invaders, who, threatening that he should soon learn whether their offer of peace more concerned their safety or his own, advanced without delay, and, in the course of a few days, began to pour into Macedonia. We have little information, either as to his preparations or his movements, besides the simple fact that he met them in the field. It seems that, though greatly outnumbered, he engaged prematurely, against the advice of his friends, before he had collected all his forces.‡ He probably relied on the strength of the phalanx and the show of his elephants, but found these advantages more than counterbalanced by that which the Celts derived from the impetuosity of their onset, and the strangeness of their aspect and mode of fighting. He was defeated, and having been thrown by the elephant on which he rode, fell into the ene-

my's hands, and was presently despatched; according to one of the more authentic accounts, torn to pieces, as if in a contest among the captors for the ornaments of his person.\* His head was struck off, and carried about the field on the point of a lance, to heighten the consternation of his army, which is said to have been so completely routed, that almost all were slain or taken.† (B.C. 280.)‡

After this blow the open country was at the mercy of the conquerors, who ravaged and plundered it as far as the borders of Thessaly; and a detachment made a devastating inroad into the vale of the Peneus. But they wanted skill and patience for the siege of fortified places, so that the Macedonians were secure within the walls of their cities, and gradually regained courage. The reins of government were successively seized by Meleager, the brother of Ceraunus, who held them only two months, and by Antipater, a nephew of Cassander, who seems to have dethroned his predecessor, but did not retain possession for more than forty-five days.§ How his reign was terminated does not appear; but we are informed that there were many competitors for the throne among the noble families,|| whose contests must have aggravated the general confusion and distress. A man at length appeared who showed himself capable of command, yet moderate in his ambition; a nobleman named Sosthenes.¶ He collected a body of troops, and obtained some advantages over the enemy, who probably believed themselves secure from all farther attempts at resistance. And this check seems to have induced them to withdraw the sooner from the country, where there was now, perhaps, but little left to tempt their cupidity. Sosthenes was saluted king by his army; but he declined the title which he had so well earned, and only desired his soldiers to swear obedience to him as their general.

The Celts returned, it would seem, to the country from which they had set out on their expedition. But little reliance can be placed on the accounts which have reached us of any transactions that passed at the back of the theatre of war, which were probably but very imperfectly known in Greece at the time. So it is difficult to say what degree of truth there may be in the statement, that the Celts, at the outset, divided their force into three bodies, one of which, under the command of a chief named Belgus or Bolgius, was destined for the invasion of Macedonia; the second, under Brennus, directed against Pæonia; and the third, under Cerethrius, against Thrace and the Triballians. For the same account represents Brennus as at home when Belgus returned from his Macedonian expedition, and as exerting all his influence and address to render his countrymen dissatisfied with the conduct of Belgus, and to obtain the command of a powerful army, which he undertook to bring back laden with the spoils of Greece, which he de-

\* From a silver tetradrachma bearing the superscription ΜΟΝΟΥΝΙΟΥ... ΣΙΑΒΩ, and apparently not much later than the age of Alexander, coupled with the fact that a Monunius was king of the Dardanians in the period of the war with Persus (Livy, xlv., 30, compared with Polybius, xxi., 5), and that the same name occurs on a coin of Dyrrhachium (ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΜΟΝΟΥΝΙΟΥ ΑΥΤΥΡΑ), Droysen (*Einermann's Zeitschrift*, 1836, No. 104) has, with his usual sagacity, shown a degree of probability nearly amounting to certainty, that this king of the Dardanians was the Monunius of these coins, and that his name ought to be substituted for *Monio* and *Mytillo*, in the Prologues to Troges, xiv., xiv.

† Justin, xiv., 4. Droysen, however (u.s.), thinks that the conduct of Ceraunus may be better explained by his yet distrust of a prince who had so lately been his enemy.

‡ Diodorus, xxi.

\* Mommsen, p. 226, b. *Διανομή τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν Γαλατῶν. Ἰνδὺν γὰρ ἀπέθρυσεν.* † Justin, xiv., 5.

‡ In the fifth month of Ol. 125, 1 (Porphyr. ap. Euseb. Arm. i., p. 330).

§ Porphyr. ap. Euseb., Arm. i., 330.

¶ Justin, xiv., 5. *Multis nobilibus regnum Macedonia affectantibus.*

¶ *Unus de Macedonia principibus, Justin, v. a.*

scribed as of inestimable value.\* This object, at least, he accomplished; and the force which he led was estimated at 150,000 foot, and about 20,000 cavalry, with the addition of two mounted followers to each cavalier. A chief named Acichorius is sometimes described as his colleague, but seems to have held only a subordinate rank. It is in Dardania that his host first appears in motion; and here a quarrel is said to have taken place among the commanders, which induced two of them, Leonorius and Lutatius, to separate from Brennus, and to lead the troops under their orders, a body of 20,000 men, into Thrace,† where they will soon again engage our attention. Brennus pursued his march into Macedonia, and began to ravage the country, which could have recovered but little from the effects of the preceding invasion. Soesthenes ventured to take the field against him; but he seems to have miscalculated his strength. The Macedonians were totally defeated, and forced to seek shelter behind their ramparts; and Brennus continued to waste and spoil without resistance, until he thought it time to seek the richer booty which he expected to find in Greece.‡

The ravages which his army committed in its progress through Thessaly warned the Greeks afresh that, from the enemy who was now approaching, it was not inglorious subjection that they had to expect as the alternative of victory, but death or miseries far more dreadful. Accordingly, on this occasion we find none of the wavering, the lukewarmness, or the treachery, which tarnished the glory of their ancestors in the Persian war. All private interests and feelings were absorbed by the urgency and fearfulness of the common danger. On the other hand, the preparations for meeting the invader were confined to the states north of the Isthmus, though it appears that the Messenians would have taken a part in the struggle, if the Spartans had consented to grant them a truce.§ As the Celts had no fleet, the Peloponnesians, it is said, believed that they should be sufficiently secured by a wall across the Isthmus.|| It must, however, be remembered that Peloponnesus was almost entirely in the possession, or under the influence of Antigonus, who was, no doubt, only concerned to husband his resources as much as possible. He was induced, indeed, apparently at the instance of the Athenians, to send a body of 500 men, under the command of Aristodemus, to their aid, perhaps only following the example of Antiochus, who sent precisely the same number under Telesarchus. One can hardly attribute any better motive to ei-

ther than the wish to save appearances. The change which had taken place in the state of Greece since the days of Salamis and Plataea was strongly marked by the proportions in which the northern states contributed to the force raised for their common defence. Bœotia furnished 10,000 heavy-armed foot and 500 horse; Phocis as many cavalry and 3000 heavy infantry; the eastern Locrians 700 foot, and Megara 400 foot. But the largest contingent, including both horse and foot, heavy and light-armed, was that of the Ætolians. Athens could only bring 1000 heavy armed and 500 cavalry into the field; but all the galleys fit for service—the number is not stated—were sent to take their station in the Malian Gulf, to support the operations of the army. Old recollections, which in the presence of such a danger would have more than ordinary influence, seem to have induced the allies to assign the supreme command to the Athenian general Callippus.\*

It was resolved to defend every tenable position in front of Thermopylæ, where the army was assembled, and as soon as it was ascertained that the Celtic host had reached the foot of Mount Othrys, a thousand light infantry and a body of cavalry were detached to guard the passage of the Spercheius, and, having destroyed the bridges, encamped on the right bank. Brennus, however, was not deficient in military skill. He sent a division of 10,000 men, selecting the tallest and the most expert swimmers, to cross the river in the night at the lower part where it spread over a marsh. The Greeks, when they learned that the enemy had effected the passage, retreated to their camp, and Brennus ordered the inhabitants of the country to repair the bridges, a task which they willingly performed, to be relieved sooner from the presence of the invader. He then pushed forward without delay against Heraclea, which had now become an Ætolian city, having been compelled the year before to join the Ætolian league. The Ætolians defended it as their own, and easily repulsed the unskilful assailants, though they could not protect the fields from plunder and havoc; nor was the place of sufficient importance to divert Brennus from his main object, even if he had seen a fairer prospect of success. He was eager to dislodge the Greeks from Thermopylæ, and, it seems, advanced as confidently as Xerxes had done to the attack. The onset of the Celts was probably more furious than that of the Persians had been, and perhaps not less orderly. But the numbers of the combatants were now more nearly equal, and the changes which had taken place in the nature of the ground on which they fought operated in favour of the Greeks, for the Athenians were able to bring their galleys so near to the scene of action as to gall the enemy with their missiles, and thus, at least, contributed very materially to the victory of their countrymen, even if the report that they likewise distinguished themselves by their valour above all the other Greeks on shore, is to be set down to the partiality of the author from whom we have received it.† The assailants were at length for-

\* Paus., x., 19, 8.

† Livy, xxxviii., 16.

‡ So Justin, xiv., 6, and this, as the account least glorious to the Greeks, is the most credible. That of Porphyry in Euseb. (u. s.) represents Soesthenes as expelling Brennus. But this is no reason for referring it to a later period with Fluthe (ii., p. 80), who, with still less probability, and without assigning any reason, transfers the quarrel mentioned by Livy (xxxviii., 16), from the beginning to the end of the expedition of Brennus. That Soesthenes was not only defeated, but slain, as is stated by W. A. J. Schmidt (*Das Oelische Persien, Rhein. Mus.*, iv., 4, p. 575), is probable enough, but is not related, as far as I know, by any of the ancients. I take this opportunity of observing that this essay of Schmidt's is extremely valuable, not only as a most important contribution to the history of the Celtic migrations, but as containing at once an exposition and illustration of sound principles of historical criticism.

† Paus., iv., 28, 5.

‡ Ibid., vii., 6, 7.

\* Paus., x., 20.

† Most probably Timæus, as Schmidt has shown in his

# HISTORY OF GREECE.

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 with the Macedonian treasury without a bribe  
 which attributed their overtures to fear.  
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CELTS INVASION—JULY.

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On the same ground, and the prodigies  
happened on both occasions are so  
the later report might seem a mere  
earlier one. We are informed

the gilded statues which they saw gleaming from the terraces of Delphi were of solid gold.\* It may be doubted whether he himself was aware of the loss which the treasury had suffered in the Phocic war. The assailants, who, in general, were easily deterred by slight obstacles in such operations, were repulsed and disheartened. Fragments of rock rolled down from the top of the cliffs contributed to their defeat and consternation. A sudden change of weather to frost and snow, and the effects of surfeit followed by scarcity, and by disease arising out of both, began to thin their ranks, and determined Brennus to abandon the hopeless enterprise. The order for retreat was to the Greeks a signal for a series of attacks, with which they continued to harass the enemy as far as the camp at Thermopylæ, where a division had been left to guard the booty. The junction with Acichorius, which seems to have taken place soon after the retreat began, only served to increase the confusion and to retard the march of the Celts, while the numbers and the confidence of the Greeks were growing from day to day. Brennus, who had been wounded before Delphi, is said to have destroyed himself

escape the resentment of his countrymen;† Acichorius, who succeeded to the command to have put his sick and wounded to death, and to have abandoned his baggage to the flames of his retreat. No estimate can be safely formed of the amount of the loss sustained by the Celts in their passage through Greece and Macedonia. But the assertion, with which some of our authors round the tale, that they were cut off to a man, is a patriotic exaggeration, almost as gross as the fictions with which the Roman historians, to save the national honour, disguised the issue of the Celtic expedition against Rome. We are informed that one part of the host of Brennus, commanded by a chief named Bathanatus,‡ reached the banks of the Danube, near its confluence with the Save,§ while another, under Comontorius, was strong enough to effect a settlement, and to establish an independent kingdom, with a capital named Tyle, in the maritime part of Thrace.¶ And it is probable that the bands of Celtic adventurers, whom we shall find a few years later in Macedonia and Epirus, and in the pay of Greek princes, were a remnant of the same body.\*\*

may, the supernatural element has not so disfigured it as wholly conceal the real course and connexion of the events. It seems that Brennus, when he arrived in the valley of the Pleistus, was advised by his Greek guides to proceed without delay to the attack of Delphi. But either because he thought that his troops needed refreshment, or because he was unable to restrain them, he permitted them first to gorge themselves with the plunder of the farms and hamlets, where large stores of corn and wine had, it is said, been purposely left. In the mean while, the approaches of the city were fortified, and preparations made to take the utmost advantage of all the means of resistance afforded by the nature of the ground. When the Celts advanced to the assault, they were, perhaps, stupefied and bewildered by their recent excesses, so as to be more than usually susceptible of superstitious terrors. Brennus, we are told, endeavoured to stimulate their rapacity by the assertion that

\* According to Pausanias, x., 23, 1, exactly co-extensive with the ground occupied by the Celts.

† On the tenacity of the popular belief among the Greeks, one may refer with pleasure to an essay of G. W. Nitzsch, *Die Helden*.

rener with pleasure to an essay of G. W. Nitzsch, *Die Hellenische Geschichte der Griechen nach ihrer nationalen Eithung*.<sup>1</sup> Justin, i. 1, 17, 2. Eumamus et Thesalorum ducis qui ne ad praedae societatem jungerant. Schorn (*Geschichte Griechenlands*, p. 35) renders, 'The true reading by a happy conjecture: Eumamus et Thesalorum' which is rendered nearly certain by the reading Εὐμαῖος καὶ Θεσσαλῶν, and by the Thesalians acting the same part as in the expedition of Xerxes (Herodot., viii., 31); and it seems by no means improbable that they were animated by a similar motive of hereditary enmity towards the Phocians.

\* Justin, xxiv., 7.

† Paus., x., 23, 12; Justin, xxiv., 8, cum dolores vulnerum  
ferre non posset. ‡ Diodorus. xxij.

‡ Diodorus, xxij.

\* Athanasius, vi., 25. Zeuss, however (*Die Deutschen*, p. 175) thinks it more probable that Bathanasius was the chief who first led the Celts into Illyria.

† Justin, xxxii., 3

† Polybius, iv., 46. Steph. Byz., Τολις.

\*\* Diefenbach (*Celtica*, ii., 1, p. 243) would draw a like inference from a passage of Pausanias, x., 19, 1, the meaning of which he has strangely mistaken, as if *ἐκδοῖς δαίης* referred to a pecuniary mulct.

ced to retreat with great loss; as many were trodden under foot by one another or sank in the morass as were slain by the enemy. Of the Greeks, forty only are said to have fallen. The Celts, whether from pride or carelessness, neither sought permission nor made any attempt to bury their dead.

Brennus allowed six days to pass without any movement. On the seventh he sent a detachment to explore the steep and narrow road which led through the gorge of the Asopus, near the ruins of Trachis, across Mount Cēta. A secondary object was to gratify his troops with the plunder of a temple of Athene, which stood on a height above the pass. But the Celts found it guarded by a body of Greeks, under the command of Telesarchus, and were repulsed, though the Syrian general fell in the combat. The leading officers of the Celtic army now began themselves to despond about the issue of the expedition. Brennus resolved to attempt a diversion, which, if successful, would, at the same time, give employment to a part of his own forces, and weaken the enemy. He ordered a division of 40,000 men, under the command of Combutis and Orestorius, to recross the Spercheus, and, ascending the valley, to make an inroad into Ætolia. He hoped that the Ætolians, who formed so main a part of the allied army, would withdraw to the defence of their own country. His plan was faithfully executed, and proved completely successful. The invaders made themselves masters of Callium, the town nearest to the eastern border of Ætolia, and committed the most horrible atrocities on the defenceless population, not, perhaps, more to indulge the instincts of savage nature, or in revenge for their recent defeats, than in compliance with the instructions they had received, and with a view to strike terror into the Ætolians, and to call those of them who were encamped at Thermopylæ to the protection of their homes. This, indeed, was the immediate effect of their barbarity, but they had not foreseen how the remoter consequences would affect their own safety. When they had exterminated the inhabitants and had set fire to the town, they began to retreat with the booty; but they found the road, itself mountainous and difficult, beset with enemies burning for revenge. When the tidings of the destruction of Callium reached Thermopylæ, the Ætolians quitted the camp in a body and hastened homeward; but the whole mass of the Ætolian population, including even the women, had also risen in arms and poured in upon the retreating invaders; and they had been joined by a body of heavy-armed Achæans from Patræ.\* The Celts fought with their usual fury, and by their superiority of numbers bore down every obstacle opposed to them in close combat; but they suffered so much from the showers of missiles, to which their flanks were continually exposed in the defiles, that not half of them was believed to have reached the camp.

interesting essay, *De Pontibus veterum auctorum in enarrandis expeditionibus a Gallicis in Macedonia aliquos Græciæ successus*. Droysen is inclined to suppose it may rather have been Demochares. But see Schmidt in *Zimmermann's Zeitschrift*, 1837, No. 94, 95.

\* Pausan., vii., 18, 6. But Lucas (*Ueber Polybios Darstellung des Ætolischen Bundes*) seems clearly to be mistaken

In the mean while, however, the path across the highest ridge of Callidromus, by which the Persians had been led to the destruction of Leonidas, had been betrayed to Brennus by the people of Heraclea and the Ænians, whose territory it traversed, who were so impatient to be delivered from the evils inflicted on them by the neighbourhood of the barbarian army, that they scrupled not to purchase a temporary and partial relief at the expense of the rest of Greece. And it even appears, as will be seen a little farther on, that a number of Ænians and Thessalian adventurers associated themselves with the invaders. Brennus accepted their proffered guidance with joy, and, leaving Acichorius with the main body, put himself at the head of 40,000 of his best troops for the passage of the mountain.\* A body of Phocians had been posted, as in the Persian war, to guard the descent on the opposite side; but a mist concealed the approach of the Celts, so that they had all the advantage of a sudden attack. The Phocians, nevertheless, made a gallant resistance, but were at length forced to give way, and hastened forward to apprise their allies of the impending danger. The warning came in time to afford them an opportunity of escape; for to have attempted resistance would have been but a useless sacrifice of the strength and hopes of Greece. They found refuge on board the Athenian galleys, and, as they were landed, dispersed to their homes.

Brennus, according to one statement, pursued his march, eager for the spoil of Delphi, without waiting for Acichorius, whom he had ordered to follow him as soon as the pass was clear. But as we find that the force with which he attacked Delphi consisted of 65,000 men,† it seems that there must have been some farther concert between the two chiefs, and it is not improbable that, after Brennus had received a re-enforcement, they agreed to take different lines of march, and to meet at Delphi: a plan which secured a more abundant supply of provisions, and held out the prospect of richer booty. But Brennus arrived first; the progress of Acichorius was retarded by the persevering vengeance of the Ætolians, who hung upon his rear, cutting off the stragglers, and seizing every opportunity of impediment and annoyance. The force assembled for the defence of Delphi, composed chiefly of Phocians, Locrians, and Ætolians, did not, after it had received its last accessions, exceed 4000 men. The accounts remaining to us of the events which ensued are as full of wonders as the description given by Herodotus of the disasters which befell the

ken when (p. 71) he supposes that the disasters mentioned by Pausanias, which compelled the greater part of the population to abandon Patræ, befell it in this war. If that had been the case, it would never have been a member of the Achæan League. In the expedition against the Celts it does not appear to have suffered any material loss, but was enriched with considerable booty. (Paus., vii., 20, 6.)

\* Whether Brennus is a proper name, or, according to the prevailing opinion, the Cymric appellative *breakin*, king, may admit of a doubt (see the note in Arnold's History of Rome, i., p. 524). But that Brennus and Acichorius are one and the same person, as is maintained by Schmidt (*De Font.*, p. 49) and Droysen, must be denied, until some better reasons appear than any which have yet been produced, to show that all the details of the narrative in which Brennus and Acichorius are represented as distinct persons must be rejected. Diefenbach (*Celtica*, ii., p. 275) suggests that Cichorius, or Acichorius, may have been the proper name of the chief called Belgus. † Justin., xxiv., 7



Persians on the same ground, and the prodigies said to have happened on both occasions are so similar, that the later report might seem a mere repetition of the earlier one. We are informed that the oracle was consulted, and declared that the god would protect his sanctuary; and that the promise was fulfilled by an earthquake,\* which rent the rocks, and brought down huge masses on the heads of the assailants, by a tempest, in which many of them were consumed by the lightning, and by the appearance of celestial warriors, who fought against them. But this is no proof that these marvellous incidents of the later story are merely fictions borrowed by the author to embellish his narrative. No doubt a great change had taken place in the heart and mind of the nation since the Persian war. The people had become somewhat less credulous, and less disposed to expect a supernatural interposition on any occasion. The scenes of the Sacred War had also tended to weaken the ancient reverence for the oracle and the temple, which had been so openly and repeatedly profaned with impunity. But Delphi was still commonly regarded as holy ground, and as favoured, at times, with a Divine presence. The remembrance of the local traditions would be forcibly awakened in the little band which had devoted itself to the defence of the temple while it awaited the enemy's approach, and might readily suggest the hope of Divine assistance; and the guardians of the oracle would not neglect any of the pious arts which had been practised on the like occasions by their predecessors, to cherish and direct the enthusiasm of their champions. We may, therefore, easily account for the rise of a genuine popular legend on the subject.†

Be this as it may, the supernatural element of the story has not so disfigured it as wholly to conceal the real course and connexion of the events. It seems that Brennus, when he arrived in the valley of the Pleistus, was advised by his Greek guide† to proceed without delay to the attack of Delphi. But either because he thought that his troops needed refreshment, or because he was unable to restrain them, he permitted them first to gorge themselves with the plunder of the farms and hamlets, where large stores of corn and wine had, it is said, been purposely left. In the mean while, the approaches of the city were fortified, and preparations made to take the utmost advantage of all the means of resistance afforded by the nature of the ground. When the Celts advanced to the assault, they were, perhaps, stupified and bewildered by their recent excesses, so as to be more than usually susceptible of superstitious terrors. Brennus, we are told, endeavoured to stimulate their rapacity by the assertion that

the gilded statues which they saw gleaming from the terraces of Delphi were of solid gold.\* It may be doubted whether he himself was aware of the loss which the treasury had suffered in the Phocian war. The assailants, who, in general, were easily deterred by slight obstacles in such operations, were repulsed and disheartened. Fragments of rock rolled down from the top of the cliffs contributed to their defeat and consternation. A sudden change of weather to frost and snow, and the effects of surfeit followed by scarcity, and by disease arising out of both, began to thin their ranks, and determined Brennus to abandon the hopeless enterprise.† The order for retreat was to the Greeks a signal for a series of attacks, with which they continued to harass the enemy as far as the camp at Thermopylæ, where a division had been left to guard the booty. The junction with Acichorius, which seems to have taken place soon after the retreat began, only served to increase the confusion and to retard the march of the Celts, while the numbers and the confidence of the Greeks were growing from day to day. Brennus, who had been wounded before Delphi, is said to have destroyed himself to escape the resentment of his countrymen;‡ and Acichorius, who succeeded to the command, to have put his sick and wounded to death,§ and to have abandoned his baggage to secure his retreat. No estimate can be safely formed of the amount of the loss sustained by the Celts in their passage through Greece and Macedonia. But the assertion, with which some of our authors round the tale, that they were cut off to a man, is a patriotic exaggeration, almost as gross as the fictions with which the Roman historians, to save the national honour, disguised the issue of the Celtic expedition against Rome. We are informed that one part of the host of Brennus, commanded by a chief named Bathanatus,¶ reached the banks of the Danube, near its confluence with the Save,|| while another, under Comontorius, was strong enough to effect a settlement, and to establish an independent kingdom, with a capital named Tyle, in the maritime part of Thrace.¶ And it is probable that the bands of Celtic adventurers, whom we shall find a few years later in Macedonia and Epirus, and in the pay of Greek princes, were a remnant of the same body.\*\*

The most important immediate effect produced on Greece by the Celtic invasion was, perhaps, that it raised the reputation and the confidence of the Ætolians, who claimed the largest share in the issue of the war, and cherished the recollection of their exploits with almost as much self-complacency as the Athenians that of their victories over the Persians. They dedicated a trophy, and a statue representing Ætolia, as an armed heroine, at Delphi, for a perpetual memorial of the vengeance they

\* According to Pausanias, x., 23, 1, exactly co-extensive with the ground occupied by the Celts.

† On the tenacity of the popular belief among the Greeks, one may refer with pleasure to an essay of G. W. Nitzsch, *Die Heldensage der Griechen nach ihrer nationalen Geltung*.

‡ Justin, xxiv., 7. Eranus et Thessalorum duos qui se ad prædæ societatem junxerant. Schorn (*Geschichte Griechenlands*, p. 35) restores the true reading by a happy conjecture: Ænanius et Thessalorum; which is rendered nearly certain by the reading Ænanius in one MS. Thus we find the Thessalians acting the same part as in the expedition of Xerxes (Herodot., viii., 31); and it seems by no means improbable that they were animated by a similar motive of hereditary enmity towards the Phocians.

\* Justin, xxiv., 7.

† Paus., x., 23, 12; Justin, xxiv., 8, cum dolores vulnerum ferro non posset.

‡ Diodorus, xxii.

§ Athenæus, vi., 25. Zeuss, however (*Die Deutschen*, p. 175) thinks it more probable that Bathanatus was the chief who first led the Celts into Illyria.

|| Justin, xxii., 3.

¶ Polybius, iv., 46. Steph. Byz., *Tôlis*.

\*\* Dieffenbach (*Celtica*, ii., 1, p. 243) would draw a like inference from a passage of Pausanias, x., 19, 1, the meaning of which he has strangely mistaken, as if *ἐκέρχθη* were referred to a pecuniary mulct.

had inflicted on the destroyers of Callium.\* But the consequence which most deeply and permanently affected the state of Greece, and of the ancient world, was the restoration of Antigonos to the throne of Macedonia, which took place within a few months after the retreat of Brennus, though he was destined yet to experience many vicissitudes of fortune before the final establishment of his dynasty. The death of Sosthenes, who remained, it seems, only about eight months at the head of affairs,† left the country exposed to the miseries of anarchy and civil war. We find mention of several obscure pretenders to the crown, among whom Antipater, probably the same who had been expelled by Sosthenes, appears to have gained the ascendancy; for it is between him and Antigonos that the last struggle takes place. Antigonos overpowered him with the aid of a body of Celtic mercenaries, whose chief is named Biderius, and who are represented as accompanied by their wives and children. Antigonos is reported to have compelled them, by a stratagem, to accept less than they demanded as the reward of their services;‡ but he now appears as undisputed master of Macedonia (B.C. 278), with a powerful army and fleet, elephants, and a great treasure; and we next find him engaged in war, and concluding an honourable peace, with Antiochus.§ In this war he sided with Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, whose dominions Antiochus had invaded to revenge the loss of an army which, with its general, Patrocles, had been cut off in an ambuscade by the Bithynians. Nicomedes, likewise, obtained the aid of the Celts, who, as we have seen, had followed Leonorius and Lutarus to the coast of Thrace, where they continued to ravage the territory of Byzantium and other Greek cities, and to levy contributions, until, with the co-operation of Nicomedes, they effected their passage into Asia.¶ It was, perhaps, the treaty which Nicomedes concluded with them, by which they bound themselves to a perpetual alliance, defensive and offensive, with him, his descendants, and confederates, that induced Antiochus to avoid a conflict and come to terms, by which he probably renounced his hopeless pretensions both to Bithynia and Macedonia. The Celts whom Nicomedes brought over continued long to take a very active part in the wars of western Asia, always eager for pay and plunder, and a terror to the peaceful population, but often willingly lending their aid to protect the freedom of the cities against the neighbouring kings, and, finally, occupied a territory on the

Halys, to which they gave the name of Galatia, where they organized their states with peculiar, and, it would seem, not ill-contrived institutions.\*

If we might rely on the sequel of Justin's narrative, which, however, is subject to strong suspicions of great inaccuracy and confusion, Antigonos had not long returned to Macedonia before he was threatened with invasion by another body of Celts, who are described as part of the army of reserve left by Brennus when he set out on his fatal expedition, to guard the frontier of the nation. They are said to have sent envoys to Antigonos with a demand of tribute as the price of peace, and to have been excited rather than discouraged by the reports they received of the treasures, which the king imprudently displayed, of his elephants, and his military and naval preparations. Though their numbers, according to Justin, did not exceed 15,000 foot and 3000 horse, Antigonos, not venturing to meet them in open field, abandoned his camp at their approach, but afterward surprised them as they were engaged in the plunder of his vessels, and defeated them with great slaughter.† Now, at least, he was left in undisturbed possession of his throne, though probably fully occupied with the necessary provisions for its stability and security, until the return of Pyrrhus from his Italian expedition threatened him with new dangers. It was during this interval that he wrested Cassandrea from its tyrant Apollodorus, who, having gained the confidence of his fellow-citizens by his professions of an ardent zeal for liberty, seized the government with the help of a band of conspirators, whom he is said to have pledged in a draught of human blood. Yet it appears that his tyranny was, at first, exercised only at the expense of the rich, and for the benefit of the poor. But it was maintained by a body-guard of Celts, who were the ready instruments of every cruelty; and the possession of absolute power seems to have tempted him to the worst abuse of it. Antigonos besieged the city for ten months, and, at last, made himself master of it only by treachery; for which he employed the agency of a pirate captain named Ameinias, who insinuated himself into the tyrant's confidence, and thus found means to introduce the enemy within the walls.‡

Pyrrhus landed in Epirus in 274, after an absence of six years, with no more than 8000 foot and 500 horse, and without the means of maintaining even this small force, unless at the expense of some enemy. He had never been less inclined for repose than after the series of disappointments he had experienced in the West, where he had signally displayed his military talents and his personal prowess, and had always shown himself superior to his fortune. He could not now hesitate as to the quarter towards which he should turn his arms. Macedonia tempted his ambition, and Antigonos had provoked his resentment, or, at least, furnished a pretext for hostility, by a recent refusal to aid him with troops or money for his

\* Paus., x., 19. 1.

† Porphyry, ap. Euseb., Arm. i., p. 331, assigns two years to Sosthenes. But Schmidt (*Das Obliche Psephisma*, p. 576, 595) has pointed out the error and its probable origin: the government of Sosthenes was divided between two Olympic years. Schmidt supposes that the anarchy terminated by the accession of Antigonos, which, according to Porphyry (p. 342), lasted two years and two months, did not last more than two months. ‡ Polyænus, iv., 8. 17.

§ Justin, xxv., 1. Inter duos reges Antigonum et Antiochum statuta pace, cum in Macedonia Antigonum reverteretur, novus eidem repente hostis exortus est. Hence, Schmidt (*Das Ob. Ps.*, p. 576) supposes the peace to have been concluded before Antigonos set out from Greece for Macedonia. But it is difficult to reconcile this supposition with Memnon's account of the war (ap. Phot., p. 227, a.), *χρόνος οὐκ ὀλίγον κατέβηκεν*.

¶ Memnon, p. 227, b. Strabo, xii., 8.

‡ Memnon, l. c., *τὸν βασιλέα τῶν τῶν πόλεων ἀνακρατῶν ἀφελὲν ἐκποδῆναι αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον τοῖς ἐδωκόσιν*.

\* Strabo, v. a.

† Justin, xxv., 2; Droysen (Hellen., ii., p. 176) believes this to have been the victory over the barbarians gained by Antigonos near Lymnæchia, alluded to by Diog. Laert., ii., 140.

‡ Polyænus iv., 8. 18.

Italian war.† After a short interval of rest he formally declared war against Antigonos, and forthwith followed up his threat by the invasion of Macedonia. He had strengthened his little army with a body of Celtic mercenaries, and the first object of his operations was plunder, which was probably all he could promise them. But before Antigonos was prepared to meet him, he had made himself master of several large towns in Upper Macedonia, and had induced a corps of 2000 Macedonian troops to go over to him. Still, Antigonos was, it appears, at the head of greatly superior numbers, and, in addition to his phalanx and his elephants, he had a strong body of Celts, notwithstanding his recent hostilities with their countrymen, in his pay. Pyrrhus, however, anticipated his approach, and by means, it would seem, of a circuitous march, was able to surprise his army, near the issue of a defile, with a sudden attack on the rear.‡ Notwithstanding the general confusion, however, the Celts, who formed the rear-guard, made a vigorous resistance, but were at last nearly cut to pieces, and the elephants, which had been stationed in the same part of the column, were surrendered by their leaders. Pyrrhus then advanced upon the phalanx, which was not only full of disorder and consternation, but very ill disposed to sacrifice itself for the sake of Antigonos, who had no claim on the respect or affection of his troops comparable to those of his adversary, the first warrior of the age, who was, moreover, favourably remembered as the prince who had delivered Macedonia from the insolent tyranny of Demetrius. It would be not an improbable surmise that there had been previously some correspondence between Pyrrhus and the principal Macedonian officers. No attempt was made to strike a blow: on the first invitation when, stretching out his hand, he called them by their names, they went over to him, and were followed by all their men. Antigonos made his escape to the seacoast, where his remaining force was sufficient to retain Thessalonica and a few other places in their obedience. A fresh army of Celtic mercenaries, which he found means to collect, enabled him soon to renew the struggle; but he was again entirely defeated by Ptolemæus, the son of Pyrrhus, and became for some time a fugitive outcast, wandering from one hiding-place to another, attended by no more than seven followers, while the whole of Macedonia and Thessaly submitted to his rival, who now sent for his son Helenus and his friend Milo from Tarentum. The reputation of the Celtic arms was at this time so high in Greece, that Pyrrhus esteemed the victory he had gained over them no slight addition to his renown, and commemorated it by an inscription on the spoils of the *bold Gaels*, which he dedicated in a temple of Athene, between Phæræ and Larissa. And he even seemed to set a higher value on the services of his Celtic mercenaries than on the attachment of his new subjects. A Celtic garrison, which he left at Ægæ, broke open the sepulchres of the Macedonian kings in search of plunder, and wantonly scattered their bones.‡ Pyrrhus took no notice of this out-

rage, a sign, perhaps, that he would have been likely to lose his new kingdom as easily as he had won it, even if he had been successful in the expedition which closed his history.

Cleomenes II., king of Sparta, son of Cleombrotus, who fell at Leuctra, survived Acrotatus, the eldest of his two sons, who left a son named Areus behind him. On the death of Cleomenes, the succession to the throne was disputed between Cleonymus, his younger son, and Areus, the representative of Acrotatus. The Gerusia, to which the question was referred, decided in favour of Areus, either on the simple ground of right, or because his uncle had betrayed indications of character which awakened distrust.\* The ephors, however, endeavoured to soothe his disappointment by high honours and important military commands,† and when an application was made by the Tarentines for a Spartan general to conduct their war against the Lucanians, he was appointed to this service,‡ which gratified his ambition while it removed him into a kind of honourable exile. His career, as a leader of mercenaries in Italy and Sicily, was neither glorious nor fortunate, and he returned to Sparta without any increase of reputation, but less than ever disposed to rest satisfied with a private condition, or to conform to Spartan habits. Still, however, he was honoured and employed as before, though Areus had long arrived at maturity, and he might, perhaps, have reconciled himself to his lot if his feelings had not been wounded by a fresh injury from the same quarter which was the origin of his former humiliation. His young wife, Chelidonia, did not disguise her preference of Acrotatus, the son of Areus, and the domestic dishonour of Cleonymus was notorious over all Sparta. This affront seemed to fill up the measure of his wrongs, and determined him to run all risk for the satisfaction of his ambition and his revenge. His eyes were naturally turned towards Pyrrhus, whose adventures bore some resemblance to his own, and as soon as the contest for the throne of Macedonia seemed to be decided in favour of the Epirot, Cleonymus appeared in his camp and urged him to make war upon Sparta. Pyrrhus was easily persuaded to engage in an enterprise which opened a new field of action with a prospect of easy conquests, and which seemed necessary to complete his victory by the reduction of the places still held for Antigonos in Greece. In the year 273 he marched into Peloponnesus with an army of 25,000 foot, 2000 horse, and 24 elephants. The arrival of this great force, which it appeared impossible to resist, no doubt excited many hopes and fears in the Grecian states. Embassies from Athens, Achæa, and Messina, repaired to his camp.§ His professions were moderate and specious: the object of his expedition was merely to restore the freedom of the cities which were held in subjection by Antigonos. Even when he had advanced as far as Megalopolis, and envoys came from Sparta to ascertain his intentions, he still held similar language, adding that he meant to send his younger sons to be trained in the

\* Justin, xiv., 2.

† Ibid., u. 2.

‡ Plat., Pyrrh., 26.

\* Plat., u. 2.

† Diod., xx., 104.

‡ Paus., iii., 6, 2.

§ Justin, xiv., 2.

Spartan discipline.\* It was useless to question his sincerity; but it seems hardly possible that the Spartans could have been deceived by such artifices, even if he had not been accompanied by Cleonymus. He no sooner crossed the border than he laid aside the mask. Plutarch, in his *Life*, says that he immediately began to ravage the country, and that when the envoys, who accompanied him, expostulated with him on the unprovoked aggression, which had not been preceded by the usual declaration of war, he only retorted with a sneer on the Spartan dissimulation. But elsewhere Plutarch relates that he required the Spartans to receive Cleonymus as their king,† and it seems to have been the threat with which he accompanied this demand that drew forth the reply which Plutarch reports in the Laconian dialect, "If you are a god, we are safe in our innocence; if a man, you are not invincible."

The invasion had been so little foreseen, that not only had no preparations been made for the defence of the capital, but King Areus himself was absent in Crete. The city had been partially fortified in its wars with Cassander and Demetrius, but was still open at several points, and the population was thin. Cleonymus urged Pyrrhus to attack it immediately on his arrival; and it seems probable that the attempt would have succeeded. The friends of Cleonymus felt so little doubt of his speedy restoration, that his house was prepared for the reception of his royal protector. Pyrrhus himself rejected his advice only because he thought his conquest secure, and did not wish to see it sullied with bloodshed and pillage. He encamped for the night, expecting to make a peaceful entry the next day. It was, perhaps, mainly the presence of Cleonymus, the dread of his vengeance, that decided his countrymen on a desperate resistance. Acrotatus, who had most to fear from him, filled his father's place. It was at first proposed to send the women away to Crete; but they retained all the spirit of ancient times with increased influence, derived from enormous wealth. Archidamia, the mother of Acrotatus, and the richest heiress in Sparta, is said to have entered the Gerusia with a drawn sword to remonstrate against the resolution. It was withdrawn, and the women earned their share of the danger by their exertions in the hour of need. A ditch had been begun on the side facing the enemy's camp. They laboured at it themselves during the night, while the men armed and recruited their strength for the approaching struggle. At each end of the ditch was formed a barricade of wagons buried up to the axles in the ground, chiefly as a rampart against the elephants.‡ The next day Pyrrhus advanced to the assault, as to a conquest which had become more difficult, but not less certain. He was, however, unable to force the passage

of the ditch; and his son Ptolemæus, whom he had ordered to break through the barricade with a detachment of Gauls and Chaonian picked troops, was repulsed with great loss by Acrotatus and a handful of Spartans. Sparta had seen another glorious day; but it was purchased by a sacrifice of life which weakened the hopes, though not the courage, of the survivors.

Pyrrhus himself had become so far anxious about the result, that a dream which he had in the night, and which seemed to him promising raised his spirits, and he related it with great satisfaction to his friends; but when his soothsayer suggested a different interpretation, he affected to make light of omens, and applied the celebrated line of the *Iliad*, which expresses the same generous sentiment, to himself, though none of his contemporaries seem to have been less exempt from superstition. At daybreak the assault was renewed. The efforts of the assailants were again directed towards the ditch, which was now partly filled with arms and corpses; but apparently not so much with a view to cross it, as to divert the attention of the besieged, while Pyrrhus made an attempt to force an entrance at another point. And it seems as if this would have succeeded if he had not been thrown by his horse, which was wounded as he was mounting a steep bank. Having been repulsed through this accident, he gave orders to put a stop to the assault; perhaps, because he had been too much hurt by his fall to conduct it in person; but he also expected that the besieged, who seemed reduced by losses and wounds to the last stage of weakness, would shortly offer terms of surrender. But the reward of their fortitude was now at hand. Ameinias, probably the pirate who commanded for Antigonus at Corinth, made his appearance with a body of mercenaries, accompanied, perhaps, by some Argive auxiliaries,\* and soon after Areus arrived with 3000 men from Crete. The Messenians, too, though they had been willing, as we saw, to treat with Pyrrhus, sent succours, unolicited, to their old enemy.† The ramparts were now so well manned, that the old men and the women who had bravely exposed themselves in the most dangerous situations, while they supplied their warriors with weapons and food, might return to their homes.

Pyrrhus did not immediately abandon his enterprise, because it had become so much more difficult; but after several fresh attempts, in which he was repulsed and wounded, he found it necessary to shift his quarters, and began to ravage the country, professing his intention to winter there. But it seems doubtful whether this was ever his real design, as he must by this time have heard that Antigonus, who had again col-

\* Paus. i., 13, 6.

\* Plut., *Pyrr.*, 26. Droysen (ii., p. 190, n. 62) observes, as a decisive objection to this account of the language of Pyrrhus, that Helenus, the youngest of his sons, was at this time old enough to be entrusted with military command. But who supposes that Pyrrhus expected to be believed?

† Apophthegm. Lac., *Δαρεῖος*. In *Pyrrh.*, 26, the envoy is named Mandricides. In Stob., *Flor.*, i., p. 213, *Gaius*, Dercyllidas, one of the Gerusia, makes a similar speech in the assembly at Sparta.

‡ Flatie, ii., p. 94, conceives that the wagons were placed in the ditch, which I can neither understand, nor reconcile with Plutarch's description.

† Schorn, p. 46, supposes that they did not come until they knew that their aid was not needed, and takes occasion to make a severe reflection on the character of the Messenians. The fact is certainly a little strange; especially as Sparta had so recently refused to grant them a truce, when they would have joined the allied army to oppose the Celtic invasion. If, however, as the language of Pausanias (iv., 28, 3) seems to intimate, the refusal was produced chiefly by the personal influence of Cleonymus, it would at least be intelligible that they might desire to prevent his restoration, which, so brought about, would have invested him with nearly absolute power. Schorn does not notice the passage (i., 13, 6) in which Pausanias first mentions the Messenian succours in a manner very adverse to the supposition that they came when the danger was nearly past.

lected an army, was on his march towards Peloponnesus. At this juncture an invitation from Argos, where Aristæas sought his assistance against a rival named Aristippus, who was favoured by Antigonus, afforded him at least a fair colour for a change of plan. He forthwith began his march to Argos. The Spartans probably regarded it as a retreat, and Areus occupied one of the passes on the road with an ambuscade. A combat ensued, in which Pyrrhus lost not only a considerable number of his rear guard, but his son Ptolemæus, the one who most resembled him in prowess and valour. He avenged his death on the field; and, after having celebrated his obsequies with splendid games, proceeded without farther interruption. When he reached the plain of Argos, he found that Antigonus was already encamped on one of the adjacent heights; and he endeavoured by an insulting message to provoke him to a battle, which Antigonus calmly declined. There was, it seems, a moderate party in Argos, or a number of citizens belonging to neither of the contending factions, and desirous of saving the city from the yoke of a foreign prince. Through their influence envoys were sent both to Pyrrhus and Antigonus, with the request that they would withdraw their forces, and permit the city to preserve a friendly neutrality. Antigonus, perhaps knowing Aristippus to be the stronger, consented, and offered to deliver his son as a hostage. Pyrrhus did not refuse, but would give no pledge. Aristæas had promised to introduce his troops within the walls. Accordingly, a gate was opened for him in the night, through which his Celtic troops made their way into the market-place unobserved. Pyrrhus himself followed with a part of the elephants, leaving his son Helenus with the bulk of the forces on the outside, to await farther orders. The entrance of the elephants, which would not pass through the gateway until their towers were taken down, was attended with delay and confusion, which at length alarmed the slumbering inhabitants. The citizens were soon in arms, and sent to Antigonus for succour. In the mean while they were joined by Areus, who had followed close at the heels of Pyrrhus with Cretan and Spartan light troops. Antigonus advanced near to the walls, and sent his son Halcyoneus, with a strong detachment, into the city, but himself remained without. After the night had been spent in wild tumult, aimless struggles, and random blows, the dawning light enabled Pyrrhus to perceive that all the strongest positions in the city were securely occupied by the enemy, and he deemed it advisable to retreat. But fearing that some obstruction might again occur in the narrow gateway, which might now be attended with disastrous consequences, he sent orders to Helenus to break down a part of the walls, and to protect the egress of the troops from molestation. Through some mistake in the delivery of the message, Helenus, instead of opening a fresh passage, advanced with his best troops and the remainder of the elephants to the same gateway towards which the tide of the retreat was rolling. The confusion created by the confluence was still more embroiled by the fall of one elephant, and the ungovernable wildness of another. Every avenue leading to the gate was choked by a solid living mass, which

could only stir as one body. Pyrrhus, on horseback, was in the rear, in a somewhat more open space, endeavouring to ward off the pressure of the enemy. The Argive women were looking down on the throng from the house-tops; and one of them, seeing Pyrrhus turning on her son who had wounded him, raised a ponderous tile with both hands, and hurled it with so true an aim that it fell on the back of the king's head. According to the Argive legend, it was the goddess Demeter herself, in human form, who had dealt the fatal stroke.\* Stunned by the blow, he sank from his horse; and though he had taken the precaution to divest his helmet of its diadem, he was recognised by some soldiers of Antigonus, who dragged him aside, and severed his head from his body. Halcyoneus, who was at hand, took possession of the bleeding trophy, carried it to his father, who was seated among his friends, and threw it down at his feet. Antigonus had enough of good feeling or discretion to be ashamed of his son's ferocious exultation. He hid his face, if not his tears, with his mantle, ordered the remains of his illustrious rival to be honoured with fitting obsequies, and received Helenus more like a friend than a prisoner. The Argives are reported to have interred the hero's bones in the temple of Demeter, which Pausanias seems to say was erected for the purpose near the place where he fell.†

Inglorious as was this termination of a career like that of Pyrrhus, the closing scene of his life was not without some points of resemblance to its general character. He was, undoubtedly, one of the nobler spirits of his age, though it would seem that it could have been only in one which was familiar with atrocious crimes that he could have gained the reputation of unsullied virtue, more particularly of probity, which we find attached to his name. With extraordinary prowess, such as revived the image of the heroic warfare, he combined many qualities of a great captain, and was thought by some to be superior even to Alexander in military art. But his whole life was not only a series of unconnected, mostly abortive, enterprises, but might be regarded, with respect to himself, as one ill-concerted, perplexed, and bootless adventure. From beginning to end he was the sport, not so much of fortune, as of desires without measure or plan, of an impetuous but inconstant will. His ruling passion was less ambition than the love of action; and he seems to have valued conquest

\* Paus., i., 13, 8. Droysen, ii., p. 197, collects from the variations in the text of Strabo (viii., 376) and Justin (xliii., 8) that Pyrrhus did not enter the city at all, but that he lay outside the gates. But it seems as difficult to reconcile their language (particularly Strabo's) with this supposition, as with Plutarch's narrative. Strabo says: *Ἀφ' οὗτο ἐπὶ Πύρρῳ πῦρ ἐξέσταντο, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ τοῖχου τεταρταῖον ὑπὸ τοῦ πύργου, ἐκ οὗκ ἐκπαρὰ τοῦ ἀσπίδος ἐπὶ τὴν κατὰ ἡμέραν. Justin: Repulus a Spartano Pyrrhus Argos petit: ibi, dum Antigonum in urbe locantem expugnare conatur inter confertissimos violentissime dimicaps, saxo de muris ictus, occiditur.*

† i., 13, 8. But, comparing ii., 21, 4, I am inclined to suspect that τοῦ θεοῦ χριστοῦ has been transposed, and belongs to ῥηθῆναι.

† Justin, xxv. 5. Satis constans inter omnes auctores fama est, nullum nec ejus nec superioris ætatis regem comparandum Pyrrho fuisse; raroque non inter reges tantum, verum etiam inter illustres viros, aut vitæ sanctioris, aut justitiæ probatoris visum fuisse.

♦ Procles, the Carthaginian, ap. Paus., iv., 35, 4. His work on the art of war was in request in the time of Cicero (Ep. ad Div., ix., 25).

chiefly because it opened new fields of battle. But viewed as subservient to higher ends, both his life and his death were memorable and important. He contributed to adjust the balance of power among Alexander's successors in the West. He exercised the Roman arms with a harder trial than they had ever before undergone; and inspired the people with a confidence in its own strength which nerved it for the struggle with Carthage, and prepared it for the mastery of the world. His death forms a momentous epoch in Grecian history, as it left the field clear for the final contest between the liberty of Greece and the power of Macedon, which was only terminated by the ruin of both.

## CHAPTER LXI.

FROM THE DEATH OF PYRRHUS TO THE ACCESSION OF ANTIGONUS DOSON.

THE appearance of Antigonus with an army before Argos implies a series of events which are scarcely noticed by any of the authors who have preserved fragments of the history of this period. Pausanias says the most, when he mentions that, while Pyrrhus was occupied with the invasion of Greece, Antigonus recovered the Macedonian cities. Pyrrhus, as we have seen, had given some offence to the national feelings, and even without such an occasion it would not have been surprising that a revolution should have taken place during his absence. But the recovery of places in Macedonia cannot have been the first or chief object that engaged the attention of Antigonus. For the present all he wanted was an army to enable him to meet his rival in Greece, and in this period nothing was easier than to raise one. There were everywhere military adventurers ready to flock to any standard which held out a prospect of prey or plunder. It is probable that, as soon as he had collected a sufficient force, he began his march, reserving the settlement of Macedonia for his future leisure. After the fall of Pyrrhus, the greater part of his army, which was chiefly composed of Macedonians, seems to have passed into the service of Antigonus. But he did not find it so easy to recover the hold which he had lost during his recent adversity in Peloponnesus, where his influence must have been violently shaken, first by the disaster which deprived him of his throne, and then by the appearance of his victorious enemy. And here he could not, consistently with his previous policy and professions, resort in all cases to open force for the accomplishment of his ends. He had ruled under the title of a protector and ally. Whether he introduced a garrison or established a tyrant, it was probably always under the pretext of providing for the security and tranquillity of the city. Flourishing as the state of his affairs had now become, it would still not have been prudent immediately to adopt a different system, and to claim the rights of a master. The spirit which Sparta had displayed in the late war, and the attitude of Ætolia, were additional motives for caution. But a course of dissimulation and intrigue could only be pursued slowly; and, accordingly, it appears that Antigonus was detained a long

while, perhaps until late in the following year (272), by the affairs of Peloponnesus, before he returned to Macedonia.

He could not suspect that a power which was at this time silently growing in a corner of the peninsula was destined to become a formidable adversary to his house. Yet seven years had now elapsed since the origin of a new confederacy among the towns of Achaia, which already comprehended the whole of that land. This Achæan League, which became so celebrated, and earned the melancholy honour of giving a name to the whole of Greece, when it was reduced into a Roman province, was founded on the recollections of earlier times, but was called into being by the wants and miseries of the period in which it arose. After the abolition of monarchical government, the old confederacy had subsisted, with few vicissitudes of fortune, and little change of condition, until the reign of Alexander. The most brilliant epoch in its obscure history was that in which its mediation was sought, and its institutions adopted, by its powerful colonies in Italy;\* the most inglorious, that of the Persian invasion, when, either from selfish indifference or pitiful hatred towards Sparta, it kept aloof from the national struggle for freedom. Its inaction at such a crisis left the deeper stain upon its honour, because, in the course of the Peloponnesian war, it submitted, no doubt very reluctantly, to the Dorian alliance.† The history of that war shows the laxity of the union which then subsisted among the members of the League, for we find Pellene at one time taking part with Sparta, while the rest remained neutral,‡ and at another, Patræ alone warmly espousing the cause of Athens.§ It displayed a more generous spirit when it sent succours to the side of independence at Chæronea, but suffered a loss which it continued to feel for many years.

Confined to a narrow tract of not exuberantly fertile land, between the mountains and the sea, with few commercial advantages, the Achæans never attained to any great share of either public or private wealth, and were, on this account, probably, the more exempt from the evils of faction, and enabled to retain a simplicity of manners and equality of fortunes, which cherished the spirit, as well as preserved the form, of their democratical Constitution; though, when we find the destruction of Helice, which was overthrown by an earthquake, and overwhelmed by the sea, in the year 373 B.C., attributed to the sacrilegious murder of suppliants who had been torn from an altar,|| we perceive a symptom of some violent political agitation. In the reign of Alexander, Pellene was estranged from the League, having fallen under the dominion of a tyrant named Chæron, of whom we only know that he gained an extraordinary number of prizes in the wrestling-matches at the Olympic games.¶ He was supported by the Macedonian influence, and hence Pellene kept aloof from the struggle which ended with the disastrous battle of Mantinea,\*\* and was exempt from the penalty which the conquerors imposed on the other Achæan towns, which all took part with Sparta.

\* Polyb., ii., 39.

† Thuc., ii., 19.

‡ Ib., v., 58; vol. iii., p. 244.

§ Ib., v., 54; vol. iii., p. 341.

|| Paus., vii., 24, 6.

¶ Ib., vii., 27, 7.

\*\* Ant., p. 308.

This second blow, falling upon them before they had recovered from that of Cheronea, left them so weak that they could not stir in the Lamian war, though their hearts were undoubtedly with their countrymen, as the name of Cheilon, also a wrestler, was long preserved in honourable remembrance among them, as that of the only Achæan who served in the allied army.\* The policy of Alexander's successors in Macedonia was continually bent, so far as Achaia attracted their attention, on effecting the dissolution of the League; and this work, which was successfully begun by Cassander and Demetrius, was accomplished by Antigonus Gonatas, who had at length the pleasure to see every town either occupied by his troops, or subject to the tyranny of one of his creatures.† The latter of these conditions was, perhaps, that which best suited his interest, but it must have been by far the most grievous to the sufferers, as the smallness of the towns rendered it the more difficult to elude the despot's observation, and their poverty rendered his exactions the more oppressive. The misery had probably become almost insupportable, when the convulsion which followed the death of Lysimachus in Macedonia opened a prospect of deliverance; and it seems to have been instinctively felt that this could only be effected by the revival of the ancient union. The example was set by Patræ and Dyme, the two maritime towns nearest to the western border, and was speedily followed by Tritæa and Pharæ, their neighbours in the interior. The confederation of these four towns was not, it appears, the result of any formal negotiation, as we are informed that it was not regulated by any written compact.‡ It was probably considered simply as a restoration of the old state of things which had been violently interrupted by foreign intervention. Five years after, the League was joined by Ægium, which expelled the Macedonian garrison, and by Bura, which put its tyrant to death. The accession of Ægium was the more important, because, after the destruction of Helice, the ordinary assemblies and festivals of the League had been transferred to Ægium,§ and its territory had been enlarged by that of its fallen neighbour. A temple had been consecrated there to Zeus, under the title of Homagyrus (the Assembler), probably with reference to these meetings, though in later times a local legend traced the origin of the epithet to the Trojan war.|| A column was now erected, inscribed with the names of the confederate towns, and, perhaps, with the conditions of their union. The list was almost immediately increased by the addition of Ceryneæ, where the tyrant Iseas, having the example of Bura before his eyes, and finding himself nearly encompassed by hostile neighbours, abdicated his authority, and having obtained security from the Achæans, annexed his town to the League. There now remained only three, Leontium, Ægira, and Pellene, to complete the number which had been left after the loss of Helice; for Olenus, which was once one of the twelve, had, it seems, been already abandoned by its

inhabitants;\* and the accession of these three was not long delayed.

The Constitution of the new League then became fixed in its main outline, though it subsequently underwent some slight changes, which will be noticed hereafter. It appears to have differed from that of the old League chiefly in two points. The bond of union was drawn closer than before. No township was permitted to make war or peace,† or to enter into any negotiation with foreign states apart from the entire body; though each appears to have retained the unfettered management of its internal affairs. And now it seems, for the first time, two officers, with the title of *strategus*, but with functions partly civil and partly military, were placed at the head of the federal government. To them was added a secretary of state (*grammateus*), probably as in the old League, and a council of ten *demiurges*, which, as it answers to the number of the Achæan towns, may also have subsisted under the same name in the former period.‡

The federal sovereignty resided in the general assembly,§ which was held regularly twice a year. To it belonged the election of the federal magistrates,|| the federal legislation, and the decision of all the great questions, as of war, peace, and alliances, connected with the affairs of the League. In this assembly every Achæan who had completed the age of thirty¶ had a vote, and was allowed to speak;\*\* and in this franchise the democratical character of the Constitution mainly consisted. There were, however, arrangements by which the share of the sovereignty, which could be exercised by any private citizen, was reduced within a nar-

\* Polyb., ii., 41, 7. Strabo, viii., p. 384, προσελθόντες τινες τὸν Ὀλένα, πλὴν Ὀλένου καὶ ἑλίκης τῆς μὲν ἐκ συνελούσης, τῆς δ' ἀφανίσθησης ἐπὶ κύματι, p. 386, he says, συνέκτισαν (οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ) Ὀλένον ἐκ Δυμῆν. But Pausan., viii., 18, 1, ἀπὸ χρόνου τοῦς ἐλευστέρας ἐκλείπειν τὸν δόρυδα φασι τὴν Ὀλένον, καὶ ἐς Παρὰς τε καὶ ἐς Εἰδυρτίδας ἀποχωρεῖται. Vestiges of Olenus were pointed out to Strabo (u. s., δεικνύονται ἔχους), which seem to have disappeared in the days of Pausanias, who proves its existence by reference to a poem of Hermesianax. Colonel Leake's statement (Morea, ii., p. 157), that "the Olenii refused to join the revived Achæic League," is as little warranted by Strabo's expression as his inference "that Olenus was at that time a place of some importance."

† The aid given by Patræ to the Ætolians against the Gauls (Paus., vi., 18, 6, κατὰ φύλιν τὸν Αἰτωλῶν) hardly deserves to be called an apparent exception, especially as the League was then only just coming into being, though it is alleged by Tittmann, p. 678, as an illustration of a general rule. He is obliged, of course, to treat the prohibition against sending ambassadors to Rome (Paus., vii., 9, 4) as an exception. But it is highly improbable that the Achæans would have ventured to make such a one, or that the senate would have suffered it.

‡ *δημιουργοί*. In the inscriptions, n. 1543, 1543, *δημογγοί*. See Boeckh, i., p. 11. Liv. (xxviii., 30) calls them *Demiurges* civitatum, qui summus est magistratus. Both Tittmann (p. 687) and Helwing (p. 236) have been perplexed by the number ten, forgetting how that of the Achæan townships had been reduced by the loss of Helice and Olenus. Schorn (p. 63) supposes, very probably, that the two generals of the new League supplied the places of the two *demiurges*, who made up the number twelve in the old one.

§ *συνδοίς, ἐκκλησία, συνέδριον*; and, according to Niebuhr (ii., p. 30, n. 54), *ἀγορά*. But Tittmann (p. 664) gives a different explanation of that word in Polyb., xxi., 8, 5.

|| That the *demiurges* had the exclusive right of proposing candidates for the chief magistracy, is inferred both by Schorn (p. 64, n. 4) and Droysen (ii., p. 463), from a passage of Polybius (xxviii., 6), in which no mention is made of the *demiurges*, and in which I can find no intimation of anything but a private agreement of some powerful individuals to promote the election of certain persons of their own party.

¶ Polyb., xxi., 9, 6.

\*\* Liv., xxlii., 30.

\* Paus., vii., 6, 5. † Polyb., ii., 41. ‡ Ib., u. s. § Liv., xxxviii., 30. Ægium, a principis Achaici concilii, semper conventus gentis indicit sunt. Paus., vii., 7, 2. ¶ Paus., vii., 24, 3. He seems also to have borne the title *Ὀνδρος*, on which a remark will be found in a subsequent note.

lower compass than might appear on a superficial view. The time allowed to one assembly for the transaction of any business was limited by law to three days.\* A special general assembly† could only be convoked by the magistrates, the generals, and demiurges: no matters could be brought forward of which notice had not been previously published;‡ nor any measure proposed without the concurrence of a majority of the presiding magistrates.§ The value of each citizen's vote seems to have been still farther limited by the manner in which the votes were taken. Every question was decided, not by an absolute majority of the citizens present, but by that of the towns, members of the League.|| Thus, as Niebuhr observes,¶ the general assembly was a representative one. Each town had as much weight in the assembly, if but one of its citizens was present, as if it sent its whole population. But if there be room for a doubt whether this was the case with regard to the general assembly, there can hardly be any as to the representative character of the great council,\*\* which we find occupying an intermediate place between the general assembly and the college of magistrates. Our information as to the constitution and the powers of this body are, unfortunately, very scanty. We do not know either what its number was, or whether it continued always the same; but it seems clear that, at a later period, it cannot have been less than 120.†† All affairs of great moment appear to have passed through the council before they were submitted to the general assembly;‡‡ and it is probable that the result of its deliberations contributed, at least, very materially to determine the final issue. There were also cases in which it acted as a committee of the assembly, and, as it seems, was authorized to decide finally on the questions which came before it.

If, from this point of view, the democratical character of the Achaean League appears tempered by a different element, we are led to a like conclusion when we observe the tendency of its institutions to increase the political influ-

ence of property. The existence of such an influence in the councils of the League is too apparent, in the course of its history, to be disputed; and yet it was neither the effect of a pecuniary qualification attached to the exercise of the franchise, nor do we find any intimation that the mode of taking the votes was regulated with a view to this object.\* It seems, rather, to have been the natural inevitable effect of the circumstances by which the federal government was distinguished from that of a single city. As the League spread, a longer and longer journey was necessary for the greater part of those who had the right of voting to attend the assembly at Ægium. This, of itself, would operate as a timocratical restriction on the exercise of the franchise; it would exclude most citizens of the lowest class. In the college of magistrates and the great council, and the federal courts of justice,‡ as more of their time was devoted to the performance of their official duties, wealth would preponderate still more; for, as we know to have been the case with regard to the council, so we have reason to believe that no salary was annexed to any of these places.

If the revival of the League had been deferred only six or seven years, that is, until the death of Pyrrhus, it is probable that Antigonus would have stifled the rising power in its infancy; but it had now acquired such a consistency that he could only have overwhelmed it by an exertion of force, which, at this juncture, while so many other more important affairs remained unsettled, he might not deem advisable. After he had taken such measures as appeared to be most urgently required for the furtherance or security of his interests in Peloponnesus, it became high time to turn his attention towards Macedonia, the rather as some events seem to have taken place, near the western frontier of his kingdom, which he could not but view with uneasiness. Pyrrhus had been succeeded on the throne of Epirus by his son Alexander, who soon gave proof of talents and a spirit not unworthy of his father. He appears scarcely to have mounted the throne before he was engaged in a war with Monunius, who had, perhaps, hoped to find Epirus defenceless. We have no information as to the issue of the war, but there is ground to believe that it was not unfavourable to Alexander. He probably foresaw that, sooner or later, he should be engaged in a conflict with Antigonus, and therefore sought to strengthen himself by an alliance with the Ætolians, which was, apparently, cemented by an act of injustice, in which they were partners. We learn the fact only from a brief notice in Polybius, who mentions that Alexander divided Acarnania with them.‡ No date is

\* Liv., xxxii., 22. Polyb., xxix., 9, 10.

† *συνκλητος*, Polyb., xxix., 9, 6.

‡ Liv., xxxi., 25.

§ Ibid., xxxii., 92.

|| This most important observation was at least first brought into general notice by Niebuhr (ii., p. 29, n. 51, Engl.). Schorn (p. 63, n. 2) adopts it with the remark that, if the case had been otherwise, Argos and Megalopolis would have prevented the alliance with the Romans. But the Argives did not all withdraw on that occasion (Liv., xxxi., 25, *quidam Argiæorum*), and it is not quite certain that the Megalopolitans were not convinced of the necessity of the measure, though they did not choose to concur in it. But Livy's language (*omnibus fere populis hanc dubie adprobantem relationem, et prae se ferentibus, quid decreturi essent*) seems to leave hardly any room for doubt on the point.

¶ U. s., p. 30. But Helwing's notion (p. 229) that the assembly was composed of delegates, is utterly untenable, and without any colour but Livy's *principes Achaeorum*, xxxii., 21.

\*\* *Βουλὴ*. The term *γερουσία*, which occurs but once (Polyb., xxviii., 5, 1), seems to have been applied to a less numerous body; probably the board consisting of the demiurges and the other magistrates.

†† This seems a necessary inference from the offer made by Eumenes, of 120 talents, for the purpose of paying salaries to the *Βουλὴ* with the interest (Polyb., xxiii., 7); a passage which has not received, so far as I know, from any of the writers who have discussed the Constitution of the Achaean League, the attention which its importance seems to claim. The number 120 = 10 × 12, corresponds both with the old and the new number of the Achaean towns.

‡‡ Polyb., ii., 466.

\* As is supposed by Droysen, ii., p. 462.

† From an expression in Plut., Philop., 7, where the wealthy Achæans who served in the cavalry are described as *μάλιστα κέραι τῆς καὶ καλῆς*, it would seem that the federal tribunals were filled by this class. In one instance (Polyb., xxviii., 7, 9) we find that two foreigners, Rhodians, had been appointed judges; whether for the particular case mentioned, does not appear. It was one which related to the honours which the League had conferred on Eumenes of Pergamus.

‡ ii., 45. Justin (xxviii., 1) alludes less distinctly to the same transaction. *Partem Acarnaniam, quam in partem belli acciperet.*



assigned to this transaction; but, from other acts, it may be inferred that it took place very early in his reign. Antigonos must have viewed both the partition and the alliance with great disquietude. The feeling which subsisted at this time between him and the Ætolians is indicated by another occurrence which belongs to this period of his reign, and which also illustrates the nature of the ascendancy which he was endeavouring to establish in Greece. With his aid an Elean named Aristotimus had made himself master of Elis, where his power was upheld by a band of mercenaries, whose leaders were permitted to indulge their brutal passions in the most atrocious outrages on the persons of the citizens.\* He put many of the principal citizens to death, and forced 800 into exile. They took refuge in Ætolia, and the Ætolians interceded with the tyrant for the release of their wives and children, whom they had left behind. He signed compliance, but only to aggravate the misery of the sufferers by fresh excesses of rapine and cruelty. His tyranny, however, lasted but five or six months: the exiles intrenched themselves in a stronghold named Lymnone, to carry on war against him. Craterus marched from Corinth, where he commanded in the name of his half-brother Antigonos, with a strong force to his assistance, and advanced as far as Olympia. But he came too late; for a conspiracy had been formed against the tyrant within the city, and he was beset as he clung to an altar. Cylon, who, under the mask of friendship, had taken the principal part in the plot, was honoured with a statue at Olympia by the Ætolians.†

The state of Macedonia, exhausted by a long series of destructive wars, and threatened by an able and enterprising neighbour, will fully account for the interval of three or four years which elapsed before Antigonos again makes his appearance in Greece. He returned with a fleet and army, and with undissembled designs of conquest, though it is probable that he did not proceed to execute them so abruptly, and with so little show of pretext, as is represented by the accounts which remain to us of his expedition. They bring him at once to the siege of Athens, while an Egyptian armament, commanded by Ptolemy's admiral, Patroclus, and a Lacedæmonian army under King Areus, are combined to protect it.‡ The presence of the Egyptian fleet in the Greek waters may have been the occasion, rather than the consequence of the siege. Sparta could not but feel that her own independence was threatened, and that she was fighting her own battle in Attica. But both Areus and Patroclus were much more careful to guard themselves than to relieve the Athenians. Patroclus, who had intrenched

himself on a little island, which afterward bore his name, near the Attic coast, over against Laurium,\* offered to second the operations of the Lacedæmonian army with his own troops on the main land if Areus would attack the enemy. But Areus, though his men, it is said, were eager for combat, did not venture to risk lives which Sparta could so ill spare, and might so soon need for her own defence, without a clearer prospect of victory. Even when an opportunity presented itself of attacking the enemy at the greatest possible advantage, no use was made of it. A mutiny, it seems, had broken out among the Celtic mercenaries in the service of Antigonos, who had either been posted at Megara, or had taken up a position there, and Antigonos thought it necessary to march against them with the bulk of his forces. The small body which he left to guard his camp before Athens might, it is supposed, have been easily overpowered, if it had been attacked by the allies. But it appears that they made no attempt either to storm the camp or to impede his operations against the Celts, who are represented as having made such a determined resistance that they first slew their wives and children, and then perished, fighting, to the last man.† Antigonos returned to his headquarters unmolested; and soon after Areus, whose provisions were exhausted, withdrew his army from Attica, and Patroclus sailed away, perhaps to establish his master's authority, with less cost and danger, in other parts of the Ægean. But the Athenians, though thus abandoned, and seemingly betrayed by their allies, did not lose courage. They sustained the siege with a patience and vigour worthy of the ancient times; and Antigonos was so exasperated by their resistance, that he not only ravaged the country, but set fire to the celebrated temple of Poseidon at Colonus, and to the sacred grove in which it stood.‡ The war with Antigonos lasted six or seven years; but, as he invested the city both by sea and land, they could not, by any dint of resolution, have held out so long if the siege had not been at times interrupted, so as to enable them to introduce supplies. And, though this is not expressly related, we find that, on two occasions, Antigonos was called away from Athens during the course of the war. As to one of these movements, we only know that it terminated in a battle, fought with a Lacedæmonian army, near Corinth, in which Areus—who may have been roused to more zealous exertions by the murmurs of his fellow-citizens—lost his life;§ and we find that about the same time he was engaged in hostilities with Alexander, son of Craterus, who had probably succeeded his father in the government.

\* Plutarch, De Mul. Virt., *Miluxa kai Meyxerai*. The name of one of these *condottieri*, Lucius, indicates that a part, at least, of these troops came from Italy.

† Paus., vi., 14, 11. Compare v., 5, 1, where Cylon is said to have struck the blow; which Plutarch's author (Droysen thinks Phylarchus) seems not to have known. Justin (xviii., 1) only mentions Hellenias; but the statue seems to corroborate the other accounts. Fluthe (ii., p. 98), deceived by the false reading *Epirorum* in Justin (xviii., 1), (which, however, had been long corrected), transfers the event to Epirus; and this mistake, perhaps, mainly led him into the fancies with which he has bewildered himself in his account of Alexander's war with Antigonos.

‡ Pausan., iii., 6.

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\* Pausan., i., 1, 1. It was, no doubt, from this station that he sent the embolical present of fish and eggs to Antigonos (Phylarchus ap. Athen., vii., 9), which Antigonos himself interpreted: *ἡ θαλασσογραφία ἡδὲ φῶς* Πύρρος: *ἡ γὰρ σίκεν ῥόγαν*. But the interpretation needs an exposition. Droysen's (ii., p. 213) seems to imply that *φῶς* might be equivalent to *κλέψας*. Nor is it clear that *ῥῶς σίκεν ῥόγαν* would be properly rendered, "to grow fies" (*Ἐβαν φῶς ἀφίστανται, φῶς σίκεν δὲ σὺν ἰθαλοῦσιν*, Ath., iii., p. 80, c.). Compare Erasmus, *Adagia*—*Ficivorus, Evcorpay-lōg*.

† If, as Lucius thinks (*Ueber Polybios' Darstellung des Atolischen Bundes*, p. 73), the strategem in Polybius (iv., 6, 3) belongs to this siege of Megara, we learn that Antigonos had brought elephants with him.

‡ Paus., i., 30, 4.

§ Plut., Agis, 3. Trogi Præl., xvi., by Google

of Corinth, and was at one time master of Eubœa.\* The other diversion probably compelled him to raise the siege for a much longer interval. Alexander of Epirus made an inroad into Macedonia;† and Antigonus, when he marched against the invader, was deserted by his troops, and, for a time, had lost possession of his throne. There is nothing to indicate how long the struggle lasted; but the final recovery of his kingdom is ascribed to his son, Demetrius,‡ who is said to have defeated Alexander in a battle fought at a place called Derdia,§ and afterward to have made himself master of Epirus, while Alexander took refuge in Acarnania, probably in the part which he had annexed to his dominions. Demetrius, however, could not secure his conquest; how long he retained it we are not informed; but Alexander is said to have been restored by the regret of his subjects, and with the aid of his allies, who were probably the Ætolians. And, as we hear of no farther hostilities between him and Antigonus, it seems not improbable that the war was, about the same time, terminated by a treaty.

As soon as this danger had passed by, Antigonus proceeded to renew the siege of Athens, and he is said to have abridged it by an artifice, which Polyænus thought worthy of a place in his collection of stratagems.¶ He granted a suspension of hostilities; Polyænus calls it a peace; and withdrew his forces, as the seed-time was approaching, in the year 263. The Athenians took advantage of the opportunity to sow their land, but neglected to lay in a fresh supply of corn, calculating that their remaining stock would suffice until the next harvest. But before the corn was ripe, Antigonus again invaded Attica, and invested the city, which, having now spent all its provisions, was compelled to submit to his pleasure, and to receive a Macedonian garrison in the Museum, Piræus, Munychia, Sunium, and Salamis. It may easily be supposed that the citizens who had most distinguished themselves by their zeal in the cause of independence were forced to quit their country. One of these exiles, named Chremonides, who appears to have taken so prominent a part in the defence of the city, that the war was sometimes called, from him, the Chremonidean, found shelter and favour at the court

of Alexandria, and was afterward intrusted with the command of an Egyptian fleet.\* Athens, reduced to extreme weakness by her long, unequal struggle, and deprived of her most active and patriotic citizens, ceased to be an object worthy of the conqueror's jealousy; and he revealed the lowest depth of humiliation to which she had ever yet sunk, when, some years afterward, he voluntarily withdrew his garrison from the city, retaining, however, those which he had stationed in the other Attic fortresses. Yet there is reason to believe that he, at the same time, took the precaution of demolishing the long walls. The Athenians, after they had gained this semblance of liberty, were still anxious to show their loyalty to Antigonus, and to convince him that his confidence was not misplaced. It was, apparently, with this view that they deposited the keys of the city with the philosopher Zeno, who had spent the greater part of a long life at Athens, and was revered as the head of the Stoic school. But it is probable that this would not have been deemed a sufficient motive for such an extraordinary mark of public esteem towards a foreigner, if he had not also enjoyed the favour of Antigonus, who not only professed the highest admiration for the philosopher, but affected to treat him as an intimate friend, and, after his death, induced the Athenians to inter him, at the public expense, among their heroes in the Ceramicus. Zeno deserved this honour so well, that it is to be regretted it should not have been more freely conferred, and that his monument, in fact, attested the subjection of Athens rather than the merit of the philosopher.†

\* Teles ap. Stob., Flor., ii., p. 62, Gaiss. Polym., v., 18.

† The Chremonidean War was the subject of one of Niebuhr's most ingenious and characteristic essays (Rhein. Mus., i., p. 159, Kl. Schr., p. 451), and it has since received all the additional light which Droysen's learning and sagacity could throw upon it in the newly-published volume of his *Hellenismus* (ii., p. 205, fol.). Yet some of the details with which he has enriched this very obscure portion of history are of such a nature that nothing less than his own talent for combination and description is required to invest them with an air of probability. That, before the outbreak of the Chremonidean War, Piræus and Munychia had been governed by independent rulers, who could be described as of *Παλαιὸς ὑπερνεκτοῦς*, is a proposition too strange to be admitted on the mere presumption that the Glaucon, the water-drinker, mentioned by Pythæmus (in Athenæus, ii., p. 44, c.), was the Glaucon of Teles (Stobæus, Flor., ii., p. 62, Gaiss.). If the conjecture by which Niebuhr proposed to explain their identity is not to be admitted, it seems easier to suppose, with Scheibe (*Die Ök. garische Umwälzung zu Athen*, p. 69, though he does not notice the Glaucon of Teles), that Glaucon had been enumerated by Pythæmus among the tyrants of 404. Droysen believes that the sea-fight off Cos alluded to by Plutarch (*De seipsum citra inv. laud.*, 16), occurred in the course of this war; not, however, as might have been imagined, between Antigonus and Patroclus, but on a much more extraordinary hypothesis. He supposes that the naval force of Antigonus was so inferior to that of Patroclus that he did not venture to risk an engagement, but nevertheless that, on his return from Macedonia, having anticipated that Philadelphus would send a re-enforcement to his admiral, he sailed to intercept it, and gained a victory over the Egyptian fleet off Cos. Droysen seems even to intimate (p. 219, n. 119) that Patroclus owed his escape to the generosity of Antigonus. Droysen makes the Chremonidean War to begin in 266, the year after that which he assigns to Zeno's death; for during the war, he argues, Antigonus could not have sent Thraos (as Diogenes Laert. relates, vii., 15) to request the Athenians to bury Zeno in the Ceramicus; after the surrender of the city, he would not have requested, but have commanded. Thus reasoning, at least, seems quite fallacious. On such an occasion the conqueror must have desired that his friend should be honoured with every appearance of free public sympathy. Niebuhr's view of the circumstances under which Zeno was

\* Suidas, *Ἐββειπύρ*.

† Flathé (ii., p. 101), with that boundless license of arbitrary conjecture which so often disfigures his otherwise useful and able work, chooses to reject Justin's express statement as to the time of Alexander's invasion of Macedonia (xxvi., 2), places it after the fall of Athens, and attributes to it effects which, so far as any evidence appears, never existed but in his own imagination.

‡ Justin, xxvi., 2. Huius filius Demetrius, puer admodum. Droysen (ii., p. 214) rejects this statement, though it is confirmed by the independent authority of the Armenian Eusebius (i., p. 240, from which we learn the name of the place), because this Demetrius was then scarcely twelve years old; and he supposes that the commander must have been one of the brothers of Antigonus, probably Demetrius the Handsome (Justin, xxvi., 3), son of Demetrius I. and Ptolemais, who would have been about twenty years old. It should, however, be remembered, that Perseus was only twelve years old when he was intrusted by his father with the command of an army (of course with a council to assist him): and Livy, where he relates the fact (xxvi., 29), uses the same expression. *Filius Perseæ, puerum admodum, datæ æt æmicorum numero qui statem ejus regerent, cum parte copiarum . . . mittit.*

§ According to Droysen's probable conjecture, in Elymiotis, where the name of Dordas was common to the ruling family.

After the conquest of Athens, the history of Greece presents almost an utter blank for a period of about ten years, during which we hear of only two occurrences worth recording. We find that Sparta was engaged in a war with Aristodemus, the tyrant of Megalopolis, in the course of which Acrotatus, the son of Areus, fell in battle, leaving his queen pregnant of an heir to his crown, who was born after his death;\* an event which must have strengthened the power of Aristodemus, and, consequently, the Macedonian interest in Peloponnesus. During the same interval, an important change took place in the Constitution of the Achæan League. A single magistrate was appointed in the room of two, to the supreme command. It is not quite certain, though probable, that a new office, that of hipparch (commander of the horse), was substituted for the one which was thus abolished.† We also find mention of a vice-general,‡ but without any account of the mode of his appointment, or of the relation in which he stood to his chief. That his office was not one of very high trust, may be inferred from the fact that, in case of the general's death, it was not he, but the general's immediate predecessor, who stepped into his place.§ But the effect was to invest one person, during his year of office, with the undivided confidence of the League. To him was intrusted the common seal. He convened its assemblies at home; he negotiated with foreign powers in its name; he wielded its military force in the field with absolute, though not irresponsible authority. It was a change which seems to indicate a heightened consciousness of the federal union, and a disposition to render the action of the League more vigorous and uniform. The man who was first honoured with this dignity was Marcus of Ceryneæ, who, before his native town had joined the League, had devoted himself to its service, and commanded its forces in the expedition by which Bura was delivered from its tyrant.¶ There was nothing, however, in this innovation that, apparently, altered the character of the confederacy, nothing that disclosed any ambitious views, or seemed to portend an approaching enlargement of its sphere; and though Antigonus probably kept an eye— which was no doubt far from a friendly one—on its movements, he could scarcely discover anything to excite alarm, or to afford a pretext for hostility, though, as we know nothing of the manner in which he was himself occupied during this period, no inference can be drawn from his apparent inaction. The League must have appeared now to have attained its full growth: it had acquired an extent and consistency which, most likely, far exceeded both the de-

signs and the hopes of those who began the work of restoration. Yet its collective strength, as Plutarch observes, was not equal to that of one considerable city, and it is very doubtful whether it would ever have emerged from the obscurity to which it seemed to be destined, without that peculiar combination of circumstances which connected it with the fortunes of Aratus.

Sicyon, his birthplace, after a period of confusion which followed the overthrow of the old Dorian aristocracy, had again fallen under the dominion of tyrants,\* but men widely differing in their character from the ancient rulers, who, under the same title, exercised a mild and popular authority, which they transmitted peaceably through successive generations. Those latter adventurers, who rapidly supplanted one another, seem to have maintained their power, whether they seized it for themselves, or were indebted for it to Macedonian aid, by a system of terror which rendered their short reigns equally miserable and odious. Death, or exile, or confiscation, were the lot of their principal adversaries, and, when their own time came, of their adherents. After the downfall of one of these tyrants, named Cleon, an attempt was made to put an end to this state of things. Two of the most eminent citizens, Timocleides and Clinias, were appointed, under what title, or with what powers, we are not informed, but for the purpose of restoring order and preserving liberty. Some degree of tranquillity had been re-established, when the death of Timocleides left the whole burden of their arduous functions to devolve upon his colleague, together with all the danger with which they had hitherto shielded one another. The opportunity was seized by a man named Abantides to murder Clinias, and make himself master of the city. The family and friends of Clinias were the first objects of the tyrant's jealousy; some were put to death, others saved themselves by flight. His son Aratus, at this time only seven years old, was especially marked for destruction. In the general confusion, the child escaped from his father's house, and wandered for some time alone through the city. His father's brother had married a sister of Abantides; the boy sought refuge in her house, and she concealed him there until she found means of sending him to Argos, where Clinias had many friends, who took the orphan under their protection, and, it would seem, some property, which rendered Aratus independent of their bounty. Here he spent the next thirteen years of his life, while several fresh revolutions took place at Sicyon. Abantides, like many bad men of that age, took a lively interest in philosophical speculations, and he was killed in the Agora by a band of conspirators, who fell upon him while he was engaged in a learned conversation with the dialectic philosopher Aristoteles, who had himself laid the plot. But the tyranny remained in the hands of his father Paseas, until he, too, was assassinated by one Nicocles, who stepped into his place. Aratus, as he grew up towards manhood, applied himself more to the exercises of the body than of the mind. He submitted to the training of a competitor for gymnastic honours, and carried off some prizes in the public games. Even in his statues, the thoughtful and

intrusted with the keys of the city (Diog. Laert., vii., 6) is incomparably the most probable. That the Athenians should have done so before the war seems hardly conceivable. If it were certain that Zeno did not live to witness the evacuation of the city, one might rather be inclined to suspect that a compliment paid to him by order of Antigonus had been attributed to the Athenians. Droysen attaches, perhaps, too much weight to the effect of Zeno's philosophy on the origin of the war. Chremonides, notwithstanding his intimacy with Zeno, may have been no more of a Stoic than Antigonus himself.

\* Plutarch, Agis, 3. Paus., iii., 6, 6. Compare (as illustrating the carelessness of Pausanias) a historical note, i. viii., 17, 1 and 20, 2. † Schorn, p. 62. ‡ Polyb., ii., 4, 1. Compare x., 34. § Ibid., xi., 2, 1. † Polyb., ii., 41, 43.

dignified mien of the statesman and the general did not altogether conceal the traces of his early familiarity with the discipline of the palestra. It may be that he did not merely indulge a natural wish to improve the advantages of a robust and agile frame, or even look forward so much to the need which he might expect to find on great occasions for an extraordinary capacity of bodily exertion and endurance, as he desired to elude the jealousy of his enemies by the semblance of frivolous pursuits, and of a vulgar ambition. This part of his history may sufficiently explain two features which were afterward most prominent in his character: his abhorrence of tyranny, which seems to have been with him more a natural instinct than a moral feeling; and a singular combination of timidity and hardihood, which perplexed his admirers, and afforded a fruitful theme of ingenious speculations to the ancient historians and philosophers.\* He was bold in the dark, resolute in an ambuscade, daunted by no obstacle or danger which he had to encounter alone, or with a few companions; but his courage, presence of mind, and readiness of invention, were almost always observed to forsake him in open day, and at the head of an army.

At the accession of Nicocles, he was about twenty years of age. He had, no doubt, long dwelt upon the thought of an attempt to deliver and recover Sicyon; and the state of affairs under the new government appeared to be very favourable for such an undertaking. Nicocles was, it seems, more unpopular than his predecessors, and the measures by which he strove to secure his dominion rendered it still more odious. The Etolians had been encouraged by his weakness to make an attempt on the city, in which they were very near succeeding. Antigonus, who had probably protected the house of Abantides, kept aloof from the usurper who had overthrown it; and Aratus, for a time, hoped that he might be induced, especially as Clinias had been connected by friendly relations with the royal family,† to aid him in his enterprise. But Antigonus could place no confidence in an inexperienced youth, and could only have consented to use him as an instrument; and this certainly not with a view to restore liberty at Sicyon. Yet he thought it advisable to amuse him with promises, which, however, soon ceased to deceive; and as the court of Alexandria, though there, also, Aratus possessed some hereditary interest, appeared too distant to furnish any effectual assistance, he fell back on his own resources.

The Sicyonian exiles, a numerous body, had begun to turn their eyes towards him, as well on account of his birth as of the promise afforded by his personal qualities, and to some of them he now opened his projects. But he found very few who were either so zealous for the cause or so willing to rely upon his judgment as to enter heartily into his plans. Indeed, his most active associates were two exiles of Megalopolis, Eodemus and Demophanes, who afterward became celebrated for many important services to the cause of freedom. His first thought was to seize some stronghold in the territory of Sicyon, from which to carry on

open war against the tyrant; but he was induced to abandon this scheme by information which he received from a citizen who had escaped from prison, and had made his way over the city wall at a part where it rose to no great height on the outside, and was nearly on a level with the ground within. This discovery suggested an undertaking still more congenial to the character of Aratus; he resolved to attempt, with a small band of followers, to surprise the city by night.

Plutarch's description of the preparations which he made for his expedition casts a strong light on the condition of Greece in these times. We are reminded of the picture which Thucydides draws of it in the ages preceding the settlement of its population. Society, in its highest stage of refinement, had relapsed into the wildness and disorder of its infancy. Aratus found it easy to provide arms without awakening suspicion: for it was a time, the biographer observes, when everybody was engaged in marauding adventures and mutual incursions. The scaling-ladders, made so as to be taken to pieces, were supplied by one of the exiles, who gained his living by the construction of machinery. The Argive friends of Aratus contributed each ten men from their own households. He himself was able to arm thirty slaves. And to make up the number which he thought necessary, he contracted with Xenophilus, a noted captain of robbers, for the services of a few of his troop, who were led to believe that the object was to carry off some horses belonging to Antigonus. They were directed to go out in small scattered parties, and to assemble at the Tower of Polygnotus, a point on the road to Nemea. The ladders, packed in boxes, were sent forward in wagons. The chief hindrance in the attempt to scale the wall unobserved was apprehended from the dogs kept by a gardener, who lived in a lone house on the outside, not far from the place where the ladders were to be fixed. To forestall this danger, Aratus had despatched his friend Cephisias with four comrades, who were to arrive at the house, after the city gates were shut, in the garb of common travellers, and, under the pretext of seeking hospitality, were to secure the man and his dogs. Some farther precautions were still necessary to throw Nicocles off his guard; for he had been led to suspect that something was meditated against him, and he was known to have sent spies to Argos to watch the movements of Aratus. To blind them, Aratus appeared in the morning in the usual places of public resort, went home accompanied by some young men who were used to share his convivial hours, and made conspicuous preparations for a banquet. The spies were deceived, and, as soon as the repast was finished, he proceeded to join his friends at the place of rendezvous. At Nemea he disclosed his real object to the whole band, and, by dint of promises and entreaties, prevailed on them to share the perilous adventure. He regulated the march so as to have the benefit of a bright moon on the road, and to reach Sicyon just as it was setting; but as they drew near to the gardener's house, Cephisias met them with the unwelcome tidings that, though he had secured the master, the dogs had escaped. It was with

\* Plut., Ar., 29. Polyb., iv., 8.

† Plut., Ar., 4.

difficulty that Aratus could now persuade his followers to persevere; and their reluctance was justified by the imminent danger in which they were placed by the vigilance of the dogs, which kept up an incessant barking at the heels of the party that was sent forward under the orders of Eodemus to apply the ladders and explore the wall, while Aratus followed slowly with the main body. When the ladders were fixed, those who mounted foremost were very nearly discovered by two parties of the patrol which passed in opposite directions soon after one another. Finally, after Aratus, having been apprized that all was secure, had reached the foot of the wall, a great hound, which was kept in the nearest tower, having been at length roused by the barking of the smaller dogs, joined in with it so loudly as to attract the attention of a sentry beyond; but as his master, when called upon to account for the noise, attributed it to the recent passing of the patrol, the followers of Aratus, who overheard the conversation, concluded that he must have been gained to favour their enterprise, and began to mount the ladders with revived spirits. It was now near daybreak, and the ladders would only bear the weight of one man at a time. When forty had reached the top, Aratus himself followed; and, having waited for but a very few more, hastened to the tyrant's house, and to the guard-room of his mercenary troops; they were overpowered and secured without bloodshed, but Nicocles made his escape by a subterraneous passage. Aratus now sent round to the houses of his friends to announce his presence and success, and the tidings soon spread through the city. By daybreak the theatre was filled by an anxious and curious crowd; but as soon as the herald had proclaimed that Aratus, the son of Clinias, invited his fellow-citizens to assert their freedom, the multitude rushed to set fire to the tyrant's house. The fire was soon extinguished by the exertions of the soldiers and the discreeter citizens, but all the property of the tyrant was abandoned to pillage.

The glory of this exploit was not stained by a single drop of blood, either during or after the struggle. But the first measure of Aratus was, to recall the exiles, and this act of justice was attended with consequences which threatened the state with fresh convulsions. Amid the revolutions of half a century, during which Sicyon had been subject to a succession of tyrants, the number of the exiles had grown to nearly 600. The influence of Aratus was able to restrain them, after their return, from the indulgence of animosity and revenge against their political adversaries; but he could not hinder them from claiming their confiscated property, the greater part of which had now passed into the hands of owners who had long enjoyed it under various titles derived from inheritance, contract, or other lawful modes of transfer. He endeavoured in vain to mediate between the contending parties: none would surrender or compromise their rights: attempts were made to dislodge the possessors from their lands and houses by force: there was reason to dread, not only that scenes of violence would frequently disturb the public tranquillity, but that the hatred and jealousy which were nourished by these contests might soon undo all

that had just been so happily effected; for Antigonus was at hand, and on the watch to take advantage of their dissensions. He was probably not a little displeased to see that an undertaking from which he had withheld his aid had been accomplished without it: both the immediate result and the tendency of the example were adverse to his interests, and there could be no doubt that he would be willing to support any one who promised to subject Sicyon to his authority, or to govern it as his creature. The danger, from within and from without, appeared to Aratus so pressing, that he was induced to look to the nearest quarter for assistance, and the Achæan League presented a prospect of ready and zealous, if not very powerful help. Its proceedings, principles, and institutions were such as to engage his lively sympathy and approbation. He and it were labouring in the same cause: it was natural and expedient that they should combine their strength. Such, we are informed by Plutarch, who had read the memoirs which Aratus left of his own life, were the motives which led him to incorporate Sicyon with the League. And it is not unimportant to observe, that this event, the most momentous in the history of the League, which altered its character and decided its destiny, was, seemingly, the accidental effect of the embarrassing position in which Aratus found himself placed at this juncture. If he had been able to extricate himself from it immediately by the expedient which he finally adopted, it is doubtful whether he might ever have made what to Sicyon must have appeared a sacrifice, though it certainly opened a wider field to his personal ambition, and constituted him the benefactor of his adopted country, no less than of his native city. The circumstances under which the union took place contributed, perhaps, mainly to fix the terms on which it was effected. Greatly as the power of Sicyon exceeded that of every one of the Achæan towns, it claimed no superiority or privilege, but was admitted on a footing of perfect equality; it obtained one vote in the councils of the League, and no more, though its contingent might be double that of any other member. This would seem, perhaps, not unequitable at a time when Sicyon was in distress, and came to the League for succour. But the precedent was afterward followed in cases where no such reason existed; and so far as it determined the course which was pursued in the sequel, it may be considered as the origin of many calamities which subsequently afflicted Greece, and hastened its ruin.

It does not even appear that, either in consequence of the accession of Sicyon, or at any subsequent period, any change was made in the constitution of the federal magistracy and government. The number of the demiurges seems, to the last, to have been limited to ten, and that of the council always to have retained its original proportion to that of the Achæan towns. Hence, strange as it appears, we are led to conclude that the places in both these boards continued to be filled by Achæans. This occasion suggests another interesting question, on which our information is not sufficiently full to preclude a great variety of opinions.\* Polybius

\* Tittmann (p. 677) and Schorn (p. 75) contend for the

celebrates the happy uniformity of political institutions, which in his time, when the League had reached its largest compass, prevailed throughout its whole extent. All the Peloponnesians, he says, then used the same laws, weights, measures, money, the same magistrates, councillors, and judges.\* This statement is evidently quite consistent with the supposition that the individual states of the League were, nevertheless, allowed to retain their own laws, magistrates, and political institutions of every kind; and as it is notorious that this was the case with regard to some of the things which Polybius enumerates,† it was most probably so as to all the rest. Yet this passage seems mainly to have impressed some modern writers with the belief that the League interfered to assimilate the institutions of all the states incorporated in it to its own; but there is neither reason nor authority to support this conclusion. It is, indeed, highly probable that democratical institutions, under various forms and modifications, were established throughout the League, not excluding, but still less enforcing, the influence of property.‡ But this kind of uniformity might well arise without any direct interposition; and when we consider that in every Greek city there was a powerful democratical party, it will be clear that the triumph of democratical principles was sure, in every instance, either to precede or to follow the union with the League.

Aratus himself was raised by this transaction to the highest degree of reputation and popularity among the Achæans, and established an indefeasible claim to their gratitude; and the modesty with which he submitted to their laws, and served as a private soldier in their cavalry, whether calculated or not, was admirably adapted to strengthen his influence over them. A supply of five-and-twenty talents, which about this time he received from Ptolemy, while it proved the value which the king attached to his friendship, enabled him to relieve some of his poorer fellow-citizens, and thus to secure their affections in favour of the new government. It may also have suggested to him the possibility of a remedy for the disorders with which the pretensions of the restored exiles continued to threaten the city. He resolved to sail to Alexandria, and to solicit a larger donation, which might afford the means of an amicable adjustment without a sacrifice from either party. He had not neglected to cultivate the favour of his royal benefactor by such returns as he was able to make for his bounty; and it happened to have been in his power to gratify one of Ptolemy's tastes at little cost. The Sicyonian school of painting was at this time still celebrated in Greece, not only for eminent artists, but as having more than any other preserved the purity of the ancient style. Even the great Apelles had thought it essential to his reputation, if not to the cultivation of his art,

to take some lessons from the Sicyonian masters. During the dominion of the tyrants, the school had produced many valuable works, several of which were tributes of flattery to the ruler of the day; and one of these was so beautiful, that Aratus was induced to exempt it from the general destruction to which he doomed all such memorials of the public dishonour. It was the strongest proof he could give of his discerning love for the art; and his good taste enabled him to take full advantage of the opportunities presented to him by his position to enrich Ptolemy's gallery with a number of choice masterpieces.

His voyage to Alexandria was not accomplished without many personal risks and hardships. His vessel was driven by a gale on the coast of Hydræa,\* where it was seized by an officer who commanded there for Antigonus, while he concealed himself, with a single friend, in a wood. It was afterward a Roman vessel which, chancing to touch there, afforded him the means of escape. It was bound for Syria; but Aratus, it seems, did not think himself safe in the dominions of Antiochus, and prevailed on the master to land him on the coast of Caria, where he had still to wait long before he could find a passage to Egypt. These perilous adventures, encountered for so noble an object, might plead with Ptolemy in his behalf. It is certain that his presence confirmed the favourable impressions which had been made on the king by their correspondence; and the result of his visit was a subsidy of 150 talents, forty of which he immediately carried home with him; the rest was transmitted in successive payments. With this sum he was able to satisfy every claim to the confiscated property, for which one of the parties in each case was easily induced to accept a pecuniary equivalent. But still, the settlement of so many controversies, many of which must have been rendered very intricate by lapse of time and perplexity of titles, must have been a most laborious and difficult work. The people testified the unlimited confidence which they reposed in Aratus when they created him sole arbitrator with full power. He, on the other hand, to place his moderation and disinterestedness beyond suspicion, declined this invidious honour, and caused fifteen other citizens to be joined with him in the commission. The arrangement was at last effected in a manner which seems to have given universal satisfaction, and to have healed every breach. The services of Aratus were acknowledged by the people with public honours, and by the exiles with a bronze statue, which bore an inscription expressive of their admiration for his courage and justice, and of their gratitude to the deliverer, who had restored them to their homes, and had bestowed equality of rights and orderly government on his country.† The fame of this peaceful achieve-

independence of the particular states. Helwing (p. 237), Flut. (ii. p. 150), Droysen (ii. p. 463), and C. K. Hermann (*Lehrbuch der Staats Alt.*, § 186, apparently straining the sense of *σολοκράτειν* in Polyb. iv., l. 7), adopt the opposite view, though with manifest discrepancies.

\* Il., 37, 10.

† For instance, as has been shown by Tittmann and Schorn, the *ἀρχαίους* and *νομιματά*.

‡ As Droysen is inclined to believe (ii. p. 463).

\* Plut., Ar., 12, τῆς Ἀδρίας. Droysen (ii. 312, 218) corrects Ἀδρίας. But the emendation which I have ventured to assume in the text, Ὑδρίας, not only comes much closer to the corrupt reading, but agrees better with the whole series of Plutarch's narrative. Aratus sailed from Methone in Messenia, doubled Cape Malea, and then, being unable to keep his course to the southeast, *καταβέβηκεν πάλιν*, ἔφυγε ἵνα τῆς Ὑδρίας. A glance at the map seems sufficient to show that this description cannot suit Andros.

† *Ὅτι σαρπίδι τῷ ἐξ Ἀδρίας ἔκριν, Σίαν τ' ἄνακας σέβει*.

ment has been still more widely spread, and fixed in a monument more durable than brass, by the pen of Cicero, who, having learned the value of such men by bitter experience, amid the death-struggles of Roman liberty, extols the conduct of Aratus with the equivocal eulogy, which, however, he meant for the highest, that so great a man deserved to have been born a Roman.\* The right of Aratus to such praise has, indeed, been questioned on the ground that in this instance the course prescribed by the purest patriotism exactly coincided with that which he would have pursued if he had aimed at nothing but the promotion of his own influence and reputation.† It might be enough to say that Cicero was praising the statesman; but, in an age when most men found it easier to rise to power through wrong and violence, there was surely no small merit in the choice of right means, even for a like end; nor will it follow that Aratus was not in earnest with his patriotism, because, as we shall find, he was not always capable of sacrificing his personal ambition to the public good.

The terms on which he stood with Antigonus may be collected from the foregoing narrative. He had been forced to conceal himself from the king's officer, and his vessel had been seized as an enemy's property. Yet, after his return from Egypt, Antigonus affected to court his friendship, not with any hope or desire of gaining it, but to throw suspicion on Aratus, and particularly to awaken Ptolemy's jealousy. From Corinth, where it seems he had taken up his residence for a time, to watch the progress of the League, he occasionally sent some little presents to Aratus; and at table, when guests were present who would be sure to report his words, he professed to admire the young man's discernment, who had detected the weakness which was covered from ordinary eyes by the theatrical pomp and splendour of the Egyptian court, and had now thrown himself without reserve into the arms of a more trustworthy ally. The artifice appears to have produced no effect at Sicyon; but it succeeded so far as to inspire Ptolemy with a temporary distrust of Aratus. Antigonus himself can hardly have expected any very important results from it; and it is probable that he was at this time endeavouring to accomplish his main end in a very different manner; for it is to this period that it seems necessary to refer a treaty, which is more than once mentioned by Polybius,‡ though unfortunately without a date, concluded between Antigonus and the Ætolians, with a view to the dismemberment of the Achaean League. It was not before the accession of Sicyon that the League could have appeared so formidable as to give occasion to such a compact; nor do we find any earlier trace of hostility between Ætolia and the League. The Ætolians had, indeed, as we have seen, made an attempt on Sicyon; and this, when Sicyon had become

Achaean, might have involved them in a war with the body in which it was incorporated. They are said to have made the first advances to Antigonus, probably in the interval between the revolution at Sicyon and the year in which Aratus was for the first time raised to the supreme command. It was in 246, in the twenty-sixth year of his age, that he first filled the office of General of the League; and all his military operations in this year, of which there remains any record, were directed against the Ætolians. The accounts left to us of these operations are very scanty and unconnected. It is only related that he ravaged the territory of Calydon and the Ozolian Locris, which at this time belonged to the Ætolians, and that he marched into Boeotia, with an army of 10,000 men, to succour the Boeotians, who were in alliance with the League against the same common enemy. But this beginning of his military career was a little ominous, for he arrived too late: the Boeotians had been defeated at Chæronea, and had lost 1000 men, and the Boeotarch Abiocritus.\* They immediately abandoned the League, and attached themselves to the Ætolians; and their public spirit was so broken by this disaster that they could hardly ever be again roused to take any part in the affairs of Greece.† How far this Boeotian alliance was designed by Aratus to counter-balance that of Antigonus with the Ætolians can only be surmised. But there is one inference which may be drawn from his campaign in Northern Greece that may serve to remove a seeming difficulty. Even if Antigonus was not at this time engaged by treaty to co-operate with the Ætolians, it may seem strange that he should have taken no advantage of the absence of the Achaean forces from their country. But the movements of Aratus indicate that Antigonus was not at this time in possession of Corinth. The Isthmus was evidently open, and this agrees with what we learn from other accounts of the state of things there.

The possession of Corinth had always been regarded by the Macedonian princes as an object of the highest importance with a view to the command of Peloponnesus. Antigonus—probably when he set out on his unsuccessful expedition against Ptolemy Cerannus—had intrusted it to his half-brother Craterus, the son of Alexander's general of the same name, and of Antipater's daughter Phila. But Craterus seems to have been encouraged by the reverses of Antigonus to treat the place as his own, and, it appears, kept it in his hands until his death.‡ Yet his relations to Antigonus were not always avowedly hostile; as may be collected from the fact, that in the last war with Pyrrhus the Macedonian general Ameinias is described as bringing succours to Sparta from Corinth. But

\* Plut., Ar. 16. Compare Polyb., xi., 4, who lays the blame on the Boeotians. † Polyb., x.

‡ So Schorn infers (p. 18), partly from the fact that Trazen is described as held by a garrison of Craterus (Frontin., iii., 6, 7), and partly from the natural supposition that Alexander's power was inherited from his father. Droysen, however (ii., p. 216), believes that Alexander first revolted from Antigonus. He seems to think that this may be inferred from Plutarch, De Frat. Amore, 15, where, however, Craterus is only mentioned as having served his brother in an inferior station. The passage contains not a word about his fidelity; nor was this necessary to the propriety of the illustration. Digitized by Google

plex. Plut., Ar. 14. One might, perhaps, have expected a more distinct reference to the recent transaction.

\* De Off., ii., 23.

† Merleker (*Geschichte des Ætolisch-Achaïschen Bundesgenossen Krieges*, p. 14). He seems to think true magnanimity required that Aratus should have exposed himself to the risk of popular odium and suspicion, instead of adopting an expedient by which he averted it both from himself and others. ‡ ii., 43, 9; 46, 1; ix., 34, 6.

it does not follow that Antigonus had recovered possession of the citadel, and the sequel clearly indicates that this could not have been the case; for Craterus, on his death, was succeeded in the command of the place by his son Alexander, who was likewise independent, though he may have been on friendly terms with his royal kinsman, and even have professed obedience to his authority, with no more real submission than many a feudal vassal or Turkish pacha, absolute master of his province, has yielded to his nominal sovereign, while he retained the style of a subject, and performed acts of outward homage. Accordingly, we have seen Antigonus at Corinth, carrying on his intrigues against Aratus; and we are informed that Aratus at first regarded Alexander as his enemy, and had formed the project of wresting Corinth from him, but that he was diverted from this design by Alexander's voluntary accession to the League,\* by which he must have openly renounced all connexion with Antigonus. It was apparently this alliance with Alexander that enabled Aratus to execute the operations which have been related so boldly and safely.

Alexander died soon after, as it was believed, of poison, administered to him through the contrivance of Antigonus:† and certainly there is nothing in the character of Antigonus to repel this suspicion, and much in his subsequent proceedings to suggest or confirm it. Alexander's widow, Nicæa, retained possession of the fortress; and Antigonus at once sent his son Demetrius, though it seems he had already married Stratonice, the daughter of Antiochus Soter, as a suitor for her hand. The difference of their ages—for she was somewhat past her prime—rendered her, perhaps, the more open to the illusions of female vanity.‡ She accepted the young prince's dazzling offers, and Antigonus himself came to Corinth to celebrate their nuptials with royal splendour. She was, however, prudent enough to retain possession of the citadel. We are not informed whether it was the subject of any stipulation in the marriage contract; but no wish was expressed by Antigonus that could awaken her suspicions. All cares of state seemed to have been banished from the mind of the delighted father, who was only intent on providing a succession of entertainments for the object of his son's choice. A musical performance was to take place in the theatre, which Nicæa consented to grace with her presence. She was conveyed with royal state in a sumptuous litter, accompanied by Antigonus himself. But at the point where the road turned off towards the gate of the citadel, he quitted the train and hastened up to the fortress, which he found carelessly guarded; a great part of the garrison was among the spectators below. He gained admittance—it appears without a struggle—for a force sufficient to secure possession of the place.§ He is said to have displayed

immoderate joy at the success of this despicable stratagem, and to have celebrated it with revelry ill becoming his age and station. The marriage, it may easily be supposed, was broken off; and we hear no more of Nicæa.

If Aratus had been led to conceive the thought of an attempt upon Corinth while it was held by Alexander, there was now much stronger motives to urge him to the undertaking. But he could hardly hope or wish to carry it into execution until he was again in office; and, according to a fundamental article of the Achaean Constitution, the supreme magistracy could not be held by the same person for two successive years. At the end of the prescribed interval he was re-elected, and the opportunity for which he was constantly on the watch soon presented itself. Three brothers, Syrian Greeks, had pilfered from the royal treasure at Corinth, and one of them, named Erginus, came to Sicyon from time to time to exchange their plunder at the house of a banker well known to Aratus. Through this channel Aratus learned that there was an accessible point in the wall of the citadel; and Erginus, having engaged the concurrence of a fourth brother who served in the garrison, undertook to conduct Aratus to the place where the wall was no more than fifteen feet high. The brothers demanded a large reward. Sixty talents were to be deposited with the banker, to be paid to them in the event of success; and even in the case of failure, if they escaped, each was to receive a house and a talent. Aratus could not immediately raise so large a sum, and was forced to pledge his plate and his wife's ornaments, purchasing, as Plutarch observes, the privilege of a perilous adventure for the good of his country, at a price which it would have been accounted magnanimous to reject if it had been offered as a bribe. When the time came which had been fixed for the attempt, leaving the main body of his forces under arms, he proceeded with 400 men, few of whom were in the secret, towards Corinth. As they approached the wall, the light of the full moon, which would have rendered concealment almost impossible, was intercepted by clouds which rose from the sea. Several other propitious circumstances contributed to his success, though he fully earned it by his courage. Erginus, with seven others, disguised as wayfarers, gained entrance at a gate and overpowered the guard, while Aratus, with only a hundred of his men, scaled

be safely collected from it beyond the fact that Antigonus recovered possession of Corinth. But we can hardly help suspecting that, in this severe criticism, the excellent author has been unconsciously biased by a wish to save the credit of Gonatas, whom he represents as an almost faultless model of a philosophic king. He observes that it was surely no extraordinary treachery in Antigonus to resume the possession of Corinth, which he had lost through Alexander's repeated disloyalty. But this is not at all the question which affects the character of Antigonus. The point is, whether he compassed his end fairly, or by means of a dishonourable trick. That the latter was the case there is no reason to doubt. It is surely contrary to all rules of sound criticism to reject the whole body of the narrative because there is one circumstance in it—the precise mode in which Antigonus seized the citadel—obscurely related. Droysen, indeed, intimates that he perceives many other difficulties, but does not specify them. As to the character of Antigonus, it must be remembered that, if he was the patron of Zeno—a connexion so useful to his reputation that he might well regret the philosopher's death (Diog. Laert., vii., 15)—he was no less the protector of such monsters as the Eleian Aristomachus.

\* Plut., Ar., 18.

† Niebuhr, *Kl. Schr.*, p. 256, says that Nicæa was suspected of having poisoned her husband; but, as he quotes no authority, it seems nearly certain that for once his memory must have betrayed him, as Plutarch (Ar., 17) distinctly relates that the suspicion fell on Antigonus.

‡ Her passion for the philosopher-poet Euphorion (Suidas, *Euphorion*) indicates the warmth of her temperament.

§ Plut., Ar., 17. Polyæn., iv., 6, 1. Droysen (*ii.*, p. 371) treats this story as so little trustworthy, that nothing can



the wall, and advanced towards the citadel with the scaling-ladders, ordering the rest to follow. But on his way through the town he fell in with a patrol, one of whom escaped, and soon raised a general alarm.

Antigonus had intrusted the place to three generals. The command of the Acrocorinthus he had assigned to Persæus, who had been the preceptor of his son Halcyoneus, but seems to have had no better title to his confidence than that he had been educated by Zeno, to whom he at first belonged as a slave, and whose tenets he afterward professed to expound. The choice would not, perhaps, have been a very happy one, even if philosophy had been a sufficient qualification for such a post; for Persæus is said to have coupled loose habits with his rigid doctrines.\* His military science was, it may easily be imagined, no less purely theoretical, though it does not appear whether Aratus derived any advantage from his incapacity. Archelaus commanded the bulk of the forces in the lower town, where the third general, Theophrastus, seems to have held some post under him. Aratus—again favoured by the moon, which broke through the clouds as he was entangled in the most intricate part of the ascent—reached the wall of the citadel safely, and was soon engaged in a hard combat with the garrison. As soon as the alarm was raised, Archelaus, finding that the citadel was attacked, hastened with all his forces in that direction. But he chanced to light on the 300 Achæans, who, unable to find the track of their comrades, had covered behind a projection of the rock. They now sprang out as from an ambuscade, and completely routed and dispersed his troops. But they were recalled from the pursuit by Erginus to the succour of Aratus, and their arrival decided the struggle. By sunrise he was in possession of the fortress, and the forces which had followed him from Sicyon, making their appearance at the same time, were joyfully admitted into the lower town by the Corinthians, who helped to capture the royal soldiers. Archelaus himself was taken, but was afterward released by Aratus. Theophrastus refused to abandon his post, and was put to death. The philosopher made his escape during the combat, and fled to Cenchrææ. He returned, it seems, to the government of his school; but he used to admit that Aratus had taught him to question the truth of his master's dogma: that the wise man is the only general.

When order was restored, and the people assembled in the theatre, Aratus came down to address them. There was a difference of opinion among the ancients as to his powers of oratory; but, whatever they were, we may easily conceive that, when he stood on the stage, visibly jaded by the fatigues of the night, and waited, resting on his spear, until the applause of the spectators had subsided, his silence was more eloquent than the speech which followed. Since the battle of Chæroneæ, the Corinthians had never been in possession of the keys of

their own city. These Aratus now restored to them; and he easily persuaded them to enter into the Achæan League, to which alone they could look for protection. The Achæans, however, continued to occupy the citadel, where they kept a garrison of 400 heavy-armed, and a pack of fifty hounds, and as many hunters; a common precaution, it seems, against surprise.

This great acquisition opened an almost boundless prospect of farther conquests. One of its first fruits was the surrender of Lechæum, where a royal squadron of five-and-twenty galleys fell into the hands of the conquerors. Aratus was not slow to follow up his advantage. Megara, Trœzen, and Epidaurus joined the League in the course of the same year; and he crowned his achievements by an expedition to Attica, in the course of which he ravaged Salamis before the eyes of the Macedonian garrison. He had probably hoped that the Athenians would declare themselves in his favour; and, though they did not stir, he released all his Athenian prisoners without ransom, in the hope of preserving their good will for some future occasion. Another measure, which was adopted by the League at his suggestion, indicates less self-confidence than might have been expected after such a series of success. He induced it to conclude an alliance with Ptolemy Philadelphus, by which the king was declared commander-in-chief of all its forces, both on land and sea. The Achæans, however, had no reason to fear any encroachment on their independence from so remote an ally; and they might think the title which they conferred on him, though it appeared to detract a little from their national honour, not too high a price for the substantial benefit which they might derive from his subsidies and fleets in the struggle which they had to expect with Antigonus. The event seems to have proved that, with regard to Ptolemy, they had as little ground for hope as for fear. He was neither formidable as a protector, nor useful as an ally. But the honour of the Achæans was less endangered by his friendship than that of Aratus himself, who accepted a yearly pension of six talents from his royal patron.

To liberate the Peloponnesian cities from their tyrants, and to incorporate them with the League, continued to be the great object of his policy; and Argos, as well on account of its position and importance, as of his own personal connexion with it, excited an interest in him little short of that which he had felt for the recovery of his native city. Aristippus, who, after the death of Pyrrhus, was, it may be supposed, established in the government under Macedonian protection, had been succeeded by Aristomachus, probably his son. If he was already master of Argos when Aratus delivered Sicyon, he had since become more vigilant and suspicious; for he had prohibited the possession of arms to the citizens under severe penalties. Nevertheless, Aratus found means both to set a conspiracy on foot against him in Argos, and to supply the conspirators with weapons. A quarrel which arose among them led to the disclosure of the plot, and probably saved the tyrant's life. It must be observed that Aristomachus was not at war with the League. It was

\* An extract from one of his works given by Athenæus (xiii., 86), with the illustration there subjoined, may serve to show how he reconciled his principles with his practice. The story in Diog. Laert., vii., 36, indicates that Antigonus himself did not give him credit for such rigid stoicism as is attributed to him by Droysen (ii., p. 372).

simply as a tyrant that he was marked for assassination. Even the principle which had long been generally admitted in the Greek republics, that a tyrant was the public enemy of all his subjects, is not sufficient to justify the conduct of Aratus in this attempt. Either he shut his eyes to the baseness of the deed, or he had persuaded himself that a tyrant ought to be regarded as a monster, who had forfeited all claims to protection under the common laws of civilized society. Some of the pernicious consequences of this maxim soon became apparent. Aristomachus was killed shortly after by his slaves; perhaps not without the privy of Aratus, though he claimed no share in the exploit; but he was quietly succeeded by a second Aristippus, most likely grandson of the first. This man, Plutarch observes, exceeded his predecessor in cruelty, no doubt from the same cause which drove him to the most pitiable precautions for the security of his person. Aratus hoped to find Argos in confusion, and the citizens ready to rise against the tyrannical government; and he immediately marched, with as many Achæan troops as he could collect at the moment, to take advantage of the opportunity. But the Argives, cowed, or broken in to the yoke, did not answer to his appeal, and he was compelled to retreat. The only immediate result of this expedition was, that it furnished Aristippus with a just ground of complaint against the Achæans, which was referred to the arbitration of Mantinea; whether according to previous treaty, or a special agreement, is not certain. But neither Aratus, nor any one else, appeared on the part of the League; and judgment was given for Aristippus, though with a merely nominal mulct. Aristippus, however, was now induced to enter into alliance with Antigonus, and openly to declare himself the enemy of the League; and he retaliated on Aratus by several attempts at assassination, in which he is said to have been aided by the king.\* Plutarch attributes the escape of Aratus to his popularity, and contrasts his security with the tyrant's wretched anxiety; but, as he had wilfully provoked the danger, he was probably always on his guard against it.

He continued for many years trying fresh expedients, from time to time, for the accomplishment of his end; and once he was very nearly master of Argos. He had scaled the wall in the night with a few followers, and had overpowered the guard; and the next day he kept his ground against the tyrant's superior force, though himself severely wounded, until the evening. But the Argives looked on—as Plutarch observes, probably in the words of Aratus himself—as quietly and impartially as if they had been sitting as judges at the Nemean games; and Aratus was so discouraged by their apparent apathy, being also in want of water, and disabled by his wound, that he gave up the attempt and withdrew; while the tyrant thought himself in such danger, that he had made preparations for flight. But Aristippus, with the exception of his secret machinations against the life of Aratus, seems to have remained entirely on the defensive; and Antigonus him-

self, through causes which are nowhere explained, took no directly hostile measures against the League to the end of his life. But it was probably at his instigation that the Ætolians, in the year 241, when Aratus was in office for the third time, resolved to invade Peloponnesus. They were, however, no doubt willing enough, without such incitement, to retaliate on the Achæans for the ravages which Aratus had inflicted on their territory in his first year of office. Otherwise, it would be a little surprising that they did not wait for a Macedonian re-enforcement before they took the field. Their preparations were on such a scale as to excite both attention and alarm among the Achæans; and the forces of the League did not seem sufficient for its defence. It is on this occasion that we first have any trustworthy account of its relations with Sparta.\* An alliance was already subsisting between the two states, of what date we know not;† perhaps merely a defensive one, against their common enemy Antigonus, and his allies, the Ætolians. Aratus wrote to the ephors to claim assistance;‡ and, from causes which will be hereafter explained, there was a general disposition at Sparta, independent of any apprehension of danger, to comply with his requisition. The young king, Agis IV., commanded the force which was sent to join the Achæan army. In the council of war, which was held after his arrival, he warmly seconded the wish which prevailed among the Achæans, to meet the enemy at the northern approaches of the Isthmus. Aratus alone, it seems, opposed this plan, and would not consent to risk the fortunes of the League, without necessity, on the event of a battle. He does not appear to have disclosed any plan of operations; and it is not certain that he had formed one. But he may have foreseen that the Ætolians, if allowed to enter the peninsula, would be betrayed into some incautious movement by their eagerness for plunder; and, as the harvest had been already secured, he persuaded himself that no serious evil was to be apprehended from their inroad.§ But a less timid general would scarcely have ventured on such a manœuvre. The council, though none were convinced by his arguments, yielded to his authority; but he had to sustain a storm of reproach and ridicule from his own people; and Agis, surprised and indignant at conduct which looked so much like pusillanimity, and, perhaps, considering his presence as useless if no battle was to be fought, returned home.|| The event, however, seemed to justify the policy of Aratus, and, perhaps, gained him more credit for sagacity than he deserved. The Ætolians, meeting

\* For reasons which will be hereafter stated, I cannot consider those which are found in Pausanias (ii., § 5; vii., 7, 3) in that light.

† Lucas (p. 84) and Droysen (ii., p. 301) imagine that it was a result of the defeat which, on the authority of Pausanias, they believe Agis to have suffered at Pellene; and Droysen adds, that it was perhaps concluded through Egyptian mediation; which is, of course, as uncertain as all the rest.

‡ Plut., Agis, 13.

§ Ibid., 15.

|| Aratus seems to have related in his Memoirs that he dismissed his allies; and Droysen (ii., p. 391) thinks this seemingly strange conduct may be explained by his apprehension of the revolutionary principles prevailing in the Spartan army. But it seems easier to conceive that Agis had first requested leave to withdraw.

\* Συμπεριφερομένη Ἀρτίστρου. Plut., Ar., 25; perhaps only a suspicion expressed by Aratus in his Autobiography.

with no resistance at the Isthmus, marched into Achaia. Having traversed the territory of Sicyn, they fell upon the little town of Pelene, which was quite unprepared for defence, and made themselves masters of it at the first assault. But while they were engaged in plunder, an alarm was given that the Achæan army was approaching, and before the greater part had returned to their ranks, they were attacked by Aratus, who easily routed them, and pursued them into the town. They lost 700 men, and hastily retraced their steps homeward. Antigonus was so little able to support his allies, that, after this failure, he concluded a truce with the Achæans, which lasted to the end of his life; though Aratus did not scruple to violate it by an attempt to surprise Piræus, the obloquy of which he vainly endeavoured to shift upon the Syrian Erginus, who was notoriously but his instrument.

The death of Antigonus Gonatas, which happened in 239, produced a change in the state of affairs, which seemed at first highly favourable to the interests of the League, as the Achæans were now freed from danger both on the side of Ætolia and of Macedonia, and were left at liberty to gain ground in Peloponnesus, having nothing to apprehend from without, except the influence of Macedonian gold. Antigonus was succeeded by his son Demetrius II., who seems to have inherited his father's ambition and his policy, if not his energy and his talents; for the accounts remaining of his reign are so scanty, that they have suggested entirely opposite views of his character and capacity to different observers. In fact, the only transactions in which we know him to have been personally engaged, during the period of ten years for which he occupied the throne, are an expedition into Greece, which was, at least, partially successful, and a war with the Dardanians, in which he was defeated, and perhaps lost his life.\* This certainly does not convey the idea of a very able or enterprising prince; but, unless we knew much more than we do, both of the difficulties which he may have had to contend with and of the extent of his success, it would be unsafe to pronounce any judgment on him. It is highly probable, though there is no distinct evidence of the fact, that the Dardanians, and perhaps some other barbarian tribes, disquieted his northern frontier in the early part of his reign. Yet, soon after he came to the throne, he involved himself in a war with the Ætolians, at the same time that he incurred the enmity of the Syrian court. Alexander of Epirus died, leaving two sons, Pyrrhus and Ptolemæus, and a daughter, Phthia, to the care of his widow Olympias, who governed the kingdom for some years as regent. On the death of Antigonus, the Ætolians seem to have attempted to wrest from her that portion of Acarnania which they had ceded to her deceased husband. Olympias sought protection from Demetrius, and induced him to accept his daughter's hand, though his queen Stratonice was still living, and, as he must have foreseen, not of a character to brook such an insult. She indignantly withdrew to the court of her nephew, Seleucus Callinicus, and endeavoured to engage

him in a war with her husband.\* The name of Demetrius, however, did not deter the Ætolians from the prosecution of their design, and it seems that he was too much occupied with his other enemies to lend any effectual assistance to his mother-in-law. But the Acarnanians themselves were strongly averse to a union, which would subject them to the sovereignty of a people whom they had long been used to account inferior to themselves. In their distress they turned their eyes towards Rome, which had recently brought her first great struggle with Carthage to a triumphant close. The Acarnanian envoys, it seems, dexterously employed the fable of Rome's Trojan origin to flatter the vanity of the great families, and to recommend their suit, on the ground that the Acarnanians alone among the Greeks had kept aloof from the expedition against Troy.† It was probably the first time they had ever boasted of the omission of their name in the Homeric catalogue. The senate did not need this argument as a motive, for since the war with Pyrrhus it must have begun to look across the Adriatic, but found it useful as a pretext for interference, in a case where it would have been hard to devise any other; and a Roman embassy, the first that appeared in Greece, called upon the Ætolians to evacuate the territory of a people which had remained neutral in the Trojan war. It was a specimen of diplomacy which might well have alarmed all the Greek states, which could not plead the same title to the favour of Rome. The Ætolians are said to have dismissed the envoys with an arrogant and insulting reply,‡ and to have made a fresh inroad into Acarnania, in order to display their contempt for the Roman intercession. They could do so for the time with impunity. The juncture had not arrived for Rome to mediate with the sword.

When the Ætolians had broken with Macedonia, their interests became more accordant with those of the Achæans; and as Pantaleon, who was at this time at the head of the Ætolian government, willingly met the overtures of Aratus, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was soon concluded between the two powers.§ The Ætolians appear to have reaped almost all the benefit of this alliance. The Achæans are said to have rendered them very important services,|| but gained nothing for themselves north of the Isthmus, and the Ætolians could not have prevented the acquisitions which they made within Peloponnesus. It is not certain whether the Ætolians, during this period, extended their dominion on the eastern side of Greece; but there are indications that they were endeavouring to do so; and it is most probable that they now made themselves masters of some of the Thessalian towns, which we find afterward in their hands. It was, apparently, in the south of Thessaly that Aratus was defeated by a Macedonian general named Bithys.¶ He returned safe, in

\* Agatharchides in Joseph. c. Apion. i. 22; Justin, xxviii. 1, ad finem Antiochum. See Niebuhr, Kl. Schr., p. 254.

† Justin, xxviii. 1; Strabo, x. p. 462.

‡ Justin, xxviii. 2, who puts into their mouth allusions to the second Punic war.

§ Polyb., ii. 44. Plut. Ar. 23. || Polyb., ii. 46.

¶ I. c. φελαξας, Plut. Ar. 34. This name is otherwise unknown, but it suggests the idea of some connection

\* Prolog. Trug., xxviii. Ut rex Macedonia Demetrius & a Dardania fœsus; qeo mortuo . . .

great haste, to Corinth, but was so generally believed to have been either killed or taken prisoner, that Diogenes, the Macedonian commander in Piræus, sent a letter to Corinth to demand the restitution of the fortress, as if, after such a loss, the Achæans could no longer hope to retain it; and Demetrius himself despatched a vessel to fetch the supposed prisoner. If Aratus had reason to be gratified with such proofs that he was universally acknowledged to be the soul of the League, the same occasion afforded a disheartening specimen of Athenian levity or servility. The rumour of his death was hailed at Athens with public demonstrations of joy, as if he had been a hostile tyrant. It was, no doubt, in despair of deliverance, and to flatter the conqueror, whose yoke seemed now fixed more firmly than ever, that this exhibition was made; but still it was unnecessary; and Aratus, it is said, was so much wounded by it, that he invaded Attica,\* and advanced as far as the suburbs of Athens, where he had it in his power to inflict irreparable damage on the sacred groves and buildings, the pride and delight of the citizens. But he suffered his anger to be soothed by the Athenian eloquence, and left the country unharmed.

If Thessaly was the theatre of war, where Aratus was defeated by Bithys, Bœotia must then have been still in alliance with the Ætolians. But it was induced to abandon them, and to submit to Macedonia, by the terror of an army which Demetrius commanded in person.† We hear nothing more of this expedition. But this result indicates that the Macedonian ascendancy was firmly established on this side of Greece, as far as the Isthmus. Hence it is not improbable that, in the course of this campaign, Demetrius carried his arms into Ætolia, though little reliance can be placed on a passage of Strabo, which has been supposed to prove the fact.‡ There is still less appearance of any evidence that he penetrated within Peloponnesus.§ There, it seems, he only endeavoured to counteract the progress

of the Achæan League by subsidies and pensions, with which he supported the tyrants, against whom Aratus maintained his contest with unremitting activity. Having been baffled in all his attempts to take Aristippus by surprise, he at length determined to bring him to a fair trial of strength, and, marching into Argolis, began to ravage the country. The tyrant did not decline a battle, and showed himself a better general than Aratus, who by his personal timidity lost the victory, when it was nearly secured by the valour of his troops. He, however, soon after made up, in some measure, for his military failure by a diplomatic conquest. He induced Cleonæ to join the League; the more easily, perhaps, as, notwithstanding its insignificance, it regarded Argos as a rival who had usurped its rights. For Cleonæ also claimed the presidency at the Nemean games, and now, under shelter of the Achæan arms, once more enjoyed that honour. But the Argives celebrated them at the same time in their own city, and the competitors who appeared there might well think themselves entitled to the usual privilege of safe-conduct for their return to their homes. Yet those who passed through the territory of the League were seized and sold as slaves by order of Aratus; a piece of cruel injustice, in which Plutarch sees nothing but his stern hatred of tyranny. Aristippus, however, in his eagerness to recover Cleonæ, was shortly afterward surprised by Aratus, who had entered the town in the night, while he was believed to have marched in another direction. The Argives were put to flight and hotly pursued, and the tyrant himself was overtaken and slain near Mycenæ. Yet his death produced no immediate visible advantage to the League, whether through remissness on the part of Aratus we know not; but a second Aristomachus immediately assumed the vacant government, and found time, before the conquering army arrived, to introduce a body of Macedonian troops into Argos; so that, though Aratus, continuing the pursuit, effected an entrance into the city, none of the citizens, on whose support he had reckoned, ventured to declare themselves in his favour, and he was compelled to retire. Aristomachus, it seems, made this a pretext for putting eighty of the principal citizens to death,\* and his authority was soon established as firmly as that of his predecessor.

The fall of Aristippus, however, was attended with a consequence perhaps even more important than the acquisition of Argos itself would have been, if, as both Plutarch and Polybius appear to intimate,† it mainly contributed to induce Lydiades, tyrant of Megalopolis, to abdicate his usurped authority, and to unite the city to the Achæan League. According to Plutarch's authors, he had been impelled by youthful ambition to seize the tyranny as the fair prize of a generous emulation; but the success of Aratus, while it rendered his posi-

with Φυλακῆ. There was, indeed, also an Arcadian town of that name; but we have no other intimation of the presence of a Macedonian army in Peloponnesus during the reign of Demetrius.

\* Plut., Ar., 34. This account of the motives of Aratus is liable to just suspicion; and would be not the less so if it had been given by Aratus himself. Droysen (ii., p. 443) imagines that Aratus, expecting Demetrius would soon follow up the victory of Bithys in person, was anxious to gain Athens as a bulwark against the Macedonian invasion. But if we may conjecture in this way, it would be as easy to suppose that he wished to show how little he was weakened or disheartened by the check he had lately received in Thessaly.

† x., p. 451. The inhabitants of Pleuron were induced to migrate by the ravages which their fertile plain suffered from Demetrius, τὸ ἐπικληθέντος Αἰτωλικοῦ. This, it is agreed, could only be Demetrius II. But one MS. reads Πολι-αρχικοῦ. Both Droysen and Schorn (p. 411) prefer the reading Αἰτωλικοῦ. But while Droysen alleges this epithet as an indication of the brilliant success which must have attended the arms of Demetrius (ii., p. 441), Schorn supposes that it was given to him in derision, on account of the losses which he suffered through the conquests of the Ætolians in Thessaly. Before we decide which of these views is the more probable, it might be desirable to be furnished with another example of such an epithet in Grecian history.

‡ Droysen (ii., p. 442), clinging to the reading Μακεδόνων in Pausanias (ii., 8. 5), conjectures that Demetrius made himself master of Mantinea. He speaks of the reading Ἀρκαδικῶν, which would clearly refer the event to the Cleonic war (Polyb., ii., 57. Plut., Ar., 36), as an emendation. But it is the reading of Bekker's Paris MS.

\* Polyb., ii., 59. It is not, perhaps, absolutely certain that this was the occasion to which Polybius alludes. But we know of no other attempt made by Aratus on Argos during the government of Aristomachus II. The descriptions of Plutarch (Ar., 29) and Polybius are perfectly consistent with one another, and the expressions *κατακτείνων* and *κατασπασκόντων*, seem clearly to refer the two narratives to the same occurrence.

† Plut., Ar., 30. Polyb., ii., 44, 5, *προσέβλεπον; τὸ μέλλει*.

tion every day more insecure, opened his eyes to nobler aims, and fired him with a more virtuous rivalry.\* But, perhaps, some other causes, more closely connected with Arcadian politics, may have concurred to produce this result. It was probably not long before this event that Laconia was invaded by an Ætolian army, which was accompanied by Spartan exiles, penetrated as far as Tanarum, where it plundered the temple of Poseidon, ravaged the country, and, after an unsuccessful attempt on Sparta, retreated with an immense booty, including, according to Plutarch, 50,000 captives of the free Laconian population. Unfortunately, this great expedition is only known to us through casual allusions, which afford no means of ascertaining either its precise date or the causes which gave rise to it.† But there are reasons which incline us to believe that it may be most probably referred to the first half of the reign of Demetrius, and that about the same time several Arcadian towns, Tegea, Phigalea, Orchomenus, perhaps even Mantinea, which we find afterward in the possession of the Ætolians, were induced to connect themselves with their confederacy. This would, at least, have been likely to alarm Lydiades as much as the more distant operations of Aratus. But he naturally preferred the Achæan to the Ætolian League, as in the former he had the prospect of the highest honours, from which he would have been excluded by the Ætolian Constitution, according to which none but Ætolians were eligible to the supreme dignity.

When the reign of Demetrius was verging to its close, the Ætolians were still intent on the conquest of Acarnania; and Demetrius, though anxious to protect the Acarnanians, was prevented, either by the renewal of his war with the Dardaniæ, or by some other unexplained cause, from marching in person to their aid. The Acarnanian town of Medeon was besieged by the Ætolians, and, after an obstinate resistance, was on the point of yielding, when the Illyrian king Agron was induced, by a subsidy from Demetrius, to send an armament to its relief. While the Ætolian chiefs were disputing about the distribution of the anticipated booty, the Illyrians suddenly landed, defeated and dispersed the besiegers, and made them-

selves masters of their camp and baggage, and sailed home laden with spoil. This success of the Illyrians was attended with very important consequences. Their king Agron was so elated with the victory which his people had gained over an enemy so formidable as the Ætolians, that he abandoned himself to an excess of intemperance, which soon put an end to his life. He was succeeded by his queen Teuta, who was led—whether by evil counsellors or by her own ignorance and vanity—to believe that she might safely enrich herself and her subjects with the spoil of every coast accessible to the Illyrian boats. Accordingly, she not only granted an unlimited license of plunder to her privateers, but sent out an armament, with instructions to her officers to treat every coast as an enemy's country.\* This expedition took place towards the end of the reign of Demetrius, after a revolution had been effected in Epirus, by which the monarchical form of government was abolished, and democracy established in its stead. The young king Pyrrhus died early, but, according to one author, after he had poisoned his mother,† and was succeeded by his brother Ptolemæus, who was treacherously slain while engaged in an expedition which was apparently undertaken against the Ætolians. Olympias, according to another account, sank into the grave under the stroke of her double bereavement.‡ There now remained only one of the royal family in Epirus, the Princess Deidamia,§ who, however, showed a manly as well as royal spirit. She took possession of Ambracia, and did not dissemble her intention of punishing the murderers of Ptolemæus. But they were connected with a powerful party, perhaps, also, supported by the Ætolians, who had profited by their crime. The country was threatened with a civil war, and Deidamia shrank from the contest. She entered into a treaty with the insurgents, and renounced her claims to the throne|| on condition that she should enjoy the patrimony of her ancestors and the honours of royalty.¶ But the securities which she took for the execution of the treaty did not guard her person from treachery and violence. She was forced to take refuge in a temple, and was there murdered at the altar by a man named Milo, whose hands were believed to have been already stained with the blood of his own mother.

It was not long after this event that Teuta's piratical expedition took place. It was bent, at the outset, against the coasts of Elis and Messenia, which the Illyrians had before frequently visited for the like purpose. But the commander, having touched, for a supply of provisions, at the coast of Epirus, near the city of Phœnice, found an opportunity to make himself master of the place. The democratical government had imprudently intrusted it to a body of Celtic mercenaries, who had alternately served the Carthaginians and Romans in the first Punic war, but, at the end of it, were

\* Polyb., iv., 34; ix., 34. Plut., Cleom., 16, 18.

† Lucas (p. 86) refers it to the reign of Agis; and this opinion is adopted by Schömann (Proleg. ad Plut., Ag., and Cleom., xxxi.), on the ground that the Ætolians were then at war both with Sparta and the Achæans. Droysen (ii., p. 387) agrees with them, and endeavours to fix the date and the occasion more precisely. He supposes that the Ætolians were instigated by Antigonus, and that his object was to crush the revolution which had been just begun by Agis, and to restore Leonidas. Schorn, on the other hand (p. 91), supposes the expedition to have been subsequent to the abdication of Lydiades, and would connect it with his proposal to invade Laconia. This, as the proposal of Lydiades was not adopted, seems improbable; but Schorn seems to be quite right when he observes that the exiles, whom the Ætolians attempted to restore, were undoubtedly the adherents of Agis. The period following the death of Agis appears to correspond better than any other to the allusions in Plut., Cleom., 10, 18. Plutarch's silence on this subject in his Agis and Aratus is least surprising on this supposition. On Droysen's, he could scarcely have spoken as he does about the return of Leonidas (Agis, 16). Nor does it seem possible that, so soon after such a destructive forced, Aratus could have deliberately permitted the Ætolians to enter Peloponnesus, on the ground that they were not likely to do much damage.

\* Polyb., ii., 4.

† Helladius ap. Phot., p. 530, a.

‡ Justin, xxviii., 3.

§ Justin (u. s.) calls her Leodamia. The true name is preserved by Polyanus (viii., 53) and Pausanias (iv., 35, 2).

|| Pausanias (u. s.), ἐπετρέψε τὸ θῆμα τὴν πραγμάν.

¶ Polyanus (u. s.), ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν κληρῶν καὶ τῆς τιμῆς ἔχουσιν τὴν προνομίαν.

transported by the Romans out of Italy, as men who had proved, by repeated acts of treachery and sacrilege, that they acknowledged no ties human or divine. They now betrayed Phœnice to the Illyrians, who, as it was the strongest and wealthiest city in Epirus, found a richer booty than had often fallen into their hands. The Epirots collected all their forces to wrest their chief town from the invaders, who retained possession of it; but, through want of foresight and military discipline, they were defeated near Phœnice, while the Illyrian general, Scerdilaidas, entered Chaonia with a fresh force of 5000 men. They now implored succour from the Ætolians and Achæans, and the allies sent an army to their relief. No battle, however, ensued, as the Illyrian forces were recalled by Teuta, who was threatened with revolt at home. They made terms with the Epirots, to whom they restored the city, with all the free inhabitants, but were allowed to carry off the slaves, and everything else that it contained. After their departure, the Epirots, dreading, perhaps, a fresh attack from the same quarter more than any other danger, and seeing the Acarnanians safe under Illyrian protection, entered into alliance with Teuta.

The depredations committed by the Illyrians on Italian merchant vessels during the stay of their armament at Phœnice gave occasion to the embassy by which the Romans demanded reparation, and to the expedition—the first in which they crossed the Adriatic—by which they avenged the murder of their ambassador. But, while they were making their preparations, Teuta, delighted with the spoil of Phœnice, fitted out another more powerful armament for a fresh excursion. It failed in an attempt on Epidamnus, and proceeded to lay siege to Corcyra. The Corcyreans, whose embassy was accompanied by envoys from Epidamnus and Apollonia, sought protection from the Ætolians and Achæans; and an Achæan squadron of ten galleys was sent to raise the siege; but it was defeated by the Illyrians, whose fleet was strengthened by seven Acarnanian galleys. Four of the Achæan ships were boarded and captured by the pirates, and a fifth sunk with its whole crew, among whom was Marcus of Cerynea, the man who, next to Aratus, had rendered the most important services to the League. Corcyra, now despairing of succour, capitulated soon after, and received an Illyrian garrison, commanded by Demetrius of Pharos, an adventurer, who afterward acquired notoriety by his restless and reckless ambition. On the appearance of the Roman fleet sent against Teuta, both the Corcyreans and Demetrius, who had in some way lost the queen's confidence, opened a negotiation with the consul, Cn. Fulvius, and, when he arrived, delivered up the city and the Illyrian garrison to him. Corcyra placed itself under the protection of Rome, and Demetrius guided the Roman army into Illyria, and when Teuta had submitted, received, it is said, the largest portion of her dismembered kingdom as the reward of his treachery.\* The victorious con-

sul, A. Postumius, sent envoys both to the Ætolians and the Achæans, to announce the success of the Roman arms against the common enemy; and the account which Polybius gives of this embassy—the first, as he believed, that the Romans had sent to Greece†—at least proves that there was no resentment or jealousy on either side.‡ The envoys explained the motives which had induced Rome to take up arms against the Illyrians, related the chastisement which had been inflicted on Teuta, and read a copy of the treaty concluded with her. The article in which the Greeks were most concerned was, that the Illyrians were forbidden henceforth to sail south of the Lissus with more than two boats at a time, and those not equipped for war. The Illyrian piracy had spread so much terror along the western coasts of Greece, that the Romans were entitled to the gratitude of the nation, and the obligation seems to have been acknowledged by both the confederate states. Another embassy was sent to Corinth and Athens. The Corinthians honoured the Romans with the privilege of participation in the Isthmian games;‡ a boon not without its value, as it seemed to imply a recognition of national affinity. The Athenians granted their franchise, and the right of initiation in the Eleusinia mysteries.§

About this time Demetrius died,|| after having suffered a defeat from the Dardaniæ;¶ perhaps on the field of battle. He left an only son named Philip, a child eight years of age. The government was assumed, in his name, by his kinsman Antigonus—a son of Demetrius the Handsome, son of Demetrius I. and Ptolemais—who was distinguished by an epithet which satirically expressed a feature in his character, by which he afterward became known to the Greeks as one forward to promise, but slack to perform: hence he incurred the nickname of Doson (about to give). Yet he discharged his duties towards his ward with strict integrity; and though he married Chryseis, the widow of Demetrius II., and had children by her,\*\* he continued to treat Philip as his own son, and rightful heir to the throne, though, it seems, without any intention of resigning it to him during his own lifetime. The death of Demetrius II. was attended with important changes in the mutual relations of the Greek states, and the administration of Antigonus Doson is the most critical period in this portion of Greek history.

This would be the more probable account, if it were but of equal authority.

\* Niebuhr (Kl. Schr. p. 256) felt the difficulty, but observes that Polybius might the more easily fall into such an error more than a century after the event, as the Roman mediation was attended with no result.

† Polyb. ii. 12. ‡ Ibid. ii. 12.

§ Zonaras, viii. 19. καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους διὰ φιλίας ἰσχυροῦς, καὶ κατὰ κοινότητα ὅρων, καὶ τὴν νεοτερπύλαιαν ἀνταγωγὴν. They were, perhaps, admitted to isopoly.

|| Polyb. ii. 44, 2. ¶ Prolog. Troj. xxvii.

\*\* Euseb. Arm. i. p. 334. Quam iustum in precationibus Phusum vidissent, regem eum creaverunt; uxoremque ipsi Aureolam desponderunt; ipse vero filios qui ex Aureola nati fuerunt vix educabat, ut imperium sine perdis Philippos conservaret. Compare Justin, xxviii. 3. Philip, after his death, styled him father. Polyb. iv. 24, 7.

\* Polyb. ii. 11, τοὺς αἰεὶ τοὺς Ἰλλυρίων. Appian, III. 8, ἐστὶν ἡ χερσὶν . . . τῶν ἀντιπάλων τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐφόρμησεν.

## CHAPTER LXII.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF ANTIGONUS DOSON TO  
THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA.

SINCE the close of her disastrous struggle with Thebes, which deprived her of the fairest portion of her territory, and left her insulated, and beset with hostile neighbours, Sparta has taken little share in the affairs of Greece. It is but seldom, and on extraordinary occasions, that we have seen her name mentioned. The part, however, which we find her acting on these occasions is an honourable one, and worthy of her ancient renown: a struggle for the national independence, such as that in which Agis III. fell, or a gallant resistance in her own defence, such as she opposed to the superior forces of Demetrius and Pyrrhus. She appears, indeed, to have discarded all ambitious views, to have buried all thoughts of her old supremacy, and to have adopted a merely defensive policy; but her patriotism, her sense of honour, and her love of liberty, seem to have survived.

During the period on which we are now about to enter, she again, for a time, fills the most prominent place among the Greek states, and is engaged in a contest for the mastery of Peloponnesus; and we are, in consequence, enabled to learn something of the course of her internal history, which was intimately connected with this change in her political attitude. These events were prepared by others which occurred several years earlier, in the reign of Antigonos Gonatas, but which we have reserved for this place, that they might not interrupt the progress of the narrative, and might not be separated from their more important sequel.

We have seen that, so far back as the year 399 B.C., when Sparta was apparently at the summit of her prosperity and power, she was, nevertheless, threatened with a bloody revolution, which was, perhaps, only averted by a timely accidental discovery. But the causes which provoked Cinadon's plot were not removed by its violent suppression. It does not appear that any attempt had since been made to remedy the evil; and it had been greatly aggravated, not only by the continued operation of the same causes, but by an innovation subsequently introduced into the law which regulated the distribution of property. According to the ancient law, the head of a Spartan family was only tenant for life of his portion of land, and had no power to alter the order of succession by which it descended after his death to the person who represented him. We are not informed what provision was made by law or usage for the cases, which must have become not uncommon even before the end of the Peloponnesian War, in which a portion was left vacant by the extinction of the family. It would seem that the arrangement most accordant with the principles of the Constitution, and best adapted to promote the common weal, would have been to transfer such lands to the younger branches of other families. But we do not hear of any such rule or practice; and the facts which have come to our knowledge render it more probable that the vacant portions were disposed of in a way much less

beneficial to the state, and went to increase the wealth of the rich and powerful, rather than to supply the wants of the poorer citizens. But the inequality of fortunes which would thus grow in proportion as the population decreased, was very much augmented after a change had been made in the law, by which all restraints on the alienation of land were removed, and every Spartan was enabled, either in his lifetime or by his will, to convey his whole estate away from his own family to strangers. This innovation—which must have been preceded by a general change of sentiment with regard to the ancient institutions—was effected by a *rhetra*, which was proposed by an ephor named Epitadeus, a man, it is said, of great influence, and of a stern, imperious character, who, having been displeased by his son, wished to deprive him of his patrimony. The anecdote is, of course, much less certain than the fact which it is supposed to explain. Such a measure could not have been carried if there had not been a disposition generally prevailing to take advantage of it.\* What Epitadeus is said to have designed out of ill-will towards his son, other parents may have done under the pressure of poverty, or in compliance with the importunity of grasping neighbours. It is only by the imagination that we can trace the working of the new law; but the final result is distinctly recorded. As the ruling caste dwindled away, its property was accumulated in fewer and fewer hands, until at length the number of the Spartans did not exceed 700, and of these, only about 100 possessed a piece of land, or any means of independent and honourable subsistence. One peculiar and important feature in this state of Spartan society was the extent of female ascendancy. According to Aristotle, two fifths of the land, even in his days, belonged to women.†

When the state had thus shrunk up into an oligarchy of 100 persons, all that in former times constituted the strength of Sparta was gone. It is difficult to conceive how even the outward form was preserved, how tranquillity was maintained at home, and why attempts like that of Cinadon's were not frequently repeated, or were never successful. All the vigilance and energy of the government must, one would think, have been needed for its own security. For any vigorous intervention in the affairs of Greece, any effort to regain the smallest degree of political weight, Sparta seemed now utterly disabled. Even if the spirit of the ancient institutions had remained in all its purity, it could have availed nothing, when the body which it should have animated was so nearly wasted away. But the spirit languished as the body decayed. The contrast between the extremes of wealth and poverty was rendered more glaring by the luxury which had, at the same time, taken the place of the primitive simplicity among those who had the means of indulging in it. This change of manners seems, indeed, to have crept into Sparta somewhat later than it became visible

\* This was written before I had seen C. F. Hermann's *Antiquitates Laconicae*, where (p. 213, fol.) reasons are given for questioning the extent of the operation assigned by Plutarch to the law of Epitadeus.

† Pol., ii., 6, p. 55, Goettingen.

in the rest of Greece, where it was rapidly spread by the intercourse which Alexander's conquests opened with the East; for the reign of Areus is represented as the period of its commencement.\* He and his son Acrotatus, it is said, first affected to imitate the voluptuousness of the foreign courts; but the fashion which they introduced was so eagerly followed, that their mode of living seemed frugal and homely when compared with the refinements of private Spartans in the next generation. Then, the plain fare and simple garniture of the common meals were exchanged for delicate viands, soft couches, fragrant and precious ointments, and the other devices of the modern luxury. And, while the wealthy shook off the restraints of the ancient discipline, the bulk of the citizens were prevented by poverty from complying with its regulations, and were unable to exercise the privileges to which they were entitled by their birth, and thus practically degraded to an inferior rank.

To such a pass had matters been brought when Agis IV. succeeded to the throne of the Eurypontids, the sixth of the line from the conqueror Agesilaus. He was under twenty at the time of his accession, and had been nursed in the lap of ease and luxury by his mother, Agesistrata, and his grandmother, Archidamia, the wealthiest of the Spartan ladies. He himself inherited an ample patrimony in land, with a treasure of 600 talents. But it is not surprising, nor is any particular occasion needed to account for the fact, that a high-minded youth should not have been satisfied with the honours or pleasures of such a station.† Tradition still preserved the memory of Sparta's departed greatness, and enough was retained of the forms of her ancient life to suggest a saddening comparison between the past and the present. The more vividly the images of other days rose upon his mind, the more impatient he would become of his own shadowy, inactive, inglorious royalty, with its vain titles, vacant leisure, or frivolous occupations. But, without some great change in the state of Sparta, he could not hope to see any field opened to him for honourable exertion. It was absolutely necessary, not only that the ancient discipline should be in some measure restored, and the ancient spirit in some degree revived, but that a new people should be formed, for such a discipline and spirit to work upon. A more comprehensive plan, embracing the whole free population of Laconia, and removing all political distinctions which raised one class in it above another, either never entered the mind of Agis, or appeared to him impracticable or inexpedient. All that he aimed at was, as nearly as possible to bring back the state of things which was supposed to have existed before the conquest of Messenia, to restore the institutions of Lycurgus to their primitive vigour. This, indeed, was a sufficiently difficult undertaking — as much so, perhaps, as a more complete revolu-

tion would have been—one in which he had to expect powerful and vehement opposition. His colleague, Leonidas, the son of the traitor Cleonymus, who, when Acrotatus fell in battle, became the guardian of his infant child, and had succeeded to the throne on the death of his ward, was so little disposed to favour such attempts at reformation, that, having spent a great part of his life in Asiatic courts, he had introduced new refinements of luxury at Sparta. With Leonidas stood the elder citizens, whose habits had been formed under the modern laxity, and who shrank from a return to the severity of the primitive discipline, and the wealthy women, who dreaded the loss, not only of their luxurious enjoyments, but of the respect and influence which accrued to them from their large possessions. On the other hand, with all who had more to gain than to lose by a revolution, with the young, the needy, the ambitious, and with as many as had their country's welfare and dignity at heart, the project of a reform was popular, and the royal authority, though very feeble for ordinary purposes, when placed at the head of a party, made an addition of incalculable importance to its strength.

If we could rely on some accounts delivered to us by Pausanias, we should be led to believe that he endeavoured—as Cleomenes afterward—to prepare the way for his meditated political changes by a series of military operations; for we read in Pausanias of unsuccessful attempts which he made on Pellene\* and Megalopolis,† and of a great battle in which he was defeated by Aratus near Mantinea.‡ But some of these accounts are liable to strong suspicion on other grounds, and it seems hardly possible

\* ii., 8, 5; vii., 7, 3. It is precisely what befell the Ætolians at the same place. Agis has made himself master of the town, but is dislodged by Aratus. Manco (Sp., iii., 2, p. 106) pointed out the great probability that Pausanias only made a mistake about the assailants; and even Schömann (Prolegg. ad Plut., Ag., xxv.), who maintains the credibility of the two other statements, cannot reconcile himself to this. Lucas (p. 88) and Droysen (ii., p. 360), indeed, say they do not venture to reject it. But it seems rather an excess of boldness to admit such a singular coincidence on so slight authority.

† viii., 27. After the accession of Megalopolis to the Achæan League (which took place some years after the death of Agis), Agis lays siege to Megalopolis, but is compelled to raise it by a hurricane which destroyed his battering-engine. Manco (u. a.) justly suspects that Pausanias has here confounded this Agis with his predecessor Agis III. (see ante, p. 309).

‡ viii., 10. The battle is described with a copiousness of detail which certainly raises a strong presumption in favour of the substantial truth of the narrative, though Pausanias was so ill-informed or forgetful as to relate that Agis was slain, and undoubtedly supposed that Lydiades had already abdicated his tyranny. (Compare viii., 10, 6, with viii., 27, 3.) But, on the other hand, so much the more difficult is it to believe that Plutarch could have passed over such an event in total silence. Schömann and Droysen, indeed, contend that the military career of Agis did not enter into Plutarch's plan; but, not to mention that such transactions could not be without influence on the state of affairs at Sparta, it is quite evident, from the manner in which the biographer notices one expedition of his hero, that he would not purposely have omitted his other military movements. But even if we admit this very unsatisfactory explanation for the life of Agis, it will not account for the omission in the life of Aratus. Schömann's remark, "Non omnesur opinor, in hac Arati vitâ rem nec leuem et Arato gloriosam," applies quite as much to this battle as to the deliverance of Pellene. It seems clear that Plutarch found no mention of either in the autobiography of Aratus. The story might, as Manco observes, have had its origin in the same confusion which probably gave rise to that about the siege of Megalopolis.

\* Phylarchus ap. Athen., iv., p. 142.

† It seems equally superfluous to imagine with Schorn (p. 99) that he was stimulated by the recollection of his great ancestor Agesilaus, as to suppose with Kortüm (in Schömann's Archiv., iv., p. 174) that his emulation was kindled by the fame of Aratus. But the latter conjecture is the less probable.



that any of them could have been known, or, at least, believed by Plutarch, when he wrote his lives of Agis and Aratus, and Pausanias is not an author entitled to much confidence.

Agis, in the warmth and openness of a youthful heart, engrossed with a new and great idea, seems to have believed that he might safely rely on the goodness of his cause, and that the object which appeared to himself so noble and attractive could not fail to excite equal interest in others. He seems, from the first, to have made no secret of his intentions, as in his dress and mode of living he strictly observed the primitive rule, trusting that he should be able to effect his purpose without either artifice or violence, to which his generous and gentle nature was almost equally averse.\* And, in fact, the success of his endeavours to infuse his convictions and wishes into other bosoms, was apparently greater than could have been reasonably expected. Three persons of the greatest weight among the elder citizens, his mother's brother, Agesilaus, a man of fluent speech, a descendant of the celebrated Lysander, who bore the same name, and inherited much of his ancestor's reputation and influence, and Mandrocleidas, who is described as surpassing all the Greeks of his age in dexterity and boldness for the management of affairs, were induced to enter into the young king's views, and seconded his enterprise with a great show of zeal. The motives of Agesilaus, though he affected to yield to the persuasions of his son, Hippomedon, a man of high military reputation,† soon, as we shall see, became perfectly clear. Those of Lysander and Mandrocleidas are not so manifest. It seems probable that they were chiefly attracted by the prospect of power, hoping to take the lead in the new order of things which they might help to establish. But with the ladies of his family Agis was still more decidedly successful. After a short opposition, which was overcome, in part, by the arguments of Agesilaus, he so completely inspired them with his own enthusiasm, that they consented to every sacrifice of their personal interests, and laboured to gain converts to the cause among others of their sex and rank. The party adverse to reform rallied round Leonidas, and prepared for a strenuous resistance to the measures of Agis; but his adherents were so numerous that Leonidas scarcely ventured openly to declare himself, though he sedulously strove to undermine his colleague's influence by secret calumnies, charging him with the design of overthrowing the Constitution, and purchasing a tyranny with the bribes which he offered to the poor out of the fortunes of the rich.

The first step taken by Agis towards the accomplishment of his object was to procure the election of Lysander among the next ephors. He then proceeded to introduce a rhetra, which comprehended his whole plan of reform. All

debts were to be cancelled: the whole territory to be divided into two parts: one, comprising the vale of Sparta and some adjacent districts, to be parcelled into 4500 equal shares for as many Spartans; the other into 15,000, for as many Laconians capable of military service. The number of the Spartans to be made up by an extension of the highest franchise to natives or foreigners of free birth, liberal education, and fitting personal qualifications, to be distributed into companies for the public meals, and to be inured to the observance of the ancient discipline.

Before the rhetra became a law, it was necessary that it should pass through the Gerousia, a body in which the enemies of reform were predominant, but which was naturally cautious, and not inaccessible to the influence of public opinion. The advocates of the measure, therefore, hoped to sway the deliberations of the council in its favour by a previous appeal to the popular assembly, and by some other, perhaps, less honest expedients. Oracles, old and new, were produced, containing admonitions against the accumulation of wealth and in favour of equality, and were urged by Lysander, who called the assembly together, and by Mandrocleidas and Agesilaus, in support of the projected changes. After them, Agis pleaded the same cause in a short speech, but one full of weighty matter, being, indeed, itself not simply a speech, but an act; for he declared his intention to make an unreserved surrender of his property to the state; the lands to be subjected to the proposed division; the money, it seems, to be paid into the public treasury: and he announced that the other members of his family, who, together, possessed a large portion of the wealth of Sparta, as well as many of his friends, had consented to make a like sacrifice to the common weal. It may be easily imagined that such a proof of disinterested patriotism, worthy of the ancient virtue, was received with great applause by an assembly consisting chiefly of persons who were to be personally benefited by the gift. It dispelled all suspicions as to the young king's motives, and exhibited the selfishness of his adversaries in the stronger relief. But it confirmed Leonidas in his opposition to the measure, as he perceived that, if it was carried, he should be obliged to submit to the like loss without the credit of a sacrifice. But, as it was necessary to bring forward some arguments more in accordance with the feelings of his hearers than his real motives would have been, he took the ground of a friend to the Constitution, and an admirer of Lycurgus, and asked Agis whether their great legislator had ever made any provision for the cancelling of debts, or for the admission of foreigners to the franchise—he who had deemed it necessary to keep the city free from the presence of strangers. It was not difficult for Agis to expose the sophistry of this appeal to antiquity, and to show that his reform was perfectly consistent with the principles of Lycurgus, who could not have meant the Spartans to contract debts when he forbade them to possess money, and whose aim was not so much to exclude the persons of foreigners as to guard against the contagion of foreign manners, though it was not surprising, he observed, that such distinctions should be

\* Droysen (p. 301) very justly observes that the character of Agis, as it appears in Plutarch's narrative, is hardly consistent with the numerous military enterprises attributed to him by Pausanias, and therefore suspects that his character has been misrepresented. But as there is no other reason for questioning the truth with which it has been drawn, it seems as fair to consider it as an accidental objection to those otherwise most suspicious accounts of his military career.

† On Hippomedon's career, see Niebuhr, *II. Schr.*, p. 466, 461.

overlooked by Leonidas, who had been brought up abroad, and had allied himself by marriage to a Syrian satrap. But he had to deal with opponents who were not to be moved by arguments, and their interest prevailed in the Gerusia, though not without a hard struggle; the rhetra was lost by a single vote.

His friends, however, were men not to be disheartened by a defeat which was so nearly a victory; it only induced them to set other engines at work. They determined to remove Leonidas, who was the main strength of the adverse party, out of the way; and that part of his private history which had afforded occasion for Agis's sarcastic allusion seemed to furnish them with the means of effecting their purpose in a constitutional manner. Leonidas had, in fact, married the daughter of an Asiatic, the governor of one of the provinces of Seleucus, by whom he had two children: it was only when, having lost his wife's affection, he found his situation grow irksome, that he had returned reluctantly to Sparta. Lysander now instructed his adherents to revive the recollection of an ancient law, which forbade a Heracleid to marry a foreigner, and even made him liable to capital punishment if he took up a fixed residence in a foreign land. When the public mind had been duly prepared for the agitation of the question, Lysander himself brought it forward in the way most likely to raise a strong prejudice against Leonidas. According to a custom which must have arisen in very remote antiquity, the ephors met once every nine years on a clear but moonless night, to observe the heavens in silence. If a meteor was seen to shoot across the sky, it was inferred that the kings had incurred the displeasure of the gods, and they were suspended from their functions until they were absolved by a favourable oracle from Delphi or Olympia. The custom had probably been long a mere ceremony; but Lysander now found a use for it. He declared that he had beheld the sign, and, proceeding to interpret it by the facts which had recently become the subject of earnest discussion, he brought Leonidas to trial for a breach of the law, and at the same time induced Cleombrotus, who had married the king's daughter, Chilonis, and was next in succession, to claim the throne. Leonidas, anticipating an unfavourable decision and a rigorous application of the law, took refuge in the sanctuary of the Brazen House, where he was joined by Chilonis. In his absence he was condemned, and the sceptre, which he was pronounced to have forfeited, was transferred to Cleombrotus.

But his partisans did not give up the contest. The official year was drawing to a close; and at the next election of ephors they were able to fill the board with their own adherents. The new ephors immediately took Leonidas under their protection, and impeached Lysander and Mandrocleidas as the authors of illegal and revolutionary measures. It was evidently a crisis which called for some vigorous stroke to prevent the ruin of their cause, and they persuaded the kings to assert what they maintained to be their legitimate authority over the ephors, who, according to them, were only entitled to interfere in affairs of state when the kings happened to be at variance. Agis and his colleague as-

sembled their friends, compelled the ephors to retire, and appointed a new board, which included Agesilaus, in their room. They then proceeded to arm the younger citizens, and to release the prisoners. Their opponents now could only hope to save their lives, and expected a general massacre. Leonidas fled, and he owed his safety to the generosity of Agis, who, finding that Agesilaus had despatched emissaries in pursuit of him, to put him to death sent an escort to conduct him to Tegea. The movement was not stained with a single drop of blood.

It was, no doubt, with reluctance that Agis consented to resort to such violent proceedings; but it now only remained to reap the fruits of them. All resistance was quelled; and if the rhetra had been again proposed, it would probably have been carried in the council without opposition. But Agis now let himself be guided by the counsels of Agesilaus, which were the more agreeable to him, as they wore the appearance of forbearance and moderation. Agesilaus had been induced to take the side of reform, neither by any patriotic feeling, nor by the persuasions of his son Hippomedon, who was sincerely attached to it, but by the prospect which it held out of relieving him from a load of debts which encumbered his estate; and he now easily played upon the young king's simplicity and inexperience. He suggested to him that it would be best to proceed gradually towards the accomplishment of his designs, and not to attempt to introduce so many startling changes at once. Let him first conciliate that class of citizens which was groaning under the burden of debt by a general release; he might then hope more easily to carry the more obnoxious innovation which related to the division of the land. Agesilaus gave such a specious colour to this proposal, that even Lysander was deceived, and assented to it. By an edict, it would seem, of the ephors, all creditors who held written securities for their money were obliged to bring them into the market-place, where they were piled in a heap, and committed to the flames. As they burned, Agesilaus exultingly declared, that he had never beheld a brighter blaze or a purer fire. By the great mass of the spectators it had probably been viewed with pleasure only because they regarded it as an earnest of the boon which they expected for themselves. A loud cry was soon raised for the division of the land, and both the kings urged Agesilaus to gratify the wish of the people, and to finish their work. He, however, evaded their request, and devised successive pretexts for continued delay, until he was relieved from their importunity by a turn of affairs, which has been already related. It was at this juncture that Aratus applied to Sparta for aid to resist the threatened invasion of the Ætolians. Agesilaus gladly seconded this call, which was doubly welcome to him, as it afforded a fresh pretext for delay, and freed him from the presence of the persons who were most zealous and active in pressing the claim which he wished to elude. Agis, as we have seen, was sent at the head of an army to the Isthmus. The discipline of his troops, who, believing their fortunes secured at home, and regarding him as their benefactor, paid the most punctual obedience to his orders excited great admiration along the

whole line of their march; and it was no less generally acknowledged, that he himself presented a complete image of a Spartan king of the old times, sharing with his men the toils and hardships of the camp, and not to be distinguished from the private soldier either in his arms or his fare,\* though there were many who dreaded his presence, as likely to spread a revolutionary contagion, and, perhaps, Aratus himself was not altogether free from such anxiety, and hence less disposed to regret the departure of his allies.†

But during his absence the state of affairs had undergone an unhappy change at Sparta. Agesilaus had cast aside every restraint of decency, and abstained from no kind of gainful iniquity for which his office afforded colour or opportunity. For the sake of some fraudulent advantage, he had even intercalated an additional month in the year. Cleombrotus he treated with open contempt; and he affected to account Agis worthy of respect, not as a king, but only as his kinsman. Growing conscious, however, that he had provoked general indignation, and apprehensive that the patience of the people might soon be spent, he took a band of armed followers into his pay. This was the first step towards formal tyranny; and he seemed resolved to follow it up; for, perhaps to sound the public feeling, he caused a report to be circulated that he meant to continue in office another year. It seems to have been at the time when the ferment excited by these proceedings had nearly reached its height that Agis returned from his expedition. It was too late to avert the consequences of his uncle's misconduct. The adverse party took advantage of the general disgust and disappointment which it had caused to effect a counter-revolution, while the poorer citizens, who, perhaps, were led to believe that they had been deceived by Agis, looked on either with unconcern, or with a vindictive joy. Leonidas was openly recalled and reinstated in his dignity. Agis and Cleombrotus, abandoned by their friends, took shelter, the former in the Brazen House, the latter in the temple of Poseidon. The chief offender, Agesilaus, was allowed to escape into exile through the intercession of his son, who was universally loved and esteemed.‡ The revenge of Leonidas was first directed against Cleombrotus, whose hostility towards one who stood in so near a relation to him, appeared to partake of ingratitude and impiety. Yet he suffered himself to be overcome by the supplication of his heroic daughter, and permitted her husband to quit the country. But Chilonis, as in her father's adversity she had shared his danger and mourned for his absence, and breathed nothing but displeasure against his triumphant rival, so now, notwithstanding his entreaties, she accompanied her dethroned husband, whom she could neither love nor esteem, in his exile.¶

Agis had no such advocate to plead in his behalf, and he had provoked more implacable enmity in the persons whose interests he had assailed, in proportion as his aims were higher and his virtue purer; Leonidas at first tried to draw him out of his asylum by fair words; it was well known that he had been misled by the arts of Agesilaus; his error was forgiven, and he would be allowed to retain his dignity. But finding that Agis would not trust his professions, he had recourse to another device. He had removed all the ephors, and filled their places with his own creatures, among whom was a sordid wretch named Amphares, who was on a footing of some intimacy with Agis and his family, and having recently borrowed some drinking-vessels, and other things of great value, from Agesistrata, hoped that, in the calamity which now threatened the royal house, he should be able to retain them as his own property. This man, with two of his associates, named Demochares and Arcesilaus, who were likewise on familiar terms with Agis, visited him in his retreat, and sometimes escorted him to a bath at some distance from the temple. On one of these occasions, having concerted their measures, they seized him, and dragged him to prison. Here the ephors assembled some of the council, their devoted partisans, and constituted themselves a tribunal to sit in judgment on the king. The trial seems to have been as irregular as the court was illegal. By way of accusation, he was called upon to defend himself; and as he disdained to plead before such judges, he was asked, first, whether he had been forced into the steps which he had taken by Lysander and Agesilaus. He replied, that he had acted without any compulsion, but following the example of Lycurgus, and aiming to revive his institutions. The next question was, whether he repented of his conduct, and when he declared that he felt no regret for his glorious undertaking, however fatal its issue might be to himself, he was forthwith condemned to death. A Spartan king, limited as was his authority, was invested with a kind of sanctity in the eyes of the people, who saw in him a lineal descendant of Hercules. The officers of justice, and even the soldiers of the government, did not venture to lay hands on Agis, and Demochares was obliged himself to drag him to the chamber of execution, where he was immediately strangled. He maintained the same calm and noble bearing to his last moments, and consoled an attendant who bewailed his fate, with the remark, that he was still superior to his murderers.

The execution was hastened, because his mother and grandmother had come to the prison doors, and were loudly demanding that he should be allowed a hearing in the assembly of the people, the only constitutional tribunal for such a cause. A crowd was gathering round them, and to prevent a tumult, Amphares, still wearing the mask of friendship, invited them to enter, and see Agis. It would seem that they

\* Plut., Agis, 14. It seems to be most distinctly implied in this description, which Droysen adopts (p. 389) without scruple, that this was the first occasion on which Agis had been seen at the head of an army out of Laconia.

† This was written before I had seen that Droysen (p. 390) takes the same view of the jealousy of Aratus; but I still scruple to make the same use of this supposition.

‡ Hippomedon himself was in exile not very long after-ward, as appears from Teles in Stob., Flor., ii., p. 82, Gaiss., and possibly he withdrew with his father.

¶ Even if it were certain, as Droysen believes, that Pla-

tarch (Agis, 18) drew this part of his narrative from Phylarchus, and that this historian was rather too fond of exercising his talent (one which the author of *Hellenismus* has displayed in a very eminent degree) for lively, graphic description, and particularly of exhibiting interesting female characters in striking situations, all this would afford no ground for questioning the truth of any essential feature of the narrative, nor does it much invalidate the general authority of Phylarchus.

had been involved in his sentence, for they were immediately put to death without any form of trial. Agesistrata, who suffered last, after having laid her mother's corpse by the side of her son, offered her neck to the cord with the parting wish, *May it but bring good to Sparta*.

The main motive of this atrocious butchery seems to have been policy rather than revenge, as the three bodies were exposed to public view, and the period which ensued was evidently a reign of terror, in which it was dangerous to betray the slightest degree of sympathy with the sufferers. Leonidas continued to govern without a colleague; the first instance of the kind in the annals of Sparta. Archidamus, Agis's brother, had fled to Meassene. The young king's widow, Agiatis, and their infant son, were left to the mercy of their enemies. But as Agiatis was a wealthy heiress, Leonidas thought it advisable to unite her in marriage with his own son Cleomenes, thus at the same time securing the possession of her fortune, and the custody of the rightful heir to the throne of the Proclids. He himself ruled with the aid of a mercenary force; yet, not as an absolute sovereign, but as the head, if not rather as the minister of the oligarchy, which had employed him to crush the project of reform. He was content with a life of ease and luxury, and willing to let his friends grasp and enjoy as they were able. The powerful citizens oppressed the weak, and embezzled the public property with impunity; and their license was the more free from all restraints of fear and shame, as, according to the spirit which commonly prevails in such times, any appeal to the principles of law and justice might expose one who ventured on it to the suspicion of revolutionary views, and ostentatious neglect of the ancient discipline would be regarded as a sign of zealous attachment to the cause of order and good government. All public spirit and sense of national honour seemed to be extinct. The coasts of Laconia were insulted by Illyrian pirates; and when the Ætolians, in the expedition already mentioned, had quietly carried off their rich booty, the loss of so many captives was treated as a happy riddance. The government, conscious that it was hated by its subjects, accounted the weakness of the country as its strength, and dreaded the growth of its population more than a hostile invasion. Nevertheless, complete and secure as the triumph of the oligarchy seemed to be, the last words of Agis were not, even with regard to the success of his cause, altogether an empty boast, and the dying prayer of Agesistrata did not wholly fall to the ground; and the expedient by which Leonidas had thought to strengthen his dynasty, and to perpetuate the ascendancy of his party, proved the occasion of the overthrow of both.

Though Agiatis had been brought into the house of Cleomenes, who was then very young, almost as a captive, and never ceased to abhor his father, a sincere and warm affection soon sprang up between them, which was not weakened by that with which she clung to the memory of her deceased husband, and which she did not attempt to dissemble. On the contrary, her recollections of Agis became a bond of union, as well as a topic of frequent conversation between her and Cleomenes. He listened with a warm interest as she dwelt with enthusi-

asm on the conduct and views of the ill-fated prince, which he had, no doubt, been used to hear grossly calumniated. The contrast between that pure and heroic character and the baseness of his enemies, between his tragical calamity and their insolent prosperity, could not but rouse strong emotions in a generous spirit. These impressions were strengthened by lessons in the stoical philosophy which he received from a disciple of Cleanthes, Sphærus of Obbia,\* who had fixed his residence in Sparta. Philosophy had been little studied there so long as it was practically enforced; but as discipline was relaxed, and manners became more corrupt, the austere doctrines of the most rigid school seem to have come into vogue in the higher circles as a branch of polite learning and a liberal accomplishment, and there is no reason why Leonidas himself may not have derived as much amusement from the stoical speculations of Sphærus, as Antigonus Gonatas from those of his master. But it could scarcely have occurred to him to imagine that his son was capable of treating such things seriously, and that discourses about virtue and happiness might help to mould his character and to fix his destiny. The result, however, was, that the thoughts and images with which the young prince's mind was nourished during the latter part of his father's life, were such as disposed him to tread in the steps of Agis.

In 236 Leonidas died, and Cleomenes succeeded to the throne. He could now better survey his prospects, measure his resources, and decide upon his course of action. His situation appeared to him little better than an irksome and degrading confinement. He found himself utterly without weight or authority at home. The ephors, the organs of the oligarchy, governed the state with unlimited sway, and regarded him as their minister. Their policy, which aimed at nothing beyond the preservation of domestic tranquillity, and tolerated all insults rather than draw the sword, seemed to condemn him to perpetual inaction, as well as Sparta to continual dishonour. His reflections soon led him to the conclusion that the only remedy for the disorders of the state was a revolution such as Agis had meditated, and the only question remaining was, how he might follow the example of Agis with greater safety and fairer hopes of success. It was difficult to find a friend to whom he could safely unbosom his views or wishes. One named Xenares, with whom he had lived on that peculiar footing of intimacy which was sanctioned and regulated by the Spartan institutions, had also been well acquainted with Agis, and from him Cleomenes endeavoured to gather the most exact information as to the steps by which Agis had proceeded towards the execution of his plans, until the insatiable curiosity with which he inquired after these details awakened the suspicions of Xenares, who not only chided him sharply for his imprudence, which seemed to border on phrensy, but, though he kept the dangerous secret, henceforward shunned his society. This was a sufficient warning to Cleomenes to conceal his designs until an opportunity should present itself for some decisive move-

\* Ο Βασσιλειεύς, Plut., Cl., 2. Diogenes Laert., vii., 177, calls him ὁ Βασσιλειεύς.

ment, and he became convinced that such an opportunity was not likely to arrive until he should see himself at the head of an army abroad. During the reign of Demetrius, however, no events occurred to force the Spartan government to engage in military operations, or to call Cleomenes across the frontier; and the only change which took place in his position seems to have been that, by the death of Eurydamidas, the son of Agis, all the functions of royalty were both really and nominally centred in him. With regard to any object which he could have had immediately in view, this event was apparently of very little importance to him. Yet it became the ground of an imputation which has thrown a dark shade over his character: he was reported to have poisoned the child. Pausanias, who has preserved this anecdote, seems to have found it in the Memoirs of Aratus. But even if it rested on better authority than that of a mortal enemy, we might fairly reject it as incredible. It may be admitted that Cleomenes was not scrupulous in the choice of means for the attainment of an object which interested his ambition; but the murder of a child, who had been placed under his protection, and whom he had so little reason to fear, was a villany which seems incongruous with all the known elements of his character, inconsistent with the affectionate intercourse in which he lived to the last with Agiatia, and hardly intelligible on any calculations of policy; for the brother of Agis, the next heir to the throne, and a more formidable rival, was still living at Messene.

After the death of Demetrius affairs took a turn more favourable to the views of Cleomenes, as the progress which the Achæan League then made in Peloponnesus brought it into collision with Sparta.

The beginning of a new reign in Macedonia usually set the neighbouring nations in motion, and a regency afforded a more than ordinary temptation to aggression. Antigonus Doseon was a long time fully occupied with the defence of the kingdom and the establishment of his own authority. He had at once to guard his frontiers against the Dardanians, and to suppress an insurrection in Thessaly, which, however, appears to have enabled the Ætolians to make themselves masters of several Thessalian towns; and even after he had quelled the foreign enemy, and had reduced his rebellious subjects to obedience, he still found himself threatened at home by popular tumults, or by the machinations of a party which refused to acknowledge him as king.\* But when this danger had passed by, and left him at leisure to pursue schemes of conquest, his attention was directed, not towards Greece, but Asia: for we next find him engaged in a maritime expedition to that quarter, the object and results of which we can only collect from the fact that he is said to have subdued Caria. But we learn that, at the period of this expedition, Bœotia was no longer subject to Macedonia, though there was a strong party there which espoused the Macedonian interest, while Thebes, still, it seems, retaining some feeling of her ancient dignity, adhered to the cause of independence. The vessels of Antigonus were stranded, through

an extraordinary ebb of the tide, on the coast of Bœotia: a general alarm was spread that he had come to overrun the country, and Neon, the commander of the Bœotian cavalry, repaired to the spot with all the horse he could muster. He found the Macedonians so embarrassed with their disaster, that he might have attacked them at a great advantage; and he was considered at Thebes as culpable, because, being himself a leader of the Macedonian party, he suffered them to proceed on their voyage without molestation. Antigonus himself felt, and subsequently acknowledged, the obligation under which he was placed by Neon's forbearance.

While, then, his forces were thus employed, Aratus was left at liberty to extend the influence of the Achæan League in the South, and its adversaries could no longer expect support from Macedonia. The Athenians were the first to seize the opportunity of deliverance, and, when they heard of the death of Demetrius, called upon Aratus to aid them in the recovery of their independence. Though it was not his year of office, and he was weakened by a long illness, he immediately caused himself to be conveyed in a litter to Athens. Diogenes, the Macedonian commander in Attica, deemed his own position so insecure, that he entered into negotiation with the Athenians, and at length consented, for 150 talents, of which twenty were contributed by Aratus as a free gift to the city,\* to withdraw all the Macedonian garrisons from Attica. Though Athens did not become a member of the League, this event greatly raised the reputation of the Achæans, and disheartened the adherents of Macedonia throughout Peloponnesus. Ægina, Hermione, and Phlius forthwith entered the League; and soon after Aratus accomplished the object which he had so long desired, and which had cost him so many fruitless efforts, the acquisition of Argos. Aristomachus, seeing himself cut off from all hope of Macedonian succours, and the Achæans gaining ground in Argolis and Arcadia, now listened to the proposals of Aratus, and declared himself willing to join the League on certain conditions.† One of these was, that he should receive fifty talents for the payment of the mercenaries whom he was to disband; and, perhaps, it was also stipulated that he should succeed Aratus at the end of his next year of office. While, however, Aratus was making provision for the performance of his part of the contract, Lydiades, who was at this time chief magistrate of the League, and ill pleased to see so important a business transacted by another, took the negotiation into his own hands, and, persuading Aristomachus that he could not safely trust a man who was the implacable enemy of all tyrants, undertook to conduct the affair himself in the Achæan assembly. But his interference only served to afford a fresh and remarkable illustration of the all-powerful influence of Aratus, as well as of the jealousy with which he guarded it. For he prevailed on the Achæans to reject the treaty when it was proposed by Lydiades, and soon afterward to ratify it, when he was again induced to sanction it with his own concurrence.‡

\* Plut. Ar., 34. Pausan., ii., 8, 6, says a sixth part.

† Flathe (ii., p. 157) supposes that this did not take place until the following year, when Aratus came into of-

\* Justin, xviii., 3.

After so great an accession to the power of the League, Aratus might not unreasonably believe that to extend it over the rest of Peloponnesus would prove the less difficult part of his undertaking; for though, besides Sparta, Messenia, and Elis, and some of the Arcadian commonwealths, still remained independent, it was probable that the example of Sparta would determine the policy of the other states; and the weakness and supineness of her government afforded ground for hope that she would not offer any very obstinate or vigorous resistance to his designs. Such hopes were, perhaps, encouraged by the exiled partisans of Agis; and Cleomenes had not yet given proof of a character or talents such as to render him a formidable antagonist to an experienced statesman. Nevertheless, there were insurmountable obstacles to a voluntary union between Sparta and the League, and it soon became evident that Aratus was not the man to overpower her reluctance by force. The friendly relations which subsisted between the two governments in the reign of Agis IV., had, perhaps, been first interrupted by the invasion which Sparta had suffered from the Ætolians while they were in alliance with the Achæans. But the accession of her inveterate enemy Megalopolis to the League probably produced a far wider alienation, if not open hostility. Then, even if the Spartan pride could have submitted to be placed on a level with the Achæan townships, and to obey the requisitions of an Achæan magistrate, such a connexion with democratical institutions would not have been welcome to a grasping and jealous oligarchy. Thus Cleomenes found the disposition of the ephors and the ruling class perfectly in accordance with his own views on this point; and they believed themselves forced, by regard to their own safety, into the war which he desired as a step towards the overthrow of their power.

The plan of Aratus was, it seems, to make himself master of the Arcadian towns which still kept aloof from the Achæan League, and thus to reduce Sparta to a state of total isolation, in which she might be compelled to accept his terms, as the only means of avoiding continual danger and annoyance; and the Spartan government felt that it was necessary to make a stand against him in Arcadia. The first occasion of direct collision seems to have been afforded by three of the towns, which, as we have seen, had attached themselves to the Ætolian League; Orchomenus, Tegea, and Mantinea. In each of them there appears to have been a strong party adverse to the Ætolian alliance, which was encouraged and aided by Cleomenes and the Spartan government; and all three about the same time renounced that alliance, and entered into the strictest union with Sparta. As this acquisition was made at the expense of the Ætolians, they alone could have reason to complain of it. But, though usually very ready to vindicate

their rights, they not only submitted patiently to the loss of these important places, but formally ceded them to Sparta. The motive of their forbearance was the jealousy they now felt of the progress which the Achæan League was making in Peloponnesus; for as, on the death of Demetrius, the common danger which kept the two powers united had ceased, their alliance was converted into hostile rivalry. It is probable, too, that at this juncture the Ætolians found full employment for their forces in Thessaly, and were on that account the more willing to resign their pretensions to the three towns, so as at once to strengthen the defences of Sparta and to embroil her with the Achæan League. The result fully answered their expectations: We do not know what pretext Aratus alleged for his interference. He might, indeed, claim possession of Mantinea with some colour of right, if it had once belonged to the Achæans; but no such reason was applicable to the case of Tegea or Orchomenus. Yet it appears that before he had any aggression to complain of on the part of the Spartan government, he was preparing to make himself master of both these towns by a nocturnal surprise. Cleomenes, it seems, had received intelligence of his designs; and he now obtained leave of the ephors to make a movement which was judged necessary for the security of Laconia. He was directed to take possession of a place called the Athenæum, in the district of Belbina, or Belemina, which commanded one of the passes leading into Laconia, but was claimed by Megalopolis as belonging to her territory.\* The occupation of this post, which is represented by Polybius as an act of wanton aggression, marks the beginning of the Cleomenean War.

Cleomenes fortified the stronghold on the frontier without interruption, and nearly at the same time Aratus made his attempt to surprise Tegea and Orchomenus. It failed as to both through the cowardice of his partisans within; and Cleomenes insulted his disappointment by a taunting letter, in which he affected to inquire, with friendly concern, after the purpose of his night's march. Aratus, in reply, professed that the object of his expedition had been to prevent the fortification of Belbina; but he had no answer to make when he was requested to explain the use of the torches and scaling-ladders with which he had provided himself. He is said to have laughed at the retort, and to have asked Democrates, one of the Lacedæmonian exiles, what kind of youth this Cleomenes was. Democrates only warned him, "if he had any designs upon Sparta, to hasten them before this game-chicken's spurs were grown." The ephors, wishing to confine themselves to defensive measures, and, if possible, to avoid a war, soon recalled Cleomenes, who advanced into Arcadia with a few hundred men. But Aratus, on his return to Achæa, assembled the council of the League, and represented the seizure of Belbina in such a light as to induce them to declare war against Sparta, and thus to sanction his own very questionable proceedings. The reduction of Caphyæ in Arcadia was the only other achievement by which he signalized his year of office. Aristome-

see again; and this view is certainly, in some degree, confirmed by Plutarch's expression (*Ar.* 35) *ἀναμύχῃ ἔσπευσεν*. Yet it seems difficult to believe that Aratus would have suffered an object which he had so much at heart to be endangered by a long delay. The official year, however, may have been near its close when Lydiades brought the measure forward.

\* *Plutarch*, viii., 35, 4.

ehus, who succeeded him, was anxious to carry the war into Laconia; and perhaps it was the report of his intentions, rather than the success of Aratus at Caphyræ, that alarmed the Spartan government, and led it again to send out Cleomenes, who made himself master of the Arcadian town of Methydrium, and overran a part of Argolis. His forces amounted to less than 5000 men; and Aristomachus now took the field with 20,000 foot and 1000 horse. Yet Aratus, when he was consulted by Aristomachus on his projected expedition, wrote—for he was staying at Athens—to dissuade him from it, and advised him to avoid an engagement with Cleomenes. But as Aristomachus could not reconcile himself to such inactivity, he came to the camp to direct the operations of the campaign by his counsels; and when Cleomenes unexpectedly presented himself and offered battle, near Palantium, he persuaded Aristomachus to decline it, and to retreat before an enemy who did not number a quarter of his force. It is difficult to decide whether timidity or jealousy had the larger share in the motives of Aratus on this occasion. But the result was so flagrantly disgraceful to the Achæan arms, that all his influence was needed to soothe the indignation which it roused against him at home. Lydiades openly accused him, and became his competitor at the next election, which, however, was carried, as usual, in his favour.

For the twelfth time, then, he had the forces of the Achæan League at his disposal. But the events of the next campaign, as the responsibility now rested exclusively with him, only served to exhibit more glaring evidence of his military incapacity, and even to throw a suspicion of much worse failings on his character. He opened it with an expedition into Elis, where, perhaps, he thought himself less in danger from Spartan interference. The Eleans, however, applied to Sparta for aid, which the ephors, however indifferent they might feel, could not decently refuse; especially as the late brilliant success of Cleomenes had begun to revive the old sense of national honour. He had reminded the people of a saying of one of their ancient kings; that Spartans never asked about their enemies, how many, but where they are; and he soon illustrated it by a fresh achievement; for he came up with the Achæan army on its march homeward, near the foot of Mount Lycæum, and gained a complete victory. It was so utterly routed, that for some days Aratus himself was believed to have fallen. But he had escaped from the field, and took advantage of the report to strike one of those clandestine blows to which he owed so much of his fortune and his reputation. Having collected some of his scattered troops, he led them against Mantinea, which, being unprepared to resist this unexpected attack, fell into his hands. He protected the town from pillage, though after its revolt from the Achæan League, Polybius thinks it had no reason to expect such clemency; but, to secure its fidelity for the future, he compelled it to receive an Achæan garrison, and to admit the resident foreigners to the franchise; and it seems probable that he provided for these new citizens at the expense of those who had shown them-

selves most adverse to the Achæan interest. By this conquest he, no doubt, in some degree repaired his credit; but it is not easy to understand all the consequences which Plutarch attributes to it. He represents it as having caused so much discouragement at Sparta, that Cleomenes could no longer obtain leave to prosecute offensive operations against the enemy. It may, however, have furnished the ephors with a pretext, which they before wanted, for restraining his ardour; and it seems that their opposition turned his thoughts with redoubled eagerness towards his long-cherished projects of revolution. Yet the step which he next took is not one which could have been expected as most clearly adapted to forward such a design. We are informed by Plutarch that he invited Archidamus, the exiled brother of Agis, to return to Sparta, thinking, it is said, that with the support of a colleague he should be better able to balance the authority of the ephors. It is certainly difficult to reconcile this with all we know as to the character and schemes of Cleomenes, and hence the sequel naturally suggests suspicion, that his object was not to call in an ally, but to rid himself of a rival; for Archidamus was put to death, according to Plutarch, as soon as he entered the city. Polybius\* would fix the guilt of this transaction entirely on Cleomenes; and relates that the Messenian Nicagoras, the friend and host of Archidamus, who negotiated the treaty with Cleomenes in his behalf, having accompanied him to Sparta, though he was himself allowed to depart unhurt, conceived bitter hatred and thirst of vengeance against Cleomenes, which, as we shall see, he was afterward enabled to gratify. Plutarch, on the other hand, represents it as notorious that the deed was perpetrated by the party which had nothing but vengeance to look for from the family of Agis; but whether with the consent of Cleomenes is a question which, as it was disputed among his contemporaries, must always remain doubtful. The reasons which would incline us to acquit him of the murder of Eurymidas, are, for the most part, equally applicable to this transaction. The treachery and baseness which would be implied in the recall of Archidamus, if it was meant as a snare for his destruction, were apparently quite foreign to the nature of Cleomenes, and no adequate motive is assigned for them in this case; the juncture was not one likely to awaken his jealousy or fear of Archidamus, and it might suggest the thought that he should find the brother of Agis a useful associate in a struggle with the ephors.

He had been endeavouring to form a party at Sparta, and his mother, Cratesiclea, a woman worthy of her son, not only exerted all her influence to promote his designs, but was thought to have given her hand to a second husband, a man of great reputation and influence, named Megistonus, only that she might gain him for her son's cause. But Cleomenes saw that, before he could effect his object, he must be again at the head of an army. The ephors, whether from timidity or distrust, wished to keep him at home; but their cupidity was too strong for their prudence, and they

let themselves be bribed to send him out on a fresh expedition, which proved honourable to Sparta, but fatal to themselves. He first made himself master of the border town of Leuctra, and when Aratus marched to protect Megalopolis, advanced to a place called Ladocea, in the immediate neighbourhood of the city.\* In an engagement which took place almost under the city walls, the Achæan light troops at first gained the advantage over the enemy. But Aratus refused to follow it up, and kept the main body of his army motionless behind the bed of a torrent. Lydiades, having in vain urged him to action, put himself at the head of the cavalry, and by a vigorous charge broke the Spartan left wing and put it to flight, but in the heat of pursuit was entangled in difficult ground, where he was surrounded and slain. After his death the cavalry fled, and, falling back upon the phalanx, threw it into disorder, which was the occasion of its entire defeat. Cleomenes sent the body of Lydiades to Megalopolis, adorned with a purple robe and a garland, while Aratus returned to Achaia amid the murmurs of his troops, to give an account of his conduct in the assembly at Ægium. The patience of the people seemed to be exhausted, and the general feeling was so strong against him, that a decree was passed which declared—if it is accurately reported—that the League would no longer supply him with money or troops for the war, but that he must carry it on, if he would, at his own charge.

It sounds like a resolution to give up the war, but it was probably only meant as a vote of want of confidence in Aratus. Yet the people may, by this time, well have begun to be weary of such a wasteful contest, for which it would have been difficult to assign any worthy object. That the League could make any material progress, in opposition to Sparta, had now, at least, become utterly hopeless: there was clearly more room to apprehend a series of disasters which might endanger its very existence; and though Cleomenes might wish for the continuance of the war, the Spartan government had shown itself strongly inclined to peace, and would, no doubt, gladly have accepted any reasonable terms. The assembly plainly intimidated, by its resolution, that it did not regard the war as undertaken on the part of the League in self-defence, but as an attempt to carry out a project of Aratus, which, whatever might have been its merits, the event had proved to be impracticable.

Yet no one seems to have ventured to call for a discussion of this question, which was the only one of real interest to the people, and the influence of Aratus was too firmly established to be shaken by an expression of passing disapprobation, which was forgotten as soon as the feeling had subsided. He thought, it is said, at first, of throwing up the seal of office, as if he had been injured by the vote of censure, but, on calmer reflection, judged it wiser to retain his dignity, and to attempt to retrieve his honour. Before his year expired he again took the field, and, in the neighbourhood of Orchomenus, defeated a body of Lacedæmonian troops, and Megistonus was among his prisoners, but, it

must be supposed, was soon exchanged or ransomed, as we find him shortly after again at the side of Cleomenes. This slight advantage was of the less moment, as, in the course of a few months, events took place at Sparta which removed the object for which Aratus was striving—the extension of the League over Peloponnesus—farther than ever from his reach.

Cleomenes had been inspired with fresh confidence by his victory at Ladocea, and he now ventured to disclose his projects to Megistonus, and engaged his concurrence, and afterward that of two or three other friends. He felt, and they believed, that, to enable him to restore Sparta's ancient ascendancy in Greece, nothing was wanting but to reform her institutions, and emancipate the royal authority from the control of the ephors. He might well think, having effected so much with such scanty means, in spite of so many hinderances, there was nothing which he might not accomplish when the force of the renovated nation, a really Spartan army, should be placed at his unfettered command. A dream related to him by one of the ephors, who, as he slept in the oracular temple of Pasiphaæ, saw four of their seats removed from their place of session, and heard a voice saying, *This is best for Sparta*, was reported to have confirmed his resolution, and to have quickened his movements. Again he marched into Arcadia, with an army composed in part of mercenaries, and in part of that class of citizens from which he had to expect the most active resistance to his measures. Traversing Arcadia with great rapidity in various directions, he reduced Heræa and Alsæa, victualled Orchomenus, and threatened Mantinea. The Spartans were, at last, so fatigued with long marches and countermarches, that they were glad to be left behind in Arcadia, when he returned for an interval to Laconia.\* On his way homeward, Cleomenes revealed his design to a few trusty followers, and regulated his march so as to reach Sparta about the time when the ephors were sitting down to supper. Eurycles was sent forward to obtain admission into their presence, under pretence of a message from the army, and while they were listening to his report, some of the other conspirators, with a few soldiers, rushed in and fell upon them. Four of the ephors were massacred: the fifth, named Agesilaus, having been left among them apparently lifeless, afterward recovered strength enough to crawl into an adjacent sanctuary. About ten other persons lost their lives at the same time in defence of the ephors. No other blood was shed, and Agesilaus himself was spared, when he came out of his place of shelter the next morning. All who would, were allowed to leave the city during the night, and it is probable that many took advantage of this permission.

At daybreak, Cleomenes summoned an assembly of the people. Two indications of the recent revolution met their view in the market-

\* Droysen (489) conceives that the danger which threatened Orchomenus was the real motive of the expedition of Cleomenes, and that some machinations of the Spartan oligarchy, which it was encouraged to undertake by his absence, and the captivity of Megistonus, and to which the ephors lent their aid, were the immediate cause which induced him to strike the decisive blow. I cannot perceive the slightest appearance of necessity for such an explanation of his conduct.

\* Τὴν Ἀσπίδα καλούμενα, Polybius, ii., 51, and Paus., viii., 44, 1. Plutarch, Cleom., 6.



place: a table was exhibited containing the names of eighty citizens who were enjoined to save the country, and four of the seats of the ephors were removed, the fifth being left to be occupied by Cleomenes.\* He now came forward to vindicate his conduct, and to explain his intentions. He went back, it appears, to the origin of the ephoralty, with a view to show that the power claimed by the ephors in later times had been acquired through usurpation. The office itself, he asserted, was unknown to the primitive Constitution, in which the supreme authority was vested in the kings and the gerusia; and it was only after the Messenian war that the kings had begun to appoint officers, under the title of ephors, to discharge some of their functions in their absence. These viceregents and servants of the kings had, in course of time, erected themselves into a distinct, independent, and permanent tribunal, and had enlarged their jurisdiction by a series of encroachments, until it overlaid all the other magistracies in the state. The memory of the ephor Asteropus, who had introduced some of the most important of these innovations, was comparatively recent. It was only by degrees that the ephors had assumed the right of summoning the kings before them; that it had not been always recognised, appeared from the usage of modern times, according to which the kings were only bound to attend on the third summons. Still, this power, unconstitutional and exorbitant as it was, might, for the sake of tranquillity, have been tolerated, if it had been exercised with moderation, and with some regard to the public good; but when it was abused, as it had lately been, by ephors who took upon them to banish their kings, and to put them to death without trial, and who established a system of terror to prevent measures of reform, which were indispensably necessary for the honour and well-being of Sparta,† it could be endured no longer. Happy should he have thought himself if the evils under which the country groaned—the luxury and extortion, and the inequality of fortunes, which was the source of all the rest—could have been corrected by any milder remedy; but the use of force, in extreme cases, had been sanctioned by the example of Lycurgus himself, the more as he was but a private person when he appealed to arms against King Charilaus. It had now become necessary to resort to the like means to overpower the resistance of the adversaries of reform; but no needless violence had been employed, no greater severity exercised than the public safety required. He then proceeded to unfold his plan, which, in its leading features, was the same as had been proposed by Agis. All debts were to be cancelled; so that the creditors, whose securities had been destroyed, seem to have been

allowed to revive their claims; the land was to be equally divided, and a new roll of citizens formed, to include the foreigners who, on strict examination, should be found worthy of the franchise. When the honour of Sparta should have been intrusted to a sufficient number of armed citizens, they would not again see her territory insulted by Illyrian or Ætolian inroads.\*

The cancelling of the debts was, perhaps, considered only as the enforcement of the law passed by Agis. The division of the lands was, it seems, made to wear the appearance of a voluntary sacrifice on the part of those who possessed more than the legal measure. Cleomenes himself set the example by the surrender of his own patrimony, and this, it is said, was followed first by Megistoneus and his other friends, and afterward by all the other citizens. In the distribution, a portion was allotted to each of the exiles; and Cleomenes announced that they would all be permitted to return when tranquillity should have been firmly established. After the enrolment was completed, the Spartan infantry amounted to 6000 men; and Cleomenes introduced some changes in its weapons and armour, in particular by the substitution of the sarissa for the old Grecian spear, which brought it nearer to the character of the Macedonian phalanx. At the same time he diligently applied himself to restore the ancient system of education and discipline, a task in which he is said to have received much assistance from the philosopher Sphærus; a proof that he did not rigorously confine himself to the traditional details, but took the opportunity to effect many seasonable improvements. The abolition of the ephoralty was not the only innovation which Cleomenes made in the Constitution. It appears that he likewise, in some way, altered the character or contracted the powers of the gerusia; and he is said to have changed its name, and to have substituted a description referring to the subdivisions of the tribes which the council was supposed to represent.† But the fact so stated is not easily explained; for he evidently studied to preserve the forms of antiquity, whenever they did not thwart his purposes; and it rests on the authority of a writer who was very liable to error. Another of his measures was certainly an infringement of the Constitution, though it was one of which the oligarchy, which, after the murder of Agis, had permitted one king to reign without a colleague,

\* An allusion which seems plainly to indicate that the period of the Ætolian invasion was not so long passed as Droysen represents.

† Paus., ii., 9, 1, τὸ κράτος τῆς γερουσίας καταλύσας παρρησίους τῷ λόγῳ κατέστησαν αὐτ' αὐτῶν. The meaning of Pausanias seems to be as stated in the text, and so it was understood by Mueller (Dor., ii., p. 132, Engl. tr., 2d ed.), who says, "Cleomenes instituted a college of παρρησίους in the place of the gerusia." But in the note he seems to adopt Boeckh's interpretation (Corp. Insc., i., p. 605), who observes on the words of Paus., "hoc est, vim Senatus resolvit Cleomenes non senatum ipsum;" and has shown (p. 610) that in later times, at least, the παρρησίους existed together with the gerusia, and that, even after the restoration of the ephoralty, the chief of the παρρησίους continued to give his name to the year; but it is quite another question whether this is what Pausanias meant to say. Droysen (ii., 492) seems to suppose that Cleomenes abolished the name of the gerusia, and nominally substituted the παρρησίους in their room: that is, with powers really inferior to those of the gerusia; but it seems more probable that τῷ λόγῳ is to be referred to παρρησίους.

\* Droysen (491) thinks that by this Cleomenes meant to intimate that he assumed all the powers which had been exercised by the ephors. It would be more important if we could ascertain that he actually did so. He clearly professed to resume all those branches of the royal prerogative which the ephors had usurped; but it seems that he also charged them with the exercise of a tyrannical power, which had never been claimed by the kings themselves (ῥητορία ἐπιτίμω τὴν κάρτιον καταλύοντας ἀρχήν. Plut., Cle., 10).

† Here, if Droysen's conjecture were well founded, should have been some allusion to the later attempts of the oligarchy.

had no right to complain. Since the sons of Aristodemus shared the royal office between them, there had never been two kings of the same house at a time. Cleomenes now filled the vacant throne of the Proclids with his brother Euclides. If this proceeding was not to be justified by the legend which traced the origin of the two royal houses to one ancestor, it was, at least, a proof that Cleomenes did not aim at despotic power, and it was more in harmony, both with that ancient precedent, and with the spirit of the Constitution, than the undivided monarchy, in which the enemies of reform had so long acquiesced.

Such was the revolution which was represented by Polybius,\* and by other writers, both ancient and modern, as a subversion of the hereditary form of government, and a transformation of the legitimate royalty into what the Greeks called a tyranny. By others it has been regarded as a salutary and temperate reform, conducted with great moderation on constitutional principles, and preserving as much both of the substance and the form of the national institutions as was consistent with the main end, the security and welfare of the state. It can hardly be denied that the facts afford some colour to each of these opinions; the case is one which, like all political changes not effected by strictly legal means, presents an ambiguous aspect; but the view taken by Polybius, whose prejudices deprive him of all authority on this question, appears to be the more narrow and superficial, and to exhibit least of the real character of the transaction, while it is grossly unjust so far as it involves any judgment on the motives and intentions of Cleomenes. The essence of *tyranny*, in the Greek sense, is the usurpation of arbitrary power in a state which had been previously governed by law; and it must be admitted, on the one hand, not only that the means by which Cleomenes compassed his ends were violent and illegal, but, also, that the power which he acquired by the revolution was, in one point of view, very nearly absolute; as, after he had abolished the ephoralty, placed his brother on the throne, and formed an army of citizens devoted to his interest, there was no one in Sparta who could counteract his will. But, on the other hand, it must be considered, that however little foundation there may have been in authentic records or tradition for his assertions as to the origin of the ephoralty, and though the office was probably, in some form or other, as old as the Dorian conquest, still, in later times, it had unquestionably assumed a new character and place, and had usurped prerogatives unknown to the early Constitution, which rendered it an irresistible engine of an oppressive and baneful oligarchical domination. Whether it would have been possible to retain the office and to reduce its authority within moderate bounds, may be doubtful, but Cleomenes had good grounds for the view which he took of it,

\* ii., 47, 3. Paus., viii., 27, 16, *ἐκ βασιλείας μεταρτήσαν ἐξ τυραννίδος ὁ Κλεομένης τὴν πολιτείαν*. Brückner has examined the question in an article in Zimmermann's *Zeitschrift*, 1837 No. 151, *On the Reforms of Agis and Cleomenes*. But the conclusion at which he arrives seems hardly worth the pains he has taken to establish it. He finds that the judgment of Polybius, though partial, was not without foundation in fact, inasmuch as the means by which Cleomenes compassed his ends were illegal.

as an excrescence which must be amputated before the state could be restored to a healthy condition. Nor is there any reason for questioning the sincerity of his conviction, that he was merely reviving the royalty of the primitive ages in the peculiar form which it had assumed at Sparta, exempt, indeed, from the restraint to which it had been so long subjected by the growth of the power which had gradually encroached upon its rights, but yet not an unlimited sovereignty. He ruled over a free and willing people, in which there was only one disaffected party, the oligarchy which he had overthrown. They, indeed, pretending to consider themselves as the state, might consistently treat him as a tyrant, for they submitted to him only through fear. But his main strength lay in his Spartan phalanx, the citizens who composed the popular assembly, and over this body he could possess no other dominion than the legitimate influence which he derived from their gratitude, admiration, and confidence. As he had thrown his private wealth into the common stock, so in his person and whole manner of living, both in the camp and at home, by a simplicity and frugality which were perfectly free from all tinge of affectation, he presented a model of a Spartan king, only distinguished from the best of the old times by the advantages which he may have gained from his philosophical education.

The tidings of the revolution at Sparta were received by Aratus and his friends with a mixture of hope and alarm. They hoped that it might prove the beginning of a long series of civil commotions, which might keep Cleomenes occupied at home. On the other hand, the cancelling of debts and repartition of the soil excited their fears, lest the contagion of this pernicious example should reach the multitude in the Achaean towns, and impel them to like enterprises, or incline them to seek alliance with Sparta. Aratus owed a great part of his reputation to the prudent forbearance with which he had respected the rights of property at Sicyon after the return of the exiles. The revolutionary measures of Cleomenes were utterly repugnant to his nature and his principles; and there can be little doubt that they did not merely serve as a pretext for that hostility to Sparta which he carried to such a fatal extreme, but really contributed to heighten it. His sympathies were all on the side of the defeated oligarchy: in his eyes the Spartan king was a demagogue, who had made himself a tyrant; as it was in these colours that his character came down to Polybius.

The winter, including the beginning of 224, had probably been occupied at Sparta with the remodelling of the state. Early in the spring, not long before Hyperbatus, the successor of Aratus, went out of office, Cleomenes, anxious to dash all hopes which his enemies might have built on the supposed continuance of internal disorders of Sparta, and to prove that the recent changes had not tended to abate the ardour or to relax the discipline of his troops,\* invaded the territory of Megalopolis, where he inflicted much damage, and collected a great booty. The Megalopolitans, who had suffered

\* Plut., Cleom. 12. But this does not imply, as Schürmann (p. 113) represents, that the expedition had no other object.

severe losses in the preceding campaigns, offered no resistance, and no succours came from Achaia, where the government felt itself insecure, and the people had no more heart for the war. To encourage his partisans by a signal display of his superiority in the field, Cleomenes, having found a company of players on their road from Messene, caused a temporary theatre to be erected, and entertained his army with a dramatic exhibition; though, in general, his camp was distinguished by the absence of all frivolous and enervating amusements, while every other in Greece, no less than in Macedonia or Asia, was followed by a train of musicians and dancers, jugglers and buffoons. He accustomed his soldiers to fill up the intervals of their martial exercises with conversation seasoned with Laconic pleasantry; as at his own table he provided no other recreation for his guests.

His commanding attitude seems to have produced the effect which he desired at Mantinea. There the party adverse to the Achæan connexion invited him to recover possession of the town; and in concert with them he surprised it in the night, and overpowered the Achæan garrison, which was almost all put to the sword. To Polybius, who chooses to overlook the distinction of parties in this affair, the conduct of the Mantineans appears to be marked by the foulest treachery and ingratitude;\* but those of them who hailed Cleomenes as the restorer of their laws and Constitution could not be conscious of any great obligation to the Achæans. After a few hours' rest he set out again for Tegea, and by a circuitous march through the west of Arcadia and Elis, penetrated into Achaia. Hyperbatus, who was directed in all his movements by Aratus, took up his position, with the largest force he could muster, at a place called Hecatombæon, near the western extremity of the country, and Cleomenes—rashly, as it was thought—placed himself between the town of Dyme and the enemy's camp. But his object was to force a battle, and he gained a complete victory. Its immediate fruit was the reduction of a place called Langon,† which he restored to the Eleans; but, in the mean while, he opened a negotiation with the Achæan League, which promised much more important advantages. It is not quite clear whether he had already, before the battle, made overtures to the Achæan government, which had been rejected through the influence of Aratus, but his aim must have been long well understood. It seems to have been almost universally expected, and, perhaps, very generally desired, that all the Peloponnesian states should be united in one body; the only question was, whether the union was to take place under Achæan or under Spartan supremacy; whether Sparta was to be annexed to the Achæan League, or the Achæan League to Sparta. The

success of Cleomenes had now made it evident that, if he entered the League, it must be on his own terms. Those which he offered after the battle appear to have been moderate, though we have no information as to the details. It is not clear on what footing Sparta was to be placed with regard to the League; but, for himself, Cleomenes demanded to be acknowledged as its chief. Plutarch speaks of this as if it were to have been a mere title of honour, in return for which he held out the prospect of many solid advantages to the Achæans.\* But there can be no doubt that it implied nothing less than that the forces of the League should be placed at his disposal, with powers as large as those which had been exercised by Aratus, and without even the same degree of responsibility. The national feeling of the Achæan race might be wounded by such a concession to a Dorian prince. But there was no great danger lest a Spartan king should abuse it, either by unnecessary wars undertaken to gratify his own ambition, or by wanton aggression on public or individual liberty. The coalition or alliance with Sparta, at least, promised an immediate cessation of that harassing petty warfare in which the strength of the League had been so long wasted; and if Cleomenes was to be feared as a protector, he was certainly not less formidable as an enemy. This view of the question prevailed in the Achæan council. The Achæan ministers were instructed to accept the king's proposals, to conclude a truce with him, and to invite him to attend an assembly to be held near Argos, in which the treaty was to be ratified. But an illness, the effect of excessive fatigue and an imprudent draught of water, compelled him to postpone his journey to Argos, and to return for a time to Sparta. He, however, so fully relied on the promises he had received, that, as one of the stipulations of the convention was the release of his prisoners, he set the principal of them at liberty forthwith. This accidental delay was, apparently, the occasion of great calamities. It afforded time to Aratus for intrigues, by which he was enabled to put an end to all prospects of peace.

Aratus, when he began the war, probably considered Sparta as an easy conquest. He was not prepared to find a formidable antagonist in the young king, and could not expect that the people which had tamely submitted to the inroads of the Illyrians and Ætolians would offer any effectual resistance to the arms of the Achæan League. But he had been very soon undeceived; and he had long ago foreboded such a crisis as had now arrived, and had pondered the course he should take when the emergency arose. The resolution which he finally adopted was one which even now we cannot read of for the first time without the same kind of painful surprise which we feel when a man whom we have hitherto esteemed has committed a dishonourable action. It was no other than at once to undo the great work of his public life, to call the king of Macedonia into Peloponnesus, as an ally and protector against Cleomenes. And this resolution he formed confessedly with a clear insight into the consequences which were likely to result from this step, a full view of the danger with which it

\* *ii.*, 58.

† *Plut.*, *Cleom.*, 14, Ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ πᾶν ἔκρητο.

† *Plut.*, *Cleom.*, 14, ἐκράδαν καὶ Ἀδύων. Droysen (*p.* 505), with Manso (*iii.*, 1, *p.* 318) and Schömann (*p.* 1v.), supposes this to be a mistake, and that the place was Læcon, in the Acropolis of Elis; and he would account for this operation by the conjecture that Cleomenes designed to afford time for the revolutionary movement in the Achæan towns to develop itself. Yet one would think that his presence in Achaia must have been more likely to accelerate the progress of this movement.

threatened the liberties of Greece. The struggle which this determination cost him may be, in some measure, estimated by the perplexity which Polybius betrays in his attempt to defend it. The plea which Aratus set up in his memoirs, and which is urged by the historian, his apologist and admirer, is necessity. But it is admitted that he had reconciled himself to the thought, had harboured the purpose, before the necessity existed; and this supposed necessity was, after all, only the creature of his own will; it was but his want of self-command, his incapacity for a great sacrifice, which led him to lay down as a first principle of action, inviolable as the laws of nature, that Cleomenes must be resisted to the last, and that any alternative was to be preferred to compliance with his demands. We can, indeed, very easily conceive how deeply mortifying such compliance would have been to Aratus; how much it would have cost him to retire from public life, baffled and humbled, and from the shade of his forced seclusion to witness the triumph of his young rival. These are considerations which may well dispose us, with Plutarch, to view his conduct with more of pity than of indignation, as an example of ordinary human weakness; but they must be discarded when an attempt is made to vindicate his policy on the ground taken by Polybius, as not unworthy of a patriotic statesman. We can, then, only inquire whether the ambition of Cleomenes threatened Greece, or even the Achæan League, with any dangers so fearful as were to be apprehended from the restoration of Macedonian ascendancy; and this is a question on which Aratus can hardly have been so far blinded by passion as to mistake the truth.

Nothing is more remarkable, in the account given by Polybius of the steps by which Aratus was led to the practical result of his deliberations, than the place assigned to the Ætolians. The importance of the figure which they make in the historian's vindication of his hero, stands in most strange and suspicious contrast to the paucity and insignificance of the actions which he attributes to them during the same period. According to this statement, a coalition between the Ætolians and Spartans was the original cause of the war, and first induced Aratus to believe that the safety of the Achæan League was endangered by the enterprises of Cleomenes. Yet the only proof he alleges of the existence of such a confederacy is, that the Ætolians surrendered their claims to the three Arcadian towns which had abandoned their alliance, and had connected themselves with Sparta; and it is not pretended that they ever sent a single man into Peloponnesus to the aid of Cleomenes, or that they in any way interposed in his behalf otherwise than by one demonstration, to be mentioned in the sequel, which came very late, and was totally useless. Another statement, equally questionable, and which proves as little, is, that the Ætolians opened a negotiation with Antigonus Doson in the hope of engaging him in a war against the Achæan League, with a view to the partition of its territory. Whatever their projects may have been, not only were these never realized, but the only part which they actually took in the war was a declaration of hostile intentions towards Macedonia. It must, therefore, be pro-

nounced an utterly hollow pretext, when we are informed by Polybius that fear of the Ætolians drove Aratus to the thought of an alliance with Antigonus.

The precise juncture when Aratus took the first step towards the execution of his design is not distinctly marked in the narrative of Polybius; but it seems to have been subsequent to the opening of the campaign in which Cleomenes first took the field after the revolution at Sparta. It was probably while he was ravaging the territory of Megalopolis without resistance that Aratus concerted a plan with two of its citizens, Nicophanes and Cercidas, his old friends, for an embassy to Macedonia, to sound Antigonus. At his suggestion they were appointed envoys to the Achæan council, and having obtained its permission, proceeded to the Macedonian court. They received their instructions from Aratus, who furnished them with the arguments which he judged best adapted to make an impression on Antigonus. The substance of them has been preserved by Polybius; and none, certainly, could have been devised better suited to the purpose of convincing and persuading the king. It is only surprising that Aratus, while he suggested them, should not have felt that they were so many reasons which ought to have deterred him, as a patriotic Greek, from the prosecution of his attempt. The envoys were to represent the danger which was impending over the Achæan League from the insatiable ambition of the Ætolians and Cleomenes, who were banded against it, and to point out that if the confederates were allowed to overpower the League, and Cleomenes become master of Peloponnesus, they would soon extend their conquests into northern Greece, and must at length come into mortal conflict with Macedonia. It was for the king to consider whether it suited his interest better to fight his battle with Cleomenes for the command of Greece in Peloponnesus, with the Achæans and Boeotians on his side, or to stake his kingdom on the issue of a contest against the united forces of Ætolia and Boeotia, the Achæans and the Lacedæmonians, in Thessaly. It was, indeed, a simple calculation; and when the envoys added, that if the Ætolians remained quiet, as they affected to do then, the Achæans would hold out as long as they could without assistance, but if fortune proved adverse, or the Ætolians took part against them, they would then call upon him for timely succour, Antigonus had nothing more to wish than that they might soon find themselves compelled to implore his protection. Nothing, however, could be more agreeable to him than that they should previously waste their own and their enemy's strength, since they would then be the more willing to accept his terms. Indeed, as if to remove all doubt on this head, Aratus expressly undertook to provide the amplest securities, and the most solid proofs he could desire of gratitude for his favours.

That Antigonus received these proposals with joy, and dismissed the envoys with the warmest assurances of his good will, hardly needs to be related. He sent a letter with them, addressed to the people of Megalopolis, in which he promised, if it was also the wish of the Achæans, to march to their aid. The report

which they made on their return of the king's favourable disposition, made such an impression at Megalopolis, where, ever since the time of Philip, there had always been a strong friendly feeling towards Macedonia, that they were immediately commissioned to repair to the Achæan assembly, and to call upon the League to solicit the Macedonian succours without delay. Aratus, we are told, was delighted to learn that Antigonus was willing to forget the injury which his house had sustained in the loss of the Acrocorinthus, and no less pleased that the ardour of the Megalopolitans released him from the responsibility of an experiment which he felt to be extremely hazardous; no blame could now be attached to him if it should happen that Antigonus crushed the liberty which he was invited to protect. He had only to moderate their impatience, while he commended their zeal; and he exhorted the people to persevere as long as they could in their unassisted exertions, and only if fortune frowned upon them to betake themselves to the promised aid.

Though Aratus had been able to obtain the sanction of the Achæan council for this negotiation, it is not to be supposed that the measure was generally popular in Achaia. The events which followed prove that it was carried by a comparatively small though powerful party, chiefly through the influence of Megalopolis, and the regard which was felt to be due to her services and sacrifices in the common cause. Not only was there a strong inclination in favour of Cleomenes among the lower classes, who hoped, under his protection, to obtain release from their debts, and a new agrarian law, but many of the leading men dreaded Macedonian intervention, were impatient of the preponderance of Aratus, and willing to acquiesce in the supremacy of Sparta. According to a usage which had never before been interrupted since Aratus first filled the office of general, he should have succeeded Hyperbatas. But he solemnly declined it, and the election fell on Timoxenus. According to Plutarch, he wished it to be believed that his refusal was the effect of the resentment he retained for the affront he had suffered after his defeat at Ladocea, but his real motive was well known to be his despondency as to the prospects of the League, produced by the battle of Hecatombeum. But even if we must infer from this that Aratus himself alleged the pretext mentioned by Plutarch, it would still be probable that he meant to intimate his conviction that the resources of the League were no longer sufficient to carry on the struggle, and that the time had come when it was necessary to claim the promised aid of Antigonus. But though he exerted the most strenuous efforts to counteract the overtures of Cleomenes, he could not prevent the conclusion of the preliminaries already related; and if Cleomenes had been able immediately to attend the assembly at Argos, it is probable that he would have found it willing to accede to his terms. But during the interval in which he was detained at home by his illness, Aratus appears to have recovered his ascendancy, and found means to avert the pacification which threatened his interests. He immediately sent his own son, the younger Aratus, to Antigonus, apparently without any other authority, to con-

clude the negotiation which had been opened by the Megalopolitan envoys. All was now adjusted between them except one point, which it was still necessary to leave open for some time longer. Antigonus required the restitution of the Acrocorinthus, as the price of his assistance; and Aratus himself was quite willing to consent to this condition; but he could not undertake that even his influence would prevail on the Achæans to surrender the Corinthians, whom they had encouraged to revolt from Macedonia, into the hands of their old masters. It was therefore arranged that, while Aratus waited for an opportunity of accomplishing this object, Antigonus should complete his preparations, so as to be in readiness to begin his march at the first summons. All that remained was to bring about a rupture with Sparta, and this he effected by a stroke of policy, in which he was aided by the Spartan king's impetuous temper. When Cleomenes had recovered from his illness, he set out for Argos to meet the Achæan assembly, which had been convened there according to the agreement. But on his road he received a message requesting him to leave his troops behind him, and to come alone, or, according to another account, with a small train;\* hostages were offered for his security.† The message seems to have been so contrived, as at once to betray distrust and to awaken suspicions of treachery. Cleomenes took fire at the affront, sent a letter to the assembly, containing bitter invectives against Aratus, who replied in a similar strain, and despatched a herald to Ægium with a declaration of war, which he followed up by the invasion of Achaia, where he surprised Pellene. Several towns in the adjacent part of Arcadia submitted to him without resistance, and the government received intelligence which led it to apprehend that, even in Sicyon and Corinth, he had partisans who were plotting to deliver those cities into his power. To suppress this attempt, it withdrew the cavalry and mercenaries from Argos, at the time when the Nemean games were about to be celebrated there.‡ Cleomenes took advantage of their absence to march suddenly upon Argos, where he surprised the quarter contiguous to the citadel in the night, and the appearance of his army amid the confusion of the festival created such consternation, that the city immediately capitulated, entered into alliance with Sparta, acknowledging Cleomenes as its chief, gave twenty hostages for its fidelity, and received a Lacedæmonian garrison. Cleomenes was unfortunately induced, by the assurances of Megistoneus, to dispense with the precaution of banishing some of the citizens who were notoriously adverse to the new order of things. Aristomachus, who had joined the Achæan League with reluctance, and probably entertained friendly feelings towards Aratus, declared himself on the side of Sparta. But perhaps the surrender may have been hastened chiefly by the democratical party, which at Argos, as elsewhere, desired a change

\* Plut. Ar., 39. I cannot perceive the absurdity which Droysen finds in this statement (307, n. 42).

† According to Plut., Cleom., 17, as many as 300: a number suspiciously large. It is that of the followers whom, according to the other statement, he was to be allowed to bring with him.

‡ February, B.C. 223.

in the distribution of property, like that which had taken place at Sparta, and hoped to effect it with the countenance of Cleomenes.\* The submission, however, of the city, which, for so many ages, had been Sparta's most formidable rival, added much to the reputation of his arms, and it was soon followed by that of all the other towns of the Argolic peninsula. Aratus hoped to arrest the progress of the defection, which was spreading with alarming rapidity among the members of the League, by rigorous measures. He seems to have accompanied the troops which were sent from Argos to Sicyon, armed with unlimited authority to proceed against the persons suspected of treasonable correspondence with Cleomenes, and he put many of them to death. He then proceeded to institute a like investigation at Corinth; but here the disaffection to the Achaean government was so general, and the people so much exasperated against him, that when intelligence arrived of the events which had taken place at Argos, an attempt was made to seize him, which he only eluded by extraordinary presence of mind. Being alarmed in time by their angry cries and threatening gestures, as he was about to enter the theatre in which they were assembled, he calmly bade them wait until he had given his horse in charge to some one, and so reaching the gate, after a hasty warning to the commander of the citadel, rode away, soon hotly pursued, and with very few companions, to Sicyon.† The Corinthians immediately sent a deputation to surrender their city to Cleomenes, whom it scarcely consoled for the escape of Aratus. But as soon as he had completed the conquest of Argolis, he marched to Corinth, and proceeded to blockade the Acrocorinthus.

An assembly was held soon after at Sicyon, though very thinly attended, in which Aratus was created strategus autocrator, an extraordinary office previously unknown to the Achaean Constitution, which must have been nearly equivalent to the Roman dictatorship. It was apparently a formal ratification, or prolongation, of the irresponsible authority which he had received or assumed for the purpose of keeping down the disaffected party. But now, perhaps for the first time, a guard was formed by the citizens for the protection of his person. It was, apparently, difficult to approach more closely to the position of a tyrant, or to show that the name with which he affected to brand Cleomenes was less applicable to himself. Cleomenes for a time abstained from farther hostilities, and tried every expedient to conciliate his rival, and to induce him to cede the possession of the Acrocorinthus. He carefully preserved the property of Aratus at Corinth untouched, while he sent his uncle Megistonus, and a Messenian named Triplylus,‡ or Tritymallus,§ successively, to negotiate with him. They were instructed to offer him a pension of twelve talents—double the amount of that which he received from Ptolemy—and even to propose that the garrison of the Acrocorinthus

should be composed in part only of Spartans, and partly of Achaian troops. But as to the claim of the supreme dignity and command, no concession was made on the part of Cleomenes; and this was probably the demand most offensive to Aratus, and the main obstacle which rendered the negotiation fruitless. He remained inflexible, covering his refusal with the vague pretext, "that circumstances were not in his power, but, rather, he in the power of circumstances," which might, indeed, be true in the sense that he had gone too far to recede. Such language at length convinced Cleomenes that he had nothing to expect from overtures of peace. He indignantly took the field, ravaged the territory of Sicyon, and encamped before its walls. No doubt could now be left in the mind of Aratus as to the course which he would pursue. All his hopes were henceforth centred in Antigonus. But still, he did not venture to take the final irrevocable step, to engage for the admission of a Macedonian garrison into the Acrocorinthus, without a vote of the Achaean assembly; and it seems to have been for the purpose of showing that he was willing to try all other resources, before he threw himself on Macedonian protection, that he sent envoys to solicit succour from the Ætolians and from Athens.\* The embassy to Ætolia, Polybius passes over in silence; but it is not more at variance with the tenour of his argument in vindication of Aratus than other facts which he relates. It was, as must have been foreseen, unsuccessful; and the Ætolians might consistently decline to violate the neutrality which they had hitherto observed in the contest between Sparta and the Achæans. The Athenians, whose assistance would have been utterly unavailing, were, it is said, not unmindful of their obligations to Aratus; but were restrained by Euclides and Micio, the two leading orators of the time, from a display of gratitude which would have been alike useless and impolitic.†

While Cleomenes lay with his army before Sicyon, an assembly was held at Ægium, which Aratus was summoned to attend.‡ The journey exposed him to great risk of falling into the enemy's hands; and Plutarch, drawing, no doubt, from his memoirs, represents the women and children at Sicyon as endeavouring to detain him by the most moving entreaties; but he made his way, accompanied by his son and ten friends, through the Spartan lines to the coast, where he embarked and arrived safely at Ægium. The business for which the assembly was convened is not distinctly stated. It seems probable that the election of the ordinary general had already taken place. Timoxenus, a steady partisan of Aratus, was again in office; but perhaps one object of the assembly was to confirm the extraordinary authority with which Aratus had been invested at Sicyon. The chief subject of deliberation, however, was undoubtedly the negotiation with Antigonus; and Aratus now found the assembly willing to take the last step. The scruples

\* Plut., Cleom., 20.

† So Plutarch (Ar., 40), and, with slight variations, Cleom., 19. Polybius (ii., 52) only says that the Corinthians required the Achæans and Aratus to quit the city. Polybius speaks as if Aratus had been at this time ordinary *στρατηγός* (*Ἀρχὴν στρατῶν*) only.

‡ Plut., Ar., 41.

§ Plut., Cleom., 12.

\* Plut., Ar., 41.

† Ibid. Pausanias (ii., 9, 4) writes the names Euryclides and Micion. Lucas (p. 89) says that the Athenians were diverted from their purpose by the *Lacedæmonians* under Euclides, as if he had read in Plutarch of *εὐκλιδὲς ἄνδρα*.

‡ Plut., Ar., 41.

of honour by which he himself had hitherto been restrained, had been removed by the revolt of the Corinthians; and his influence seems to have gained strength in proportion as the League had shrunk within its original limits. A decree was passed that Antigonos should be put in possession of the Acrocorinthus; and the son of Aratus and his Sicyonian friends, who accompanied him to Ægium, were sent to conclude the treaty, to urge the king to begin his march, and to remain with him as hostages until the proposed security should be delivered into his hands. The decree, when it became known at Corinth, excited vehement indignation there: the populace pillaged the house of Aratus, and the assembly of the people bestowed it on Cleomenes. Cleomenes immediately withdrew his forces from the neighbourhood of Sicyon, after having ravaged its territory,\* and began to fortify the pass between the Acrocorinthus and the part of the Onian range which guards the southeast extremity of the Isthmus.†

Antigonos had collected his forces, and was waiting on his southern frontier for the summons to march: as soon as he received the embassy, he sent to prepare the Achæans for his coming, and set out for the Isthmus. The only interruption he found on his road was interposed by the Ætolians, who threatened to stop him if he should attempt to pass through Thermopylæ. They might, perhaps, have annoyed him more seriously if they had not thus put him on his guard; but the only effect of their threat was a slight inconvenience and delay. He transported his army across the Maliac Gulf into Eubœa, and thence again to the main land, so as to avoid the pass. The Ætolians made no other demonstration of hostility, and sent no aid to Cleomenes. Antigonos found the Isthmus so strongly guarded that he at once renounced all hope of forcing his way through the Spartan intrenchments, and lay for some time encamped at the foot of Mount Geranea, revolving various projects for effecting his entrance into the peninsula at some other point. In the mean while Aratus, accompanied by the Demiurges, crossed over to Pegæ, at the northwest corner of the Corinthian Gulf, and had his first interview with Antigonos. He is said to have felt some uneasiness as to his reception; but he was soon reassured by the king's affability and marked attention to himself, and was confirmed in the conviction which had first encouraged him to look towards Macedonia, that princes make their interest, not their feelings, the measure both of their enmity and their friendship: his recent services to Antigonos might well be allowed to outweigh the old injury done to the royal house. But it seemed, at first, as if their schemes would be disconcerted by the foresight and vigilance of Cleomenes. Antigonos made an attempt in the night to turn his lines on the side of Lecheum, but was repulsed with some loss. He then began to entertain a project of transporting his troops to the coast of Sicyon, from the headland of Heræum, the nearest

point of the Isthmus. But it would probably have been difficult to escape observation, and the landing at so short a distance from the enemy's camp would have exposed him to great danger, and transports for so large a force were not easily found. On the other hand, he foresaw that the deficiency of supplies would not permit him to remain long in his present position. But he was unexpectedly relieved from his perplexity by an opportune revolution which broke out in Argos, and effected a diversion in his favour.

The people, or the democratical party at Argos, had expected, as we have seen, that the ascendancy of the Spartan interest would be attended with measures of confiscation which would benefit them at the expense of the opulent. But these hopes were soon discovered to be fallacious. Cleomenes did not mean to assume the character of a demagogue in foreign cities, or to apply the same violent remedy which he had deemed necessary for the disorders of Sparta, to all other cases. The disappointment excited general discontent; and a man named Aristoteles, encouraged by the vicinity of the Macedonians, and apparently in concert with Aratus, roused the multitude to insurrection, and began an attack on the Lacedæmonian garrison in the citadel, while he sent to Sicyon for succours. Timoxenus immediately marched to his aid with the Achæan troops under his command, and Aratus arrived not long after with 1500 Macedonians, whom he had obtained from Antigonos, and had brought over the Saronic Gulf to Epidaurus. On the first intelligence of the revolt, Cleomenes despatched Megistonous—whose imprudent confidence in the disposition of the Argives had misled him into his ill-judged lenity—with 2000 men to Argos; he himself remained in his intrenchments to observe Antigonos, and, for the encouragement of the Corinthians, affected to speak of the insurrection as a trifling tumult of a few turbulent persons. But Megistonous was slain, soon after he reached Argos, in an attempt to recover possession of the city; and the garrison, reduced to almost the last extremity, sent courier after courier to Cleomenes to solicit support. Apprehending that the loss of Argos would expose Sparta to the danger of a hostile inroad, and believing that nothing less than the display of his whole force would be sufficient to guard against it, he abandoned his intrenchments and marched into Argolis. But the sacrifice came too late to retrieve what had been lost, and only completed the ruin of his prospects. It threw open the gates of Peloponnesus to the enemy, who took possession of Corinth and the Acrocorinthus without resistance. In the meanwhile Cleomenes forced his way into the Larissa, and effected a junction with his troops, who still held out there, and even made himself master of an adjacent quarter of the city. But while the issue of the struggle was yet doubtful, the Macedonian arms were seen glittering on the heights, and the cavalry pushing forward at full speed across the plain. Cleomenes did not feel himself strong enough to risk an engagement near a hostile city, and therefore sounded a retreat, evacuated the citadel, and took the road through Mantinea to

\* Plut., Cleom., 19. The *ἐμβαλὼν* may be Plutarch's mistake.

† Polyb. (v. 2.), *διαλαβὼν χάρακι καὶ τάρφῃ τὸν μεταφύ τήνων τοῦ τε Ἀκροκόρινθου καὶ τὸν Ὀνείων καλουμένων ὄρων*. See Leake's *Moræa*, iii., p. 311.

Tegea, which he reached unmolested, but not before he had been deserted by a part of his Peloponnesian troops. At Tegea he was met by tidings of a domestic calamity, the death of his noble-minded wife Agiatia, whose influence had so greatly contributed to form his character, and to induce him to spurn inglorious ease for a life of toil and danger, which he could not regret even in the midst of the misfortunes which darkened its close. His affection for her had been so strong that, when his arms were most successful, he could not endure to be long absent from Sparta. But he controlled his feelings with stoical firmness, and before he proceeded homeward, calmly gave directions for putting Tegea in a state of defence. Continuing his march during the night, he reached Sparta early the next morning, and after he had paid the last offices to Agiatia, turned his thoughts on the posture of his affairs. In the calculation of his means of defence, he found himself most embarrassed by financial difficulties, and foresaw that it would be easier to raise an army that might cope with the enemy than to keep it in the field. There was only one quarter in which he had a prospect of assistance to extricate him from this strait. Ptolemy Euergetes had withdrawn his pension from Aratus, as soon as it was known that he had attached himself to Antigonus, and was willing to support Cleomenes by subsidies in his conflict with Macedonia. But the accounts which had reached him of the character of the Spartan king were, it seems, not such as to inspire him with perfect confidence in his steadfastness, and he therefore required, as the condition of his assistance, that Cleomenes should send his mother and children to Alexandria as hostages. It was only after a hard struggle with his feelings that Cleomenes could bring himself to disclose this demand to his mother, but she received it with the spirit of a Spartan matron, chided him for his hesitation, and bade him instantly send her wherever her presence would be most serviceable to Sparta. Preparations were forthwith made for her departure, and, when they were completed, Cleomenes escorted her, at the head of his troops, to the place of embarkation at Tænarus. Before she went on board, they retired to the temple of Poseidon, to interchange a parting embrace; and the mother, who, in her old age, was going to be thrown on the mercy of strangers in a distant land, is said to have exhorted her son to master his emotions, and to preserve the composure which befitted a king of Sparta.

In the mean while, the progress of Antigonus was a series of easy triumphs. In Argos the people elected Aratus to the office of Strategus, and, on his motion, granted all the property of the persons who were now branded with the name of tyrants and traitors to the King of Macedonia. Aristomachus, it seems, escaped out of Argos, but fell into the hands of his enemies at Cenchreæ, where he was put to death by the order, or with the sanction of Aratus, and, as it was rumoured, after the infliction of torture, which, however, Polybius denies.\* All the other towns of Argolis submitted, without resistance, to the conqueror, who then marched into

Arcadia, and as far as the borders of Laconia, where he dislodged the Spartan garrisons from Belemna and Ægys, and consigned the fortresses to the custody of the Megalopolitans. He attempted no farther aggression on the territory of Sparta, and, it seems, made no assault on any of the Arcadian towns, but proceeded to Ægium, where he was to meet a general assembly of the Achæans. It may easily be supposed that this assembly was not less ready to comply with his demands than that which had invited him into Greece. The title which had been refused to Cleomenes was conferred on Antigonus, and with such additions as entirely to destroy the independence of the League, and almost to efface its character. He was declared chief of all the allies,\* which can only signify that the Achæans were henceforth to be members of a great confederacy, including all the other Greek states which were in alliance with Macedonia, among which Epirus, Phocis, Boeotia, Acarnania, and Thessaly are afterward named.† If the League might be considered as still retaining a distinct existence, it seems to have been only for the purpose of increasing its burdens. It charged itself with the pay and maintenance of the Macedonian troops, while it renounced the right of sending an embassy, or even addressing a letter to any other prince, without the consent of Antigonus. Antigonus was not content with the substance of power, but exercised it in a manner which showed that he looked upon his new allies as his subjects, and had not forgotten that they had been his enemies. He restored the statues of the tyrants at Argos, and ordered those which had been erected at Corinth to the liberators of the city to be pulled down, all but that of Aratus, who interceded in vain for those of his friends. The Achæans, on their part, would hardly rest satisfied with the ordinary tokens of respect due to his royal dignity, but paid their court to him with honours rather belonging to a god. Sicyon took the lead, and celebrated his arrival when he came as the guest of Aratus, with sacrifices, processions, and games. The other towns followed the example. Festivals were dedicated to him, and called, after him, the Antigonea; and Aratus thought himself obliged to appear on these occasions with the festive wreath, conducting the sacrifice and leading the psæan in honour of a man whose character he left painted, in his Memoirs, in very dark colours.‡ After the assembly at Ægium, Antigonus closed the campaign, and took up his winter-quarters in Sicyon and Corinth.

Early in the next spring he opened a fresh campaign with the siege of Tegea, which was soon forced to surrender; and he then advanced towards the frontier of Laconia, where he found Cleomenes, prepared to defend the passes. But, after some time spent in fruitless attempts on his enemy's position, he was induced to return northward, by information that the garrison of Orchomenus had marched to join the

\* Polyb., ii., 54, 4, κατασταθεὶς ἡγεμὸν πάντων τῶν συμμάχων. It seems rather difficult to reconcile this with Droysen's view (ii., p. 557), that no formal pre-eminence was assigned to Macedonia in the League (nicht ein Bündniss mit und unter Makedonien geschloßen, Makedonien zur Hegemonie bestimmt war).

† Plut., Cleom., 16, τοῦτον αὐτὸν Ἀντιγόνου εὐχρηστὶ κατὰ κυρία, δι' ὃν ἀπολλήκεν ἑκουσμάτως.



army of Cleomenes. He immediately proceeded to attack the almost unguarded town, and took it by storm, and gave it up to pillage. It was too useful a conquest, for the access which it gave to the interior of the peninsula, to be retorted to the Achæans, and it was henceforth occupied by a Macedonian garrison. Mantinea was the next object of attack, and was soon reduced in like manner. It, also, was abandoned to plunder, and all the citizens sold into slavery: lenient punishment, in the judgment of Polybius, for the ingratitude it had shown to the Achæans, whom he regards as the protectors of its liberty, a light in which they certainly did not appear to those who rose against them. The despoiled city was placed by the conqueror at the disposal of Argos, which decreed that the colony should be sent to take possession of it under the auspices of Aratus. The occasion enabled him to pay another courtly compliment to the King of Macedonia. On his proposal, he gave the name of the lovely *Mantineia*\*—as it was described in the Homeric catalogue—was exchanged for that of Antigonea—a symbol of its ruin, and of the humiliation of Greece. Antigonus now turned his arms against the western side of Arcadia, where Heræa and Tilphusa submitted to him without resistance; and this was, in his part, the last achievement of this campaign. He forthwith returned to attend the Achæan assembly at Ægion, sent his Macedonian troops back to their homes, and put the rest into winter-quarters.

It seems evident that he was not at all eager to bring the war to a close, whether because he believed that his own influence in Peloponnesus would be strengthened by the delay—as the Achæans would be more compliant and submissive while the issue was yet in suspense—or hoped that the resources of Sparta would soon be spent, and Cleomenes forced to resign the unequal contest.† Cleomenes, indeed, thrown back upon Laconia, found it extremely difficult to maintain a force capable of resisting the master of Macedonia and of the greater part of Greece. Notwithstanding the pledges he had given, it does not appear that he received any considerable subsidies from the court of Alexandria,‡ where the ministers of Antigonus exerted their utmost efforts to counteract his application, and seem to have spread a report that he was negotiating with the Achæans, and playing a double game, so that his mother wrote to exhort him, if he found means of concluding an honourable peace, not to sacrifice the interests of Sparta through anxiety for the

safety of an old woman and a child. It does not appear, however, that Cleomenes even entered into such negotiations after the arrival of Antigonus in Peloponnesus,\* and it is certain that he never allowed the threatening aspect of his affairs to abate his courage or relax his energy. To the last, he neglected no expedient, lost no opportunity, shrank from no venture that promised any advantage. To recruit his finances, he allowed 6000 Helots to purchase their emancipation for five minas apiece, and thus raised 500 talents;† and perhaps out of this number organized a body of 2000 men, armed after the Macedonian fashion, like the troops which were distinguished by their white bucklers. In the course of this summer, he had very nearly made himself master of Megalopolis by surprise,‡ and, as soon as Antigonus had dismissed his troops to their winter-quarters, he renewed the attempt, and with better fortune. Polybius adopted a report that he was aided by the treachery of some Messenian exiles who were residing in the city, and opened a gate in the night-time. But it seems questionable whether he was indebted to anything but the prudence with which he concerted his measures, and the promptitude and secrecy with which they were executed, for the success of his enterprise. The great compass of the walls rendered it difficult to man them with a population thinned, as that of Megalopolis had been, by several disastrous battles in the course of the war. The lateness of the season, and, perhaps, the success with which they had repelled his former attempt, seem to have thrown the citizens off their guard. Cleomenes ordered his troops to provide themselves with victuals for a march of five days, and took the road to Sellasia, as if with the design of invading Argolis; but he soon turned his front in another direction, and came down into the territory of Megalopolis, where, after a short rest for the evening meal, he pursued his march during the night, until he came near to the city. He then sent forward an officer, named Panteus, with a small detachment, to take possession of a part of the walls which was known to be the least carefully guarded. Panteus met with little resistance, and, by the time that Cleomenes came up with the main body, had demolished some of the defences to open a passage for them; and the whole army had effected its entrance before the alarm had become general among the inhabitants. The bulk of the citizens, as soon as the danger was discovered, fled with their families, and as much of their property as they were able to remove, towards Messene. But a small band of no-

\* *Μαντινείῃ ἱερᾷ*. D., ii., 607.

† Droyen (p. 523) believes that Antigonus was waiting until Ptolemy should be weary of supplying Cleomenes with subsidies, or should have been induced to abandon him. But if this was his policy, it seems strange that he should have changed it just at the time when he might expect shortly to reap its fruits, and should have brought the contest to an issue by the invasion of Laconia, before the resources of Cleomenes had been in the slightest degree impaired through Ptolemy's desertion, which, according to Droyen (p. 543), Antigonus purchased at no less a price than the cession of Caria.

‡ Droyen (p. 523, 541) thinks it clear that he received subsidies from Egypt to such an amount that Antigonus might hope that Ptolemy would not be able to afford them much longer. But this, at least, seems inconsistent, not only with Plutarch's *ἡλικίῳ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῖς ἐνοικοῦσι, κ. τ. λ.* (Cl., 27, compared with Polyb., ii., 63; v., 1), but with the measures adopted by Cleomenes for replenishing his treasury.

\* The statement of Pausanias, vii., 7, 3, 4, that Cleomenes made peace with Antigonus and the Achæans, and that his attack on Megalopolis was a breach of this treaty—by which Pausanias conceives he incurred Divine vengeance—cannot be considered as entitled to any weight, being virtually refuted by the silence of Polybius and Plutarch, which implies that of Aratus.

† Plut., Cleom., 22. Droyen (337) questions the fact, which certainly does not very well harmonize with his view of the dependant condition of Cleomenes.

‡ Polyb., ii. The allusion which Polybius makes to the event in this passage seems to show that the loss which Cleomenes suffered on this occasion was not so great as Droyen infers from the language in which Polybius speaks of it elsewhere (ix., 18, *ἔλαττο πολλοὺς ἀποβάντων, καὶ ἐνδυναμίσας τοὺς ἑλῶτας*). Droyen supposes that the 6000 Helots were levied to repair this loss.

bler spirits, headed by Philopœmen, the son of Craugis, made a gallant stand against the enemy, and, though they could not dislodge him, kept him so long employed as to enable the fugitives to withdraw without molestation, and afterward made good their own retreat, leaving only a few of their number prisoners.

Among these were two men of the highest reputation and influence in the city, named Ly-sandridas and Thearidas. They, according to Plutarch, prevailed on Cleomenes to try pacific measures with their fellow-citizens, and undertook themselves, accompanied by a Spartan herald, to carry his overtures to Messene. But he probably needed little persuasion to satisfy him that it was much more desirable to detach Megalopolis from the Achaean alliance than to wreak his vengeance on its deserted buildings. He restrained his troops from all acts of pillage with the most scrupulous rigour until the return of the envoys. They invited their fellow-citizens to return to their homes on the condition of renouncing their connexion with the Achaean League, and entering into alliance with Sparta. We cannot think so highly of the magnanimity of the people who rejected this offer, as Polybius would persuade his readers to do. It was not only one which must have shocked their deep-rooted hereditary prejudices against Sparta, but, when Antigonus was so near, with a force so far superior to that of Cleomenes at his command, had little to recommend it on the score of prudence. Yet, if we might believe Plutarch, there was a very strong inclination among them to accept the proposal, and they were only diverted from it by the remonstrances of Philopœmen, who worked upon their anti-Spartan feelings by the remark that, while Cleomenes offered to restore the city to them, his real object was to make himself master of them as well as of the city. Phylarchus, a better authority, and, on this point, confirmed by Polybius, described the temper of the Megalopolitans as so violently adverse to all terms of pacification, that they would not even hear the letter of Cleomenes read to the end, and were near stoning the bearers. There was probably something irritating in the manner in which the proposal was rejected as well as in the rejection itself. Cleomenes, as soon as he received the report of the envoys, collected all the booty he could find in the city, and then proceeded to lay it in ruins, with such elaborate hostility as, according to Polybius, to extinguish all hope that it would be ever again inhabited. The value of the plunder—strangely exaggerated by Phylarchus—was not, it seems, sufficient to afford any material relief to Cleomenes in his financial difficulties.\* After this stroke of vengeance he marched back to Sparta.

We have mentioned a name which will appear very frequently and prominently in the sequel: that of a man whose character reflects some lustre on the decline of Greek independence, and who was entitled, by an admiring Roman, the last of the Greeks.† His char-

acter seems, indeed, to have been cast rather in the Roman than the Grecian mould. It is not one to which we must look for any great elevation, either of mind or spirit, yet not without moral dignity, and exciting some interest by the simplicity, energy, and perseverance with which it was bent on the pursuit of an object, on the whole, perhaps, as virtuous and noble as the circumstances of that age could have suggested to the ambition of a Greek. Philopœmen lost his father, one of the most distinguished citizens of Megalopolis, at an early age; but he grew up to manhood under the care of affectionate and able guardians: first, his father's most intimate friend, a Mantinean exile, named Cleander; and afterward two of his most celebrated fellow-citizens, Ecdemus and Demophanes,† men who, as we have seen, combined the study of the Academic philosophy with a warm interest in the political movements of their day, and who had contributed their aid to deliver both their native city and Sicyon from tyrannical government. Their lessons and counsels may have helped to guide him in the choice which he seems to have made very early, and to which he steadfastly adhered, of a life of unremitting hardship and labour in the political and military career which the state of Greece opened for him. The example of Epaminondas—the hero whose memory was dearest and most sacred to every citizen of Megalopolis—shone as a polestar on his path, though he was thought to resemble his great model rather in the sterner than the more amiable features of his character. From his boyhood he disclosed a remarkable fondness and aptness for martial exercises and military studies; and though his excellence in the accomplishments of the palestra was such as, in the judgment of his friends, to promise success in the contests of the public games, he renounced the prospect—so tempting to most of his countrymen—with contempt, when he became aware that the training of the athlete was utterly irreconcilable with the habits of the camp. As soon as he had reached the age of military service, he distinguished himself in the inroads which were frequently made into Laconia, endeavouring always to be the foremost in the advance and the last in the retreat. In the intervals left by these duties he divided his time between civil business, literary studies, husbandry, and the chase, still, however, keeping his main end steadily in view. He commonly left the city towards evening for a farm which he possessed two or three miles off, where he rose early to take a part in the labours of the field, until private or public engagements called him back to Megalopolis. The cultivation of his estate was regarded by him not merely as a healthy exercise, but as the means of securing his political independence. His favourite reading was such as bore directly on his chief pursuit: the Tactics of Evagelus or the History of Alexander's Campaigns. From the works of philosophers and poets he drew as much as might serve the purpose of a general and a statesman. The image of war was constantly in his mind. On his journeys, every turn of the road or change in the face of the

\* Droysen, however (530), thinks that the booty collected from the territory of Megalopolis, which was not taken into account by Polybius when he estimated the value of the spoil at 300 talents (ii., 62), may have produced a much larger sum.

† Plut., Philop., 1: *Ῥωμαίων τις ἑταίρων*. Ar., 24: οἱ *Ῥωμαῖοι φιλοκλέμενα διαμαρτυρεῖς*.

\* The name is written *Megalophanes* in Pausanias, viii., 49, 2.

country suggested to him a military problem which he would discuss with his companions, leading him to consider the evolutions which the nature of the ground would have required if he had found himself there at the head of an army in presence of an enemy. Philopomen was thirty years old when Megalopolis was taken by Cleomenes; and we can easily understand how intolerable the thought of a composition with the victorious enemy must have been to such a spirit, and how he burned for an opportunity of retrieving possession of his home with the sword, and of avenging its ruin on Sparta.

The news of the fall of Megalopolis reached Aratus while the Achæans were assembled at Ægium, and he announced the disaster from the bema, after a pause, as of unutterable grief, during which he covered his face with his cloak.\* But it seems that the assembly, as if stunned by the calamity, broke up without any deliberation on the measures to be adopted in consequence of the event. They were, perhaps, left expressly, or by tacit understanding, to the judgment of Antigonus. In fact, he forthwith gave orders for the re-assembling of his troops from their winter-quarters. But this was probably designed only to evince his sympathy. His orders were slowly executed, and before any force had come together, as the enemy had retired from Arcadia, no object remained for military operations. He therefore countermanded the movement, and proceeded, with a small body of mercenaries, to Argos, where he took up his residence for the winter.

The eye of Cleomenes was upon him, and, early in the following spring, he took advantage of his enemy's position to make a movement, which was bold enough to be generally regarded by his contemporaries as desperately hazardous, but is acknowledged by Polybius to have been very judiciously calculated as well as completely successful. He made an inroad into Argolis, and ravaged the plain, where the corn was yet green, as far as the city walls. He foresaw that, if Antigonus should be induced by the impatience of the Argives to march out and give battle, he should be almost sure to gain an important, perhaps a decisive victory. On the other hand, if he should be allowed to waste the country without opposition, discontent and dejection would ensue within the city; in either case he should raise the reputation of his arms and the spirit of his people. The event

answered to his expectations, though the result was less important than he had hoped. Antigonus did not move. The Argives murmured loudly at his inaction, and even thronged the gates of his lodging, clamorously demanding that he would either protect their fields or resign his command to his abler rival. He turned a deaf ear to their taunts, and let the tumult spend itself in empty noise. Cleomenes, when his provisions were exhausted, led his army back to Sparta.

So far all is perfectly intelligible; but Plutarch relates another expedition of Cleomenes in the same direction, but undertaken under widely different circumstances. The truth of his narrative seems to have been never questioned by modern writers; \* yet it is so difficult to understand, that the more we consider it the more we are inclined to reject it as incredible, and to attribute it to mistake. According to this statement, soon after the return of Cleomenes to Sparta, Antigonus having assembled his forces, marched to Tegea with the design of invading Laconia. Cleomenes, when he heard that the enemy was so near his frontier, led his army by a different road into Argolis, where he committed great devastation, having provided his troops with large wooden swords to beat down the standing corn. Some of his officers wished to set fire to the gymnasium of Cylarabis, a place hallowed by several sacred monuments; but he forbade this mischief, with an intimation, it is said, of regret for the damage which he had been provoked to inflict on Megalopolis. Antigonus, on the other hand, finding that he had it in his power to enter Laconia without opposition, and, probably, to make himself master of Sparta, immediately marched back to Argos, and occupied all the passes by which the enemy might have effected his retreat. Cleomenes affected to set him at defiance, sent heralds to request the keys of the famous temple of Here, between Argos and Mycene, that he might sacrifice there before his departure, and, having performed the sacrifice on the outside, took the road to Phlius, crossed Mount Oligyrtus, where he had to force his way through a defile guarded by Macedonian troops, and, having come down near Orchomenus, returned to Sparta by the high road to Mantinea and Tegea, without encountering any other obstacle.

We can hardly help suspecting that Plutarch must have referred two different narratives of the same expedition to two distinct occasions, following Polybius in the one and Phylarchus in the other. Polybius is quite silent about the second invasion of Argolis, which, after his remarks on the policy of the first, he could scarcely have failed to mention, if he had heard of it; and his own narrative of the events immediately ensuing seems inconsistent with the suppo-

\* Droysen (527) suspects that both Antigonus and Aratus were aware of the danger to which Megalopolis was exposed, and purposely forbore to avert it, and secretly rejoiced in the ruin of the city. With regard to Antigonus, there can be no doubt that his aim (as that of all his predecessors since Philip I.) was as much as possible to break the power of Greece; and it was for this reason that, until the domination of Rome appeared to be the more oppressive and destructive of the two, resistance to Macedonia was the object which a patriotic Greek statesman would have kept constantly foremost in his view. But still, when we consider the attachment of Megalopolis to the royal house of Macedonia, and its enmity to Sparta, it would seem that this was just the one great city of Peloponnesus which, for his own sake, he must have wished to see standing. As to Aratus, one would not lightly think him capable of such atrocious hypocrisy and villainy; and the grounds which Droysen assigns for his suspicion all depend on a most questionable hypothesis as to the state of parties at Megalopolis. One may affirm, with a more reasonable confidence, that Aratus felt himself only too safe, under Macedonian protection, from any attacks of political adversaries. He had paid dearly for his security.

\* Schorn, Flathe, Helwing, and Lucas (p. 90) adopt it without the slightest hesitation. Munro (tit., 334) seems to betray a little misgiving, observing in the note, "The expedition is evidently a second one, distinct from the first, but has been passed over by Polybius." The two expeditions are indeed clearly distinguished from one another by Plutarch; but there is no action attributed to Cleomenes in the second which might not have belonged to the first. Droysen (544) suggests the possibility that Antigonus might have been waiting at Tegea for the Achæan contingents, and that Cleomenes intended to prevent their junction with him.

sition that they had been preceded by the operations which Plutarch describes.

According to Polybius, Antigonus, having collected his army in the beginning of the summer, opened the campaign with the invasion of Laconia; and Cleomenes, instead of attempting any diversion, bent all his thoughts towards the guarding of the passes on the frontier, so as to prevent the enemy from penetrating into the vale of the Eurotas. Expecting that Antigonus would take the road which led through Sellasia down the valley of the Cénus, having fortified the other passes, chiefly by ditches and felled trees, so as not to be obliged materially to weaken his army for their defence, he advanced with all his forces, about 20,000 men, to occupy a strong position on the Cénus, near Sellasia, where the stream flowed between two hills named Evas and Olympus, which were parted from each other by a small level. He strengthened his position by a trench and palisade, stationed his brother Euclidas, with one division of the infantry, on Mount Evas, while he himself encamped, with the flower of the Lacedæmonian troops and the mercenaries, on Olympus, and covered the opening between the two hills with his cavalry. In this posture he was found by Antigonus, whose army numbered 30,000, composed of Macedonians, Illyrians, under Demetrius of Pharos; Acarnanians and Cretans; Peloponnesians, among whom Megalopolis furnished a thousand foot and a body of horse, which was commanded, it seems, by Philopœmen, and mercenaries. Antigonus, having encamped near the foot of the hills, behind a rivulet, the Gorgylus, tributary to the Cénus, waited several days in the hope of discovering some weak point in the enemy's lines. But Cleomenes, as Polybius admits, had so skilfully availed himself of all the advantages of the ground, that his adversary was at length forced to renounce the thought of a surprise, and prepared to stake his fortunes on a fair trial of strength.

Phylarchus had related that, about ten days before the battle, an envoy from Alexandria arrived in the Spartan camp to announce that Ptolemy would grant no farther subsidies to Cleomenes, and advised him to make peace with Antigonus; and it was by this message, according to Phylarchus, that Cleomenes, whose treasury was exhausted, and who feared that the hopeless condition of his finances might soon become known to his troops, was induced to risk an engagement, when, in consequence of events which were taking place in a distant quarter, a delay of a few days would have relieved him from danger, and have restored his ascendancy in Peloponnesus. Polybius, though he mentions this statement only to expose the inconsistency of Phylarchus, who had represented the spoil of Megalopolis as amounting to 6000 talents, seems afterward in some degree to confirm it, as he says that both parties determined to join battle; yet his own description seems to show that Cleomenes remained as long as he could on the defensive. His account of the battle differs very widely from that which Plutarch reports from Phylarchus, who had imputed its loss to the treachery of a Spartan officer named Damoteles, who deceived Cleomenes by false information, which

prevented him from sending timely succour to his brother, and induced him to advance prematurely against Antigonus. Polybius, on the other hand, ascribes the event partly to the sagacity and energy of Philopœmen and the valour of the Achæan cavalry, but in a still greater degree to the incapacity of Euclidas, which proved fatal first to himself, and then to Cleomenes. His narrative suggests no suspicion of treachery, and it seems, in all respects, the more trustworthy. In the earlier part of the day Philopœmen had the merit of making a charge at the head of the Megalopolitan cavalry without orders, which saved the wing of the army on the side of Mount Evas from total defeat. His superior officer, when he pointed out the emergency, had refused to move until he saw a preconcerted signal. Philopœmen was afterward praised for this seasonable breach of discipline by Antigonus, who said that his cautious general had acted like a stripling, the Megalopolitan youth like an experienced general. Euclidas committed the error of waiting on the brow of the hill to sustain the enemy's attack, and thus lost all the benefit of his vantage ground, which would have enabled him to charge them before they reached the top with overpowering effect. His division was driven back with great slaughter over the precipices on the other side of the hill, and he himself slain. In the mean while, the Lacedæmonian cavalry was beginning to give way to the Achæans, who felt, Polybius says, that the whole contest was for their liberty, and were animated by the example of Philopœmen, who, when his horse had been killed under him, continued to fight on foot, and did not even retire from the field when both his thighs had been transfixed by a javelin. It was now, according to Polybius, that Cleomenes, seeing himself in danger of being surrounded by the victorious enemy, resolved on a last effort to retrieve the fortune of the day, and quitted his intrenchments to charge the Macedonian phalanx, which was commanded by Antigonus himself, and, on account of the narrowness of the ground, was formed in twice the ordinary depth. The Spartan valour strove in vain to break this impenetrable mass, and was at length, after a hard struggle, overwhelmed by its weight. The slaughter which followed was terrible, but is probably exaggerated, when it is said, that out of 6000 Lacedæmonians, not more than 200 are said to have escaped. Cleomenes, seeing all lost, quitted the field, and hastened, accompanied by a few horsemen, to Sparta. Here he exhorted his countrymen not to think of irritating the conqueror by a useless attempt at resistance; he himself, though unable to stay, would still, whether in life or death, devote himself to the service of Sparta. While his companions rested and refreshed themselves, he went into his house, but would neither sit down nor slake his thirst. He stood for a while, as lost in thought, leaning his brow on his arm as he stayed it against a pillar, and then, with the friends who adhered to him, proceeded to Gythium, where he embarked in a vessel which had been provided for the contingency, and sailed away for Alexandria.

If he had delayed his departure for a few days longer he might have returned safely to his cap-

ital, and, perhaps, have kept possession of his throne.\* The conqueror proceeded to Sparta, where he was submissively received, and used his victory with a lenity and moderation which Polybius extols as a proof of magnanimity. But the opposite course would have been no less impolitic than cruel: nor had he suffered any provocation which could incite him to tread hard on the necks of the fallen. He can have felt no resentment even against Cleomenes, whom in his heart he must have esteemed incomparably above Aratus. But he seems to have taken the measures best calculated to prevent Sparta from ever rising again. He is said to have restored her ancient laws and Constitution. The exact meaning of this phrase is not explained by the writers who use it;† but one of the measures to which it refers was, undoubtedly, the revival of the ephoraty: and it is most probable that this was accompanied by others, including the recall of the exiles, and a recognition of their title to property which had passed into other hands, all tending to overthrow the work of Cleomenes, to restore the abuses of the ancient system, and to sow the seeds of perpetual discord. But in the course of a very few days Antigonus was called away from Sparta and from Greece by intelligence that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia. It seems, indeed, according to the more probable meaning of an obscure passage of Polybius, that he left his Theban friend Brachyllas, the head of the house of Neon, governor of Sparta;‡ perhaps, as we hear nothing more of him, only to remain there until the new order of things should be established. On his road northward he halted at Tegea, where he is said likewise to have re-established the hereditary polity, that is, no doubt, the ascendancy of a party favourable to the Macedonian interest, and then proceeded to Argos. Here he arrived just in time to be present at the celebration of the Nemean games, where he was greeted as well by the Achaean League as by its separate cities, with all the homage pertaining, as Polybius expresses it, to immortal glory and honour. We may judge of the adulation which was now offered to him by the compliments which he had received before the decisive victory. Leaving a body of troops under the command of Taurion to preserve tranquillity in Peloponnesus, he hastened his march homeward. He found the Illyrians still in Macedonia, and brought them to an engagement, in which he gained a complete victory. But the germe of a wasting disease was, it seems, already lodged in his frame,§ and the exertion of his voice during the battle so weakened his lungs, that he sank into an illness, which, in the course of a few months, car-

ried him to the grave. He was succeeded by his nephew and adopted son, Philip III., now a youth of seventeen, for whom he appointed by his will a council of ministers, and the principal officers of the court and army, and left directions for the administration of his kingdom. His intentions towards him were undoubtedly good, though he was singularly unfortunate in the choice of the men whom he placed about his person; and he showed his anxiety for his welfare, as well as for the perpetuity of his own work, when, in his last illness, he sent him into Peloponnesus with instructions to conciliate the friendship of Aratus.\*

Before we resume the thread of Grecian history, it will be convenient to anticipate the course of events, that the reader may be enabled to follow the adventures of Cleomenes, without farther interruption, to their close. Having touched at Cythera, and afterward at another island named *Ægialea*—where Plutarch supposes him to have been urged by one of his companions to put an end to his life†—he crossed over to the coast of Cyrene, and was escorted by Ptolemy's officers to Alexandria. His deportment and conversation by degrees impressed Ptolemy with so favourable an opinion of his character and abilities, that he promised to aid him with ships and money towards the recovery of his kingdom, and, in the mean while, assigned a yearly pension of twenty-four talents for his maintenance. A very small part of this allowance was needed to supply the wants of Cleomenes and his friends, who retained their Spartan habits; and with the surplus he endeavoured to secure the good will of the Greek refugees who had emigrated to Egypt.

But these prospects were soon overcast by the death of Ptolemy Euergetes, who was succeeded by his son Philopator, a weak and dissolute prince, addicted to the most shameful vices, though not destitute of literary tastes and talents,‡ and, like Antigonus Gonatas, a patron of the stoical philosophy.§ He was seldom, it is said, entirely sober; and the gravest occupation of his most lucid intervals was, to celebrate the mystic orgies of some Egyptian superstition. The government of his kingdom he abandoned to his mistress Agathoclea, her brother Agathocles, and her infamous mother Ceanthe. A man of this cast could not but feel an instinctive aversion to a Cleomenes; yet, at the beginning of his reign, an occasion arose in which, finding himself in danger, he was willing to make use of the stranger's military talents. He dreaded his half-brother Magas, who was supported by the interest of his mother Bere-

\* Plut., Ar., 46.

† The conversation reported (c. 31) has very much the appearance of having been drawn from some sophistical exercise.

‡ He was, as we learn from the Ravenna scholiast in Aristoph., Theam., 1059, quoted by Droysen, the author of a tragedy called Adonis, on which his favourite Agathocles commented; and he built a temple in honour of Homer. *Ælian*, v. H., xiii., 21.

§ Diog. Laert., vii., 177. The same Sphærus who had given lessons to Cleomenes, accepted the king's invitation to Alexandria, which Chrypsius more prudently declined (Diog. Laert., vii., 185). Ptolemy amused himself with the Stoic, as Frederic II. with his French philosophers. He deceived him with a dish of pomegranates in wax (or birds, *Athen.*, viii., p. 354, e.), to make him own that the wise man might assent to an erroneous impression of the senses.

\* So Polybius, ii., 70. Droysen (ii., p. 550) considers this as a very inadequate view of the subject. Antigonus, he thinks, would not have suffered himself to be called away by an Illyrian inroad until he had completed the settlement of affairs in Peloponnesus. But it seems bold to assert that he would certainly have stayed there until he made himself master of the person of Cleomenes.

† Polyb., ii., 70; iv., 9, 9; ix., 36, 4. Plut., Cl., 30. Pausan., ii., 9, 2.

‡ Polyb., ix., 5, 12, *κρίσις γενομένης τῆς Ἀρχαίλαβρος, ἡμετέραν ἀνέλκει τῆς πόλεως Βραχύλλου*. But the context certainly raises a doubt whether Sparta or Thebes is the city meant. Flathe (ii., p. 184, and 228) interprets it of Thebes (but erroneously describing Brachyllas as a Macedonian); Schorn, Brückner (u. s., p. 1232, n. 19), and Droysen, of Sparta.

† Plut., Cleom., 16, 30.

nice, and popular among the soldiery. In this emergency Cleomenes was called in to aid the king with his counsels. Ptolemy and his ministers had, indeed, already made up their minds on one point, that Magas was to be despatched. The only question on which they wished to consult Cleomenes was, how this purpose might be most safely accomplished. Cleomenes, however, betrayed his ignorance of the court by the simple remark, that it would be better for Ptolemy if he had more brothers to uphold his throne; and when Sosibius, the chief favourite, pointed out the danger to be apprehended from the wavering fidelity of the mercenaries, so long as Magas lived, he bade them dismiss all anxiety on that score, as he would undertake to answer for some 4000 of the number: Peloponnesians and Cretans, who would be ready to act at his beck, and would easily overpower the Syrian and Carian troops. This assurance, though not unwelcome at the time, sank deep into the minds of the king and his courtiers, and rendered Cleomenes himself an object of jealousy and suspicion, which his demeanour, calm but watchful, did not tend to allay. Carrying his deep thoughts and high aims constantly about with him in the midst of a frivolous and licentious court, he seemed to them like a lion prowling about a sheepfold.

He soon perceived that he must resign all hope of the assistance which had been promised by the late king. But when he learned the state of affairs in Greece which followed the death of Antigonus, he was eager to be allowed to depart, accompanied only by the friends whom he had brought with him. Even this request, however, he urged in vain. Ptolemy himself was too much occupied by his revels and his devotion to attend to it; and Sosibius thought it dangerous to part with a man who knew so much of the secrets of the court and the weakness of the kingdom, and who might soon be in condition to take advantage of it.

While he remained in this feverish suspense, a combination of seemingly trifling occurrences brought a still darker cloud over his prospects. Nicagoras the Messenian arrived at Alexandria with a cargo of horses for the royal stables. According to Polybius, Nicagoras, while he panted for revenge on Cleomenes for the death of Archidamus,\* professed to be deeply indebted to him for the forbearance shown on that occasion towards himself. On his landing, he met Cleomenes, with two of his friends, walking on the quay, and, after a friendly greeting, Cleomenes, having inquired what he had brought, observed that a troop of minions or music girls would have been better suited to the present king's taste. Nicagoras took the first opportunity to report this sarcasm to Sosibius, who, having discovered his animosity against the man whom he himself hated and feared, induced him, by bribes and promises,

before he set sail, to write a letter, charging Cleomenes with a design upon Cyrene.\* The letter was shown to Ptolemy, and, under the double excitement of anger and alarm, yet partly, it seems, restrained by shame or other fears, he ordered Cleomenes and his friends to be confined in a large house, though, in other respects, treated as before. Still, Cleomenes, who, it seems, was not informed of the cause of his imprisonment, regarded it for a time as merely a temporary effect of the king's capricious displeasure. But an accidental discovery convinced him that his keepers did not mean ever to release him from his cage, and that if he was to regain his liberty, it could only be by some hardy stroke in which he must risk all.

The attempt which he finally made was, indeed, one in which it was impossible for any reasonable man to expect success; and it seems, more than any other act of his life, to have subjected him to the reproach of a wild temerity; but it may more probably be ascribed to the impatience of despair, which preferred death to the prolongation of captivity, and caught at any chance of deliverance as a clear gain. Having eluded the vigilance of his guards, while Ptolemy was absent on an excursion to Canopus, he made a sally into the streets with his friends, thirteen in number, all with drawn swords, and raised the cry of liberty. The Alexandrian populace stared and applauded, as at a scene on the stage, but with as little thought of taking any part in the action. The Spartans killed the governor of the city, and another courtier, but after an ineffectual attempt to break open the prison in the citadel, finding themselves universally shunned, they abandoned their forlorn hope, and turned their swords against their own hearts. Panteus, the dearest of the king's friends, consented, at his request, to survive until he saw that the others had breathed their last. Ptolemy, as soon as he learned what had happened, ordered all the women and children belonging to the deceased to be put to death; and the young wife of Panteus is said to have paid the like pious offices to Crateasilea, who was forced to witness the butchery of her two grandsons, as Cleomenes had received from her husband. The body of Cleomenes was flayed and hung on a cross, until, if we may believe Plutarch, an extraordinary occurrence awakened Ptolemy's superstitious fears, gave occasion for new expiatory rites in the palace, and induced the Alexandrians to venerate Cleomenes as a hero.

Such, indeed, he was, when measured with them. As we turn from them to the proper subject of this history, we feel, as it were, that we are beginning again to breathe a healthier atmosphere; and we carry away a strengthened conviction that, great as were the evils which Greece suffered from the ill-regulated passion for liberty, it was still better living there than under the sceptre of the Ptolemies—among a people who can hardly be said to have a history in any higher sense than a herd of animals, always prone, unless when goaded into fury.

\* It is remarkable that Plutarch does not even notice the cause which Polybius (v., 37) assigns for the enmity of Nicagoras towards Cleomenes, but relates that it arose out of a debt contracted in Greece, which Cleomenes, in his exile, was unable to pay. But, on the showing of Polybius, Nicagoras was not a man of scrupulous veracity; yet the share imputed by Polybius to Cleomenes in the murder of Archidamus seems to rest on his testimony.

\* Plut., Cleom., 35. Polybius (v., 38) speaks less definitively.

## CHAPTER LXIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA TO THE END OF  
THE SOCIAL WAR BETWEEN THE ACHÆANS AND  
ÆTOLIANS.

AFTER the termination of the Oleeonic War, Greece enjoyed a short interval of general tranquillity. The states which had taken part in the recent contest needed repose; and the Achæans, though they were now rid of their formidable antagonist, were not the more at liberty to engage in any fresh enterprises without the consent of the master to whose dominion they had been subjected by the selfish and short-sighted policy of Aratus. Throughout Peloponnesus military preparations and martial exercises were suspended: the people returned to the occupations of peace; the Megalopolitans began to settle again amid the ruins of their city.†

The death of Antigonus produced no immediate visible change in the state of affairs; but it may be considered as the main cause of the movements which ensued, and which soon flung involved Greece in another wasteful and alarmitious war. The occasion of this new struggle arose, indeed, at a great distance from Macedonia, without any intervention of the Macedonian government, and seemingly more through accident than design; yet it could hardly have taken place, and certainly could not have been attended with such consequences, if the restraint hitherto imposed on those who were desirous of change by the ability and success of Antigonus had not been withdrawn. When his sceptre passed into the hands of a boy of seventeen, the Ætoliens believed that they had nothing to apprehend on the side of Macedonia, and readily followed the first impulse which they had received from turbulent and ambitious leaders, who wished, for private ends, to disturb the quiet of Greece.

As the internal state of Ætolia throws some light on the origin of these movements, and is illustrated by them, this may be a convenient place for a general survey of its political constitution and social relations. The main points which have been preserved to us by incidental notices of the ancient writers lie within a narrow compass. We are not able to trace the steps by which the primitive monarchical form of government was exchanged for that which we find established in the period we have now reached. The title of king was retained in one district, that of the Agræans, down to the Peloponnesian War.‡ In the reign of Philip I. all were united in a democratic confederacy for commonwealth;§ and it is probable that no other polity subsisted in any of the towns; but it is not clear what degree of independence each canton preserved in its internal adminis-

tration, nor, indeed, is it quite certain that it is more correct to consider the whole body as a league than as a single republic. It seems that the union of the Ætoliens was still closer than that of the Achæans; that there was a deeper consciousness of national unity, and a greater concentration of power in the national government. The great council of the nation, called the Panætolicen, in which it is probable all freemen who had reached the age of thirty had a voice, was assembled once a year, at the autumnal equinox, at Thermus, for the election of magistrates, general legislation, and the decision of all great national questions, more especially those which related to transactions with foreign states. We find no indication of any other ordinary general assembly; but there was another deliberative body, called the Apocletes—a name which suggests that it was a council of deputies—which appears to have been permanent, though we do not know whether it held regular sittings, or was only convoked as occasion required. It was so numerous, that a committee of thirty might be drawn from it for the transaction of special business.\* The chief magistrate, who bore the title of strategus, was annually elected, presided in the assemblies, represented the sovereignty of the people, and disposed of its military force. His office, among such a people, conferred great power; and there is an indication that it was viewed with some degree of jealousy, for it seems that he was not allowed to speak in the assembly on a question of war or peace.† A commander of the cavalry (Hipparchus) served under him in the field, and perhaps filled his place, when necessary, at home. A chief secretary‡ was also elected annually.

The Ætoliens still retained their predatory habits, which Thucydides had pointed out to his contemporaries as an illustration of the primitive semibarbarous manners of Greece. The ruggedness of their land, the strength of their mountain fastnesses, the vicinity of still wilder tribes in the north, concurred with the hardy, reckless, self-confident character of the

\* Schorn (p. 27) considers it as an aristocratical council, which represented the noble families, probably relying on Livy's description (xxv., 45, where *triginta principes* answers to *τρίκοντα τῶν ἀρχαίων* in Polyb., ix., 1). But it seems that no reliance can be safely placed on Livy's expression, as it is clear that he mistook these thirty for the entire council, and supposed that they were appointed on extraordinary occasions by the national assembly. Tittmann (p. 727) regards them as a standing committee for foreign affairs; and so Pastoret (Hist. de la Leg., viii., p. 378): "C'étoit une sorte de commission intermédiaire des états nationaux;" adding, without the slightest evidence, that the assembly delegated to it "la décision des objets d'un ordre inférieur." But this view likewise seems to rest on Livy's misconception. Another question is, whether the *συνέδριον* mentioned in the inscriptions (Boeckh, n. 3250, 3048, *συνέδριος δαι τοῖς ἐνέργοις*) are connected with the *ἀρχαίον*, as a judicial committee for cases of piracy, or were an entirely distinct body. Boeckh's opinion about them is not quite clearly expressed. (C. I., ii., p. 632, *Synedrion sunt concilia Ætolici magistratus ordinarii, senatus quippe*.)

† Livy, xxv., 25. Tittmann (p. 726) questions the fact, because elsewhere it is expressly stated that the strategus made proposals. But the instance to which he refers (Livy, xxi., 32) is perfectly consistent with the supposition which he disputes. Thucydides only interposes to adjourn the discussion. Schorn (p. 28) supposes the reason of the rule to have been, that the general was entitled to a large share of the spoil. But, though this is probable in itself, it does not appear from the passage of Polybius (ii., 2) to which he refers. It was clear, however, that the general's bias would always be towards war.

\* Polyb., vi., 7, 7.

† Ibid., v., 25, 4.

‡ Thuc., iii., 3.

§ Schorn (p. 25) infers from Arrian's account of the Ætolian embassy to Alexander, as *κατ' ἑξῆς* (l. 10), that the league was not then formed; but that it existed at least as early as the reign of Philip, not only appears (as is observed by Nitzsch, *Polybius*, p. 119) from an inscription on the altar of Ætolia at Therma, quoted by Ephorus (in Strabo, i., p. 463, *Ἀτταλὸν τῶνδ' ἀνθρώπων Ἀτταλοὶ σφετέρῃς μὲν ἑστῆς ἐπὶ τῇ πόλει*), but may also be inferred from the mention of Naupactus, which was made to them by Philip (Strabo, i., p. 427, *ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ πόλει Ἀτταλῶν Φιλίππου προσκρίναντες*; see ante, p. 134, and Boeckh, *Corp. Inscr.*, i., p. 637).

people, to prevent any change in this part of their hereditary usages. They were still a nation of freebooters and pirates. Plunder was to them what eloquence or music was to other Grecian races—their study, their business, their pleasure, their pride.\* In their marauding excursions they spared nothing. They paid as little regard to the sanctity of the things and places which were most revered in Greece as if they had professed a different religion; yet we have no reason to believe that they were freer from superstition than their more civilized neighbours. One of the consequences of this appetite for plunder was, that the democratical character of the Ætolian institutions was in no small degree tempered by the influence which the chiefs who took the lead in such expeditions naturally acquired over their followers, and the weight which they thus gained in the councils of the nation. But it seems that they found it necessary to sustain the popularity which they earned in the foray by the exercise of liberality and hospitality at home, on which they frequently spent more than their share of the booty, and thus were often induced to look to predatory excursions as the readiest means of repairing their damaged fortunes. Many of the leading men possessed houses at Thermus, which they adorned with great magnificence; and, at the time of the annual elections, they appear to have vied with one another in the splendour of their entertainments; for, though they had made so little progress in civilization, the Ætolians were not at all behind the other Greeks in luxury. An ancient author expressly connects their eager pursuit of pleasure with their contempt of death.† They were willing, it seems, to crowd the enjoyments for which alone they valued life, by profuse expenditure, into a narrow compass. The sanctuary of Apollo at Thermus was adorned with a multitude of statues, works, indeed, of foreign schools, but not the less gratifying to the national vanity as a display of wealth and refinement; and those yearly meetings were probably not inferior in exhibitions of art, particularly dramatic and musical entertainments, to any of the kind which were celebrated in the rest of Greece.‡

It seems that nearly as soon as the national union was firmly cemented, the Ætolians began to aim at extending their power and enlarging their territory. One of the earliest occasions on which they appear acting as one body, is that on which they acquired Naupactus from the Achæans; and they never afterward omitted any opportunity of gaining ground upon their neighbours, until, elated by the success with which they had defended themselves against their Macedonian and Celtic invaders, and encouraged by the weakness of the other states, they aspired to take the lead in Grecian politics. Their conquests, as we have already

seen, were not confined to northern Greece, where, in process of time, they made themselves masters of Locria, Phocis, Bœotia, and parts of Acarnania, Epirus, and Thessaly, and assumed the entire control of the Delphic oracle and Amphictyony.\* They also annexed some Peloponnesian cities to their dominions; and we afterward find not only the Island of Cephallenia, but places at a great distance from their frontier—cities of Thrace and Asia Minor—in a similar relation with them.

Hence a question of some importance arises as to the origin and the precise nature of this relation. That in most cases it was the effect of compulsion, as is expressly related with regard to the Trachinian Heraclea,† can hardly be doubted, but, rather, whether there is sufficient reason to believe that it was in any instance purely voluntary, so that it may be attributed to a peaceful attraction which the Ætolian League exercised upon foreign states. We are informed, indeed, by Polybius, that Mantinea, of its own accord, abandoned its connexion with the Achæans to attach itself to the Ætolian League;‡ and this was no doubt true, in the limited sense which the historian's argument required. But whether this accession took place, as appears most probable, at least, with regard to Tegea and Orchomenus, in the course of the expedition in which the Ætolians swept Laconia, or after Megalopolis had become a member of the Achæan confederacy, on either supposition motives may be suggested for it quite distinct from a preference grounded on the character of the Ætolian League.§ In the more distant dependancies, such as Lysimachia on the Hellespont, and Cioe on the eastern coast of the Propontis,|| the object was either protection from more dreaded neighbours, or security against the piratical incursions of the Ætolians themselves, who were not least formidable to those who had never injured them. We know that the people of Cioe were glad to plead their mythical connexion with Naupactus, after it had fallen into the hands of the Ætolians, to obtain exemption from the attacks of Ætolian privateers;¶ and we may collect from the inscription which records this transaction, that the Ætolians not unfrequently abused the power they had usurped over the temple at Delphi, and the name of the Amphictyonic council, which they had appropriated to themselves, to give a legal, and even a religious colour to their aggressions. Even Teos thought it worth while to send an embassy to Thermus to conclude a treaty of the closest amity, which provided against the violation of its city and territory.\*\* These ex-

\* Plat., *Demetr.*, 40; Polyb., *iv.*, 25, 8. See Boeckh, *Corp. Inscr.*, n. 1694.

† Pausan., *x.*, 20, 9. Οἱ Ἀττωλοὶ συντελείν τοὺς Ἱερακλείδας; ἡγάγεσαν ἑς τὴν Ἀττωλίαν.

‡ *ii.*, 57, 1. Brückner (in *Zimmermann's Zeitschrift*, 1837, p. 1226, n. 7) expresses a doubt as to the fact, but only refers to Plat., *Arat.*, *i.*, 33, 35 (perhaps 36), where I can find nothing even inconsistent with the assertion of Polybius, much less capable of overthrowing his authority.

§ Brückner (u. s.) justly remarks, that Mantinea seems to have been from the time of Epaminondas in constant opposition to Megalopolis.

¶ Polyb., *xvii.*, 3, 11, 12. *¶ Corp. Inscr.*, *ii.*, n. 2350. Μνηστὴρ ἀγχιὸν Ἀττωλῶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἀττωλῶν πολιτευόμενων τοὺς Κείσιον, ἀπαρμόθεν ἐρώμενον, μήτε κατὰ γὰρ μήτε κατὰ δαίμασαν, μήτε ποτ' Ἀφειστυνίκον, μήτε ποτ' ἄλλο ἐγκλήμα ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀττωλῶν οὐτως τῶν Κείων.

\*\* *Corp. Inscr.*, n. 3046.

\* Maximus Tyrius, *Diss.* *xviii.*, 2. Flathe (*ii.*, p. 139) endeavors to rescue them from this reproach, but only damages his own reputation for impartiality by his attacks on Polybius.

† *Agatharchides* *apud Athen.*, *xii.*, 33. Ἀττωλοὶ ποσόντων τῶν Ἀσίων ἐπιμαρτύροντες ἔχοντες πρὸς Ἀθήνας, δασυφὲρ καὶ ἤν τελευτῶντες καὶ ἐκτελεστέον ὑποδοὺ τῶν Δελφῶν.

‡ A law specially providing for the security of the artists (*τοὶ Διονυσιοὶ τεχνίται*) is referred to in the inscription, n. 3046 (Boeckh).



amples illustrate the mode in which the Ætolians gained adherents to their League on the Continent of Greece. On the whole, notwithstanding their impetuous courage and sturdy love of freedom, it seems that they were never either liked or respected by the other Greeks: they were regarded, as they were, as a half-civilized race; and even if the Achaean League had not been in their way, would probably never have been able to extend their own so as to embrace the whole nation.

Another interesting question relates to the terms on which they admitted new members into their body. So little information has been afforded to us by the ancient authors on this point, that room has been left for directly opposite opinions on the subject among modern writers, some of whom represent the relation as one of subordination and dependance,\* while others suppose the newly-incorporated members to have been received on a footing of perfect equality,† and to have enjoyed every privilege of Ætolian citizens, with the single exception, that none but native Ætolians were eligible to the supreme dignity. The truth seems to lie midway. It is nearly certain that the term *sympolity*, which is most frequently used to describe the condition of the newly-admitted states, was applied to a great variety of very different relations. That the general assemblies were sometimes held beyond the borders of Ætolia, as at Naupactus, Heraclea, and Hy-pata, undoubtedly raises a strong presumption that the citizens of those towns shared all the political franchises of Ætolians; but it would be rash to conclude that this was the case with all, even if there were not evidence that, in some instances, at least, the relation was one of simple subjection,‡ and the payment of tribute enforced by the constant presence of an Ætolian garrison.§

Such appears to have been the case with the Arcadian town of Phigalea, which was situated near the right bank of the Neda, close to the borders of Triphylia and Messenia, and not many miles from the coast. As it was thus easily accessible to the Ætolians, it lay very commodiously for the prosecution of any designs which they might form against the southern part of Peloponnesus, and might serve as a starting-point for their inroads, and a place of refuge where they might deposit their booty. We can only conjecture when the connexion began; but, at the death of Antigonus Doson, we find it under the protection of the Ætolians, and furnishing them with a pretext for enterprises which involved Greece in a fresh war, one of those which received the name of the Social.

We are not informed what danger was supposed to threaten Phigalea; but very soon after Philip's accession, Dorimachus, the son of Nicostratus, was sent thither avowedly to provide for the security of the city, but, as Polybius intimates, with secret instructions to observe the state of affairs in Peloponnesus.

Dorimachus was a man of noble parentage in the Ætolian sense; for his father had made himself notorious as one of the leaders of an expedition, in which the Ætolians, in time of peace, fell upon the Boeotians at Coronea, while they were assembled for the celebration of their national festival, and plundered the temple of Athena Itonia, one of the most ancient and venerated sanctuaries in Greece. Dorimachus was not a degenerate son of such a father, and, though young, had inspired his countrymen with confidence in his disposition and capacity to emulate the achievements of Nicostratus. He had not been long at Phigalea before he was joined by a band of adventurers, whom Polybius describes simply as pirates, and who, therefore, probably flocked to him from the coast of Elis, where the Ætolian privateers always found harbour. Dorimachus, deeming it his first duty to provide for his hungry followers, encouraged them to cross the Neda, and carry off the cattle from the Messenian pastures, though the Messenians were at this time in alliance with the Ætolians. The freebooters soon extended their depredations so far as to break open the Messenian farm-houses in the night, and complaints were addressed to Dorimachus by the Messenian government. As he himself received a share of the spoil, he delayed for some time to return any answer; but at length, being pressed by a succession of expostulating embassies, he promised to go to Messene, and investigate the alleged grievances. But when, on his arrival, the injured parties applied to him, instead of redress or excuses, they met with insult and invectives. During his stay in Messene, the public indignation was exasperated by a fresh outrage of the pirates, who attacked a farm in the neighbourhood of the city, killed several of the inmates who defended their master's property, and carried away the rest of the slaves and the cattle. The Messenian ephors now summoned Dorimachus to appear before the council of the magistrates, where the ephor Sciron proposed to detain him until he should give satisfaction. This proposal, which was received with general assent by the assembly, produced a vehement altercation between him and Dorimachus, in the course of which he threw out a sarcasm which deeply stung the Ætolian. In the end Dorimachus was allowed to depart, on an engagement that compensation should be made for the wrong which had been done; but he returned home bent on revenge. Still, a private quarrel provoked by such outrageous aggression on his own part, did not seem to him a ground on which he could appeal to the sympathy of the nation. But he was able to wield the power of the state for his purpose without a public disclosure of his motives. The Strategus Ariston was his kinsman, and being prevented by ill health from taking the field, had devolved the cares of his office on Dorimachus and another of his kinsmen, named Scopas. All, therefore, that Dorimachus need-

\* Niebuhr, *Hist. of Rome*, ii., p. 51, English transl.

† Flatche, ii., p. 151.

‡ Schorn (p. 29) infers this with regard to Cephallenia from the article by which it was excluded from the treaty (Polyb., xxii., 12, 15; Liv., xxxviii., 9, 11). He argues that if it had been in sympathy with the Ætolians, it would have been expressly ceded; if it had been a free ally, like Elis, it would not have been necessary to mention it at all. But it seems that the same thing may be inferred as to places which were said *μετέχουσιν τῆς Æτωλῶν συμπολιτείας*, from Polyb., iv., 25, 7.

§ Polyb. (u. s.), ἀφορρητους, ἀφορολογητους. Flatche (ii., p. 257) sings this aside as a calumnious insinuation; though he treats (p. 250, n. 1) the same expressions in the proposal made to the Eleans (Polyb., iv., 84) as an admission that this was the common lot of the allies of Macedonia.

ed was to gain over Scopas to his views: and Polybius supposes that Scopas was won by the prospect of a rich booty in Messenia, which had been long exempt from hostile ravages, while Philip's youth and the weakness of the Achæans removed all fear of consequences. So much might be inferred from the events which ensued; and it can only be regarded as a like inference, when the historian adds, that the two chiefs, without consulting either the national council or even the Apocletes, and only in concert with a few of their private friends, resolved to make war on Messenia, Epirus, Achaia, Acarnania, and Macedonia, at once. It is very doubtful that they formed any such plan of war; but it appears that they gave license and encouragement to a series of hostile aggressions on all these states, without either legal authority or colourable pretext.

The Ætolian privateers sallied forth in all directions, and brought in a Macedonian merchant-vessel, captured off Cythera, which was sold as a lawful prize, together with the whole ship's company. But some other operations of warlike aspect, which took place at the same time, could only be regarded as acts of the government. Vessels were borrowed from the Cephallenians, with which descents were made on the coast of Epirus; and an attempt to surprise the Acarnanian town of Thyreum in the night, which had been concerted with some of the inhabitants, only failed, it seems, through some mischance. We do not so clearly perceive the object of another movement which Polybius attributes to Dorimachus and Scopas. He says that, by their direction, a small body of Ætolians made their way clandestinely through Peloponnesus, and seized a stronghold, called Clarium, in the territory of Megalopolis, where they established a market for the booty which they collected from the country round; but they were forced, in the course of a few days, to surrender to Timoxenus, the general of the Achæans, and Taurion, who united their forces to besiege the place. It might have seemed that this inroad would probably put the Peloponnesians on their guard, and thus interfere with the main design of the Ætolian leaders; but it appears that no farther notice was taken of it; and Dorimachus and Scopas proceeded to strike the blow which was their chief aim. Having waited until the year of Timoxenus had nearly expired, so that he could not be expected to undertake an expedition which might last much longer than his command, they assembled the whole force of Ætolia at Rhium, where the Cephallenian vessels and a great number of transports were in readiness to carry it across the straits, and having landed on the opposite point, directed their march through the territory of Patræ, Tritæa, and Pharæ, towards Messenia. They affected, however, to disclaim hostile intentions towards the Achæans, but probably made no serious attempt to restrain the national propensity, and the track of the army was marked by havoc and depredation as far as Phigalea. They then invaded Messenia, where they met with no resistance, and found the wealth accumulated during a long peace exposed to their rapacity.

While they were gorging themselves with plunder, the Achæans met for the election of

their magistrates at Ægium, and Aratus was elected, as usual, to succeed Timoxenus. In this assembly Messenian deputies appeared to implore protection; and loud complaints were heard from the cantons which had suffered from the passage of the Ætolians; but the insult offered to the national territory excited still warmer indignation. A decree was carried, by which the general was empowered to muster all the forces of the League, and to march to the aid of the Messenians. Farther deliberation was reserved until the nation should be assembled under arms. Aratus, who was probably the mover of this decree, was eager for its immediate execution. But Timoxenus was the less inclined to begin a campaign when he had but a very few days to remain in office, as he felt little confidence in the Achæan troops, which had not only lost much of their military habits and discipline since the end of the last war, but had never shown the same spirit since they began to depend on Macedonian protection.\* He was ready, however, to resign his authority to Aratus, and Aratus did not scruple to assume the command five days before he was legally entitled to it; and having received the common seal from Timoxenus, issued orders to the cities of the League to arm their contingents, and send them forthwith to Megalopolis. There, when the army was collected, the Messenian deputies appeared to renew their entreaties for succour, to which they now added the request that they might be admitted into alliance with the Achæans. This part of their petition was rejected, as the Achæans were not at liberty to contract any new alliance without the consent of Macedonia; but succour was promised to them, on the condition that the envoys would send their sons as hostages to Sparta, for a security that the Messenians would not make peace with the Ætolians without the sanction of the Achæans; for Sparta had not yet disclosed any hostile intentions, and had sent her contingent into the field, though it kept aloof from the Achæan army, as if watching the issue. Having taken this precaution, Aratus sent a message to the Ætolian commanders, requiring them to withdraw their forces from Messenia, and to abstain from setting foot on the Achæan territory in their retreat. Dorimachus and Scopas, who were now chiefly anxious to carry away their spoil in safety,† promised compliance, and immediately wrote to Aristo to send the transports to the isle of Pheias, off the coast of Elis, to be in readiness for the embarkation of the troops, and two days afterward began their march in that direction.‡

Aratus, deceived by their professions, hastily dismissed the bulk of his forces, retaining only

\* Polyb., iv., 7; Plut., Ar., 47. But it does not appear that Timoxenus endeavoured, as is stated by Schora (p. 141), to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, or, as K. W. Nitzsch expresses it (*Polybius*, p. 15), dissuaded the war. All we learn is, that he shrink from the personal risk.

† Merleker (*Geschichte des Bundesgenossen-Krieges*, p. 43) represents Aratus as having required the Ætolians to leave their booty behind them; and as so much displeased when he found that they had carried it away with them, that he determined to attack them. But neither of these statements is warranted by Polybius.

‡ Colonel Leake (*Morea*, iii., p. 124) gives a different account of their plans, supposing that they meant to embark at Rhium, and only assembled the transports at Pheias to secure their embarkation of the baggage, in case they should be unable to convey it across the Strait of Rhium.

3000 foot and 300 horse, together with the auxiliaries under Taurion, with which he took the road to Patræ, intending to observe the movements of the Ætolians. The Ætolian generals, as Polybius himself believed, apprehended that he designed to attack them during the confusion of the embarkation; and they were thus, it appears, induced to change their plan.\* They sent the booty to the coast of Elis, under the escort of a detachment which they ordered to meet them at Rhium, and then by a sudden change in their line of march moved towards Olympia; but hearing that the Achæans had advanced northward as far as Clitor, so that they could not hope to embark at Rhium without molestation, they resolved to watch for a favourable opportunity for a battle with Aratus. With this view they encamped at Methydrium; and Aratus, when he learned that they were so near, moved southward into the plain of Caphyæ. The Ætolian commanders then advanced towards Caphyæ, expecting a battle, and confident of victory; but they were daunted when they observed the strength of the position which Aratus had taken up, and were proceeding to enter the defiles of Mount Oligyrtus, when Aratus, who might have attacked them to advantage on even ground, drew them into an engagement in such a manner as to expose every portion of his army in succession to the certainty of defeat. It was totally routed, and would, perhaps, have been destroyed if the vicinity of Caphyæ and Orchomenus had not afforded refuge to the fugitives. The Megalopolitans, who had marched in full force to join the Achæans, arrived in time to bury the slain; while the victors, quietly pursuing their way towards the northeast, after having made an unsuccessful attempt on Pellene, and ravaged the territory of Sicyon, returned home by the Isthmus.

The errors which Aratus had committed in this short campaign were so many and gross, that Polybius is led into a digression to explain how so great a man could be capable of folly, such, the historian says, as could not be surpassed. An assembly of the League was held soon after his return, in which he found himself the object of general indignation as the author of the recent disaster; and his adversaries did not fail to point out how much the fault of his illegal usurpation was aggravated by the remembrance of the many similar calamities which he had drawn upon the state by his military incapacity. Still, his influence was so predominant, that, though he could not venture altogether to vindicate his conduct, by an appeal to the indulgence of his audience, on the ground of former services, he completely turned the current of public feeling in his favour, and gained the assent of the assembly to all his measures. It decreed that an embassy should be sent to Philip, and the other allies, to call for succour against the Ætolians, and to propose that the Messenians should be admitted into the confederacy; and that, in the mean while, the general should raise an army of 5000 foot and 500 horse for the protection of Messenia, and should fix the con-

tingents of Sparta and Messene. Each was to furnish 2500 foot and 250 horse; so that Aratus would have had at his disposal a standing army of 10,000 foot and 1000 horse, a force which might have seemed adequate, without foreign aid, to guard Peloponnesus against invasion from Ætolia. But Aratus may already have begun to distrust the fidelity of Sparta; and this is the best excuse that can be offered for this second invitation of Macedonian interference in the affairs of Greece. An Ætolian assembly was held about the same time, which, as if unconscious of any wrong, declared its purpose to remain at peace with the Lacedæmonians and Messenians, and all other states, but to make war on the Achæans if they should admit the Messenians into their alliance: a threat which Polybius considers as glaringly inconsistent with their pacific language, but which expressed their resolution to resist the extension of the Achæo-Macedonian League. This was now the point on which the question of peace or war turned; and the Macedonian government, when, in conjunction, it seems, with the other allies, it adopted the proposal of the Achæans with regard to Messene, virtually decided for war; yet they did not treat the past aggressions of the Ætolians as a ground for active hostility, but proclaimed their intention to continue at peace with them.

The Ætolians, however, still thought it better to act as if war had been declared than to declare it in words. They entered into secret negotiations with Sparta, and they took the earliest opportunity to make a fresh inroad into Peloponnesus. An Illyrian chief named Scerdilaidas, who, with Demetrius of Pharos, in spite of their treaty with Rome, had made an expedition with ninety galleys towards the south, after a fruitless attempt on Pylos, had parted from his associate, and, while Demetrius with fifty galleys made for the Cyclades, sailing homeward with the rest, touched at Naupactus. Dorimachus and Scopas, who, through intelligence with a faction in the Arcadian town of Cynætha, hoped to become masters of it, engaged the Illyrian, for a share of the spoil, to aid them in their enterprise.

Cynætha was unhappily distinguished among the Arcadian cities by the long prevalence of internal discord, and the sanguinary excesses of party rage with which it had been afflicted. Polybius, in one of his most pleasing and instructive digressions, traces this singular ferocity of the Cynæthians to their neglect of the institutions which chiefly contributed to soften and elevate the character of their countrymen, early instruction in sacred music, and the frequent celebration of religious festivals. After a long series of convulsions, always accompanied with massacres, banishments, and confiscations, one of the parties, having expelled its antagonists, committed the guard of the city to an Achæan garrison. But growing, perhaps, impatient of this burden, they afterward accepted the overtures of the exiles, and permitted them to return, with the sanction of the Achæans, who withdrew their troops. The exiles, however, who were about 300 in number, were no sooner restored than they opened a secret negotiation with the Ætolian chiefs, and it was to take advantage of their perfidy

\* Polybius's account of their movements, notwithstanding its minuteness, is very obscure, as appears from the various ways in which it has been understood by Leake (l. c.); Lucas, p. 108; Merleker, p. 43; Helwing, p. 173; and Schorn, p. 142.

that Dorimachus and Seopas united their forces with those of Scerdilaidas. They marched across Achaia, and arriving at Cynætha in the night, were admitted by some of the conspirators, and soon made themselves masters of the town. They then immediately began an indiscriminate massacre, in which their friends were the first victims; all who were suspected of concealing property were put to the torture. When they had finished the work of pillage, they proceeded to attack a celebrated temple of Artemis at Lusi, between Cynætha and Clitor, but allowed themselves to be propitiated by a portion of the sacred treasure, the more willingly as they were about to make an attempt on Clitor. Having been repulsed by the Clitorians, they began their retreat, collected fresh booty from the temple lands at Lusi, set fire to Cynætha, and embarked at Rhium with their plunder, which they brought home safely. During their stay in Arcadia, Aratus had sent to solicit succours from Philip, and in the mean while had assembled the force of the League, and called upon Sparta and Messenia for their contingents. Sparta sent only a handful of men to save appearances. Still, he might have attacked the invaders on many points of their march with the prospect of an easy victory; but, as if to compensate for his recent temerity by an equal degree of inertness, he suffered them to pass unmolested. Taurion was more active; he prevailed on Demetrius, who had been chased from the Cyclades by the Rhodians, and had put into Cenchrææ, to transport his galleys across the Isthmus, and intercept the Ætolians; but he arrived two days too late. Philip, too, set his army in motion as soon as he received the summons of Aratus; but he did not reach Corinth until the emergency was past. He, however, invited all the allies to send deputies to hold a congress with him at Corinth, and in the mean while advanced to Tegea for the purpose of restoring tranquillity at Sparta, which had been lately the scene of violent tumults. The great body of the Spartans, notwithstanding the changes introduced by Antigonus, retained all the feelings of animosity towards Macedonia and the Achæans which had been infused into them by Cleomenes. They eagerly longed and hoped for the return of their hero, and, as long as he lived, kept the throne vacant, or, rather, treated it as filled. They viewed the proceedings of the Ætolians with secret sympathy, and only waited for an opportunity of declaring themselves. Three of the ephors, who were favourable to the alliance with Ætolia, fearing that they might be denounced by their colleague Adeimantus, caused him to be murdered, with several other partisans of the Macedonian interest, and immediately sent envoys to pacify Philip, who met them as he was crossing Mount Parthenius, and directed that commissioners should be appointed by the ephors to confer with him at Tegea. Ten were despatched accordingly, with Omias at their head, and pleaded the cause of their party in the royal council, endeavouring to throw the blame of the late commotion on Adeimantus, and to soothe Philip by the strongest protestations of fidelity. But when they had withdrawn, the voices of the council were unani-

mously raised against the Spartans, though opinions were divided as to the measure of punishment which it deserved. There were some who advised Philip to make an example of Sparta, as Alexander had of Thebes. The elder and more discreet counsellors thought that it would be sufficient to punish and remove the authors of the tumult, and to lodge all the functions of the government in the hands of the opposite party. But the young king carried his forbearance far beyond even this decree of lenity. He laid down the broad principle that, as chief of the League, he had no right to interfere, otherwise than by remonstrance or advice, in the domestic concerns of any of the allied states, so long as they did not affect the general interests of the confederacy. It would be strange, he observed, if the Spartans, now that they professed unshaken attachment to the common cause, should receive harsher treatment from him than from his father (Antigonus), who had spared them while they were open enemies. He accordingly dismissed the Spartan ministers, and sent Petreus, one of his friends, along with them, to exhort the people to steadfastness, and to receive oaths of fidelity from the government. Polybius supposes that Philip's language was prompted by Aratus; and no doubt it expressed the maxim which he must have wished to see observed by his powerful ally. But Philip was of the age to which popularity is most attractive, and a liberal sentiment most congenial.

He then returned to Corinth, where he found the deputies of the allies waiting his arrival, and immediately opened the congress. Every state had to complain of some injury from the Ætolians, and war was unanimously decreed against them. The decree, however, not only set forth their recent aggressions, but declared the resolution of the League to recover whatever territory or city, belonging to any of the allies, they had conquered since the death of Demetrius, Philip's father; to restore all who had been compelled to enter into the relation of sympathy with them to entire independence, and to reinstate the Amphictyonic council under its ancient laws in the control over the temple at Delphi, which they had usurped. Such, Polybius remarks, was the formal beginning of the Social War; and envoys were sent in the name of the congress to procure the ratification of the decree from each of the confederates. Yet Philip addressed a letter to the Ætolians, in which he declared himself still willing to listen to any plea which they might have to allege for their conduct, but warned them that they must not think to shelter themselves from just retaliation under the pretence that their aggressions were the acts of individuals, not of the state. To this letter he received an answer, proposing a conference at Rhium. The offer was made with the belief that it would not be accepted. But when the Ætolian chiefs found that Philip was ready to meet them, they retracted their proposal, on the pretext that they could not treat with him until they were authorized by the great council of the nation. It met very soon after for the annual election; but, as if to show how little was to be expected from its sense of justice, it

invested Scopas, the associate of Dorimachus, with the chief magistracy. The Achæan assembly, which was held about the same time at Ægium, ratified the decree of the congress at Corinth, and proclaimed public license of reprisals against the Ætolians. Philip appeared at this assembly, and addressed it in a long speech, which was received with great applause, and a vote was passed by which all the honours conferred on his predecessors were revived in his favour. He then returned to Macedonia to make preparations during the winter for the ensuing campaign, leaving a strong impression of his ability and moderation on the minds of the Greeks. It was already clear that he possessed extraordinary talents and activity, and that he was quite equal to the government of his kingdom. In the course of the winter he not only ordered fresh levies, and took measures to secure his northwest frontier against his barbarian neighbours, but ventured to seek an interview with Scerdilidas in his own dominions. The Illyrian prince had been defrauded by the Ætolians of his share of the booty which he had helped to win. He was, therefore, well disposed to meet Philip's advances, pleased with the confidence placed in his generosity, and easily induced to become the ally of Macedonia, and to engage, for a yearly subsidy of twenty talents, to make war on the Ætolians with a squadron of thirty galleys.

The result of the embassies sent in the name of the congress to receive the ratification of the decree showed how large a part of the burden and risk of the war would fall on Macedonia. The Acarnanians alone seem to have pledged themselves honestly and without reserve to the common cause, though none had so much reason to dread the enmity of the Ætolians. The Epirotes, though they likewise ratified the decree, passed a resolution not to begin hostilities until Philip should have set the example; and they represented to the Ætolian envoys that they were determined to remain at peace. Even the Messenians, though the war had arisen in their defence, declined to enter into it immediately. They were governed by an oligarchical party, which considered this policy as the best calculated to secure their possessions from the danger of another Ætolian invasion; and informed the envoys of the League that they would not declare war until Phigalea, which now enabled the Ætolians to infect their border, should have been taken from them. At Sparta the ministers of the congress were dismissed without an answer: a sign, Polybius thought, of perplexity; but which seems rather to indicate that the adverse parties balanced each other. New ephors came into office not long after, who were disposed to maintain the alliance with Macedonia; but it seems that about the same time the death of Cleomenes became known, and encouraged the leaders of the opposite party to make a fresh attempt. At their request, an Ætolian envoy was sent to Sparta; and they then called upon the ephors to introduce him to the assembly of the people, and to fill up the vacancy of the throne. The ephors reserved the question of the succession for future consideration, but fearing to irritate the

younger citizens, who were eager for change, consented to grant an audience to Machatas, the envoy. Yet, in the assembly, the recollection of the evils inflicted on the country by the Ætolian invasion, which some of the elder speakers contrasted with the forbearance of Antigonus, turned the current of public feeling against his proposals. The Macedonian alliance was confirmed, and the envoy dismissed. But this failure seems only to have instigated the leaders of the disappointed party to bolder and more decisive measures. A festival, which was celebrated with an armed procession of the younger citizens to the Brazen House, and with a sacrifice performed there by the ephors, afforded an opportunity, which they seized not the less willingly because it involved the profanation of a sanctuary hitherto regarded as inviolably sacred. They engaged some of their young partisans to fall upon the ephors while they were busied with the sacrifice. All were murdered; and the terror inspired by this deed quelled all resistance to the conspirators. Some members of the gerusia were put to death; all who had opposed the Ætolian envoy in the assembly were banished, and the ephorate filled with men devoted to the party, who made it their first business to take measures for concluding an alliance with the Ætolians. Machatas, who had not yet, it seems, reached home, was recalled; and in the mean while royalty was restored, yet not with a strict adherence to the constitutional order of succession. The place of Cleomenes, indeed, was filled by the legitimate heir, Agesipolis, a grandson of Cleombrotus, the rival of Leonidas. He was under age, and his uncle Cleomones was appointed his guardian; so that it was evident the whole business of the royal office would, for some time, devolve on his colleague. But in the house of Procles, though the murdered Archidamus had left two sons, who were still living, as well as others of the same line, a man named Lycurgus, who had no lawful title, was raised to the throne. Polybius intimates that he was not even an Heracleid, and represents it as notorious that he purchased his elevation by a bribe of a talent to each of the ephors. But it is probable that the chief ground of their preference was, that they could rely on his devotion to the interests of their party. Machatas then, on his return to Sparta, found the objects of his mission accomplished, and had only to exhort his friends to close the door against reconciliation with their late allies by an early commencement of hostilities. Lycurgus accordingly made an irruption soon after into Argolis, where he surprised several towns on the coast, and then proceeded to lay siege to the Athenæum, the fortress which Cleomenes had seized at the beginning of the last war. Machatas, on his way home, persuaded the Eleans to follow the example of Sparta.

Such was the state of affairs in Greece when Aratus went out of office, and was succeeded by his son, who bore his father's name, but seems to have been endowed with no great share of his abilities. The Achæan League, surrounded by active enemies, had no ally nearer than Macedonia to whom it could look for effectual aid; and its own resources had been very much reduced by its exertions in the

Cleomenic War. Some of the mercenaries who served it in that war had never received their full pay, and, consequently, the new general found it difficult to draw others into the service. Philip took the field early in the spring, with an army of 15,000 foot and 800 horse, and marched from Thessaly into Epirus with the design of invading Ætolia; a movement by which, if he had executed it without delay, he would, as Polybius believed, soon have brought the war to a close. But he yielded to the solicitation of the Epirots, who wished to become masters of Ambracia, and laid siege to Ambracus, a place of great strength in the vicinity of that city; and the time which he thus wasted was employed by the Ætolians to the best advantage, both with a view to defence and offence. Dorimachus, indeed, was repulsed, with some loss, in an attempt on Ægira, through the greediness with which his troops fell on the plunder. But the Ætolian general Euripidas, who had been sent to take the command of the Elean forces, ravaged the north of Achaia with impunity, and fortified an ancient stronghold called Teichos, near Cape Araxos, which enabled him to infest the territories of Dyme, Pharæ, and Tritæa with continual inroads. The people of these three cantons, after having repeatedly applied for succour to their general without effect, resolved to withdraw their contributions from the League, and to apply them to the maintenance of a body of mercenaries for their own protection. Thus the League seemed to be in danger of internal dissolution, while it was most vigorously assailed from without. Polybius charges the younger Aratus with supineness and neglect; but his position would probably have been embarrassing, even to a man of extraordinary energy.

While Philip lay before Ambracus, Scopas, with the bulk of the Ætolian forces, marched through Thessaly into Pieria, and, after having ravaged the plain country, advanced against Dium, the Macedonian Olympia. The inhabitants abandoned the town at his approach, and he found nothing but the buildings whereon to wreak his fury. These, whether private dwellings or public monuments, he destroyed or defaced; he dismantled the walls, demolished the gymnasium, set fire to the precincts of the sacred ground where the games were celebrated, stately galleries or cloisters richly adorned with choice works of art, and threw down all the statues of the Macedonian kings. In Ætolia this barbarous outrage was regarded as a glorious triumph, proving that, while their own land remained untouched, no enemy's country was secure from their victorious arms. Philip received the mortifying intelligence while he was still detained before Ambracus, which he only compelled to capitulate by extraordinary exertions at the end of forty days, the garrison, 500 Ætolians, being allowed to retire. He then delivered possession of the town to the Epirots, and proceeded through Acarnania, where he was joined by the Acarnanian contingent, 2000 foot and 200 horse, into Ætolia. Here, after some slight advantages, he encamped on the Achelous near Stratus, and ravaged the adjacent country. He was thus occupied, when Achaean envoys came

to request that he would make a diversion in their favour by the invasion of Elis, where his army would find ample booty. Professing to require time for deliberation on this proposal, and, keeping the envoys by his side, he moved forward towards the southern coast, by Metropolis, Conope, and Ithorea, leaving the town of Metropolis and Ithorea, which were deserted at his approach, in ruins, and wasting the country through which he passed, until he came to Pæanium, a strong place, which he took by storm, and, having razed it to the ground, carried away the materials of the houses with a view to the siege of Ceniadæ. The Ætolians had made preparations to defend the citadel of Ceniadæ, but, after the fall of Pæanium, abandoned it in terror. Philip, perceiving the manifold advantages of its position, both as a place of embarkation for Peloponnesus, and with a view to operations in Ætolia, having first made himself master of Elæus, another fortress on the Calydonian coast, was proceeding to fortify Ceniadæ, and to connect the harbour, by a wall, with the citadel, when he was interrupted by the news that the Dardanians were collecting their forces to invade Macedonia during his absence. He immediately dismissed the Achaean envoys with a promise that, as soon as he had provided for the safety of his kingdom, he would endeavour to succour his allies, and then set out for Macedonia by the same road which he had taken southward. At the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf he fell in with Demetrius the Pharian, who had been driven out of Illyria by Æmilius Paulus, and had made his escape with a few galleys.\* He was kindly received by Philip, who directed him to proceed to Corinth, and thence repair by land to his court. He himself reached Pella before the Dardanians had entered Macedonia, and, though they were near the border, they were so much alarmed by the news of his return, that they abandoned their enterprise and disbanded their forces. Philip, likewise, finding that the danger was past, dismissed his troops to their homes for the vintage, and fixed his own residence for the rest of the summer at Larissa.

At the next election of the Ætolian magistrates Scopas was succeeded by his friend Dorimachus, who signalized the beginning of his administration by an achievement like that which had gained so much renown for his predecessor. He made an expedition into Epirus, in the course of which, among other acts of wanton havoc, he destroyed the temple of Dodona. After this the season seemed too far advanced for military operations; and neither friends nor foes expected that Philip would stir again before the spring. But when he took up his quarters at Larissa he appears to have meditated a movement which was quite at variance with the common rules of Grecian warfare, but, on that very account, afforded the fairer prospect of brilliant success. He set out from Larissa, in the depth of winter, with a small force, 3000 heavy-armed, 2000 targeteers, 300 Cretan bowmen, and 400 horse; and, taking the route of Eubœa, Locris, and Boeotia,

\* Polyb. iii., 19, 8. Afterward, indeed (iv., 66, 4), he says that he arrived ἐφ' ἐνός ἡμέρας. But Zonaras also (viii., 20) relates that he escaped μετὰ πολλῶν χρημάτων.

arrived at Corinth before any rumour of his approach had reached Peloponnesus. Having ordered the city gates to be closed, and the roads strictly guarded, to prevent the tidings from passing to the enemy, he next day sent for Aratus from Sicyon, and at the same time, by letters, appointed a day on which the general should meet him with the forces of the League at Caphyæ. After his conference with Aratus he continued his march, and encamped in the territory of Phlius. It happened that the Ætolian general, Euripidas, who had fixed his quarters at Psophis in Arcadia, had chosen the same time for an inroad into the territory of Sicyon with a body of about 2000 men. He had passed the Macedonian encampment in the night, and was about to cross the Sicyonian border the next morning, when he learned Philip's vicinity from some foragers who fell into his hands. Keeping his discovery to himself, he gave immediate orders for retreat, hoping, by a forced march, again to pass the Macedonian army before it had entered the plain of Stymphalus, so as to return by Pheneæ to Psophis unobserved. But he was deceived by his calculation, and fell in with the enemy in the passes of Mount Apelauros, between Phlius and Stymphalus. Seeing that an engagement was unavoidable, and believing defeat certain, he basely abandoned his men, and escaped with a few horsemen over the mountains to Psophis. His troops, whom he had not even warned of their danger, and who, at first sight, mistook the Macedonians for Achæans, were completely routed, 1200 taken, and almost all the rest slain. The fame of this victory was, to most of the Peloponnesians, the first report which they had heard of Philip's arrival.

At Caphyæ he was joined by the younger Aratus and about 4000 Achæans, and indulged his troops, who had suffered great hardships amid the deep snows of Mount Oligyrtus, with two days' rest; and then proceeded to lay siege to Psophis. The place, situate at the confluence of two rapid streams, Aroanius and Erymanthus, was so strong, both by nature and art, that Philip seems to have owed his success, in a great measure, to the boldness of the attempt. When he had stormed the town, the citadel capitulated. The Elean garrison was allowed to depart, and Euripidas to return to Ætolia. Philip then assembled the Achæans, and, having pointed out the importance of the place, delivered it into their possession as a token of his good will. To this favour he shortly after added the cession of Lasium, which he found evacuated by the Eleans. After a short repose at Olympia, he advanced into the vale of Elis, to collect the booty which it offered in greater abundance than any other district of Greece. The Eleans still retained their love of rural pursuits, and all the wealth of the people was spread over the face of the country; and the attempt which they made to secure it only enabled the enemy to take possession of it the more easily and quickly. A great multitude of husbandmen, with their flocks and herds, and other moveable riches, sought refuge in a stronghold called Thalame, which was deemed impregnable, and was defended by two hundred mercenaries under the Elean

general Amphidamas. But when Philip had overcome the difficulties of the first approach, Amphidamas surrendered the sooner, as he could maintain no control over such a motley mass. The conqueror carried away more than 5000 captives, besides cattle without number; and the camp was so encumbered with booty, that he was obliged, on that account, to hasten his return to Olympia. An expedition which he next undertook against Triphylia was no less successful, though Dorimachus, at the request of the Eleans, had sent Philidas with 600 Ætolians to their aid. After the reduction of Aliphera, the Triphylian towns opened their gates to the king, so that he had made himself master of the whole country in the course of six days. The Phigæans, who had begun to feel their connexion with Ætolia burdensome, now took up arms against the pirates, and, having compelled them to retire, surrendered their city to Philip. The hinderance which had kept Messenia neutral was thus removed. As Philip moved forward to Megalopolis, the Spartans believed that they should be the next to feel his presence; they evacuated the Athenæum and razed it to the ground, and began to remove their property from the country into the city. Yet an attempt which had been made just before to effect a counter-revolution had signally failed. One Chilon, a man of the royal blood, who believed that he had been unjustly excluded from the throne which was usurped by Lycurgus, formed a conspiracy, into which he drew two hundred associates, to overturn the government. His first measure was to put to death all the ephors as they sat at table—a fit retribution for the crime by which they had risen to power—and he then proceeded with like intention to the house of his rival; but Lycurgus was concealed by his neighbours, and escaped to the frontier. Chilon, whose hopes were dashed by this failure, now only persevered because it was too late to recede; and he shortly found that, though he was able to get rid of a few more of his enemies, he could not gain a single new friend to his cause; even the proposal of a new agrarian law, on which he chiefly relied, as the engine by which Cleomenes had accomplished his ends, produced no effect on the multitude. It seems to have been felt that he represented a party which was directly opposed to the policy of Cleomenes, and which leaned on Macedonia for support. Accordingly, when he found it necessary to fly from Sparta, he took refuge in Achaia. Philip, however, did not think it advisable, at this juncture, to invade Laconia, but proceeded to pass the rest of the winter at Argos.

While he was thus successful in all his undertakings, and was unfolding such extraordinary talents, hands were at work spinning a web of intrigues around him, which, as it thickened, threatened to fetter his activity and to mar his prospects. Antigonus, by his will, had assigned the principal place in his council to Apelles, an ambitious, overbearing man, who was willing enough to promote his master's interests so long as his own influence was supreme in the cabinet, but impatient of a rival, and capable of sacrificing every principle of honour and duty to pride and jealousy. Apelles viewed the course of events in Greece, as it

was probably viewed by every Macedonian statesman, as affording an opportunity for reducing Greece to complete subjection; and, when he accompanied Philip into Peloponnesus, he made it his aim to accustom the Achæans to the same state of dependance and acknowledgment of inferiority to which the Thessalians had already submitted, though they still retained the forms of a free Constitution, and even looked down on the Macedonians, as subjects of a monarchy, with some degree of contempt. In the prosecution of this plan, he encouraged the Macedonians to turn the Achæans out of their quarters, and to deprive them of their share of the booty, and he endeavoured to break their spirit by the infliction of corporeal punishments for every slight fault. During Philip's last sojourn at Olympia, some of the Achæans had complained of this conduct to Aratus, who reported their grievances to the king, and Philip had promised to protect them, and had enjoined Apelles to desist from all encroachments on their rights and on the authority of the Achæan general.

Apelles now regarded Aratus as his enemy, and endeavoured both to estrange the king from him and to undermine his influence among his countrymen. He sought out and caressed his political adversaries, and represented to Philip that, so long as he followed the advice of Aratus, he would obtain nothing from the Achæans beyond the letter of the treaty; but if he would be guided by different counsels, and support the opposite party, he would be able to make use of the Peloponnesians at his pleasure. Philip quite agreed with his minister as to the desirableness of the end, and adopted his suggestions as to the means. At the next election, under colour of an expedition against the Eleans, he stopped at Ægium on his way, and, by secret influence, caused Timoxenus, the friend of Aratus, to be rejected, and Eperatus, a man, according to Polybius, of small abilities, but perhaps a zealous partisan, to be elected general. He then continued his march westward, and encamped before Teichos, which the Elean garrison, not venturing to stand a siege, presently surrendered, and, having restored it to the Dymæans, he made an inroad into the territory of Elis, and returned to Dyme with a great booty.

Apelles had been unremitting in his endeavours to inspire the king with a distrust of Aratus, and, shortly after the election, he had found a pretext for a new and bolder calumny. Amphilamachus, the Elean general, who was taken prisoner at Thalamæ, when he was brought to Olympia, had obtained an audience of Philip, and undertook, if he was allowed to return home, to negotiate an alliance between Elis and Macedonia. Philip was thus induced to release him without ransom, and empowered him to make very liberal offers to his countrymen. But it appeared that he had greatly overrated his influence or his powers of persuasion, for, instead of gaining their assent to his proposals, he became an object of their suspicions. Apelles imputed this failure to the artifices of Aratus, who, he pretended, had secretly warned Amphilamachus to beware how he endangered the independence of Peloponnesus by such an addition to the power of Macedonia. This

charge he ventured to repeat in Philip's presence when confronted with Aratus, who, as he was unable immediately to prove his innocence, could only request the king to suspend his judgment until he should have more fully investigated the truth. During Philip's stay at Dyme the truth came to light. The recent invasion had excited the suspicion of the Eleans against Amphilamachus, and a design was formed to arrest him, and to send him in chains to Ætolia; but, having discovered his danger in time, he fled to Dyme, and Aratus immediately begged Philip to examine him on the allegations of Apelles. His statement convinced Philip that the charge brought against Aratus was utterly groundless. This discovery, while it revived the king's confidence in Aratus, shook that which he had hitherto reposed in the author of the detected calumny, and he soon found other reasons for deeper distrust of his minister.

Eperatus had scarcely entered upon his office before it became manifest that, either from want of energy or of credit, he would never be able to farther his patron's views. Philip was in need of money and provisions for the pay and maintenance of his army, and he caused an assembly to be held at Ægium, in the hope of obtaining a supply. But, as the new general possessed no weight, and that of Aratus and his party was thrown into the opposite scale, the assembly showed no disposition to meet the king's wishes. He now perceived the error into which he had been drawn by the counsels of Apelles, and, having induced the government to transfer the assembly to Sicyon, he, in the mean while, made overtures for a reconciliation with Aratus and his son, expressed his regret for the steps into which he had been misled by Apelles, and solicited the renewal of their friendship and good offices. He soon reaped the fruits of this condescension. When the influence of Aratus was exerted in his favour, the assembly displayed the utmost readiness to comply with his requests. It granted an immediate subsidy of fifty talents as three months' pay for his army, and a large supply of corn, and decreed that, for the future, he should receive seventeen talents a month as long as he should carry on the war in Peloponnesus. He now resolved to equip a fleet, as the most effectual instrument of annoyance to the enemy, who would neither be able to guard themselves nor to succour one another against attacks from the sea-side, which could never be foreseen. He therefore collected all the naval forces of the League, together with his own, at Lechæum, and exercised his Macedonians in nautical evolutions, until he had rendered them expert in all the operations of naval warfare. But, in the mean while, Apelles, seeing his credit declining, and despairing of recovering his master's confidence, resolved to break the power which he was no longer allowed to wield, and to thwart every plan adopted without his concurrence, hoping, it seems, that, by a series of failures and disasters, Philip might be compelled to abandon himself to his guidance. Among the other great officers whom Antigonus had appointed by his will, two, Leontius and Megaleas, were entirely devoted to his interests, and, by malicious insinuations, he had alienated Philip from the other two, Taurion



and Alexander, the commander of the guard, and had caused them to be removed from their posts. Leontius and Megaleas entered into his schemes, and it was concerted among them that Apelles should, on some pretext, retire to Chalcis, and intercept all supplies which the king had to expect from the north, while his two associates, remaining by the king's side, should take every opportunity of baffling his enterprises.

The first operations of the fleet were directed against Cephallenia, which had long been the arsenal that supplied the Ætolians with most of the vessels they used for their expeditions. As well on this account as for the conveniences of his position, it was an object of the highest importance to Philip, who set about the conquest of the island with the siege of Palæ, which contained large magazines of corn. Here, according to his previous requisition, he was met by re-enforcements from Messenia, Acarnania, Epirus, and Illyria. The town was accessible only on one side, where there was a small plain, on which he stationed his engines and light troops, so as to cover the operations of his miners. When they had undermined the wall to the length of two furlongs, he felt so sure of victory that he went up in person to call upon the besieged to surrender. On their refusal, he ordered the props on which the wall was resting to be fired. It immediately fell, and he sent Leontius, with his targeteers, to mount the breach. But the traitor, faithful to his compact with Apelles, found means, with the help of some of his officers whom he had previously corrupted, thrice in succession to check and embarrass his troops, after they had gained the top of the broken wall, and were on the point of pouring into the city. In the end, they were repulsed with severe loss; and Philip, seeing symptoms of treachery which he could not with certainty trace to their source, raised the siege, and for the present abandoned his designs on the island.

While he lay before Palæ, Lycurgus invaded Messenia, and Dorimachus made an irruption into Thessaly with one half of the Ætolian forces to divert him from his purpose. The Acarnanians now sent envoys to advise him to invade Ætolia during the absence of Dorimachus; while the Messenians implored his protection, and pointed out to him that, during the continuance of the summer winds, he could reach Messenia in a day from Cephallenia. But they seemed to have overlooked that he might be detained in Messenia by the same cause through the summer. Leontius and his associates, who clearly foresaw this result, for this reason warmly supported the proposal of the Messenians. But Aratus, with superior force of argument, maintained the opposite opinion, and urged him not to neglect so fair an opportunity of overrunning Ætolia without resistance. Philip, who had already begun to distrust Leontius, adopted the advice of Aratus, and, having directed Eperatus to succour the Messenians, transported his vessels across the Leucadian Isthmus, and sailed to Limnæa, in the southeast corner of the Gulf of Ambracia. Here he was joined by the whole force of Acarnania, eager to avenge the repeated injuries which they had suffered from the Ætolians. The Epirots, who were

equally zealous, were unable, on account of the extent of their country and the shortness of the notice, to come up in time.

The main object of the expedition was to surprise Thermus. Leaving a sufficient force at Limnæa to guard the baggage, Philip set out in the evening, and, by a long night march, reached the Achelous, between Conope and Stratus, at daybreak. Leontius, who knew that the success of the expedition depended on rapidity of movement, wishing to gain time for the Ætolians, would have persuaded Philip to allow his troops an interval of repose; but Aratus conjured him not to risk the loss of the golden opportunity by any needless delay; and Philip, now more and more disgusted with Leontius, crossed the Achelous, and pursued his march without intermission, wasting the country through which he passed, until he reached Metapa, a town on the western edge of the Lake Trichonis, about seven or eight miles from Thermus. It had been abandoned by the Ætolians, and he occupied it with 500 men for the security of his rear. The approach to Thermus from Metapa was a series of defiles overhung with rocks and thick woods; and for the last three or four miles, beginning from the village of Pamphlia, the road ran along a narrow crest, with precipices on each side, until it opened on a small elevated plain, where stood Thermus, the citadel of Ætolia. Philip, using every precaution of a wary general, though he saw no enemy, and leaving another detachment at Pamphlia, arrived at Thermus long before nightfall. The Ætolians, who had never thought that he would venture so far into the heart of their country, and had no time to make preparations for defence, had abandoned the place, but had not removed any of its treasures. The plunder of the houses and of the neighbouring villages occupied the remainder of the day. The next morning the invaders, having selected the most valuable part of the spoil, burned all that they could not carry off, among the rest 15,000 suits of armour, which were found in the public armories. So far, Polybius remarks, they conformed to the rules of civilized warfare. But before they quitted the place, to retaliate for the destruction of Dium and Dodona, they set fire to the sacred buildings, and levelled them with the ground, defaced all the works of art, and threw down the statues, which were not fewer than two thousand, sparing only those of the gods from total ruin. Polybius condemns this imitation of a bad example as not less impolitic than sacrilegious and barbarous; and no doubt Philip lost an opportunity for a display of generosity, which would have greatly raised his reputation and strengthened his power; but this act of vengeance was probably the main object of his expedition, and there is no reason to attribute any very important share in it, as the historian suggests,\* to the influence of Demetrius the Pharian, or, on the other hand, to suppose that Aratus viewed it with much regret. Philip professed, at least, to regard himself as the minister of Divine retribution; and many parts of the blackened ruins were inscribed with a line composed by his foster-brother, Samus, son of Chrysogonus, in which the flames that scathed Thermus were wittily described as a bolt of

\* Polyb., v., 12; vii., 14; ix., 23.

the god whose sanctuary had been profaned at Dium.\*

When this was accomplished he set out on his retreat. In the mean while the Ætolian general, Alexander, had assembled a body of 3000 men, with which, as soon as the Macedonians began to descend from the table-land of Thermus, he attacked their rear; but he was drawn into an ambuscade, and totally defeated; and Philip, having destroyed Pamphias and Metapa, brought his army out of the defiles in safety, and encamped near Acræ, not far from the western bank of the Achelous. The next day he ravaged the country about Conope, and on the third marched up the vale, and crossed the river near Stratus, where he made a short halt, having heard that an Ætolian force of about 4000 men was assembled in the town, and hoping to draw it into an engagement. But no enemy appeared until the rear of his column had passed the town, when it was charged by the Ætolian cavalry, aided by a body of Cretan bowmen. This attack, however, was soon repelled; and the army, pursuing its march without farther molestation, arrived safely at the camp at Limnæa. Here he celebrated a thanksgiving sacrifice, and gave a banquet to his principal officers.

Leontius and Megaleas were so deeply disappointed and dejected by their master's triumph, that they could not even assume a decent degree of cheerfulness at table, and attracted the king's attention by the contrast which he perceived between their behaviour and that of his other guests. The fumes of the wine at length thawed their reserve and raised their courage, without restoring their good-humour. When the entertainment was over, they waylaid Aratus as he was returning to his tent, and assailed him, first with invectives, and then with stones. A crowd gathered round them, and a scene of confusion ensued. The noise reached the king's ear, and he sent to learn the cause of the uproar. Leontius disappeared; but Megaleas, and one Crinon, who had taken part with him, were summoned into the royal presence, and sharply reprimanded. But, instead of offering an apology, they so far forgot themselves as to declare their purpose of revenging themselves on Aratus. Philip, incensed at their insolence, ordered them to find surety for the payment of twenty talents, and, in the mean while, to be taken into custody. The next day he sent for Aratus, and promised to give him satisfaction for the insult he had received. Leontius came, soon after, to the royal tent, with some of his targeteers, thinking to strike terror into the young king, and asked who had presumed to arrest Megaleas. But when Philip replied, in a firm tone, that it had been done by his own order, he was cowed, and withdrew, only uttering an angry murmur. On his voyage back to Corinth, Philip touched at Leucas, and remained there two days, to give time for the sale of the booty, and, during this interval, brought Megaleas and Crinon to trial before a council of his friends. Aratus came forward as the accuser, not only of Megaleas, but of Leontius, and, it is said, unmasked their conspiracy with Apelles, and

established his charge by proof and testimony, though it is difficult to conceive how he could have found evidence of such a secret compact. The court, however, was satisfied, and unanimously condemned the prisoners. Crinon, being unable, it seems, to pay the penalty, remained in confinement. Megaleas was released on the undertaking of Leontius to become his surety.

In the mean while, Dorimachus had entirely failed in his expedition to Thessaly, where he found Chrysogonus and Petreus so well prepared to receive him, that he did not venture, to descend into the plains. As soon as he heard of Philip's irruption into Ætolia, he hastened back to defend his country, but found the enemy gone. Lycurgus had effected as little in Messenia; and, though he afterward made himself master of the town of Tegea, he was unable to take the citadel, to which all the inhabitants had retired. Philip, on his arrival at Corinth, immediately despatched couriers to summon the Peloponnesian allies to meet him at Tegea within three days, and, setting forward the next morning, reached Tegea by the way of Argos on the second evening. Here he was joined by the Achæan forces under the command of Aratus, and, after a night's rest, resumed his march towards Laconia. To conceal his movements from the enemy, he took a circuitous route through a wild country, and, on the fourth day, came down into the vale of the Eurotas, and encamped at Amyclæ, to the amazement of the Spartans, who had only just heard of the destruction of Thermus, and had begun to think of sending Lycurgus to succour the Ætolians. He then ravaged the country downward to the coast of the Laconian Gulf, and, after an unsuccessful attempt on Asine, extended his incursions as far as Tenarus on the one side, and Boizæ, near Malea, on the other. In the mean while, Lycurgus had intercepted a body of Messenians, who, having arrived too late at Tegea, were making their way to join the Macedonian army over the mountains of the eastern coast, and compelled them to retreat with the loss of their horses and baggage. Elated by this success, on his return to Sparta he resolved to make a stand against Philip, when he should pass by Sparta on his way back. For this purpose he occupied the heights of the Menelaion, which rise above the eastern bank of the river opposite the city, with 2000 men, and ordered the remaining forces of Sparta to be in readiness, on a preconcerted signal, to be drawn up on the space between the city and the western bank; and, the more effectually to obstruct the enemy's passage on that side of the river, he, by means of a dam, laid the low grounds under water. Philip, however, dislodged him from his position, worsted the Spartan cavalry which threatened his rear, and brought his whole army safely through the pass, and encamped for the night a quarter of a mile above the city. On his road to Tegea he halted, to survey the field of battle, near Sellasia, and offered a sacrifice on the summit both of Olympus and Evan. On his return to Corinth he found envoys from Rhodes and Chios, who had been sent to offer their mediation for the purpose of terminating the war, which the islanders probably found detrimental to their

\* Ὅπως τὸ θεῶν ὁ βίος δεικνύται. It can hardly be translated so as to preserve the allusion.

commerce. He professed himself disposed for peace, and encouraged them to address themselves to the *Ætoli*ans; but in his heart he was bent on the continuance of the war, from which he had reaped honour and profit, and he was now meditating an expedition into *Phocis*, from which he anticipated some important advantages. While he was making his preparations for this expedition at *Lechæum*, a violent mutiny broke out at *Corinth* among the troops under the command of *Leontius* and his associates, who had taught them to believe that they were wronged in the distribution of the spoil. They plundered the lodgings of the king's principal friends, and even broke into the royal residence. Philip, hearing of the tumult, hastened back from *Lechæum*, and, by judicious management, restored tranquillity, but carefully concealed his knowledge of the origin and authors of the disturbance.

The conspirators, defeated in this attempt, saw no prospect of recovering their footing at court without the aid of *Apelles*, and, by repeated messages, at length induced him to return from *Chalcis*. He was not aware how far he had himself lost ground in Philip's confidence during his absence. He had been so successful in his endeavours to cut off the supplies of the royal treasury, that the king was sometimes forced to pledge his plate for the subsistence of his household. Philip more than suspected the cause of these embarrassments, and he had also been deeply offended by the arrogance of *Apelles*, who, representing himself as the real head of the government, and the fountain of all authority, drew the administration of affairs entirely to himself. The king's officers in *Macedonia* and *Thessaly* addressed themselves to him for instructions; and the Greek cities assigned a more prominent place in their honorary decrees to him than to Philip himself. *Aratus*, too, did not fail to take advantage of his enemy's indiscretion, and to inflame the king's resentment against him. Philip, however, had so steadily dissembled his feelings, that *Apelles* returned to court under a full persuasion that his presence would at once restore the credit of his friends. To give the greater weight to his first appearance, they procured that he should be met on his entry into *Corinth* by a great concourse of officers and soldiers, and, thus escorted, he repaired immediately to the palace; but, instead of seeing the gates thrown open to him, as in times past, he was informed by one of the attendants that the king was not at leisure to give him audience. He withdrew in surprise and perplexity; and the ardour of his followers was so rapidly chilled by the first breath of royal displeasure, that, before he reached his lodgings, he was abandoned by all but his own menials. Philip still admitted him now and then to his table, and treated him with some show of respect, but excluded him from his counsels and familiar intercourse. *Megaleas* now, seeing his last hope extinguished, made his escape during the king's absence in *Phocis*, and fled to *Athens*, and, not being allowed to remain there, took refuge at *Thebes*. Philip, on his return, having first taken the precaution to send the targeteers on some pretext into *Triphylia*, under the command of *Taurion*, ordered *Leontius*,

as the surety of *Megaleas*, to be thrown into prison. The targeteers, at his instigation, sent some of their number to the king, with a request, in very free language, that, if their commander was arrested for any offence, he might not be brought to trial in their absence; and offered, if he was imprisoned on the ground of his suretyship, to redeem his pledge by their own contributions. But Philip was so much exasperated by their interference, that he forthwith ordered *Leontius* to be put to death.

In the mean while, the *Rhodian* and *Chian* envoys had induced the *Ætoli*ans to accept their mediation, to conclude a truce of thirty days, and to appoint a day for a conference with Philip at *Rhium*. Philip, on their report, ratified the truce, and summoned a congress of the allies to meet him at *Patræ*. Here letters were brought to him, which had been intercepted in *Phocis*, addressed to the *Ætoli*ans by *Megaleas*, in which the writer exhorted them to persevere in the war, describing Philip's finances as quite exhausted, and assailing his character with bitter invectives. It is not clear whether Philip was able to trace these letters to *Apelles*, or made use of them as a pretext against him; but he immediately sent him, with his son and another intimate friend, under a guard of soldiers, to *Corinth*, where all three were shortly after put to death. About the same time, *Megaleas*, having been arrested by Philip's orders at *Thebes*, and sued for the penalty, laid violent hands on himself. These executions, which crushed a dangerous conspiracy, and thus rendered Philip more formidable than ever to his enemies, nevertheless put a stop to the negotiation for peace. The *Ætoli*ans, who had before been eager to terminate the war, which had begun to press very hard upon them, when they heard of these occurrences, conceived hopes that the punishment of persons so high in command might give rise to discontent and mutiny in the *Macedonian* army, and they were thus induced to put off the conference at *Rhium*. Philip gladly seized this pretext to break off the treaty, and, having exhorted the deputies who came to attend the congress to bend all their thoughts to the prosecution of the war, returned to *Corinth* and dismissed his *Macedonian* troops to their homes for the winter. He himself embarked at *Cenchrææ*, and sailed through the *Euripus* to *Demetrius*. Here he brought *Ptolemæus*, the only surviving associate of *Leontius*, to trial before a *Macedonian* assembly, which condemned him to death. He was thus finally extricated from a great danger, but not, perhaps, without suffering deep and lasting injury. If any share is to be assigned to outward circumstances in the development of his character, none can be conceived which could have tended more to stifle every ingenuous feeling, and to harden and corrupt his heart, than the detection of such foul treachery in the guardians of his youth, the men who had been the earliest objects of his esteem and confidence.

After his departure, the *Achæans* suffered much from the incursions of the *Eleans* and *Ætoli*ans, against which *Eperatus* was unable to provide any defence. The cities, finding themselves unprotected, became tardy and irregular in their contributions; the troops, being

often forced to wait long for their pay, were not active in the service, and the mercenaries, at last, quitted it altogether. Polybius still lays the whole blame on Eperatus; \* we might otherwise suspect that he was embarrassed by the opposition of Aratus and his party, and would have done more if he had been better supplied with the sinews of war. The Spartans did not move during the winter; for Lycurgus, having incurred the suspicions of the ephors, had been compelled to fly, and took refuge in Ætolia. Eperatus was succeeded in office by Aratus; and the Achæans immediately recovered their spirits for the prosecution of the war. The assembly decreed to maintain mercenaries to the number of 8000 foot and 500 horse, with 3300 troops of the League, of which 500 foot and 50 horse were to be raised by Megalopolis, and as many by Argos. It was also resolved that three galleys should cruise about the coast of Argolis, and as many in the Corinthian Gulf. In the mean while, Lycurgus had been recalled by the ephors, who had ascertained the groundlessness of their suspicions, and concerted measures with Pyrrhæus, the Ætolian general who commanded in Elis, for combined operations in Messenia. Aratus, having discovered their intentions, marched to Megalopolis to succour the Messenians. But, though Lycurgus invaded Messenia, and made himself master of Calame, he was unable to effect a junction with Pyrrhæus, and was obliged to return to Sparta. Aratus now prevailed on the Messenians and Taurion, who seems to have been restored to his command, to keep a small force in the field for the protection of the interior of the peninsula against the Spartans, while the main army of the League was to be employed against the Ætolians and Eleans in the north of Achaia. During his stay at Megalopolis, he accomplished another object not less important for the security of Arcadia. Megalopolis, just rising out of its ruins, was divided between two parties; one, which included the poorer class, requiring that the compass of the walls should be contracted, so as to be both completed and defended with less difficulty, and that the wealthy citizens should give up a third of their lands for the support of a body of new settlers. But the opulent would neither part with their possessions, nor consent to reduce the dimensions of the great city. Violent disputes had also arisen about a code of laws which had been framed for them by Prytanis, a Peripatetic philosopher, whom Antigonus had appointed as their legislator. Aratus, under a decree of the Achæan assembly, undertook the adjustment of these differences, a task for which he was eminently well qualified, and in which he appears to have satisfied both parties, but the terms of the compact which he concluded between them are not related by Polybius, perhaps because they had been inscribed on a column which was erected near the altar of Vesta in one of the public buildings of his native city.†

\* iv., 30.

† Polyb., v., 98, iv. *Ἰσχυρῶς*. The *Ἰσχυρῶς* at Megalopolis answered to the temple of Ζεὺς Ἰσχυρῶς at Ægium, which Strabo (viii., 385, 387) seems also to have called *Ἰσχυρῶς*, or (according to Welcker's emendation of the readings *Ἀρπύριον* and *Ἀλφειον*, Episch. Cycl., p. 128) *Ἀρπύριον*. It was the temple of Ζεὺς *Ἰσχυρῶς*, the god of Concord. Welcker believes that the common temple erect-

The war was now carried on by the Achæans with unusual vigour and success, both by land and sea. They defeated Eurypidas, who, at the request of the Eleans, had been sent to replace Pyrrhæus, invaded and ravaged Elis, and, after another victory, carried off their booty in safety. The merit of these achievements, however, belonged; not to Aratus, but to his lieutenant, Lycus of Pharsæ. The Achæan admiral made several captures from the enemy in the Corinthian Gulf, landed his troops on the coast of Ætolia, wasted the country, and worsted the Ætolians in two engagements; so that the League seemed now well able to maintain the war without Macedonian assistance, though there was no prospect that it would in this way be brought to a close until the strength of the belligerents should be exhausted. Philip, in the mean while, had made himself master of Bylazora, the chief city of Pæonia, which gave him the command of the passes by which the Dardanians were used to penetrate into Macedonia, and thus relieved him from the fear of invasion in that quarter. He then collected all his Macedonian forces, and marched into Thessaly, where he was foiled in an attempt on Melita,† but proceeded to lay siege to the Phthian Thebes, for which he had been making active preparations during the winter. It was still in the hands of the Ætolians, and enabled them, at their pleasure, to make inroads into the most fertile regions of Thessaly. He met with a stout resistance until he had thrown down a part of the wall by a mine, and his troops were on the point of mounting the breach. The besieged then surrendered; and Philip took this opportunity to convince all who still doubted of the treachery by which, with precisely similar advantages, he had been repulsed before Palæ. He reduced all the inhabitants to slavery, planted a Macedonian colony in their room, and exchanged the name of Thebes for Philippopolis. Here he received another embassy from Chios and Rhodes, whose envoys were now accompanied by others from Byzantium, and Ptolemy Philopator, with renewed offers of mediation. He repeated his former pacific professions, and sent them away to sound the Ætolians; but, in his heart, was as little as ever inclined to peace. The object on which he was now immediately bent was to chastise and humble Scerdilaidas, who, having been offended by some omissions in the payment of his stipulated subsidy, had sent a squadron, which, before its hostile purpose was suspected, captured four Corinthian vessels, and afterward, cruising between Leucas and Malea, infested the coast, and attacked all the merchant ships that fell in his way. Philip equipped an armament, in the hope of overtaking the Illyrians, but, having missed them, returned to the Isthmus, sent his larger vessels round by Malea to the Corinthian Gulf, and caused the rest to be transported over land to

ed by Croton, Sybaris, and Metapontum, when they regulated their confederacy on the Achæan model (Polybius, ii., 39), was also dedicated to Ζεὺς *Ἰσχυρῶς*. The explanation of the reading *Ἰσχυρῶς* given by Helwing (*Geschichte der Achaïschen Bundes*, p. 54, n. 5), that the worship of the god was brought over from Hellas, a neighbouring country, is at least utterly improbable.

† He arrived either before or after the preconcerted time (Polyb., v., 97; ix., 16), and his scaling ladders proved too short.

**Lechæum.** In the mean while he made a hasty excursion to Argos to celebrate the Nemean games.

While the Greeks were wasting their strength in these bootless struggles, Italy was the theatre of the contest on the issue of which their future condition depended. That their interests must be deeply affected by the conflict which had been lately renewed between the two great powers of the West, could not but be evident to every intelligent Greek. When Hannibal had crossed the Alps, it became still clearer that a mighty crisis was approaching; yet it seems to have been only when a blow had been struck, which, apparently, gave a decisive advantage to one of the parties, that even a few of the more thoughtful Greeks became so far sensible of the importance of the events which were passing on the other side of the Adriatic, as to feel the littleness, the uselessness, and the folly of the feuds by which their country was torn and drained of its resources. While Philip was viewing the games at Argos, he received the news of the battle of Thrasymene, in a despatch brought by a courier from Macedonia. Demetrius the Pharian was among the friends who accompanied him to Argos, and had now evidently gained the highest place in his confidence. To him alone he showed the letter, under an injunction of secrecy; and in his subsequent deliberations on the new aspect of affairs, he suffered himself to be guided by the Pharian's counsels. Demetrius was entirely bent on two objects: he was eager to revenge himself on the Romans, and to recover his territory in Illyria; and, as he regarded Philip only as his tool, the advice he gave was that which was dictated by his own passions and interest. He urged the king to drop the Ætolian war, and to turn his attention from Greece, which was already subject to him, to the great prospects of conquest and glory which were now opened to him in Illyria and Italy. The disaster which had befallen the Roman arms invited him to the great theatre of war.

If Philip had consulted a less selfish or interested adviser, the question might not have been simply whether he should remain neutral, but into which scale he should throw his sword, and whether it might not be safer for him to aid the weaker side than to help to crush it, and to establish the predominance of its antagonist. But perhaps Philip would scarcely have listened to such a suggestion. The course proposed by Demetrius was the most agreeable to his temper, and, apparently, the best suited to his interest. It held out the temptation of immediate gain. By an attempt to balance the two parties he might only incur the enmity of both. If either was to prevail, he had less to fear from the one whose seat of empire was the more distant; and it was much safer to reckon on Rome's weakness than on her gratitude. He, however, at once adopted the views of Demetrius, but, without disclosing his real motive, held a council of his friends, and proposed the question of peace with the Ætolians. Aratus himself was willing to put an end to the war, which he could not expect to conclude on more favourable terms than at a time when the Achaean arms were everywhere prosperous. The rest of the council probably saw and yielded to the

king's wishes. Without waiting for the envoys of the mediating states, he despatched a Naupactian prisoner, named Cleonicus, to open the negotiation with the Ætolians. They were now heartily tired of the war, and eagerly accepted his overtures. He himself proceeded to Panormus, on the coast opposite Naupactus, and summoned a congress of the allies to meet him there. After the congress had met, an embassy, headed by Aratus and Taurion, was sent over to Naupactus, where the Ætolians were assembled, and Ætolian envoys came to request Philip to cross over and conclude the treaty in person. He accordingly transported his forces across the gulf, and encamped at a distance of two or three miles from Naupactus. The negotiation then proceeded rapidly, for both parties were equally desirous of peace. Philip proposed, as the basis of the treaty, that each should retain what it then possessed: the Ætolians readily assented, and it only then remained to come to a mutual understanding on the construction of this principle and its application in detail. Many conferences were held for this purpose, and, on the first of these occasions, a Naupactian named Agelaus is reported to have addressed a memorable warning to Philip and the assembled ministers. He reminded them that there never had been a time when the Greeks had not great need of union, and reason to be very thankful to the gods, if, by their combined exertions, they could protect themselves against the influx of the barbarians. But the danger was now visible and imminent. It could not be supposed that either Rome or Carthage, if victorious in their present contest, would remain content with the possession of Italy and Sicily. As the safety of the Greeks depended on their union, so Philip's security lay in the good will and confidence of the Greeks, and it was his interest not to consume their strength, but, on the contrary, to cherish it as the firmest defence of his throne. If he was bent on conquest, Italy presented an ample field for his ambition. Let him reserve his quarrels with the Greeks for a season of greater leisure, but, above all, let him take care to keep the power of warring and treating with them in his own hand; for if the clouds then gathering in the West should once lower upon Greece, it was to be feared that there would be an end forever to their child's play of hostilities and negotiations, and they would wish in vain to recall the time when peace and war, or any other subject of public deliberation, was in their own power.

These warnings would have come too late, even if they had produced more than a momentary impression; but it is doubtful whether they were attended with any practical effect, except so far as they happened to coincide with the temporary views and feelings of the hearers. Agelaus was afterward raised to the highest dignity in the state; but in this choice his countrymen probably expressed the need they had felt of the peace which he helped to conclude, rather than their sense of his political sagacity. Philip took his advice so far as it tallied with his preconceived designs; but did not let it move him one step towards a more liberal course of policy.

## CHAPTER LXVI.

FROM THE END OF THE SOCIAL WAR BETWEEN THE  
ÆTOLIANS AND THE ACHÆANS TO THE PROCLA-  
MATION OF THE LIBERTY OF GREECE UNDER  
ROMAN PROTECTION.

GREECE was now permitted to enjoy another short interval of repose, while Philip returned to Macedonia, where his presence was needed to protect his northwest frontier against the inroads of Scerdilaidas. He was fully occupied in this quarter during the rest of the summer of 217, and, in the ensuing winter, he increased his navy with 200 new galleys, built on the Illyrian model. In the spring he embarked his forces, and sailed round Peloponnesus into the Adriatic. Though Italy was uppermost in his thoughts, so as to haunt his dreams, he thought it necessary, before he crossed the channel, to secure his dominions more effectually against Scerdilaidas, and for this purpose resolved to make an expedition to the coast of Illyria. He expected, it seems, that the Romans would send succours to Scerdilaidas, as, in fact, the Illyrian, when he heard of Philip's maritime preparations, had requested them to do; and he therefore waited for some time between Cephallenia and Leucas to ascertain the movements of the Roman fleet. But, having learned that it was still at Lilybæum, he sailed up towards Apollonia, and had anchored near the mouth of the Aous, when he received advice that Roman galleys had been seen at Rhegium bound for Apollonia. Believing that the whole Roman fleet was at hand, he gave immediate orders for retreat, and, as if chased by a victorious enemy, pushed forward day and night, until he reached Cephallenia. The panic was caused by a false alarm; a squadron of only ten vessels had been detached from the fleet at Lilybæum. Philip, however, after a short stay, to colour his flight with some pretence of affairs to be transacted in Peloponnesus, returned to Macedonia, and appears to have remained inactive during the rest of the year. In the mean while the battle of Cannæ seemed to have extinguished the last hopes of Rome. Philip's aid was become so much the less important to the conquerors; and if he had ever expected concessions of territory in Italy, as the price of his alliance, he could no longer flatter himself with such a prospect. Yet, according to Livy,\* it was only after he had received the tidings of this third great disaster of the Roman arms that he resolved on sending envoys to Hannibal. But it seems hardly credible that there should not have been some previous correspondence between them, and the difficulty of eluding detection might perhaps account for the length of the delay, and for Philip's apparent supineness. Now, however, towards the end of the year B.C. 216, he sent an embassy, with Xenophanes, an Athenian, at its head, to conclude a treaty with the Carthaginians. The envoys landed safely in the south of Italy, but were stopped in Apulia, on their road to Capua, by Roman soldiers, who led them to the camp of M. Valerius Lævinus, the prætor. Here Xenophanes pretended that he was on his way to Rome, to conclude an alliance between Philip

and the Roman people; and having been courteously entertained, and sent forward by the prætor, found means to escape from his escort, and to reach Hannibal's quarters at Capua. He there negotiated a treaty, which is reported by Livy,\* and transcribed, apparently in full, by Polybius;† but the Roman historian's report differs essentially from the copy preserved by the Greek author; and it is probable that false accounts of the articles were circulated by the Roman government, for the purpose of inflaming public resentment against Philip. It was a treaty of friendship, fraternity, and alliance, offensive and defensive, between the Carthaginians and their allies on the one part, and the Macedonians and the other Greeks, their allies, on the other; and it stipulated that Philip should aid the Carthaginians in their war with the Romans, and that, when this should be brought to a successful termination, the Romans should not be allowed to retain their possessions on the eastern side of the Adriatic, and should restore all that they had taken from Demetrius of Pharos: the Carthaginians were to succour Philip against the Romans, and all other enemies. It appears, therefore, that he had now abandoned all thoughts of conquest in the West, and only wished to be relieved from the restraints which Rome had laid on his ambition; but it is not clear what advantage he was to derive from the treaty: whereas, according to the other reports, Greece, Epirus, and the adjacent islands were to be annexed to Macedonia.‡ Three Carthaginian envoys were sent with Xenophanes, when he returned; but the ship in which they sailed was captured by a Roman squadron, which was guarding the coast of Calabria. Xenophanes endeavoured to deceive the Roman commander by a repetition of his former artifice; but the presence of the Carthaginians led to a discovery of the truth, and the envoys were sent, with all their papers, to Rome. The senate immediately resolved not to wait for a Macedonian invasion. A fleet of fifty sail was ordered to watch Philip's movements; and the prætor, M. Valerius, was directed, if occasion should appear, to cross over to Macedonia, and endeavour to find employment for the king at home. In the mean-

\* xxiii., 32.

† vii., 9. The ostentation of the gods worshipped on both sides occupies a considerable space. Flatie (ii., p. 279) supplies a number of articles, which he supposes the Roman government to have erased from the treaty when it fell into their hands, by which Philip provided for the independence of a part of Italy. Flatie indulges in a license of conjecture hardly to be found in any other modern historian. But the parts of his work which are most likely to mislead an incautious reader, are not those in which he has avowedly substituted his own guesses in the room of the facts recorded by the best authors, as by Polybius, who, as he comes oftener in the way of his hypotheses, is uniformly treated with supreme contempt. The worst is, that Flatie often disguises and distorts the facts which he finds, so as to convey an impression very different from that which they must make on every unprejudiced reader in the original report. He thinks he has perceived that Philip was signally deficient in energy of will and decision of character. So the narrative is everywhere adapted—as in a romance—to exhibit this defect in the most glaring light.

‡ Liv., v. 8., *Quæ civitates continentes, quæ insule ad Macedoniam vergunt, ex Philippi regniq; ejus essent. Sc. in substance, Zonaras, viii., 4: Τῶν μὲν Ἑλληνικῶν τοὺς ἁπλοῦς λαβεῖν, τὴν δὲ ἑλλάδα καὶ τὴν ἡσίονον πρὸς τὴν ἡσίωνον, ἑστίνον: and, still more briefly, Appian, Mac., i.: Ὑπερχρόστους ἀπὸρ συμμάχουσαν εἶναι τῇ Ἑλλάδι, ἢ ἡσίονον, ἀπὸρ συνδοῦναι κατεργάσασθαι τὴν ἑλλάδα.*

while, however, Philip learned the disaster of his embassy from a ship which escaped when they were taken; but as he did not even know the result of the negotiation, he was obliged to send a fresh embassy to Hannibal; and, though it executed its commission successfully, the summer (215) was spent before it returned to Macedonia. We hear of no military operations undertaken by Philip this year. But he paid a visit to Peloponnesus, with what view does not appear, accompanied by Demetrius the Pharian; and on this occasion we learn how little he had imbibed the liberal principles of Agelaus. Discord had grown so fierce between the aristocratical and the democratical party at Messene, that it threatened to break out into open violence. Aratus, again for the sixteenth time General of the League, was on his road to Messene, with his son, to preserve tranquillity and heal the breach. But Philip arrived the day before, and secretly fanned the flame, asking the magistrates whether they had no laws to control the multitude, and the democratical leaders whether they had not hands to resist tyrants. Thus instigated, the party in power provoked its adversaries by injudicious severity, and a tumult ensued, in which all the magistrates and about 200 private persons were massacred. It seems to have soon become notorious that Philip's insidious suggestions had been the cause of this bloodshed; and, even after it had taken place, instead of endeavouring to reconcile the contending parties, he manifestly did his utmost to irritate their mutual animosity. Aratus and his son were deeply disgusted with this conduct, and the younger, who had hitherto treated Philip with the affection of an elder friend towards an amiable youth, gave vent to his indignation in bitter reproaches, addressed to him in the theatre. Philip was evidently stung, but forbore to reply, and proceeded with the elder Aratus and Demetrius to sacrifice on the summit of Ithome. At the usual inspection of the entrails, he consulted his two advisers, whether it seemed to be the will of the gods that he should keep the citadel, or restore it to the Messenians. The Pharian bade him interpret the omens as a king, and hold the ox by both horns. The king understood the allusion to the two strongholds which commanded the peninsula, and entreated Aratus, who remained long silent, to deliver his opinions. At length he reminded the king that he had not thought it necessary to seize the mountain holds of Crete, or Bœotia, or Phocis, or Acarnania, but had hitherto found it sufficient in those lands to secure the affection and confidence of the people, and he would never gain any stronger fortress than those in Peloponnesus. Philip, though he must have been conscious that this truth was no longer seasonable, still retained so much shame or respect for Aratus, that he dropped, for the time, his half-formed treacherous project. But Aratus felt that his influence was lost, and he kept henceforth more and more aloof from the court; and the next summer, when Philip undertook a fresh expedition to the coast of Illyria, declined to accompany him.\*

Philip's object in this expedition was to make himself master of Apollonia and Oricum,

the possession of which he seems to have regarded as an indispensable preliminary to the invasion of Italy. He had sailed up the Aous with 120 galleys, had taken Oricum by assault, and was besieging Apollonia, when the prætor, M. Valerius, to whom the people of Oricum had sent for succour, arrived on the coast. He immediately recovered Oricum, and a detachment of 2000 men, which he sent to Apollonia, surprised the Macedonian camp in the night, and as Valerius immediately brought up his fleet to the mouth of the river, Philip was forced to burn his ships and retreat over land, leaving his baggage, ammunition, and a great part of the arms of his troops in the enemy's hands. Such was the issue of his first trial of strength with Rome. In the interval of leisure left by this disaster, he again turned his thoughts to Peloponnesus. Whatever impression had been made on his mind by the maxims of Aratus had been effaced by the suggestions of Demetrius, who was always by his side. As if repenting of his weakness, he sent Demetrius to surprise Messene; but the attempt failed, and Demetrius himself was slain.\* His genius, however, seemed ever after to preside in Philip's councils, for it was, in fact, not unlike Philip's own. Polybius seems to have greatly exaggerated the influence which this adventurer exercised on the young king's character, and Plutarch saw more of the truth, when he supposed that the germes of all the vices which rendered the man so odious were only concealed in the boy, and waited for time and opportunity to unfold them,† though Plutarch appears also to exaggerate, when he represents Philip as, even in his early years, only restrained by fear from the full indulgence of his evil nature;‡ it was, no doubt, constantly gaining strength, and not merely brought to light, but cherished and matured by prosperity and power, flattery and bad councils. But, when he had stifled his sense of decency and honour, and thrown off his respect for public opinion, his progress in crime became fearfully rapid. To revenge himself on the Messenians for his disappointment and for the loss of his favourite, he ravaged their territory, and Aratus did not suppress his displeasure. He had also discovered that Philip had abused his son's hospitality to corrupt his wife, and it was perhaps chiefly on this account that Philip resolved to silence his remonstrances. He found a ready instrument in Taurion, who undertook to remove Aratus, as his master proposed, by slow poison.§ It took effect while he was filling the office of general for the seventeenth time. The symptoms seemed to him to betray the cause of his disorder, and he referred it at once to its author, but he only once disclosed his suspicions to a trusty attendant, observing, as he noticed one of the tokens of the poison, "This is the reward of my friendship for

\* Polyb., iii., 10, 11. This authority greatly outweighs that of Apian, who states (Illyr., 8) that he was put to death by the Romans. † Ar., 40. ‡ Ar., 51.

§ Polyb., viii., 14. Plut., Ar., 52. Flæbe (ii., p. 288), with his usual independence of testimony, conjectures that Philip had discovered that Aratus had entered into correspondence with Rome. On the other hand, Mr. Long (Biographical Dictionary—Aratus) questions the fact, observing, "tales of slow poisons are suspicious evidence." But it is not often that they are confirmed by the opinion of the patient.

\* Plat., Ar., 51.

Philip.\* He was ashamed, Polybius remarks,\* of Philip's ingratitude. But this shame was probably blended with a more or less distinct consciousness of those fatal errors by which he had himself sunk in the esteem of all reflecting men. He could scarcely but feel that Philip could not have been ungrateful, if he himself had not been culpably imprudent, and had not sacrificed the welfare of his country to petty passions. That he should perish through the arts of the man whom he had so faithfully served, was a kind of retribution which might well have awakened both shame and remorse. His countrymen, however, remembered only his ancient services. His remains were conveyed from Ægium, where he died, to his native city, which earnestly claimed them. Both law and a deeply-rooted superstition forbade the burying of a corpse within the walls; but an oracle was brought from Delphi, which was understood as an injunction to treat the remains of Aratus as the relics of a hero, and they were interred with festive pomp in an enclosure dedicated to him as the founder of the city, and one of its tutelary powers. The day on which he had delivered it from its tyrants, as well as that of his birth, were commemorated by yearly sacrifices, for which a priest was assigned to him, and these rites were still celebrated, though with diminished splendour, in the time of Plutarch, three centuries after his death, when his posterity were still dwelling in Sicyon and Pellene.

Valerius, with a single legion and a fleet of fifty ships, kept Philip occupied, while the Romans were recovering ground in Italy. Until the tide had begun to turn, all Greece remained in suspense. Even the Ætolians, though as hostile as ever to Philip, and now again weary of peace, did not venture to declare themselves. But after the fall of Syracuse and Capua, Valerius, having previously sounded Scopas and Dorimachus, induced them to summon an assembly, which he attended in person, and which he persuaded to conclude an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Rome. Elis and Sparta, Scerdilaidas and his son Pleuratus,† and Attalus of Pergamus, were included in the treaty as their allies. The conquered towns and territory were to belong to them, the spoil to the Romans; and it was expressly stipulated that Acarnania should be reduced under their dominion. They then declared war against Philip, and the Romans began to execute their part of the contract, though the year (211) was now drawing to a close. They made themselves masters of Zacynthus all but the citadel of the town, and wrested Ceniadæ and Naxos from the Acarnanians; and having delivered all up to their allies, returned to Corcyra. Philip had taken up his quarters for the winter at Pella when this news reached him, and as he expected that his presence would be required in Greece early in the following spring, he immediately took the field again to strike terror into his western and northern neighbours. After an expedition into Illyria, in which he advanced as far as Apollonia, he returned eastward to the borders of

Thessaly, where he left 4000 men under Perseus to guard the pass of Tempe, and then marched northward to invade the territory of the Mædians, a tribe in the interior of Thrace, who were used to infest his frontier during his absence from home. He had laid siege to their chief city, Jamphorina, when Acarnanian envoys came to his camp to implore his succour against the Ætolians, who, hearing of his Thracian expedition, had collected all their forces under Scopas for the conquest of Acarnania. In the mean while, however, the Acarnanians opposed a firm countenance to their enemy's superior force. They sent their wives, children, and men past sixty into Epirus; the rest bound themselves by oath to conquer or die, pronounced terrible imprecations on all Acarnanians who should harbour a fugitive from the army, and adjured the Epirots not to receive one, but, should fortune prove adverse, to inter the slain in a common grave, with an inscription recording that they had fallen in defence of their country against the violence of the Ætolians.\* Thus prepared, they marched to the border to await the enemy's approach. But the Ætolian leaders began to doubt whether it would be safe to drive men who showed such a spirit to extremities; and when they heard that Philip was on his march to succour the Acarnanians, they abandoned their enterprise. The king had advanced by forced marches south of Dium, when he was informed of their retreat, and he then returned to Pella for the rest of the winter.

Early in the next spring (210) Lævinus sailed into the Corinthian Gulf, and combined his forces with those of the Ætolians, to besiege the Locrian town of Anticyra; and when it surrendered, disposed of the place and the booty according to the terms of the treaty. He was called away immediately after by tidings that he had been elected consul, and P. Sulpicius Galba appointed to succeed him; and on his return to Rome he advised that the legion should be withdrawn, as the fleet would suffice to secure the coast of Italy against Philip, who was now occupied with a war nearer home. Galba found himself indeed strong enough for this purpose, and for aggression on Philip's defenceless allies, though not for any more important operations. He made his appearance on the eastern coast of Greece, conquered Ægina, and, having carried off the inhabitants as slaves, put the Ætolians in possession of it.† But their united forces were not able to raise the siege of Echinus, which surrendered to Philip after they had been defeated in an assault on the Macedonian camp.‡ The presence of the Romans only served to keep the balance even, which would otherwise have inclined in Philip's favour. The war in other respects assumed the character of that which had been terminated by the treaty of Naupactus. Sparta was again induced to side with her own allies, though now under a different leader. Lycurgus, who had soon forced his young colleague Agesipolis to go into exile, had been succeeded by another usurper named Machanidas, though he had left a son of tender years, Pelops, who seems to have been permitted to retain a shadow of royalty. The Achæans again found

\* viii., 14.

† Livy, xxvi., 24, seems to call him a king of the Thracians, but he appears to be the same who is afterward (xxxi., 30) described as the son of Scerdilaidas.

\* Livy, xxvi., 25. Polyb., ix., 40.

† Polyb., xxiii., 8, 9; xi., 6, 8.

‡ Ibid., ix., 42.



themselves exposed to the descents of the Ætolians on their coasts, while Machanidas and the Eleans pressed them on the land side; and in the year 209 they were so much distressed by these attacks, that they were obliged to solicit aid from Philip. Yet they now possessed an advantage which they had not enjoyed in the last war: they had a man among them capable of seeing and drawing forth their military strength, as well as of conducting it in the field. Philopœmen had returned, after a long absence, to his native city. After the battle of Sellasia he had declined the offers of Antigonus, who would have taken him into his service.\* He wished to enlarge his military experience, but not to sacrifice his personal independence; and he therefore preferred seeking employment in Crete, which was at this time agitated by a civil war between Cnossus and Lyttus, in which all the other cities of the island took part. Cnossus was in alliance with the Ætolians, and obtained Ætolian succour; and when the Social War broke out, her enemies addressed themselves to Philip and the Achæans, who admitted them into their alliance and furnished them with troops. The contest thus became intimately connected with that which was carried on at the same time in Greece: and though Philopœmen only sought for a school of war, there can be little doubt which side he chose; and in the end the whole island was brought over to the Achæo-Macedonian confederacy.† Philopœmen, however, seems not to have returned to Greece so soon as tranquillity was restored in Crete, but to have remained abroad until the time when the Achæans began to be harassed by the attacks of Machanidas. His reputation had preceded him, and at the next election he was appointed commander of the Achæan cavalry. He found this, as all other parts of the army, in a very defective condition. The wealthier citizens, though bound by law to personal service in the cavalry, had been allowed, through connivance of the magistrates who preceded Philopœmen, to evade the performance of their duty,‡ and they had been used to send substitutes wretchedly mounted, unpractised, and timid. He immediately applied his attention to remedy this abuse. By the exertion of his authority, combined with personal influence, he induced the youths of the higher class to serve in person, excited their zeal and emulation, and in the course of a short time, by training and exercise, formed them into a well-organized body, which executed all its movements with easy and orderly promptitude. Philip complied the more readily with the request of the Achæans, as Attalus of Pergamus, on whom the Ætolians, by an extraordinary decree, had conferred the title of their chief magistrate, was reported to be on the point of crossing over to Europe. On his march through Thessaly he found an Ætolian army at Lamia, re-enforced by auxiliaries furnished by Attalus, and 1000 Romans sent by Galba,§ under the command of Pyrrhias, who had been appointed either colleague or lieutenant

to the King of Pergamus.\* They were worsted, however, in two engagements, and forced to take shelter behind the walls of Lamia, while Philip advanced to Phalara on the Malian Gulf. Here he was met by envoys from Ptolemy, Rhodes, Chios, and Athens, who came to offer their mediation; and the Ætolians themselves were so far moved by the remonstrances of the envoys, who pointed out the imminent danger with which the liberty of Greece was threatened by Roman interference, that they had engaged Amynder, chief of the Athenians, to negotiate on their behalf. A truce was concluded for thirty days, within which a day was fixed for an Achæan assembly at Ægium. Philip then continued his march southward, and, having left a garrison at Chalcis in Eubœa, to protect it against Attalus, proceeded with a small escort of cavalry and light troops to Argos, where he was honoured with the presidency of the Heræan and Nemean games expressly on the ground of his Argive descent: a delicate piece of flattery, which assumed his connexion with the ancient line of the Macedonian kings: a relation which he fondly claimed, but could hardly prove. After the celebration of the Heræa, he repaired to the congress at Ægium.† But, in the mean while, the views of the Ætolians had been changed by the arrival of Attalus at Ægina, and of the Roman fleet at Naupactus. They now took the tone of conquerors, and demanded the restitution of Pylos to the Messenians, and cessions of territory for the Romans and their Illyrian allies. Philip indignantly broke off the negotiation, and leaving 4000 men for the protection of the Achæans, returned to Argos to celebrate the Nemean festival. But in the midst of this entertainment, he was called away by the tidings that Galba, having crossed over from Naupactus, was ravaging the coast between Sicyon and Corinth. He immediately put himself at the head of his cavalry, ordering the infantry to follow, and hastened to repel the invasion, surprised the Romans while they were spread over the country and encumbered with spoil, and drove them, with some loss, to their ships. He then returned to enjoy the glory of his victory, and to finish the celebration of the games at Argos. He was still fond of the shadow of popularity, though he cared little for real affection and esteem. To gratify the multitude, he laid aside the diadem and the purple, and assumed the garb of a private citizen; but, at the same time, he indulged his passions in the most tyrannical license; and where the arts of seduction were unavailing, forced husbands and parents to sacrifice the honour of their families to his lust. He had already carried off the wife of the younger Aratus into Macedonia, and had murdered her husband by drugs which deprived him of his reason.

Soon after the festival he set out on an expedition against Elis, which had received an Ætolian garrison within its walls. Philip hoped to expel the Ætolians, and again to enrich his army with the spoil of that fertile region. At Dyme he was joined by the Achæan forces un-

\* Plut., Philop., 7.

† Polyb., vii., 14, 4.

‡ Ibid., x., 25. Plut., Philop., 7.

§ Who, as Schœn suspects (p. 186), was himself gone in quest of the Carthaginian fleet; but it rather seems, from the sequel, that his object was to ravage the coast of Achæia.

\* Liv., xxvii., 30. Duce Pyrrhia, qui pretor in eum annum cum absente Attalo creatus erat.

† The reading Rhium, in Liv., xxvii., 30, seems clearly corrupt.

der the General Cycliades and Philopœmen. Near the banks of the Larissus, the confine of Elis and Achaia, they found the enemy waiting for them, and a sharp skirmish of cavalry ensued, in which Philopœmen slew the Elean commander Damophantus with his own hand. The invaders met with no farther resistance until they reached the gates of Elis; but they were not aware that Galba had landed at Cylene, and had entered the city with 4000 men. The presence of the Romans was only discovered after an engagement had begun between the Ætolians and the Macedonian light troops. It was too late to retreat, and Philip charged the Romans at the head of his cavalry. His horse was killed under him, and he narrowly escaped being made prisoner, but fought bravely on foot until the combat became too unequal, and he was forced to mount another horse and quit the field. Yet the enemy had not gained any advantage which tempted them to seek a fresh engagement. He marched the next day against the stronghold where most of the country people had taken refuge with their cattle, carried it at the first assault, and found 4000 persons and 20,000 head of cattle within. While he was dividing this spoil, he received tidings of revolt in his own dominions, and of threatening movements among the Dardanians, and hastened back to the north, leaving 3600 men for the protection of the Achæans. It turned out that the Dardanians had been encouraged to invade Macedonia by a rumour of his death, arising out of an accident, through which one of the ornaments of his helmet having been broken off, had fallen into the hands of an Ætolian, who had sent it to Scerdilaidas. After his departure, Galba sailed eastward to join Attalus at Ægina, which the Ætolians made over to their royal ally for thirty talents,\* and the Achæans found themselves strong enough to invade Messenia, and gained a victory over the Eleans and Ætolians near Messene.

The prospect which opened on Philip with the following spring (208) was more threatening than any that had presented itself since his accession to the throne. A storm seemed to be gathering in every quarter of his horizon. His enemies, either by concert or coincidence, were preparing to attack him at once on every assailable point. Galba and Attalus, having wintered together at Ægina, sailed to Lemnos with a fleet of sixty pentereme galleys, of which twenty-five were Roman, and were visibly meditating a blow on some of his maritime possessions, while the Ætolians resumed their operations with redoubled activity in the West. Philip had assembled his forces at Larissa, and took up his quarters at Demetrias, as the most convenient station for watching the enemy's movements, and here he received alarming and importunate embassies from all his allies. The Achæans again needed succour, for Machanidas had taken the field with a force which, it seems, turned the scale decidedly against them. The neighbours of the Ætolians, especially the Acarnanians, were suffering from their inroads, and they were fortifying the pass of Thermopylæ with a fosse and rampart. At the same time, the Illyrians

and Mædians were stirring to invade Macedonia in his absence, and the hostile fleet had crossed over to Peperathus, its troops were ravaging the island, and its chief town was hardly able to hold out. It was on this side that the danger seemed most pressing, for it was clear that Attalus and Galba were aiming an attack on Eubœa, the loss of which would have almost entirely shut out the King of Macedonia from the south of Greece. Philip dismissed all the envoys with cheering promises, but his first care was to send troops into Peperathus and Bœotia, and to strengthen the garrison of Chalcis. He himself proceeded to Scotussa, to put himself at the head of his army, and moved by forced marches upon Heraclea, hoping to surprise Attalus and an Ætolian assembly which had been convened there to confer with their royal ally. But he arrived too late for this purpose, and, having ravaged the Malian plain, retreated to Scotussa, where he left his army and returned with his escort to Demetrias. Not knowing what point would soonest require his presence, he ordered beacons to be erected on conspicuous heights in Phocis, Eubœa, and Peperathus, and a watch-tower on Mount Tiseus, at the entrance of the bay of Pagasæ, so as to communicate the earliest intelligence of the enemy's approach.

The allied fleet had moved from Peperathus to Nicœa, on the Malian coast, and thence crossed over to the north of Eubœa, to lay siege to Oreus. Attalus was to invest it on the land side, the Romans from the sea; but, before they began the assault, they gained Plator, the commander of the Macedonian garrison, who betrayed the town into their hands. He interceded, however, for the garrison, which was sent by sea to Demetrias: he himself entered the service of Attalus. The Romans plundered the town. Through Plator's treachery, the beacons had not informed Philip of the danger of Oreus until it would have been too late to relieve it, even if he had been able to send succours by sea. But when he learned that Chalcis was threatened, he instantly rejoined his army at Scotussa, and marched southward with almost incredible rapidity, forcing his way through the Ætolian intrenchments at Thermopylæ, and reaching Elatea the same day. But, in the mean while, the Roman general had abandoned the enterprise of Chalcis, where the road was dangerous, the town strong and well garrisoned, and the officers faithful to their master, as hopeless, and had sailed back to Cynus, the port of Opus. The city surrendered at the first sight of the enemy, and was abandoned by Galba to the Asiatic troops, as a compensation for the plunder of Oreus; and Attalus was nearly surprised here by Philip, while he lingered to extort money from the principal citizens. He was soon after recalled to Asia by intelligence that his dominions had been invaded by his neighbour, Prusias of Bythinia, and Sulpicius, on his departure, retreated to Ægina. Philip, after the conquest of two or three places held by the Ætolians, proceeded to Elatea, where he had appointed a meeting with the envoys of Ptolemy and the Rhodians, who had been renewing their attempts at mediation in the Ætolian assembly at Heraclea. But

\* Polyb., xxi., §. 10.

the conference was interrupted by a report that Machanidas was preparing to attack Olympia during the celebration of the games. Philip, eager to appear as the protector of the national solemnity, dismissed the envoys with professions of his desire for peace, and set forward towards Elis.\* But when he arrived in Arcadia, he found that Machanidas, alarmed by the report of his approach, had returned to Sparta. He himself proceeded to Ægium, to meet a congress of the Achæans; and he seems to have felt it necessary, not only to animate his allies by exaggerated statements of his recent success, but to strengthen their attachment by some concessions of territory. He, at least, recognised the claim of the Achæans to Triphylia and Heræa, and that of Megalopolis to Aliphera.† He had expected to find at Ægium a Carthaginian fleet which had been brought to his aid the year before,‡ and had sent a squadron to join it in the Corinthian Gulf.§ But the Carthaginian admiral, having heard that Attalus and the Romans had left Oreus, apprehended that they were coming in pursuit of him, and, dreading to be overtaken within the gulf, had sailed away to the coast of Acarnania. He, nevertheless, crossed over with six Achæan galleys to Anticyra, where he found his own squadron, and, after a descent for the purpose of plunder on the coast of Ætolia, sailed to Corinth; and, sending his land forces home through Boeotia, returned by sea to Demetrias, and thence to Macedonia, where he was occupied during the rest of the year with the chastisement of the Dardaniens, and with the enlargement of his navy, for which he placed 100 war galleys on the stocks at Cassandrea.

The Ætoliens would, it seems, have been willing, after the departure of Attalus, to abandon the war, in which they had gained no advantage adequate to their efforts; but Galba eluded their wishes under the plea that he had no authority to treat for peace, while, in a secret despatch, he represented to the senate that the interest of Rome required the continuance of the war in Greece. The senate is said to have forbidden them to treat, and to have sent a re-enforcement to their aid, with which they made themselves masters of Ambracia.¶ But it appears that these succours

were soon recalled, and that for two years after the Ætoliens were left to carry on the war alone. They would scarcely have been able to maintain it so long if Philip had not been frequently diverted from them by the hostility of his barbarian neighbours; for, during this interval, the energy of Philopomen infused new vigour into the Achæan League, and delivered it from its most formidable enemy.

At the election which followed next after the campaign just related, Philopomen was raised, for the first time, to the office of general.\* As the success of the reforms which he had introduced in the cavalry had contributed mainly to his elevation, it both encouraged him to undertake still greater changes, and served to smooth the way for them. As a Greek, jealous of liberty, as a patriotic citizen of the Achæan League, and as a soldier passionately fond of his art, he had reason to be very much dissatisfied with the existing state of things. He found the Achæans, though they possessed ample means of making themselves respected by their neighbours, reduced to a miserable and degrading dependance on a foreign power for protection against aggressions which they might have repelled by their own exertions, and purchasing succours, which kept them subject to Macedonia, by subsidies which ought to have contributed to the support of their own armies. Though almost always at war, they had not become a military people. Their chief strength lay in their mercenary force, which, though a heavy burden on their resources, sometimes failed them in the hour of need, and was never quite trustworthy in the service of a free state. This defect was intimately connected with the personal qualities of the man who had for so many years exercised almost absolute sway over their councils. Aratus, himself destitute of military talents and martial spirit, was neither capable nor desirous of training a nation of soldiers. For the extension of the League, he relied on bold stratagems, dexterous negotiations, or simple corruption; and he was content to meet every exigency as it arose by such expedients as necessity suggested. The men who filled the chief magistracy during the same period, in the alternate years, were mostly his friends and creatures, without either ability or character adequate to the conception of a different system. The habits of the Achæan citizens were totally foreign to a military life; they had a keen taste for luxurious enjoyments, and were much addicted to frivolous ostentation in dress and furniture, by which many were led into expenditure which exceeded their means. These tastes they carried with them into the camp, while they regarded its service as an irksome task, and grudged whatever they were obliged to lay out on their martial accoutrements. Philopomen saw that to raise his countrymen to the place which they ought to occupy among the states of Greece, it was necessary both to reorganize the army and to change the whole course of their social usages, tastes, and feel-

\* Livy, as has been shown by Manso (iii., 2, p. 973), but in a much more satisfactory manner by Schorn (p. 186, n.), has not only committed the error of making the hundred and forty-third Olympiad begin in the consulship of C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius Salinator (see Clinton, F. H., xii.), but has assigned the events of Greek history, which should have been related under the years U.C. 545, 546 (Varr.) to the years 546, 547. Schorn has pointed out the great probability that the treaty between Rome and the Ætoliens concluded in the autumn of 211 U.C. (Varr., 543), of which Livy says (xxvii., 24) a copy was deposited by the Ætoliens at Olympia two years afterward (*biennio post*), was so placed on record at the ensuing Olympic festival, which therefore, according to his own calculation, must have fallen in the year preceding the consulship of Claudius and Livius, and that the mission of L. Manlius, who was directed to attend at the Olympic games (Liv., xxvii., 35), was connected with this solemn ratification of the treaty.

† Ibid., xxvii., 15, 30.

‡ Appian, Mac., 2. There is, no doubt, great confusion in Appian's account of these negotiations, since the force with which he represents the senate to have aided the Ætoliens in the prosecution of the war is no other than that which Sempronius brought over after they had concluded their treaty with Philip (Liv., xxi., 12). But it does not

§ Ibid., xxviii., 7.

¶ Ibid., xxviii., 8.

seem necessary, on this account, with Schorn (p. 203, n. 6), to reject the facts stated in the text.

\* B.C. 208. Schorn (p. 210-214) has rendered it highly probable that from Ol. 140, 4, the election of the Achæan strategus took place about six months earlier than in the preceding period, when it was held in May.

ings. The former of these objects was by far the least difficult: it only required the consent of the assembly to his scheme, and a few months' training, to carry it into effect. The latter would have seemed hopeless to another man, and could only have been accomplished by the personal influence of one in whom his fellow-citizens felt pride as well as confidence. Philopœmen achieved both with singular ease, and in a surprisingly short time. He substituted complete armour, long spears, and large shields for the light equipments of the Achæan infantry, and trained it to the close array and complicated evolutions of the Macedonian phalanx. At the same time that he obtained leave to introduce this change, he, by a single speech, turned the current of public opinion and sentiment into a new channel. He exposed the effeminacy of that luxury in which the wealthy youths had been used to vie with one another, and pointed their emulation to different objects, in which personal display would be associated with the ideas of toil, hardship, danger, patriotic sacrifices, duty, and glory, and so would be neither enervating nor futile. When the point of honour was once shifted, the habits of the rich underwent a rapid change. They began to take pride in the splendour of military equipments, and to curtail their other expenses, that they might make a better appearance at the review. Their plate was sent to the crucible, to be employed in the decoration of arms and caparisons. No arts were so much in request as those which ministered to the pomp and lustre of war. It was thought ridiculous to be seen richly attired except on the parade. Philopœmen took care that these exhibitions should not be an empty show, but accompanied with a constant progress in the knowledge and practice of soldiiership. He went round the cities of the League to inspect and exercise their contingents, and to animate them by his exhortations and his example. In the course of less than eight months he had formed an army, with which he was ready to take the field against Machanidas.

The Spartan chief had entered Arcadia with a formidable force, and expected to overrun the open country, as usual, without opposition. He was agreeably surprised when he heard at Tegea that the Achæans had assembled their forces at Mantinea, and he hastened, the next day, to meet them there, with full confidence of a decisive victory, which would make him master of Peloponnesus. The core of his army was a Lacedæmonian phalanx, armed and organized like that of the Achæans; but he had also a strong body of mercenaries in his service. Such were also the greater part of Philopœmen's light troops, among which was a corps of Illyrians.\* Philopœmen drew up his forces before Mantinea, so as to place his phalanx behind a trench which crossed the middle of the plain, with the light infantry in one wing and the cavalry in the other. The progress of military art is marked by a feature which does not appear in the description of the earlier bat-

tles. Machanidas had brought engines for the discharge of heavy missiles, which he disposed at intervals along the whole front of his line, to play upon the enemy and throw them into confusion before the encounter began. Philopœmen forestalled the effect of the artillery by a charge of his Tarentine cavalry, which led to a general engagement between the mercenaries of both sides. These of Machanidas soon showed themselves superior to their antagonists, not only in number, but in condition, and at length put them to flight: and Polybius points out that no other result was to have been expected, where the combatants on the one side fought for a master who would be sure always to need, and must, therefore, reward their services; while those on the other knew that, the more decisive their victory, the earlier they would be discharged.\* Machanidas, however, instead of following up this success with an attack on the Achæan phalanx, which would probably have given him the day, let himself be hurried on by the instinct of pursuit to a great distance beyond the field of battle. In the mean while, Philopœmen, having changed the position of his phalanx to meet the new emergency, waited until the Lacedæmonians, eager to complete the victory which they saw begun, moved forward to cross the ditch, which, on their side, offered an easy descent, and was at this time nearly dry. While their ranks were disordered by this operation and by the difficulty of the ascent, Philopœmen charged, and routed them with great slaughter, and was already completely master of the field, when Machanidas returned from the pursuit and found himself intercepted. After a fruitless attempt to cut his way through the enemy, at the passage of a bridge, he was overtaken by Philopœmon, who slew him with his own hand as he was spurring his horse across the ditch. His head was cut off and shown to the conquerors, to animate them in the pursuit, which was continued as far as Tegea, where, having carried the town sword in hand, they halted for the night: Four thousand Lacedæmonians were left on the field of battle, and a still greater number, together with all

\* But the Tarentines, who served on both sides (Pol., xi., 13), are not to be considered as natives of Tarentum. It was only a name for a species of heavy cavalry. Steph. Byz., Τάραν. Ταρανταίειν (perhaps Ταραντίειν) τὸ τοῦ ἐκείνων καὶ τὸς τοῦ μέγας χρέματον ἱκανοὺς νομιστοὺς. Liv., xxxv., 36.

\* These remarks of Polybius (xi., 13) are illustrated by those of Guicciardini (Storia d'Italia, libro i.) on the Italian mercenaries in the fifteenth century. A namesake of Polybius, likewise a native of Megalopolis, served and was intrusted with an important command in this battle. But in one of the Vatican fragments (p. 448) Polybius remarks, *Μήτις μὲν γὰρ ἦν τῶν κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ ἀποστολῶν καὶ πλοῦτος, βούλ' ἦν καὶ αὐτῶν*. On which Cardinal Mai observes, "Insignis est hic vatiani codicis locus ad refutandos Casaubonum, Fabricium, Reiskium, et Schweighæuserum qui Polybium Megalopolitanum, libro xi., 15, memoratum, negant esse hunc nostrum historicum; sed paulo seniores credunt, et historici fortasse patrum aut avum. Ergo in predicto etiam loco sine dubio intelligendus est historicus noster." But he has omitted to notice a difficulty which renders this inference more than doubtful. Mr. Clinton (F. H., ii., p. 75) observes, "It appears (from Polyb., xxv., 7) that Polybius was under the age of thirty in B.C. 161." In this case he was a child of, at most, not more than three or four at the time of the battle of Mantinea. And even if it be supposed that the Achæan laws required the age of forty in an ambassador, he would have been a boy of only thirteen or fourteen at the time of the battle. That he should have commanded there at that age would certainly be more wonderful than that his memory should have preserved him on a very trifling point when he was past seventy. (I now see that Leucht in his useful edition of the Vatican Fragm. of Polyb., p. 68, has noticed Mai's oversight as to the chronology, but he believes that the name Πολύβιος, xi., 15, has been substituted, by a mistake of the transcribers, for Πλοῦτος).

the baggage and arms, fell into the hands of the Achæans, whose loss was trifling. The next day Philopœmen enjoyed the pleasure of encamping on the banks of the Euratas; and, though he did not venture to attack Sparta, he carried his ravages to the farthest corner of Laconia.

After this victory, the Achæans stood in no need of Macedonian succours, though Machanidas was soon afterward succeeded by another usurper named Nabis, who became, in time, as formidable as his predecessor, and a much more odious tyrant; and Philip, when he was left at leisure by his Illyrian and Thracian neighbours, could turn his arms against the Ætoliæ without interruption. We have but scanty and fragmentary notices of his operations against them; but it appears that he wrested Ambracia from them,\* and made at least one expedition into the heart of their country. He had gained Amynander to his interest by the cession of the island of Zacynthus,† and was thus enabled to lead his forces through Athamania into the upper part of Ætolia. In one of these incursions he again sacked Thermus, and repeated his sacrilegious devastations in the sanctuary of Apollo.‡ The Ætoliæ, apparently deserted both by Atalhus and the Romans, began to be earnestly desirous of peace, and of their own accord renewed the negotiation with Philip, and accepted the terms which he prescribed. They were, no doubt, moderate enough, if, as Livy intimates, he knew or suspected that the Romans were on the point of sending a fresh armament to the Ætoliæ. The treaty had scarcely been concluded, when the proconsul, P. Sempronius, brought over a fleet of 35 galleys, 10,000 foot, and 1000 horse, and, finding that he had arrived too late for his main object, sailed to Dyrachium, and endeavoured to rouse the adjacent Illyrian tribes against Macedonia; but, seeing that his forces were not sufficient to meet Philip in the field, and that he could not induce the Ætoliæ to break the recent treaty, he listened to the proposals of the Epirots, who, being themselves weary of the war, assumed the character of mediators, and at length prevailed on Philip and the proconsul to come to a conference at Phenice, which was attended by Amynander and the Epirot and Acarnanian magistrates. Sempronius demanded the cession of some parts of Illyria to the Romans, and in return offered Atintania, the valleys northward on the upper Aous, to the king. To these conditions, which were to be subject to the senate's approbation, Philip consented. The absent allies of each party were included in the treaty: on Philip's part, the Achæans, Bœotians, and Thessalians, and Prusias of Bithynia; on that of Rome, the Eleans, Messenians, and Athenians, Nabis, Pleuratus, and Attalus. To these, in honour of the legend by which the Romans traced their origin to Asia, was added the name of Ilium. A truce of two months was granted to allow time for an embassy to Rome, where the senate, intent on the approaching crisis of the struggle with Car-

thage, and knowing that it would never be too late to reopen the discussion with Philip, adopted the treaty, and it was ratified by the unanimous suffrages of the tribes. The Ætoliæ, who had been the staunchest allies of Rome, and the chief sufferers in her cause, were passed over in the treaty in an ominous silence, which showed that she considered all her obligations towards them as cancelled by their claim of independence.

For a few years after the battle of Mantinea Greece remained tranquil. The Ætoliæ were fully occupied with their domestic concerns. The long series of wars in which they had been engaged had, it seems, enriched none, but, while it impoverished the state, had rained most private fortunes; for whatever gain it yielded to successful adventurers was consumed by the growing prodigality of their mode of living. The two chiefs who, to gratify their own avarice and ambition, had plunged the nation into these wasteful wars, Derimachus and Scopas, were themselves deeply involved in debt; and when, by the peace, they were thrown upon their own encumbered patrimonies, they appear to have resorted to a new kind of spoliation, which they carried on under the forms of law. Through the intrigues of a party, which comprehended all who were in like embarrassment with themselves, they were invested with an extraordinary commission to revise the laws. The history of their legislative proceedings has not been preserved; but there can be little doubt that they chiefly concerned the relation between debtor and creditor; and the character of the men renders it easy to conceive the use they would make of such an opportunity; especially as we are informed that one main object which Scopas had in view in the execution of his task was to secure his election to the chief magistracy.\* In this, however, he was disappointed, and he then quitted his country to seek his fortune at Alexandria, where he was admitted into the king's service on very liberal terms, but afterward lost his treasure and his life through his insatiable rapacity. In Ætolia, his legislation gave occasion to civil discord, which frequently broke out in open violence and bloodshed.

In Peloponnesus, the fame of Philopœmen was sufficient, for a time, to repress any inclination which might exist among the enemies of the Achæans to disturb the peace. At the Nemean festival which next followed his great victory, being a second time general, he exhibited his phalanx amid the admiration and applause of the assembled Greeks, and was greeted in the theatre as the protector of Grecian liberty. A renown so pure seems to have excited Philip's envy and hatred; and he was, at least, generally believed to have suborned emissaries to take away the life of Philopœmen by the method which he had practised against Aratus, but the plot was—we are not informed how—detected and baffled.† A mere rumour, which proved to be groundless, of his approach is said to have struck such terror into a Bœotian army which was on the point of assaulting Megara, that it precipitately retreated, leaving its scaling-ladders fastened to the walls. In

\* Appian, Mac., 2.

† Liv., xxxvi., 31. A strange acquisition, apparently, to be coveted by the prince of a highland valley far removed from the sea on every side.

‡ Polyb., xi., 4.

\* Polyb., xiii., 1, 2; xviii., 36-38.

† Plut., Philop., 12. Justin, xii., 4.

the mean while, however, a power was growing up at Sparta, of a kind which had scarcely been ever before witnessed in Greece. We are not informed by what means Nabis seized the vacant throne; but they were probably like those by which he maintained himself in it. One of his first acts was to despatch Pelops,\* whom Machanidas had suffered to preserve a title which kept up some resemblance to the ancient form of Spartan royalty, and thus gave a show of legitimacy to his government. Nabis reigned, as without a colleague, so without any affection of respect for the ancient Constitution. He had emancipated a great number of slaves or Helots, and had made a new distribution of land in their favour. But it was not on their support that he chiefly relied. He had collected a body of mercenaries from the vilest refuse of society. The worst criminals, the most desperate outlaws, found an asylum at Sparta, a bountiful patron, and a gracious master in Nabis, and were preferred as his guards and the ministers of his will.† The citizens most eminent for birth and wealth were either put to death or driven into exile, and their wives and fortunes transferred to the tyrant's favourites. They were not safe even in exile, but were often murdered by his emissaries, even in the cities where they had taken refuge. Those who remained at Sparta were subject to incessant exactions and to exquisite tortures, if they were suspected of possessing more than they disclosed, or refused to comply with his demands.‡ He seems to have valued power chiefly as an instrument for amassing wealth, and he turned Sparta into a nest of pirates and a den of robbers. He harboured the corsairs of Crete, and received a share of their booty; and he sent out gangs of villains, who roamed through Peloponnesus, waylaying and murdering travellers, and plundering houses and temples, and divided the spoils with their master. When he had carried on this system for two or three years he grew bolder from impunity, and began to meditate greater enterprises. A pretext was easily found. One of his most valuable horses had been carried off by some Boeotians, who, being overtaken at Megalopolis, appealed to the magistrates, when their pursuers would have dragged them away, and were protected from their violence. Nabis, under colour of retaliation, made inroads into the territory of Megalopolis, which, however, did not immediately provoke hostilities on the side of the Achæans. He seems thus to have been encouraged to make an attempt which no one could have foreseen, as it was directed against an ally from whom he had received no provocation. He surprised Messene, and made himself master of the town. Philopœmen at this time filled no office, and he could not prevail on the general, Lysippus, to march to the relief of Messene, which appeared to him to be irrecoverably lost. But, by his private influence, he collected the forces of Megalopolis and led them into Messenia, and Nabis, hearing of his approach, evacuated the town by the opposite

gate, and made a hasty retreat into Laconia.\* In his third year of office, Philopœmen, having assembled the forces of the League with great secrecy at Tegea,† led them to the borders of Laconia, where he drew the tyrant's mercenaries into an ambuscade, and defeated them with great slaughter, so that Nabis did not venture beyond the frontier for the rest of that year.

In the mean while, the contest between the two great powers of the West was decided by the battle of Zama, and the senate was left at leisure to turn its attention towards the affairs of Greece. Philip, as might easily be supposed, had watched the approach of the crisis which so closely affected his interests with deep anxiety. But his conduct during this interval seems strangely at variance, not only with the dictates of an enlightened policy, but with the plainest maxims of common prudence. He knew that the enmity of the Romans continued unabated, and that it was not in his power to conciliate them unless by unqualified submission. But this was no reason why he should provoke them by demonstrations of hostility, which could neither hurt them nor benefit himself. Yet this he did. He sent a body of 4000 men, under the command of Sopater, a Macedonian of the highest rank, being distantly connected with the royal family, to join the Carthaginian army in Africa, together with a supply of money,‡ and he seems not to have abstained from petty aggressions on his neighbours who were in alliance with Rome. Complaints on these heads were brought against him before the senate, which sent three envoys to remonstrate with him, and M. Aurelius, one of the three, stayed in Greece, under the pretext of protecting the allies of the republic, and often engaged in open combat with Philip's officers. It might, indeed, be suspected, if Philip had shown more discretion in other respects, that these quarrels had, from the first, been fomented by Roman intrigues. After the battle of Zama, when a Macedonian embassy came to Rome with a reply to the senate's remonstrances, the senate declared its approbation of the conduct of Aurelius, and sternly rejected the king's excuses, with the threat: "He was seeking war, and, if he persisted, he would soon find it." He had reason, indeed, to expect it, even though he had taken the utmost pains to avoid it, and therefore prudence required that he should employ the interval of peace in the most active preparations for the defence of his kingdom. But instead of this, he provoked new enemies, and embarked in fresh wars and expeditions, which, even if successful, would have yielded but little advantage to him in his conflict with Rome, and he formed plans of aggrandizement which were merely visionary, so long as the issue of that conflict remained uncertain. The death of Ptolemy Philopator, whose heir, Epiphanes, was a child four or five years old, opened a prospect which so inflamed the ambition of Philip and Antiochus of Syria, that they entered into a compact to divide his

\* Diodor., xxvii.

† Ibid., u. s. Polyb., xliii., 6, 7; xvi., 18.

‡ He had contrived a figure representing his wife Apaga, which clasped the sufferer in its embrace, and pierced him with nails, with which its arms and bosom were studded. Polyb., xlii., 7.

\* Plut., Philip., 12. Polyb., xvi., 16, 17. Pausanias (iv., 39, 10) speaks of a convention: ἀρχαίων ἐνέκροτος, and viii., 50, 5, ἱλαστικὴ ἐνέκροτος.

† Polyb., xvi., 36. Manso (Sparta, iii., 1, p. 401) has erroneously assigned this stratagem to the campaign of the year 192.

ominions between them. It was agreed that Antiochus should take possession of Egypt and Cyprus, and Philip of Cyrene, and all the conquests of Ptolemy Euergetes in Ionia and the Cyclades, and that they should aid one another to effect these conquests.

Philip seems to have hoped that, before he would have a war with Rome on his hands, he might establish his ascendancy in the Ægean, so as to bar the Roman fleets from the eastern coasts of his dominions; but though perfectly reckless of honour and good faith in the means which he chose to compass this end, he appears to have miscalculated his strength, and the tortuous policy to which he trusted for success only led him into dangers and difficulties which he would otherwise have avoided. The two great maritime powers which stood in the way of his design were Attalus and Rhodes. Attalus was a rival and an enemy, and the breach between the two kings had been widened by Philip's alliance with Prusias of Bithynia, who had married his daughter. The Rhodians were by no means hostile to Philip, and had given sufficient proof that they would not willingly have sacrificed him to the Romans. But it was clear that they and Attalus, if either were attacked, would defend each other. Philip, however, resolved to force the Rhodians into a war with him, while he inflicted a heavy blow on their marine by an act of perfidious aggression. He had men in his service who were capable of every crime. He placed a squadron of twenty galleys under the command of the Ætolian, Dicaærchus, with general orders to levy contributions among the islands of the Ægean, and to treat all trading vessels as lawful prizes, and with special instructions to aid the Cretan pirates against the Rhodians, who had been obliged to declare war on them for the protection of their commerce.\* The spirit in which Dicaærchus executed his commission may be gathered from his practice of erecting two altars, one to Impiety and Lawlessness, at the places where he anchored.† Yet this was the most open and honourable part of Philip's scheme, and it served to cover a fouler device, which he intrusted to another very fit agent, the Tarentine Heraclides. This man, who having attempted first to sell his native city to the Romans, and then to betray the Romans to Hannibal, had been forced to fly from Italy,‡ had been admitted by Philip to a degree of favour and confidence like that which he had formerly granted to Demetrius the Pharian, and, by calumnious accusations, he had induced the king to put five of his principal councillors to death.§ Hence there were some who attributed the corruption of Philip's character to Heraclides,|| and with, perhaps, as much reason as those who referred it to Demetrius. In each case Philip only attached himself to a congenial adviser. Heraclides undertook to destroy the Rhodian navy in a way worthy of his reputation. He renewed the stratagem of Zopyrus, and pretended to seek refuge at Rhodes from Philip's cruelty. The Rhodians were not blindly credulous, but their suspicions were lulled to rest by the sight of a letter of Philip to the Cretans, produced by the fugitive, in which he undertook to make

war on the Rhodians. Having thus gained their confidence, Heraclides only waited for the first windy night, and then set fire to the arsenal, and made his escape in a boat.\* The conflagration did great damage; but it was not by a stroke of this kind that a wise enemy would have thought to crush such a power as Rhodes. Yet the Rhodians were slow to declare war against Philip, and they continued to hesitate even after another signal specimen of his bad faith and rapacity. He had reduced the towns of Lysimachia, Chalcedon, and Cius, though they were all in alliance with the Ætoliæ, and carried off the inhabitants as slaves. Cius he sacked in the presence of the envoys of several Greek cities, who had come to intercede for it, and the news was brought to Rhodes at the time when a Macedonian ambassador was haranguing the Rhodians on his master's magnanimous forbearance towards the conquered city.† He afterward treated Thasos in the same manner, after it had capitulated with his general, Metrodorus.‡ The Rhodians now made preparations for war; but yet hostilities were begun almost without their consent by their brave admiral, Theophiliscus, and it was not until the first blow had been struck that they applied themselves in earnest to the contest, and induced Attalus to combine his forces with theirs. Philip had taken Samos, and was besieging Chios, where he made a fruitless attempt to excite the slaves to revolt,§ when the fleets of the allies appeared in superior numbers. He attempted to escape to Samos, but was overtaken and defeated, with a great loss both of ships and men.|| Philip affected, indeed, to claim the victory, because he had forced Attalus to run his galley ashore, and to leave it in the enemy's hands; but he declined a second combat when it was offered to him, soon after, by the combined fleets. The Rhodian admiral died of his wounds the next day, and it was, perhaps, this event that turned the fortune of the war for some time in Philip's favour. The allies parted their fleets, and the Rhodians were defeated off Lade.¶ This victory enabled Philip to make himself master of Samos and Chios, and probably of several other places on the coast of Ionia,\*\* and to invade the dominions of Attalus, where he committed much useless havoc on sacred buildings and works of art in the neighbourhood of Pergamus, but through the precautions which had been taken by Attalus, found it difficult to provide for the subsistence of his troops.†† He afterward again

\* Polyæn., v. 17, 2. Polyb., xiii., 6.

† Polyb., xv., 23.

‡ Ibid., 24.

§ Plut., De Mul. Virt., *XI*. He tempted them with the offer of liberty and their masters' wives. According to Plutarch's author, the women were roused to extraordinary exertions; but none of the slaves revolted.

|| Polyb., xvi., 2, 6.

¶ Ibid., xvi., 14, 15. Livy (xxi., 14) seems to have adopted the account of the Rhodian authors, Zeno and Antisthenes, whom Polybius censures for their partiality.

\*\* Appian, *Mac.*, 3.

†† Polyb., xvi., 1. But this fragment appears to be misplaced. That the invasion of the dominions of Attalus was subsequent to the battles of Chios and Lade, may be inferred not only from Appian, and from the remark of Polybius, xvi., 9, that it was the Rhodian admiral Theophiliscus who, by his example, induced Attalus to begin hostilities against Philip (Schorn, p. 221, n. 5), but perhaps still more decisively from Philip's plea (Polyb., xvii., 6) that Attalus and the Rhodians were confessedly the aggressors in the battle of Chios: *ὅτι γὰρ ἡμεῖς Ἀττάλῳ πρότερον καὶ Ῥωδίοις τὰς χεῖρας ἐπέβαλλον, οὗτοι δ' ἡμῖν ἐμολογούμενοι*: language

\* Diodor., xxvii., xxviii.

† Polyb., xviii., 37.

‡ Ibid., xiii., 4.

§ Diodor., xxviii.

|| Ibid.

moved southward, and ravaged the territory of the Rhodians on the main land, and made himself master of several towns, but when he would have returned to Europe, found himself blockaded by Attalus and the Rhodians, who had again united their armaments, and he was compelled to winter in Caria, much straitened for provisions, and in great anxiety about the safety of his own dominions.\* He extricated himself, however, from this embarrassing position, early in the next spring (B.C. 200), by a stratagem. He sent an Egyptian to the enemy, who, pretending to have deserted, informed them that Philip was preparing to engage the next day. The report was confirmed by an unusual number of fires which were lighted in the Macedonian camp during the night. The blockading squadron was recalled to make preparation for the battle, and in the morning Philip was far out at sea,† and, though pursued by Attalus and the Rhodians, arrived safely in Macedonia.‡

It was high time, for Rome had already declared war against him. The senate had disclosed its intentions or disposition, even before the conclusion of the peace with Carthage, and needed no fresh motive to stimulate the spirit of conquest and domination in the whole body, or the eagerness of its leading members for new provinces and triumphs, of which they saw a boundless prospect opening in the rich unwarlike East. Pretexts, too, sufficient for its purpose, had been furnished through Philip's imprudence before the battle of Zama. Yet it was glad to find more of these, and to receive fresh complaints against him from its allies, for the Roman people, which was ultimately to decide the question of war or peace, had not altogether the same interests with the men who commanded its armies, governed its provinces, and conducted its negotiations: it was just at this time weary of war, and longed for an interval of repose. The senate, therefore, gave willing audience to the envoys of Attalus and the Rhodians, when they came to report Philip's aggressions; and, though it rejected the petition of the Ætolians, who solicited a renewal of their alliance, it carefully treasured up their complaints against Philip. § Another ground of quarrel still more acceptable was

supplied by the Athenians, and they earned the unhappy distinction of suggesting the immediate occasion of the war. Two young Acarnanians, who, through ignorance of the sacred observances, had entered the temple at Eleusis during the celebration of the mysteries, had been discovered, and though there was no doubt as to the innocence of their error, were put to death by the priests. Their countrymen were indignant at this cruelty, and prevailed on Philip to furnish them with a body of Macedonian troops, with which they overran Attica, and returned laden with spoil.\* Henceforth the Athenians, who, it seems, had steadily resisted all Philip's overtures,† were incessantly harassed by Macedonian privateers from Chalcis and by inroads from Corinth, and they were threatened with another invasion, against which they sought protection at Rome, where their envoys received the thanks of the senate for their courageous fidelity. But the views of the Roman government were, perhaps, most effectually forwarded by the accounts received from M. Aurelius of Philip's military and naval preparations, and of his movements in the Ægean. The despatch described Philip as a second Pyrrhus, equally ambitious, and much more formidable, and urged the necessity of forestalling his designs upon Italy by the invasion of Macedonia. This was a comparison which might work upon the feelings of the comitia; and it proved very useful to the senate; for when the war with Philip was proposed by the consul, P. Sulpicius Galba, to whose lot the province of Macedonia had fallen, it was, at first, rejected by a great majority of the centuries, and it was only when the consul, in a second comitia, insisting on the example of Pyrrhus, argued that the only question left was, whether the war should be waged in Macedonia or in Italy, that the people, unable to detect the fallacy, gave a reluctant assent.

Attalus and the Rhodian admiral, when they followed Philip to Europe, made first for Ægina, and as they happened to arrive there at the time when three Roman envoys, who were on their way to Alexandria, were staying at Athens, Attalus crossed over to Piræus, and was received by the Athenians with extravagant adulation: a new tribe was created to bear his name, and the Athenian franchise or isopolity was conferred on the Rhodian people. Attalus declined presenting himself before the assembly on the plea of modesty; but addressed a letter to the people, in which he recounted the benefits he had bestowed on them, and exhorted them to declare war against Philip. It was not yet known that Rome had declared war; and the Roman envoys sent a message to Philip's general, Nicanor, who had made an inroad into Attica, and had advanced near to the city gates, bidding him inform his master that, if he would have peace with Rome, he must abstain from hostilities against the Greeks, and must make such compensation to Attalus as should be awarded by an impartial tribunal. This message had induced Nicanor to withdraw his troops.‡ Yet the Athenians, with at least the tacit sanction of the Roman envoys, declared war

which he could not have used if he had made such an attack upon Attalus before the sea-fight. He had urged the same plea to M. Æmilius: ab Attalo et Rhodis ultro se bello locassentum (Liv., xxxi., 18), and Æmilius virtually admits the fact. Compare, however, Polyb., vi., 34. The Vatican Fragment of Polybius (p. 409), *ἢ περὶ τὸ συνέλαβετον τὴν περὶ τὴν Ἀδελφὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ τοὺς μὲν Πόλιους ἀποκρίσας τὸν δὲ Ὀρόντιον ἄνθρωπον ἐνυμμάχους* (Cod. vatic., viii., 14), seems to intimate that the battle of Leds preceded that of Chios, and Lucet adopts this conclusion. But it is difficult to conceive that the Rhodians could be said *ἐνυμμάχους* before the battle of Chios; whereas what is said of Attalus may be explained, as in the text, of his subsequent co-operation with the Rhodians. Lucet also supposes the invasion of Pergamus to have preceded the battle of Chios.

† Polyb., iv., 17, 2.

‡ Appian, Mac., 3. Liv., xxxi., 1, 20. Schorn (325, n. 2) supposes Livy to have been in error when, in the first of these passages, he says that the Romans renewed the war with Macedonia in part on account of the Ætolians. Livy, however, only says that the Romans were *incauti Philippo*, *ad infandam aduersum Ætolos chiocis regionis ejusdem socios pacem*: and the embassy of the Ætolians proves that they had some complaints against him. The only difficulty is to reconcile the conduct of the parties on this occasion with that which we find related Liv., xxxi., 15 (gaudent utcumque composita cum Philippo pace), and 29-32.

\* Polyb., xvi., 24.

† Liv., xxxi., 14.

\* Livy, xxxi., 14.

† Ibid., 5.

‡ He was distinguished by the singular addition of the Elephant. Polyb., xviii., 72, 2.



against Philip. But the allies, who instigated them to this step, neither set them an example of vigour in the prosecution of the war, nor provided for their security. The Rhodians sailed away to Rhodes, only compelling the islands which lay on their passage, all but Andros, Paros, and Cythnos, to submit to them. Attalus lingered long in utter inaction at Ægina, waiting the result of an embassy which he had sent to the Ætolians, but which could not rouse them to take up arms. In the mean while, Philip was left at liberty to strengthen himself by new conquests. On his return to Macedonia, he had sent Philocles, with a small force, to ravage Attica, while he conducted an expedition in person to the Thracian Chersonesus, and, after having gained several maritime towns hitherto occupied by Ptolemy's garrisons in that region, laid siege to Abydos. The Abydenes, though they received scarcely any succour from Attalus or the Rhodians, made a gallant resistance.\* Yet they would at length have capitulated, but Philip required them to surrender at discretion. Being thus driven to despair, they devoted themselves to destruction; and the conqueror, when he took possession of the city, found hardly a living person in it besides the women and children. During the siege, M. Æmilius, one of the three envoys who were proceeding to Alexandria, was deputed by his colleagues to repair to Philip's camp, and remonstrated with him in a tone to which the king's ear was not yet accustomed, repeating the demands which had been before conveyed to him through Nicanor, with an addition in favour of Ptolemy and the Rhodians. Philip retorted with a sarcastic defiance, which he had no reason to regret, as, on his return to Macedonia, he learned that the Roman consul had already landed in Epirus. It was late in the summer when Galba arrived, and, having taken up his own quarters at Apollonia, he sent a squadron detached from the fleet which was stationed, under L. Apustius, at Coreyra, under the command of C. Claudius Cenchus, for the protection of Attica. Claudius not only chased the enemy's privateers from the Attic coast, but, sailing by night up the Euripus, surprised Chalcis, made a great slaughter of the garrison and the inhabitants, set fire to the magazines and armory, broke open the prison, threw down the king's statues, and carried off a rich booty. His force was not sufficient to retain possession of the place, unless he had withdrawn that which was needed for the defence of Attica. Yet the abandonment of Chalcis did not enable him to secure Attica; and the evils which he drew upon it were greater than any from which he had hitherto preserved it.

Philip was at Demetrias when he received intelligence of the disaster which befell Chalcis; and he immediately set out with 5000 foot and 300 horse, in the hope of surprising the Romans there. But as, notwithstanding the rapidity of his march, he found nothing but the smoking ruins, his next thought was to retaliate by a like blow; and, leaving a few of his men to bury the dead, he continued his march with equal speed towards Athens. He would probably have succeeded in his attempt, if the movement of his column had not been described by a

sentinel from a watch-tower, who ran forward and roused the city from its midnight slumbers. Philip came up a few hours later, yet before daybreak; and perceiving lights and other signs that his approach had been discovered, halted to let his troops take breath, purposing still to try the event of an open assault. But when he advanced along the broad causeway which led from the city to the Academy, the gate was thrown open, and the Athenians, with a body of mercenaries and some Pergamenian auxiliaries, came forth in battle array. Philip, however, charging them with great fury at the head of his cavalry, soon forced them to take shelter behind their walls. He then encamped in the outskirts, and proceeded to wreak his vengeance on the Athenians, as he had indulged it at Thermus and Pergamus. He destroyed or defaced all the monuments of religion and of art, all the sacred and pleasant places which adorned the suburbs. The Academy, the Lyceum, and Cynosarges, with their temples, schools, groves, and gardens, were all wasted with fire. Not even the sepulchres were spared. The next day, finding that the garrison had been re-enforced with fresh troops from Ægina, and by the Romans from Piræus, he moved his camp a few miles farther off; and, after an unsuccessful attempt to surprise Eleusis, proceeded to Corinth, and suddenly made his appearance at Argos in an assembly of the Achæans, which had been convoked to deliberate on means of defence against Nabia.

Philopemen had been succeeded in his office by Cycliades, a man not only of very inferior abilities, but of very different views, being regarded as a devoted partisan of Philip. It was apparently on this account, and not through impatience of a private station, or for want of sufficient occupation at home, that Philopemen, at the request of the Gortynians, made another voyage to Crete, and undertook the command of their forces.\* His absence encouraged Nabia to renew his aggressions on Megalopolis, which he reduced to such distress by his incessant inroads, that the inhabitants were fain to sow the open spaces within the walls to ward off famine. The Achæan army had been disbanded, and it was necessary, before succour could be sent to Megalopolis, to fix the contingents of the several cities. Philip offered to take the whole charge on himself, and not only to drive the enemy back into his own territory, but to carry the war into Laconia. This proposal was received with great applause; but the gratitude of the assembly was cooled when Philip added, that he should expect the Achæans, while he protected them against Nabia, to serve in the garrisons at Corinth and in Eubœa. It seemed clear that his object was to employ the Achæan forces so as to have them completely in his power, and to involve the League in his contest with Rome.† But even his friends seem not to have been willing to go this length in his cause. An Achæan embassy had been sent earlier in the year to Rhodes, to offer its mediation between him and the Rhodians, who, however, were forbidden to accept it by the Roman envoys.‡ This was, perhaps, the greatest effort that his Achæ-

\* Polyb., xvi., 27.

\* Plut., Phil., 12.

† Polyb., xvi., 35.

‡ Liv., xxxi., 26.

an partisans could venture on in his favour; Cycliades thought it safest not to provoke a discussion, but alleging that he had no power to propose any other question than that which they were met to consider, after a decree had been passed for the levy of troops against Nabis, dismissed the assembly. Philip, having only collected a few volunteers in Peloponneseus, returned into Attica. There he was joined by Philocles, who had, it seems, taken up his headquarters in Eubœa. But after some fruitless attempts on Eleusis, the Piræus, and Athens itself, they again divided their forces, and carried the same kind of devastation which had been recently exercised within sight of the city, through the whole length and breadth of Attica, levelling and burning all the rural sanctuaries, the temples of the demes, which, though less sumptuously adorned than those of the capital, were mostly of still more venerable antiquity, having been founded before Athens had become the centre of the united state, and enriched with many precious works of art.\* When no more subjects could be found for his barbarous rage to work upon, Philip returned to Macedonia.

In the mean while Galba, still remaining himself near the coast, had sent Apustius with a part of his forces into the upper valley of the Apeus, and the lieutenant had taken several towns, ravaged the Macedonian border, and defeated a body of Macedonian troops, and had returned, laden with booty, to the consul's camp. The success of this expedition encouraged the Dardanian and Illyrian princes, and the Athamanian Amynder, to offer their services. Galba sent Apustius back to the fleet at Corcyra, with orders to join Attalus at Ægina. He himself seems to have delayed opening the campaign in person until he had made an attempt to engage the Ætolians on his side. The senate was no longer averse to receive them into alliance, and Amynder was directed to exert his influence to animate them against Philip. But the Ætolian assembly, which was held soon after to debate the question of war or peace, and was attended by Macedonian, Roman, and Athenian envoys, came to no decision, a result which seems quite intelligible, when we consider how little either of the belligerents had done to earn the confidence of the Ætolians, without the cause reported by Livy, that Damocritus, the presiding magistrate, had been corrupted by Macedonian gold. The neutrality of the Ætolians, however, was, at this juncture, of great moment to Philip, who had to expect an attack, which would try his strength to the utmost, from the Roman army and their Illyrian allies, on the landside, while the Roman fleet, with Attalus and the Rhodians, threatened his eastern coast. He intrusted the armament which he had collected at Demetrias, and the defence of the maritime region, to Heraclides; sent a body of troops, nominally under the command of his son Perseus, a boy of twelve, but with a council of officers at his side, to occupy the passes through which the Dardanians were used to penetrate into Macedonia, and then devoted his whole at-

tention to preparations for resistance to the Roman invasion. While he was still assembling his forces, Galba had taken the field. He had taken a circuitous route, perhaps with the view of effecting a junction with the Dardanians, which brought him into the upper valleys of the basin of the Axius, where Philip first fell in with him. Philip, however, declined a battle, but thought it necessary to send for the division under Perseus, and thus to open the passes to the Dardanians. The consul, though superior in the field, did not venture to push forward towards the eastern coast of Macedonia, but overran the central highlands, where he found it difficult to provide for the subsistence of his troops, and he finally returned to his winter-quarters at Apollonia, without any much more important advantage than the conquest of a few towns. Still, he had been uniformly successful, and had worsted the enemy in two or three engagements of cavalry; the Dardanians, too, with the Illyrians under Pleuratus, had taken the opportunity to invade Macedonia; and, as Attalus and the Roman fleet were at the same time threatening Eubœa, Philip's situation seemed less hopeful than at the beginning of the campaign. This aspect of his affairs put an end to the hesitation of the Ætolians; and Damocritus himself now strongly urged them to join the victorious side, and to press upon their falling ally. They forthwith declared war against Philip, and, in conjunction with Amynder, invaded Thessaly, where they stormed and sacked some towns, and, against Amynder's advice, spread over the level country in quest of booty, as if perfectly secure from attack. Yet an enemy was close at hand. Galba's retreat had induced the Dardanians to betake themselves homeward, and Philip, having sent a body of light infantry and cavalry under Athenagoras to harass their rear, hastened into Thessaly, where he surprised the Ætolians, as they were encamped in the plain near the town of Pharcadon. Amynder had taken the precaution of intrenching himself on rising ground. He was thus enabled to afford a refuge to his allies, when they were forced to abandon their camp; and when they fled, panic struck, the next night, he guided them over the mountains, so as to elude the enemy's pursuit, into Ætolia. Athenagoras likewise executed his commission successfully, though the good order in which the Dardanians conducted their retreat secured them from much loss. Soon afterward the number of Philip's enemies was reduced by a cause in which he had no share, but which produced the effect of a diversion in his favour. Scopas returned from Alexandria with a large sum of money, and an unlimited commission to levy troops in Ætolia for the king of Egypt. He raised 6000 men, horse and foot, and would have carried away more, if he had not been checked by the remonstrances of Damocritus, who, either from patriotic anxiety, or because Scopas had not bribed him, interposed his warnings and authority to prevent the country from being drained of all its citizens of military age.

Apustius, with the fleet, joined Attalus at Cape Scyllæum on the coast of Argolis, and they then sailed together into Piræus. The

\* Liv., xxxi., 26. Aristides says of them, under the Acemides, that there were some *λαμπρότερον τῶν ἄλλων πᾶσι κατεκινεμένοι* (Panathen., t. i., p. 305, Dindorf.).

Athenians, now released from all fear of Philip, gave vent to their anger in a decree, by which they condemned him to perpetual ignominy and execration, while they heaped honours no less extravagant on their protectors. The course of the combined fleets, which were re-enforced with twenty Illyrian boats, and subsequently by a Rhodian squadron of twenty galleys, as they proceeded northward, was checked with successes and reverses. They conquered Andros, and made descents on Eubœa, but failed in an attempt on Cythnus, and were repulsed, with considerable loss, from Cassandrea. Acanthus, which they stormed and sacked, was the extreme point which they reached. They then returned, heavily laden with booty, to Eubœa, and after a conference with an Ætolian embassy at Heraclea, from which Attalus and the Ætolians departed in mutual displeasure, laid siege to Oreus, which yielded after an obstinate resistance. This was their last, as their most important conquest. Here, as in all other cases, the town was given up to Attalus, the spoil and captives to the Romans. As by this time the autumnal equinox was approaching, Apustius returned by Malea to Corcyra; and Attalus, after having celebrated the Eleusinian mysteries, passed over to Asia, and the Rhodians to their island.

In the division of the provinces at Rome in the beginning of the year, Macedonia had fallen to the consul P. Villius Tappulus. It was late in the autumn when he arrived, and before he took up his quarters for the winter at Corcyra, he was occupied with the suppression of a dangerous mutiny which had broken out in the army. It had been for some time gathering to a head, and had perhaps contributed, in some degree, to retard the progress of his predecessor. About 2000 of his troops, who, after the battle of Zama, had been transported to Sicily, and thence to Macedonia as volunteers, complained that they had been embarked against their will, and tumultuously demanded their discharge. The consul appeased the disturbance by a promise that, if they returned to their duty, he would lay their case before the senate. Philip, towards the close of the year, had undertaken the siege of Thaumaci, a town strongly situated near the defiles of Mount Othrys; but was compelled to abandon it by the vigorous sallies of a body of Ætolians who threw themselves into the place. During the winter he sent an embassy to the Achæans to receive their yearly oath of fidelity, and, at the same time, to conciliate them by a fresh promise of the cession of Triphylia and Heræa, to which he now added Orchomenus.\* He also thought it expedient to sacrifice his profligate minister, Heraclides, to the public indignation, and threw him into prison, to the great joy of all his subjects.† In the mean while he carried on his military preparations with unremitting activity, keeping his troops in constant exercise during the winter; and early in the following spring sent Athenagoras with the light infantry into Chaonia, to occupy the defiles near Antigonea. He himself followed a few days after with the main body, and, having carefully inspected the features of the country, resolv-

ed to fortify a position on the River Aous, where it flows between two high hills, Æropus and Asnaus, leaving only room for a narrow road on one bank. He had not been long encamped here before Villius came over from Corcyra, and was guided to the pass by Charops, an Epirot of great influence, who, almost alone among his countrymen, had declared himself a partisan of the Romans.\* Having viewed the enemy's position, he held a council of war on the question, whether he should attempt to force his way through the defile, or should take the more circuitous route by which his predecessor had invaded Macedonia the year before. The deliberation occupied several days; and he was still in perplexity, when he received advice that the consul T. Quinctius Flamininus, to whom the province of Macedonia had been assigned, had already crossed over to Corcyra.

Flamininus had mounted, by one step, from the ædileship to the consulship, notwithstanding the protest of two tribunes against a novelty which they regarded both as dangerous and illegal. He had not yet completed his thirtieth year, and had performed no very important services, either military or civil; though in the government of Tarentum, and the settlement of two colonies, he had displayed talents for business which might prove that he was qualified for higher offices. It must have been chiefly to his manners and address that he owed his extraordinary elevation. He was a Roman of the new school, which studied to soften the homely roughness of the old Italian character, and to adapt the forms of Roman society to the altered relations of the state. He was conversant with the Greek language, now an indispensable instrument for a Roman statesman, who looked beyond the narrow field of the old Italian politics into the new sphere of war and negotiation now opened for the Roman arms and diplomacy among the nations and princes of the East, and who was ambitious of conducting the affairs of the commonwealth in these regions. A happier lot for Rome had rarely fallen than that by which the Macedonian war was committed to Flamininus. It was a work which required such a man, and which probably would never have prospered in the hands by which it had hitherto been carried on. Much was felt to be wanting for the fulfilment of the omen which Galba had reported to the senate; that a laurel had sprung up in the stern of one of his galleys.† The contest with Philip, which had now occupied two successive consuls, had scarcely been brought a step nearer a decision, and was even beginning to assume a more threatening aspect; for an embassy had come from Attalus to announce that his dominions had been invaded by Antiochus, and to request the senate either to send a force sufficient to protect him, or to permit him to employ his own fleet and troops for the defence of his kingdom. The senate did not choose to provoke Antiochus at such a juncture. It declined to send succour to Attalus, against a prince who was the friend and ally of the Roman people, but left him at liberty to use his own forces as he thought fit, and promised to

\* See ante, p. 435.

† Diodorus, xxviii. Liv., xxxiii, 5.

\* Polyb., xviii., 13. Liv., xxxiii., 6, 11 (Charops priest-  
po Epirotarum), 14. Liv., xxxiii., 1.

intercede with Antiochus in his behalf. A re-enforcement of 8000 foot and 800 horse was decreed for the army of Macedonia, and Flamininus selected them among the veterans who had served in Spain or Africa. He also prevailed on the senate to appoint his brother Lucius to the command of the fleet. Instead of staying at Rome, like his predecessors, to enjoy the civil honours of his office, until the season for warfare was spent, he embarked as soon as he had completed his preparations, and, on his arrival at Coryra, immediately crossed over with a single galley to Epirus, and hastened forward to the camp on the Aous, where he dismissed Villius, and, while he waited for the rest of his troops, deliberated with his council on the plan of his future operations. If he took the safer and more circuitous route, it was probable that another summer would be wasted in marches and countermarches, in reaping the harvest of the highland valleys, and in trifling engagements. He therefore determined on the more arduous and dangerous attempt, which promised the greatest advantages in case of success, and bent all his thoughts towards forcing the enemy's position.

But to see what was most desirable was much easier than to find means of accomplishing it. He remained forty days in presence of the enemy without any decisive movement. Philip conceived the hope that he might put an end to the war by negotiation; and, through the intervention of the Epirot magistrates, an interview took place between him and the consul on the banks of the river, at a point where it was so narrow that they could hear one another from the opposite sides. The substance of the consul's demands was, that he should withdraw his garrisons from the Greek towns, and make restitution or reparation for his aggressions. And Philip professed himself not unwilling to resign his own conquests. But when they proceeded to details, and Flamininus began with a demand of liberty for the Thesalians, Philip indignantly broke off the conference, exclaiming, "What harder terms would you impose if I were conquered?" The next day the Romans made a vigorous assault on the enemy, but gained no ground; and they must probably have abandoned the attempt if a herdsman, sent by Charops, had not offered to show a path by which they might reach the summit of the defile in the rear of the Macedonians. Flamininus sent a tribune, with 4000 men, to follow the shepherd's guidance, with the requisite precautions against treachery, and with instructions to signify their arrival on the heights by a bonfire, and on a preconcerted signal to fall upon the enemy. The detachment, marching only by night, and reposing in the daytime, made the circuit in two days. On the third morning a column of smoke announced their presence, and Flamininus gave orders for a general assault. The Macedonians, who advanced to meet it, were driven into their intrenchments; but the advantage was, as usual, on their side, when the Romans had entered into the defile, until, after the consul raised the appointed signal, they found themselves attacked from behind. A general panic immediately ensued; the whole army took to flight, and would have been utterly destroyed

if the conquerors had not been obstructed in the pursuit by the nature of the ground. Philip halted at a few miles' distance, to collect the fugitives, and found only 2000 missing. With the rest he took the road to Thessaly.

He expected that the Romans would speedily follow him thither; and, as he did not venture to await their coming, determined to deprive them, as far as possible, of the fruits of their victory. This, at least, was the pretext under which he plundered and destroyed several Thessalian towns, after having compelled the inhabitants to quit their homes with as much of their property as they could carry away. At Pheræ, however, the gates were shut against him; and, fearing to be overtaken by the Romans, he made no farther attempt on it, but retreated into Macedonia. The success of Flamininus had roused the Ætolians and Amynder, and they, too, invaded Thessaly at the same time, though with separate forces; the Ætolians apparently with a view merely to plunder; Amynder to the conquest of Gomphi and some other strong places adjacent to his own territory. In the mean while Flamininus had traversed Epirus, where, notwithstanding the disaffection which had been betrayed by the people towards Rome, he spared their fields, and, sending for Amynder as a guide across the mountains, entered Thessaly from the northwest. He studied to exhibit a contrast to Philip's barbarous policy, by the care which he took to restrain his troops from all wanton outrages, and, instead of living at the expense of the Thesalians, sent over to Ambracia for a supply of corn, which he had previously ordered to be brought from Coryra. Yet several of the towns which were defended by Macedonian garrisons offered a vigorous, and some a successful, resistance. He was occupied for a long time with the siege of Atrax on the Peneus, and, at last, was constrained to abandon it as hopeless. He then passed into Phocis, where, for the sake of easier communication with the Corinthian Gulf, he designed to fix his winter-quarters. For this purpose he made himself master of Anticyra, which he selected for his magazines; and several other small towns yielded to him with little or no resistance; but Elatea set him at defiance, and sustained a siege. He was still lying before it when the cause of Rome received a weighty access in Peloponnesus.

While the consul remained encamped on the banks of the Aous, his brother Lucius, having succeeded Apustius in the command of the fleet, had sailed round Malea, and arrived at Piræus at about the same time that Attalus and the Rhodian admiral Agesimbrotus, who had combined their forces near Andros, began the siege of Eretria. Lucius soon after joined them there. The Macedonian garrison kept the town in awe, but after Philocles had been repulsed in an attempt to re-enforce it from Chalcis, could not prevent overtures of capitulation being made to Attalus. While these were pending, Lucius surprised the town in the night. The inhabitants fled to the citadel, which soon after surrendered. The town contained little treasure, except works of art, in which it was uncommonly rich. Carystus capitulated a few days later, the Macedonian gar-

ison being allowed to depart at a fixed ransom, without their arms, and the allied fleets then sailed to Cenchree, and made preparations for the siege of Corinth. But before they opened the siege, it was thought advisable to make an attempt to gain over the Achæan league, and, with the consul's approbation, an embassy composed, of envoys representing the three allied powers and Athens, was sent to Sicyon, where an assembly was held to receive their proposals. Ambassadors from Philip were also present. The party which espoused the Roman interest among the Achæans had already so far prevailed, that Cylindades had been banished on account of his attachment to the Macedonian connexion,\* and Aristæus, his successor, was an open and zealous partisan of Rome. But among the mass of the people opinions and feelings were almost equally divided on the subject. It gave rise to disputes so violent as to disturb the peace of families and to imbitter all the pleasures of social intercourse. It was the standing topic of conversation in every company, the great matter for consultation in every family. For the question was one which deeply affected not only the welfare of the state, but the safety of every citizen, and it was one of which the most enlightened and patriotic statesmen, the most exempt from prejudice and passion, might take opposite views. Philip was in possession. The triumph of the Romans was by no means certain, especially if Antiochus should throw his weight into the opposite scale. They might be forced to abandon their allies to the resentment of the King of Macedonia, who would be more offended by the defection of the Achæans, as he had of late been striving to conciliate their good will by spontaneous concessions; and still as he was entitled either to their confidence or their gratitude, to turn against him without any fresh provocation in his hour of anger, wore the appearance of treachery and baseness. Least of all was it possible to foresee whether Roman protection would prove less burdensome than Macedonian dominion. No wonder that the Achæans felt themselves in a trait; but the manner in which they betrayed their perplexity, according to Livy's description, was almost ludicrous. The first day of the assembly was occupied with the speeches of the envoys. A difference might be observed between the tone of the Romans and their allies, and that of Philip's ambassador, Cleomedon. The Romans urged the League not only to enter into their alliance, but to take an active part in the war, and held out the restoration of Corinth as a recompense. Cleomedon asked so faintly for support, as made it evident that his master hoped for nothing more than neutrality on the part of the Achæans. The next day, when the usual invitation had been given by the herald, no orator rose to address the assembly. It was in vain that Aristæus, as president, endeavoured to excite a debate: not a murmur was heard among the multitude. Aristæus then undertook to plead the cause of the Romans himself. He insisted chiefly on Philip's manifest inferiority and his inability to protect the Achæans if they should be attacked by

the allied fleets, while Nabis pressed them in the interior of the peninsula. Even this speech, however, produced only confused murmurs and contention, but no regular debate. The demagogues themselves, to whom it belonged to put the question, were equally divided: five declared their intention to take the votes of the assembly on the alliance with Rome; the other five protested against this proceeding as a breach of the law, by which it was forbidden that any measure adverse to the alliance with Philip should be either proposed by the magistrates or decreed by the assembly. The rest of the day was spent in violent but fruitless altercations. On the third, when the law required that the decree should be moved, one of the protestors, whose resolution had given way to his father's threats, went over to the Roman party, and the general sense of the assembly now showed itself so clearly on the same side, that, before the question was put to the vote, all the Dymeans and Megalopolitans present, and a part of the Argives, rose up and quitted the place. The old connexion between Megalopolis and the royal house of Macedon, the benefits which Philip had recently conferred on Dyme, having ransomed its citizens from the masters to whom they had been sold after the town was taken by the Romans, and his supposed descent from an Argive stock, and his manifold relations of friendship and hospitality with Argive families, furnished reasons for their conduct which were admitted to be sufficient even by the Romans and their partisans. The decree of alliance with Attalus and the Rhodians was then carried forthwith: the alliance with Rome was only deferred until the requisite sanction of the Roman people could be obtained. In the mean while, it was decreed that all the forces of the League should march to the aid of L. Quinctius, who, having taken Cenchree, was now laying siege to Corinth. He had reckoned on a division between the Corinthians and the Macedonian garrison. But the citizens and the soldiers appeared to be animated by one spirit, as if defending their common country. And he was also deceived in his calculations as to the strength of the garrison itself, which, besides the Greeks and Macedonians, included a great number of Italian deserters, who, having the fear of an ignominious death before their eyes, fought with desperate fury; and when it had been re-enforced by a body of 1500 men brought by Philoctes, Attalus advised Lucius to abandon the hopeless enterprise: the Roman clung to it a little longer, but at last, seeing the obstacles to be plainly insurmountable, raised the siege, and returned to winter at Coreyra. The consul, about the same time, made himself master of Elatea; but, on the other hand, Philoctes, after the relief of Corinth, was invited to Argos by the Macedonian party, and had surprised Larissa in the night. There was a garrison of 500 Achæans in the town, commanded by the Dymeans Ænesidamus, who, at first, made some show of resistance, but seeing himself far outnumbered, he accepted the permission offered by Philoctes for his troops to depart. He himself refused to abandon his post, and, with a few followers who remained by his side, perished in a shower of missiles.

\* Liv., xxxii., 10. Polyb., xvii., 1.

After the election of the consuls for the ensuing year, the friends of Flamininus exerted all their influence to prevent him from being superseded by either of the new consuls, and through the intercession of two tribunes, the consuls were induced to submit their claims to the pleasure of the senate, which decided that he should retain his command until a successor should be appointed in his room, and that both the consuls should remain that year in Italy. A re-enforcement of 5000 foot and 300 horse was decreed for his army, and 3000 for the fleet, which was also to remain under his brother's command. Before Titus knew that his wishes had been thus gratified, and while he was on the point of besieging the citadel of Opus, where he had been admitted into the town by an aristocratical party, though the Ætolians had been previously invited by their adversaries, he received a proposal from Philip, who was wintering at Demetrias, to appoint time and place for an interview. Flamininus desired, above all things, the honour of terminating the war; and being uncertain how long his command might last, willingly complied with the king's request. They met on the coast near Nicæa, in the Mælian Gulf, Flamininus accompanied by Amyntander, Dionysodorus, an envoy from Attalus, the Rhodian admiral Agesimbrotus, Phœneas, the Ætolian strategus, and several of his countrymen, and the Achæans, Aristenus and Xenophon, Philip only bringing with him, besides his two Macedonian secretaries, the Achæan exile Cycliades, and Brachyllas, his leading partisan in Bœotia. Flamininus stood on the beach; the king at the prow of his galley, declining to land, on the plea of distrust towards the Ætolians. Philip, though he was the only speaker on his own side, showed himself more than a match for all his adversaries in the management of his cause, only indulging his humour in sarcastic sallies and retorts more freely than was thought to becom his dignity.\* The main article in the conditions required by the Romans was, that he should withdraw his garrisons from all the Greek cities; they also demanded that he should deliver up the prisoners and deserters, restore the places in Illyria which he had taken since the treaty of Epirus, and all those belonging to Ptolemy which he had conquered since the death of Philopator. But each of the other allied states had its separate complaints and demands, which, with Philip's replies, occupied the greater part of the day, and, towards evening, it was agreed that they should set down in writing the terms which they insisted on, and that the conference should be renewed at the same place the next morning. But on the morrow he did not appear before the afternoon, pretending to have been perplexed by the difficulty of the demands made on him, but apparently wishing to avoid fresh altercation, and then proposed a private interview with Flamininus, to which the Roman consented. The result, however, did not satisfy any of the allies, and the conference was again adjourned. At the third meeting Philip obtained leave to send an embassy to Rome, and a two months' armistice for that purpose; but as the price of this favour, he was obliged immediately to withdraw all his garrisons from

Phocis and Locris. Flamininus and the allies likewise sent envoys to watch the proceedings of the king's ministers at Rome, and to put the senate on its guard against them. These envoys obtained an audience at Rome before Philip's ambassadors, and they drew the senate's attention chiefly to one point: that Greece could never be really independent so long as Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias remained in Philip's hands. These were, as he himself was used insultingly to call them, the fetters of Greece, and she could not stir a limb while Peloponnesus was commanded by the garrison of Corinth, the central provinces threatened from Chalcis, and Thessaly overawed by a force stationed at Demetrias.\* The senate seized this handle, and stopped Philip's orator at the beginning of his speech by the question, whether his master was ready to evacuate Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias; and when it appeared that the ambassadors had received no instructions on this head, they were roughly dismissed. The terms on which peace should be granted were left to the discretion of Flamininus, who, finding the senate so ready to meet his wishes, declined a fresh interview with Philip, and declared that he would receive no embassy from him which did not lay down as the basis of the negotiation the entire emancipation of Greece.

In the course of the winter, Philip received another mortifying intimation of the opinion, which generally prevailed in Greece as to the issue of the contest. Now that the crisis of his destiny seemed to be approaching, he could ill spare the force which might be necessary to defend Argos; and he, no doubt, thought he had devised a happy expedient for relieving himself from this burden, while he secured a useful ally, when he instructed Philoctes to commit Argos to the custody of Nabis, to be restored if his arms should prosper, and to hint that the king was willing to give some of his daughters in marriage to the tyrant's sons. Nabis, on this occasion, conducted himself in a manner worthy of his reputation. He at first affected to decline the proposal unless the Argives should consent to the transfer. But when in their public assembly they rejected his protection with the strongest expressions of loathing and horror, having now a sufficient handle for his purpose, he immediately closed with the overtures of Philoctes, and was admitted by night into the city. A few of the opulent citizens made their escape in the tumult, and only lost their property, which was immediately confiscated. The rest were not only robbed of all their gold and silver, but compelled to raise large sums by fear of torture, which was inflicted on all who hesitated or were suspected of concealing their wealth. Having thus sustained the character of the tyrant, he proceeded to play the part of a demagogue, and called an assembly, in which he proposed a decree for the cancelling of debts, and the redistribution of the land. It was a repetition of the process by which he had made himself master of Sparta.

\* Polyb., xvii., 11: Πόδας Ἑλληνίδας. Strabo, ix., p. 438: Πόδας ἐκάλεσεν Φιλίππος τῆς ἑλληνίδος τὴν Χαλκίδα καὶ τὴν Κόρινθον, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις βλάπτειν τὸν δόμον δ' οἱ βεβαίον προσηγγέρουν ταύτας τε καὶ τὴν Ἀργυρίδα· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ παρῶν ἦν κυρία τὸν περί τὴν Τήνην, τὸ τε Πάριον ἔχουσα καὶ τὴν Ὀσσαίαν.

\* Polyb., xvii., 1, foll. Liv., xxxii., 32.

It only remained for him to secure his acquisition by another piece of perfidy. He sent envoys to open a negotiation with Flamininus and with Attalus, and invited them to an interview at Argos. It took place at a little distance from the city. The Roman required that Nabis should make peace with the Achæans and send auxiliaries against Philip. Nabis consented so far as to grant a truce for four months, and he supplied the proconsul with 600 of his Cretans. But though he professed to have come to Argos as its protector, at the request of the people, Attalus could not induce him to withdraw his troops, that they might freely declare their mind. He left a garrison in the city, and on his return to Sparta sent his wife to Argos to complete the spoliation which he had begun. Apegea was worthy of such a consort; and her dissimulation, avarice, and cruelty were not unfavourably represented by the engine of torture which Nabis had contrived in her image. She summoned the Argive women of the higher class into her presence, and did not let them go until, by threats or torments, she had stripped them of every ornament of their persons.\* Flamininus, on his way back to his winter-quarters, stopped at the gate of Corinth to show his Cretans as a proof of the tyrant's defection; and having invited Philocles to an interview, he found that even his fidelity was beginning to waver, and that he was watching the turn of events for a fitter season to betray his trust.

There were now only two states south of Thermopylæ which had not declared themselves in favour of Rome: Acarnania and Bœotia. The Acarnanians, partly through their sense of honour, partly through their enmity to the Ætolians, adhered to Philip to the last. In Bœotia Thebes was the stronghold of the Macedonian interest. The Theban partisans of Macedonia, at first a very small faction, with Brachyllas, the chief of the house of Neon, at their head, had, under the protection of Antigonus Doseon and Philip, become masters of the state. They kept the people in good humour by largesses from the treasury, and by connivance at their transgressions of the law, while they themselves eluded all inquiry into their administration, and spent their fortunes in a continual round of feasting. It was this wretched state of things which had induced the Megarians to return to their connexion with the Achæans; and the Bœotian force which was sent to recover Megara was scared away, as we have seen, by the mere rumour of Philip's approach.† When the Romans had established themselves in the heart of Greece, and seemed to be on the point of bringing their contest with Philip to a successful close, his partisans at Thebes were in a still harder strait than the Achæans had been before their last decision. They could not bring themselves to renounce the advantages which they owed to Macedonian patronage, but still less could they venture to defy the enmity of the Romans. They wished, therefore, to be allowed to remain neutral; but, in their attempt to escape between two opposite dangers, they were so unhappy as to fall into both without the merit or honour of either.

They were neither constant to Philip, nor acquired the favour of Rome, but were betrayed by their own duplicity into the hands of Flamininus. Having caused a general assembly of the Bœotians to be summoned to the capital, he marched from Elateæ with 2000 legionaries, and encamped five miles from Thebes. The next day, accompanied by Attalus and by the ministers of the allied states, he advanced towards the city, ordering the troops to follow at the interval of a mile. At half way he was met by the Bœotarch Antiphilus, with whom he engaged in friendly conversation, but slackened his pace as they drew near to the city, to let his men overtake him. In the bustle of his entrance, their approach was not perceived until it was too late to exclude them. He was thus master of Thebes, and the assembly which was held the next day could only exhibit the vain semblance of free consultation. Attalus opened the proceedings with a speech in favour of Rome, but the exertion caused a fit of paralysis, in which he was carried away from the assembly, and which, though not immediately fatal, he did not survive many months. The decree, however, of alliance with Rome was carried without a dissentient voice; and Flamininus could thus turn all his thoughts to the approaching contest without any anxiety as to the part of Greece which he would leave behind him when he next marched against Philip.

Early in the spring of 197, Philip assembled his forces at Dium for the decisive conflict. If it had been possible to elude it much longer, the delay would only have exhausted all the resources which afforded him a hope of success. Even now the population of his kingdom had so shrunk during the long series of wars waged by him and his ancestors, that he was obliged to fill up the muster-rolls with boys of sixteen, and veterans past the age of military service. He therefore resolved to give battle in the plains of Thessaly, where he would have the advantage of favourable ground, and his kingdom to fall back upon. Flamininus was detained two or three days on his march northward at Thermopylæ, while an Ætolian assembly, held at Heraclea, was debating on the amount of the force which it should send to him. On the borders of Thessaly he was joined by 2000 foot and 400 horse under Phœnæus, and after an unsuccessful attempt on the Phthiotic Thebes, encamped about six miles from Phæræ. Philip had already advanced to Larissa, and, as soon as he had heard of the enemy's position, marched to meet him. While the two armies lay near Phæræ, a skirmish of cavalry took place, in which the Ætolians were victorious. But the ground about the suburbs of Phæræ, being thickly planted and intersected with walls, was ill suited for the operations of either army; and the two commanders, as if in concert, moved at the same time towards the territory of Scotussa, attracted by the corn, which was just ripe. Without any intelligence of each other's movements they encamped on opposite sides of a ridge, called, from some rocky summits, Cynocephalæ (the Dogs' heads). This was the field of the battle which decided the fate of the Macedonian monarchy.\*

The two armies were about equal in num-

\* So Polybius, xvii., 17, Πᾶν ὅλον αἰεὶ καὶ βίαν ὑπερέκειν: which is singularly softened by Livy, xxxii., 40, *vincendo ac minando*.

† Polyb., xi., 4-6.

\* Polyb., xviii., 2-16. Liv., xxxiii., 6-10.

bers; the Macedonian phalanx consisted of 16,000 men, to which were added 7000 light infantry and 2000 cavalry. The Romans had the advantage by the number of the Ætolian horse. It was the first time that an opportunity had occurred for the phalanx and the legion to measure their strength against each other, and the empire of the civilized world depended on the result. Yet, to a superficial observation, it might seem that on this occasion a blind chance had interfered to prevent a fair comparison. On the morning of the battle, the ground was covered by so thick a mist, that Philip, thinking it impossible that any action could take place that day, had sent out numerous parties to collect fodder. But a Roman detachment, sent from the camp to explore the country, and discover the enemy's position, fell in with one which he had posted on the heights of Cynocéphale. An engagement ensued, in which the Romans were beginning to give way, when the Ætolians came to their aid, and turned the fortune of the fight. Philip was obliged to send his cavalry, and the greater part of his light infantry, to support the first detachment, and their arrival again changed the scene. The Romans were dislodged from the heights, and driven down into the plain, and they would have been completely routed if they had not been protected by the Ætolian cavalry, which is admitted by Polybius to have been the best in Greece for service of this kind. Flamininus now deemed it necessary to bring up the legionaries, who quickly put the Macedonians to flight. In the mean while Philip had been induced, by exaggerated accounts of the first successes obtained by his troops, to set the phalanx in motion. Yet it was only a part of it that was brought into action. Reluctantly, and against his better judgment, misliking, as he declared, both the place and the time, he nevertheless, in compliance with the importunity of his officers, hastened forward with the right wing, that he might not lose the supposed favourable juncture, ordering the rest to follow as quickly as possible. And this right wing, which reached the top of the heights in time to protect the fugitives, who were driven back by the advance of the legionaries, was completely victorious over the left of the Roman army. The Roman arms could make no impression on that hedge of spears, ten of which were pointed against each soldier.\* The Macedonians also stood on the higher ground, and after the first shock, which was accompanied with a tremendous shout of both armies, continued to gain on the retreating foe. Flamininus soon perceived that the day was lost on this part of the field. But the rest of the phalanx, which was just appearing on the heights, had not yet formed, and was impeded by the unevenness of the ground. While it was still in this confusion, the Roman general, having first sent the elephants to increase the disorder, charged it with the whole of his force not previously engaged: and as the phalanx, if not irresistible, was utterly helpless, it was presently

routed, and the Romans had only to slaughter their defenceless enemies. One division raised its sarissas in token of surrender; but as the Romans did not understand the sign, it was only the more exposed to their attack; and Quinctius, though he discovered the error, could not, or would not, prevent the carnage. The victory was completed by the promptness of a Roman tribune, who, without orders, like Philopemen at Sellasia, charged the Macedonian right wing in the rear. Unable to change its front, and seeing the enemy, who had hitherto been retreating before it, now making a stand, it could only seek safety in flight. Philip, having first, with a few followers, ascended an eminence, from which, as the mist had now rolled away, he could survey the field of battle, and having satisfied himself that the day was irrecoverably lost, rode off at full speed towards Tempe; and having stopped for one day at Gonni, to collect as many of the fugitives as could overtake him, and having sent to Larissa to destroy his papers there, pursued his way into Macedonia. On his side 8000 were slain, 5000 made prisoners. The loss of the Romans was estimated at no more than 700.

Such was the issue of the battle of Cynocéphale; and it might seem, as has been observed, at first sight, rather a work of chance, produced by an extraordinary combination of fortuitous circumstances, than a proof of any intrinsic superiority of the one army over the other. And so it appears to have been common among the Greeks to attribute the success of the Romans to fortune. But Polybius has pointed out very clearly that the very essence of the advantage which the legion had over the phalanx lay in this: that there was so much room in all military operations for the intervention of fortuitous circumstances. The efficacy of the phalanx was, in fact, merely conventional; it depended on certain conditions, which no general could command, and on events which none could foresee. It was, therefore, no match for a force which could readily adapt itself to every position and emergency. Philip lost the battle only as he must have done in every other case, unless his enemy had allowed him to choose his own time and ground.

The Romans, on their return from the pursuit, proceeded to plunder the Macedonian camp; but they found that the Ætolians had already carried off the greater part of the booty; and they were the more offended with the greediness of their allies, as the Ætolian cavalry might have done much harm to the flying enemy, and, perhaps, might have overtaken the king himself. The murmurs which arose from this circumstance were a prelude to more serious differences. The Ætolians, as we have seen, had done good service in the earlier part of the battle; but they claimed almost the whole glory of the victory: and the Roman general himself was deeply displeased by some verses which circulated through the camp, in which the name of the Ætolians stood foremost, and he and his army were described as if they had taken a subordinate part in the work.\* There was another still deeper ground

\* Livy (xxxiii., 8), deceived by his imperfect knowledge of Greek, has fallen into the ludicrous mistake of supposing that the phalanx laid aside its sarissas, which he fancied encumbered it by their length, and translates *κατάλλους τὰς σαρίσσας ἁρτίς ποσὶς*.

\* Plut., Flam., 9.



of offence. The Ætolians had pretensions which were at variance with the interests of Rome: and Flamininus soon made them feel he change which had taken place in their relations with him, from the moment that he had no farther use to make of them. At Larissa he was met by three envoys from Philip, who came to ask the ordinary truce for the burial of the slain, and leave to send an embassy to the Roman camp. Flamininus granted a truce for fifteen days, and consented to admit Philip to a conference at Tempe, adding an encouraging message, which gave great offence to the Ætolians, who complained that they had not been consulted, as they used to be on all matters before the battle, and threw out insinuations that the Roman general was making advances to the king from corrupt motives. A few days before that which had been fixed for the conference, Flamininus held a council to consider the terms of peace which should be demanded. The Ætolians would hear of none, but urged him to follow up the victory, until Philip should be despatched, or driven out of his kingdom: an occasion which Flamininus did not neglect, to enlarge on the generosity with which Rome was wont to treat her vanquished enemies. Amyntander innocently expressed a hope that the terms would be such as would enable him to maintain himself against Philip, after the departure of the Romans. At the conference Philip cut off all dispute at the outset, by a declaration that he accepted all the conditions which had been previously prescribed to him by the Romans and their allies, and was ready to submit to the decree of the senate on other points. But an angry altercation ensued between Flamininus and the Ætolians, who demanded the restitution of their Thessalian towns, while the Roman refused to give up any which had opened their gates to him: Pthiotic Thebes, which had been taken by force after it had refused to surrender, they might deal with as they would.\* A truce of four months was concluded with Philip, who was required to pay 200 talents immediately, and to deliver his son Demetrius and some of his friends as hostages; but the money and hostages were to be restored to him if the treaty should be broken off at Rome.†

It was not any magnanimous feeling, but the threatening movements of Antiochus that had rendered Flamininus unwilling to push Philip to extremities; and the same cause made the senate anxious to terminate the Macedonian war. Notwithstanding, therefore, the opposition of the new consuls, each of whom wished for the Macedonian province, the peace was decreed and confirmed by the comitia of the tribes. The heads of the treaty were embodied in an ordinance of the senate, and ten commissioners were appointed, according to established usage, to carry it into effect, and to consult with Flamininus on some points which were left to their discretion.

The battle of Cynocephalæ put an end to the resistance of the Acarnanians. Their magistrates and leading men had yielded to the solicitations of L. Quinctius, or saw more clearly than the common people that it was

vain to withstand the power of Rome; and they held a congress at Leucas, in which a decree was passed in the name, but without the authority, of the nation, for alliance with the Romans. But this decree was soon after indignantly annulled by the people, and its authors called to account, though pardoned on acknowledgment of their offence. Lucius, as soon as he heard of this reaction, sailed from Corcyra and laid siege to Leucas, which made a long and most gallant resistance, though exposed to attack both by sea and land, and only surrendered after the enemy had been treacherously admitted into the citadel. A few days after, the contest was decided in Thessaly, and the rest of the Acarnanian towns submitted to the conquerors.

About the same time the Achæans, under their general, Nicostratus, gained a victory over Androsthenes, the commander of Corinth, which delivered the Achæan territory from the ravages which it had previously suffered from the garrison; and a body of Achæan auxiliaries aided the Rhodians to recover the greater part of the Perææ. Philip himself did not remain inactive after his defeat; but when the Dardanians, supposing that they might now insult him with impunity, made an inroad into Macedonia, he hastily collected a small army, fell upon them suddenly near Stobi, and chased them, with great slaughter, out of his dominions.\*

Towards the close of the year the tranquillity of Greece was slightly disturbed by some struggles of the two Boeotian factions, which kept up their contest after that of their patrons had ceased. Notwithstanding the alliance which had been concluded with Rome, a number of Boeotians fought on Philip's side at Cynocephalæ, under the command of Brachyllas; and he, with many others of them, was among the prisoners. Flamininus, however, to conciliate the Boeotians, consented to release them; but he could not soothe their hostility by this favour, which they affected to ascribe to Philip's intercession; and Brachyllas, on his return, was elected Boeotarch. The chiefs of the opposite party, who had promoted the alliance with Rome, began to be uneasy about the lot which awaited them when their adversaries should be no longer overawed by the vicinity of a Roman army, and they consulted Flamininus on the expediency of removing Brachyllas. Flamininus would not meddle with such a transaction himself, but advised them to speak to the Ætolian general, Alexamenes. By him they were furnished with six men, three Ætolians and three Italians, who killed Brachyllas as he was returning home at night with some dissolute companions from a feast. But the contrivers of the murder were afterward detected, and one of them was put to death, after he had been examined by torture, in which he probably disclosed the connivance of Flamininus. The discovery inspired all classes of the Boeotians with mortal hatred towards the Romans; and as they did not venture to exhibit it openly, they wreaked it by a series of cowardly assassinations on the individual Roman soldiers who happened to pass through Boeotia. When, at length, search was made by the order

\* Polyb., xviii., 17-22. Liv., xxxiii., 11-13.

† Liv., xxxiii., 13.

of Flamininus, 500 corpses were found, with clear signs of violent death, at the bottom of the Lake Copais. Flamininus demanded the delivery of the murderers, and imposed a contribution of 500 talents on the Boeotians. When they offered excuses instead of compliance, he invaded the country, and laid siege to Acraphia and Coronea, the towns nearest to the principal scenes of bloodshed. The Boeotians now were ready to submit, but could only obtain forgiveness through the intercession of the Achæans and the Athenians, and on condition of surrendering the guilty, and paying a fine of thirty talents.

By the decree of the senate which was brought by the ten commissioners, peace was granted to Philip on the following terms: all the Greeks, both in Europe and Asia, were to be free, and governed by their own laws; but with one very important exception. The districts subject to Philip, and the towns held by his garrisons, were to be delivered up to the Romans before the next Isthmian games. Yet this exception, again, was so qualified, that several towns were named which he was immediately to evacuate, and to restore to absolute freedom. These were Euromus, Pedasa, Bargylia, and Iassus in Caria, Abydos, Thasos, Myrina, and Perinthus, all places far remote from Greece. Titus was to write to Prusias of Bithynia, in the name of the senate, on behalf of Cios. Within the same time Philip was to surrender all the Roman prisoners and deserters, and his ships of war, except five boats and his state galley, a huge and useless vessel; and he was to pay 1000 talents, one half immediately, the rest by instalments in ten years.

These articles, according to Polybius, diffused universal joy throughout Greece, except among the Ætolians; they alone complained that the liberty announced by the decree was a mere name, destitute of reality. Polybius attributes these complaints to their resentment, yet he admits that they were not without plausibility; and though the sagacity of the Ætolians may have been quickened by their disappointment, it is probable that their suspicions were shared by many who had not the courage to express them. They observed that, since the towns which Philip was to set at liberty were named, it was clear that those which he was to deliver up to the Romans were not included in the same class, or to enjoy the same freedom; and among these, besides Oëus and Eretria, were Chalcis, Demetrias, and Corinth. It was, therefore, evident that the fetters of Greece were not to be unlocked, but only to be transferred to the grasp of a stronger hand. Polybius, with a breach of candour into which he is often betrayed by his ill-will towards the Ætolians, treats these objections as mere verbal cavils and exaggerations. But it is certain that the Ætolians not only put a fair construction on the language of the decree, but penetrated the intentions of the senate. The senate meant to keep these important places in its own possession; not, indeed, so much through distrust of the Greeks, as for the sake of precaution against Antiochus. It had not, however, finally determined this point, but left it to the decision of the commissioners after consultation with Flamininus; for there was room for hesitation as to the expedi-

ency of the measure. If, on the one hand, it was dangerous to leave these places exposed to attack from Antiochus, it was also unsafe, at such a juncture, to forfeit the confidence and alienate the good will of the Greeks. The question became the subject of a long and warm debate between Flamininus and the commissioners, who were inclined to carry out the senate's original design in every part. But Flamininus so strongly pleaded the necessity of stopping the mouths of the Ætolians, and of making good the professions which the Romans had so often held out to their allies, that the commissioners yielded, on some points, to his opinion. It was settled that Corinth should be immediately delivered up to the Achæans, according to the terms of their late treaty with Rome, but that the Acrocorinthus, Chalcis, and Demetrias should be retained by Roman garrisons. Livy supposes it to have been expressly declared in the decree of the council, that this occupation should be merely temporary, to last only as long as the movements of Antiochus should afford cause for anxiety; but Polybius is silent as to any such restriction.\*

These deliberations took place at Corinth, and the final decision of the commissioners was to be published at the Isthmian festival, which was now near at hand. It was attended by an unusual concourse of Greeks, anxious to learn the fate of their country, and the use which the Romans would make of their victory. This was the subject which engrossed all conversation, and various conjectures were formed about it; but the prevailing opinion, as reported by Polybius,† seems not to have differed very widely from that of the Ætolians. When the spectators were assembled, before the games began, after silence had been bidden by the sound of the trumpet, proclamation was made by a herald that the Roman senate, and Titus Quinticius, having overcome King Philip and the Macedonians, give liberty to the Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Eubœans, Achæans of Phthia, Magnetes, Thessalians, and Perrhæbians, with exemption from garrisons and tribute, and permission to govern themselves by their hereditary laws. The catalogue included every part of Greece which had hitherto been occupied by Philip; and the proclamation was in substance, as it was sometimes described, a declaration that the independence of Greece was restored. So it was understood by those who heard it. A shout of joy rent the air, such, that birds which were flying over the heads of the multitude are said to have dropped to the ground; and the herald was obliged to repeat the proclamation, as well for the sake of those who had not heard it distinctly, as because the rest could scarcely believe the evidence of their senses. The shout then rose again still louder than before; the spectacle which followed passed unheeded; the whole assembly was occupied with one thought and one feeling. Titus, as he withdrew at the end of the games, was almost stifled by the throng which crowded about him, to gaze and applaud, to grasp his hands, and shower garlands and fillets on his head. Yet we may suspect that the pressure which he found most painful was that of undeserved gratitude; for

\* Polyb., xviii., 28. Liv., xxxiii., 31. † xviii., 29.

he probably thought much less highly of his own services than Polybius, who does not scruple to observe that, extravagant as the display of gratitude might seem, it fell short of the obligation: a reflection so glaringly wide of the truth, that we can hardly explain it, so as not to question either his judgment or his sincerity. The enthusiasm of the multitude was more excusable, as they could not foresee all the advantages which the Romans were to reap from their victory over Philip, and either did not yet know that they had resolved to keep the fetters of Greece in their hands, or believed that this was only a temporary measure, and a necessary precaution. But the joy of the more considerate might have been damped by the thought, that such a boon could only be bestowed by a master who was able to resume it at his pleasure.

After the festival, Flamininus and the commissioners proceeded to adjust the other affairs which were committed to their discretion. The envoys of Antiochus were dismissed with a peremptory injunction to their master, to evacuate all the Asiatic cities which had belonged either to Philip or to Ptolemy, and to abstain from aggression on those which retained their independence, and, above all, not to pass over in person, or to send forces into Europe; but it was announced that some of the ten would shortly seek an interview with the king. The province of Orestis, which had revolted from Philip during the war, was declared independent, and he was thus, to his bitter mortification, prevented from taking revenge for its disloyalty.\* The Illyrian districts of Lynchnis and Parthi, which had been subject to Philip, were given to Pleuratus. Thessaly was, as far as possible, dismembered; the Perrhæbians, Dolopes, and Magnetes were detached from it as independent states; Phthiotis, however, was annexed to it, with the exception of Thebes and Pharsalus. The claims of the Ætolians to Pharsalus and to Leucas were referred to the senate; but they were permitted to renew their former relations with Phocis and Locris. Corinth, Triphylia, and Heræa were restored to the Achæans. The commissioners wished to bestow Oreus and Eretria on Eumenes, who had succeeded his father Attalus on the throne of Pergamus, but, on the remonstrance of Flamininus, the question was referred to the senate, which decided that these towns, together with Carystus, should be restored to liberty. Valerius Antias, a writer of very slight authority, related that, by the original decree of the senate, Ægina, which Attalus had purchased from the Ætolians, and the elephants, were given to his son of the same name; and that the Athenians were rewarded with the lordship of Paros, Imbros, Delos, and Scyros.† Nothing but the silence of Polybius throws a doubt on either fact. The commissioners then parted to undertake various missions. Cn. Cornelius, who was sent to Philip, prevailed on him, that he might not seem to be reserving himself for Antiochus, to sue for alliance and amity with Rome. Cornelius next proceeded to the Ætolian assembly at Thermus; but he was there received with complaints, upbraidings, and reproaches, which

grew, at last, so violent that he thought it safest to decline discussion, and to advise them to send an embassy to Rome, where they would be sure to obtain satisfaction of all reasonable demands. So ended the Macedonian war, with a plentiful sowing of the dragon's teeth.

## CHAPTER LXV.

FROM THE PROCLAMATION OF THE LIBERTY OF GREECE UNDER THE ROMAN PROTECTION TO THE EMBASSY OF CALLICRATES TO ROME.

ANTIOCHUS, the son of Seleucus Callinicus, and the sixth from the founder of his dynasty, surnamed by his contemporaries the Great, was, perhaps, eminent in energy and ability above most of his line, though certainly not comparable in this respect to his ancestor the Conqueror. He seems to have owed that title—which, however, imported little in an age so lavish of such distinctions, that his grandfather, a vile and odious prince, was surnamed the God—chiefly to the contrast between the low state into which the Syrian monarchy had fallen when he ascended the throne, and that to which he finally raised it, but especially to his expedition for the recovery of the eastern provinces, which had been taken from it by the Parthian and Bactrian kings, an expedition which, by its extent, duration, and dazzling success, might, to a degenerate race, recall the achievements of the Macedonian conqueror. He seems to have been elated with the sounding epithet,\* and to have forgotten how largely he was indebted for his triumphs to the imbecility of his Egyptian neighbours; and in an evil hour he conceived the project of enlarging the bounds of his empire, until it should include all the conquests made by the first Seleucus after his victory over Lysimachus. In the prosecution of this undertaking, he crossed the Hellespont in the spring of 196, and made himself master of the Thracian Chersonesus; and being struck with the advantageous site of Lysimachia, which had been ruined by the Thracians after Philip had withdrawn his troops, he determined to rebuild it, and make it the capital of his European dominions, which he intended should comprehend the whole kingdom of Lysimachus.† While this work was going on, he collected as many as he could of the old inhabitants, many of whom he ransomed from slavery, and invited new colonists.‡ He was thus employed when L. Cornelius, who had been sent by the senate to mediate between him and Ptolemy, and three of the commissioners who had just been regulating the affairs of Greece, came to Lysimachia. They were amicably received and hospitably

\* Appian, *Syr.*, l. Gerrius, *Ueber die Historische Größe*, in Schösser's Archiv., v. p. 423, seems to doubt whether Appian's authority is sufficient to prove that Antiochus received the epithet in his lifetime. But it could hardly have been bestowed on him after the reverses which befell him towards the end of his life, though Roman self-complacency was interested in the greatness of a conquered enemy, and even magnified it in honour of the hero who finally achieved the victory—*ingenium cecidit Antiochus*. Niebuhr (*Kl. Schr.*, p. 231) observes that the house of Seleucus never produced a great prince.

\* Liv., xxxiii., 34. Compare xxxix., 23.

† Ibid., xxxiii., 30.

† Liv., xxxiii., 40; xxxiv., 58. Polyb., xviii., 34.

‡ Liv., xxxiii., 30.

entertained. But when they required him to restore the conquests he had made from Ptolemy and Philip, and demanded an explanation of the purpose for which he had come over to Europe, he firmly rejected their dictation, reminded them that Rome had no more to do with Asia than he with Italy, and asserted his claim to the European as well as the Asiatic possessions of Lysimachus. The conference, which had been carried on in a very high and sharp tone on both sides, was abruptly broken off by a false rumour of the death of the young king of Egypt, which induced Antiochus to return to Asia, leaving his son Seleucus at Lysimachia. The commissioners, on their return to Rome, made a report which prepared the senate for an approaching war with Syria, and, at the same time, directed its attention to the hostile temper of the Ætolians and the independent attitude of Nabis.

The only doubt with regard to Nabis was, whether there was any sufficient pretext for a declaration of war against him; and it appeared so difficult to find one, that it was decided to refer the question of war or peace to Flamininus. As soon as this decree of the senate reached him, he summoned a congress of the allies at Corinth, and, professing that he should be entirely guided by their wishes, bade them consider whether they would have Argos left in the power of Nabis. It was a matter in which Rome had no concern, except so far as it interfered with the liberty of Greece, and thus impaired the glory of her work. The Athenian deputies extolled the Roman magnanimity, with some reflections on the malignity of its detractors: an allusion which roused the Ætolians, against whom it was pointed. They had been deeply offended by the result of their last embassy to Rome, where the senate, as if to aggravate injury with insult, referred their claims again to their adversary Flamininus.\* They now inveighed against the meanness of the Athenians, complained of the wrong by which they were defrauded of Echius and Pharsalus, and taxed the Romans with dissimulation and hypocrisy. "They pretended to be the liberators of Greece, and yet held it in its old fetters. Argos and Nabis were only pretexts to cover the continued presence of their army. Let the legions be embarked for Italy, and the Ætolians would undertake that Nabis should withdraw his garrison from Argos." The truth would only have displeased the Romans; the boast disgusted the other allies. The Achæan general, Aristæus, declaimed bitterly against the Ætolians, and intreated Flamininus not to leave Peloponnesus until he had secured it against their aggressions. The rest of the deputies joined in the same strain, and the war against Nabis was unanimously decreed.

Flamininus, having sent for his troops from Elatea, marched against Argos, and at Cleonæ was joined by Aristæus with an Achæan army of 10,000 foot and 1000 horse. Nabis had committed the command of the garrison at Argos to his wife's brother Pythagoras, who was also his son-in-law, and he made the best preparations for its defence. He suppressed an insurrection which was prematurely at-

tempted by some of the citizens on the approach of the Romans, and no farther movement took place within when Flamininus encamped in the suburbs. Finding this hope disappointed, he called a council to deliberate on a siege. All the Greek officers, except Aristæus, thought that, as Argos was the occasion of the war, the first operations of the army should be directed against it. But Flamininus adopted the advice of Aristæus, to carry the war into the enemy's country, and, having reaped or wasted the harvest in the plain of Argos, he marched to the borders of Laconia, where he waited some time for a reinforcement which he expected from Philip, and for a supply of provisions which he had ordered the Peloponnesian towns to furnish. He was joined by 1600 Macedonians and 400 Thessalian horse, and by a numerous body of Lacedæmonian exiles, with Agesipolis at their head. About the same time, his brother Lucius had sailed into the Gulf of Laconia with forty galleys, and Eumenes and the Rhodians were approaching with their combined squadrons. Nabis, however, did not abandon himself to despair, though his whole force amounted to no more than 15,000 men, being composed of 3000 Cretans, 3000 other mercenaries, and 10,000 Laconian troops. He strengthened the defences of his capital with a new ditch and rampart, and struck terror into his subjects by the arrest of eighty suspected citizens, whom he put to death the following night, and by the execution of some Helots, who were charged with having attempted to desert. When the Romans, having descended the vale of the Cénus to the banks of the Eurotas, were proceeding to pitch their camp within a short distance from Sparta, they were thrown into great confusion by a sudden charge of the tyrant's auxiliaries, who were only repelled by the advance of the legionaries, and the next day, when the Roman column, moving southward, had passed the city, Nabis again sallied out and fell upon its rear with his mercenaries; but the Romans, who anticipated an attack, shifted their front so rapidly, and in such good order, that, after an obstinate combat, he was put to flight, and the Achæans were enabled, by their knowledge of the ground, to intercept or overtake many of the fugitives before they could gain the city gate. Flamininus then ravaged the adjacent plain without farther interruption, and afterward continued his devastations down to the seacoast.

In the mean while, Lucius, after he had taken several of the smaller towns on the coast, laid siege to Gythium, the arsenal of Sparta, a populous and well-fortified city; and, as Eumenes and the Rhodians arrived about the same time, the works made rapid progress. Two officers, Gorgopas and Dexagoridas, commanded the place with equal authority. Dexagoridas, when defence seemed hopeless, opened a clandestine correspondence with the Roman general, but was detected and put to death by his colleague. But he, too, was reduced to despair, when Titus came up with a body of 4000 men to support the besiegers; and he surrendered on condition that the garrison should be allowed to withdraw. Nabis,

\* Lib., xxxiii., ult.

though he had been re-enforced by 1000 mercenaries and 2000 Argives under Pythagoras, who had left Argos under the charge of Timocrates, an Achean, when he heard of the fall of Gythium, began to think his situation desperate, and sent Pythagoras to solicit an interview with Flaminius. This request was granted; and they met, with a few attendants on each side, in the plain of Sparta. In the conference, as reported by Livy, the strength of the argument seems to have been on the side of Nabis; for it was difficult to point out any change that had taken place to afford a just ground for hostility against him since the day when Flaminius accepted his aid against Philip. The Roman had then virtually, if not expressly, recognised his title, not only to Sparta, but to Argos. The answer which the Roman historian puts into the mouth of his countryman is hardly intelligible, but apparently quite inconsistent with the facts recorded by the historian. Flaminius is made to deny that the Romans had contracted any friendship or alliance with Nabis, and then to allege the tyrant's misgovernment, his aggression on Messene, his alliance with Philip, and his piracies, as grounds of war; but the validity of all these grounds manifestly depended on the truth of an assertion which, if Livy's narrative is to be believed, was notoriously false. Flaminius, however, was in a position in which it might be considered as a condescension to reason even on false premises. Aristæus more ingenuously exhorted Nabis to abdicate his power, and reminded him of many tyrants who had descended of their own accord to a private station, and had afterward lived in safety and honour among their fellow-citizens. But Nabis had not so used his power that he could venture to resign it. The conference was adjourned to the morrow, and then Nabis offered to evacuate Argos, and to give up his prisoners and deserters; if the Romans had any other demands to make, he desired that they might be set down in writing, that he might deliberate on them with his friends. A truce was granted, during which Flaminius conferred with his allies on the question of peace. At first, they were all unwilling that it should be granted to him on any terms; and Flaminius, who had private motives for desiring it—chiefly the fear that he might otherwise be superseded before he had brought the war to a close—could not bring them over to his mind until he had frightened them with a prospect of the heavy contributions which he should be obliged to lay on them for the support of the army if he was forced to undertake the siege of Sparta, which he represented as likely to last through the winter. He was then allowed to prescribe terms of peace. They were sufficiently hard. One of the more important articles provided for the dismemberment of Laconia. Gythium and the other maritime towns were to be severed from the dominion of Nabis, as independent allies of Rome. He was also to give up all the towns which he possessed in Crete to the Romans, and to surrender his whole navy, retaining only two boats. He was strictly confined to Laconia, and forbidden even there to build or fortify, as well as to make war or contract alliances.

But he was left absolute master of Sparta, and the only provision introduced in favour of the exiles was an article by which their property, which included the emancipated slaves, their children, and as many of their wives as wished to share their fortunes, were to be restored to them. Nabis was to pay 100 talents immediately, and 400 more by instalments in eight years. A six months' truce was to be granted for an embassy to Rome.

Nabis, however, found the conditions insupportable, especially those which deprived him of his maritime possessions, which were the chief source of his wealth, and furnished the main strength of his army. The article of restitution to the exiles was no less disagreeable to the great mass of his creatures and dependants, and the mercenaries dreaded the end of a profitable occupation. Nabis inflamed the general discontent, and the Romans were soon apprized, by a renewal of hostilities, that the negotiation was broken off. Flaminius now saw himself obliged to make an attempt on Sparta; but his object still was, it seems, rather to terrify the tyrant into submission than to make himself master of the city. He sent for all the crews of the three allied fleets, and when they arrived his whole force amounted to no less than 50,000. With this multitude he surrounded the city, and ordered a general assault, while three divisions of his best troops were led against three quarters in which the fortifications had not been completed. The city would have been carried at these points if Pythagoras had not set fire to the adjacent houses, and thus compelled the assailants to retire. The main purpose of Flaminius, however, had been answered; for, three days after, Nabis sent his son-in-law to implore peace. It was granted on the same conditions which had been before prescribed: the money was paid, and hostages, including a son of Nabis, delivered. In the mean while, the Argives, having heard of the tyrant's danger, rose and expelled his garrison. Flaminius arrived at Argos, soon after, with his victorious army, and was invited to preside at the Nemean festival, which, having been omitted in the season of public distress, was now celebrated in honour of the recent deliverance (B.C. 195). The liberty of Argos was solemnly proclaimed by a herald during the games, and the universal joy was only allayed by one reflection, which afforded fresh matter for the invidious insinuations of the Ætolians, that Rome still sanctioned and upheld the tyranny of Nabis, while the rightful heir of the Spartan throne was allowed to remain in exile.

The senate ratified the treaty with Nabis, and resolved to withdraw its army from Greece, and its garrisons from the Greek towns, either moved by the influence of Flaminius, or because the good will of the Greeks and the honour of Rome appeared more important than the advantage which would be derived from the continued occupation of these places in a war with Antiochus, which was still, indeed, expected as much as ever, but with more eagerness than anxiety. The reputation of Flaminius, as the patron of Greece, required this measure to enable him to complete his task, and terminate his mission with lustre. During the winter, after his campaign in Laconia, he

remained at Elatea, occupied with the settlement of the internal affairs of the Greek cities, in which the Macedonian interest had hitherto been predominant; and it had, probably, been everywhere so much abused, that he might seem to be merely redressing wrongs and protecting liberty, while he turned the scale in favour of Rome. In the spring he summoned the deputies of all the allied cities to Corinth, where, as he took his leave, he recounted the benefits which they owed to the Romans, to his predecessors, and to himself; vindicated the peace with Nabis as necessary to save Sparta from destruction; and announced that he was on the point of returning to Italy, with his whole army; that he should immediately put the Achæans in possession of the Acrocorinthus; and that, within ten days, they would hear that the Roman garrisons had been withdrawn from Demetrias and Chalcis. They would then know what credit to give in future to the charges of the Ætolians. He concluded with an exhortation to use their liberty soberly and discreetly; to cherish concord both between city and city, and within each, and to show themselves worthy of the boon bestowed on them by the Roman people; remembering that, though their freedom had been won for them by the arms, and restored to them by the good faith of a foreign power, it could only be preserved by their own care. It was, no doubt, an earnest and friendly warning, and it drew tears from the audience, which affected the speaker himself. After a short pause, he added a parting request, that they would collect as many Roman citizens as they could find living among them in slavery, and send them after him, within two months, into Thessaly. This was gladly promised, and the number redeemed in Achaia alone amounted to 1900, and cost the Achæans 100 talents. Before the assembly was dismissed, it saw the garrison descend from the citadel and march out of the city. Flamininus followed it, amid acclamations of gratitude from the Greeks, and took the road to Elatea. He then sent his lieutenant, Ap. Claudius, with all the forces, to Oricum, there to wait for him, and proceeded to Eubœa, where he withdrew the Roman garrisons, not only from Chalcis, but from Oreus and Eretria, and, in a congress of Eubœan deputies, repeated the advice which he had given at Corinth. He next passed on to Demetrias, where, while he withdrew the garrison, he seems to have taken measures to secure the ascendancy of the partisans of Rome; and he probably, at the same time, regulated the federal Constitution of the Magnes, who henceforth have a magistrate at their head, with the title of Magnetarch. His last work was to restore order and tranquillity in Thessaly, which he found in extreme confusion. The character of the people is described as turbulent and unsteady, and, under the Macedonian government, which superseded the forms of their ancient Constitution, but substituted no definite system in its room,\* they seem to have experienced the evils of anarchy and despotism by turns.† The object of Flamininus appears to have been to assimilate the

Thessalian Constitution to that of the Achæan League, establishing a perfect equality with regard to the election of the federal magistrates and the administration of public affairs;‡ for this was the feature in the Achæan Constitution which, as it tended most to limit the power of the League, best suited the views of Rome. But the polity which he introduced into the cities approached nearer to that of Rome itself: it was what the Greeks called a timocracy, an oligarchy founded on the basis of property.† The government was lodged in a senate, or council of the wealthier citizens, and a pecuniary qualification was required for the exercise of judicial functions. Every oligarchical party throughout Greece regarded Rome as its patron.‡ It was, no doubt, in reliance on the efficacy of these measures for the security of the Roman interest that he had advised the withdrawing of the troops; but he knew that Rome had nothing to fear if he should be deceived in his calculations. He then proceeded to embark at Oricum, with his ransomed countrymen, and returned to Italy to receive the honours of a triumph, which few Roman generals ever deserved better. His conduct in Greece is entitled to nearly as high praise as it was possible for him to earn in such a station. He probably never for a moment lost sight of the aggrandizement of Rome, as the mark to which all his aims were directed. But his policy was as liberal as was consistent with this object; and, as appears from the opposition which he encountered, few of his contemporaries were capable of equal moderation or generosity. He would, possibly, not have shrunk from any violence or fraud which he deemed necessary for the establishment of the Roman ascendancy in Greece; but he was willing, and even desirous, that the Greeks should enjoy the largest measure of prosperity and apparent freedom that could coexist with real dependence on the will of Rome. The part of his conduct which it is, perhaps, most difficult entirely to justify, even from this point of view, is that which relates to Nabis, whom he seems purposely to have left as a thorn in the side of the Achæans, while he committed the maritime towns of Laconia to their protection, though it was easy to foresee that the result would be a fresh collision between them.

The Ætolians were ready to give the necessary impulse. In their contest with Philip, though it arose out of their own aggressions, the Ætolians might, with some colour of truth, represent themselves as champions of the national independence. Their connexion with Rome might, perhaps, be defended on the plea of a supposed necessity, though no fair excuse could be offered for the iniquitous compact into which they entered with her. But they were now about to set Greece in a flame, without any assignable motive but lust of power and gain, jealousy of the Achæans, and resentment against the Romans. They waited for a time, after the departure of Flamininus, in the hope that it would be a signal for the enemies of Rome to enter the vacant field; but, when

\* Niebuhr (Kl. Schr., p. 346) gives a concise but luminous view of the internal history of Thessaly.

† Liv., xxiv., 51.

\* Niebuhr, u. 2.

† Liv., xxiv., 34. Inter omnes constabat, in civitatibus principes, optimum quomque, Romanæ societatis esse, et præsentis statu gaudere, multitudinem, et quorum res non ex sententia ipsorum essent, omnia novare velle.

† Liv., u. 2.

they found that all remained quiet, they held an assembly at Naupactus, and, by the advice of their general, Thoas, resolved to do their utmost to kindle a fresh war. They sent envoys at the same time to Antiochus, Philip, and Nabis, to work upon the ambition or revenge of each by appropriate arguments. Antiochus was, indeed, meditating war, and he had now Hannibal at his side, to urge and direct him; but the season for the commencement of hostilities against Rome had not yet arrived. Philip had bought his experience too dearly to let himself be drawn so soon into a struggle so much more hopeless than the last. Nabis, as he was more impatient of the condition to which he had been reduced, yielded more easily to the persuasions of the Ætolian envoy, and began immediately to make attempts for the recovery of the maritime towns, gaining some of the leading men by bribes, and removing those who adhered to the Roman cause by assassination, and, finally, laid siege to Gythium. The Achæans, as protectors of these towns, while they remonstrated with Nabis, sent a body of auxiliaries to Gythium, and envoys to Rome. Philopœmen had now returned from Crete. His absence at a period when his services were supposed to be required for the defence of his country had given so much offence at Megalopolis, that a decree was very nearly carried for depriving him of the franchise; and this dishonour was only averted through the interposition of Aristæus, the general of the League, who, though afterward, at least, opposed to Philopœmen in his political views, was induced to intercede in his behalf. We are informed that Philopœmen was moved, by resentment for this affront, to aid several of the subject Arcadian towns in an attempt which they made to deliver themselves from their dependence on Megalopolis.\* The motive assigned for this step is certainly too petty for such a man; but we do not find any reason to believe that this was a democratical measure.† If these towns were admitted into the League, it was, most probably, Philopœmen's object simply to counterbalance the preponderance of the old Achæan towns, as we shall find him afterward the author of another innovation manifestly designed for that end. Now, however, he was again general of the League. But though Nabis, while he vigorously pressed the siege of Gythium, made inroads into the Achæan territories, it was not thought prudent to undertake any offensive operations against him

until the senate's pleasure should be known. Even when they learned, on the return of their envoys, that the senate had directed the prætor, A. Atilius, to carry succours to their Laconian allies, they would not come to any resolution until they had consulted their patron Flaminius. They then held a council at Sicyon. It seemed evident that Gythium and the whole coast would be lost unless measures were speedily taken to check the progress of Nabis; and these would have been voted unanimously if a letter of Flaminius had not been read, in which he advised them to wait for the prætor's arrival. The opinions of the assembly were then divided. Philopœmen declined to express his own, but declared himself ready to execute their decree, whether it were for peace or war. This was construed as a sufficient guarantee: war was decreed, and the time and mode of conducting it left to his discretion. Philopœmen himself would willingly have waited for the Roman fleet; but the danger of Gythium seemed to admit of no delay, and there was little hope that any relief could be brought to it unless by sea. He resolved, therefore, though totally destitute of knowledge or experience in marine affairs, to attempt a naval expedition for that purpose. The Achæan navy was not strong; but Nabis, having so lately surrendered all his ships to the Romans, had only been able to equip a very small squadron for the blockade of the port: this, however, he kept in constant exercise. Philopœmen had heard of a large galley of war, which was laid up at Ægium, and, believing that it would be a valuable accession to his fleet, ordered it to be manned, and placed it under the command of Tiso, the Achæan admiral; but he seems to have forgotten that it had been captured eighty years before,\* and he was not informed that its timbers were utterly decayed. Yet it performed the voyage to the Gulf of Laconia, and led the way with gallant port against the enemy: but, at the first shock which it received from one of the tyrant's new ships, it went to pieces, and the whole crew was taken. The rest, dismayed by the fate of their admiral, took to flight, and did not stop till they reached Patræ. Happily, Philopœmen was on board one of the smaller vessels. He was not disheartened by a failure which detracted nothing either from his military or nautical reputation, but was only stimulated to set all the resources of his art in action against the tyrant. He soon after, with a detachment of light troops, surprised a division of the enemy which was stationed a little to the east of Gythium, set fire to the camp, which was formed chiefly of huts of reed, and made a great slaughter; and, having ravaged a part of Laconia, proceeded to Tegea, where he assembled all his forces and summoned a council, which was attended by ministers from Epirus and Acarnania. He now resolved, as the last expedient for the relief of Gythium, to

\* Plut., Philop., 13.

† So it is represented by Nitzsch (Polybius, p. 17), who observes that "the ancients seem to have been so much occupied with Philopœmen's military inventions that they forgot his political plans;" that is, in other words, we have no satisfactory evidence remaining as to their real nature. If so, it is now scarcely possible, by any effort of sagacity, to fill up the void. This little work of Nitzsch is full of interesting hints, bold surmises, and startling assertions. It may seem ungrateful to complain of its brevity, otherwise than in the way of praise; but much time would have been saved to ordinary readers if the author's views had been more largely developed. One of the more serious defects of the work is, that very questionable propositions are laid down, not only without evidence, but without any intimation that they are doubtful, and often the more dangerously, because coupled in the same period with others which are undeniable. It is also to be regretted that the propositions towards which the induction is pointed are seldom so distinctly stated as to enable the reader to estimate the exact force of the argument.

\* Plutarch (Philop., 14) says forty years had passed since it had been last used, which is not inconsistent with the date of its capture, given by Livy, xxiv., 36, who says it was taken while carrying Nicæa, the wife of Craterus, from Naupactus to Corinth. One may suspect that either as Schorn believes (¶ 1), the word *filii* has dropped out of Livy's text, or that Livy confounded Craterus with his son Alexander, as we do not know that the father's wife was also named Nicæa; but even Alexander had now been dead more than fifty years.

march against Sparta; but, on the very day when he crossed the border, Gythium was taken by assault, and Nabis, having information of his movements, hastened to occupy a pass\* by which he expected he would descend into the vale of the Eurotas. Philopœmen, though taken by surprise, and at a great disadvantage, not only extricated himself by a skilful manœuvre from his perilous situation, but drew the enemy into an ambuscade, scattered his whole army on the mountains, and, having posted some of his own troops on two of the roads which led to Sparta, intercepted so great a number of the fugitives, that hardly a fourth part was believed to have escaped. Nabis no longer ventured to stir beyond the walls; and Philopœmen, having ravaged Laconia for about thirty days, returned home, with the glory of a victory, which his admiring countrymen were inclined to prefer to all the achievements of Flamininus himself.†

Flamininus, in the mean while, had returned to Greece, having been sent as envoy, with three colleagues, to counteract the machinations of the Ætolians, and to keep the other Greeks steadfast in the Roman alliance. He is said to have been so much offended by the comparison drawn between himself and Philopœmen, that he interposed his authority for the protection of Nabis, and granted him a truce.‡ But, however capable Flamininus may have been of such jealousy, there are strong reasons, besides Livy's silence, for doubting that he betrayed it in this manner. His mission required that he should carefully conceal any displeasure which he might feel towards the Achæans, and it is related that he relied on their hostility to Nabis as a pledge of their friendly disposition towards Rome.§ Nor does it appear that the supposed truce could have had any object; for it is not probable that Philopœmen would have undertaken the siege of Sparta, which Flamininus, with 60,000 men at his command, had treated as so arduous an enterprise. The war seems only to have been intermitted through the weakness of Nabis, who, however, made repeated applications to the Ætolians for succour.

The four Roman envoys, after a very short stay in Achaia, proceeded northward, through Athens and Chalcis, to attend a council of the Thessalians. They appear to have met with no symptoms of disaffection until they came to Demetrias, where an assembly of the Magnetes was convoked to meet them. Here they found that great alarm had been spread by a report that Demetrias was to be restored to Philip; and on this ground or pretext several of the leading men, among whom was the Magnetarch Eurylochus, had declared themselves in favour of the Ætolians. The envoys did not venture either to acknowledge or deny the truth of the report; for it seems clear, and it is even intimated by Livy, that the senate, to prevent a union between Philip and Antiochus, had not only released the Prince Demetrius, and remitted the arrears of the Macedonian tribute, but had, at least, held out a hope to Philip that he

should recover Demetrias. The envoys, therefore, were obliged to elude the inquiries and complaints of Eurylochus and his party on this head, by the recital of past services, and other irrelevant topics, which produced little impression on their hearers; and when, in the course of the debate, Eurylochus ventured to observe that even then Demetrias was free only in semblance, but really subject to the beck of the Romans,\* there were many assenting murmurs, though the envoys and their adherents assumed a tone of indignant astonishment. The Roman interest was, indeed, so strong that, when the assembly broke up, Eurylochus thought it prudent to make his escape from the city, and took refuge in Ætolia.

About this time Thoas, the Ætolian ambassador who had been sent to Antiochus, returned, accompanied by Menippus, an envoy from the Syrian king. An assembly was summoned to give them audience, and, in the mean while, they circulated extravagant accounts of the forces and treasure of Antiochus. Quinticius, who had agents in Ætolia, by whom he was informed of all that took place there, sent an Athenian embassy to plead the cause of Rome in the assembly; but the popular feeling was so strong against it, that the assembly could hardly be persuaded to admit the Romans themselves to a hearing. Quinticius, however, availed himself of this permission, not with any expectation of preserving peace, but with the view to fix the blame of the war on the Ætolians. This end he accomplished; for they passed a decree in his presence, inviting Antiochus to come and emancipate Greece; and when he asked for a copy of this decree, Damocritus, the general, replied that he could not then attend to his request, but would shortly publish the decree from the Ætolian camp on the Tiber. It was the absurd vanity of the Ætolians, rather than the violence of their resentment, that precipitated the war in a manner very advantageous for Rome. Having now thrown off all reserve, they wished to strike some important blow before Antiochus arrived to share their glory. It was resolved, in the council of the Apocletes, to make an attempt on the same day on Demetrias, Chalcis, and Sparta. At Demetrias the enterprise succeeded. Diocles, to whom it was intrusted, having been appointed to escort Eurylochus, who had been recalled from exile, took possession of the city by means of a stratagem like that which had made Flamininus master of Thebes. But at Chalcis, the partisans of Rome called in the Eretrians and Carystians to their aid, and presented such a front to Thoas, who was sent, with a small army, to surprise them, that he was obliged to retire, concealing his disappointment under professions of friendly intentions. At Sparta the plan was successfully executed, but its authors, through the blind greediness of their agents, lost the fruit of their iniquity, which was reaped by their enemies, while they themselves only retained the guilt and shame of a foul crime.

Nabis, as has been said, had importuned them for succour, to enable him to carry on the war into which they had urged him. Alexamenus was now sent, with 1000 foot and 30 chosen

\* Liv., xxxv., 27. *Pyrrhî castra*: clearly a different place from δ Πύρρου καλούμενος χῆρα of Polyb., v. 19, with which it is confounded by Manno, Sp. iii., 1, p. 402.

† Liv., xxxv., 30. Plut., Philop., 15; though here, as in Flamin., 13, and Pausanias, viii., 50, 10, there is great confusion of dates. ‡ Paus., u. a. § Liv., xxxv., 31.

\* Liv., xxxv., 31. *Re verâ omnia ad nutum Romanorum fieri.*



horsemen, who were instructed by Damocritus, in the council of the Apocletes, to execute whatever order they might receive from their commander, however strange and perilous it might seem. Alexamenus, on his arrival at Sparta, represented Antiochus as already on his way to Greece, and exhorted Nabis to exercise his troops, that they might be ready to bear their part in the great contest which was now approaching. Accordingly, reviews were frequently held in the plain near the city, at which Nabis was only attended by a few horsemen, and Alexamenus made it his practice frequently to ride off to one wing, where the Ætolian troops were posted, as if to inspect them, and then to hasten back to the tyrant's side. Having thus guarded against all suspicion of his design, one day, when he had reminded his horsemen of their secret instructions, he bade them follow him with their spears couched, and imitate his example. He then charged Nabis, who was riding up to him, and threw him on the ground, where he was soon despatched. Before the tyrant's guards, who were posted in the centre of the line, had recovered from their amazement, Alexamenus had quitted the field, with all the Ætolians, to take possession of the palace. It now only remained to invite all who were averse to tyranny to declare themselves, and the Ætolians would soon have been hailed by the multitude as the liberators of Sparta. But the leader and his men followed their national instinct; while he ransacked the palace, they began to plunder the city. At length, indignation armed the people with courage to collect their forces in defence of their property. They found a boy of the royal blood, who had been brought up among the tyrant's children, and having set him on horseback as a rallying-point, fell upon the spoilers. Alexamenus was killed in the palace; most of his troops, within the precincts of the Brazen House, to which they fled as an asylum. The few who escaped out of Laconia were stopped on their way through Arcadia, and sold as slaves. Philopemen, as soon as he heard of these events, hastened to Sparta, which he found in great confusion; and, having assembled the principal citizens, persuaded them to enter into the Achæan League. The arrival of Atilius, with a fleet of twenty-four great galleys, at Gythium, contributed to overcome all opposition. The League received an accession which Aratus had scarcely dared to hope for.

After the repulse of the Ætolians from Chalcis, Quintus sailed into the Euripus, where he met Eumenes of Pergamus, who strengthened the garrison with 500 of his troops, and proceeded to Athens, while the Roman envoys continued their voyage to Demetrias. They hoped that the failure of the recent attempt on Chalcis would tend to incline the Magnesians to renew the alliance with Rome. Villius, one of their number, was sent forward to sound the disposition of the people at Demetrias, while Eunomus, the Thessalian general, was directed to assemble all the forces of Thessaly to encourage the partisans of Rome. But Villius was not allowed to enter the harbour of Demetrias, and, after an angry altercation with Eurylochus, was obliged to rejoin his colleagues, who sailed back to Corinth.

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The revolt of Demetrias proved a great gain to the Romans; for it hurried Antiochus into rash counsels, and induced him to begin the contest he had so long meditated without sufficient preparation, and in a manner most disadvantageous to himself. He had already shown, by his treatment of Hannibal, how largely he had been indebted to fortune for his past successes, and he was now about to prove still more clearly how unequal he was to the great designs which he had conceived. Hannibal, driven out of Carthage by the jealousy of the Romans, had taken refuge at his court; for a war with Rome, the trustiest and ablest of counselors; bringing imbibed hatred of their common enemy, with enlarged experience and knowledge both of her strength and her weakness, wanting only the means which Antiochus possessed in abundance, to annoy and distress her, if not to bring her once more into mortal peril. He asked for 100 galleys, 10,000 foot, and 1000 horse. With this armament he undertook to rouse Carthage to revolt, to invade Italy, and keep the Romans employed, while Antiochus took possession of Greece, and threatened to cross the Adriatic. Antiochus had for a time adopted this plan, and Hannibal sent an emissary to Carthage to concert measures with his friends. His projects, of which various rumours had reached Rome from time to time, seem to have alarmed the senate much more than the power of Antiochus; and it was, apparently, on this account that, after the return of Flaminius from Greece, P. Sulpicius and P. Villius were sent to the Syrian court. Antiochus had fixed his residence at Epheus, but, when the envoys arrived, was engaged in an expedition to Pisidia; and, during his absence, they held frequent conferences with Hannibal. These meetings, when reported to Antiochus, inspired him, as the Romans designed, with distrust of his guest,\* who was, for a time, excluded from his councils, and seems never entirely to have recovered his confidence. But the real cause of his alienation appears to have been, that he could not help seeing that, notwithstanding his title, Hannibal was the greater man; and he willingly lent an ear to the Greeks, who flattered and deceived him. The project of the expedition to Italy was not laid aside, but it was reserved as a subject for maturer deliberation; and it was the less necessary to decide upon it immediately, as the forces which he had been collecting in the eastern provinces were still at a distance, and on the western coast of Asia he had not yet been able to overpower the resistance of Smyrna, Alexandria, Troas, and Lampsacus, which he wished to secure before he passed over to Europe. He was thus wavering when Thoas, the Ætolian, came to announce the revolt of Demetrias, and to urge him to go over to Greece without delay. All Greece, Thoas made him believe, was ready to welcome him; the Ætolians and Sparta were already in arms; Philip was only waiting for his arrival to declare himself; for the present, he needed no greater force than he had already with him. This, however, was the very force

\* Polyb. iii. 11, *Ἐπιδεικνύμενος εἰς τὸ πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίοχον δὲ καὶ συνίημι γινώσκειν*. Livy (xxv. 14) does not like to acknowledge the artifice, and tries to mask it. *Secutum sua sponte est, velut consilio petitiū esset, ut villior ob ea regi Hannibal, et suspectior ad omnia fieret*.

—it amounted, at least, to no more than that—which Hannibal required for his proposed expedition. Thoas, therefore, endeavoured to dissuade the king from this project; and, by insinuations which revived his jealousy of Hannibal, induced him to drop it altogether, and, without any farther preparations, at once to cross over to Europe.

Antiochus, having first sacrificed at Ilium, as if to appease Rome's tutelary deity, embarked, with no more than 10,000 foot, 500 horse, and six elephants, in a fleet of 100 galleys, of which only forty were completely decked, and 200 transports. He made for the Gulf of Pagasæ, and was received at Demetrias with great joy by Eurylochus and his party. He soon after proceeded with a thousand men to Lamia, to attend an assembly of the Ætolians, in which he was created commander-in-chief of the national forces, with uncontrolled authority,\* and thirty of the Apocletes were appointed to assist him with their counsels. It was resolved to begin operations with a fresh attempt on Chalcis, where it was thought his presence would overcome all opposition. He therefore set out with the force which he had brought from Demetrias, and a small body of Ætolians, and, having encamped at Salganeus on the Euripus, crossed over, accompanied by his Ætolian counsellors, to Chalcis. The magistrates and chief men of the city, among whom Mictio and Xenocides, the leaders of the Roman party, were foremost, went out to meet him, and a conference ensued between a select number on each side. It was conducted in a friendly tone, as the Ætolians affected to regard alliance with Antiochus, who had only come to restore liberty to Greece, as consistent with the friendship of the Romans. But Mictio, who was the chief speaker on the other side, declared that the people of Chalcis, in common with all Greece, already enjoyed perfect liberty, for which they were indebted to the Romans, without whose sanction they would neither conclude any fresh alliance, nor receive any foreigners within their walls. With this answer, as he was not prepared to use force, Antiochus was obliged to return to Demetrias. It was then determined to try the effect of negotiation with the Achæans and Bœotians, and with the king of the Athamanians. Amynander, a weak man, was easily gained, through his wife's brother Philippus, a native of Megalopolis, but of Macedonian family, which claimed descent from the great Alexander; and the Ætolians, humouring him in this pretension, prevailed on him to draw Amynander into an alliance with Antiochus. The Bœotians were well known to be ill affected towards Rome, and the answer they gave to the application—that they would deliberate when the king himself should have come into Bœotia—was equivalent to consent. With the Achæans, on the contrary, there was no apparent ground to hope for success, but the supposition of personal rivalry and animosity between Philopœmen and Flamininus, which, even if it existed, could not have produced any such result. Flamininus himself was present at the assembly which was held in Ægium to give audience to the envoys of Antiochus and the Ætolians.

They enlarged with rhetorical exaggeration on the immense preparations which the king had made, both by land and sea, to overwhelm his enemies, and pompously enumerated the various distant nations which were to swell his countless host. All that they asked, however, of the Achæans was neutrality. Flamininus ridiculed their bombast with some humour, and pointed out the glaring contrast between the mighty armaments which they had described, and the paltry force with which Antiochus had actually landed in Greece. It was, indeed, much too small to put the fidelity of the Achæans to the test. The assembly, without the slightest hesitation, resolved that they and the Roman people would have both friends and enemies in common, and declared war against Antiochus and the Ætolians, though the Romans themselves had not yet done so. They also, at the request of Quinctius, sent 500 men for the protection of Chalcis, and as many to Piræus; for Antiochus had found partisans at Athens, who were endeavouring to draw the needy multitude over to his side by the prospect of royal largesses, and the adherents of Rome thought it necessary to send for Quinctius, whose presence, with that of the Achæan troops, quelled the spirit of disaffection, and Apollodorus, who had fomented it, was condemned to banishment. Antiochus, when he heard of the vote of the Achæans, sent his general, Menippus, with 3000 men, and his whole fleet under Polyxenidas, to intercept all succours destined for Chalcis, and, a few days after, followed them with 6000 men of his own, and as many Ætolians as he could collect at Lamia. They did not arrive until the Achæan troops, with some auxiliaries furnished by Eumeneæ, had been safely conducted into the town by Xenocides; but Mictio, who had been sent to request an additional re-enforcement from Quinctius, and had obtained 600 Romans,\* on his return found the road to Aulis barred by Menippus, and he therefore turned aside to Delium. Here, before they found means of embarking for Eubœa, while the men wandered about, some in the sacred grove, others for forage in the adjacent fields, apprehending no hostility, as war had not yet been begun, or declared, and believing themselves sheltered by the sanctity of the place, which possessed the privilege of an asylum, they were suddenly attacked by Menippus, and almost all cut to pieces or taken. A few escaped with Mictio in a small transport. The Romans hardly regretted a loss which enabled them to exclaim against Antiochus as the aggressor; and the Greeks thought it an ill omen that he had begun the war with an act of sacrilege.† To him, however, it may not have been useless, as, on his next summons, when he arrived at Aulis, notwithstanding the remonstrances of Mictio and Xenocides, the Chalcidians opened their gates to him; and their example was followed by all the other towns in the island.

At Chalcis he received an embassy from Epirus, headed by the same Charops who had before stood almost alone on the side of the Romans. The Epirots, in cautiously-guarded and

\* Livy (xxxv., 45), *Imperatorum*. Appian, Syr., 12 (anticipating the decree), *στρατηγὸν ἀντιπρόσωπον*.

\* Livy, xxxv., 50, does not say whence these Romans came: perhaps it was from the fleet under Atilius.

† Diodor. Exc. p. 574.

somewhat perplexed language, intimated that they would gladly admit him into their harbours and towns if he brought a fleet and an army to protect them; but lying so near as they did to Italy, they could not venture sooner to declare themselves in his favour. The Eleans, professing to fear an invasion from the Achæans, solicited aid, and a body of 1000 men was sent for their defence. Antiochus himself then repaired to Thebes, where he was warmly welcomed, and, though he still affected only to ask that the Bœotians should receive him into their alliance, without prejudice to their connexion with Rome, a decree was passed which amounted to a declaration of war against her. He then returned to Demetrias, where he held a council with the Ætolian commissioners and Amynder, at which Hannibal, whom he had not for a long time before called in to take a share in his deliberations, was likewise present. The question for discussion was, whether an attempt should be made to gain the Thessalians, and, all being unanimous on this point, opinions were only divided as to the time and manner of the enterprise: some thought it best to try the effect of negotiation, others, to make a display of force; whether immediately, or not before the spring, was another question. Hannibal had remained silent; but when his advice was asked, he pointed out the futility of all that the king had hitherto done in Greece, and of the measure which was then the subject of debate; how little it imported towards the issue of the war, whether he had the Thessalians or any other Greeks—who would always be with the strongest—on his side; how great a mistake he had committed when he came over with so small a force, trusting to the promises of the Ætolians; that the only power on that side of the Adriatic which could either serve or injure him materially was Macedonia. The sum of his advice was, that his forces should be brought over as early as possible from Asia; that Philip should either be won by persuasion, or, if he adhered to the Romans, should be kept occupied in his own dominions by attacks, which Seleucus might make from Lysimachia, on his northeast frontier; that one division of the Syrian fleet should infest the south coast of Italy, while the rest was stationed at Corcyra, and Antiochus himself, with all his land forces, took up a position in Epirus, threatening, and always ready, if occasion required, to pass over into Italy.

This was, indeed, the plan which the Romans dreaded, and against which they had been endeavouring to shield themselves by timely precautions. But Antiochus and his other counsellors were too jealous of the sagacity which exposed their shortightedness to profit by it, and the only result of Hannibal's advice was, that Polyxenidas was sent to hasten the passage of the armament from Asia. Envoys were sent to the Thessalian assembly at Larissa, while Antiochus moved against Phæræ, where he was joined by Amynder and the Ætolians. Here he committed a fatal mistake. He sent a body of 2000 men to collect the bones of the slain at Cynocephalæ, and interred them with magnificent obsequies, and he assigned the command in this expedition to Philip, the pretender to the Macedonian crown, a choice

which probably rendered this invidious ostentation of sympathy doubly offensive to Philip. He had hitherto wavered, and had taken no decisive step, but he now invited the Roman prætor, M. Bæbius, who was wintering with his army at Apollonia, to a conference, that they might concert measures to check the progress of Antiochus in Thessaly. Antiochus, when the Thessalians rejected his overtures, made himself master of Phæræ and Scotussa, and several other towns, and proceeded to lay siege to Larissa; but he let himself be scared away by the stratagem of Ap. Claudius, who, after the meeting between Bæbius and Philip, was sent with a small detachment into Thessaly, and led the enemy to believe that the whole allied army was approaching. Antiochus took up his winter-quarters at Chalcis, that he might gratify the passion he had conceived for the daughter of one of the citizens, and having married her, as if he had no weightier business on his hands, gave himself up entirely to the celebration of festivities in honour of his nuptials. His officers, following his example, laid aside all military cares and exercises, and when the army was reassembled in the spring, it was found that, in the long interval of ease and luxury, discipline had been dissolved, and the habits of the camp were almost forgotten, so that Philipomen was heard to regret that he was not at this time general of the Achæans, to have surprised and cut down the Syrians, as they roved from tavern to tavern.\* His first operation was an expedition to Acarnania, where, through the treachery of two leading men, whom he had corrupted by bribes, he gained possession of Medion; but while he was besieging Thyrium, he was alarmed by a report that the consul, M. Acilius Glabrio, had entered Thessaly with his army, and he immediately hastened back to Chalcis.

Bæbius and Philip had previously united their forces, and were recovering the Thessalian towns which had submitted to Antiochus and the Athamanians, when the consul arrived. On his appearance all opposition ceased. The pretender Philip, surrendered to him, and, after having suffered the mockery of his rival, was sent in chains to Rome. Philip won the good will of the Athamanian prisoners by mild treatment, and through them, having dismissed them to their homes, soon after made himself master of Athamania. Amynder fled with his family to Ambracia. While Philip was thus occupied with his own interests, he permitted the consul to advance without him to the vale of the Spercheus, and afterward, either being detained by illness, or feigning it, did not overtake him until the crisis was past. Antiochus, as the enemy approached, sent messenger after messenger to Polyxenidas, to hasten the passage of his forces from Asia; but with so little effect, that when the Roman army, about 40,000 strong, had nearly reached Thermopylæ, he had only 10,000 foot and 500 horse to bring against them. The Ætolians, too, failed him almost entirely in his hour of need. Only some 4000 could be induced to take part in the unequal conflict. These, after he had intrenched himself with a double rampart, fosse, and wall,

\* *Plut., Philip., 17.*

in Thermopylæ, he sent to protect Hypata and Heraclea against the Romans; but the consul, having ravaged their fields, encamped near the pass, and the Ætolians threw themselves into Heraclea. Antiochus now despatched a messenger to them to request that, at least, they would guard the path over the mountain, that he might not suffer the fate of Leonidas without his glory. Only half of them complied with this request, and, dividing themselves into three bodies, occupied the summits Callidromus, Rhoduntia, and Tichius. The consul sent two of his tribunes, M. Portius Cato and L. Valerius Flaccus, with 2000 men, to dislodge them, while he attempted to force the pass below. This he would probably never have accomplished, as the force of Antiochus was sufficient to defend his fortifications; but in the heat of the conflict, Cato, having surprised the Ætolians on Callidromus, and driven them from their post, appeared with his troops, chasing them before him, on the heights in the rear of the Syrians. As soon as this was perceived, a panic spread through the host of Antiochus; all threw down their arms and fled. Antiochus himself did not stop until he reached Elatea, and then, with as many followers as he could collect, proceeded to Chalcis. But the Roman cavalry made such havoc among the fugitives, that not more than 500 are said to have escaped. The whole loss of the Romans was estimated at 200. The Ætolians in Heraclea took the opportunity to attack the camp of the conquerors in their absence, and were not repulsed without loss on the part of the Romans. The consul now marched towards Chalcis, receiving on his way the submission and deprecations of the revolted Phocian and Bœotian towns, which he treated with clemency. On his approach, Antiochus embarked for Asia with his Eubœa,\* the only permanent acquisition he had made in Greece. The island submitted without resistance to the conqueror, who, at the intercession of Flamininus, spared even Chalcis.

The Ætolians were thus left to maintain the contest, which they had so rashly and prematurely begun, alone. Yet, hopeless as it now appeared, their pride did not permit them immediately to abandon it, and they rejected the consul's overtures, when he summoned them to surrender Heraclea, and to throw themselves on the clemency of Rome. Heraclea sustained a siege which lasted nearly a month, during which the assault was continued night and day without intermission. At the same time Philip, who had met the consul on his return from Bœotia with congratulations and excuses for his absence, laid siege to Lamia. But when Heraclea had fallen, Acilius desired him to desist, as the Romans, who had won the victory, were entitled to its fruits. Yet he did not himself turn his arms against Lamia; for there now seemed a prospect that the war would be soon ended. A few days before the capture of Heraclea, an Ætolian council, assembled at Hypata, had decreed to send an embassy to Antiochus, to request that, if he could not immediately pass over again, with all his forces, into Greece, he would support them in the struggle with subsidies and troops. But

the loss of Heraclea sunk their spirits, and, before they had received an answer from Antiochus, they sent envoys to the consul to sue for peace. He granted an armistice of ten days, and sent his lieutenant, Valerius Flaccus, back with them to Hypata. Here, when they would have pleaded their ancient services, Flaccus bade them consider all such claims as forfeited by their recent injuries to the Romans, and advised them to confine themselves to the language of humble supplication. They believed that they were following his advice when they passed a decree by which they committed themselves to the Roman *Faith*. But they had adopted a phrase of the Roman international law under a mistaken notion of its meaning; and while they supposed that they had placed themselves under the safeguard of the Roman honour and piety as suppliants, they had unconsciously surrendered at discretion. The consul, however, expounded the phrase very lucidly to their envoys when they came to him with the decree; for when they hesitated to give up Amynder and some other obnoxious persons whom he demanded, he ordered them to be put in chains; and it was only through the intercession of Flaccus that they were allowed to return to consult with their countrymen at Hypata. There vehement indignation was excited by the report of the consul's behaviour, as well as by the unreasonableness of his demands; and, as it happened that at this juncture a supply of money was brought to them from Antiochus by one of their envoys, together with cheering promises and dazzling descriptions of the king's preparations, they resolved to hold out still longer before they threw themselves on the Roman *faith*. But they seemed to have no spirit left for any other than defensive hostility; and when Acilius crossed Mount Corax to besiege Naupactus, they neglected the opportunity of attacking his army, which was heavily laden with baggage, on a most difficult road, where they might, probably, have repelled the invaders with a defeat not less disastrous than the Athenians had formerly suffered in the same region. Naupactus, however, made a vigorous defence, and as the garrison was stronger than at Heraclea, after the consul had been lying before it two months, it was still in a condition to occupy him much longer. In the mean while, Philip was making conquests in Thessaly and the adjacent regions. He had obtained permission from the consul, when he set out from Naupactus, to recover the places which had revolted from the Romans. Demetrius, fearing the vengeance of the Romans, had opened its gates to him, notwithstanding the efforts of Eurylochus, who slew himself as the Macedonians entered. The soldiers and vessels of Antiochus were allowed to depart. Philip then proceeded to reduce the towns which had not yielded in Dolopia, Aperantia, and Perrhæbia. His progress did not escape the observation of Flamininus, and furnished him, at least, with a pretext for interposition in behalf of the Ætolians, who, when he came over to Naupactus, earnestly implored his intercession. They had, indeed, little claim to his good offices, but it belonged to his character, as patron of Greece, to extend his protection

\* Polyb., xz., 8. Appian (Byz., 20), *Eddias*.

to them. He therefore drew the consul's attention to Philip's acquisitions, and persuaded him to grant a truce to the Ætolians, that they might send an embassy to sue for peace at Rome. A stop was thus put to the progress of the Macedonian arms. Acilius raised the siege, and sent his army into Phocis, while he accompanied Quinctius to Ægium, where they had business to transact with the Achæan assembly.

The expedition of Antiochus had apparently promoted the interests of the Achæans, as the Peloponnesian states which still kept aloof from the League were induced to declare themselves on his side, and thus afforded a pretext for the renewal of hostilities against them. Indeed, if we may trust Plutarch,\* some movements in favour of Antiochus took place, or seemed to be threatened in Achaia itself, at Patra, Ægium, and Corinth, so that before the battle of Thermopylae, Acilius thought it necessary to send Cato to maintain tranquillity there. It is more certain that Sparta showed a disposition to revolt, and that Diophanes, the Achæan general, seized this occasion to make an expedition into Laconia. Diophanes was not, it appears, so devoted a partisan of Rome as Aristenus; but he was a personal rival of Philopemen, though it was in his school he had acquired all his military experience:† he was eager for reputation, and hoped, with the sanction of the Romans, to gain important advantages for the League. It was in vain that Philopemen privately remonstrated with him, and pointed out that, at a juncture when the contest between Antiochus and the Romans was still pending in Greece, it would be more prudent for the Achæans quietly to await the issue.‡ Diophanes was confirmed in his design by the approbation of Flamininus, who accompanied him into Laconia. Philopemen then ventured on a very bold step. He hastened to Sparta, and composed the disturbances which had broken out there, by his authority, and by warnings of the approaching danger; so that, when the Achæan army arrived, there was no appearance of any commotion to justify hostile measures, and neither Diophanes nor Flamininus entered the city. This is probably all that we are to understand when it is said that he shut the gates against them.§ The Spartans believed that Philopemen had delivered them from a great calamity, and they wished to show their gratitude by a present of 120 talents, the sum which had been brought into the treasury by the sale of the property of Nabis. But Timolaus, whom they sent with this offer to Megalopolis, was so struck by the simplicity of Philopemen's domestic habits, and the dignity of his conversation, that he could not summon courage to deliver his message until he was sent a third time. Philopemen, who was superior to all such temptations, though he declined the offer, did not neglect the opportunity it afforded of strengthening his influence. He went to Sparta, and advised

them to spare such gifts for their enemies and bad men, whose mouths they might stop by bribes, but not to attempt to corrupt and degrade men of honour, who were already their friends.

The flight of Antiochus, though it did not produce any great change in the state of affairs in Peloponnesus, was attended by a sensible alteration in the tone and deportment of the Romans towards their Greek allies, and removed all doubt as to the position which the Achæans were henceforth to occupy. But though no reasonable man among them could any longer hope for absolute independence, much might turn on the attitude which they maintained in their transactions with the superior power. There were two extremes between which it was possible and advisable to steer: on the one hand, an excess of servility, which, while it degraded the national character, would invite insult and oppression; on the other, an affectation of defiance, which could only provoke resentment, and plunge them into utter ruin. One of these extremes was represented by Aristenus, who did not scruple openly to recommend unreserved compliance with the will of the Romans in every point. Philopemen, who saw quite as clearly that the power of Rome was irresistible, nevertheless indignantly rejected these slavish maxims, and sharply censured their author, who, he said, was precipitating the destiny of Greece. He saw that there was a mean which combined honour with safety, and that the nation would not suffer the worse treatment if it showed a sense of its own dignity while it acknowledged the majesty of Rome.\* Diophanes, on the other hand, seems to have cherished extravagant hopes, and to have deceived himself with a vain reliance on the forbearance of the Romans. He believed that the time was now come to force Elis and Messenia to enter into the League. The Eleans, when they were summoned, returned an evasive answer, promising that they would consider the proposal when the Syrian troops still remaining in Elis had been dismissed. The Messenians took no other notice of the requisition than to prepare for war. But when Diophanes began to ravage their territory, and to threaten Messene, they sent to Flamininus, who was then at Chalcis, offering to surrender to the Romans. He hastened to Megalopolis, and ordered Diophanes immediately to raise the siege, and come to him; and when they met, having gently reproved him for engaging in such an enterprise without his sanction, bade him disband his forces. He, however, enjoined the Messenians to incorporate themselves with the Achæan League, and to recall their exiles; but gave them leave to apply to him if they wished for any indulgence or security. Diophanes had attempted to make another acquisition for the League. Zacynthus, when Philip ceded it to Amynder as the price of his alliance, had been committed to the charge of a Sicilian named Hierocles, who, when he heard of the defeat of Antiochus, agreed with Diophanes to deliver it up to the Achæans. But the Romans now put in their claim to the island, and

\* Cato, 12. But it is very difficult to reconcile this embassy of Cato with Livy's account of the operations of Acilius before the battle of Thermopylae, when we consider that Cato was present at it, and carried the news with extraordinary speed to Rome.

† Polyb., xxiii., 10, 4; xxi., 7. ‡ Plut., Phil., 16.

§ *ἀντίκλειος*, Plut., u. s.

\* Polyb., xiv., 9.

said that it was not for the benefit of Diophanes and the Achæans that their legions had fought at Thermopylæ. Diophanes ventured to vindicate his own conduct and the rights of the League, but there were many voices in the Achæan council, among them, no doubt, that of Aristæus, which condemned his pertinacity, and proposed to submit the question to the judgment of Flamininus. Flamininus, on this occasion, compared the League to a tortoise, which is safe only so long as it keeps within its shell: so the Achæans would be in danger as soon as they began to sally beyond Peloponnesus. The League drew in its head, and the island was given up to the Romans.

The Spartans who showed themselves so grateful to Philopemen seem to have been only a party, and not a very numerous or powerful party. It was probably the same which had been placed at the head of affairs by Philopemen when he first united Sparta with the Achæan League, and, having lost its ascendancy in the reaction produced by the arrival of Antiochus, was restored to power, as we have seen, through Philopemen's intervention. But as soon as the danger was past, its adversaries appear to have recovered their superiority, and one of their first measures was an infringement at once of the Constitution of the Achæan League, and of the treaty between the Achæans and Rome, which provided that no embassy should be received at Rome from any of the states, members of the League, apart from the entire body.\* They, notwithstanding, sent envoys to request the senate to release their hostages, and to restore the maritime towns to the dominion of Sparta. One of their complaints with regard to these towns was, that, so long as they were shut out from their coast, they could not conveniently send ambassadors to Rome, though by the Achæan Constitution, which had been affirmed by the treaty, they were forbidden to do so. But the motive which rendered them most anxious to recover these places was, that they afforded a refuge for the exiles. The return of the exiles was what all classes at Sparta, except the party which was protected by Philopemen, most dreaded, as it was likely to be attended by a revolution, in which the greater part of the new citizens admitted by the tyrants would have been in danger of losing their property, their franchise, and their personal freedom. The main object of the embassy to Rome was, apparently, to avert this calamity, and it is probable that the exiles at the same time sent envoys to support their claims there. The senate reserved the petition as to the hostages for farther consideration;† but, some time after, released all of them except the son of Nabis, who would, perhaps, also have been sent back if he had not been carried off by sickness.‡ The question as to the towns it referred to the decision of Flamininus and his colleagues: on the subject of the exiles it seems to have answered with studied ambiguity, expressing surprise that they were not recalled to their homes, now that Sparta was once more free. This was the business on which Flamininus came with Glabrio to Ægium, after the siege of Naupactus had been

raised. The cause of the exiles was probably viewed with favour by the Roman government as that of an oligarchical party, and their restoration could not fail to produce frequent occasions for Roman intervention. Philopemen also wished to bring it about, but for a very different end; to reduce Sparta into more complete dependance on the League;\* and he prevailed on the council to reject the request of Flamininus and the consul, when they interceded in behalf of the exiles.† The case of Elis was discussed at the same time. The Eleans no longer refused to enter into the League, but they desired, it is said, to be admitted on their own application, rather than through the intervention of the Romans.‡ But it may have been the jealousy of the independent party among the Achæans which declined that intervention in this case, as in that of the exiles. Thus, at last, the work begun by Aratus was completed; the whole peninsula was united in the League: but the time when it thus reached its greatest compass of territorial extent was the beginning of a period in which it continued to descend from one degree of humiliation to another, until it sank into total subjection to a foreign yoke.

The Ætolian envoys, though Flamininus, who had returned to Rome, pleaded in their behalf, found the majority of the senate implacable, and, after a warm debate, which lasted several days, they were bidden to choose one of two conditions: to surrender at discretion, or to pay 1000 talents, and to acknowledge the allies and enemies of Rome as their own. When they hesitated between the extinction of their freedom and a burden which they could not support, and attempted to make stipulations, they were sternly dismissed. On the return of their envoys, the Ætolians, taught by experience, secured the passes of Mount Corax; and Acilius, finding that he could not safely return to Naupactus, suddenly marched against Lamia, which he stormed in the course of two days. He then sat down before Amphissa, and was still occupied with the siege, when he was superseded by the new consul, L. Scipio, who came, accompanied by his brother Africanus, to carry on the war with Antiochus in Asia. With such an object before them, they had no mind to be detained by an Ætolian town; and they gladly accepted the mediation of the Athenians, who interceded in behalf of the Ætolians. Yet they could not relax the rigour of the terms which had been prescribed at Rome, and the Ætolians were persuaded by their Athenian friends once more to solicit a truce, that they might again implore the clemency of the senate. The Scipios willingly granted six months for this experiment, and then proceeded on their march to the East. Philip, whom the senate had gratified by the release of his son Demetrius, had already prepared roads, bridges, and magazines, for the passage of the Roman army through Macedonia and Thrace, and he escorted it in person as far as the Hellespont. He was rewarded for his loyalty by the remission of the remainder of his tribute.

Before the issue of the contest with Anti-

\* Paus., vii., 9, 4.

† Polyb., xl., 12.

‡ Polyb., xl., 12.

\* Liv., xxxviii., 31.

† Ibid., xxxvi., 35. Plut., Philop., 17. Paus., viii., 51.

‡ Liv., 2. 2.

ochus became known in Greece, the Ætolians, though they had sent an embassy to Rome, rashly crediting, as it seems, a rumour of the defeat of the Roman army in Asia,\* resumed hostilities against Philip, restored Amynder to his dominions, recovered Amphiloehia and Aperantia, and drove the Macedonians out of Dolopia.† These unfortunate conquests reached the ears of the senate while the Ætolian envoys were still in Rome, and inflamed the resentment which they provoked by their injudicious language. They were dismissed, with notice that an Ætolian embassy which should come to Rome unaccompanied by a Roman commissioner would be treated as enemies.‡ The tidings of the battle of Magnesia had struck the Ætolians with dismay: the answer of the senate plunged them into despair, as they learned, at the same time, that the new consul, M. Fulvius Nobilior, had crossed over to Apollonia. In their terror, they entreated the Rhodians and Athenians to intercede for them with the senate, and, notwithstanding the recent prohibition, sent a fresh embassy, which, however, was intercepted by the Epirots before it reached Italy.§ Fulvius began his operations with the siege of Ambracia, which was in union with the Ætolian League. The Ambracians themselves afterward alleged that they were ready to submit, but compelled, by unprovoked hostility, to close their gates against him.|| They received a re-enforcement of 1500 Ætolians, and defended themselves with persevering courage. The consul might, perhaps, have been forced to raise the siege if the Ætolians had been able to employ all their forces for the relief of Ambracia; but they were obliged, at the same time, to guard their coast against the combined attacks of the Illyrians and Achæans, and to repel the Macedonians, who, under the command of Philip's son Perseus, had laid siege to Amphiloehia. Thus pressed on three sides, they resolved to end the unequal conflict at any price. Through the intercession of Amynder, who had submitted to the Romans, and the more powerful influence of C. Valerius, the consul's half-brother, and a son of that Lævinus who concluded the first treaty with the Ætolians, they obtained an abatement of the tribute which had been demanded by the senate to 500 talents, of which they were to pay 200 immediately, and the rest by instalments in six years. The Ambracians had, with some difficulty, been induced to surrender, by the friendly advice of their ancient guest Amynder. The city was stripped of all its works of art, with which it was richly adorned during the period when it was the residence of Pyrrhus, but suffered no other injury;¶ and the conqueror's clemency was acknowledged by a decree of a golden crown of the value of 150 talents. C. Valerius accompanied the Ætolian envoys to Rome, where they found that a Macedonian embassy was endeavouring to prejudice the senate against them. But perhaps Philip's animosity may as little have injured their cause, as it was probably aided by the el-

quence of the Rhodian and Athenian orators who pleaded in their behalf. The senate apparently granted peace because no greater advantage could have been expected from a continuance of the war, and it was not even desirable entirely to crush a people so hostile to Philip. By the articles of the treaty they became, with regard to their foreign relations, mere vassals of Rome, and were bound to serve in her wars. They renounced their title to all the possessions which had been taken from them since the consulship of L. Quinctius Flaminius and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus.\* Cerniæ and its territory was annexed to Acarnania. Cephalonia was expressly excluded from the benefit of the treaty; for the senate was determined to take possession of this, as of the other Ionian islands. No change was made in the article relating to the tribute. Thus ended the resistance of the Ætolians: and their humiliation ought to have been imbibed by the reflection that they deserved their fate; that their policy had been uniformly at once selfish, iniquitous, and short-sighted; and that they had contributed more than any other people, by their blind rapacity and reckless ambition, to hasten and aggravate the degradation of Greece.†

After the submission of the Ætolians, Fulvius crossed over to Cephalonia, and summoned the four towns of the island to surrender. All obeyed, and gave the hostages demanded by the consul. But the people of Same, excited by a report that the Romans intended to displace them, flew to arms, and closed their gates. They held out for four months; and it was only after they had been reduced to a handful of men, weakened by wounds and fatigue, that the town was stormed.

From Cephalonia, when the conquest was completed, the consul passed over into Peloponnesus, to settle some differences in which he had been requested to interpose his authority. Philopœmen was now again at the head of the League; and he had taken the opportunity to introduce a change of some importance in its laws. As an Arcadian, he could feel no sympathy in favour of any exclusive privileges of the old Achæan towns, and he now proposed to abolish that which had hitherto been enjoyed by Ægium, as the place of assembly, and to share this advantage in rotation among all the cities of the League.‡ For the same reason that Ægium loudly protested against this innovation, it was received with great complacency by the other cities. Philopœmen had summoned an assembly for the discussion of his measure to Argos, and notwithstanding the opposition of the demiurges, who attempted to transfer it to Ægium, it appeared so clearly that they could not collect one there, that Fulvius himself, though he wished to thwart Philopœmen, was obliged to attend at Argos, and he found the general inclination so strong in favour of the proposal, that he thought it best to give way. His dislike to it seems to indicate that, in his judgment at least, it tended to promote the stability and prosperity of the League. But

\* Liv., xxxvii., 48.

† Ibid., xxxviii., 1-3.

‡ Liv., xxxvii., 49.

§ Polyb., xxi., 8, 9.

|| Liv., xxxviii., 43.

¶ This appears to be clear from Polyb., xxi., 13, notwithstanding the allegations of the Ætolians reported by Livy, xxxviii., 43.

\* Polybius (xvii., 15), and, after him, Livy (xxxviii., 11), have made a mistake in the pronomen of Quinctius.

† I do not make these remarks without having weighed the attempts which have lately been made by Flath and other writers (as Nitzsch, Polybius) to place the conduct of the Ætolians in a fairer light. See ante, p. 37.

his presence was required by another still graver question. The Spartans, growing more and more impatient of the restraint imposed on them by the vicinity of the exiles and the loss of their maritime towns, surprised one of these towns named Las, in the night. They were soon dislodged by the inhabitants; but the attempt so much alarmed the other towns on the coast, and the exiles, that they complained of the aggression to the Achæans. On the motion of Philopœmen envoys were sent to Sparta, with a declaration that the Achæans would consider their treaty with Sparta as dissolved, unless the Spartans surrendered the authors and abettors of the attack on Las. This demand roused both indignation and alarm at Sparta, where it was viewed not only as an insult, but as a prelude to the restoration of the exiles. Thirty of the party which had been supported by Philopœmen were put to death, and the assembly of the people decreed to renounce the connexion with the Achæans, and to send an embassy to Fulvius, with an offer to surrender to the Romans. When the Achæan envoys brought back a report of these proceedings, the Achæan assembly unanimously decreed war against Sparta; but the season was too far advanced for the commencement of regular hostilities. Fulvius caused an assembly to be convoked at Elis, where he expressed himself so as to foster the hopes of each party, but enjoined both to abstain from war until they should have consulted the senate. Each, accordingly, sent an embassy to Rome. That of the Achæans, to which the Spartan exiles likewise committed their cause, was conducted by Lycortas, the father of Polybius, the historian, a partisan of Philopœmen, and by his rival Diophanes, who had returned from Asia with a great increase of reputation, from brilliant exploits which he had achieved in the Roman service against Antiochus, at the head of the Achæan auxiliaries. The envoys did not act in concert with each other. Diophanes was willing to refer the whole dispute to the arbitration of the senate. Lycortas insisted on the rights of the League. The senate dismissed both parties with an answer so framed that each might construe it as suited its own interest. The Achæans understood it as a permission to deal as they would with Sparta.

Philopœmen was re-elected for the following year, and in the spring led an army to Compaſium, on the frontiers of Laconia, where the Spartan exiles flocked to his camp. He sent a message to Sparta, repeating the demand for the surrender of the aggressors, some of whom he named, but with a promise that they should have a fair trial. On the faith of this promise, those who were demanded by name repaired to the Achæan camp, accompanied by many friends and advocates. But as they approached they were assailed by the exiles, first with invectives, and at length with personal violence. The envoys and Philopœmen endeavoured in vain to allay the tumult, in which the Achæans, instigated by the exiles, took an active part against the Spartans. Seventeen were arrested and put to death on the spot, and sixty-three more the next day, after a mock trial in which their enemies were judges. Those who remained in the city were so cowed by this exe-

cution that they offered no resistance to the orders of Philopœmen. He required that the walls of Sparta should be razed; all the foreign mercenaries who had served under the tyrants sent out of Laconia; that all who had been emancipated by the tyrants should leave the country before a certain day, under pain of being seized and sold for slaves; and that the laws and discipline of Lycurgus should be abolished, and the Achæan institutions established in their room.\* It would seem, from Livy's description, that the restoration of the exiles was not exacted until the other demands were so far fulfilled that the city was left completely defenceless. It was decreed in an assembly which was held at Tegea: and as, at the same time, intelligence was received that a number of the disfranchised citizens, instead of quitting Laconia, were lurking in the country, Philopœmen was directed to return with a body of light troops, and seize as many as he could find. He took about 3000, who were all sold, and with the produce of the sale a colonnade at Megalopolis, which had been in ruins since the time of Cleomenes, was rebuilt. The debated territory of Belemna was likewise re-annexed to Megalopolis. These measures were undoubtedly unjust, tyrannical, cruel, and impolitic. They violated the wisest maxims which Philopœmen himself had adopted, and which he appears to have observed in almost every other case; for they afforded a fresh occasion for Roman interference, which it should have been the chief aim of every Greek statesman as much as possible to prevent. But it seems as if the feelings of the Megalopolitan were too strong for his ordinary moderation and prudence, and blinded him to the real character and tendency of his measures. He could not resist the temptation of so signal a triumph over the old enemy of his country, of such ample retaliation for the injuries it had suffered from Cleomenes.

The surprise which may be felt at the boldness of these measures is somewhat abated, when we find that at this time the most powerful princes of the East in alliance with the Romans courted the friendship of the Achæans, and were eager to purchase it by costly presents. While Philopœmen found it necessary to send an embassy to Rome, headed by an Elean named Nicodemus, to apologize for the recent transactions in Laconia, he introduced into the Achæan assembly an envoy from Ptolemy Epiphanes, who came to solicit a renewal of the ancient alliance between Egypt and the League. An embassy, headed by Lycortas, was sent to Alexandria, to negotiate a fresh treaty. When this embassy returned, Philopœmen had been succeeded in office by Aristæus, the leader of the opposite party. Lycortas was accompanied by ambassadors from Ptolemy, and in the same assembly in which they were admitted to an audience, ministers likewise appeared from Eumenes and Seleucus Philopator, who had just succeeded Antiochus on the throne of Syria. The Egyptians brought a present of 6000 suits of armour, and 200 talents of copper money. But the ratification of the treaty was postponed, and Aristæus gained a triumph over his adversaries by the discovery that, whereas several treaties of alliance had been concluded at va-

\* Plat., *Philop.*, 16. Liv., *xxxviii*, 32-34.



rious times between the two powers on diverse conditions, it had been neglected, in the recent negotiation, to determine which of these was to be renewed. The envoys of Eumenes were instructed to offer the sum of 120 talents for a singular purpose. It was to be put out to interest, and the produce was to be applied to the payment of salaries to the members of the Achæan council. But Apollonidas of Sicyon, one of Philopœmen's party, warmly protested against the acceptance of a donative which he denounced as an odious bribe, designed to extinguish the freedom of their future deliberations. The feelings of the assembly were still farther turned against Eumenes by an Æginetan, who reminded it that his native island was still occupied by the King of Pergamus. The magnificent present was indignantly rejected, and a decree was passed, by which all such honours conferred on Eumenes as were illegal and unseemly were abolished.\* Seleucus, likewise, desired the renewal of the alliance which had subsisted between his house and the Achæans, and offered a squadron of ten galleys of war to the League. But towards him the assembly assumed an equally dignified attitude. The alliance was accepted, the present refused. It seems clear that these princes must have expected some advantage from the connexion which they were so anxious to form with the League, though what it was we can hardly conjecture, unless that, as will be seen hereafter, occasions sometimes arose in which Achæan troops might render them important service in their wars.† But the tendency of such scenes was undoubtedly to encourage and strengthen the party which wished, as far as possible, to preserve the tone and demeanour of independence in the national transactions with the Romans.

But every fresh transaction between Rome and the League contributed more and more to dispel all illusions as to the real footing on which they stood with each other. Immediately after the last revolution at Sparta, a Lacedæmonian embassy brought complaints to Rome against Philopœmen's oppressive measures, and the consul, M. Æmilius Lepidus, addressed a letter to the Achæans, expressing his disapprobation of their proceedings. Philopœmen, in consequence, sent Nicodemus to Rome, and he returned and made his report at the same time that the foreign embassies just mentioned were admitted to an audience in the Achæan assembly. But while Philopœmen was still in office, he was forced to lend his sanction and support to another encroachment of the Roman senate on the independence of Greece. Zeuxippus, the author of the assassination of Brachyllas, had been long endeavouring to accomplish his return from exile through the interest of Flamininus, and the senate was at length induced to send an order for his restoration. He had not yet been formally convicted of the murder, because, through the intrigues of the ruling party, there had been a suspension of forensic business in Bœotia for five-and-twenty years.‡ But his enemies now hurried two indictments, which had been long laid against him, one for a sacrilegious embezzlement, the other for the murder of Brachyllas, through their remaining

stages, and when the order of the senate arrived, they were able to plead the sentence which had just been passed on him, as a ground for declining to obey the senate's order. The senate, however, paid no regard to this excuse, and ordered the Ætolians and Achæans to restore Zeuxippus; and after friendly exhortations had proved ineffectual, Philopœmen was obliged to resort to measures which would have led to a war if the senate had thought fit to insist on the execution of its mandate.\*

The answer which Nicodemus had brought from Rome signified the senate's disapprobation of the treatment which Sparta had suffered, but intimated no intention of repealing the acts of the League. Not long after, however, the Achæans were called to account for their conduct by Q. Cæcilius Metellus, who had been sent with two colleagues on an embassy to Macedonia, and seems to have been instructed to inspect the condition of Peloponnesus, after he had finished his more important business with Philip. Aristæus convened a meeting of the Achæan magistrates at Argos, where Metellus censured the course which had been adopted towards Sparta, and urged them to redress the wrong which had been done. Aristæus remained silent, as having no vindication to offer; but Diophanes openly condemned the measures of Philopœmen, not only with regard to Sparta, but to Messenia. Metellus, being thus supported, became more vehement in his demands. But Philopœmen and his friends vindicated their proceedings, and the sense of the majority was on their side. Metellus then called upon the magistrates to convoke a general assembly; but being unable to show any instructions from the senate which he had to communicate, he was informed that the law did not permit them to comply with his request. He withdrew, deeply mortified and displeased, and would not even receive the written answer which was tendered to him.† As it was easy to foresee what kind of report he would make at Rome, the Achæans sent an embassy, headed by Apollonides, to explain and defend their conduct. But their envoys not only had to encounter the accusations of Metellus, but found themselves opposed by the Spartan exiles themselves, whom Philopœmen had restored. The exiles had not wished to see their country reduced to such a state of helplessness and abject dependance on the Achæan League as had been the result of Philopœmen's measures, and they had sent two of their number, Areus and Alcibiades, to complain to the senate. As a fresh embassy, with Appius Claudius at its head, had just been appointed to visit Macedonia, it was directed to proceed to Greece, and there to arbitrate the dispute about Sparta. The senate accepted the excuse offered by the Achæan envoys for the denial of the assembly to Metellus, but required that the law should be altered for the future, so that a Roman ambassador might never be again subject to a similar refusal.

Aristæus had been succeeded in office by Lycortas when Ap. Claudius conducted the embassy to Macedonia; and, before he came into Greece, the Achæan general held an assembly to prepare the public mind for his re-

\* Polyb., xviii., 7. † Ibid., xxix., 8. ‡ Ibid., xx., 6.  
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\* Polyb., xliii., 2.  
† Ibid., xliii., 10-12. Liv., xxxix., 33.

ception. He or his friends pointed the indignation of the assembly against the Spartan exiles, more especially the two who had represented them at Rome, and a decree was tumultuously passed by which Areus and Alcibiades were condemned to death. A few days after, Appius Claudius and his colleagues arrived in Peloponnesus, and an assembly was called at Clitor, in Arcadia, to receive them; but, to the dismay of the Achæans, they came accompanied by Areus and Alcibiades. Appius went over the same heads of complaint which Metellus had dwelt on the year before: the massacre at Compasium, the dismantling of the walls, the abolition of the old Spartan institutions. Lycortas, as belonged to his office, and his political connexions, undertook to reply. If Livy found any good authority for the arguments which he puts into his mouth, he ventured on some allusions to passages in Roman history, which it would have been more prudent to have avoided, and exposed the inconsistency of the senate's intervention in such a case with the liberty which had been proclaimed at the Isthmian games.\* But he took his stand on ground which seems less solid. He alleged that religion forbade the Achæans to rescind acts which had been confirmed by an oath, and recorded on monuments of stone for perpetual remembrance. There is no wrong or folly which might not be made irrevocable, if such scruples were to be admitted. If the Achæans had sworn to perpetuate injustice, the impiety was in the oath, not in the breach of it. Appius, however, disdained to reason, and would only advise the Achæans to comply while they could with a good grace, and not to wait until they were forced to yield. The assembly groaned at the threat, but felt that it was not to be defied. The religious sanction, however, still afforded some shelter to the national dignity. The Romans were requested to make what changes they would in the state of Sparta, but not to compel the Achæans to incur the guilt of perjury. The only concession immediately made to Appius was the repeal of the decree passed against Areus and Alcibiades. All other points were again referred to the decision of the senate, and fresh embassies were sent to Rome, both from the League and from Sparta. From Sparta the senate received ministers who represented the claims of four distinct parties.† The exiles were divided among themselves. One body, which had the prince Agesipolis at its head, claimed the entire restitution of their ancient possessions. The rest, among whom were Areus and Alcibiades, would have been content to recover a portion of their property, to the value of one talent. There was a third party, which desired the re-establishment of the order of things which had been settled in Sparta before the late violent changes, but so as to preserve the union with the Achæan League. Whether it was adverse to the exiles, or only wished to see the walls rebuilt, and the laws of Lycurgus revived, does not clearly appear. A fourth deputation represented those who had been condemned to death or banishment by the decree of the Achæan assembly, and prayed that they might be restored to their country. The senate referred these intricate

controversies to a committee composed of Flamininus, Metellus, and Appius Claudius, all more or less unfriendly to Philopœmen and the Achæans. There were, however, two points on which the four parties seemed to be agreed. None asked to be separated from the Achæan League; and the petition of those who wished to have their condemnation reversed was not repugnant to the claims of any of the rest. At the suggestion of Flamininus, an agreement was drawn up, including these two articles only, and was subscribed by all the Spartan deputies. It was then proposed to the Achæan envoy Xenarchus, who, not seeing how to reject the one and accept the other, likewise put his seal to the whole. But the question of property was left undecided, probably because it was seen to be of much greater moment for the tranquillity of Sparta. Sparta, in fact, became soon after the scene of fresh commotion, in which the original exiles were again expelled, and Agesipolis was slain by pirates as he was on his voyage to Italy, with other envoys, for the purpose of another appeal to the senate.\*

When Flamininus annexed Messenia to the Achæan League, he had encouraged the Messenians to seek protection or redress from Rome, if they should be oppressed by the Achæan government.† It had been the policy of Philopœmen to strengthen the popular party at Messene, as of principles most congenial to the Constitution of the League. The measures which he had taken for this purpose were condemned, as we have seen, by his political opponents in the Achæan councils; and it was by this time well known that he was not viewed with a favourable eye at Rome. The oligarchical faction was thus stimulated to make an effort to recover its power under Roman patronage, and sent Dinocrates, one of its leading men, and a personal enemy of Philopœmen, to plead its cause before the senate. He arrived in Rome at the time when Q. Marcus Philippus had just been appointed ambassador to Macedonia and Greece, and Flamininus to Prusias of Bithynia. He had formerly insinuated himself into the intimacy and favour of Flamininus, though his character and habits could only inspire the Roman with contempt;‡ but he was not the less useful as a political instrument. Flamininus entered into his views, and when he sailed for Greece, on his way to Asia, took Dinocrates with him. On his arrival at Naupactus, he wrote to the Achæan magistrates to summon an assembly. Philopœmen was now general for the eighth time. He was aware of the object for which Flamininus desired an audience; but he also knew that he had received no instructions with regard to Greece. He, therefore, replied that he would call an assembly if Titus would state the business which he had to bring before it; since the law did not permit an assembly to be summoned without such notice. No answer could be devised to this objection, and Flamininus proceeded on his journey without having been able to effect anything either for Dinocrates or the newly expelled Spartan exiles, who had likewise reckoned on his patronage.§ Dinocrates, how-

\* xxix., 26.

† Polyb., xxiv., 4.

\* Polyb., xxiv., 11. † Livy, xxxvi., 31.

‡ Polyb., xxiv., 5. Plut., Flam., 17. Philop., 18.

§ Polyb., u. s.

ever, though disappointed, was not discouraged. He had probably received assurances of support from Flamininus, and perhaps had previously concerted measures with his partisans, which he did not think it safe to defer, or for which he could not expect a fairer opportunity, since Philopæmen was lying sick of a fever at Argos.\* On his return to Messene, he effected a revolution, by which the government was placed in the hands of his faction. They proclaimed Messenia independent of the Achæan League, and made preparations for the defence of the country. Philopæmen, as soon as he heard these tidings, despatched Lycortas, with all the forces at his disposal, into Messenia. But notwithstanding his illness, and though he was now in the seventieth year of his age, he could not bear the confinement of a sick room at such a juncture, and a day or two after set out for Megalopolis, which he reached in one day. Here he collected a small body of the Megalopolitan cavalry, and pushed on to overtake Lycortas. Dinocrates, however, had taken such precautions to secure the passes leading into Messenia, that Lycortas was not able to force his way through. We want the details which would have explained how it was that Philopæmen neither met him on his retreat, nor was checked by the same obstacle. Livy says that his object was to relieve Corone, which had not yielded, and was threatened by the enemy.† He advanced near to Messene, and worsted Dinocrates in a skirmish, but was soon forced to retreat by the arrival of a fresh body of Messenian troops; and while he exerted himself beyond his strength, and exposed himself to the brunt of the enemy's charge, to cover the rear of his little squadron, he was thrown from his horse, and, being stunned by the fall, was taken and led in triumph to Messene. Dinocrates and his party, to gratify the curiosity of the multitude, exhibited him for a short time in the theatre, but apprehending that the spectacle was likely to rouse the public sympathy in behalf of their noble prisoner, they hurried him away to their council chamber, and then threw him into a dungeon called the Treasury, a pit with only one opening, a hole at the top, which was secured by a heavy slab of stone. Here he was kept in chains till the morrow, when his enemies, alarmed, it seems, by the indications which they perceived of popular feeling in his favour, held another secret council, in which it was resolved to despatch him. An executioner was sent with a cup of poison; and Philopæmen, when he had learned that Lycortas was safe, and that the Megalopolitan cavalry had escaped, calmly swallowed the fatal draught.

The last great man whom Greece produced, or for whom she could have found any fit employment. Even he came too late to do more than give proof of abilities, by which, in a different age, he might have rendered more important services to his country. We can hardly help thinking that the part he had to sustain

was better suited to the genius of Aratus, and that, if he had lived earlier, the independence of Greece might not have expired so soon.

The tidings of his death excited vehement grief and indignation throughout the League, except in the small party of his political adversaries; for Philopæmen was not only the pride of the nation as the greatest, indeed, the only very able commander it had to boast of; he also possessed its confidence and esteem, as he represented its feelings and wishes. An assembly was immediately summoned to Megalopolis, where the people manifested their feelings by the election of Lycortas to supply his place; and there would probably have been no hesitation or dispute as to the immediate adoption of the most active measures for avenging his death, had it not happened that, at this juncture, Q. Marcus arrived in Peloponnesus on his return from Macedonia. It appears that he was present when the decree of war against Messenia was brought forward, and he endeavoured to divert the Achæans from their purpose, and to induce them to wait until they had consulted the senate. But the assembly was not in a temper to take this advice, even if it had believed that it might obtain satisfaction at Rome. War was declared, and Lycortas immediately invaded Messenia with an overpowering force, and ravaged it with vindictive animosity. It was, however, thought advisable to send an embassy to Rome to propitiate the senate. The Spartan exiles, and the party now in possession of the city, also renewed their applications. But Marcus returned about the same time, and the policy of the senate was determined by his report and advice. He suggested that a slight hint of the senate's displeasure towards the Achæans would encourage Sparta to make common cause with Messene, and then the League would be glad to place itself under Roman protection. Accordingly, the agents of the Spartan government were informed that the senate had already done all in its power for them, and did not consider the business as one which concerned it any longer. The Achæan envoys requested that, if they might not hope for aid from Rome, according to the terms of the alliance, in their war with Messene, the senate would at least prevent arms or provisions from being brought to the enemy out of Italy. The senate did not even notice this request, but declared that the Achæans must not be surprised, though Sparta, or Corinth, or Argos should revolt from the League, if the Romans did not regard this as their concern; an answer which, as Polybius observes,\* was equivalent to a proclamation of a license to all members of the League to dissolve their connexion with it. The Achæan envoys, however, were detained at Rome, until it should be seen what turn events took in Messenia.

The oligarchical government at Messene was neither able to resist the enemy in the field, nor was it strong at home. For some time, indeed, it suppressed the murmurs of the people by terror, and declined the proffered mediation of the Bœotians. But at length the general discontent, under the suffering produced by a war carried on to serve the interest of a small faction, broke out in demands which the rulers did not

\* Plut., Philop., 18. Paus., viii., 51, 5.

† xxix., 49, *ad præconserendum Coroneæ*. Plutarch, Philop., 18 (of Dinocrates), *Κάμην τὴν καλὴν καὶ τὴν Κολωνίδαν προσεγγέζοντες ἐλθόντες καταλαμβάνουσιν*. *Colonia, or Colonides, was adjacent to Corone*. Paus., iv., 24, 8: *τῇ Κορωνίδει πύλαι ἐκτὶς θυροῖς Κολωνίδες . . . κείτων δὲ τὸ πᾶν μακρὸν ἐκ Κολωνίδος ἐστὶ ὑψηλὸν, μικρὸν δὲ τὸ Σάδιστον*.

venture to resist. Dinocrates and his friends retired to their houses, while the assembly of the people, following the advice of some of the elder citizens and of the Boeotian envoys, who had not yet quitted Messene, appointed ambassadors to Lycortas, to sue for pardon and peace. Lycortas prescribed three conditions: that the authors of the revolt and of Philopœmen's death should be given up to him; that all other persons and matters should be subject to the decision of the national assembly; and that the citadel should be immediately surrendered. As none but the oligarchical party had anything to dread from the vengeance of the Achæans, these terms were gladly accepted. Lycortas, when he had garrisoned the citadel, entered the city, and cheered the Messenians with a promise of lenient treatment, but he sent orders to all who had taken a part in the condemnation of Philopœmen to put an end to their own lives. Dinocrates had already killed himself. There were others, it seems, whose cases were reserved for the cognizance of the Achæan assembly.\* The body of Philopœmon was burned, and his bones were carried in solemn procession to Megalopolis. The urn which contained them was borne by Polybius the historian, and was almost hidden under the load of garlands and fillets which were showered upon it. At Megalopolis the remains were magnificently interred with heroic honours,† and, according to Plutarch, Messenian prisoners were stoned to death at his grave. If this is true, they must have been the wretches who, as Plutarch also relates, but without confirmation from Polybius, proposed to put him to death with torture.

It happened to be the time for one of the ordinary Achæan assemblies, and Megalopolis was the place of meeting.‡ In this assembly the Messenians were readmitted into the Achæan League. But the towns of Thuria, Abia, and Phare were separated from Messene, and constituted distinct members of the League.§ The Achæan envoys now returned from Rome, and with an answer very different from that which they had at first received there. The senate, as soon as it learned that the Achæans did not need its aid, descended to the meanness of declaring that it had taken measures to prevent the exportation of arms and provisions from Italy to Messene. Lycortas soon after convened another assembly at Sicyon, to decide on the relations which should subsist between Sparta and the League. The question seems to have been, whether the League should recognise the party which had expelled the exiles as the legitimate government of Sparta. The senate, by the evasive answer with which it had dismissed the Spartan envoys, seemed to have dropped the cause of the exiles, and to have left the Achæans at liberty to act as they would. Lycortas took advantage of this supposed permission to persuade the assembly to acknowledge Sparta as a member of the League, and, notwithstanding the opposition of Diophanes, a decree was passed to that effect, but on the condition that those of the exiles who had

not shown themselves hostile to the Achæans should be recalled. The senate, which was again consulted, seemed to acquiesce in this arrangement, though it wrote a letter to the Achæans in favour of the exiles. But, as the Achæan envoy, on his return, represented this letter as written merely to get rid of their importunity, no farther notice was taken of the recommendation so long as Lycortas remained in office.\* The senate, however, probably foresaw that it would serve as a hook whereon to hang fresh intrigues. In the mean while the League enjoyed a short interval of repose, in which it might seem to have recovered its dignity and independence. The administration at home was at once mild and vigorous. The Messenians were relieved by an exemption from taxes for three years, as a compensation for the damage their country had suffered during the war.† The Achæan general exercised a wholesome superintendence over the internal affairs of Sparta. A young man of low origin, named Chæron, who had been the agent of the Spartans proscribed by Philopœmen at Rome, seemed to be treading in the steps of the tyrants. He had acquired sufficient influence to carry an enactment, by which the property which had been left even by Machanidas and Nabis to the female relatives and children of the exiles who remained at Sparta was confiscated, and distributed in a capricious manner among the indigent multitude. He next obtained some office which placed the public revenues at his disposal, and misapplied them to further his own ends, and, finally, when an attempt was made by some of the citizens to bring his malversation to light, he suborned assassins to murder the chief manager of the inquiry in open day. Lycortas hereupon made a journey to Sparta, caused Chæron to be brought to trial, convicted, and thrown into prison, and directed the investigation to be carried on, and the confiscated property to be restored to the families of the exiles.‡

It was about the same time that the League received a fresh embassy from Ptolemy Epiphanes, with the offer of a squadron of ten galleys completely rigged. The question of the alliance, which had been left in suspense, seems to have been dropped by tacit consent, as of no moment. All the ends of both parties were satisfied, it appears, by the maintenance of mutual good understanding. The assembly accepted the king's offer, though it had before declined a similar one from Seleucus, and appointed Lycortas, his son Polybius, and Aratus, a grandson of the first, envoys to Alexandria, to return thanks for the former present, and to take charge of the ships. But before they set out news arrived of Ptolemy's death, which, as his successor, Philometor, was a child of six years old, put a stop to the embassy.§

There was only one safeguard by which the Achæan League had hitherto been protected

\* Polyb., xiv., 1.

† Polyb., xiv., 3, expressly referring to the damage (ῥήγῃ; ὑβρίας καταβροχθῆς) as the ground of the relief granted. Yet Nitzsch (Polybius, p. 122, n. 5), without a particle of evidence, except a very questionable hypothesis as to the financial administration of the Achæan League, ventures to say that the exemption seems to have been granted to compensate for the loss of the three towns which were separated from Messene.

‡ Polyb., xiv., 8. Digitized by Google

§ Ibid., 7.

\* Polyb., xiv., 12. Plat., Philop., 21. Pausan., viii., 51, 8.

† Liv., xxxix., 50. Adeo omnibus humanis congestis horribus, ut ne divinis quidem abstinere.

‡ Polyb., xiv., 12, 12.

§ Ibid., xiv., 1.

against the power of Rome — its manifest and notorious feebleness. Not that there was in the senate the slightest touch of any magnanimous feeling, which might have induced it to deal gently with the weak, and to respect either their honourable pride or their clearest rights; nor because it viewed the efforts of the Greeks to preserve a shadow of independence with contemptuous indifference. It was content with nothing short of their absolute submission to its despotic will, and no impulse of pity or generosity diverted it for a moment from the prosecution of this purpose. But even these great masters of political deception could not devise any artifice by which they could persuade the Roman people, as they had with regard to Philip and Antiochus, that the Achæan League was an object of alarm to Rome, or that anything had taken place in Greece to provoke hostility, or to require the intervention of a Roman army. They had also a character of moderation to sustain, which was of great use in negotiation with foreign powers, and which it would not have been prudent lightly to forfeit by an open act of wanton tyranny. The senate, therefore, in its transactions with the Achæan League, was confined to the exercise of its diplomatic arts, in which it probably surpassed every cabinet, whether of the ancient or the modern world. Its aim, which it kept steadily in view, was to foster divisions in Peloponnesus, and to afford as much encouragement and support as it could with decency to the enemies of the League. Still, so long as this was the case, it could hardly be said that the liberty of Greece was merely precarious. An Achæan statesman had ground to stand on, where, by circumspection and address, he might hope, notwithstanding the opposition of the senate, to keep his footing with honour and advantage to his country. As long as he avoided direct collision with the senate, treated it with respect, and abstained from all acts that could afford a provocation or pretext for hostility, he might safely and firmly insist on any pleas with which the laws and Constitution of the League might furnish him. The success, however, of this peaceful resistance would depend on the unanimity with which he was supported by the great body of the people. Hitherto, as we have seen, the patriotic party, that of Philopœmen and Lycortas, had a decided preponderance in the councils of the League over those who, possibly with upright intentions, argued for unreserved obedience to every intimation of the senate's pleasure. But now, in the year 180, a change begins, a new epoch opens in the history of the downfall of the League, which is marked by the appearance of Calliocrates.

In this year Lycortas was succeeded in office by Hyperbatus, a partisan of Aristœnus and Diophanes. The new general, with what motive does not appear, but probably at the instigation of Calliocrates, recalled the attention of the Achæan assembly to the letter which the senate had written the year before in favour of the Spartan exiles. Lycortas contended that the senate, though willing to succour the unfortunate as far as justice permitted, could not wish to force the Achæans to violate a religious engagement, and that it would desist from its application if it was informed that the

thing it desired was inconsistent with the fundamental laws, solemn oaths, and public records of the League. Hyperbatus and Calliocrates recommended simple unqualified compliance with the wishes of the senate. But as a question had been raised as to the senate's real mind, it was resolved to send an embassy to Rome, to explain the grounds stated by Lycortas, which compelled the Achæans to disobey the senate's injunctions on this point. Calliocrates himself was appointed to this embassy, perhaps under the belief that his political principles would give the greater weight to the plea which he was instructed to maintain. With him were associated Lydiadas of Megalopolis, and Aratus, both probably friends of Lycortas. But when they were admitted to an audience at Rome, Calliocrates, instead of pleading the cause of his countrymen, offered his best advice to their enemies. "The senate," he said, "had only itself to blame if the Greeks did not obey all its commands. There were in every city men enough who were willing to inculcate the necessity of submission to Rome, but they needed encouragement and support. The cause of their adversaries, who appealed to the laws and federal compacts of the League, was the more national and popular, and would always prevail with the multitude, unless the senate would show some countenance to the other side." Calliocrates himself afforded a fair sample of the goodly crop of traitors, sycophants, and sophists which might be expected to spring up in Greece under the sunshine of Roman patronage. The senate adopted his advice, and issued a rescript, calculated to silence the patriotic party in the League, and to invite all who coveted power and influence to follow his example. It repeated the injunction to restore the exiles, and proposed Calliocrates as a model which all Achæan statesmen would do well to imitate. But, at the same time, letters were sent to most of the northern states, to the Ætolians and Epirots, to the Athenians, Bœotians, and Acarnanians, exhorting them to lend their aid towards the same object. It would not be for want of encouragement from Rome if they did not come into collision with the Achæans, and it was probably only their weakness that prevented this result. Calliocrates, on his return, could show that his adversaries had misrepresented the senate's mind, and that he enjoyed its entire confidence. He, of course, did not make an exact report of the advice he had given to the senate, though, if it had been heard by his colleagues, it is not clear how he could have concealed it, as he is said to have done. But through the influence which he thus acquired, with the help of corruption, for which he may have been supplied with means at Rome, he carried his election to the office of general, and the first measure of his administration was to restore the exiles both to Sparta and Messene.\*

Polybius has, perhaps, assigned too much importance to the embassy of Calliocrates. His allusions to the Roman generosity, compassion, and love of justice, might have been properly introduced in a speech of Lycortas, but are quite out of place in a history; and it would be absurd to suppose that the senate needed a les-

\* Polyb., xxvi., 1-3.

son from Callicrates in state policy. It had already shown in numberless instances, like those of Zeuxippus and Dinocrates, that it was thoroughly conversant with the maxims which he laid down. Nevertheless, it may be true that, through the treachery of Callicrates, a regular correspondence and connexion was first established between the Roman government and the party in the Achæan League, which was willing to become the tool of the stranger, for the sake of securing its own ascendancy at home: the senate was encouraged to adopt a more imperious tone and harsher measures, and the defences by which the patriots endeavoured to avert or retard the ruin of the League were more rapidly swept away.

## CHAPTER LXVI.

### FROM THE EMBASSY OF CALLICRATES TO ROME TO THE REDUCTION OF GREECE INTO A ROMAN PROVINCE.

THE Romans, as we have seen, had treated Philip with some degree of forbearance so long as they had anything to hope or to fear from him. To soothe him after the affront he had suffered when he was compelled to abandon the siege of Lamia, he had been permitted to make some petty conquests in Thessaly and the adjacent regions. The release of his son and the remission of the tribute concurred with his distrust of Antiochus and the Ætolians, to retain him on the Roman side until the contest with the Syrian monarchy was decided by the battle of Magnesia. But he had learned by very costly experience that no reliance could be placed on the moderation of Rome; and, after the conclusion of the peace, he had bent all his thoughts towards repairing his losses, and increasing the internal strength of his kingdom. He began to recruit its exhausted population as well by regulations tending to encourage the growth of families, as by large draughts of Thracian colonists whom he transplanted to Macedonia; and strove to replenish his treasury, both by the improvement of all the branches of his ordinary revenue, and with the produce of the mines; resuming old works which had been interrupted, and opening others in many places before untried. On the other hand, the Romans could feel no confidence in a prince whom they had so deeply injured. It was not without misgiving that the Scipios committed themselves to his guidance in their march to the Hellespont; and when Manlius was attacked by the Thracian tribes on his return from Asia, there was a strong suspicion that they had been secretly instigated by Philip.\* It is not certain that in these measures he aimed at anything beyond his own security; though he was no doubt eager for revenge, and would have seized any opportunity of seeking it with a tolerable prospect of success. But in the eyes of the Roman senate, preparations for self-defence, and a wish for independence, were sufficient evidence of hostile intentions in a neighbouring sovereign; and the more flourishing the state of his dominions, the more it

excited the Roman cupidity and ambition. The senate only wanted a pretext for a fresh war with Philip, and soon made it known that it was willing to receive complaints against him. Envoys from Eumenes, and from others of his neighbours who had claims or grievances to allege against him, found an attentive and favourable audience at Rome; and though Philip also sent an embassy to vindicate his rights before the senate, three commissioners, L. Cæcilius Metellus, M. Bæbius Tampilus, and Ti. Sempronius, were appointed to go and decide the question after they should have heard his own defence of himself. There was a twofold advantage in this course: the certainty of humiliation to Philip, and the likelihood that he would be betrayed by indignation into some indiscretion. The three commissioners first held their court near Tempe, and the King of Macedonia came before them to plead his cause against the Thessalians, Perrhæbians, Magnesians, and Athamanians, who claimed the restitution of the places which he had occupied in their territory. They were the conquests which he had made with the express consent of Acilius. But a cavil was now devised to elude this title; and the commissioners decided that he must evacuate all these possessions, and confine himself to the ancient limits of Macedonia. In the heat of the controversy, Philip dropped an angry word, which was carefully treasured by the Romans: *the last sun had not yet set*. He was next obliged to appear before them at Thessalonica, to answer for some additions which he had made to his territory on the coast of Thrace. There he had made himself master of Ænus and Maronea after the Syrian garrisons had been withdrawn; and Eumenes, to whom the senate had granted Lysimachia and the Thracian Chersonesus, pretended that these towns had been included in the grant. Philip, while he denied this assertion, seems to have taken this occasion to complain of the treatment he had suffered from the Romans. The commissioners reserved the question of right for the cognizance of the senate, but required that the Macedonian garrisons should be withdrawn from the Thracian towns; and on their return to Rome, the senate sent another embassy, with Ap. Claudius at its head, to see whether their orders had been obeyed, and to clear the Thracian coast of Macedonian troops. The object of this interference was plainly not so much to weaken Philip as to gall and irritate him; to provoke him to some rash step, which might afford a decent colour for a declaration of war. And such was its effect; for Philip, having been apprized of the senate's decision before the arrival of Ap. Claudius, wreaked his vengeance on the inhabitants of Maronea by a bloody massacre, which he afterward tried to represent as the result of their own intestine dissensions. But as the Roman envoys declared themselves dissatisfied with this statement, he thought it necessary to send his son Demetrius to Rome, to plead in his behalf, or deprecate the senate's displeasure. In the mean while he made an expedition into Thrace, under the pretext of succouring the Byzantians, defeated the Thracians in battle, and took prisoner one of their chiefs named Amadocus.

The arrival of Demetrius seems to have sug-

\* Livy, xxxviii., 40. *Opinio erat, non sine Philippo fraude id factum.*

gested a new plan to the senate; for it can hardly be supposed that it did not foresee the consequences of its behaviour towards him. It received him with the most gracious benignity: when he appeared to be perplexed by the multiplicity of complaints brought against his father—for, as the senate's disposition became more notorious, the number of Philip's accusers rapidly increased—he was called upon to read the private instructions which he had brought with him; and thus the senate heard many comments on the unjust and insolent conduct of its envoys which Philip had not intended for its ears. The answer which it gave to Demetrius was framed in terms the most gratifying to him, but calculated, in the same degree, to wound his father's feelings. The senate consented, for his sake, to overlook much which it could not approve, and would not otherwise have endured, in his father's conduct; it reposed entire confidence in the friendship and honour of Demetrius: it knew that his heart remained a hostage at Rome, after his person had been restored to his father: to show its regard for him, it would send envoys to Macedonia, that past omissions might be supplied in an amicable way. And it wished Philip should understand that he owed this indulgence entirely to his son.

There can be no doubt that every phrase in this answer was calculated for the effect which it produced. Whether ambitious hopes were directly infused into the mind of the young prince during his stay at Rome, we do not know; but the senate's language was of itself sufficient, and was apparently designed, to suggest them; and, even if it failed to corrupt Demetrius, could not but excite the jealousy of his elder brother. There was thus a fair prospect of a feud in Philip's family, which might kindle a civil war, and was almost sure to afford some fresh occasion for Roman interference. Livy admits that Demetrius, on his return home, showed himself elated by the senate's favour, and that it was generally believed among the common people in Macedonia that the Romans would place him on the throne after his father's death.\* At the same time, rumours were spread which threw doubt on the legitimacy of Perseus.† And while his birth-right was thus threatened, Philip found himself reduced to depend, as it were, on the patronage of his younger son, and deprived of his authority on the question of the succession to the crown. But his jealousy and resentment were much inflamed by the arrival of the Roman envoys, who not only exacted the performance of all the injunctions which he had previously received, but brought fresh requisitions from the senate, which he obeyed, indeed, to avoid affording a pretext for war, but with the bitter vexation, as he observed that Demetrius passed more of his time in the society of the envoys than at court. Whether Demetrius was really as innocent as he appears in Livy's pathetic narrative, must remain a secret to us; but his conduct afforded a ground for suspicion, and Philip had reason to look upon a son who was a favourite with the senate as an enemy and a traitor. His distrust of Demetrius grew with

his hatred of the Romans, and both are said to have been fostered by the artifices of Perseus, and the principal courtiers, who, perceiving Philip's alienation from his younger son, took part with the heir-apparent. But Demetrius, at least, lent a handle to their machinations by the unguarded warmth with which he defended the Romans whenever they were attacked in his presence. He was now, it seems, excluded from the council in all deliberations relating to Rome, or to the negotiations which Philip was carrying on—as the senate gave out, with hostile designs against Italy—with several barbarian tribes in the north. A lustration of the army, and sham fight, in which the two princes commanded the opposite sides, led to some scenes on which Perseus founded a charge, that his brother had made an attempt against his life. Demetrius, it seems, convinced his father of his innocence on this head; but Philip sent two envoys, Philocles and Apelles, to Rome, with secret instructions to inquire into the truth of another accusation which Perseus had brought against him, that he had disclosed his ambitious designs to Flamininus and other Romans. In the mean while the king made an expedition into the wilds of Thrace, professedly for the purpose of ascending the highest summit of the Balkan, which was reported to command a view reaching on the one side to the Euxine, and on the other to the Adriatic; but undoubtedly he did not undertake this laborious march, which was not altogether free from danger, merely to gratify his curiosity. It is highly probable that he really entertained the project attributed to him by the Romans, of inducing some of the northern barbarians to make an irruption into Italy, and that this journey to the Balkan was in some way connected with that plan. He took Perseus along with him, but left Demetrius behind, under the colour of parental tenderness, at Stobi, and directed Didas, the governor of Paeonia, to escort him to Macedonia. Didas had been secretly gained by Perseus, and insinuated himself into the confidence of the young prince to betray him. He soon after reported, whether truly or falsely we can only conjecture, that Demetrius was meditating to escape into Italy, and had solicited his aid; Philip hastened his return to investigate this matter, but remained in suspense until his envoys returned from Rome. He had chosen Philocles and Apelles for this commission, because he believed them to be impartial between the brothers. But they, too, were devoted to Perseus, and, among other calumnious impostures, brought a forged letter purporting to be addressed to Philip by Flamininus, so composed as to imply the reality of all that had been imputed to Demetrius, while it deprecated his father's displeasure. Herodorus, the most intimate friend of Demetrius, was put to the rack, and died under the torture, but no information could be extorted from him. Philip, however, was now convinced of his son's guilt, and, it is supposed, instructed Didas secretly to despatch him. Demetrius was poisoned at a banquet, and his dying exclamations against his murderers were stifled with brutal violence. Philip did not long survive this event, and his end was hastened by remorse and anguish at the discovery that his son had been the victim of a conspiracy, and that the pretended

\* xxxix., 53.

 † Liv., u. s. Plat., *Æm. Paull.*, 8.

letter of Flamininus was a forgery. The fraud was detected, it appears, so as to leave no room for doubt, through the exertions of the king's cousin, Antigonus, a nephew of Antigonus Doson. Perseus henceforth kept at a distance from the court, but having no fear of a rival, was indifferent about his father's resentment. Philip, now doubly irritated, conceived the design of transferring the succession to Antigonus, and endeavoured to recommend him to the acceptance of the Macedonians; but he was overtaken by death at Amphipolis, while Antigonus was returning from an embassy on which he had been sent to invite the Bastarnians,\* from beyond the Danube, to invade and settle in the land of the Dardanians. The king's physician, as soon as he perceived the symptoms of his approaching agony, sent notice to Perseus, who was thus enabled to take possession of the throne without resistance; and one of the first acts of his reign was to put Antigonus to death.

Philip left his kingdom in a condition to defy any power but that of Rome; with an abundant population, a well-filled treasury, an army of 30,000 foot and 5000 horse, and large magazines of arms and provisions. It remained to be seen what use would be made of these preparations, and into what hands they would finally pass. Perseus, with the crown, had inherited all the motives of enmity which had subsisted between his father and the Romans, together with a large addition on his own account. He must have felt that the war which had been averted through the mediation of Demetrius was now inevitable; and his policy was entirely directed to two objects: to hold himself in readiness for the impending struggle, and to defer it as long as possible. As long as his exertions were required for no other purpose than this, he displayed a degree of energy and prudence which seemed worthy of his station. But though his character has undoubtedly been misrepresented through hostile prejudices and wilful calumny, and he was probably neither so odious nor so despicable as it suited the senate's interest to have him described,† he was clearly still less equal to a contest with Rome than his father; and notwithstanding the sympathy which we cannot refuse to the justice of his cause, we can feel none with the man. It is true that he seems to have been free from some of his father's vices;‡ but it was, perhaps, because his own were of an opposite kind. He was temperate, and addicted to no licentious pleasures; so that either on this account, or because, like his ancestor, Antigonus, he took some interest in the speculations of the schools, he is termed by the author who has left the most favourable description of his character, a philosopher.§ On the other

hand, he is charged with a blind and abject love of money for its own sake; and so many glaring instances of this failing are recorded in his history, that it is impossible to consider them all as malicious inventions.\* He was apparently deficient in moral, if not in personal, courage. His dread of the Romans stimulated him to vigorous exertions, so long as they were at a distance; but seems to have deprived him of his presence of mind when they came in sight. The worst acts imputed to him appear to have been the effect of this timidity. We have no reason to believe that he was inclined to wanton cruelty, or inordinately passionate or vindictive; but he was probably as unscrupulous as his father about the choice of means for the accomplishment of his designs, and never shrank from the perpetration of a safe and useful crime. Still, when compared with most of the contemporary kings, he almost rises into a hero; and his misdeeds are few and light, if weighed against the enormous guilt contracted during the same period by the Roman senate.†

The first measures of his administration, after he had established himself on the throne, were, indeed, extremely judicious, and calculated to suggest the best hopes of his government. He remitted all arrears of debt due to the crown, and released all who had been thrown into prison for offences against his father; and he published an amnesty for those Macedonians who had fled from the pursuit of the law, whether in public or private causes, and invited them to return to their homes, with promises of security for their persons and property. As he caused this act of grace to be recorded in the temples of Delus, Delphi, and Coronea, his liberality and clemency became no less generally known to the Greeks than among his own subjects.‡ Soon after his accession he found himself compelled, in self-defence, to make war on a Thra-

\* Flath labours to rescue his character from this imputation, but besides vague, arbitrary suspicions of Roman calumnies, he has no argument to produce except his own interpretation of Liv. xlv., 46, which (p. 561) he chooses to consider as an admission that Perseus had spent almost the whole of his treasure. He notices, indeed, the reports that Perseus carried 2000 talents (Liv. xlv., 46), or (according to Justin, xxxiii., 2), 10,000 talents with him to Samothrace; but omits the authentic statement of Polybius (xviii., 18). *Τῆς ὅλης χωρὶς κατασκευῆς καὶ χορηγίας, ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν θησαυρῶν ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσοῦ πλείον τῶν ἑκατοσχιλίων ταλάντων.*

† It may be hardly necessary, but yet it will be safer, to observe, once for all, that it is not intended by this language to involve all the members of the senate in an indiscriminate condemnation. There was, no doubt, within that body a great variety of characters and of opinions, both as to the mode of extending the power of Rome, and of the use to be made of it: and we would gladly believe what Nitzsch (*Polybius*; see particularly ii., 5) endeavours to show, that there was a moderate party in the senate (represented by the Scipios, Flamininus, and Æmilius Paulus), which desired no conquests east of the Adriatic, but only wished to see Rome at the head of a system of independent states, and holding the balance between Macedonia and the Achaean League, Rhodes and Pergamus, Syria and Egypt. But we must regret that the proofs which he has adduced in support of this proposition are not commensurate with its importance.

‡ Polyb. xvi., 5. Schorn (p. 332) understands this passage very differently, considering it as an invitation to Greek exiles and outlaws; and the term *ἄλλογενεῖς* is no doubt in favour of this explanation: but, on the other hand, the expressions *κατακαλέσθαι* and *καταπροσμελόντας*, and more especially *τοὺς τῶν βασιλικῶς ἐγγέλματος παρασκευηθέντων, καὶ τῶν θανάτων κοινῶν ἀφ' ὧν ἐκαστος θύναται*, seem to place it beyond a doubt that the persons described were Macedonian subjects. The good opinion of the Greeks was sought by the publication of this recall in the three temples.

\* It has been much disputed whether the Bastarnians were a Teutonic or a Celtic race. Niebuhr (*A7. Schr.*, p. 386) thinks it impossible to decide the question, as Polybius (xvii., 9) appears to be contradicted by Strabo, vii., p. 306, and Tacitus, *Germ.*, 46. Zeuss (*Die Deutschen*, 128) pronounces the evidence of Tacitus conclusive in favour of their Teutonic origin. But Dieffenbach (*Celtica*, ii., 1, p. 218) shows that they were most probably a mixed race.

† Liv. xlii., 5. Nec ullo commendabilem merito.

‡ Polyb. xvi., 5.

§ Appian, *Mac.*, ix., 2. Flathé (xi., p. 534), by a strange complication of mistakes, talks of his *love for the arts and sciences*, referring to the description in Livy, xli., 20 (from Polybius, xvi., 10), of the extravagances of Antiochus Epiphanes.



cian chief named Abrupolis, who had made an inroad on the mines of Pangæum, and not only repelled his aggressions, but made himself master of his territories. The conquest may have strengthened his northern frontier; but it exposed him to danger on another side; for Abrupolis was an ally of Rome.\* He hastened, however, to avert this danger by an embassy, which he sent to renew the treaty which the Romans had concluded with his father. The affair of Abrupolis was not overlooked; the Macedonian envoys were instructed to vindicate their master's proceedings; but the senate took care not to bind itself by any distinct admission. It viewed Perseus as a prey, on which it resolved to fasten as soon as an opportune juncture arrived; but the state of its affairs was not at this time such that it could conveniently embark in a war with Macedonia; nor had it hitherto any sufficient provocation to allege. It therefore tacitly reserved the subject of Abrupolis as a future ground of complaint, and, in the mean while, acknowledged Perseus as king, and received him into its alliance in the room of his father.†

Perseus did not let himself be lulled into a false security by the favourable result of this negotiation, or relax his endeavours to provide as he best might against the impending storm. He cultivated the relations of friendship into which Philip had entered with several of the Thracian, Illyrian, and Celtic tribes;‡ and the Odrysian king, Cotys, who is described as an intelligent, active, and estimable prince,§ became his steady ally.¶ Philip's plan for the extermination of the Dardanians had been interrupted by his death. The Bastarnians, who were on their march through Thrace, when they received tidings of that event, began to commit disorders which provoked the hostility of the Thracian tribes, and the greater part were forced to return across the Danube. Thirty thousand of them, however, are said to have penetrated into Dardania,|| and perhaps these were afterward re-enforced by fresh bands of their countrymen. They made war on the Dardanians, in concert with the Scordiscans, a kindred race, and some of their Thracian neighbours, and seem, for some time at least, to have pressed very hard upon them. This war became a fresh subject of complaint against Perseus at Rome. The senate, under what pretext we know not, was continually sending envoys to explore the state of Macedonia, and was thus first informed of the war. Afterward it received an embassy from the Dardanians, who were joined by the Thessalians, soliciting protection, and attributing the invasion of their territory to the instigation of Perseus.¶ The senate appointed commissioners to ascertain the fact, and Perseus was obliged to send fresh envoys to defend him from this charge, and to deny that he had any share in the enterprise of the Bastarnians. It was true that it had been planned and set in motion by Philip. The senate waived this question, and contented it-

self with a grave admonition to the king to be very careful to avoid all appearances of an infringement of the treaty.\* The warning probably served to quicken his vigilance and activity. His agents appear to have been busy in every quarter from which he could expect any accession of strength or reputation. He had formed a connexion with the Illyrian king, Gentius, perhaps at the same time that he afforded shelter to some conspirators who had killed Artheurus, another Illyrian chieftain, who was an ally of Rome. He was also reported to have sent ministers to Carthage; and, as the Carthaginians were, at this time, almost driven to despair by the senate's peridious connivance with Masinissa's unrelenting hostility,† the report may have been well founded, though it rests on no better evidence than the assertion of Roman envoys,‡ and answered the double purpose of a charge against Carthage and against Perseus. But it is certain that his alliance was coveted by several of the Asiatic princes. Prusias of Bithynia, and Seleucus Philopator of Syria, thought themselves favoured when he granted his sister to the one, and—having, it was said, put to death a former wife—accepted the other's daughter in marriage. They evidently regarded Macedonia as a bulwark against the encroachments of Rome; and the free Greek cities of Asia looked to Perseus with like feelings. Even the Rhodians, though they had nominally received a large tract of continental territory as the reward of their services in the war with Antiochus, and had not yet fully discovered how little reason they had to be grateful for it, paid their court to him in a very signal manner. They lent their galleys to convey the Syrian princess Laodice to Macedonia,§ and were rewarded by a present of timber for their fleet, as well as by other royal gifts. On the same occasion, Perseus received innumerable embassies of congratulation, accompanied with presents.

In Greece, too, he had a fair prospect of recovering the influence which his father had lost. The good wishes of every Greek, except those who had either sold, or were ready to sell themselves to the Romans, were on his side. In Ætolia and Thessaly the general poverty, caused by the calamities of war and the Roman exactions, had given rise to a struggle of parties which, in Ætolia, was attended with terrible scenes of bloodshed.|| The wealthy, who aggravated the distress of their countrymen by usurious extortions, hoped for protection from the Romans; the indigent, who could only expect relief through sweeping and violent changes in the distribution of property, seem to have turned their eyes towards Perseus as their friend.¶ In Boeotia fear alone prevented his partisans from openly declaring themselves; the feelings of the people were everywhere

\* Liv., xli., 19. Ut sanctum haberet fœdus, quod si cum Romanis esse videtur posset. Even if we reject the emendation of J. Gronovius: ut sanctum habere fœdus, quod si cum Romanis esset, videri posset; we shall not believe, with Flathé (p. 539), that the senate meant to express a doubt as to the existence of the treaty. † Liv., xli., 22.

‡ Liv., xli., 22.

§ An inscription still extant (Marmor., Oxon., p. 277, or Boeckh., ii., p. 231) testified the gratitude of the Delians for her pious munificence, which she exercised, no doubt, in the course of this voyage.

|| Diodorus, Exc., p. 523. Liv., xli., 25; xlii., 5. Polyb., xxi., 14.

\* Polyb., Exc. Vat., p. 413. Pausanias (vii., 10, 6) absurdly exaggerates the importance of the war. From him, however, we learn that Abrupolis was king of the Sapeans. Cf. Strabo, xli., p. 549.

† Appian, Mac., ix., 3. Liv., xli., 24. ‡ Justin, xxii., 4.

§ Polyb., xxvii., 10. Τὴν ψυχὴν πάντα μάλλον ἢ θανάτῳ. Diodorus, Exc., p. 577. † Liv., xl., 58.

¶ Polyb., xxvi., 9.

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with him. It was, no doubt, to animate his well-wishers by a display of his power and his moderation that, in 174, he made an expedition into the heart of Greece. The Dolopians, who had been allowed to remain subject to Macedonian rule, had revolted, and put his governor to a cruel death.\* They would then have appealed to Rome, but Perseus invaded their country, and reduced them to submission; and then, pretending some religious scruples, marched across the range of Cēta to Delphi, and, after a sojourn of three days there, returned home through Thessaly, leaving a very favourable impression by the excellent discipline which he enforced throughout his march.† He was most anxious to draw the Achæans into friendly relations with him; but as, in the warmth of their zeal for the Romans, they had passed a decree to exclude all Macedonians from their territories, it was not easy to gain access to them. The separation, however, thus made between the two states, had been attended with a consequence very annoying to the Achæans, who had no remedy when their runaway slaves took refuge in Macedonia. Perseus now collected as many of these fugitives as he could find, and wrote a letter, in which he offered to restore them to their owners, but, at the same time, reminded the Achæans that it rested with themselves to guard against losses of the same kind for the future. The letter was read in the Achæan assembly by Xenarchus, the general, and a motion was founded upon it for the repeal of the inhospitable decree, but was rejected through the influence of Callicrates, who represented Perseus as on the eve of a war with Rome. Livy supposes that some offence was taken because an embassy was not sent with the letter; and so, it appears, Perseus himself had been informed; but when he sent envoys to repair this omission, they could not obtain an audience.‡

The senate continued to send ambassadors across the Adriatic, to inspect the state of affairs in Macedonia and Greece, to keep the Greeks quiet, and to collect information against Perseus. Nothing was done to relieve the misery of the Ætolians; but hostages were taken from the contending parties, and lodged at Corinth, so as to place both more than ever in the power of the Romans. § In Thessaly something was done to mitigate the evil; by the authority of the Roman envoy, the rate of interest was reduced, and a long term allowed for the payment of debts by yearly instalments. || The Achæans—that is, Callicrates and his party—were praised for the firmness with which they had adhered to the decree which interdicted commerce with Macedonia—a declaration of enmity to Perseus which might serve at once to irritate him, and to give countenance to the Achæan partisans of Rome. ¶ But, in Bœotia, the Macedonian party gained the ascendancy, and concluded a treaty of alliance with Perseus, copies of which were preserved at Thebes, Delphi, and Delos.\*\* Two leaders of the opposite faction, Evercas and Callicritus, were despatched on their return from Rome,

and this violence was laid to the charge of Perseus.\* The Roman envoys reported that they had found it difficult to obtain an audience of him, but pretended to have observed, not only that he was preparing for war, but on the point of beginning hostilities.† Yet he, too, continued to send embassies to Rome, with apologies for his proceedings, which were received, it seems, by the senate, with apparent acquiescence.‡

The rupture was hastened by the efforts of Eumenes. He was either so blinded by ambition or animosity that he did not perceive how much his own safety depended on that of Perseus, or, believing the war to be inevitable, desired to pay his court to the senate by advice which met its inclinations. In the year 178, he came in person to Rome, for the purpose of describing the formidable preparations, extensive alliances, and hostile acts of Perseus, and warned the senate that, if it remained passive much longer, it would have to contend with him for the possession of Italy. This alarm of invasion, which had done good service when a pretext was wanted for the first Macedonian war, would now have been a little too stale, as well as absurd, in the mouth of a Roman; but, coming from a foreign prince, it had a more plausible sound. In the whole of his speech, as reported by Livy, there is only one wholesome truth, which he hardly ventured to intimate, but which he might be the more willing to disclose, as it tended to enhance the merit of his own loyalty; this was, that Perseus owed his popularity to the hatred everywhere felt towards the Romans. § Envoys had come at the same time from Macedonia, Rhodes, and many of the Asiatic cities; for the journey of Eumenes had raised a general expectation of some important result. But the senate would not allow the Macedonians to be confronted with him; and Harpalus, the chief of the embassy, finding his audience steeled by their prejudices against all his arguments, is said to have been provoked to use language which sounded like defiance. The Rhodians fared no better, though they were permitted to plead with Eumenes; their complaints against him only seemed to strengthen the senate's prepossessions in his favour. He departed with the highest honours it could bestow on a stranger, among which an ensign of Roman magistracy, the curule chair, was accounted the chief.

Still, nothing that he had alleged against Perseus was thought worthy to be published, at the time, as a ground for war. He was destined to accomplish his intention in a manner which he had neither foreseen nor wished—at the expense of personal suffering and danger. On his return to Asia, he paid a visit to Delphi; but, between Cirrha and the temple, he was waylaid, and nearly killed by heavy stones which were rolled down on him from the top of a wall under which he was passing. The assailants, said to have been four in number, made their escape to the top of Parnassus, and the royal

\* Liv., xlii., 41. Appian, Mac., ix., 3.

† Liv., xli., 22.

‡ Ibid., xlii., 5.

\*\* Ibid., xlii., 12.

|| Ibid., u. s.

§ Ibid., xli., 23, 34.

¶ Ibid., xlii., 6.

\* Liv., xlii., 13.

† Ibid., xlii., 42.

Cum Bootis amicitiam facimus. Hæc, qualicumque sunt, per legatos meos non solum indicata sed etiam excusata sunt sæpe in senatu vestro. Sed nundum Roman accusator Eumenes venerat.

§ Liv., xlii., 13. Quod ipse restatur dicere, invidiâ adversus Romanos favore illi consilii.

† Ibid., xlii., 2.

‡ Ibid., xlii., 42.

guards could not overtake them ; but, according to the Roman story, they were soon discovered to have been emissaries of Perseus, one Evander, a Cretan officer in his service, and three Macedonians, who had been recommended by letters from the king to the hospitality of a wealthy Delphian lady named Praxo. She herself was, soon after, brought to Rome by one of the Roman envoys who had been last sent to Macedonia, and, of course, confirmed the charge against Perseus ; for her evidence was heard and reported by his enemies. But, at the same time, the senate received information of a still fouler plot, contrived by the same unscrupulous foe. One Rammius, or Evennius, a principal citizen of Brundisium, was brought to Rome with Praxo, and related that he had been solicited by Perseus to poison the Roman commanders and envoys, who usually lodged at his house when they embarked at Brundisium. This last story is so improbable in itself as to throw additional doubt on the former, which, though strange, is apparently better attested ; as the main fact, the assault on Eumenes, is unquestionable, and not otherwise accounted for. Revenge might, certainly, have impelled Perseus to such a deed, though we should not have expected that he would have chosen such means to compass his end. The other charge is hardly credible. If Perseus was capable of the attempts imputed to him, the senate was, at least, equally capable of as vile a calumny. The stories, true or false, were most happily suited to its purpose, and far better fitted to work on the public mind, and to excite general indignation against Perseus, than any enumeration of his political transgressions. Accordingly, war with Macedonia was now resolved on, and preparations for it were immediately begun, though it was not to be formally declared until the year after, on account of a quarrel in which the senate was involved with the consuls, C. Popilius and P. Ælius. Orders were given for a levy of troops to be carried over to Epirus, to occupy the towns on the coast, and secure a safe landing for the consul to whose province Macedonia might fall. In the mean while, ambassadors were sent to demand reparation from Perseus, and, in case of refusal, to renounce his friendship and alliance. He had been already apprized by Harpalus of the senate's temper, which rendered it evident that peace could not last much longer, and we may therefore easily believe that he was earnestly engaged in preparations for the defence of his kingdom. But the envoys, on their return, not only described his warlike attitude, but reported that he had replied to them in a strain of reproach and defiance ; had declared that he no longer considered himself bound by the treaty which his father had made with Rome, and would consent to none unless on terms of equality ; and, when they renounced his alliance, ordered them to quit his dominions in three days.

After such a scene it might have been supposed that he must have abandoned all thoughts of peace. But we find the case to have been so far otherwise, that he lost whatever advantages he might have derived from the forward state of his preparations, through his anxious desire and credulous hopes of averting the in-

evitable war. We have, therefore, strong reason to suspect that his language was violently exaggerated and perverted by the envoys, even if the answer which they pretended to have received from him was not a mere forgery. It is, at least, certain, from the admission of the Roman historian himself, that the senate's transactions with Perseus in the course of the year preceding the commencement of the war were a tissue of the most disgraceful frauds, and perhaps the extraordinary inconsistencies which perplex this part of Livy's narrative may have arisen from his unwillingness to unfold the full extent of the senate's duplicity. As soon as the consuls of the ensuing year, P. Licinius Crassus, and C. Cassius Longinus, entered into office, the decree of war was carried through the comitia. The province of Macedonia fell to Crassus, and the new levies were prosecuted with the utmost activity. But earlier in the year 171, the prætor, Cn. Sicinius, had crossed over to Epirus with 5000 foot and 300 horse, encamped in the territory of Apollonia, and thrown garrisons into several places near the western border of Macedonia ; and, nearly at the same time, five commissioners, Q. Marcus, A. Atilius, a Publius, and a Servius Cornelius Lentulus, and L. Decimius, were sent into Greece. Marcus, it must be observed, was connected, by an hereditary relation of hospitality, with the royal house of Macedon. They were escorted as far as Corcyra by a thousand men ; and then, having arranged their various destinations with one another, divided the escort into three parties. But, before they separated, they received a letter from Perseus, inquiring, it is said, for what purpose the Romans had brought troops over to Greece, and occupied towns there ; but they dismissed the messenger with a verbal answer, that it was for the security of the towns themselves. They then set out on their several missions : Decimus to the Illyrian king Gentius, who was still wavering between Rome and Macedonia ; the two Cornelii to Peloponnesus, where they made a circuit of the principal towns, exhorting all, without distinction, to maintain the loyalty to Rome which they had shown in her wars with Philip and Antiochus : a confusion of dissimilar cases, which is said to have given great offence to the Achæans, who found that, notwithstanding their long and steady attachment to the Roman cause, they stood no higher in the estimation of the Romans than the Eleans and Messenians, who had sided with Antiochus, and had on that account been annexed against their will to the Achæan League. Possibly it was meant that they should be reminded that the latest services alone possessed any value in the eyes of the Romans. Marcus and Atilius passed over to Epirus, where they prevailed on the assembly to send 400 men for the protection of Orestis, and then proceeded through Ætolia, where they only stayed to see Lyciscus, a partisan of Rome, elected in the room of the deceased general, into Thessaly. Here it seemed, at first, that they had nothing to do but to exchange professions of friendship with the Thessalians ; but it soon became clear that their mission had a farther and more important object. Perseus, who was at Dium,

heard that Marcius, the son of his father's friend, was at Larissa. He conceived a hope that, through his interest, the negotiation with Rome might be renewed with a fairer prospect of success, and sent to request a personal conference with him. Marcius encouraged this hope, and intimated that he had come for that very purpose, but put off the interview on the plea of indisposition. The meeting at length took place on the banks of the Peneus; and, as Perseus wished for a fresh hearing before the senate, Marcius, as if he was granting a great favour, consented to a truce, that the king might send ambassadors to Rome. Thus his hands were tied for the interval that was necessary to complete the Roman preparations; and this was the object which Marcius had in view, and probably the main end of his mission.

From Thessaly, he and Atilius proceeded to Bœotia. They had already, on their arrival in Thessaly, been met by Bœotian deputies, who, being upbraided with the alliance which had been concluded with Perseus, had represented it as the work of a faction headed by Ismenias, and as carried against the will of several townships. Marcius took this occasion to hint that he should soon discover which of the towns could claim the benefit of this excuse, as they would be at liberty to take measures each for itself. The effect of this hint now became visible: it had produced a general anxiety among the Bœotian towns to sever their cause from that of the federal Bœotian body, and to place themselves individually under Roman protection. The Roman commissioners fixed themselves at Chalcis, to receive the embassies of the towns. They were accompanied by a band of Theban exiles, who had been recently condemned in a struggle for office with Ismenias, one of the new Bœotarchs.\* Ismenias himself came to Chalcis, and proposed that the Bœotian nation should submit in a body to the Romans. But this proposal was directly contrary to the views of Marcius, who aimed at the dissolution of the Bœotian League; and therefore, while he gave a most gracious reception to the deputies of those towns which were willing to enter separately into the same relation to Rome, he treated Ismenias with such harshness and contumely as encouraged his enemies to attack him, and he was obliged to seek shelter from their fury at the tribunal of the Romans. In the mean while a fresh contest took place at Thebes, in which the Macedonian party was supported by an influx of strangers from Coronea and Haliartus, but it ended in the complete triumph of their adversaries. The friends of Ismenias were forced to withdraw, and fled to Chalcis, while decrees were passed for a separate treaty with Rome, and the restoration of the exiles. Thus the object of Marcius was completely attained: the Bœotian confederacy was broken up; its towns became severally subject to Rome; Ismenias and others of his party were put to death. Neon, the head of the house of Brachyllas, fled to Macedonia. The commissioners next proceeded to Peloponnesus, while Ser. Cornelius took their place at Chalcis; and the Achæans, at their desire, sent 1000 men, to serve at once

as a garrison for Chalcis and as a security for the good behaviour of their own fellow-citizens. Marcius and Atilius then returned with P. Cornelius to Rome.\* When they made their report in the senate, and boasted of the manœuvre by which they had fettered the operations of Perseus, a few of the elder senators were startled, not at the baseness of their cunning, but at the distrust which it seemed to imply in the superiority of the Roman arms. The majority, however, applauded their conduct, and they were sent back to Greece—Marcius with full powers to act as might appear expedient, Atilius to occupy Larissa with 3000 men, whom he was to take from Sicinius. The envoys of Perseus, who came about the same time,† were, for the sake of decency, admitted to an audience; but the only answer vouchsafed to their arguments and deprecations was an order to them and all their countrymen residing in Rome to leave the city the same day, and Italy within thirty.‡ Perseus was not more successful in the other embassies which he sent during this interval, which he might have employed to dislodge the Romans from the coast of Epirus, and to guard against the impending invasion. From the Rhodians he could not obtain even the promise of their mediation; for they had been visited a little earlier by a Roman embassy, which had decided their fluctuation in favour of Rome. On the other hand, in Bœotia, Coronea and Haliartus still clung to him, and implored his aid against Thebes; but he felt himself obliged to refuse their request, that he might not break the truce.

Licinius set out from Rome at the beginning of June, 171, and appears to have landed with his army in Epirus about the same time that Perseus learned from his envoys the trick by which he had been cheated of a golden opportunity. Yet he had councillors who still advised him to sue for peace, and, if possible, to purchase it either by tribute or by cession of territory; and he would probably have been glad to do so, if he could but have hoped to secure a portion of his kingdom against the encroachments of Roman ambition. It was in a spirit of desperate resolution, rather than of cheerful courage, that he at length threw himself on his own resources, and yet they were such as no former king of Macedon, since Alexander, had ever possessed: an army of

\* Polyb., xxvii., 2: Ταῦτα ἀπαρτίζοντας ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησποδίοις καὶ χερσὶνα. Liv., xlii., 44, principio hiemis. Yet he has previously related (c. 35) that the prætor C. Lucretius set out for Brundisium after having solemnised the Læturæ on the first of June, so that the reader would naturally suppose that the winter he afterward speaks of was the following, not the preceding one. But it is clear, from his own narrative, that the return of Marcius cannot have been earlier than May, which is not absolutely inconsistent with the language of Polybius.

† Compare Liv., xlii., 46, 48.

‡ Polyb., xxvii., 7. Liv., xlii., 48. Diodor., Exc., p. 632. Appian, Mac., ix., 5, but without any reference to the embassy of Marcius. It is clear that these envoys were dismissed just before the consular set out for his province. Yet Livy (c. 36) gives an account of another embassy from Perseus, which came to Rome at the beginning of June, and to which—as war had been already decreed—audience was given in the temple of Bellona, and which was then ordered to quit Italy within eleven days. It is added, *Hæc Romæ acta nondum profectis in provinciam consulis*. I have not seen this confusion anywhere noticed. But it seems as if Livy must have seen two different accounts of the same embassy, and have referred them to two distinct occasions.

9,000 foot and 4000 horse, including a phalanx of 20,000, and all troops inured to service, with stores and treasure sufficient for the supply of its wants for ten years.\* The Macedonian cities offered voluntary contributions of money and corn, which the king declined, only requiring them to provide carriages for his munition. Having collected all his forces, he marched into Thessaly, made himself master of some towns in the north, and finally took up a strong and commodious position at Pycium, near the foot of Ossa. But he neglected to occupy the passes between Epirus and Thessaly, where he might easily have topped the enemy's progress, and would probably have defeated him with great slaughter. Licinius was allowed to penetrate, unmolested, through the highlands of Athamania, with an army inferior in numbers, and consisting mostly of raw recruits. In his camp, on the Peneus, he was joined by Eumenes and his brother Attalus, with 4000 foot and 1000 horse, and received other re-enforcements which raised the whole amount of his forces nearly to an equality with that of the enemy. Yet for some time he shrank from an engagement, and suffered the fields of Phœræ to be ravaged, before he would accept the challenge which Perseus repeatedly offered. An action at length took place, in which the Macedonian cavalry was victorious, and the Romans lost 2400 slain and 600 prisoners. But the timid or treacherous counsels of Evander—the Cretan whom he was said to have employed for the attempt on the life of Eumenes—prevented him from following up this advantage, and probably saved the Roman army from total discomfiture. The consul thought it necessary, for the safety of his camp, to transfer it to the other side of the Peneus in the night, and then, to console his troops, shifted the blame of the disaster on the Etolians, who were the first, it was alleged, to turn their backs. This account of the matter not only saved the credit of the Romans, but served as a pretext on which three Etolian officers, who were supposed to be adverse to the Roman interest, were sent to Italy, to undergo a trial on the charge of treachery.† But not even victory could animate the courage of Perseus. In the midst of his triumph he still quailed under the ascendancy of the genius of Rome, and let himself be persuaded to solicit peace from his vanquished enemy, on the same terms to which his father had submitted after he had lost the battle of Synopephale. But his pusillanimity was hardly equal to the Roman arrogance. Licinius, by the advice of his council, replied, that Perseus could only obtain peace by unconditional submission to the will of the senate. Even this repulse did not rouse his pride or his resentment, but only urged him into lower depths of dishonour, and induced him to make larger offers, which were rejected with inflexible disdain. When he found every humiliation fruitless, he resumed his hostile position.‡ The campaign ended without any other important event. The Romans, on one occasion, claimed a slight advantage; but, on the whole,

they remained on the defensive until Perseus led his army back to Macedonia for the winter. But such a negotiation might well have appeared to them equivalent to a victory.

Nevertheless, the report of their defeat contributed to aggravate the calamities of Greece by the encouragement which it gave to the partisans of Macedonia. It seems to have caused a reaction at Thebes, which restored their ascendancy there. Haliartus, with the aid of a re-enforcement from Coronea, defended itself obstinately against the prætor C. Lucretius, who commanded the Roman fleet, but was at length stormed, pillaged, and razed to the ground. The old men and children were mostly put to the sword: the garrison was sold as slaves. He then marched against Thebes, which surrendered without resistance, and was delivered up to the exiles and their faction. Their adversaries were probably all condemned to death or banishment, as their property is said to have been confiscated.\* The Thebans were now harassed by the hostility of Coronea, which alone, of all the Bœotian towns, still adhered to Perseus, and on their entreaty, the consul, after he had recovered a few places in Thessaly, and had left the greater part of his forces in winter-quarters there, marched with the rest into Bœotia.† We gather from an incidental allusion,‡ that he made himself master of Coronea by a capitulation, which he broke to indulge his cruelty and avarice; that he put the leading men to death, and sold the rest as slaves; and we know that he treated several other towns, the names of which are not recorded, in like manner. The prætor Lucretius carried his rapacity still farther, and did not even spare the staunchest allies of Rome, against whom he had no complaint whatever to allege. He plundered the temples of Chalcis to adorn his villa at Antium with statues and pictures, and abandoned the property and persons of the citizens to the outrages of his lawless marines, whom he quartered in their houses. Another mode of oppression practised by the Roman commanders is illustrated by the example of Athens. The Athenians sent the largest military and naval force which they were able to furnish to the aid of the Romans; but the consul and prætor declined their services, and demanded a large quantity of corn, though Attica itself depended on the importation of foreign grain for its subsistence.§ The Greeks fared no better the next year, when Licinius was succeeded by the new consul A. Hostilius, and L. Hortensius took the command of the fleet. Hortensius followed the example of his predecessor at Chalcis, and having treacherously stormed Abdera during a truce, gave it up to pillage, and exercised the like cruelty towards the inhabitants as those of Coronea had suffered from Licinius. Complaints were brought to Rome by the injured Greeks, and the senate showed itself willing to interfere, and, as far as possible, to redress the wrong. It reprimanded Hortensius, ordered the enslaved citizens of Coronea and Abdera to be restored to freedom, and called Lucretius to account. He was brought to trial by the tribunes, and condemned to a heavy fine. But the love of justice had very little share in

\* Liv., xlii., 51, 52. Compare xlii., 13.

† Polyb., xxvii., 13, 14. Liv., xlii., 60.

‡ Polyb., xxvii., 8.

\* Liv., xlii., 63.

† Ibid., xlii., 4.

‡ Ibid., xlii., 67.

§ Ibid., 6.

any of these proceedings. They were apparently connected with the ill success which attended the Roman arms during the first two years of the war, which seemed to render it advisable to soothe the Greeks by the correction of some of the more flagrant abuses under which they were groaning. A great part of Epirus had been driven to revolt by the system which the senate had adopted at the suggestion of Callicrates. There it had a still more profligate instrument of its tyranny in the person of Charops, a grandson of the man of the same name who distinguished himself by his attachment to the Roman interest in the first Macedonian war. The younger Charops was sent to Rome by his grandfather after his father's death, in his boyhood, to learn the Latin language, and contracted an acquaintance with many of the principal Romans. On his return to Epirus he endeavoured to push his way, by arrogant pretensions and base intrigues, to the head of affairs; and the war with Perseus gave him an opportunity of exciting the senate's jealousy against the rivals whom he wished to supplant, whom he accused of a leaning to the Macedonian interest. The charge was the more plausible, as the leading men of the opposite party, Cephalus and Antinous, had been on terms of friendship with the royal house of Macedon. But the course of policy which they had pursued was that prudent and honourable mien which it had been the aim of Philipæmen and Lycortas to preserve in the councils of the Achaean League. They were aware of the calumnies with which Charops was assailing them, but, conscious of their innocence, believed for a time that they might defy his malice. But when they saw the Ætolian officers sent as culprits to Italy, they thought it no longer safe to trust themselves in the power of the Romans, and openly went over to Perseus.\* A plot was laid by some of their partisans for seizing Hostilius on his way through Epirus, and giving him up to Perseus; and the consul only escaped through an accidental change in his plans.† He displayed as little capacity or energy as his predecessor in the prosecution of the war, was repulsed in an attempt which he made to penetrate into Elymiotis, and afterwards remained on the defensive in Thessaly, and acknowledged the enemy's superiority by declining a battle. Perseus not only made himself master of several towns in Thessaly, but found leisure for an expedition against the Dardanians, defeated them with great slaughter, and carried off much booty.‡ He was even encouraged by the supineness of the prætor, who seems to have been much more intent on the plunder of his allies than on the annoyance of the enemy, to make an attack on the Roman fleet at Oreus, where he took or sank a great number of transports and several galleys of war.§

The accounts which the senate continued to receive of the conduct of its officers in Greece induced it to issue a decree, by which it forbade any one to furnish supplies for the purposes of war at the requisition of the Roman

magistrates without its authority.\* Hostilius received this ordinance while he was in winter-quarters at Larissa, and sent C. Popillius and Cn. Octavius to publish it in Greece. They carried it first to Thebes, and then round the cities of Peloponnesus, which had probably all suffered from arbitrary exactions. But while they displayed this proof of the senate's clemency and kindness, they dropped several intimations of their displeasure at the conduct of men who, in their hearts, were hostile to Rome, and, under the pretence of moderation and discretion, were only waiting for an opportunity of declaring themselves against her. It was well understood that these hints were pointed against Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius; and it was supposed that the envoys had designed formally to accuse them in the assembly at Ægium. But they could find no colourable ground for any charge, and, perhaps, perceived that the temper of the assembly was not favourable to such an attempt. They then passed over to Ætolia, where, in an assembly held at Thermus, they endeavoured to obtain hostages from the party which was suspected of disaffection to the Roman cause; and in this demand they were supported, not only by Lyciscus, but by Thoas, who had now the baseness to instigate the Romans against the men through whose intercession he had been released after he had been delivered up by Antiochus. But the popular feeling displayed itself so strongly against his treachery and ingratitude, that the envoys thought it prudent to waive their demand. In Acarnania, which they visited next, their partisans ventured on a still bolder attempt, and exhorted them to introduce Roman garrisons into the towns as a security against the machinations of the Macedonian party; but the aversion which the people manifested to the measure induced them to abandon it, and they returned to Larissa without having accomplished any other object.† As their mission was one of conciliation, and the juncture required an exhibition of gentleness and forbearance, it was not difficult to foresee what would be the fate of the Greeks as soon as the motives which led the senate to spare them should have ceased to operate.

In the depth of the winter, when the snow lay so deep on the Cambunian hills as to be an insurmountable barrier against an invading army, Perseus undertook an expedition into Illyria, chiefly with a view to draw Gentius into his alliance. In the field his operations were successful: he made himself master of several strong places, and advanced near to the frontier of the dominions of Gentius; but the negotiation which he then proceeded to open with the Illyrian king was long protracted without any effect, though Gentius, from the first, declared himself willing to make war on the Romans, because Perseus could not bring himself to spare the subsidy which he required. After his return to Macedonia, he made another laborious expedition into Ætolia. There Stratus would have opened its gates to him, for its principal citizen, Archidamus, had been goaded into revolt by the calumnious accusations of Lyciscus and Thoas, as Cephalus by those of Charops; but C. Popillius, who had been sent

\* Polyb., xxvii., 13. Liv., xliii., 18. Died., Exc., p. 578.

† Polyb., xxvii., 14.

‡ Plut., Æmil. Paull., 9. Liv., xliii., 18.

§ Plut., Æmil. Paull., 9.

\* Liv., xliii., 17. Polyb., xxvii., 2-5.

by the consul, with 1000 men, to Ambracia, having received intelligence from the opposite party of the approach of Perseus, arrived in time to save Stratus, and to prevent the Ætolian general, Dinarchus, from joining the Macedonian army with all the troops under his command. Aperantia, however, was induced, through the influence of Archidamus, to submit to Perseus, as would probably have been the case with all the rest of Ætolia, but for the timely intervention of Popilius. During the same time, the Macedonian general, Clevas, successfully defended the revolted Epirots against a Roman army under Ap. Claudius, and forced him to retire, with loss, into Illyria.

Early in the spring of 169 Hostilius was superseded by the new consul, Q. Marcius Philippus, who brought a re-enforcement of 5000 men to the army. Marcius, notwithstanding his advanced age and unwieldy person,\* seems to have been a man of greater energy than either of his predecessors in the command; and he was most probably stimulated by the impatience which had been excited at Rome by the long continuance of the war to more vigorous efforts. As soon as he had put himself at the head of the army in Thessaly, he resolved to penetrate into Macedonia. The pass of Tempe was so strongly fortified as to preclude all attempts on that side. His choice lay between the different passes of the mountains, all difficult, even if no resistance should be offered by the enemy, and, if defended, extremely dangerous. He selected the eastern route, which led over Mount Olympus, down to the seacoast of Pieria, where Perseus himself was encamped, near Dium. He had been apprized of the consul's design, though not of the route which he meant to take, and he had sent a body of 12,000 men, under Hippas, to occupy the heights of Olympus, and 10,000 light infantry to the pass over the Cambunian range. But these precautions seemed to have exhausted all his powers of thought and action. He remained on the coast awaiting the issue, which, by a slight exertion of foresight and alertness, he might have determined in his own favour. Hippas maintained his ground, and a desultory combat was carried on between the light infantry of each for two days, during which Perseus, who was not more than twelve miles from the scene of action, might have come up with fresh troops, which would probably have forced the Romans to a disastrous retreat. But instead of this, Marcius, having left a body of 4000 men to observe Hippas, was allowed to descend by a ravine of indescribable difficulty, where a handful of men might have destroyed his whole army. This was only the first of a series of fatal errors, by which Perseus threw away the fairest opportunities and marred the brightest prospects. When Marcius had come down safely into the plain, his situation was still extremely perilous. He was enclosed in a narrow space between the mountains and the sea. Retreat was utterly hopeless, and a very slight fortification would have rendered the king's position at Dium impregnable. The consul, therefore, must have remained motionless as long as the enemy chose to keep guard over him, and, in the mean while, depended for subsistence en-

tirely on the fleet, that is, on the weather and the season, and before even the first necessary supply could arrive would have been reduced to extreme distress. From this embarrassment, however, he was immediately extricated by the insatiation of Perseus, who, seized with a panic at the approach of the Romans, abandoned himself to despair at the very moment when an abler general would have conceived the most sanguine hopes of a decisive advantage. He not only abandoned Dium, after having removed the gilt statues on board the fleet, and fell back upon Pydna, but withdrew all the garrisons which guarded the strongholds of Tempe, and sent Nicias, his treasurer, to Pella, with orders to sink all his treasures deposited there in the lake,\* and Andronicus to Thessalonica, with a commission to burn the arsenal. Marcius advanced to the distance of two days' march beyond Dium, hardly believing that a place so rich and strong could have been abandoned to him unless with a view to some stratagem; but the scarcity of provisions compelled him to retreat to Dium, and afterward to Phila. The fleet brought no supply, and his army would have starved if it had not been seasonably relieved by the corn found in the evacuated fortresses of Tempe. This retrograde movement a little revived the courage of Perseus. He again took possession of Dium, and encamped five miles to the south, on the left bank of the river Enipeus. He now began to be ashamed of his cowardice, and to wish to conceal it. He accused the generals, whom he had recalled from their posts, of throwing open the passes to the enemy. Andronicus had wisely deferred the execution of his frantic order. The treasure had been thrown into the lake, but was mostly recovered by diving; and Perseus is said to have put the divers, as well as Nicon and Andronicus, to death, in the hope of covering his own disgrace. The Roman fleet, under the prætor, C. Marcius Figulus, who was accompanied by Eumenes, made unsuccessful attempts on Thessalonica, Cassandrea, and Torone; and a division of the army, which had been sent by the consul to besiege Melibœa, was put to flight by the Macedonian general, Euphranor, who, though he had but 2000 men under his command, was likewise able to protect Demetrias and its territory against the fleet which lay at Iolcus. The armies on both sides went soon after into winter-quarters; and at the end of the third campaign, notwithstanding the folly of Perseus, the Romans had only gained a footing on the threshold of Macedonia, without any clear prospect that they would be able to advance a step farther. Marcius himself, when a Rhodian embassy came to his camp at Heracleum, with congratulations on his success, suggested to the envoys that their government would do well to offer its mediation between the belligerent powers. This intimation encouraged the Macedonian party at Rhodes, as a proof that the Romans themselves did not consider their affairs as prosperous; and the consequence was, that an embassy was sent to Rome, which tendered its

\* Liv. xlv., 10. Gazam in mare dejici Pella. Diodorus, Exc., p. 579, writes the treasurer's name Nicon, and that of the place Phacus. *Tây bệ rợ ở đêw gưai tại rả xấpinara kasamvrioi.* Digitized by Google

\* Liv., xlv., 4. *Prægravis corpore.*

mediation in haughty and almost threatening terms. Polybius believes that Marcius, expecting that the war would soon be brought to a triumphant issue against Perseus, desired to embroil the Rhodians in a quarrel with Rome, and to furnish a pretext for hostile proceedings towards them.\* There can be no doubt that he was quite capable of such perfidious cunning; but it may be questioned whether he felt so much confidence as to the approaching termination of the war, and would not have wished that peace should be granted to Perseus before he was himself superseded. Even Eumenes began to waver in his loyalty to the Romans. He entered into a private negotiation with Perseus, and went so far as to consent to accept a subsidy from him, possibly hoping to overreach him, and to avoid any overt act of hostility towards Rome; but the treaty was broken off because Perseus would not part with his gold.† This wretched parsimony was still more conspicuously displayed in two other transactions, nearly at the same time. He had at length made up his mind to purchase the aid of Gentius at the price which the Illyrian demanded, 300 talents. The hostages were interchanged, and the treaty solemnly ratified by Perseus in the presence of the Macedonian cavalry, whom he wished to encourage by the intelligence of this important alliance. Ten talents were sent to Gentius as an earnest; the rest was sealed in the presence of his envoys, to be conveyed to him by Macedonian bearers, who were directed by Perseus to wait, when they reached the frontier, for farther orders. Gentius now embarked frankly in the cause, and not only sent ambassadors to accompany those of Perseus to Rhodes, but threw two Roman envoys into prison. Perseus, as soon as he heard that his ally had thus broken, past all hope of reparation, with the Romans, retained the rest of the subsidy.‡ In like manner, he lost the services of an army of 20,000 Bastarnians, whom he might have taken into his pay. The bargain was concluded; the Celts advanced within five or six days' march of his camp, when Perseus, unable to endure the sacrifice of so much treasure, even for the sake of a kingdom, resolved to engage only 5000 of the cavalry; but, as he did not send the stipulated gold even for these, the Celtic chief indignantly marched away.

At Rome, though no apprehension was felt as to the final issue of the Macedonian war, its state at the end of the third year was not regarded as promising; and L. Æmilius Paullus was raised for the second time to the consulate, with a general hope that his tried abilities would bring the contest to a speedy close, though the province was not assigned to him, as Plutarch relates,§ but, apparently at least, fell to him by lot.|| He himself, after his election, caused commissioners to be sent to inspect the condition of the army, and their report of it was not at all cheering. A levy of 14,000 foot and 1200 horse was decreed to re-enforce it. He set out from Rome with Cn. Octavius, who commanded the fleet, on the first of April; arrived

at Corcyra on the same day on which he sailed from Brundisium; five days after, celebrated a sacrifice at Delphi, and in five more had reached the camp in Pieria.\* His soldiers, who had been accustomed to great license,† soon learned, by the regulations which he introduced, that they had now a general as well as a consul at their head;‡ and Perseus no longer felt himself safe behind the Enipeus when he saw the Roman camp moved forward to the opposite bank. The terror with which he was inspired by the fame of Paullus was soon heightened by tidings that whatever hopes he had built on his alliance with Gentius had fallen to the ground. After a war of not more than twenty or thirty days, Gentius being besieged in his capital, Scodra, surrendered to the prætor Anicius, and was carried, with all his family, to Rome, to adorn his triumph, having received ten talents as the price of his throne and his liberty. Perseus, however, did not neglect the precautions which his situation required. He fortified his position on the Enipeus; detached a body of cavalry to protect the coast of Macedonia from the operations of the Roman fleet, which had entered the Gulf of Thessalonica; and sent 5000 men to guard the northern pass of Olympus at Petra, which opened a way near the highest summit of the mountain, the Pythium, by which an enemy might descend to the plains in his rear. This was, indeed, the danger which he had most reason to provide against; for Paullus, having weighed all the modes of attack by which he might attempt to dislodge the enemy from his position, finally decided on this. He sent P. Scipio Nasica, accompanied by his eldest son, Fabius Maximus, with 8000 men, to force this pass, while he occupied the attention of Perseus with a series of assaults on his intrenchments. Nasica, after a long circuit, surprised the Macedonians at Petra, and drove them down before him; and Perseus, at his approach, hastily abandoned his position, and retreated towards Pydna, where the consul, having been joined by Nasica, came up with him the same day, but deferred giving battle until the morrow. An eclipse of the moon, which took place in the night, filled the Macedonians with superstitious terror: the Romans had a tribune in their army who was able to predict and explain it. Perseus, though with blank misgivings, yielded to the advice of his friends, who exhorted him to risk an engagement: he could not but perceive that farther retreat would be attended with the dispersion of his forces and the loss of his kingdom. The next day (June 22, B.C. 168) a short combat decided the fate of the Macedonian monarchy. The power of the phalanx was again tried, under circumstances the most advantageous to it, and again failed, through the same causes which occasioned the loss of the battle of Cynocephale. Victorious on the level ground, it fell into disorder when it had advanced upon the retreating enemy to the foot of the hills, where it could no longer preserve the evenness of its front and the compactness of its mass, and opened numerous

\* xxviii. 15.

† Liv., xlv. 55.

‡ Polyb., xviii. 8, 9; xxix. 2, 3. Liv., xlv. 23, 27.

§ Liv., xlv. 27. Plut., Æmil. Paull., 12. Diodor., xxc., p. 580.

|| Æmil. Paull., 10, *ὅτι ἰδόντες κλέρος γενέσθαι.*

\* Liv., xlv., 17. Designator *exteropus sortiri placuit* provincias . . . Æmilio Macedonia erant.

† Liv., xlv., 41.

‡ Plut., Æmil. Paull., 13. Liv., xlv., 1 (probably exaggerating the merits of Hostilius).



passages through its ranks for the legionaries, who rushed in to an almost unresisted slaughter. The slain on the Macedonian side are said to have amounted to 20,000; upward of 10,000 were made prisoners: the Romans lost scarcely 100 men. Perseus took little part in the battle, as the Romans gave out, through cowardice; but it appears that he had received a kick from a horse the day before, which compelled him to use a litter.\* It is certain, however, that, as soon as the rout began, he left the field with the cavalry, which remained untouched, and fled towards Pella. He was soon deserted by his Macedonian followers, and, even at Pella, found that he was no longer obeyed by his subjects. In the first movement of his passion, he killed two officers of his household with his own hand, and continued his flight with no attendants besides the royal pages but three foreigners—Evander the Cretan, Neon the Boeotian, and the Ætolian Archidamus—with 500 Cretans, whose attachment was only retained by permission to plunder the royal plate, which Perseus afterward recovered from them by a disgraceful trick. At Amphipolis he sent three persons of low rank, the only messengers he could find, with a letter to Paulus, but only stayed long enough to embark the treasure deposited there, and sailed with it down the Strymon to Galepsus, and thence to Samothrace.

Little loyalty could seem due to such a king, even if his fortunes had been less desperate. The whole of Macedonia submitted immediately without resistance to the conqueror. The Roman fleet soon pursued the royal fugitive to Samothrace. But Octavius spared the sanctity of the asylum, and only demanded Evander, as a man whose hands were stained with the blood of Eumenes, and Perseus was said to have despatched him, to prevent a disclosure of his own guilt. But he suffered himself to be overreached by another Cretan, who engaged to convey him to the coast of Thrace, where he hoped to find refuge at the court of Cotys; but sailed away without him, as soon as his treasure had been put on board. He then hid himself in a nook of the temple, until his remaining servants had been tempted by a promise of free pardon to surrender themselves, and his younger children had been betrayed into the hands of Octavius by the friend who had charge of them. He then gave himself up, with his eldest son, Philip, to the prætor, and was immediately conducted to the consul's camp. He was courteously received by the conqueror, but is said to have forfeited the respect which would have been paid to his rank, by the abjectness of his demeanour; though he was thought to have been guilty of extravagant presumption, when, in the letter which he wrote immediately after his defeat, he retained the title of king. About the same time that these events were taking place in Macedonia, Anicius, after the subjugation of Illyria, marched into Epirus. At Phanota, where the plot had been laid for the seizure of the consul, Hostilius, the whole population went out to meet him with the ensigns of suppliants. All the other towns of Epirus submitted likewise without resistance: only in four, in Molossis, was there so much as an appearance of hesitation, which was the effect of

the presence of Cephalus, and some other leaders of the Macedonian party.\* But this obstacle was soon removed by their execution or voluntary death, and these towns also surrendered without any opposition. Anicius distributed his troops among the principal cities, and left the whole country perfectly tranquil, when he returned to Illyria to meet the five commissioners who were sent from Rome to regulate its affairs.

A commission of ten was appointed, as usual, to settle those of Macedonia. In the summer of 167, before the arrival of the commissioners, Paulus, accompanied by his second son, the future conqueror of Carthage and Numantia, and by Athenæus, a brother of Eumenes, made a tour in Greece; not with any political object, but simply to gratify the curiosity of a stranger, who was familiar with Greek literature, and whose house at Rome was full of Greek rhetoricians, and artists, and masters of all kinds for the education of his sons. He went to view the monuments of art, scenes celebrated in history or fable, or hallowed by religion: to compare Phidias with Homer.† It was not only Athens and Sparta, Sicyon and Argos, and Epidaurus, Corinth, and Olympia that attracted his attention: the comparatively obscure shrines of Lebadea and Oropus were not without their interest for the Roman augur, who was no less exact in the observance of the sacerdotal ritual than in the maintenance of military discipline,‡ but sacrificed at Olympia before the work of Phidias with as much devotion as in the Capitol. He did not, indeed, wholly lay aside the majesty of the proconsul; at Delphi he ordered his own statues to be placed on the pedestals which had been erected for those of Perseus. But he made no inquiries into recent political transactions, and displayed his power chiefly in acts of beneficence; for, amid so many memorials of ancient prosperity, he everywhere found signs of present poverty and distress, and the vast magazines of corn and oil which had fallen into his hands in Macedonia enabled him to relieve the indigence of the Greeks by liberal largesses.§ His visit to Greece is a pleasing idyllic episode in a life divided between the senate and the camp; and it is characteristic of the beginning of a new period, being, as far as we know, the first ever paid to the country for such a purpose.||

It would have been happy for Greece if her destinies had now depended on the will of Paulus. But he was the minister of a system by which the rapacious oligarchy, which wielded the Roman legions, was enabled to treat the fairest portion of the civilized world as its prey, and, as it grew bolder with success, became more and more callous to shame and remorse in the prosecution of its iniquitous ends, which it scarcely deigned to cover with the threadbare mantle of its demure hypocrisy. Such men as Q. Marcus and C. Popilius were now the fittest agents for its work. A scene occurred to Paulus, as he passed through Thessaly on his return to Macedonia, which exhibited a slight prelude

\* Liv., xlv., 26.

† Polyb., xxx., 15. Liv., xlv., 27. 28. Plut., Æmil. Paul., 22. ‡ Plut., Æmil. Paul., 3. § Ibid., 28.

|| Livy intimates that even in his time such tours in Greece were not very common: Nobilitata fama magis aribus accepta sunt, quam oculis videntur (xlv., 27).

\* Plut., Æmil. Paul., 19.

to the miseries which Greece was to endure under the absolute ascendancy of this system. He was met by a multitude of Ætolians in the garb of suppliants, who related that Lyciscus and another of his party, having obtained a body of troops from a Roman officer, had surrounded the council-room, had put 550 of their opponents to death, forced others into exile, and taken possession of the property both of the dead and the banished. Paulus could only bid the suppliants repair to Amphipolis, where he was to arrange the affairs of his province in concert with the ten commissioners, who had already arrived in Macedonia. They had brought with them the outlines of a decree,\* which, when the details had been adjusted, was solemnly published from the proconsular tribunal at Amphipolis, in the presence of a great concourse of people; first recited in Latin by Paulus, and then in a Greek translation by the prætor Octavius. By its provisions Macedonia was divided into four districts, to which Amphipolis, Thessalonica, Pella, and Pelagonia were assigned as capitals. They were to be governed each by its own councils and magistrates, and were to be not only independent of each other, but separated from each other by the strictest prohibition of mutual intercourse, both of intermarriage and of contracts for the acquisition of land or houses, beyond the border within which either of the parties dwelt.† Even the importation of salt was forbidden, as well as the working of gold and silver mines—to guard against the abuses which were admitted to be inseparable from the administration of these royalties on the Roman system—and the felling of ship-timber. As the three regions which bordered on the territories of barbarian tribes were expressly permitted to keep garrisons for the protection of their frontiers, the use of arms for any other purpose seems to have been tacitly, if not expressly, interdicted. A tribute of 100 talents, one half of the amount of the taxation under the royal government, was reserved for the Romans. Whether the burdens of the people were lightened to the same extent, or the difference was more than equal to the increased expense of the quadruple administration, has been, perhaps, justly questioned.§ The most important benefits conferred on the conquered nation were exemption from the rule of a Roman magistrate and the rapacity of Roman farmers of the revenue—which, however, was only a precarious and temporary boon—and a new code of laws, compiled under the care of Paulus himself, and therefore probably framed on equitable principles, and wisely adapted to the condition of the country, as it is said to have stood the test of experience. That, nevertheless, the decree was received with deep discontent by every Macedonian who retained any degree of national feeling, may be easily supposed; and we hardly know whether Livy is in earnest, when he affects to correct the error of those who complained of the dismemberment of their country, not aware, he

thinks, how adequate each region was to the supply of its own wants. The jealousy of the senate, however, was not satisfied with these precautions. The government of each region was committed to an oligarchical council;\* and to secure an election of its members conformable to the interests of Rome, all the Macedonians who had held any office in the king's service were ordered, under pain of death, to go with their children who had passed the age of fifteen to Italy.

The authority of the commissioners was not confined to Macedonia. They were invested with an unlimited jurisdiction over all political causes in Greece, and even beyond the shores of Europe; for they sent one of their number to raze the town of Antissa in Lesbos to the ground, and to remove its whole population to Methymna, because it had received a Macedonian admiral in its port, and supplied his fleet with provisions. Every part of their instructions seems to have breathed the same spirit of vindictive cruelty, and insolent, shameless tyranny; or they were directed to follow the counsels of Callicrates, Charops, and Lyciscus. From all parts of Greece the principal traitors and sycophants flocked to their tribunal, for no state ventured to send any representatives but the men who had been most forward on the side of Rome. From Achaia, Callicrates, Aristodamus, Agesias, and Philippus; from Boeotia, Mnasippus; from Acarnania, Chremes; from Epirus, Charops and Nicias; from Ætolia, Lyciscus and Tisippus—the authors of the recent massacre—are named among the men who came to share the triumph of the Romans, and to direct their persecution against the best and most patriotic of their fellow-countrymen. Paulus saw and despised the baseness of these miscreants, and would not have sacrificed better men to their malice; but his was only one voice against ten.† His colleagues were better informed as to the intentions of the senate, and knew that Callicrates and Charops possessed, as they deserved, its entire confidence. The manner in which they decided on the case of the Ætolians, who had been the victims of the recent violence, removed all doubt as to the course which they meant to pursue, and encouraged their partisans to lay aside all shame and reserve. No inquiry was made except as to the political principles of the actors and the sufferers.‡ The bloodshed, the banishment, and the confiscation, were all sanctioned and ratified; only Bæbius was pronounced to have been in fault, when he lent his soldiers for such a purpose. Still, even Ætolia was not deemed to be yet sufficiently purged from disaffection. There, as well as in Acarnania, Epirus, Boeotia, and Achaia, as the commissioners were assured by their Greek advisers, there were still many covert enemies of Rome, and, until this party was everywhere crushed, and the ascendancy of the decided advocates of the Roman supremacy firmly established, there could be no security for the public loyalty and tranquillity. Lists of the suspected citizens were drawn up by their adversaries, and letters were despatched in the name of the proconsul

\* Liv., xlv., 18.

† Neque connubium neque commercium agrorum adificationumque inter se cuiquam extra fines regionis sue. (Liv., xlv., 20.)

‡ Liv., xlv., 18. Ubi publicanus est, ibi aut jus publicum vanum, aut libertatem sociis nullam esse.

§ By Schlosser, *Universal-hist. Uebersicht*, ii., 2, p. 143.

\* Liv., xlv., 32. Senatores, quos Synedros vocant.

† Polyb., xxx., 10. § Liv., xlv., 31.

to *Ætolia*,\* *Acarmania*, *Epirus*, and *Boeotia*, commanding them all to proceed to Rome to take their trial. With the Achæans it was thought prudent to adopt a different course, for it was doubted whether they might submit so quietly to such an order; especially as no papers had been discovered in the Macedonian archives to implicate any of their proscribed citizens in the charge of correspondence with Perseus. Two of the commissioners, C. Claudius and Cn. Domitius, were sent to Peloponnesus, to accomplish their object without danger of tumult or opposition. In the mean while, for a specimen of the justice which awaited the accused, Neon the Boeotian, and Andronicus the *Ætolian*, were beheaded: Neon, as the author of the alliance with Perseus; Andronicus, because he had followed his father to the war against the Romans.

When these affairs had been transacted, after having celebrated magnificent games at Amphipolis, in which the spoils of the Macedonian monarchy, which were about to be transported to Rome, formed the most splendid part of the spectacle, Paullus set out for Epirus. On his arrival at Passaro, he sent for ten of the principal citizens from each of seventy towns, mostly of the Molossians,† which had been involved in the revolt of Cephalus, or in a suspicion of disloyalty to Rome, and ordered that the gold and silver of every town should be collected and brought forth into the public place. A detachment of soldiers was then sent into each, in such order that all were occupied precisely at the same time; and at the same hour, at a preconcerted signal, were all given up to pillage. The inhabitants, whose fears had been previously lulled by an intimation that the garrisons were to be withdrawn,‡ were carried away as slaves. A hundred and fifty thousand human beings were thus at one blow torn from their homes and reduced into the lowest depth of wretchedness. The produce of the spoil was divided among the troops.§ The guilt of this atrocious wickedness rests with the senate, by whose express command it was perpetrated. Paullus, though a severe exactor of discipline, who threw the deserters under the feet of his elephants,|| was of an affectionate and gentle nature, softened by study, inclined to contemplation, deeply sensible of the instability of mortal greatness, and shrinking with religious awe from wanton oppression of a vanquished enemy, as he showed when, after his triumph, he interceded for Perseus, and procured his release from the dungeon to which he had been mercilessly consigned.¶ That such a man should have been made the instrument of such a deed, may be numbered

among the most melancholy examples of military servitude.

That the conduct of the Roman government towards the Achæans may be better appreciated, we must resume the thread which we dropped after an account of the embassy of Popilius and Octavius. The threats thrown out by the envoys against the neutral or moderate party, induced the men of all shades of political opinion, who might regard themselves as affected by them, to hold a conference on the common danger and the means of avoiding it. Lycortas still adhered to the view which he had before taken of the course which it became them to pursue: to keep aloof from a contest in which they could not wish success to either party, but least to that which it would have been madness to provoke by direct opposition. There were others who agreed with him as to the necessity of this neutrality, but thought it desirable to present an attitude of firmer resistance to the slavish and mercenary faction which was ready to surrender everything to Rome. The majority, however, remembering the intimations which they had so lately heard from the Roman envoys, thought that they ought so far to yield to circumstances as to avoid giving any handle for calumny to their adversaries. On this side were Archon, Polybius, and Xenon: and Archon, as the representative of this opinion, was promoted to the chief magistracy, Polybius to the command of the cavalry. An opportunity was very soon afforded for an indication of the policy which they had adopted, by the arrival of envoys from Attalus, who came to solicit the restoration of his brother's honours; and in this suit they were supported by Polybius, who obtained a decree for the restitution of all such honours to Eumenes as were not either illegal or degrading to the Achæans.\* When Marcius had taken the command of the Roman army in Thessaly, a more decided movement was made in the same direction. A decree was passed to place all the forces of the League at the consul's disposal, and an embassy was sent to him, with Polybius at its head, to learn his pleasure on the subject. When this embassy arrived in Thessaly, Marcius was just on the point of crossing the mountains, and Polybius did not obtain an audience from him until he had effected his descent into Pieria. He, however, then declined the offer, as having no need of additional forces, which, indeed, in that critical position would probably have increased his difficulties. Polybius sent his colleagues home with this answer, but remained himself in the Roman camp until Marcius learned that Ap. Claudius, who commanded in Illyria with a very small army, which had been weakened by a disaster in the preceding campaign,† had applied to the Achæans for a re-enforcement of 5000 auxiliaries. Marcius now sent Polybius to Peloponnesus, with private instructions to prevent his countrymen from complying with the call of Appius. Polybius professes to doubt whether his object was, as he pretended, to relieve the Achæans, or to thwart Appius, evidently believing the latter to have been his real motive. But it might not be an improbable

\* Justin, xxiii., 2, 8. *Universarum urbium senatus, cum conjungit et liberis, qui dubia fide fuerant, Romanis misit.* † Polyb., xx., 15. *Μολοττων τὰς ἀλιείας.*

‡ Liv., xlv., 34. Appian (iii., 9) says they were promised forgiveness on condition of surrendering their gold and silver.

§ Plutarch, *Æmil. Paull.*, 29, and Livy, xlv., 34, follow widely different reports as to its amount.

|| Val. Maxim., ii., 7, 14.

¶ Plutarch, *Æmil. Paull.*, 37. Diodorus, *Fragm.*, xxii. Livy, xlv., 42, seems to draw a veil over the fate of Perseus, who, according to other accounts, was committed to the custody of barbarians, who killed him by depriving him of sleep. Zonares (ix., 24) relates that he killed himself, when he began to despair of recovering his kingdom. But it is scarcely credible that after the triumph he should even for a moment have cherished such a hope.

\* Polyb., xxviii., 6, 7. Digitized by † Liv., xlii., 19.

or unjust surmise that he also wished to entrap the Achæans into a refusal, which might afterward be used as a ground of accusation against them; and thus, when the demand of Appius was brought before the Achæan assembly, Polybius found himself placed in a very embarrassing position: on the one hand, not feeling himself at liberty to reveal the instructions which he had received from Marcius; on the other, fearing to incur the appearance of opposition to the interests of Rome. To extricate himself from this dilemma, he appealed to the recent ordinance, which forbade compliance with such requisitions unless authorized by the senate. The question was consequently referred to the consul, who, of course, decided according to the terms of the ordinance; and thus the appearance of entire submission to the will of the senate was preserved, though Polybius was conscious that he had probably given mortal offence to Ap. Claudius.\*

In this affair the moderate independent party had avoided all collision, not only with Rome, but even with Callicrates: but before Marcius had been superseded, another transaction occurred, in which Callicrates found an opportunity of displaying his servility, and, perhaps, a handle against his adversaries. The Ptolemies, Philometer and his brother, Euergetes II., or Physcon, having composed their differences, needed protection against Antiochus Epiphanes, and sent envoys to obtain a body of auxiliaries from the Achæans. They asked for 1000 foot and 200 horse, and desired that Polybius might have the command of the cavalry, and that the whole might be under the orders of Lycortas. This request was opposed by Callicrates, on the pretext that, so long as the contest with Perseus remained undecided, the Achæans ought to keep all their forces at home, to be at the disposal of the Romans in case of need. Polybius reminded the assembly that the consul had declined their proffered aid, and that, if it were otherwise, a state which could bring 40,000 men into the field, might well spare a handful for the service of an old ally. The discussion was adjourned at the instance of Callicrates on a point of legal form, and in the interval, it appears, he called in the aid of Marcius; for when the subject was brought before another assembly, in which he proposed that, instead of sending succours, the League should tender its mediation between the Ptolemies and Antiochus, when the motion of Lycortas was on the point of being carried, a courier arrived with a letter from Marcius, in which he exhorted the Achæans, in conformity with the wish of the senate, to endeavour to reconcile the kings. This was a mere pretext; for the attempts which had been made by the senate itself for the same purpose had hitherto failed. But it answered the end of silencing the party of Lycortas. Envoys were appointed to act as mediators, and the Egyptian ambassadors then produced a letter from their masters, which was only to be delivered if their first request should be rejected, soliciting that Lycortas and Polybius might be sent to Egypt, to aid them with their counsels in the war. The celebrated circle of Popillius

precluded the need of this or any other assistance.\*

Such appears to have been the entire amount of provocation and ground for jealousy that had been given to Rome by any party in the League, before the arrival of the two commissioners, C. Claudius and Cn. Domitius. We may, therefore, but faintly conceive the mixture of astonishment and indignation with which the Achæan assembly, summoned to receive them, listened to their demands, when they alleged that there were some powerful men who had contributed, both by supplies of money and in other ways, to the aid of Perseus, in the war, and required that they should all be condemned to death. After sentence had been pronounced, the commissioners would publish the names of the criminals. The assembly, however, was not yet so broken to the yoke as to submit to such an outrageous mockery of justice, and called upon them first to name the accused. They were not disconcerted by this repulse, and, at the suggestion of Callicrates, declared that all who had filled the office of general since the beginning of the war were involved in the charge. Xeno now came forward to assert his innocence; but he was betrayed by the warmth of his feelings into an imprudent offer. He, too, had been in that office; but had never either done wrong to the Romans, or shown favour to Perseus: and this he was ready to maintain either before an Achæan, or even a Roman tribunal. The Romans caught at this undertaking, and required that all the accused should go to be tried at Rome.† Xeno's offer served as a pretext to cover the fear which induced the assembly to consent to this tyrannical demand; if, indeed, its consent was asked; for we know only the result. Callicrates drew up a list of more than 1000 names, of course including all who, by station or character, had any title to his fear or his hatred—the best and purest portion of the nation. All were forced to embark for Italy, and, on their arrival, instead of being put upon their trial, were, by order of the senate, distributed among the Etruscan towns. Only Polybius was permitted to find a home in the house of Paullus,‡ having probably become known to him or his sons in Greece. Here he contracted an intimate friendship with Scipio Æmilianus, the future conqueror of Carthage and Numantia, which enabled him to render some services to his country, and, no doubt, added much to the value of his history, though its influence on the tone and spirit of his narrative may not have been always favourable to an unreserved exhibition of the truth.

The men who had been carried away from Peloponnesus were not a faction, but represented the feelings, and were accompanied by the good wishes of the whole nation. Great anxiety, therefore, was felt about their fate, which, for a time, was believed to depend on the event of the expected trial. But when year after year rolled by, and nothing more was heard of them than that they were still detained in the Italian cities, and it was no longer possible to suppose that the senate had been prevented by the pressure of other business

\* Polyb. xxviii., 10, 11.

\* Polyb., xxix., 8–10.

† Polyb., xxxii., 9.

‡ Polyb., vii., 10.

from taking cognizance of their cause, an embassy was sent to Rome to request that they might be brought to trial. The senate, in its answer, affected to be surprised that the Achæans should make such a request with regard to persons whom they themselves had already condemned.\* A fresh embassy, therefore, was sent, in the year 184, to correct this mistake, to inform the senate that the prisoners had never been either condemned, or even heard, by their countrymen, and to pray that they might not be left to waste their lives in confinement without a trial; and that, if the senate itself was not at leisure to sit in judgment on them, it would commit the inquiry to the Achæans, who would endeavour to conduct it with the strictest impartiality. This proposal drove the senate out of its last subterfuge, and extorted a declaration of its intentions on the subject. It dismissed the envoys with the answer, that it did not seem to it expedient, either for the interest of the Romans or of the Greeks, that the prisoners should return home. This decision, while it crushed the hopes of all patriotic Achæans, inspired Callicrates, and all the other creatures of Roman influence throughout Greece, with fresh confidence.† The insolence of Charops now began to break through every restraint which either fear or the sense of decency had hitherto imposed on his cruelty and rapacity; and he established a tyranny in Epirus similar to that of Nabis, but with the difference, that his favour with the senate supplied the place of foreign mercenaries, and secured the unresisting submission of his countrymen to his despotic will. For a time he contented himself with a series of murders, perpetrated through his emissaries on some of the wealthier citizens, often in the face of day, and in public places, either in the cities or on the high roads, as well as in their own houses; and followed by the confiscation of their whole property to his use. He afterward ventured on a more sweeping measure, and published a list, including all the most opulent Epirots of both sexes, as condemned to banishment. It was, however, soon generally understood that this was only intended as a new mode of spoliation, and that the proscribed might make private bargains with Charops for leave to remain in Epirus. While he himself drew large sums from the men, as the price of this indulgence, the women were directed to address themselves to his mother Philotis,‡ in whom he found as willing and able a coadjutrix in the work of rapine as Apega had proved to Nabis. But when he had obtained all that could be extorted from them by the fear of exile, he nevertheless accused them before the assembly of disaffection to Rome, and, by intimidation or corruption, caused them to be condemned to death. As they mostly made their escape, he thought it necessary to exert all his interest to obtain a ratification of his proceedings from the senate, and for this purpose undertook a journey to Rome, well furnished with money, which, it seems, was already known to possess great influence over the deliberations of that assembly. Two doors,

however, were closed against him: neither Æmilius Paullus nor M. Æmilius Lepidus, then chief pontiff and first of the senate, would let him enter their houses; and it is probable that the protector of Polybius actively opposed his application to the senate. The result was, that he was dismissed with the answer that the senate would instruct envoys of its own to inquire into the case. Charops felt that such an answer was equivalent to an expression of disapprobation, and that it would give a dangerous shock to his authority at home; and he therefore suppressed it on his return, and substituted another conformable to his wishes; a fraud which we can hardly suppose he would have ventured on if he had not received private intimation from his patrons that he might do so with impunity, and that the threatened investigation was merely a colour to save appearances. Still, this repulse seems to have operated as a check upon his conduct, which kept him within bounds short, at least, of his previous excesses, and somewhat alleviated the misery of the people subject to his rule; and as he died a few years after at Brundisium, on his way to or from Rome, it may be inferred that he continued to regard his position as insecure. He had probably done so much to afflict and exhaust Epirus, that even the jealousy of the senate was satisfied with the degree of weakness to which it was now reduced, and believed that the time had come when it might interpose its protection without fear of restoring strength sufficient for any independent movement. An embassy sent from Epirus to Rome in the year after his death, received a promise that the commissioners, who were about to proceed to Illyria, should be furnished with instructions for the regulation of affairs in Epirus.

The state of things was, perhaps, not very different in Ætolia, Acarnania, and Boeotia, though none of the partisans of Rome, who held rule there, equalled Charops in ferocity and recklessness. But still it was a happy riddance, and the beginning of quieter times for Ætolia, when the bloodthirsty Lyciscus came to his end; and nearly at the same time Acarnania was delivered from Chremes, and Boeotia from Mnasippus. Each had so abused his power that his death was a public blessing, and attended with a salutary change in the state of affairs.\* Callicrates survived all these kindred spirits, and retained his ascendancy to the end of his life. He was probably as unscrupulous, shameless, and greedy as any of them, and would have shrunk from no kind of outrage which he could commit with safety. But, notwithstanding the Roman patronage, his power was limited by the spirit which still animated the Achæan League, and which had a force still at its command by no means contemptible in itself, though quite incapable of sustaining a struggle against Rome. The removal of his adversaries did not screen him from the most galling marks of general loathing and contempt, which he did not dare to resent. He found himself shunned in public places as an infection, and heard himself hooted as a traitor by the boys in the streets.†

\* Polyb., xxxi., 8.

† Ibid., u. c.

‡ Φιλότης; Polyb., xxxii., 21. Φιλότης; Diodor., Exc., p. 567.

\* Polyb., xxxii., 21, 22.

† Ibid., xxx., 20. On the other hand, we learn that

Even in the assembly, where he could wield the terrors of Roman vengeance to overawe opposition, he was not omnipotent. He could not prevent a series of embassies from being sent to Rome to solicit the release of the captives. It may, however, have been, in part, owing to his counteraction that these attempts were so long unsuccessful. Direct attacks, therefore, on the persons or property of his fellow-citizens, such as Charops and Lysiscus might venture on, were beyond the means of Callicrates; and the advantages which he derived from his infamy seem to have consisted chiefly in the price which he received for the exercise of his influence.

Soon after the senate had declared its intentions with regard to the detained Achæans, its suspicions were directed against Eumenes, and it was induced to send C. Sulpicius Gallus and M. Sergius to Asia to investigate the charges which had been laid against him, or to collect materials for future accusations; and it instructed them to visit Greece on their way, and take cognizance of the dispute which was still agitated between Sparta and Megalopolis about their confines.\* According to Pausanias, a like question had been revived between Sparta and Argos.† But whatever controversies of this nature may have been brought before him, Gallus, it seems, thought them all beneath his notice, and referred them to the decision of Callicrates, an opportunity which his delegate probably did not neglect, to enrich himself at the expense of one or both the parties. Gallus, however, had received some other more secret instructions, which he could only execute by the exercise of his own authority. He was directed to take measures for detaching as many places as he could from the Achæan League. Yet within Peloponnesus he seems to have found no occasion or pretext for any act of dismemberment, and we only hear that he gave an encouraging reception to the Ætolians of Pleuron, when they came to him with a petition that their connexion with the Achæans might be severed, and permitted them to send an embassy for that purpose to the senate, which finally decided in their favour.‡ The conduct of Gallus towards Eumenes in Asia, as described by Polybius,§ justifies the belief that there is no exaggeration in the account given, in general terms, by Pausanias of the arrogance with which he treated the Greeks. To mortify and humble them by all means in his power was probably a part of his instructions, and he could not execute this commission better than by conferring honours and favours on Callicrates.

But so long as the exiles were detained in Italy, the voice of Callicrates seems to have been sufficient to decide all questions of public policy in the Achæan assembly. In the year 152, on the occasion of a war which had broken out between Crete and Rhodes, envoys from each island came to solicit aid from the Achæans. When both sides had been heard, the inclination of the assembly manifestly leaned in favour of Rhodes. But Callicrates then rose, and put

an end to the debate, with the simple declaration that the Achæans ought not either to wage war or send succours without the sanction of Rome.\* On such questions he was listened to as the organ of the senate, and the speaker's unpopularity did not at all lessen the weight of his counsels.

Yet, justly odious as he was, the time was at hand when his countrymen found reason to look back with regret on the period of his sway, and might be tempted to believe that they could not have followed wiser guidance. At the end of seventeen years after their transportation to Italy, when, through a variety of causes, which, however, might all be traced to the sickness of hope deferred, the original number had shrunk from above 1000 to below 300, the exiles were permitted to return to Peloponnesus. The embassies which had been sent to intercede for them, after the senate had refused to grant them a trial, had waived all pleas of right, and confined themselves to the language of humblest supplication, but with no better effect. The senate would not even consent to the release of Polybius and Stratus, when this was made the object of a special request.† It was not before the year 154 that any indications could be discerned of a more favourable disposition at Rome. Opinions were then so divided on the subject that, when the question was debated, if the presiding prætor, A. Postumius, had not been adverse to the exiles, there would have been a majority in their favour.‡ Yet, two years after, another suppliant embassy was dismissed with another peremptory refusal.§ The Roman friends of Polybius were, it seems, too well acquainted with the views and temper of the senate to intercede directly, even in his behalf. It was not until long after the death of Paullus that a prospect was opened to encourage them to make any attempt in behalf of the whole body of his fellow-sufferers. But in the year 151, when the question was raised once more, Scipio Æmilianus exerted his interest with the censor Cato, whose son had married his sister, to gain the accession of his voice on their side; and Cato's authority turned the scale in their favour. It was, however, only after a long debate, and then by an appeal, not to the justice or the humanity of the senate, but to the Roman pride. "Have we nothing better to do," he asked, "than to be deliberating a whole day about a few old Greeks, whether they shall be put in the grave here or in their own country?" But when the restoration was decreed, and Polybius proceeded to solicit Cato's intercession for an additional boon, that he and his friends might be reinstated in all the privileges which they had enjoyed before their deportation, the old man warned him, with a smile, not to venture back into the cave of the Cyclops for the sake of any trifles which he might have left behind there.||

It seems clear, from this authentic account, that the senate was taken by surprise, and shamed out of its jealousy, and granted the indulgence which had been so long importunately implored in mere indifference and contempt. If it had foreseen the results which were to

statues were erected to him (Polyb., *Æc. Vat.* p. 448); which, however, was anything but a proof of public esteem.

\* Polyb., *xxi.*, 9.  
† Paus., *u. s.*, § 5.

‡ *vi.*, 11, 1.  
§ *xxi.*, 10.

\* Polyb., *xxxiii.*, 15.

† *Ibid.*, *xxxiii.*, 1.

‡ *Ibid.*, *xxxv.*, 6.

† *Ibid.*, *xxii.*, 7.

‡ *Ibid.*, 13.

§ *Ibid.*, *xxxv.*, 6. Digitized by Google

nsue from the return of the exiles, it would most probably have consented to it sooner; but they were such as it was hardly possible to calculate.\* Among the restored were some whose presence in Greece was, at this juncture, the worst calamity that could befall their country. We have to deplore the loss of that part of the work of Polybius in which he gave a full account of the character and history of the men, among whom he names Dicus and Damocritus, Cleamenes, Theodectes, and Archicrates.† But from the terms in which he speaks of them in the extant fragments, and from the facts recorded of them, we may collect that they were, like so many who have been placed in similar circumstances, men who had learned nothing and forgot nothing in their exile, who came back burning with hatred and thirst of vengeance, not only against the Romans, but against all whom they regarded as friends of Rome, bent on satiating this vengeance at any cost, but quite incapable of a sober estimate of the means they possessed of compassing their end. There were, probably, several among them who had been carried away to Italy when they were just entering on public life.‡ In the seclusion of the Italian towns they could gain but little political experience; and the long indulgence of malignant passions, the dreams of ambition and revenge, with which they beguiled their tedious hours, the perpetual fluctuations between sanguine hopes and listless despondency, common to men in such a situation, could only tend to weaken and distort their natural judgment. When to all this it is added, that they were as mercenary and unprincipled as Callicrates himself, it will be evident that they were even still less fitted than he to direct the councils of the nation, and that nothing but ruin was to be expected from the predominance of their influence. Polybius also revisited Greece for a time. In the first year of the third Punic war, he was summoned to attend the consul Manilius at Lilyæum; but when he reached Coreyra, having received intelligence of the submission of the Carthaginians, he returned to Peloponnesus,§ not, however, it appears, to make a long stay there. He probably found that his intimacy

with Scipio, and the favour by which he had been distinguished at Rome, were so many barriers which intercepted his prospects of honour, authority, and useful activity in his native land. Possibly he abandoned himself too soon to despair, was too eager to return to the society of his Roman friends, and to the great theatre where he had an opportunity of witnessing, from the most favourable position, the most momentous scenes in the history of mankind, to record which was the main business of his life. He may have deceived himself with the belief that he was likely to be more useful to his country in Italy than at home. Perhaps he would have acted a more generous part if he had remained in Peloponnesus to support the patriotic efforts of his friend Stratus. His proper place may have been at Corinth, when he was standing before Carthage. But, besides that he may again have been obeying orders from Rome, we can only say, that in him such devotion to a sinking cause would have been singularly magnanimous; there appears not the smallest likelihood that it would have produced any sensible effect on the course of events.

The closing scenes in the history of the Achaean League are represented as having been introduced by a transaction in which Athens bore a principal part, and which is chiefly remarkable as an illustration of the state into which that city had now sunk. Even before the disastrous war in which its territory suffered so much from Philip's merciless ravages, it had been driven to seek occasional relief from the growing pressure of poverty at the hands of the eastern princes, particularly the Ptolemies, whose munificence it endeavoured to attract and requite by the most profuse and exquisite flattery.\* The policy of Euryclides and Micio, who directed its affairs during several years of Philip's reign, seems to have consisted almost wholly in such mendicancy. Its connexion with Rome, which set little value on its choicest honours and most sounding phrases, was rather burdensome than profitable. According to Valerius Antias, indeed, the senate had rewarded it for its loyalty at the end of the first Macedonian war by the grant of Paros, Imbros, Delos, and Scyros.† But the fact is questionable, as we learn from Polybius,‡ that after the termination of the war with Perseus, they sent an embassy to Rome to ask for Delos and Lemnos. The same envoys were instructed to intercede for the people of Haliartus; but, if they found the senate inexorable, then to beg that the territory of Haliartus might be annexed to Attica. The senate rejected the first of these petitions, but granted the territory of Haliartus and the two islands; and, in answer to the remonstrances of the Delians, decreed that they should migrate with all their moveable property to Achaia.¶ They were there admitted to the franchise, and the Athenians were compelled by the senate to adjust the differences which arose out of the transfer according to the Achaean laws. The senate, at the same time, declared Delos a free port, and was thus enabled to strike a ruinous

\* Not only Fläthe (ii., p. 639), but Schorn, who is so much more cautious and impartial (p. 381), believes that the restoration of the exiles was designed by the senate to give occasion to disturbances which might afford a pretext or open hostility.

† Polyb., xl., 4, 9. Lucas (p. 44, n.) observes that this passage was probably the ground of Hoeren's assertion *Alte Gesch.*, 1821, p. 342), "that Dicus, Critolaus, and Damocritus had returned from their confinement in Italy with exasperated feelings," but does not warrant it; since, even if the reading *ρετρυχότες*, which Schweighauser would alter to *ρετρυχός*, be retained, the passage cannot refer to the Italian exiles. And this, indeed, seems clear from the cause assigned for their return, *ὅτι τὴν ἐνστάσαν ἰκρίσιν*, which is plainly the *ἀκρισία* and *ταραχή* mentioned before (xxviii., 4, 1). But the connexion between the return of the exiles and the subsequent disturbances is distinctly stated by Zonaras (ix., 31). *Ἐπει τὸν Ἑλλήνων ἡ κορυφαίνονται ὑπὸ τοῦ Παύλου Ἀλμύλου μετακίσθησαν εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, οἱ λοιποὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσέειπεν τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀπέρηται. Ὡς δ' οὐκ ἔτυχον, καὶ τινες ἐκέλευον, τὴν οὐ κατὰ ἀπογόνους ἐπανάσσειν, ἐαυτοὺς διεκρήσαντο, καὶ ἐκείνους ἐκέλευον, καὶ πάνθος δημόσιον ἐποίησαντο, τοὺς τε τὰ Ῥωμαίων φρονέοντες παρὰ οἰσίην ὠργίζοντο, οὐ μόνον αἱ πόλεις ἐκείναις ἐπιδόσαντο, μέχρις οὐ τοὺς περιλήψεις τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων κοίμασαν. Τότε δὲ διενεχθέντες ἀλλήλοισι οἱ ἡδικομένοι καὶ οἱ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἔχοντες, ἐπολέμησαν.*

‡ Polybius (xl., 4, 4) observes of Stratus that he was *ῥῆγ γράψας*. The remark seems to indicate that it would not have been applicable to many who had returned from Italy.

§ Exc. Vat., p. 447.

\* Polyb., v., 106.

† Liv., xxxiii., 30.

‡ xxx., 18.

§ Polyb., Exc. Vat., p. 437. *Ἐκ τῆς τῶν Ἀλαριῶν χάρας ὀνειδὸς αὐτοῖς μάλλον ἢ καρπὸς τῶν συνεπικολούθησεν.* Strabo, ix., p. 411. *Τὴν χώραν ἔχουσαν Ἀθηναῖοι ὀδύνην Ῥωμαίων.*

¶ Polyb., xxxii., 17.

blow at the commerce and revenues of Rhodes.\* But the possession of Delos, and the sovereignty of Lemnos, could not afford any very important relief to the poverty of Athens; and in the year 156 the public distress was so urgent there, that the people was persuaded, by some advisers, it seems, less scrupulous and discreet than Micio and Euryclides, to resort to an extraordinary remedy. An expedition was undertaken against Oropus, which was surprised and plundered. The Oropians complained of this outrage to the senate, which was indignant at such encroachment on its monopoly of rapine, and directed the Sicyonians to lay a mulct on the Athenians, proportioned to the damage done to Oropus. No advocates appeared in behalf of Athens at Sicyon, and the sentence imposed the enormous penalty of 500 talents. The extravagance of this sum, whether as compared with the value of the spoil carried off from Oropus, or with the resources of Athens, may be the better estimated if we remember that Polybius calculates the amount of all the booty found by Cleomenes in Megalopolis at 300 talents, and that no more than 500 were exacted by the Romans themselves, in the utmost bitterness of their anger, from all Ætolia. It was to obtain a remission, or mitigation, of this penalty that the Athenians sent the celebrated embassy of the three philosophers to Rome: the Stoic Diogenes, the Peripatetic Critolaus,† and Carneades, the founder of the third Academic school. If they were not profound thinkers, they were, in their various styles, among the most eloquent talkers of the day. Yet it is probable they would scarcely have been selected for such a mission if their success had depended entirely on the impression which their pleading might make on the senate. But it was known that there was now a large circle among the highest families of Rome, in which the clinching logic of Diogenes, the ethical paradoxes of Critolaus, who maintained that pleasure was an evil,‡ and the speculative impartiality of Carneades—whose most intimate scholar could never discover what opinion he really held on any question,§ as there was none which he could not maintain with equal plausibility—would be received with avidity and delight. The envoys, in fact, found numerous patrons and admirers at Rome. On their first introduction to the senate, their speeches were translated by a senator, C. Acilius, who also supported their suit in his own person;|| and while their cause remained pending, each of them, but especially Carneades, drew crowds of the young nobility to their private exhibitions of philosophical rhetoric.¶ Cato was deeply displeased and alarmed by the reports he heard of the fascination which they were exerting on the Roman youth; and in his place in the senate he censured the magistrates, who had allowed a set

of men to be waiting so long for the despatch of their business, who were able to gain assent to whatever proposition they would.\* It was not, however, we must observe, the matter of their discourses, nor the indifference with which Carneades, after he had descanted in praise of justice one day, showed on the next that as much might be as well said against it,† that gave offence to the old censor, who had himself unconsciously imbibed the principles of Polus, Thrasymachus, and Gorgias, to his heart's core, had never been able to perceive a distinction between might and right, justice and expediency,‡ and thought it no bad argument for the destruction of Carthage, that the African figs were so large and good.§ The danger which he dreaded was, lest the growing enthusiasm for foreign literature and arts should supersede the old Italian tastes and modes of thinking, and the young Romans should be diverted from the business of the forum or the camp by a passion for frivolous disputations. The success of the philosophers in the object of their embassy was greater in appearance than in reality.|| The senate, indeed, reduced the penalty to 100 talents; but it must have been known that even this was much more than it was in the power of Athens to raise. Nor was it ever paid: By means of a negotiation, which is related in a manner not perfectly intelligible to us, the Athenians prevailed on the people of Oropus, not only to forego the compensation which had been awarded to them, but to accept an Athenian garrison, and to give hostages to the Athenians; on condition that, if they should create any fresh ground of complaint to the Oropians, the garrison should be withdrawn and the hostages restored.¶

In the year following the return of the exiles this case arose. The Athenian garrison committed some outrage on the townspeople, who demanded the restitution of the hostages, and the evacuation of their town. This the Athenians refused to grant, but offered to punish the offenders. The Oropians applied to the Achæan League for redress; but the Achæan assembly, which had no authority over either party, and bore no ill will to Athens, declined to interfere. A Spartan named Menalcidas was, at this time, chief magistrate of the League, and his character seems to have been so notorious as to encourage the Oropians to tamper with him. For a bribe of ten talents he undertook to espouse their cause; and that he might be able to execute his engagement, he promised five talents to Callicrates as the price of his assistance. The influence of Callicrates, we find, still continued unimpaired, and he carried a decree to send succours to Oropus. The Athenians, however, no sooner heard of it than they made another expedition to Oropus, again pillaged the town, and then withdrew their gar-

\* Polyb., xxii., 7. Καταλάβουσι δὲ τοὺς λιμένας πρόσδος, ὅπου δὲλον δὲλθῃ πρεσβύτην. The customs (τὸ δὲλμῆσιον. See Boeckh, *Ath. Statist.*, iii., 5) had sunk from 1,000,000 to 150,000 drachms.

† This was, no doubt, one of those great occasions on which alone Critolaus thought it fit that his services should be used, like the Salaminius or the Paralus. (Plut., *Reip. Ger. Presc.*, 15.) ‡ A. Gell., N. A., ix., 5.

§ Cicero, *Ac. Quest.*, ii., 45.

|| A. Gell., N. A., vii., 14. Plut., *Cat. Maj.*, 22.

¶ Macrobius, *Sat.*, i., 5. Quos ferunt seorum quemque ostentant gratia per celebrissima urbis loca magno conventu hominum disertavisse.

\* Plut., u. s.

† Lactantius, *Div. Inst.*, v., 15. Audiente Galba, et Catone Censorio. He spoke, it seems, boldly. "Romanis ipsis, qui totius orbis potestatem (!) si iusti velint esse, hoc est, si aliena restituant, ad cassas esse redeundum."

‡ Polyb., xxii., 3, § 6. Αἰδὲ ἐνὶ ταῖς τοῖς Καρχηδονίου διαρροῖσιν παρὰ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, οὐ τὸ δικαίον, ἀλλὰ τὸ πικρὸν τοῖς κρινόντας, συμφέρειν ὅσῳ ἐν τοῖς ταῖς ὑπόλοιπαις.

§ Plut., *Cat.*, 37.

|| According to Elian (*V. H.*, iii., 17), the senate declared that the Athenians had sent envoys who were irresistible.



rison. The two associates then urged the invasion of Attica, but met with opposition, it is said, from the Lacedæmonian troops, which induced them to desist and disband their forces. Menalcidas, though he had rendered no service to the Oropians, exacted payment of his bribe; but when he had received it, defrauded Callicrates of his share. Callicrates, in revenge, brought a capital charge against Menalcidas, when he had gone out of office, as having endeavoured to persuade the Romans to detach Sparta from the Achæan League. Menalcidas found himself in so much danger, that he thought it necessary to purchase the protection of his successor Dieus with a bribe of three talents, and with his help escaped condemnation. But he was so generally odious, that Dieus incurred much obloquy through his interference, and, according to Pausanias, it was to divert public attention from this subject that he pushed the Achæans into violent measures against Sparta, which, in the end, involved the League in a fatal struggle with Rome.\*

The occasion seems to have been furnished by an appeal which the Spartans made to the senate against the decision of Callicrates on the boundary dispute. The answer they had received was, that they must submit to the decree of the Achæan assembly in all matters not involving questions of life or death. But Dieus misrepresented this answer, and persuaded the assembly that it was invested with an unlimited jurisdiction over Sparta; and, when the Spartans proposed to ascertain the fact by a reference to the senate, charged them with an infringement of the fundamental article of the Constitution, which forbade any of the united states to send an embassy to a foreign power without the sanction of the whole body. On this ground war was declared against them, and Dieus made preparations for the invasion of Laconia. Conscious of their inability to resist, they sent embassies to the principal cities of the League to deprecate the threatened attack, and endeavoured to propitiate Dieus himself; but every city declared itself bound to obey the orders of the general when he called for its contingent. And Dieus professed that he was not going to make war on Sparta, but on the men who disturbed her tranquillity. On this hint the gerusia inquired the names of the individuals who were the objects of his hostility, and he sent in a list of four-and-twenty of the principal men in Sparta. They adopted the sagacious proposal of Agasisthenes, who advised them to seek refuge at Rome, with full confidence that they would soon be restored by the senate. After their departure they were condemned to death by a Spartan tribunal, and the Achæans sent Callicrates† and Dieus to Rome to oppose their restoration. Callicrates fell ill, and died on the road, at a juncture when, for the first time in his life, he might have done some service to his country; though the nature of his relations to Dieus is too obscure to permit more than a very uncertain conjecture on this point; but it is not improbable that he might have checked the violence, and have

counteracted the intrigues of his colleague. At Rome, Dieus found Menalcidas his chief antagonist; though he does not seem to have been one of the twenty-four; and a warm altercation arose between them in the senate. But the answer which they carried back declared that the senate was about to send envoys to decide the dispute between Sparta and the Achæan League. This embassy, however, delayed its appearance somewhat long, and, in the mean while, both Dieus and Menalcidas, having, perhaps, been themselves the dupes of the senate's equivocation, deceived their countrymen with a false report of their success. Dieus gave out that the Spartans had been enjoined to obey the Achæans in all things; Menalcidas, that they were to be detached from the Achæan League.\* Thus the Achæans were encouraged to renew hostilities, the Spartans to venture on resistance.

In the mean while a fresh war had broken out in Macedonia, where Andrisceus, a young man of low birth, a native, it is said, of Adramyttium, giving himself out to be a son of Perseus, whom he resembled in his person,† and assuming the name of Philip, had been universally acknowledged as king. We are less surprised at his success, when we observe that Macedonia had been the scene of continual disorders and tumults ever since the establishment of a republican government; and we can hardly doubt that the senate foresaw and designed this effect of the new Constitution. Three years after the battle of Pydna, Roman envoys were sent to inspect the state of Macedonia, because, as Polybius remarks, the Macedonians, being unused to a democratical and representative government, were divided into factions.‡ Two years after, we find a Macedonian, named Damasippus, who, after having massacred the members of one of the legislative councils, had fled with his wife and children, sailing in the same galley with a Roman envoy; and, if we might rely on an insulated statement, of uncertain authority, we should be led to infer that, in the year B.C. 158, at least one important change was introduced into the internal administration of Macedonia; for we are informed that the mines, the closing of which had been considered as indispensable for the preservation of tranquillity, then began to be worked again.¶ In the same year in which the Achæan exiles returned, a Macedonian embassy had been sent to Rome to request that Æmilianus might be appointed commissioner to heal their dissensions.¶ It was natural, therefore, that any pretender who held out a prospect of internal peace, together with the restoration of the monarchy, should be hailed by all parties

\* Paus. vii., 12.

† Zonaras, ix., 28. Liv., Epist., xlix. Florus, ii., 14. Ex similitudine Philippi, Pseudo-Philippus vocabatur: probably a conjecture to explain the name. But I find no authority anywhere for Schorn's statement (p. 286) that he gave himself out for Philip, the brother and adopted son of Perseus. From Polyb., Exc. Vat., p. 446, it only appears that when the first rumour of his attempt reached Rome, it was supposed there that he was personating that Philip; and so Polybius observes that the true Philip was known to have died at Alba. It is the explanation of the preceding remark: τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐδὲ διεκρίθη ὁ λόγος ὁμοιωμένο.

‡ xxxi., 12. 'Αἰσὺς ὅντας ὁμογενεῖας καὶ συνεπαιδείας πολέτας, στρατίζοντες πρὸς αὐτούς. † Polyb., xxii., 26. † Cassiodori Chronicon. M. Æmilius et C. Popilius. His cœs. metalla in Macedonia instituta. ¶ Polyb., xxxv., 4.

\* Paus., vii., 12, 3.

† This renders it very doubtful that his statues were removed, as Lucht supposes (ad Polyb., Exc. V., p. 63), at the instance of Polybius and the other exiles immediately on their return.

with an eager welcome. Andrisus, or, as the Romans called him, Pseudo-Philippus, appears to have been endowed with qualities which he could scarcely have inherited from the father whom he claimed, and which rendered him worthier of the throne than any son of Perseus would probably have been. But the accounts remaining of his actions are so scanty, that we may be in danger of overrating his abilities. Having failed in his first attempt to excite an insurrection in Macedonia, he had fled to Syria to solicit aid from Demetrius Soter; but by him was sent as a prisoner to Rome. The senate did not think him worth notice, or was not loath to see him renew his enterprise, and suffered him to depart. He collected a band of adventurers, drew several towns east of the Strymon over to his side, and strengthened himself by alliances with the Thracian tribes, which supplied him with a large body of auxiliaries, with which he made himself master of Macedonia, and advanced into Thessaly.\* The senate, at first, thought it sufficient to send Scipio Nasica to quell the revolt by a peaceable intervention,† but soon learned that the danger had grown serious. Nasica collected an Achaean force,‡ marched into Thessaly, and compelled Andrisus to retreat into Macedonia, and kept him occupied there until he was relieved by the arrival of a Roman army under the praetor, P. Juventius Thalna. A battle ensued, in which Thalna was defeated and slain, and Andrisus again invaded Thessaly. The next year the praetor, Q. Cæcilius Metellus, was sent against him with a stronger force. Metellus arrived in Macedonia nearly at the same time that Damocritus, who had succeeded Diæus as general, was preparing to invade Laconia. At this juncture a Roman embassy was on its way to Asia, and, at the desire of Metellus, endeavoured to prevent hostilities in Peloponnesus, and urged the Achæans to wait for the commissioners who were coming from Rome to compose their dispute with the Spartans. Damocritus, however, paid no heed to their advice, but, as soon as they were gone, marched into Laconia. The Spartans gave him battle with, it seems, very inferior numbers, and were defeated, with the loss of 1000 of their best troops. It was generally believed that, if Damocritus had followed up his victory with due activity, he would have made himself master of Sparta, and at the close of his official year he was brought to trial on a charge of treachery, and condemned to a fine of fifty talents, which, as he was unable to pay it, force him to go into exile. He was succeeded in office by Diæus.

In the mean while the war in Macedonia was brought to an end. Attalus of Pergamus brought a fleet to second the operations of the Roman army, and Andrisus, being obliged to provide for the defence of his coast, fell back on Macedonia. Near Pydna, however, he defeated the

Roman cavalry, but was afterward induced to divide his forces into two corps, which were separately routed by Metellus. Andrisus escaped into Thrace, where he collected another army, with which he again gave battle to the Romans, but lost the day, and, having taken refuge with a Thracian chief named Byzes, was delivered up to Metellus.\* While he waited in Macedonia for the arrival of the commissioners who were to reduce it into a province, Diæus was preparing to prosecute the war with Sparta; but, being warned by Metellus to desist, promised to suspend hostilities until the expected mediators should arrive. But if he observed the letter of this promise, he broke it in substance, for he introduced Achæan troops into the Laconian towns in the vicinity of Sparta, which, it seems, continued to infest the country by frequent inroads. The Spartans were driven by their distress to an expedient like that to which the Athenians had resorted in the case of Oropus: they surprised and plundered the border town of Iasus. But as this was a palpable breach of the armistice, and an act of direct disobedience to the injunctions of Metellus, they soon repented of their rashness, and Menalcidas, who had drawn them into the undertaking, was so alarmed at the prospect of the consequences, that he put an end to his own life by poison.†

The embassy which was to restore tranquillity to Greece seems to have been purposely delayed until the end of the Macedonian war, when it might safely assume a tone of absolute authority, which would hardly have been prudent while Andrisus was still formidable. It arrived in Peloponnesus while Diæus was in office, and the chief commissioner, M. Aurelius Orestes, called a meeting of the Achæan magistrates to Corinth, and plainly informed them that the senate did not think it right that either Sparta or Corinth itself should any longer be comprehended in the Achæan League, but desired that Argos and Heraclea in Trachis, and the Arcadian Orchomenus, should be restored to independence, being of different origin and late accessions to the League. In other words, the League was to be reduced to its primitive state, when it included only the Achæan towns. The Achæan magistrates were so indignant at this demand, that they did not even wait until Orestes had ended his speech, but rushed out into the streets, and hastily summoned an assembly, to which they communicated the proposal which they had just heard. It roused a furious burst of popular resentment, which, however, was directed against the Spartans sojourning in Corinth. As many of them as could be found were arrested, and some of them were dragged away from the house of Orestes himself. It was in vain that he expostulated with the multitude, and warned them that they were offering wrong and insult to Romans. All who had been seized, and who proved to be Spartans, a few days after, thrown into prison. Orestes himself and his colleagues narrowly escaped violence.‡ On their return to Rome they complained, with much exaggeration, of the treatment they had received, which they maliciously represented as the effect of delib-

\* Polyb., *Exc. Vat.*, p. 446. Πάρεστι τις ἐκὶ τῆς Μακεδονίας ἀποστολῆς Φ.

† Zonaras (u. s.). *Ελληνικῶς τῶς τὰ ἐκὶ διοικήσαντα.*

‡ Liv., *Epist.*, l. Thessalia quum et illum invadere armis et occupare Pseudo-Philippus vellet per legatos Romanorum auxilium Achæorum defensas est. Zonaras (u. s.), Nasica. Εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἰδὼν, . . . δόναμιν παρὰ τῶν καὶ στρατῶν δόρτοις, ἔργον εἶχεν, καὶ πρόβλεπε μέχρι Μαινακίδης. Polyb., *Exc. Vat.*, p. 447. ὁ στρατὸν ὑπερμαρτὰ καὶ πρεσβυτάς τιμωρῶντας πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ παραλαβόντων βοήθειαν.

\* Zonaras (u. s.). Liv., *Epist.*, l. Florus, ii., 14.

† Paus., vii., 13. ‡ Paus., vii., 14. Polyb., xxxviii., l.

rate contrivance. The senate appointed a fresh embassy, with Julius Sextus at its head, ut instructed him to use the mildest language of friendly admonition, and only to require satisfaction from the authors of the outrages. Polybius would consider this as a proof that the object of the instructions given to Orestes was, not to break the League, but merely to frighten and humble the Achæans; though there were some, he observes, who regarded this forbearance as mere dissimulation, adopted because the war with Carthage was still unfinished. He himself professes to believe that the Romans wished to spare the Achæans, and only sought to inspire them with a wholesome terror.\* But his supposition is utterly inconsistent, both with the character of the senate and with the policy it had hitherto pursued towards the Achæans, as well as towards the other states of Greece. The dissolution of the League was the object to which its measures had been tending, and it might easily foresee that he sudden change in its tone would be so misinterpreted as to give occasion to some fresh indiscretion, which might afford a fair pretext for greater severity.

After the departure of Orestes, the Achæans ad sent Thearidas at the head of an embassy to offer an apology for the scene which had taken place at Corinth. Their envoys met Sextus on their way to Rome, and, at his desire, returned with him to Peloponnesus. Diæus had now been succeeded in office by Critolaus, an equally violent and imprudent enemy of Rome, and no less bent on widening the breach, in which he probably believed all his hopes of authority and influence, and even his personal safety, to depend. The pacific language of the Romans in the assembly at Ægium was treated by him and his partisans as a symptom of fear. The senate, they supposed, or endeavoured to persuade the multitude, felt itself embarrassed by the Celtiberian and Carthaginian wars, and therefore wished to avoid a struggle with the Achæans. It must also have been imagined that the state of Macedonia was not yet sufficiently tranquil to permit Metellus to employ his troops elsewhere, and, in fact, after the overthrow of Andriscus, a fresh pretender, named Alexander, started up, calling himself a son of Perseus, and established himself for a time on the banks of the Nestus, but was forced to fly before Metellus into Dardania. A courteous answer, however, was given to Sextus. Thearidas was directed to proceed on his mission to Rome; but the Roman envoys were invited to conference at Tegea for the purpose of adjusting the dispute with Sparta. Sextus and his colleagues accordingly repaired to Tegea, where they were met by Spartan ministers; but after they had been kept long waiting for the arrival of the Achæans, Critolaus came almost alone, and after an interview with the partisans, informed Sextus that he had no authority to decide on such questions, but that he would refer them to the next regular assembly, which was to be held at the end of six months. Sextus saw that a plan had been laid to deceive and affront him, and immediately set out on his return to Italy. His report seems to have induced the senate to decree war with

the Achæan League. Critolans, in the mean while, was exerting his utmost efforts to hasten the rupture. In the course of the winter he made a circuit through the principal towns, to inflame the passions of the people against the Romans and the Spartans, by, perhaps, partial and exaggerated accounts of the conference at Tegea; and he won the most numerous class of the community to his side by an order which must have been a great strain of the prerogatives of his office, that the magistrates should suspend all legal proceedings for the recovery of debts until the war should be brought to a close.\*

Metellus had hoped to follow up the conquest of Macedonia with the pacification of Greece, and the intelligence which he received of the course which affairs were taking in Peloponnesus induced him to send four of his officers to attend the Achæan assembly at Corinth, and, if possible, allay the ferment which had been excited by Critolaus. They were instructed, it appears, to repeat the gentle warnings and advice of Sextus. But the popular feeling had now been so strongly roused against Rome, that their smooth phrases only served to feed the flame, and they were obliged to retire amid the jeers and hootings of the multitude, and were even bespattered with mud as they passed through the streets.† Polybius, indeed, intimates that Critolaus was chiefly supported by the lowest of the populace, and by the soldiery.‡ This was, no doubt, so far true, that those who had most to lose were least willing to expose themselves to the risk of a war with Rome, and most clearly perceived the danger. But there is no reason to believe that the hatred towards Rome was confined to any class; and Polybius himself observes that all the cities of the League were infatuated, but Corinth most generally and deeply.§ Critolaus took this occasion to deliver an inflammatory harangue, in which he inveighed against the Romans, threw out hints that he had received promises of assistance from foreign powers, and told the people that, if they were men, they would be in no want of allies, nor, if weaklings, of masters.|| He set the council,¶ which attempted to restrain him, at defiance, and declared that he feared neither Sparta nor Rome, but only the traitors who were in correspondence with the enemy and divulged the secrets of the state. By such arts he carried a decree of war, nominally, as Polybius observes, with Sparta, but really against Rome. It was in itself equivalent to an assertion of the absolute independence of the League; and by another decree the general was invested with unlimited authority; and it was thus left to the discretion of Critolaus to conduct operations in the way which he might think best calculated to provoke hostilities with the Romans.

Such appears to have been the use which he made of his enlarged powers. When he took the field in the spring of 146, it was to march, not against Sparta, but northward to the vale

\* Polyb., xxxviii., 2, 3. Paus., vii., 14.

† Strabo, viii., p. 381.

‡ Polyb., xxxviii., 2, 8.

§ U. a., § 9: Πάσαι μὲν ἑσθροὺν αἱ πόλεις, πανθροὺ δὲ καὶ μηδιστά πως ἦ των Κορινθίων.

|| U. a., § 9: Ἐάν μὲν ἄνδρες ὦνεν, οὐκ ἀπορήσουσιν συμμάχων, ἐάν δ' ἀνδραποῦνοι (Diodorus, Mal., p. 96, ἀνδραποδαί, κυρίως).

¶ Τῶν τῆς γενομένης, probably, as I have already observed, the Demijurges. See ante, p. 376.

\* Ubi supra.

of the Spercheus, where he laid siege to Heraclea, which had renounced its connexion with the Achaean League, or refused to enter into it. This movement seems to have been undertaken in the hope of exciting a general revolt in Bœotia and Eubœa. The Thebans, apparently under the pressure of the general poverty, had made inroads into the territories of their neighbours, and had been condemned by Metellus to pay three fines, one to the Phocians, another to the Eubœans, the third to the Locrians of Amphissa.\* In their misery and despair, they had promised to join Critolaus with all their forces, and the Bœotarch Pytheas, who seems to have had some private grounds of alarm, had instigated the Achæans to the war. Whether Chalcis was urged by any stronger motive than the remembrance of the oppression it had suffered from the Romans, we are not informed; but it sent a body of auxiliaries to the Achæan army. It was now known that the command of the forces destined for the war with the Achæans had been assigned to the consul L. Mummius, who was expected shortly to arrive in Greece. As Metellus was, on this account, more anxious than ever to bring the Achæans to terms, so he might reasonably expect that, when such a storm was gathering over their heads, they would be more willing to listen to his overtures. He again sent to assure them that they need not despair of pardon, if they would even now comply with the injunctions of the Romans which had been conveyed to them by Orestes, and abandon their connexion with Sparta, and the other cities which it had been proposed to separate from the League.† Critolaus, however, had gone too far to recede with safety, and remained inflexible. According to Pausanias, Metellus had begun his march from Macedonia at the same time that his envoys set out on their mission, and he was, therefore, probably already in Thessaly when he met them on their return. He is said to have advanced with such speed, that he had already crossed the Spercheus before the Achæans were apprized of his approach. Their leader was then seized with consternation equal to his previous temerity, and not only raised the siege of Heraclea, but did not even venture to make a stand at Thermopylæ. Yet he allowed himself to be overtaken a little south of the pass, near Scarpheæ: his forces were there entirely broken, and he himself disappeared, and was never heard of more.‡ The victors, advancing to Chæronea, fell in with 1000 Arcadians, who were returning to Peloponnesus, having marched as far as Elatea to join Critolaus, when they heard of his defeat, and cut them all to pieces.§

\* Paus., vii., 14, 7.

† This appears to be the meaning of Pausanias (vii., 15, 3), which, however, is very differently understood by Schorn (p. 390, n. 1), who supposes that Metellus only required the Achæans to part with the places which had actually revolted from the League, namely, Sparta, Heraclea, and Pleuron; and he owes himself surprised at the moderation of these terms. I see nothing in the words of Pausanias to suggest such an interpretation, but a clear allusion to the demands of Orestes, as described (c. 14, 1).

‡ Paus. (vii., 15, 4) supposes him to have been drowned. Zonaras (ix., 31) has simply *Κριτολάου πνέοντος*. From Liv., Epist., lii., it would seem that he escaped from the battle: *Critolaus veneno tibi mortem convexit*. But there may have been some confusion between the fate of Critolaus and that of Diæus.

§ Orosius (v., 3) represents Polybius to have related that

The country through which Metellus pursued his march towards the Isthmus was a scene of desolation, misery, and dismay, for which Polybius can hardly find expressions sufficiently strong, though he sets before us the inhabitants of the towns quitting their homes to wander in the mountains; numbers taking refuge from their fears and sufferings in suicide; others attempting to provide for their own safety by voluntary information against their neighbours, or to propitiate the conqueror by the most abject humiliation. Thebes was found entirely deserted; and, though Metellus would not let the fugitives be pursued, many must have perished, from hunger and hardships, in the trackless wilds to which they fled. Pytheas escaped, with his family, to Peloponnesus.\*

In the mean while, Diæus had taken the place of Critolaus, by virtue of the law which provided that, on the death of the general, his predecessor should resume the command until an assembly was held for a new election. Diæus was, no doubt, aware that resistance was utterly unavailing; but as the mildest fate he had to expect, if he fell into the power of the Romans, was perpetual exile, he was resolved to hold out to the last. He immediately sent Alcamenes, one of his partisans, with 4000 men to occupy Megara, and himself proceeded to Argos to superintend the levy of fresh troops. He ordered all freemen of military age to appear in arms at Corinth, and 12,000 household slaves to be set at liberty, and equipped for the field at the expense of their masters; and raised large sums, under the name of voluntary contributions, from the opulent, compelling the women to part with the ornaments of their persons.† As those who were called upon to make these sacrifices knew that they must be fruitless, and had not the same motives for despair as Diæus, they obeyed his orders with reluctance, especially as he showed great partiality in the assessment of the emancipated slaves, and frequently eluded them, for the whole amount of the new levies, including the freedmen, appears never to have exceeded 14,000 foot and 600 horse. Elis and Messenia, which had never been well affected towards the League, now openly kept aloof. Even the township of Tenea, in the territory of Corinth, is said to have revolted from the Corinthians, and to have joined the Romans, who afterward rewarded it for its desertion.‡ Before Diæus came to Corinth, a council was held there by the vice-general, Sosicrates, in which it was resolved to attempt negotiation with Metellus; and Andronidas, Archippus, and Lagius were sent to his headquarters. He was eager to terminate the war on any terms consistent with the dignity of Rome, and not only dismissed them with fair promises, but sent Philo, a Thessalian, with similar proposals to Corinth. In the mean while he advanced towards the Isthmus. Alcamenes, on his approach, made a hasty retreat from Megara, and the city opened its gates to

these Arcadians were commanded by Diæus. But it is hardly possible to reconcile this with Pol., xl., 2.

\* Polyb., xl., 3. Paus. (vii., 15, 10) seems to suppose that he was taken in Bœotia, and put to death by Metellus.

† *τὸ βέλτερον*, Paus., vii., 15, 4.

‡ Strabo, viii., p. 380: *Προσθίσταται τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐκστράτας Κορινθίαν, καὶ κατασκαφίους τῆς πόλεως συμμαχῶν*. The Teneates had another claim on the favour of Rome: they pretended to be of Trojan origin. (Paus., ii., 4, 4.)

the Romans. But the arrival of Diæus at Corinth extinguished all hopes of accommodation. He was confirmed in his office by the assembly, and so prejudiced the people against the envoys, by charges of treasonable correspondence with the enemy, that, on their return, they were arrested, and dragged to prison with the greatest indignities. Philo was admitted to an audience, and Stratus, now an old man, earnestly implored Diæus to accept his proposals. But as he could not believe that he and his party could be included in the benefit of any treaty, he continued inexorable, and urged the people to violent measures against his adversaries. He caused Sosicrates to be condemned to death for the part he had taken in the negotiation with Metellus, and endeavoured to extort a confession of guilt from him by torture, under which he expired, asserting his innocence to the last. The envoys would have suffered a like fate, but the cruel treatment of Sosicrates produced a reaction in their favour, and two of them propitiated Diæus with bribes; for, gloomy as his prospects were, he was not the least intent on every opportunity of sordid gain.

Such was the state of affairs when Mummius arrived at the Isthmus, accompanied by Orestes, who seems to have come to see vengeance exacted for the affronts he had endured. Mummius immediately sent Metellus back to Macedonia with his army. His own forces, when they were all assembled, amounted to 23,000 foot and 3500 horse, besides Cretan bowmen and a body of auxiliaries sent by Attalus, under the command of his general, Philopemen. The Romans felt so secure in the consciousness of their superiority, that they let their advanced posts be surprised by the enemy, who carried away 500 shields; the last trophies of independent Greece. Diæus was so elated by this trifling victory, that he immediately led his troops out to battle. Mummius readily accepted the challenge.\* The Achæan cavalry, all belonging to that class which was adverse to the measures of Diæus, did not even wait for the charge of the Romans, but fled at the beginning of the battle. The infantry, though discouraged by this desertion, kept their ground bravely, until they were attacked in their flanks, which should have been protected by the cavalry. The slaughter was probably not very great, as the field of battle was not far from Corinth; and perhaps the city might, as Pausanias thought, have been allowed to capitulate if it had stood a siege. But it may have been better for Greece that her agony came soon to an end; and, according to Polybius, the saying in every one's mouth was, "If we had not been ruined sometimes, we should not have been saved."† Diæus, whether he had lost all presence of mind, or felt that he could not retain his authority during a siege, did not attempt to take shelter in Corinth, but brought the first tidings of the disaster to Megalopolis, and having killed his wife

with his own hand, swallowed a draught of poison.\* The fugitives who escaped from the battle quitted Corinth the same night, together with the greater part of the inhabitants. Mummius had not expected so easy a conquest, and, though informed that the gates were open, suspecting some stratagem, suffered an entire day to pass before he marched into the city. Though no resistance was offered, all the men found within the walls were put to the sword; the women and children were reserved for sale; and when all its treasures had been carried away, on a signal given by blast of the trumpet the city was consigned to the flames. So, it is said, the senate had expressly decreed.† But vengeance for the insults offered to the Roman envoys was probably more the pretext than the motive for this cruelty.‡ It was, at least, no less a crime, in the eyes of the Roman soldiers, that Corinth was the richest city of Greece. Scarcely any other was adorned with so many precious works of art. Mummius himself had as little eye for them as any of his men, who made dice-boards of the finest master-pieces of painting;§ but he knew that such things were highly valued by others, and he therefore preserved those which were accounted the choicest to embellish his triumph; stipulating with the contractors who undertook to transport them to Italy, that they should replace all that might be lost on the passage with new pieces of equal worth.|| Those of inferior note he sent as a present to Attalus. It seems to have been chiefly by this indifference that he earned the praise of disinterestedness which is bestowed on him, not only by the Roman writers, but by Polybius,¶ and it seems still more questionable how far he was entitled to the character of lenity, which is attributed to him by the same historian, whose narrative of these events in the extant fragments sometimes sounds rather official than historical. Before the arrival of the ten commissioners, who were sent in the autumn to regulate the state of Greece, he made a circuit in Peloponnesus to inflict punishment on the cities and persons that had taken an active share in the war. The walls of all such towns were dismantled, and their whole population disarmed.\*\* The adherents of Diæus were sentenced to death or

\* Aur. Victor adds that he set fire to his house; which seems not to harmonize so well with the manner of his own death.

† Florus, ii., 16: *Turbâ precipiente deleta est. Oro., v., 3: Muralis lapis in pulverem redactus.*

‡ Liv., Epit., l. lii.: *Omnis Achæia in deditiorem accepta. Corinthon ex senatusconsulto diruit, quia ibi legati Romani violati erant. Cic., Pro Leg. Man., §: Legati quod erant appellati superbis. Compare Cic., De Off., i., 11; iii., 11. Plut., Lucull., 19.*

§ The Dionysus of Aristides, which Polybius himself saw treated in this manner (sp. Strab., viii., p. 594), was afterward put up to sale, and was purchased by Attalus at so high a price, that Mummius, now discovering its value, would not part with it, and, notwithstanding the king's complaints, carried it to Rome, and dedicated it in a temple of Ceres, with which it was afterward burned.

¶ V. Pater., i., 13. He was *avarus domi*. Dio Chrys., Corinth. (ii., p. 123, Reisk.), gives other instances of his ignorance. Yet, according to Valer. Max. (vi., 4, 2) *senariis vite*.

¶ xl., 11. Liv., Epit., liii., *abstinentissimum virum egit. Compare Strabo, viii., p. 381. Plin., N. H., xxvii., 17: Mummius devicta Achæia replevit urbem: ipse excessit non relicturus filios dotem. Aur. Victor: Quibus cum totam repleasset Italiam, in domum suam nihil contulit. Cic., De Off., ii., 22: *Italiam ornare quam domum suam maluit.**

\*\* Paus., vii., 16, 9. This must limit the statement (ii., 1, 4) which represents all the walled cities in Greece to have suffered the same treatment.

\* Aur. Victor furnishes a name for the battle: *Corinthios apud Leucopetram vicit*. The place is, I believe, nowhere else mentioned. The analogy of the Italian Cape Leucopetra renders it probable that it was the name of a headland. Justin's account of the presumption of the Achæans, as carried to such a height that they brought vehicles with them to carry away the spoil, and placed their wives and children on the tops of the adjacent hills to witness their expected victory, seems scarcely to deserve so much credit as Schorn (p. 401) is inclined to give it. † xl., 5, 13.

exile, and their property confiscated; and the Achæans—that is, the cities which had contributed to the war—were condemned to pay 200 talents to Sparta. The greater part of the Corinthian territory was annexed to Sicyon, which undertook the superintendence of the Isthmian festival.\* Mummius afterward marched northward to deal like retribution among the insurgents of Bœotia and Eubœa. He razed Thebes and Chalcis—or, at least, their walls—to the ground; condemned the Bœotians and Eubœans—or, more probably, those cities alone—to pay 100 talents to Heraclea, which they had helped to besiege; and at Chalcis he shed so much blood of the principal citizens, that Polybius himself can only reconcile his conduct with the supposed mildness of his character by the suggestion that he was urged by his council to unwonted severity.†

It remained for the ten commissioners, according to the instructions of the senate, to fix the future condition of the conquered nation. All Greece, as far as Macedonia and Epirus, was constituted a Roman province; and Achaia enjoyed the melancholy distinction of giving its name to the whole.‡ But the senate's jealousy was not satisfied with the formal establishment of its sovereignty; it had also decreed a series of regulations tending, as much as possible, to restrict every kind of union and intercourse among the Greeks, and to reduce them to the lowest stage of weakness and degradation. All federal assemblies, all democratical polities, were abolished, and the government of each city committed to a magistracy, for which a certain amount of property was required as a qualification. No one might acquire land in any part of the province but that in which his franchise lay. The details of this outline, and all temporary measures for the settlement of the country, were left to the discretion of Mummius and the Ten; and Polybius, who appears to have arrived in Greece soon after the fall of Corinth,§ was now able, in some degree, to alleviate the calamity which he had found it impossible to avert; and perhaps it would not have been equally in his power to render such services to his countrymen if he had been previously less alienated, at

least in appearance, from the national cause. As the intimate friend of the conqueror of Carthage, he was treated with the highest respect and confidence; and he employed his influence so as to win the esteem and gratitude of his fellow-citizens. He refused to accept any portion of the property of Diæus; and induced his friends, for the most part, to abstain from purchasing that which had been confiscated in other cases; and it seems probable that it was rather to his intercession than to the mercy of the Romans that the wives and children of the condemned were indebted for the permission they received to retain the property of their husbands and fathers. A Roman, whom he either did not deign, or did not think it prudent, to name, urged the commissioners to extend the inquisition which they were carrying on against the Achæans, who had shown themselves enemies of Rome, even to those who had been long dead; and, on this ground, both to remove the statues of Philopœmen, and to abolish the commemorative rites with which he was still honoured. Polybius was obliged to treat the charge—which really did more honour to the memory of his countryman than any statue—as a calumny; but he was able to prove, to the satisfaction of the commissioners, that Philopœmen's opposition to the measures of the Romans had never exceeded the limits of mild and respectful remonstrance. Not only were his remaining statues permitted to stand, but those which had been already carried away to Acarnania for embarkation, one of the mythical Achæus, of Aratus, and of Philopœmen—perhaps the most valued as works of art—were restored to Peloponnesus.\* Mummius himself, when sated with bloodshed and rapine, showed a disposition to conciliate the vanquished. Before his departure, though he had removed the statue of the Isthmian Poseidon, to dedicate it—in gross violation of religious propriety—in the temple of Jupiter at Rome,† he repaired the damage which had been done to the public buildings on the Isthmus, adorned the temples of Olympia and Delphi, and made a circuit round the principal Greek cities to receive tokens of their gratitude.‡

Polybius rendered other services to his country which were clearly more solid and important, though we are not sufficiently informed as to their precise nature fully to appreciate them. We learn from Pausanias that he framed political institutions and laws for the cities of the Achæan Confederacy,§ and he himself relates that he was directed by the commissioners, when they were on the point of departing homeward, in the spring after the fall of Corinth, to make a circuit round the cities, for the purpose of determining doubtful points, until the people should have become familiar with the Constitution and the laws.¶

\* Strabo, viii., p. 361. Paus., ii., 3, 2.

† xl., 11, 4, 5. Zonaras, ix., 31. Τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν πτοχάρημα μὴν καὶ ἀφαιρῶν καὶ χρημάτων ἱκλογαῖς ἱκατόθυ. Diodor., Mai, p. 15: Σφαγὴς καὶ πτελικισμοῦ καὶ ἀπραγίας καὶ πτωχικῆς μετ' ἑδρίης ἀνθρώπων. The anecdote in Plutarch (Sympos., ix., 1, 3), even if considered as authentic, would only prove a degree of sensibility not uncommon in men capable of the greatest cruelty. Compare what Plutarch relates of Alexander of Phœre. Pelop., 29.

‡ Strabo, xvii., near the end. Ἐδόθην Ἀχαιῶν μέγχι Γερραίας καὶ Αἰτωλῶν καὶ Ἀκαρνανίων, καὶ τινῶν Ἡπειρωτικῶν ὄνων, ὅσα τῇ Μακεδονίᾳ προσηύριστο. But as μέγχι is here inclusive, a negative seems to be required before Μακεδονίᾳ, and perhaps τῇ should be μὴ.

§ Orosius (v., 3) observes that Polybius was in Africa when Diæus was defeated; and Lucas (p. 45, n.) adopts this statement. Havercamp, the editor of Orosius, considers it as an error, and infers from the fragment of Polyb. in Strabo (viii., p. 38), that he was an eyewitness of the destruction of Corinth; and so Krause (Vite Vett. Historicor. Romanorum, p. 168), and Mr. Clinton (F. H., 111). It certainly seems as if scenes such as Polybius described from his own observation could not have taken place long after the fall of the city. On the other hand, it is not likely that Polybius would have hurried to Greece until he learned that the struggle was over. Mai (Polyb., Exc. Vat., p. 403) says: "Corintho delenda interfuit, teste Plutarcho, Vit. Philop., fin." But Plutarch says nothing that intimates any opinion on the point. Schorn likewise (p. 406) seems to think that he did not arrive before the fall of Corinth.

\* Polyb., xl., 8. Plut., Philop., ult. But it is not clear how these accounts are to be combined with the fragment of Polybius, Mai, p. 459: Διὰ τὴν προπάρχουσαν τοῦ πλεθους πρὸς Φιλοκρίμενα εὐνοίαν, οὐ καὶ αὐτὸν τὰς εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ ἐν πόλει τῶν οὐδῶν.

† Dio Chrys., t. ii., p. 123. Reisk: Ἀνέθηκε τῷ Διὶ ὁ θεὸς τῆς ἀμειβίας τὸν δόξαν ὡς ἀνδρῶν.

‡ Polyb., xl., 11. Paus., v., 10, 5; 24, 4, and 8.

§ vii., 30, 9. Ἑλλήνων νότοις πόλεις ἐς τὴν Ἀχαιῶν συναντιδόντων, κατὰ Ῥωμαίων εὐνοίαν καὶ εὐνοίας οὐκ ἐπὶ πολέμας τε παρ' ὀρθοτάτοις καὶ νόμοις δέσιναι.

¶ xl., 10: Μέγχι δὲ συνθηκῶν ἔχειν τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς νόμους. These laws, therefore, were now, and were probably those of which Pausanias speaks.

It would seem, therefore, that he drew up the laws and forms of municipal government, of which Pausanias speaks, in the course of the preceding winter. We do not know what cities shared the benefit of his legislation, for which the Macedonian code of Æmilius Paulus might, perhaps, serve as a model. The political institutions were, of course, according to the senate's decree, strictly oligarchical; and, in this respect, no alteration seems ever to have been granted by the Roman government. But, in some other points, the rigour of its original regulations was, a few years afterward, greatly relaxed. The fines imposed on the Achæans, and on the Boeotians and Eubœans, were remitted; the restraints on intercourse and commerce were withdrawn; and the federal unions, which had been abolished, were revived.\* There can be no doubt but that this indulgence was obtained through the intercession of Polybius, and the influence of his friend Æmilianus.† An inscription on the base of a statue erected to Polybius by his grateful countrymen at Megalopolis, recorded his extensive travels, the services he had rendered to the Romans in their wars, and the success of his mediation, by which he had appeased their resentment against the Greeks. An inscription on another statue declared that Greece would not have fallen if she had always followed the advice of Polybius, and that, after her fall, she had found succour through him alone.‡ The Romans, in their official language, seem to have described this renewal of the old forms as a restoration of liberty to Greece.§

\* Paus., vii., 16, 10: *Συνθήματα κατὰ ἔθνος ἀποδόσαντες ἰδιότατα τὰ ἄρχαία.*

† Plut., Reip., Ger. Præc., 18. *Πολύβιος καὶ Παναίτιος, τῇ Σακευτίας εὐνοίᾳ πρὸς αὐτοὺς μέγα τὰς πατρίδας ὠφελοῦντες.*

‡ Paus., viii., 30, 37. Polybius himself (Mai, p. 455) claims this merit: *παραιτούμενος τὴν τῶν πατριῶν ὀργήν, διὰ τῆς ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐποιήσαντες ἀλθιότητος.*

§ N. 1543. Boeckh and Rose, p. 405. An inscription found among the ruins of Dyme by Mr. Hawkins, and presented by him to the library of Trinity College, Cambridge: a letter from the proconsul, Q. Fabius Maximus, Q. F., to the magistrates and council of Dyme (*Δαμάλω τῆς ἀρχαίας καὶ συνθήκης καὶ τῇ πόλεως*), in which he alludes to an attempt made by one Sosus, who had written laws contrary to the Constitution (*πολιτείας*) which had been restored to the Achæans by the Romans, and had given rise to a sedition, in which the public archives of Dyme had been burned—proceedings which appeared to the proconsul to tend to the subversion of social order and of the liberty which had been restored to the Greeks (*τῆς ἀποδόσεως κατὰ κοινὸν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐλευθερίας*). He had, therefore, inflicted capital punishment on Sosus and one of his accomplices, and had sent a third to be tried at Rome. Boeckh's commentary on this very interesting monument is not so satisfactory as usual; and I agree with Nitzsch (Polyb., p. 136), that it must be referred to the period subsequent to the renewal of the League; but not at all for the reason assigned by Nitzsch, because it is evident, or even in the slightest degree probable, that the *τῆς Κολλάνειον συνέλευσης*, from whom the proconsul had received a report of the disturbances, were the congress of the League, but because it seems impossible to explain the allusion to the restoration of liberty otherwise than by reference to the revival of the federal unions: of *περὶ Κολλάνειον συνέλευσις* may perhaps be the *convocatus*. After the fall of Corinth, the Achæan *συνέλευσις* seems to have been always held at Ægium, as it was in the days of Pausanias (vii., 24, 4). This inscription seems likewise to prove, that if there is no error in Plutarch's statement (Cim., 2), that in the time of Lucullus the Romans had not yet begun to send praetors into Greece (*οὕτω εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ῥωμαῖοι στρατηγοὺς ἀπέμειναν*), at least we must reject the conclusion drawn from it by Zinkeisen (Gesch. Griechenlands, p. 548), that Achæa was then free from Roman praetors. Nitzsch, on the other hand (p. 87), refers the description in Polyb., ii., 37, to the provincial administration of Achæa, which, he says, "satisfied

But even if the monument, in which this sounding phrase appears to be applied to it, did not itself illustrate the vigilance with which the exercise of political freedom was checked by the provincial government, we might be sure that these revived confederations answered no other purpose than that of affording an occasion for some periodical festivals, and some empty titles, soothing, perhaps, to the feelings of the people, but without the slightest effect on their welfare. The end of the Achæan war was the last stage of the lingering process by which Rome enclosed her victim in the coils of her insidious diplomacy, covered it with the slime of her sycophants and hirelings, crushed it when it began to struggle, and then calmly preyed upon its vitals.

We have brought the political history of ancient Greece down to a point which may be fitly regarded as its close; since, in the changes which afterward befell the country, the people remained nearly passive. The events of the Mithridatic war, in which the Achæans and Lacedæmonians, and all Bœotia except Thespies, are said to have declared themselves against Rome, and the royal army in Greece received a re-enforcement of Lacedæmonian and Achæan troops,\* might serve to indicate that the national spirit was not wholly extinct, or that the Roman dominion was felt to be intolerably oppressive. But Athens certainly no more deserved Sylla's bloody vengeance for the resistance into which she was forced by the tyranny of Athenio than for the credulity with which she had listened to his lying promises. In another point of view, however, it will not be foreign to the plan of this work to take a brief survey of the fortunes of Greece after its incorporation with the Roman empire.

No historical fact is more clearly ascertained than that from this epoch the nation was continually wasting away. Strabo, who visited Greece but a little more than a century later (B.C. 29†), found desolation everywhere prevailing. Besides his special enumeration of ruined towns and deserted sites, and his emphatic silence as to the present, while he explores the faint vestiges or doubtful traditions of the past, the description of almost every region furnishes occasion for some general remark illustrating the melancholy truth. Messenia was, for the most part, deserted; and the population of Laconia very scanty in comparison with its ancient condition; for, besides Sparta, it contained but thirty small towns, in the room of the hundred for which it had once been celebrated.‡ Of Arcadia it was not worth while to say much, on account of its utter decay.§ There was scarcely any part of the land in tillage, but vast sheep-walks, and abundant pasture for herds of cattle, especially horses;

all the demands which appeared to Polybius most essential for the interests of Peloponnesus.† Bitter as Plutarch is against Polybius, he has said nothing to lower his character as a patriot so much as this interpretation of his words.

\* Appian, Mithrid., 29. † x., p. 483. ‡ viii., p. 363: *Ἐκλειμένης τῆς πόλεως ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ ἡ Λακωνικὴ Λακεῖον, κρινόμεναι πρὸς τὴν καλαῖαν ἐλευθερίαν.*

§ viii., p. 368: *Διὰ τὴν τῆς χώρας παντὶ ἐκλείπειν. Δὲ γὰρ πόλεις ἐπὶ τῶν συνεχῶν τοῦ λαοῦ ἡφανίσθησαν . . . τὴν τῆς χώρας οὐ γεωργεῖσθαι ἐκλείπειν.*

and so the solitude of Ætolia and Acarnania had become no less favourable to the rearing of horses than Thessaly. Both Acarnania and Ætolia, he repeats elsewhere, are now utterly worn out and exhausted; as are many of the other nations.\* Of the towns of Doris scarcely a trace was left: the case was the same with the Ænians.† Thebes had sunk to an insignificant village; and the other Boeotian cities in proportion, that is, as he elsewhere explains himself, they were reduced to ruins and names, all but Tanagra and Thespizæ, which, compared with the others, were tolerably well preserved.‡ Thessaly would furnish a long list of celebrated names, but few of its towns retained their early importance; Larissa more than any other.§

It has been usual, in modern times, to attribute this decline of population to the loss of independence; to the withering influence of a foreign yoke; in a word, to Roman misrule. And it would be bold, and probably an error, to assert that it was wholly unconnected with the nature of the government to which Greece was subject as a Roman province. It is too well known what that government was: how seldom it was uprightly administered,|| how easily, even in the purest hands, it became the instrument of oppression.¶ The ordinary burdens were heavy. The fisherman of Gyarus, who was sent ambassador to Augustus, to complain that a tax of 150 drachmas was laid upon his island, which could hardly pay two thirds of that sum,\*\* afforded but a specimen of a common grievance. Greece was not exempt from those abuses which provoked the massacre of the Romans in Asia at the outbreak of the Mithridatic war;†† and, even if we had no express information on the subject, we might have concluded that it did not escape the still more oppressive arbitrary exactions of corrupt magistrates and their greedy officers. “Who does not know,” Cicero asks,‡‡ “that the Achæans pay a large sum yearly to L. Piso?” It was notorious that he had received 100 talents from them, besides plunder and extortion of other kinds.§§ The picture which

Cicero draws of the evils inflicted by him upon Greece is, no doubt, rhetorically overcharged, but it is one of utter impoverishment, exhaustion, and ruin.\* And here we may remark that the privileges of the free cities included in the province afforded no security against the rapacity and oppression of a Piso or a Verres. The Lacedæmonians, Strabo observes, were peculiarly favoured, and remained free, paying nothing but voluntary offerings.† But these were among the most burdensome imposts;‡ and so Athens, which enjoyed the like immunity, was nevertheless, according to Cicero’s phrase, torn to pieces by Piso. To this it must be added, that the oligarchical institutions everywhere established—and even Athens was forced so to qualify her democracy that little more than the name seems to have been left§—tended to promote the accumulation of property in few hands; as we read that the whole island of Cephallenia was subject to C. Antonius as his private estate.||

Nevertheless, it seems certain that, when these are represented as the main causes of the decline of population in Greece, which followed the loss of her independence, their importance has been greatly exaggerated, while others, much more efficacious, have been overlooked or disparaged. For, on the other hand, it is clear that this decline did not begin at that epoch, but had been going on for many generations before. A comparison of the forces brought into the field to meet the Celtic invasion by the states of northern Greece with those which they furnished in the Persian war, would be sufficient to prove the fact with regard to them; while, as to Peloponnesus, it is expressly attested by Polybius, who does not scruple to declare that, in the period of the Cleomenic war, it had been utterly wasted.¶ Polybius is, indeed, in this passage, speaking of the financial resources of the Peloponnesians; but the cause which he assigns for their decay is manifestly one by which the population must have been affected in proportion. He attributes it to foreign invasion and intestine warfare.\*\* The long continuance of destructive wars is, also, the cause assigned by Strabo for the desolation which he beheld. Yet, in his time, Peloponnesus and the greater part of northern Greece had enjoyed a century of uninterrupted peace and tranquillity. This shows that the evil lay deeper than the ravages of war. And we have now the evidence of Polybius†† that, in the pe-

\* x., p. 460: Νυνὶ μὲν οὖν ἐκπενήθηται καὶ ἀπηγόρευται ἅτε τῶν συνεχῶν πολέμων, ἢ τ’ Ἀκαρνανία καὶ Αἰτωλοὶ, καθάτερ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἔθνων.

† ix., p. 437: Θανασιῶν εἰ καὶ ἔχουσιν αὐτῶν εἰς Ῥωμαίους ἄλλοι. Τὰ δ’ αὐτὰ πενήθηται καὶ οἱ Ἀθηνῆες.

‡ ix., p. 402: Πρώτιστον ἐνέκιστον αἰεὶ μέχρι εἰς ἡμᾶς, οὐδὲ κόμης ἀξιολόγου τύπον εὐφροσύνης. καὶ ἄλλαι δὲ πόλεις ἀνάλογον, πλὴν Ταννύρας καὶ Θεσπιῶν· αὗται δ’ ἰκανῶς συμμέμνηται πρὸς ἑκάστην κρίσιν. P. 410: Νυνὶ μόνῃ συνεχῶς (Θεσπία) τῶν Βοιωτικῶν πόλεων καὶ Ταννύρα· τῶν δ’ ἄλλων κρίσις καὶ οὐράτια δέλεται.

§ ix., p. 430: Τῶν πόλεων δὲγαί αὐτοῖσι τὰ πατρίων ἀλγῶνα· μάστιγι δὲ δάπτουσι.

¶ Cic., *Mem.*, 22. Etiam si qui sunt pudore ac temperantia moderatores, tamen eos esse tales, propter multitudinem cupidorum hominum nemo arbitrat. Difficile est dictum, Quiritibus, quanto in odio sinus apud externos nationes propter eorum quos ad eos per hos annos cum imperio mistas, injurias ac libidines.

¶ Cic., *Epist.* ad Q. Fratrem, l. i., p. 191, b. Nequaquam satis, ipsum hæc habere virtutes, sed esse circumspiciendum diligenter ut in hac custodia provincia non te unum sed omnes ministros imperii tui, socios, et civibus, et reipublice prestare videas. P. 203, b. Parri refert ab te ipso ius dici equitatis et diligenter, nisi idem ab iis fiat, quibus tu ejus munus aliquam partem concesseris.

\*\* Strabo, x., p. 465. Tacit., *Ann.*, i., 76. Achæiam ac Macedoniam olera deprecantes.

†† See Plut., *Lucull.*, 30, and the interesting story of Damon (*Cim.*), i., where the brutal centurion and the hired sycophant may be regarded as not uncommon characters.

‡‡ De Prov. Cons., 2.

§§ Pis., 37.

\* Pis., 40. Achæia exhausta: Thessalia vexata: lacertæ Athens: Locri, Phocii, Boeoti exusti.

† viii., p. 365: Ἐγερθήσαν διαφέντες καὶ ἑμῶν Διόθεροι, πλὴν τῶν φιλικῶν λειτουργούντων ἄλλο συντιθεμένων οὐδέν.

‡ See Ernesti, *Clavis Cic.* *Ædilitius*: Vectigal: Coronarium: und Walter, *Geschichte des Römischen Rechts*, p. 237.

¶ Strabo, indeed (ix., p. 398), says Ῥωμαῖοι παραλάβοντες αὐτοὺς ὁμακρατομένους ἐβόλησαν τὴν ἀντρονομίαν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. But Appian (*Mithrid.*, 39) alludes to the restrictions imposed on them by the Romans after the conquest, which were renewed—probably with increased rigour—by Sylla; and the recovery of the democracy (τὴν ὁμακρατίαν ἀνακρατομένην) was one of the baits held out to them by Athenio (Pisidan. ap. Athen., v., 48, 51). See Ahrens, *De Athenarum Statu Politico* inde ab Achæici Fœderis Interitu usque ad Antoninorum tempora (p. 25).

§ Strabo, x., p. 455: Τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἡσίων ἔχουσιν ἔσχατον, ὡς ἴδιον κτήμα. § 11., 62, 3: Ἀπὸν κατὰ μέρος.

\*\* u. s.: Ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλέων, ἐπὶ δὲ μάλ' ὡν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐσχίας τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολέμων.

†† Exc. Val., p. 449.



od either immediately preceding or immediately subsequent to the establishment of the Roman government—a period which he describes as one of concord and comparative prosperity,\* when the wounds which had been inflicted on the peninsula were beginning to heal—even then the population was rapidly shrinking, through causes quite independent of any external agency, and intimately connected with the moral character and habits of the society itself. He is giving an example of a case in which it was unnecessary to consult an oracle.

For instance," he observes, "in our times all Greece has been afflicted with a failure of offspring; in a word, with a scarcity of men;† so that the cities have been left desolate and the land waste; though we have not been visited either with a series of wars or with epidemic diseases. Would it not," he asks, "be absurd to send to inquire of the oracles by what means our numbers may be increased, and our cities become more flourishing, when the cause is manifest, and the remedy rests with ourselves? or when men give themselves up to ease, and comfort, and indolence, and would neither marry nor rear children born out of marriage, or, at most, only one or two, in order to leave these rich, and to bring them up in luxury, the evil soon spread, imperceptibly, but with rapid growth; or when there was only a child or two in a family for war or disease to carry off, the inevitable consequence was, that houses were left desolate, and cities, by degrees, became like deserted hives.‡ And there is no need to consult the gods about the mode of deliverance from this evil; for any man would tell us that the first thing we have to do is to change our habits, or, at all events, to enact laws compelling parents to rear their children."§

We see, then, the evil was not that the stream of population was violently absorbed, but that it flowed feebly, because there was an influence at work which tended to dry up the fountain-head. Marriages were rare and unfruitful, through the prevalence of indifference or aversion towards the duties and enjoyments of domestic life. The historian traces this unhealthy state of feeling to a taste for luxury and ostentation. But this explanation, which could only apply to the wealthy, seems by no means adequate to the result. The real cause struck deeper, and was much more widely spread. Described in general terms, it was a want of reverence for the order of nature, for the natural revelation of the will of God; and the sanction of infanticide was by no means the most destructive, or the most loathsome form in

which it manifested itself.\* This was the cancer which had been for many generations eating into the life of Greece. The progress of luxury which followed Alexander's conquests no doubt quickened and extended its ravages, and the subsequent political changes probably contributed to heighten its effects, though no others could have remedied or materially checked the mischief. The despondency produced by a single overthrow drove the Bœotians, as Polybius informs us,† into a round of sensual dissipation, in which all duties, both public and private, were utterly neglected; and we cannot doubt that the far heavier despair which weighed upon the spirit of the entire nation, when at length it felt its chains, and saw itself bestridden by the Roman Colossus, was everywhere, in some degree, attended with like consequences. The more active and hopeful migrated to seek employment, wealth, and reputation in Italy or the East.

How little the vices of the Roman government had to do with the decrease of population in Greece becomes still more apparent as we follow its course through the history of the empire. The change from republican to monarchical institutions was, in general, beneficial to the provinces, and especially to Greece, which was not only exempt from the danger of arbitrary oppression, but was distinguished by many marks of imperial favour. Within the space of a few years, about the beginning of this period, three new colonies animated the south coast of the Corinthian Gulf. Pompey planted a settlement of pirates in the solitude of Dyme.‡ His great rival restored Corinth, and, if he had lived longer, would perhaps have opened a canal through the Isthmus. § Though the commerce, which, at the fall of Corinth, had been diverted to Delos,¶ and afterward dispersed by the Mithridatic war, may not have wholly returned into its ancient channel, still there can be no question that the advantages of this restoration were very largely felt throughout Greece. Augustus founded another populous Roman colony at Patræ, which enjoyed the privileges of a free city.|| Nicopolis, indeed, was rather designed as a monument of his victory than to promote the prosperity of Greece; for it was peopled from the decayed towns of the adjacent regions, and the effect was to turn Acarnania and Ætolia into a wilderness.¶ Athens, too, had soon repaired the loss it suffered through Sylla's massacre, though Piræus did not rise out of its ruins.\*\* But the Athenian population was recruited, as it had long been, by the lavish grant or cheap sale of the franchise. It was like the galley of Theseus, retaining nothing but the name and semblance of the old Athenian people, without any real natural identity of

\* *ii., 82, 4*: "Ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς πάντες ἐν αὐτῷ λέγοντες, μάλιστα καρποδοθῆαι δοκοῦσιν ἐδοκίμασαν. But the fragment referred to in the last note shows us much this statement needs to be qualified.

† *Εὐκτοχὴ ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς καιροῖς τῇ Ἑλλάδι πᾶσαν παύσθαι καὶ συλλεθῆναι ἀνθρώπων, δι' ἣν αἱ πόλεις ἐρημώθησαν καὶ ἀφορία εἶναι συνέβαινε. καίπερ οὐτε πολέων συγγεῶν ἰσχυρίστων ἡμᾶς οὐτε λοιμικῶν περιεστῶτων.*

‡ *Ἐν ἀπορώτων ἐκ ἀναγνῶντων καὶ φιλαρμονίᾳ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ βασιλείᾳ ἐκτετραμμένων καὶ πρὸς βουλήντων ἢ καὶ χαμῶν ἢ ἀγῶνι τὰ γενόμενα τέκνα τρέφειν, ἀλλὰ μόλις ἐν τῷ λίσσῳ τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ πλουτοῦτος τοῦτον καταλίπῃ καὶ παλαιωτάς δρέψαι, ταχέως ἔλαβε τὸ πᾶν ἀνθρώπων' καὶ ὅρ' ἐνός ὄντος ἢ οὐκ, τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ἐν πλεῶνι τῇ νόσῳ νοσῶσα παραλείπει, ὅλην ὡς ἀνέχετο καταλίπῃσθαι τὰς οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἰσχυρίας, καὶ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μελιτῶν τὰ ἐμῆν, τὸν τῶν πρόπον κατὰ βραχὺ τὰς πόλεις ἀπορούμενας ἀδυνατεῖν.*

§ *Μελίσσας μὲν αὐτοὶ δι' αὐτῶν μεταβήμενοι τὸν ἄλλον, εἰ ἢ μὴ, νόμους γράψαντες ἑνα τρέφονταί τε καὶ νόμιμα.*

\* All that F. Jacobs has said (*Vermischte Schriften, Akademische Reden*, i., p. 211–254) on the subject here alluded to is one side of the truth, but no more. The other is exhibited by Zumpt, in an instructive essay in the *Transactions of the Berlin Academy*, 1841, *Ueber den Stand der Bevölkerung und die Volksvermehrung im Alterthum*, p. 14–16.

† Strabo, viii., p. 367. Plut., *Pomp.*, 28.

‡ Strabo, x., p. 496. Cicero, *Manil.*, 18. Delos, quo omnes undique cum mercibus atque oneribus commebant.

§ Paus., vii., 18, 7.

¶ Strabo, vii., p. 325. Paus., v., 23, 3; viii., 24, 11; vii., 18, 6; x., 38, 4.

\*\* Serv. Sulpicius, *Ep. ad Div.*, iv., 5. Strabo, ix., p. 395: *Τὸν Παιρῆα συνιστάμενος ἐκ ὀλίγης κατοικίας.*

race; so that it was no exaggeration when Piso called it a jumble of divers nations.\* The poverty, indeed, of the city, which had been a main cause of its unfortunate accession to the side of Mithridates,† still continued, and was but slightly relieved by the bounty of benefactors like Pomponius and Herodes Atticus, or even by the growing influx of wealthy strangers who came to pursue rhetorical or philosophical studies there. While its splendour was increased by the magnificent structures added to it by Hadrian and Herodes, perhaps the larger part of the freemen were never quite secure of their daily meal. Still, the good will of the early emperors was unequivocally manifested. They seem always to have lent a favourable ear to the complaints and petitions of the province;‡ and Nero went so far as to reward the Greeks for their skilful flattery of his musical talents by an entire and general exemption from provincial government, which may have compensated for the presents he exacted from them.§ The Greeks, it is said, abused their new privileges by discord and tumults, and Vespasian restored the proconsular administration, and, above all, the tribute—which was, perhaps, his real motive—with the remark, that they had forgotten the use of liberty.|| But it is evident that, on the whole, from the reign of Augustus to that of Trajan, the increase of the population was not checked by oppression or by any calamity. Yet, at the end of this period, we find Plutarch declaring that Greece had shared more largely than any other country in the general failure of population which had been caused by the wars and civil conflicts of former times over almost all the world;¶ so that it could then hardly furnish 3000 heavily-armed soldiers, the number raised by Megara alone for the Persian war; and his assertion is confirmed by the pictures drawn by another contemporary witness of the desolation which had overspread some of its most fertile regions.\*\*

In times when the present was so void and cheerless, the future so dark and hopeless, it was natural that men should seek consolation in the past, even though it had been less full, than was the case among the Greeks, of power and beauty, prosperity and glory. Nor was it necessary, then, to evoke its images by learned toil out of the dust of libraries or archives. The whole land was covered with its monuments in the most faultless productions of human genius and art. There was no region so desolate, no corner so secluded, as to be destitute of them. Even the rapacity of the Romans could not exhaust these treasures. Though Mimmius was said to have filled Italy with the

sculptures which he carried away, it is probable that, in the immense multitude which remained, their absence, in point of number, might be scarcely perceived. If Nero robbed Delphi of 500 statues,\* there might still be more than 2000 left there.† The expressive silence of these memorials was interpreted by legends which lived in the mind and the heart of the people; and so long as any inhabitants remained in a place, a guide was to be found thoroughly versed in this traditional lore. The town of Panopeus, at the northern foot of Parnassus, though celebrated by Homer as a royal residence,‡ had been reduced, when it was visited by Pausanias, to a miserable assemblage of huts, in which the traveller could find nothing to deserve the name of a city, as it contained neither an archive nor a gymnasium, nor a theatre, nor a market-place, nor a fountain; but the people remembered that they were not of Phocian, but of Phlegyan origin: they could show the grave which covered the vast bulk of the great Titus, and remnants of the clay out of which Prometheus had moulded the human race.§ Relics of like antiquity were at the same period reverently treasured in most parts of Greece.|| The memory of the past was still more effectually preserved by a great variety of festivals, games, public sacrifices, and other religious solemnities. After the extinction of the national independence, the battle of Plataea did not cease to be commemorated by the Feast of Liberty;¶ as, notwithstanding the absence of all political interests, the forms of deliberation were kept up in the Amphictyonic,\*\* the Achæan, Phocian,†† and Bœotian councils.‡‡ The heroes, both of the mythical and historical age, were still honoured with anniversary rites: Aratus§§ and Demosthenes,||| and the slain at Marathon,¶¶ no less than Ajax\*\*\* and Achilles,††† Temenus,‡‡‡ Phoroneus,§§§ and Melampus.||||

The religion of the Greeks, which was so intimately connected with almost all their social pleasures, and their most important affairs, had never lost its hold on the great body of the nation. We hear much of the change wrought in the state of religious feeling by the speculations of the sophists, and the later kindred philosophical schools, by the frequent examples of sacrilegious violence, by the progress of luxury, and the growing corruption of manners. But the

\* Paus., x., 7, 1.

† Plin., N. H., xxiv., 17. Rhodi etiamnum tria millia signorum esse Mutianus ter consul prodidit: nec pauciora Athenis, Olympie, Delphis, superasse creduntur. The identity of the number in these four places rather lessens the authority of the statement. On the fecundity of this branch of Grecian art, see F. Jacobs, Verm. Schr. Ak. Red., *Ueber den Reichtum der Griechen an plastischen Kunstwerken*.  
‡ Il., xvii., 307. § x., 4.

|| So, the bones of Pelops (Paus., vii., 23, 1), of Arcas (viii., 9, 3, and 36, 8), and Linus (ix., 29, 8), the head of Medusa (ii., 31, 5), and her hair (viii., 47, 5), the skin of the Calydonian boar (viii., 47, 2), the dice of Palamedes (ii., 30, 3), the wood of the plane-tree at Aulis (ix., 19, 7), the trophy of Polydeuces (iii., 14, 7), the staff of Agamemnon (ix., 40, 11). ¶ Plut., Aristid., 21.

\*\* Paus., vii., 24, 4. 'Ες Αἰγῶν καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐπὶ συνδριον τὸ Ἀχαιοῦ ἀβροβέται, καθότι ἐς Θερμοπύλας τε καὶ ἐς Δελφοὺς ὁ Ἀμφικτυόνες.

†† Φωκεῖον, ἢ δὲ ἀπὸ ἐκείνης πόλεως συνελθὼν ὁ Φωκεῖς. ‡‡ ix., 34, 1. In the sanctuary of the Ionian Athene—ἐς τὸν κοινὴν συνελθὼν ἐνθάδ' ὁ Βοιωτὸν ἐόλονον.

§§ Plut., Ar., 53. || Paus., ii., 23, 5. ¶¶ i., 32, 4. \*\*\* i., 35, 3. ††† ii., 1, 8. ‡‡‡ ii., 28, 1. §§§ ii., 20, 3. |||| ii., 44, 5.

\* Tacit., Ann., ii., 55. Non Athenienses, tot cladibus extinctos, sed colluviem illam nationum. And with this may be combined what is said in Philostratus (V. S., ii., 7) on the decay of the purity of the language at Athens, though there attributed to the influx of the sojourners.

† Posidonius in Athen., v., 48.  
‡ Tacit., Ann., i., 76. Strabo, viii., p. 366.  
§ Paus., vii., 17, 3. Plut., Flam., 12. Tacit., Ann., xv., 45. His spoliation of the works of art did not impoverish the country.

|| Paus., vii., 17, 14: Ἀπομαθησκόμενοι τὴν εὐσεβίαν τὸ Ἑλληνικόν.

¶ De Def. Or., 8: Τῆς κοινῆς ἀλιγανρίας . . . πλείστον μέρος ἢ ἑλλὰς μετόχου.

\*\* Dio Chrys., Venator. See especially T. i., p. 233, Reisk., c. 11: Οὗτος δὲ Πηνελόπειος δὲ Ἰφίμαχος περὶ Ἀσπιδος, οὗτος δὲ Ἀδωνὶς διὰ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἀναστρέφοντες γυναικῶν;

effect seems to have been confined to a not very large circle of the higher classes. With the common people Paganism continued, probably as long as it subsisted at all, to be not a mere hereditary usage, but a personal, living, breathing, and active faith. In the age of the Antonines, the Attic husbandmen still believed in the potent agency of their hero Marathon,\* as the Arcadian herdsmen fancied that they could hear the piping of Pan on the top of Mænalus.† The national misfortunes, as they led the Greeks to cling the more fondly to their recollections of the past, tended to strengthen the influence of the old religion, and rendered them the less disposed to admit a new faith which shocked their patriotic pride, and dispelled many pleasing illusions, while it ran counter to all their tastes and habits, and deprived them of their principal enjoyments. Accordingly, it seems that Christianity, notwithstanding the consolations it offered for all that it took away, made very slow progress beyond the cities in which it was first planted; and its ascendancy was not firmly established long before the beginning of a period in which a series of new calamities threatened the very existence of the nation.

The result of the Persian invasion, in the mind of the victorious people, was a feeling of exulting self-confidence, which fostered the development of all its powers and resources. The terror of the Celtic inroad was followed by a sense of security earned, in a great measure, by an honourable struggle. Far different was the impression left by the irruption of Alaric, when Greece was, at length, delivered from his presence. The progress of the barbarians had been stopped by no resistance before they reached the utmost limits of the land. They retreated, indeed, before Stilicho, but not broken or discomfited, carrying off all their booty to take undisturbed possession of another, not a distant province. It was long, indeed, before the Greeks experienced a repetition of this calamity, but henceforth they lived in the consciousness that they were continually exposed to it. They neither had strength to defend themselves, nor could rely on their rulers for protection. The safety of Greece was one of the last objects which occupied the attention of the court of Constantinople. In the utter uncertainty how soon a fresh invader might tread in the steps of Alaric, every rumour of the movements of the hordes which successively crossed the Danube might well spread alarm even in the remotest corners of Peloponnesus. The direction which they might take could be as little calculated as the course of lightning. Who could have foreseen that Attila and Theodoric would be diverted from their career to fall upon other prey? that Genseric, after his repulse before Tænarus, would not renew his invasion? that the Bulgarians would be so long detained by the plunder of the northern provinces? In the reign of Justinian the advances of the barbarians became more and more threatening, and in the year 540 Northern Greece was again devastated by a mixed swarm of Huns and other equally ferocious spoilers, chiefly of the Slavonic race. The strengthened fortifications of the Isthmus, indeed, withstood this flood, though they could

not shelter the Peloponnesians from the earthquakes and the pestilence which, during this unhappy period, were constantly wasting the scanty remains of the Hellenic population which had escaped or survived the inroads of the barbarians. Justinian's enormous line of fortresses revealed the imminence of the danger, but could not long avert it. In the course of the seventh and eighth-centuries the worst forebodings were realized: after many transient incursions, the country was permanently occupied by Slavonic settlers. The extent of the transformation which ensued is most clearly proved by the number of the new names which succeeded to those of the ancient geography. But it is also described by historians in terms which have suggested the belief that the native population was utterly swept away, and that the modern Greeks are the descendants of barbarous tribes which subsequently became subject to the empire, and received the language and religion which they have since retained from Byzantine missionaries and Anatolian colonists: and such is the obscurity which hangs over the final destiny of the most renowned nation of the earth, that it is much easier to show the weakness of the grounds on which this hypothesis has been reared than to prove that it is very wide of the truth.\*

\* The texts on which the author of this hypothesis (Fallmerayer, *Geschichte der Moree*) mainly builds, are a passage of Evagrius, *Hist. Eccl.*, vi., 10 (in which the Avars are said to have stormed and enslaved Singidon, Anchialus, and the Ἰλλυρία πᾶσαν . . . ἀπολλύσας; ἀπαντα καὶ νεπολοῦντες); a letter of a patriarch of Constantinople in the year 1081 (in Leunclavius, *Jus Græco-Romanorum*, p. 370, in which the Avars are said to have occupied Peloponnesus for 218 years before the deliverance of Patras in 807: καὶ τῆς Ῥωμαϊκῆς ἀρχῆς ἀποστεμμένον ὡς μὴδε πόδα βαλεῖν εἰς οὐνάσθαι ἐν αὐτῇ Ῥωμαίων ἀνδρά); and an expression of Constantine Porphyrogenitus (*de Them.*, ii., 6, ἐσθλαδὴν τὰς ἡ χώρα καὶ γέγονε βέρβρος). But Fallmerayer himself proves by his own example how unsafe it would be to rely on such phrases in writers from whom accuracy is so little to be expected. In his preface (p. 141) he asserts that not a drop of pure and unmixed Hellenic blood flows in the veins of the Christian population of modern Greece. But in the work itself we find this statement gradually qualified, so that, at p. 239, vol. i., it appears that at the end of the Slavonic immigration the Hellenic portion of the Peloponnesian population formed one eighth of the whole: a proportion, of course, merely arbitrary. The inferences which Fallmerayer draws from the geographical names are, as Zinkeisen and others have shown, no less precarious. But still, when his strong phrases are reduced to their precise value, the difference between him and his opponents as to the extent of the change which took place in this period does not seem to be very material. But then the effect of the subsequent wars and of the Albanian immigration remain to be taken into the account. Fallmerayer also insists on the disappearance of the old dialects of the language as an argument in favour of his hypothesis. Thiersch, however, is believed to have shown that the *Tæzakonia* dialect contains old Greek roots, which are peculiar to it. But a solitary exception rather confirms than invalidates the rule. On the other hand, a very candid and philosophical observer (Brandis, *Mittheilungen ueber Griechenland*, iii., p. 9)—who, however, admits that the great majority of the ancient population was extirpated in the seventh and eighth centuries—conceives that the modern Greek language exhibits a character irreconcilable with Fallmerayer's hypothesis of its origin. Another impartial and intelligent traveller, whose judgment carries with it all the weight that can be derived from an accurate knowledge of Greece, both as it was and as it is (Brandstedt, *Reisen in Griechenland*, Vorrede, p. xvi.), observes, "that the modern Greeks resemble their forefathers, the Hellenes, in their natural endowments, their failings, their form and physiognomy, much more clearly than could have been expected." It should not be forgotten that the primitive Hellenes are represented as bearing a very small proportion in point of numbers to the earlier population: though, on the other hand, there is reason to believe that the great mass of the Pelasgian tribes was much more nearly akin to them than any portion of the Slavonic race.

\* Philostrate, V. 8., ii., 7.

† Paus., viii., 36, 8.

The discussion of this subject would be altogether beyond the limits of this work, and the question has been alluded to only for the sake of one concluding remark.

We have lived to witness a memorable and happy coincidence. The prostration of Greece under the Turkish yoke was intimately connected with the revival of the study of Greek literature in the west of Europe. The opening of a new era for philology, even more important than that of the fifteenth century, one which has already added more to our knowledge of the old Grecian world than had been gained in the three preceding centuries, has been followed by the emancipation of the Greeks from their bondage, and was certainly not without its share in the preparation of that glorious event.\* The better the free Greeks become acquainted with the people from which they believe themselves sprung, the more unwilling they must be to part with the persuasion of

such an illustrious origin. But still, it is well that they should remember that their title to the sympathy of civilized Europe, and to the rich inheritance of their land and their language, does not rest on their descent, but has been earned by struggles and sacrifices of their own, equal to any recorded in history: struggles and sacrifices, however, in which their Albanian brethren, who make no pretensions to such a descent, bore their full share. And it might, perhaps, be a less burdensome, and yet equally animating consciousness of their relation to their great predecessors, if they were content to regard them, not as ancestors, whom they represent, and whom they may, therefore, be expected to resemble and emulate, but simply as departed benefactors, whose memory they are bound to cherish, while they enjoy their bequests, but not so as either to overlook their errors and faults, or to strain after the excellence of a mould which the power that formed it appears to have broken.

\* See Jacobs, *Verm. Schr.*, u. s., p. 120-150.

# APPENDIX

## TO THE SECOND VOLUME.

### I. ON THE ORDER OF THE OLYNTHIACS.

I AM not about to add another dissertation to the many which have been written on this perplexing subject, but only to direct the reader's attention to some questions connected with it which have not been noticed in the text. It will be observed that I have not only followed the order of Dionysius, but have assumed that each oration was delivered on the occasion of a fresh embassy from Olynthus. On this point, as well as on the other, opinions differ, and those who agree on the one question may take opposite sides on the other.

As to the occasion, it seems clear that Dionysius, when he wrote (ad Amm., c. 10) *μετὰ γὰρ ἀρχόντα Καλλιμαχόν, ὃν οὐ τὰς εἰς Ὀλυθὺν βοήθειας ἀνίστασαν Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ τὴν ἐκ Δημοσθένους*, meant that the succours described in the passages which he had just before cited from Philochorus were granted each time in compliance with the exhortations of Demosthenes, and that he conceived the speeches to correspond to three distinct stages of the war. Philochorus, on the contrary, in the argument to II. (I., D.), supposes that I. and II. were both delivered before any succours had been sent. This opinion has been adopted by A. Z. Becker, the author of several valuable works on Demosthenes, and by other modern critics. F. Jacobs, in his translation of Demosthenes (*Demosthenes Staatreden*, 3d ed., p. 159), goes a step farther, and contends that the case was the same with all three. His ground is the absence of all allusion, such as might have been expected on the contrary supposition in the last two orations, whichever they were, to succours already sent. It seems evident, indeed, that if this argument has any force, it must compel us to adopt the same conclusion with regard to all three. Now it may be difficult to explain how it happened, if an expedition had been not only decreed, but sent, that the orator should have made no mention of it, when he was urging the necessity of more active co-operation, and should have spoken as if nothing had been done. But, on the other hand, if such a decree had been passed, and had not been carried into execution, it is not much easier to account for his silence on this subject, when it might have seemed so natural as to be almost unavoidable, that in one, at least, of the subsequent speeches he should have reminded the people of the time that had elapsed since they had decreed an armament, which, even if it was not adequate to the emergency, might still have done some service. But the difficulty which strikes one as the greatest on this supposition is the extreme improbability that Demosthenes should have made three speeches between the first and second embassy of the Olynthians, while, on the occasion of the second embassy, when, according to Philochorus, their distress was much greater (*ἐλθούσων τῶ πολέμῳ*), and after the third, when the danger had become still more pressing, either he did not speak at all, or his speeches have not been preserved. This seems a sufficient reason for believing that one, at least, of the three was delivered on the occasion of one of the last two embassies; and it raises a strong presumption that, in some order or other, they correspond to the three epochs of the war described by Philochorus. This presumption appears to be confirmed when we consider their contents. Whatever may be imagined to have been the motive of delay which is supposed to have given rise to the second speech, nothing can easily be conceived less appropriate to the subject than that which is so placed in the oration of Dionysius. The second of the other order would indeed be much more suitable, if the cause of the delay was the fear which the Athenians entertained of Philip's power. But this supposition itself appears to me so extravagantly improbable, that the more plainly the speech, if delivered to hasten the sending of an expedition previously decreed, would imply such a state of public feeling, the less I could believe that it was destined for such a purpose. The Athenians, in their contest with Philip, were indeed often dilatory and remiss, and let slip many opportunities, but we have no reason to think that this was ever the effect of timidity. Their ordinary fault, we know, was one of the opposite kind. If they were not too much afraid of Philip to persevere in their war with him, it would be strange that their fears should have restrained them from supporting the

Olynthians, whom they had so long desired to draw over to their side.

The question as to the order of the speeches is, as we have observed, distinct from that of the occasion, yet not so as to be altogether independent of it. If all the three were delivered before the second Olynthian embassy, it may be presumed that the state of affairs abroad was not much changed between the first and the last; and that the orator had only to seek fresh arguments derived from the same circumstances, or to place the same facts in a new point of view. If this was the case, the last two speeches might be considered as supplementary to the first, which might contain the most forcible reasons and the most important suggestions. But if the three speeches were delivered on the occasions described by Philochorus, since the need and the danger were growing more and more pressing from the beginning to the end of the period, we naturally expect to find the orator's tone corresponding to the altered state of affairs. This is the view by which I have been determined in favour of the order of Dionysius.

Since the preceding part of this volume was sent to the press, I received a new work on the history of Philip, by Bruckner, entitled *Koenig Philipp und die Hellenischen Staaten*, Goettingen, 1837, which contains a great deal of good criticism. But the author has a remark on this subject, p. 312, which seems to me to place it in a false point of view. He observes that the first oration (III., D.) contains a general exhortation to succour the Olynthians, while in the second Philip's situation is discussed with a view to lessen the fear which he inspired. Now the supposition that this fear had caused a delay of the meditated expedition, since it involves the point in dispute, and is, as I have endeavoured to show, highly improbable in itself, must be dropped from the argument. But then the second speech (I., D.), so far as it contains an estimate of Philip's power—which is the subject of nearly the whole—is evidently of a more general nature, that is, less appropriate to any special occasion, than either of the two others. Such a review of the causes of Philip's greatness was at all times equally adapted to the purpose of rousing and encouraging the Athenians to more strenuous exertions. But it certainly suggested itself to the orator more naturally, when the contest begun by Olynthus had just opened a prospect of retrieving what had been lost through past negligence, than after this prospect had been overclouded, and the growing distress of the Olynthians threatened Athens herself with still more imminent danger. After either of the other orations, this would have formed an anti-climax, whatever may be thought of its object: whether it was designed to cheer the dejected spirits of the Athenians, or to warn them against supineness and procrastination.

It appears no less evident that the oration I. (III., D.) is that which represents the danger as most pressing, and most emphatically declares the safety of Athens herself to be involved in the event of the struggle. For instance, there is a sentence both in III. (II., D.) and in I. (III., D.), beginning with the words *Ὁ μὲν οὖν παρὼν καιρὸς, ὃ ἀνέστη Ἀθηναίοις*. The description of the present juncture which follows in the first passage is, *ἐπεὶ ποτὶ καὶ νῦν πολλὰς θρονοῦς καὶ βουλὰς εἶσαν*. The second proceeds with the words, *μονονοῦσι λέγουσιν φωνῇ ἀφελῇ, ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτόν ἔσθιν, ἐπεὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς σωτηρίαις αὐτῶν φέρονται*. This last was surely the critical, or the more alarming emergency. So, again, in both these orations there is mention of the danger which threatened Attica itself from Philip's arms. In the first it is thus noticed: *χαλεπὴ τῆς ἀποχρῆς . . . οὐδὲ τὸν φόβον μικρὸν ἔρω τὸν πᾶσι τούτῳ*. In the second, *νῦν ἀλγεῖς ἔσθιν οὖν, πότερον ὑμεῖς ἐκὶ χροῦ πολέμου, ἢ κατ' οὖν ἐκείνου*; and further, on the object of the proposed succours is described as being *ἀποθνήσκουσι τὸν πόλεμον*. It is difficult to understand how Jacobs could say of a speech which dwells on such a topic at such length and in such a strain, that it breathes a cheerful, confident spirit of joy and hope (*In dieser Rede weht ein frischer, muthiger Geist, hervorgegangen aus der Freude über das lang gewünschte Ereigniss, und besetzt von der frohen Hoffnung*, u. s. w., p. 165)—the alternative *ἢ μὲν ἀντίχρ' τῶ τῶν Ὀλυθίων, ἢ μὲν ἐκὶ πολέμου . . . ἢ δ' ἐκείνα φάσιντος λόγου, τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπὶ καλῶς ὁρῶ βα-*



stands on a commanding eminence over the river, has either communicated its name to the river, or derived its own from it. "One may easily perceive the connexion between it and the *Kerous* of Xenophon, and the *A* of Mahery is probably guttural."

C. Niebuhr, in the third volume of his travels, published 1837, speaks of this part of the coast as follows, p. 101: "From Scanderone to Pasis one sees nothing worthy of remark, except *Merkes*, a small castle on the mountain, and below by the seaside are here and there traces of ancient castles and other buildings. Some remains of an old wall in this quarter are called the *Pillars of Jonas*; and the Eastern Christians have a legend that it was here the prophet was vomited upon the dry land by the fish."

Mr. Kinneir (Journey, p. 138) also observes, in the description of his journey from Pias (Bayas, Pasis) to Scanderone, "At the ninth mile are the ruins of a castle, romantically situated at the foot of the mountains, which here approximate the sea, and near it, on a projecting point of land, the remains of a sort of obelisk, apparently ancient. At the twelfth mile a small but rapid river, with steep and high banks, answering the description given by Arrian of the *Pinarus*, and about half a mile farther, the fragments of masonry walls jutting into the sea." We see that the river which Mr. Kinneir takes for the *Pinarus* is that which Major Rennell believes to be Xenophon's *Kerous*. Mr. Kinneir himself, p. 146, believed Xenophon's *Kerous* to be the torrent which descends down the ravine at Balan. And he observes, p. 143, that D'Anville's opinion, which places the *Portus Syriæ* close to Pias, and on the road to Scanderone, appears to him quite erroneous, inasmuch as there is no defile or mountain to pass between *Ayas* and Scanderone, that he could perceive or hear of. "But," he proceeds, "to the south and east of the latter we have two defiles, which in my opinion are those alluded to under the designation of the *Gates of Syria* and *Straits of Amanus*. The first, on account of the ruinous and deserted state of the towns along the coast, is seldom or never in use, and leads over a range of hills immediately behind Scanderone. The other is called the *Pass of Balan*."

The objection here raised against D'Anville's opinion had, however, been met by Major Rennell—whose illustrations, published in 1810, Mr. Kinneir, perhaps, had not seen. In 1816, when his journey was published—in the following passage, p. 53:

"It may be proper in this place to add a word respecting Arrian's description of the strait which Alexander passed through about 70 years after Cyrus. His description is that of a narrow passage over hills; evidently not a defile, but that kind of ground which would compel an assailant to form a very straitened front for an attack. But the different sites alluded to by the two historians can hardly be a mile from each other, the ground being particularly described by Dr. Pococke, Mr. Drummond, and others; for within that distance, south of the River Mahery, the swampy plain is shut up by a narrow tract of hills, which has on the one hand an abrupt descent to the sea, and on the other the steep mountain of Amanus, which leaves only a narrow space, in the nature of a shelf, between its foot and the sea. And this must be conceived to be the pass intended by Arrian; for he describes the advanced guard of the army of Alexander to have taken possession of the pass on the evening before the battle of Issus, and who at daybreak began to descend from the hills, being confined to a very narrow front by reason of the straitness of the ground."

I take it for granted the reader is aware that, for the operations of Darius and Alexander before the battle, four passes are required, two maritime, through which the road led out of Cilicia into Syria along the coast, and two inland, which crossed the ridge of Mount Amanus, and of which the one lay to the north of the other. So far the ancients and moderns agree; but as to the position of these passes, the extracts already given show that there is room for considerable variance of opinions. The northern maritime pass, which is not mentioned by Xenophon, and not distinctly by Arrian, though Curtius, iii., 7, 7, marks it very clearly as lying between Mallus and Issus, would be the one best ascertained according to either of the views already stated as to the other. There could be no doubt, whether we adopt Major Rennell's opinion or Mr. Kinneir's, that the northern pass must be that of Kara Cape or Demir Kapu, which is mentioned by all travellers who have passed this road, and is described by Mr. Kinneir, p. 135. After leaving Kastania, which he takes to be the ancient Castabala, he says, "Thence we directed our course for the first three miles over a sort of table-land abounding in partridges, hares, and antelopes, when we entered a narrow valley, or rather defile, clothed with thick cypresswood and evergreens. At the eighth mile the rocks on either side approached each other, and we passed under an arch of an old gateway, built of black granite, and called Kara Cape, or the Black Gate. . . The pass expanded immediately when we had quitted the gate, and after a gentle descent of about a mile entered a narrow belt, having the Gulf of Scanderone

close on our right hand, and at the foot of the hills near the shore the ruined town of *Ayas*." Accordingly, Colonel Leake, in his map to his *Tour in Asia Minor*, identifies *Demir Kapu* with the *Pylæ Amanides* of Strabo, which he takes to be the northern maritime pass.

There is, however, a difficulty which must strike every one who inspects Colonel Leake's map, or reads Mr. Kinneir's account of his own journey, and this is to explain what Alexander was doing at Myriandrus if his object was to seek Darius in Syria; and this difficulty is particularly glaring according to Mr. Kinneir's hypothesis, that Darius crossed Amanus by the Pass of Balan, while Alexander lay at Myriandrus. It may perhaps be observed, that Alexander's motive might be, as Flathe suspects, to ensnare Darius, and that he continued his march along the coast in the hope that the enemy would cross the mountains. But this is evident from Arrian that, whatever his intentions or hopes may have been, he had not, when he came to Myriandrus, made any movement inconsistent with his professed design of marching by the nearest road to Sochi, which, according to Mr. Kinneir's hypothesis, would have been by Balan; and though Major Rennell and Colonel Leake were aware that it was not by this, but by a northern pass of Amanus that Darius entered Cilicia, their statements are exposed to the same objection.

This difficulty and some others would be removed if we adopt the hypothesis which has been very learnedly and acutely maintained by Mr. Williams, in his *Essay on the Geography of the Anabasis*. He conceives (p. 112) that the *Gates of Syria* and Cilicia were situate at the Pass of *Demir Kapu*; that this was the pass occupied by Alexander in the night before the battle; that this is one of the two passes mentioned by Cicero, the other being that by which Darius crossed the mountains; and that Mr. Kinneir, if he had been permitted to follow Alexander's route through Mallus, instead of taking the upper road by Mesias, would have found the field of battle about four miles to the southwest of the defile. Mr. Williams also assigns some reasons for believing that no road existed through the Pass of Balan in the time of Alexander; and he holds Pias to be the modern representative of Myriandrus, and refers to a map of Syria, published by Arrowsmith, constructed according to actual observations of Captain Corry, in which an opening in Mount Amanus, immediately to the east of Pias, is marked as the upper Amanian Pass, exactly according to Pococke's description.

It cannot be denied, that as this hypothesis would remove the above-mentioned difficulty as to Alexander's presence at Myriandrus—which, however, may be only an apparent one arising from our want of more exact information—so Mr. Kinneir's description of the *Demir Kapu* seems to answer better to that which Arrian gives of the pass occupied by Alexander in the night before the battle, and still more to Xenophon's of the *Gates of Syria* and Cilicia, than any which we find of the country between Balan and Scanderone. Mr. Williams, however, insisting strongly on Mr. Kinneir's assertion that there is no defile or mountain pass between *Ayas* and Scanderone, takes no notice of Major Rennell's observations on this subject. He observes (p. 136) that "a defile like that of *Demir* or *Kara Cape*, in the immediate neighbourhood of the sea, must sooner or later communicate with it." This, however, depends on the existence of a stream at the bottom, which Mr. Williams assumes, perhaps probably enough, but without any authority from Mr. Kinneir, whom one should have expected to mention it if he had seen one. Another point which Mr. Williams is obliged to assume is the existence of a maritime pass on the coast between *Demir* and *Kapu* and the site of Mallus. This, however, is not an argument against the hypothesis, but only a subject of curiosity, which might cause to perplex us if we were better acquainted with the features of this corner of the Mediterranean, making allowance for the changes which have taken place since the days of Alexander.

There is another difficulty, which is, it must be admitted, a real, though not a fatal objection. The position which Mr. Williams assigns to Myriandrus is at variance with the statements of Strabo and Ptolemy, who both mention it as south of Alexandria (Scanderone). Mr. Williams, however—who does not believe that this Alexandria was founded by Alexander—contends that Ptolemy's authority is neutralized as to Myriandrus, because he gives it a higher latitude than Alexandria.

On the whole, though of course much less confident than the author appears to feel about his own hypothesis, I am inclined to consider it as the most probable that has yet been proposed on the subject.

## II. On the Site of Ecbatana.

It is well known that Mr. Williams has devoted the first of his two *Essays on the Geography of Ancient Asia* to the purpose of proving that the site of the ancient capital of Media is occupied, not, as most scholars have believed, by

Hamadan, but by Isfahan. It cannot be supposed that a person of his learning and acuteness should have failed to give a specious aspect to his hypothesis, or, rather, that he should have been so firmly convinced of its truth as he seems to be, without some plausible reasons; and, in fact, he has shown that it tallies very happily with the account given by Diodorus (xix., 19) of the march of Antigonos from the neighbourhood of Susa to Ecbatana, and with the time assigned by Diodorus (xix., 46) for the march of Antigonos from Ecbatana to Persepolis. I do not say that these are the only arguments which give a colour to this hypothesis, but they seem to me the strongest. Those which are drawn from the marches of Alexander fail, I think, altogether; nor does Mr. Williams appear to me to have been more successful in his attempts to get rid of the testimonies of the ancients which make against him, while he passes in total silence over some of the evidence in favour of Hamadan, which he would probably have found it most difficult to meet.

This silence—as was observed by a writer, evidently conversant with the subject, who reviewed his *Essays* in the Quarterly Journal of Education, No. IV.—is the more remarkable, because the evidence appears on the face of the map which accompanies the *Essays*, when taken together with the information afforded by modern travellers, with which Mr. Williams was undoubtedly well acquainted. Isidore of Charax, in his Itinerary, entitled *Στοιχέον Ἰσλαρῶν*, mentions a city, *Κορυκοπέη*, where was a temple of Artemis, in Upper Media, nineteen *stadii* from Apobatana. That Isidore's Apobatana is Ecbatana, appears clearly from his description, and is not disputed by Mr. Williams. But in his map, on the road from Kermanshah to Hamadan, appears a place there spelled Kungawur; and when we know that this place, which is about forty-five miles from Hamadan, contains the ruins of a magnificent building (described by Ker Porter, *Travels*, ii., p. 141), it seems impossible to doubt its identity with Isidore's Conobar. There is, moreover, a high degree of probability, if not approaching quite so near to certainty, that Besittoon, thirty-two miles to the southwest of Kungawur, on the same line of road, with a high, perpendicular rock artificially smoothed, and exhibiting sculptures that appear to be of the same age and character as those of Persepolis (see Kinneir, *Memoir*, p. 131, 137; and Ker Porter, ii., p. 150, foll.), represents Isidore's Bapatana, which stood on a mountain where was a statue of Semiramis and a pillar, though this may not be the pillar which Olivier saw.

I am not so clearly satisfied that Besittoon is likewise, as Mr. Kinneir and others have supposed, the Mount Bagistanum of Diodorus, ii., 12, at the foot of which, in a plain, Semiramis laid out her park or garden of twelve *stadia* in circumference, watered by a great fountain, though at the foot of the rock at Besittoon there bursts, as Ker Porter says, a beautifully clear stream. Notwithstanding this coincidence, his description of the Vale of Besittoon does not seem well adapted to the garden of Semiramis. It was waste and stony, a dreary contrast to the luxuriant valley of Kangavar; and at Besittoon itself, all he can say is, that "nature did not look quite so sterile." The description of Diodorus seems to correspond much better to the mountain of Taeki-i-Bostan (Kinneir's Taqi Bostan), the Throne of the Garden: a part of the range of Besittoon, and only five hours' ride to the southwest, nearly opposite to Kermanshah, at five or six miles' distance. This mountain, which is, it seems, still more richly adorned with sculptures, is described by Ker Porter (ii., p. 169) as lowering over the blooming Vale of Kermanshah. "At the base of this sombre mountain," he says, "bursts forth the most exquisitely pellucid stream that I ever beheld, and to this sparkling fountain the natives have given the name of Shirens. Its bed is rather on a declivity, which gives a rapidity to its current that increases the brilliancy of its waters as they dash along, spreading verdure on every side, and bathing the pendant branches of variously foliated trees which grow on its banks." Here was a spot which Semiramis might well choose for a garden. Von Hammer observes (*Wien. Jahrb.*, vii., p. 267), that in the Persian and Turkish legends, Shahrin (Shirens) has everywhere taken the place of Semiramis. Ker Porter, indeed, conjectures that the name Besittoon (which signifies *without pillars*), and is satisfactorily explained by Kinneir, as alluding to the overhanging canopy of rock) is "a local corruption of Bagistan, the place of the garden." This conjecture, every one must see, is utterly untenable. But that *bagh*, garden, is the root of the name Bagistanum, is exceedingly probable; and then the modern appellation of the mountain, Taeki-i-Bostan, answers very closely to the ancient one.

But to return from this little digression, which is nevertheless not wholly irrelevant. The proofs derived from such coincidences between the line of road described by Isidore, and that between Kermanshah and Hamadan, are of a quality so much stronger than any of those which Mr. Williams—who, as he appeals to the authority of Isidore, was bound to notice them—has deduced from measurement of

distances, according to data which are, after all, liable to a suspicion of error, that it may seem almost superfluous to enter any farther into the subject. Still, as Mr. Williams has drawn several of his arguments from Alexander's marches, I am tempted to make a few remarks on some other points in his *Essay*. Indeed, the question whether, after the battle of Arbela, Darius spent the winter on the site of Hamadan or of Isfahan, is one on which it would be rather painful to remain undecided, and which deserves to be distinctly considered.

Mr. Williams, p. 24, endeavours to ascertain the time employed by Alexander in his march from Persepolis to Ecbatana. He admits that it is impossible to draw any conclusion as to this point from the account of Arrian alone, because in that account there are two omissions: one of the place from which Arrian reckons as the starting-point, when he says (iii., 19), that Alexander arrived in Media on the twelfth day; the other of the time that had elapsed between his entering Media and his finding himself within three days' march from Ecbatana. But "Quintus Curtius," says Mr. Williams, "enables us to correct the first omission satisfactorily; for he states that an expedition against the mountaineers was finished in thirty days, after which Alexander returned to Persepolis, and commenced his journey into Media." But this correction turns upon a supposition which is merely gratuitous: that the expedition against the Mardi, mentioned by Curtius, v., 6, was the same as that against the Parastace spoken of by Arrian, iii., 19, who clearly supposes it to have been included, as a digression of unknown duration, in the march to Ecbatana. The territory, therefore, at that time occupied by the Parastace, must have been situate between Persia Proper and Media; but it is by no means certain that the seats of the Mardi lay north of Persepolis. Droysen places them in the mountains nearer to the Persian Gulf. Whether this be correct or not, it is clear that Mr. Williams has here made a groundless assumption, and that there is as little remedy for the first as for the second omission, as to which he merely observes, "it is not probable that it was more than one day, otherwise Arrian would have mentioned it." And on such premises he builds the conclusion that Alexander's march from Persepolis to Ecbatana occupied sixteen days. This, he thinks, is not more than the time which would have been necessary for Alexander, though he marched unencumbered, and increased his rapidity during the last four days, to reach the neighbourhood of Ecbatana.

Let us, however, compare the account of one of Timur's marches, given by an author with whose accuracy Mr. Williams professes (p. 19) that he has many reasons to be satisfied. Cherefeddin begins the 27th chapter of his third book with the following description of his hero's march from Shiraz towards Isfahan: "Timour partit de Chiraz le vingt sept de Jumazulakher, l'an 795 (18th June, 1403). Il prit la route d'Isfahan toujours en chassant, et depeuplant les campagnes de gibrier, qui ordinairement y set en abondance. Il campa a Coucha apres douze jours de marche." Coucha, or Komesha, which Petit de la Croix erroneously describes as *village pris d'Isfahan*, is forty miles south of Isfahan (Morier, *Journey*, p. 156-160). On the other hand, Shiraz is thirty miles south of Persepolis (Kinneir, p. 76); so that Timur's march was ten miles shorter than Alexander's. It appears, however, from the description, to have been very much less rapid. Mr. Williams assumes (again gratuitously) that Alexander's march was retarded by the winter. Even if that was the case, we might fairly suppose that his rate of marching compensated for this disadvantage, and that he could very well have traversed the distance between Persepolis and Isfahan in twelve days.

And here a question might be raised, whether it is credible that Alexander should have remained four months so near to Ecbatana without making any attempt to disturb Darius, even if he did not, during that time, make an expedition, as Mr. Williams supposes, towards the north; and, on the other hand, whether it is probable that Darius should have taken up his residence after the battle so near to Persepolis. This consideration might perhaps be fairly opposed to another, which impressed Mr. Williams "with a conviction, depending on moral grounds as strong as if grounded on scientific deductions, that had Hamadan been Ecbatana, Alexander would never have approached it, but by a cross-road have gained at least two days' march upon the royal fugitive," p. 27. This consideration was, that Alexander, when three days' march distant from Ecbatana, heard of the escape of Darius five days before in the direction of the Caspian Gates. But it may be doubted whether Alexander's character is so inconsistent with the route which he is generally believed to have taken as Mr. Williams supposes. It must be remembered that the cross-road would have traversed a part of the Great Salt Desert: that Alexander could not have known the exact direction of the march of Darius, who had the choice either of crossing the chain of Elburz to the shores of the Caspian, or of skirting the northern edge of the desert: that he might wish to fall into the road where he would be sure of tracking the fugitive; and,



a fine, that we cannot pretend to know all the reasons which might render it advisable for him to pass through Ecbatana. According to the common opinion, indeed, as the route by which he pursued Darius, it would follow, on Mr. Williams's reasoning, that he did not pass through Rhage; or, rather, if Rhage lay where it is commonly placed, that is, about fifty miles north of the Caspian Gates—since Alexander certainly halted there in his pursuit of Darius—it would be quite evident that Ecbatana was not Isfahan. If this Mr. Williams is fully aware; but he has been lucky enough to find a passage where Strabo, quoting Apollodorus of Artemis, mentions Aracica, which was built near Rhage, and originally called Rhageia, as 500 stadia to the south of the Caspian Gates. Mr. Williams is bold as well as lucky; for, though he does not touch on this point in his essay, he has ventured, in the little map which accompanies his Life of Alexander, to lay down a Rhage between Is Ecbatana and the Caspian Gates; and in the text (p. 30) he coolly observes of Alexander's march, "In eleven days he reached Rhage, placed by Strabo about thirty miles south of the Caspian Gates, and, consequently, not to be commended with the Arabian Ray, more than fifty miles to the northward of them." It was, indeed, a question of life or death to the hypothesis; and parental affection frequently inspires unwonted courage. An unbiased critic would certainly have hesitated on such authority to assume the existence of a second Rhage, otherwise utterly unknown: he would have thought it easier and safer to suppose a mistake in Strabo or his author: he would have doubted whether, as the northern Rhage was at least the more notorious, anybody would have thought of mentioning the other without some mark to distinguish it; and he would not have elected to compare another passage, in which Strabo speaks of the same Rhage, also quoting Apollodorus as to a distance from the Caspian Gates. There (xi., p. 435, Tauch.), describing the extent of Parthia, he says that it included the country as far as the Caspian Gates and Rhage, and the Tapyriani, which formerly belonged to Media *ἡ δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν Κασπίων καὶ τῶν Περσῶν, ὅσα τῆς Μηδίας τέρματα*. Can any one who knows the situation of the Tapyriani doubt whether this Rhage was north or south of the Caspian Gates?

The journey of Tobias from the Tigris through Ecbatana to Rhage, coinciding with the line of Isidore's Itinerary, might also have seemed very difficult to reconcile with the situation of either Rhage, if Ecbatana was Isfahan. But Mr. Williams may perhaps dispose of this objection by an expedient, which we must consider among some others, with which he meets certain testimonies of the ancients as to the site of Ecbatana, which he acknowledges (p. 10) are more favourable to the established theory than to his own.

Before I proceed to notice them, I will just observe that Mr. Williams has very dexterously contrived to extract evidence in favour of his hypothesis from a passage of Ammianus Marcellinus, which, when examined by an advocate on the other side, would appear to be directly opposed to it. Ammianus, xiii., c. 39, describes Ecbatana as *sub Jasomio monte in terra sita Syromedorum*. One would have thought that in this description the situation of the *Mont Jasomius* was more likely to throw light upon that of Ecbatana than the territory of the Syro-Medians, the precise extent of which, according to the ideas of Ammianus, it might be difficult to ascertain. Now Strabo, xi., p. 454, Tauch., describes Mount Jasomius as a great mountain above the Caspian Gates on the left hand (*ὅρος μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν Κασπίαν ὕλην ἐν Ἀρσίρπῳ, καλούμενον Ἰασμόν*). The name itself sufficiently proves that it was in the north of Media. Mr. Williams, notwithstanding, numbers Ammianus among the authorities which favour his hypothesis, because "Ptolemy expressly asserts that Syro-Media was the southern district of Media, running parallel with Persia." Now this reference to Ptolemy is a specimen of the almost uniform accuracy with which Mr. Williams quotes the ancient authors, whenever a literal translation of their language would support his argument. Ptolemy, who just before describes the position of Mount Jasomius, in perfect accordance with Strabo, as near to the district of Rhage (*ἡ γὰρ ἐστὶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄρων τῶν Ἰασμίων ὅρος δὲ τὸ Οὐδῶσι καὶ ἡ Δαρδανία χερσὶς*), concludes his account of Media with the words *καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Περσίδα ἡ Συρομέδια*. His Mr. Williams calls expressly asserting that Syro-Media was the southern district of Media. Ptolemy here says no more of Syro-Media than he might have said of Media: here is not a word to mark the northern limits of the country he mentions. His observation, therefore, can throw no light whatever on the language of Ammianus. Nor was any wanted, since the Mount Jasomius sufficiently marked the position of Ecbatana.

This, however, is by no means the most remarkable instance of the inaccuracy I have mentioned. One was noted by the Reviewer in the Quarterly Journal of Education, who justly complains that Mr. Williams, for the sake of his argument, has mistranslated Strabo, xvii., 744, *Καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸν ἰσθμὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἑσπέρην*. As I have as-

serted that this inaccuracy is almost uniform when it happens to be convenient, I am bound to point out other instances.

Mr. Williams wishes to prove that the mutiny which, according to Arrian, broke out at Opis, really happened, as Diodorus relates, at Susa; and he endeavours to show that this appears from the words which Arrian himself cites, 10, *ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ βασιλέως τὴν ἐκ τῆς Σούσης*. Mr. Williams, p. 32, translates as follows: "Go, and announce that after Alexander, your king . . . had been safely conducted by you to Susa, you there deserted him." Mr. Williams prints the word *there* in Italics, but, I am afraid, not for the same purpose that words are so printed in our translation of the Bible; for on this word *there* the whole of his argument depends, and yet there is nothing answering to it in Arrian's text, who simply says *ἐπὶ τῆς Σούσης ἐκείνης*, *ἐκείνης* *ἐκείνης*. The reason why Susa, and not Opis, is here mentioned, is evident enough from the context; and the introduction of *ἐκείνης* in the original would have implied a falsehood, namely, that his soldiers had been on the point of leaving him on his first return to Susa.

Mr. Williams concludes his Essay with an "attempt to account for the errors that have partially prevailed on this subject for the last two thousand years," "and it grieves" him "to begin with Polybius." This sensibility is, however, a little misplaced: it might have been spared if he had not himself done Polybius a wrong. He translates a passage of a fragment of the tenth book of Polybius as follows: "Media is encircled with Grecian cities after the plan of Alexander, in order to guard it against the neighbouring barbarians, with the exception of Ecbatana. It (should be *this city*, *αὕτη*) is placed in the northern parts of Asia (a misprint, probably, for Media), but it lies near (or overhangs) those parts of Asia which are round Meotis and the Euxine." And he then proceeds to observe, that "if this passage be not deplorably corrupted, it proves that Polybius must have been totally ignorant of the geography of Upper Asia, for on no supposed latitude of construction can it be allowed that the Ecbatana, even of Ptolemy was placed near, or overhanging, the districts round the Meotis and the Euxine." The phrase which Mr. Williams translates *lies near, or overhangs*, is *ἐκκρέμαται*; but he seems to have overlooked the meaning of Polybius, which, if Ecbatana lay in the northwest of Media, is neither unintelligible nor absurd. Having mentioned the Greek cities which had been planted round Media by Alexander's direction on account of the neighbouring barbarians, he distinguishes Ecbatana as the ancient capital (*βασιλεὺς ἔξ ἀρχῆς Μηδῶν*), but describes it with reference to the same political object which he had noticed in the case of the Greek cities. It lay in the north of Media, and was opposed to the invasions of the barbarians from the side of the Meotis and the Euxine. This I believe to be the meaning of *ἐκκρέμαται*. Polybius may have been thinking of the ancient eruption of the Scythians; but, at all events, the word does not necessarily imply any close vicinity.

Mr. Williams proceeds to observe: "That it is either a corruption of the text or a mistake of the author, is evident from the subsequent history compared with the map." Now what is this history? According to Mr. Williams, it is this, which he means for a translation of Polybius: "Arasaces expected that Antiochus would have reached Ecbatana, but that he would not dare, at the head of so large an army, to advance through the desert which bordered upon it." Now Isfahan does lie comparatively near to the Great Desert: Hamadan is at a great distance from it. It cannot, therefore, stand on the site of Ecbatana. Such is the reasoning which Mr. Williams builds on this passage, and very fair it would have been, if Polybius had indeed mentioned Ecbatana; but he has not done so. In c. 94 he describes Media in general, and makes a little digression to notice the splendour of Ecbatana, and thence proceeds, c. 95, *Ἐκ τῆς δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὡς τῶν ἄλλων ἀπὸ τῆς ἑσπέρης*. This Mr. Williams translates, "Arasaces expected that he would have reached Ecbatana."

Strabo's turn comes next. Mr. Williams doubts whether he was acquainted with the true position of Ecbatana or not. Here, for instance, is a passage which will suit Isfahan: "Media, for the most part, is high and cold; such are the mountains to the east of Ecbatana, the mountains near Rhage and the Caspian Gates, and thence to Matiana and Armenia." Mr. Williams observes that "this arrangement, commencing to the east, circling round to the north as far as the Caspian Gates, then trending westward to Matiana and Armenia, will suit Isfahan, and no other place;" for "as to the existence of a range of hills (which of course must be high and cold) running southward from the Caspian Gates, skirting the east (west!) of the Great Desert, and joining that part of Mount Zagros which separates Media from Persia, it was never doubted but by the shallow and blundering Pinkerton." Let us then turn from this shallow blunder to the Greek text, which describes these *mountains to the east of Ecbatana*, and we shall find that the words which Mr. Williams so translates are *τὰ βουνὰ καὶ τὰ ὄρη τῶν Ἐκβατανίων ὅρα*: the mountains which lie

above Ecbatana, that is, to the north of it, as Mount Jaspian lay above the Caspian Gates.

But there are other passages in Strabo which might lead us to look for Ecbatana in a very different quarter from Isaphan. For instance, Mount Abos, a part of Taurus, which contains the sources of the Euphrates and the Araxes, is said (xi., p. 464, Tauch.) to be near the road leading to Ecbatana. Again, Strabo (xvi., p. 342, Tauch.) cites Polykleitos, who said that the highest mountains were in the northern parts above Ecbatana (here, therefore, it seems, above does not signify to the east). Mr. Williams candidly owns that "these two passages clearly indicate that there must have been an Ecbatana somewhere in the vicinity of these mountains," and then he proceeds to unfold one of the main causes "of the errors that have prevailed on this subject for the last two thousand years."

"The geographers describe three cities of the name of Ecbatana, the Median, the Persian, and the Syrian." To this list Mr. Williams adds another, "an Ecbatana between the Tigris and the mountains to the east, in the vicinity of the Cappas." This is that Ecbatana which Plutarch mentions (Alex., 35) as a place in Babylonia where there was a spring of fire, and Mr. Williams believes that it is the same which Ammianus meant (xxii., 6, 32) when he numbered Ecbatana with Ninus, Arbela, and Gaugamela, among the cities of Adiabene; and he makes use of the same hypothesis to explain a passage of Strabo (ii., p. 126, Tauch.), which had been thought to show that Eratosthenes placed Ecbatana nearly in the same latitude with Arbela and the Caspian Gates. Happily, it is not necessary for our present argument to discuss the passages of Ammianus and Strabo, nor even to inquire how Plutarch's description of the Babylonian Ecbatana is to be reconciled with the other two, if they all refer to the same place. It is sufficient for our purpose to observe—that nothing but the enthusiasm which a beloved hypothesis inspires could have caused Mr. Williams to overlook—that even if his interpretation of Ammianus and Strabo were admitted to be correct, it would not in the least affect the conclusion which would otherwise flow from the two passages of Strabo, which, as he himself admits, clearly indicate that there must have been an Ecbatana somewhere in the vicinity of the northern mountains. The question seems to be simply this, whether, when Ecbatana is mentioned by itself, without any distinguishing epithet or mark, any other than the famous capital of Media can be meant? Could Polykleitos, or the author whom he followed, if he was himself ignorant of the subject he treated of, have described the high mountains in the north by a reference to Ecbatana, meaning a place which very few of his readers had ever heard of, and which they would be sure to confound with another, one of the most celebrated cities of Asia, and in a totally different position?

There are other points in Mr. Williams's argument perhaps equally vulnerable. His remarks on the situation of the Nisæan Plain appear to me extremely sophistical; and it would not be difficult to show that Strabo's description of the *Ἀσπυρὶ ἱερῶν* (xi., p. 453, Tauch.), compared with Diodorus (xvii., 110) and Arrian (vii., 13), clearly prove that the Nisæan Plain which Alexander viewed on his way to Ecbatana lay near the road to Hamadan. But if what has been said is not sufficient to prove that Ecbatana was not Isaphan, I should despair of showing where it is to be found.

### III. The Persian Gates.

As it can hardly be doubted that the road by which Alexander marched from Susa to Persepolis was that which is so minutely described by Cherefeddin, iii., 24, it has naturally been supposed that the Persian Gates were the Kelah-i-Sefid which arrested Timour's progress. So Droyen and Mr. Williams, who entertains his readers with a description of this celebrated hill-fortress from Cherefeddin and Kinneir. (Mr. Williams is mistaken about the meaning of the name. It does not mean the *Castle of the Demons*, but the *White Castle*, though it was also called Kelah-i-Dive-Sefid, the Castle of the White Demon, in allusion to a legend of a combat between this Demon and Rustam.) There is, however, a difficulty about the exact position of the Gates, which does not seem to have been sufficiently noticed, or at all explained: yet it must strike every one who attends to the descriptions of the Kelah-i-Sefid, given by Cherefeddin and Kinneir, and compares them with Arrian's account of Alexander's attack on the Persian Gates. I will transcribe a few sentences from the later authors. Cherefeddin says, *Cette place est située sur le sommet d'une montagne fort escarpée, où il n'y avait pour monter qu'un petit chemin glissant et difficile. Au sommet de cette montagne il y a une belle plaine, égale et unie par tout, qui a plus d'une lieue de longueur et autant de largeur. L'on y voit couler de tous côtés des ruisseaux et des fontaines, on y voit des arbres fruitiers, et des terres cultivées remplies de toutes sortes de bêtes et d'oiseaux. Le chemin qui conduit au haut de la montagne est pratiqué en sorte qu'en quelque endroit, que trois hommes se veulent tenir fermes, ils peu-*

vent en arrêter cent mille, et les empêcher d'y monter. . . . Le rapport de ces champs cultivés est suffisant pour la nourriture des habitants, et un grand nombre de troupeaux, de bestiaux, et de gibier y trouvent de quoi paître et se nourrir. Mr. Kinneir's description (Memoir, p. 73) of the Kelah Sufeed perfectly agrees with Cherefeddin's; but he adds, "A deep and romantic glen, overtopped by high and barren rocks, and about three miles and a half in length, separates this fortress from the Kotuli Suceab (Von Hammer conjectures Sohrab), one of the longest and most difficult passes I have seen in Persia. It was in many parts so steep and so slippery that we were under the necessity of unloading the mules and dragging the baggage up the sides of the precipices. The mountain is covered with wood, and a thick forest extends for eight fursangs on the S.E. side. This is, without doubt, the pass mentioned by Arrian and other writers under the appellation of the Persian Straits."

If, then, the Kotuli is the pass defended by Anabazanes, what use did he make of the Kelah-i-Sefid? How has it happened that Arrian's authors made no mention of the peculiar features of this remarkable fortress? How did Alexander's victory at the Pass put him in possession of this place, which assuredly he did not leave in the enemy's hands? I am unable to answer these questions, and merely throw them out to promote farther inquiry. I observe that Mr. Long, in his Map of Ancient Persia, intimates a doubt as to the position of the Fyls Persica.

This place suggests another remark. I have called the Araxes of Persepolis the modern Bendemir. I did not know there was a doubt as to this point till I saw the following remark in a popular work of, I believe, a learned author (Secret Societies of the Middle Ages, in the Library of Entertaining Knowledge, p. 135): "*Asad-ud-dowlah* had a dike constructed across the River Kur, near the ruins of Persepolis. It was called the Bund-Amser (Prince's Dike), and travellers ignorant of the Persian language have given this name to the river itself. We must not, therefore, be surprised to find in Lalla Rookh a lady singing

'There's a bower of roses by Bendamser's stream;'

and asking,

'Do the roses still bloom by the calm Bendamser?'

Calm and still, beyond doubt, is the Bendamser."

Never was ridicule more unfortunately applied. Von Hammer, whose knowledge of Persian the author of this remark certainly would not question, calls the river the Bend Emir, at the same time that he explains the meaning of the name. "The greatest," he observes (Wien. Jahrb., viii., p. 311), "of all the rivers of Fars is the Kur, exactly coinciding in name with the Kur of Northern Persia, but for distinction's sake also called Bend Emir, the Prince's Dike." What, in fact, could be more natural than to designate the river by the name of this remarkable object? So, as Baber informs us, the river of Samarcand was called the Kokih, from a hillock near that city. I will add Von Hammer's remark, that the Greeks called the river of Persepolis the Araxes, that of Paesargada the Cyrus, which flowed into the Persian Gulf. Hence he concludes that Paesargada lay to the southeast of Persepolis.

### IV. The Sogdian Rock and the Fortress of Chorienes.

Mr. Williams (Life of Alexander, p. 336) finds a difficulty in conceiving that a Bactrian chief could have anything to do with Sogdiana, or should have looked for a refuge beyond the Oxus, when the Paropamisus, with its summits and recesses, presented a natural retreat for the insurgent natives. He is, therefore, strongly inclined to believe that the rock where Roxana was captured was not in Sogdiana, but in Bactria, where Strabo places it (xi., p. 440, Tauch.), that is, the rock of Sysmithres. "If, therefore," he concludes, "it was in Bactria, there can be no doubt that it was the same hill-fortress which was captured by Timour previous to his expedition into India, and the description of which answers exactly to the Rock of Oxyartes. According to the tradition of the natives, it had been besieged in vain by the great Iskander."

The difficulty which Mr. Williams here raises seems exceedingly slight; for surely it was natural enough that Oxyartes should commit his family to the protection of an ally in a remarkably strong fortress, though it happened to be north of the Oxus. But his conjecture as to its position, if it was in Bactria, about which he thinks there can be no doubt, is extravagantly improbable. The hill-fortress he alludes to is no other than that of Ketuar or Kettore, described by Cherefeddin, iv., 3. A glance at the map, and at Cherefeddin's account of the manner in which Timour penetrated to it, should suffice to satisfy every one that this could not be the rock where Roxana was captured, the description of which answers to it no more than must be the case with any two hill-fortresses.

Mr. Williams also thinks that the Margina of Curtius, vii., 10, is Margiana, and his Ochus the Tedjen, and that, "as we find the Parace and the Mardi continually confounded with each other, it may fairly be inferred that the

Paratace in the vicinity of Bactria (Arrian, iv., 21) were the Mardi of Margiana." Hence he is led to conjecture that the fortress of Chorienes is Nadir Shah's favourite stronghold, the modern Kelat.

I have only to remark, that, whatever may be thought of the expedition to Margiana, this conjecture is utterly untenable. Whoever has read the description of Kelat in Fraser's *Khorasan*, Appendix, p. [58], foll., which may be

compared with Charefeddin, ii., 37, knows that it is a valley closely resembling the Grande Chartreuse. No description can be less applicable to the Rock of Chorienes.

It may, perhaps, just deserve to be noticed, that Marghi-  
naa (Fraser, Appendix, p. 126) is the chief city of Ferghana, and that, according to Waddington's map to Baber, it lies to the northeast of the Ak-su.



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